The Politics of Nfd Secession, 1960–63
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chapter 2 The Politics of nfd Secession, 1960–63 The political struggle for nfd secession began in 1960, when Kenya was for- mally set on the road to independence at the Kenya Constitutional Conference, which was held at Lancaster House in London.1 During the same year, British and Italian Somaliland were granted independence as the Somali Republic, and subsequently adopted a constitution that committed itself to the union of all Somali inhabited territories.2 In northern Kenya, the pc advised the colo- nial government in Nairobi that it was “inevitable” that a movement for nfd integration within “Greater Somalia” would develop.3 The development of a secessionist movement in the nfd may have seemed inevitable to those working on the frontier in the early stages of the Kenyan independence process, but the exact nature of the demand, or whether it would be successful was far from certain. A review of British policy on the nfd between 1960 and 1963 reveals a number of different opinions. These range from outright rejection of any potential secession of Kenyan territory, to those that considered secession to be the “only logical and just solution.”4 There was talk of giving the nfd regional autonomy, in order to isolate it from the rest of the colony, and government lawyers explored the possibility of giving Somalis living in the nfd dual nationality, or of allowing nfd Somalis to reside in Kenya with Somali nationality.5 Both of the last two options, it was argued, would encourage nfd Somalis to remain within Kenya without feeling “cut- off” from the Somali Republic.6 There was also a range of opinions about what secession might look like within the nfd. Some people demanded outright secession and unity with the 1 The conference was held during January and February. See Berman, Control and Crisis, 406. 2 Adar, Kenyan Foreign Policy, 85. 3 United Kingdom National Archives, London (NA), fco 141/6840, pc Northern Province to Office of the Chief Secretary, Nairobi, Reference NP.25/8/24, 16 June 1960. 4 na, fco 141/6840, Memorandum on the future of the Northern Province, Reference AA.61.11. IA, 5 October 1960; co 822/3030, Eric Griffith-Jones to Malcolm MacDonald, Cipher 413, 15 July 1963. 5 na, fco 141/6840, Memorandum on the future of the Northern Province, Reference AA.61/11/ IA-25, 14 October 1960. na, fco 141/6840, Deputy Chief Secretary to Solicitor General, Nairobi, Reference AA61/11/IA-35, 28 October 1960. 6 na, fco 141/6840, Deputy Chief Secretary to Solicitor General, Nairobi, Reference AA61/11/ IA-35, 28 October 1960. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004283084_003 <UN> The Politics Of Nfd Secession, 1960–63 25 Somali Republic.7 Others advocated for the creation of a special regime in the nfd, which would initially be under British administration, but that would eventually lead to secession.8 Still others envisioned the division of the nfd between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic.9 Under this last formulation, the western Boran inhabited districts of the nfd would join Ethiopia, and the east- ern Somali inhabited districts would go to the Somali Republic. There were also those that wanted to remain within Kenya, albeit with some form of regional autonomy.10 Of all the possible options for the future status of the nfd area, only full integration or regional autonomy within Kenya was ever acceptable to the two major nationalist Kenyan political parties. Throughout the negotiations that led to Kenyan independence, neither the Kenya African Democratic Union (kadu) nor the Kenya African National Union (kanu) were willing to negoti- ate the territorial integrity of the state. They may have been divided on the future shape and form of governance in Kenya – and debates about the nfd implicated negotiations over majimboism (regionalism)11 – but they were united on the sanctity of Kenya’s colonial borders.12 This was an attitude that was reflected by nationalist leaders from across much of the continent. They had witnessed the violent partition of India in 1947, and Congo’s descent into civil war when it gained independence in 1960. They were therefore well aware of the violent potential that territorial revisionism at independence could entail. As such, when the Organization of African Unity (oau) was founded on 7 kna, BB/1/98, npppp Garissa Branch to pc Northern Province, 27 August 1961; na, co 822/2004, Constitutional Proposals for the Somali Districts of the Northern Frontier Province of Kenya, Memorandum submitted on 23 March 1962. 8 na, co 822/2004, Patrick Renison to Eric Griffith-Jones, 3 March 1962; co 822/2004, United Ogaden Somali Association to Colonial Secretary, 18 February 1963. 9 na, fco 141/7127, nppnu, npua, and Boran Welfare Association to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 November 1961. 10 na, fco 141/6840, nfd Political Parties, Loose Minute I&S 134/105/01(S), 1 September 1961. 11 Larger ethnic groups such as the Kikuyu and Luo wanted a centralized unitary govern- ment under kanu, while smaller Mijikenda, Luhya, Maasai, Samburu, and Kalenjin eth- nic groups, as well as Asian and European politicians united kadu, and sought a federal constitution that would protect the rights of ethnic minorities by dividing the new nation into seven autonomous regions. For a short history of majimboism see David Anderson, “Majimboism: the Troubled History of an Idea,” in Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya since 1950, eds., Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman and Leigh Gardner (London: Transaction Publishers, 2010): 23–52. 12 na, fco 141/7135, Governor of Kenya to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, Reference, AA.61/11/1A, 24 October 1960; Guy Arnold, Kenyatta and the Politics of Kenya (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1974); Branch, Kenya, 30. <UN>.