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1114 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 5, MAY 2014 An Efficient Offline Delegation Protocol in Mobile RFID Environment Jia-Ning Luo Ming Chuan University, Information & Telecommunications Engineering, Taoyuan County, Taiwan 333 Email: [email protected] Ming-Hour Yang* Chung Yuan Christian University, Information & Computer Engineering, Taoyuan County, Taiwan 320 *Corresponding Author, Email: [email protected] Abstract—In this paper, we propose a new protocol to allow reader, and the delegated reader is allowed to access a delegation transfer between offline mobile readers in the specific tag in the future even in an offline environment mobile RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) environment. [10] [14] [16]. A mobile reader can grant the access rights of a specific tag Fouladgar et al. [5] propose an online delegation and to another reader. Besides, our protocol is efficient and ownership transfer protocol. Lee et al.’s scheme [9] uses secure against most current network threats, such as replay attacks, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, denial of timestamps to manage authorization, but in Lee’s protocol, service (DoS) attacks caused by asynchronous update, if one user updates a tag’s timestamp, others will have to guessing attacks, and counterfeit tags. It also guarantees use the new timestamp to access the tag. When a tag forward/backward secrecy, data privacy, and location reaches its maximum timestamp update times, all the privacy. delegated readers have to connect to their back-end server for new delegation. Yang [15] also proposes an offline Index Terms—Mobile RFID; Offline Delegation; Delegation delegation protocol that stores an access control list (ACL) Transfer on a tag to limit a reader’s access right. He also deploys timestamps in his offline delegation scheme. His back-end I. INTRODUCTION server can delegate the access right to a tag, but the access right cannot be transferred from one reader to another. Radio frequency identification (RFID) has been widely For these reasons, we propose a new scheme to perform applied in logistics management, entrance control, smart offline delegation transfer. In our protocol, the delegation appliances, medical control, and e-wallet services. An of a specific tag is within control. A mobile RFID reader is RFID framework consists of back-end servers, database, allowed limited access times of a specific tag by its RFID readers, and tags. RFID tags include active tags and back-end server. The tag can verify and decrease the passive tags. An active RFID tag contains a battery, and a access counter in each access. After the counter expires, passive tag is powered by radio wave energy from an the reader has to request a new delegation from the RFID reader. Most RFID tags used in supply chains are back-end server. The other reader can request delegation passive ones. Because of the limitation of power from the reader that owns the tag. A delegation transfer is consuming and gate counts, a passive RFID tag can only operated offline without the involvement of the back-end do simple computation and have limited storage capacity. server. After the delegation transfer, the access times of Most of its data is stored on the back-end database servers. the tag are transferred to the new reader, and the access In recent years RFID technology has seen the counter of the previous reader decreases by the same integration of RFID and mobile devices [2] [7] [8]. An amount. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: RFID-embedded cellphone can access a tag and retrieve section 2 details our proposed protocol; section 3 analyzes its data from the back-end server through wireless or 3G the security issues; section 4 deals with performance networks [14]. evaluation and comparison; section 5 concludes our In a mobile RFID environment, even though a mobile scheme. reader can communicate with its back-end server through telecommunications, weak reception or poor network II. OFFLINE DELEGATION PROTOCOL quality can usually affect its performance [3] [4] [5] [9] Our offline delegation transfer protocol includes an [11] [15]. Among RFID’s research, offline delegation initial stage and three protocols: (1) offline reader-tag transfer allows users who have been authorized to access a mutual authentication protocol; (2) readers’ delegation specific tag to transfer a part of their authorization to protocol and (3) offline delegation transfer protocol, as others without Internet connections [1] [10] [12] [16]. To shown in Figure 1. At the initial stage, mobile readers have perform offline delegation, a back-end server has to been delegated authority to a specific tag and authenticate delegate authority of a specific RFID tag to an RFID each other. In the second part, the readers identify and © 2014 ACADEMY PUBLISHER doi:10.4304/jnw.9.5.1114-1120 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 5, MAY 2014 1115 access the tag offline. In the third part a reader delegate his performed offline. Figure 3 details the steps of our access rights to another reader. reader-tag mutual authentication. Reader RIDi Back-end server Reader i 1.offline authentication R,T, Delegation RIDi , Tlisti 1. RequestDelegation , RIDi m m 2.offline reading Generate RK i , ri m m SKi H(Secrectm || RIDi || ri ) DM m LE (SK m , RID || TID || RS || RK m || RC m ) 3.offline delegation i i i m m i i m m m m transfer 2.offline reading Tlisti Tlisti {TIDm , RK i , RCi , DM i ,ri } Tag TID1 2.Tlisti Tlisti Tlisti 1.offline authentication Figure 2. Initial stage Reader RIDj Reader i Tag m Figure 1. Offline coupon delegation transfer scheme RIDi , Tlisti {{TIDm , TIDm , Secretm , TSm , RK m , RC m , DM m ,r m}} i i i i Rlistm Notations uses in this paper are listed in Table 1. m m 1. Request Authentica tion , RIDi , ri , DM i TABLE I. NOTATIONS flag false m m SKi H(Secrcet m RIDi ri ) Tag ’s identifier. m m m Derive RIDi ', TIDm ', RSm , RKi , RCi from DM i Reader ’s identifier. (target reader in delegation transfer) If (RIDi RIDi ') and (TIDm TIDm ') and (RSm TSm ) Secret key shared between and its back-end server. If (RSm TSm ) TS RS , Clear Rlist Tag ’s timestamp. m m m m m Reader’s current timestamp. / Tag ’s current timestamp If (Rlistm {RIDi , RKi , RCi }) m m that a reader holds. Rlistm Rlistm {{RIDi , RKi , RCi }} Counters that indicate reader ’s and reader ’s maximum flag true query times to tag . (on tag’s part) Generate r1 If ( flag true) Counters that indicate reader ’s and reader ’s maximum m m query times to tag . (on reader’s part) M1 LE(RKi ,TIDm || ri || r1) Else Tag ’s access control list. M1 r1 Reader ’s authorization table. m 2. M1 Reader ’s and reader ’s shared keys with tag , Derive TIDm ',ri ' from M1 m m respectively. If (ri ri ')and(TIDm TIDm ') Delegation message, generated by back-end server for Confirm reader i to access tag m. Requested query times in delegation transfer. Figure 3. Mutual authentication protocol Delegation transfer flag. Session key, used to en/decrypt a delegation message. Step 1: Reader i sends a request message Nonce generated by back-end server, used in reader-tag to tag m, along with its own communications, between reader and tag . Random numbers. identifier , a nonce , and a delegation message Hash function. Lightweight symmetric key encryption algorithm. Step 2: Tag m generates a session key and Concatenation of messages. decrypts to derive reader’s identifier , tag’s A. Initial Stage identifier , reader i’s current timestamp , the key , and reader i’s delegated query times . Tag In the initial stage, when an RFID reader i wants to access a tag, it should send a delegation request to the m compares and with and , respectively. It also checks if . If , back-end server, and the server will return a tag-list that contains all the tags owned by the reader, see Figure 2. the reader’s delegated authority expires. If , tag m has to update its timestamp, i.e. , and to The server randomly generates a session key and a clear its access control list . Then tag m stores , nonce . After concatenating , and , and on its . If reader i is valid, tag m and generate the session key , a delegation message sends a message to the reader, as shown in figure3. If contains reader’s and tag’s identifiers, system’s reader i fails to pass the authentication, tag m returns a timestamp , session key , and reader’s maximum random number. query times . Then the server sends to the Step 3: When receiving , reader i derives and reader. and compare them to and . B. Offline Reader-Tag Mutual Authentication Protocol C. Reader’s Delegation Protocol After a reader gets the access right of a specific tag from In our protocol, the delegation of a specific tag is the back-end server, the reader and the tag should do limited. Each time when a reader accesses a tag, a counter mutual authentication to identify each other, which is decrease. After the counter expires, the reader has to © 2014 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 1116 JOURNAL OF NETWORKS, VOL. 9, NO. 5, MAY 2014 request a new delegation from the back-end server. We use Our offline delegation transfer requires a tag and two two counters and to restrict delegated readers’ mobile readers (one to request delegation transfer, the access to a tag, as shown in Figure 4. Detailed steps are as other to transfer authorized query times). Both reader i and follows: reader j have to be delegated authority in advance to access Reader i Tag m tag m.