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The Bottom of Things: Essences for Explanation

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The Bottom of Things: Essences for Explanation ORBIT-OnlineRepository ofBirkbeckInstitutionalTheses Enabling Open Access to Birkbeck’s Research Degree output The bottom of things: essences for explanation https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/40102/ Version: Full Version Citation: Gibson, Peter (2014) The bottom of things: essences for ex- planation. [Thesis] (Unpublished) c 2020 The Author(s) All material available through ORBIT is protected by intellectual property law, including copy- right law. Any use made of the contents should comply with the relevant law. Deposit Guide Contact: email Birkbeck, University of London THE BOTTOM OF THINGS Essences for Explanation Thesis for the degree of PhD Department of Philosophy Peter Gibson Submitted May 2014 1 For Sylvia, Eileen and Kate, who have each, in their own way, given wonderful support to this endeavour Declaration I confirm that this thesis is entirely my own work, and that all quotations from other sources have been acknowledged in the text and in the bibliography. 2 ABSTRACT Central to the philosophy of Aristotle is the belief that the aim of serious enquiry is knowledge of the constitutive essences of a given field. Modern scientific essentialism claims that this still holds good, and this thesis aims to support that approach by elucidating and applying the original concept of essence. Chapter one argues that Aristotle formulated his theory of essences entirely in the context of the theory of explanation expounded in Posterior Analytics . The components of that theory are explained, and the implications of Aristotle’s view for current debate are considered. Chapter two examines the reasons for the decline of Aristotelian essentialism during the scientific revolution, the metaphysical problems which resulted, and Leibniz’s reasons for defending the older view. Chapter three considers the nature of explanation in a modern context, starting with the preconditions for any grasp of reality that are needed to make explanations possible; it is then argued that only essentialist explanation can occupy the role which these preconditions entail. Chapter four surveys the components of that picture of reality that seem explicable, to see how essentialist explanations would actually be formulated. The theoretical discussion concludes with an account of what form essences should take, in order to occupy the explanatory role that has been assigned to them. The final chapter examines the cases of counting physical objects, explaining abstract axiomatic systems, and the discovery of the periodic table of elements, showing how attempts at explanation in these cases all converge on the sorts of essence which have been delineated in the thesis. 3 Contents ONE Aristotle on Essence 1. Starting with Aristotle 6 2. Translating Aristotle 6 3. Aristotle’s metaphysical project 8 4. Explanation 10 5. Demonstration 13 6. Definition 14 7. Unity 17 8. Essence for explanation 20 9. Aristotle and modern science 24 TWO Crisis for Essentialism 10. The scholastics 27 11. Rejection of Aristotle 30 12. New science 32 13. New scepticism 34 14. Locke’s ambivalence 37 15. Leibniz’s response 42 THREE Explanation for Essentialists 16. Four examples 51 17. What needs explaining? 52 18. Stable structures 53 19. Foundations 53 20. Levels 54 21. Direction 55 22. Ontology 55 23. Induction 56 24. Typicality 56 25. Coherence 57 26. Induction problems 57 27. Necessities 58 28. Preconditions summary 58 29. Prediction and accommodation 59 30. Covering laws 60 31. Reductive explanation 62 32. Causal explanation 64 33. Models and mechanisms 65 34. Levels of mechanism 67 35. Abstracta 67 36. Convergence and fruitfulness 68 FOUR Essence for Explanations 37. Psychology of essences 69 38. Necessary or essential? 71 39. Metaphysical explanation 73 40. Explaining individuation 74 4 41. Explaining tracking 78 42. Explaining conceptualisation 79 43. Explaining classification 80 44. Explaining definition 81 45. Explaining extrapolations 82 46. Explaining natural kinds 83 47. Explaining modal reference 86 48. Role of essence 87 49. Essence and concepts 89 50. Essence and classification 90 51. Essence for induction 91 52. Essence and natural kinds 92 53. Essence and possibilities 93 54. Essence and unity 93 55. Essence and change 94 56. Essence and definition 95 57. Explanation aims at essence 95 58. Value of essentialism 99 FIVE Cases of Explanatory Essentialism 59. Testing the theory 101 Case 1 : Unity and Counting 60. Symbols for counting 101 61. Concepts for counting 102 62. Perception and counting 105 63. Unity and counting 108 Case 2 : Axiomatised Systems 64. Explaining systems 111 65. The kernel of a system 111 66. Axioms and explanation 114 67. The essence of classical logic 115 68. The essence of set theory 117 69. The essence of arithmetic 118 70. Peano Axioms as the essence of arithmetic 119 71. Logic as the essence of arithmetic 121 72. Set theory as the essence of arithmetic 123 Case 3 : The Periodic Table 73. The nature of gold 126 74. Scientific essentialism 127 75. Mendeleev 127 76. Explaining the periodic table 128 77. Essence of an element 130 78. Weak and strong conclusions 131 Bibliography 134 5 ONE Aristotle on Essence 1. Starting with Aristotle The concept of an essence seems to be an inescapable feature of all human thought, and arises without prompting in small children. Extensive research by the psychologist Susan Gelman conclusively demonstrates a tendency among even the youngest infants to search for the hidden essence of a thing, which will explain the patterns of the thing’s behaviour (Gelman 2003, to be revisited later). A quest for the ‘essence’ of things runs throughout early Greek philosophy, and Plato’s theory of Forms can be seen as making a bold claim about essences, that they must be unchanging, and so cannot be a feature of the visible world, where change is endemic. Perhaps the most significant rebellion of Aristotle against his teacher was on this issue, because it seemed that change can only be understood if there is something unchanging present within reality to support the process, and so he proposed that essences were present in the experienced world precisely to fulfil that role. Thus Aristotle launched the essentialist view of nature which interests us. Most philosophers of the early modern period could read Greek, had direct acquaintance with the full corpus of Aristotelian texts, and understood him very well. In recent times, however, the picture has been less encouraging. We moderns tend not to read Greek, and are so daunted by the new complexities of analytic philosophy that we are tempted to imbibe our Aristotle through second- or third-hand summaries. In consequence certain misunderstandings have become ossified, and the actual reasoning that led to the original essentialist doctrines has dropped out of view. Serious students of modern essentialism must endeavour to achieve three objectives. The first is to arrive at an understanding of how we should translate a small family of central terms in the ancient Greek. The second is to search out from the Aristotelian texts a wider range of quotations than is customary (two or three friendly sentences often being thought sufficient). The third is to pay as much attention as possible to the Aristotelian scholarship which has flourished in recent times, since a huge effort has been made by a community of experts, resulting in a substantial shift in our understanding of the works, particularly of the way in which texts should be read in the light of the whole corpus, rather than in isolation. The first objective of the present discussion is to assay these three tasks, in an attempt to reach a more accurate picture of what Aristotle was proposing, and the reasons why he was proposing it. 2. Translating Aristotle Aristotle’s discussion of what we call ‘essentialism’ centres on a small group of Greek terms, most of them taken from normal speech but given a slightly specialised nuance. The translations of Aristotle most readily available in English tend to preserve traditional readings which have drifted significantly from the original, and a return to the original words is a necessity for even relatively unscholarly modern philosophers. The key fact to be recognised is that 6 conventional translations of Greek terms come to us indirectly, via their use in Latin versions of the texts (dating from a time when medieval scholars spoke fluent Latin, but could not read Greek). In our ensuing discussion certain original Greek words will often be supplied in parenthesis, and we must first attempt to clarify what the author seems to have meant by them. Urmson offers a helpful guide to key translations (1990). Ousia is a cognate of the verb ‘to be’, and literally means ‘being’ or ‘reality of’. It is a broadbrush term used by Aristotle when he is trying to grapple with general problems of existence. The best usual translation in English is ‘being’. Aristotle also has a concept of prote ousia , which means ‘primary being’, which is a rather more specific notion of whatever is central to a particular thing’s existence, for which the English word ‘substance’ is an understandable equivalent. When he uses the word ousia it is often clear from the context that he means prote ousia , so mere ‘being’ may not be sufficient. The important fact about the word ousia which needs to be understood is that in Latin the word became ‘essentia’, based on the Latin verb ‘to be’. This, of course, has given us the English word ‘essence’, producing the impression that ousia can be translated as ‘essence’, which is usually misleading or wrong. The best account of the situation is that ousia is the problem Aristotle set himself, and ‘essence’ is the beginnings of a solution, so the two concepts must be kept separate if we are to read him correctly.
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