DOCSLIB.ORG

Essentialism Regarding Natural and Social Kinds Syllabus

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Essentialism Regarding Natural and Social Kinds Syllabus Syllabus Name of the course: Essentialism Regarding Natural and Social Kinds Course level: MA, elective course Instructors: Maria Kronfeldner and Ferenc Huoranszki Number of credits: 2; ECTS: 4 Prerequisites: None Teaching format: Seminar with asynchronous course duplication Semester: 2020, Fall, Wednesday 13.30–15.10 Consultation: after classes, by appointment, or during office hours (details will be announced at the beginning of the course) Course description: What is an essence? When do we and when should we attribute essences to natural and social kinds? For instance, what does it mean to say that there is an essence of being a human being, or of being a woman, or of being a sports fan? When are we justified in making claims about essences, i.e. how can we know about essences? If the category at issue is of social and political importance, essentialist claims are naturally contested not only within academic discourses, but also in the arena of political and social discourse and activism. It matters academically and socially how we think about essences since essentialism can support social stereotypes, and, on the basis of that, othering, discrimination, exclusion, hatred, etc. At the same time, essentialism has certain cognitive functions and can have positive psychological effects too (e.g. for identity maintenance) as well as social effects (e.g. in preventing discrimination and stigmatization). In this course, we will not directly engage with the growing literature on positive and negative social consequences of essentialism about human kinds, even though we will discuss the suggestion of ‘strategic essentialism’ for defending human rights. The aim of the course is rather to train students in the philosophical foundations of the various debates about essentialism that one finds in the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities, in order to enable them to use these foundations in a systematic manner in debates about social consequences of essentialism. Learning outcomes: Students will learn how to ask and answer philosophical questions about a frequently used concept and how to integrate knowledge from other fields in doing so. The ultimate aim is to train students in analysing, criticizing and using a contested philosophical concept such as “essence”. Learning activities and assessment: Onsite: After an introductory lecture in the first week (recorded and distributed as an audio-file), meetings will normally start with a structured discussion of a predetermined set of questions related to the background reading for that week and the study material sent in addition to that. Mandatory readings will be specified for each session. Access to the elearning platform of the course is required. Class attendance is mandatory. Students will have to study course readings, participate in class discussions, and practice their research skills. Participation in discussions counts towards active participation and will not be graded. Students will regularly get faculty-feedback and/or peer-feedback on their weekly written contributions. For each class, one or more students will take over special responsibility and do a written discussion report. Certain extra tasks (counting toward active participation) will be assigned on an irregular basis, depending on case, but in particular in the last Part of the course. Online: After an introductory lecture in the first week (recorded and distributed as an audio-file), students will normally have to provide each week written answers to a predetermined set of questions related to the background reading for that week and the study material sent in addition to that. Mandatory readings will be specified for each session. Access to the elearning platform of the course is required. Weekly online-participation is mandatory. Students will have to study course readings, reply to distributed questions, and practice their research skills. The replies (the weekly study assignment regarding the questions sent to students) count towards active participation and will not be graded. Students will regularly get faculty-feedback and/or peer-feedback on their weekly written contributions. Once in the term an online student has to join for a synchronous session and report on the discussion. Certain extra tasks (counting toward active participation) will be assigned on an irregular basis, depending on case, but in particular in the last Part of the course. 2 Grading: Students’ final grade shall be based on participation in class and/or replies to the study question and a 2000 word long final term paper. Excellent class participation can contribute up to plus one grade to the final grade (e.g. from B to B+ etc). Onsite/online: Replies to the study questions/learning goals normally involves reformulating the main thesis in the reading, reconstructing core concepts used, making implicit assumptions and argumentative structures explicit, finding a critical stance, and (towards later parts of the course) some research engagement. More specific guidelines for class activities and for the term papers will be announced weekly, as we move on. The assessment criteria for the term paper will be an integral part of the last two weeks of the course, to facilitate reflective engagement with these criteria and to prepare students for their main course output, the final term paper. The topic of the final essay can be either a careful critical reconstruction of a particular and important argument for some position discussed in the course; or a comparison between competing arguments about alternative solutions to a problem; or a defence of some particular position/argument against some relevant criticism. Deadline for submitting term-papers: 2021 ** January Class schedule: Intro 1. Introduction and knowledge-café Part I: Foundations of essentialist thinking 2. Philosophy of language and classificatory essentialism 3. Scientific essentialism 4. Neo-Aristotelian essentialism Part II: Essentialism in context 5. Essentialism in chemistry 6. Essentialism in life sciences 7. Social kinds in comparison to natural kinds Part III: Essentialism in our minds 8. Cognitive science and psychological essentialism 9. Social psychology, entitativity and ethical and political issues Part IV: Special topics 10. Explorative research workshop (no background reading) 11. Presentation of term paper research ideas (no background reading) 12. Triadic feedback groups (no background reading) Course material: Readings comprise introductory readings, contributions from philosophy and other fields of the humanities (e.g. history and gender studies), as well as empirical studies on psychological essentialism from cognitive and social sciences. Some of the readings in Part II and Part III will be determined only after Part I, together with students, depending on their topical interest. All mandatory readings will be made available on the e-learning platform of the course, which is shared between the onsite and online course to facilitate interaction. 3 List of references Philosophy of language and classificatory essentialism Mandatory: Putnam, H. 1973. Meaning and Reference. Journal of Philosophy 70: 699-711. Recommended: Donnallen, K. 1983. Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms. In C. Ginet & S. Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind. pp. 84-104. Oxford UP. Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Chapter III. Blackwell. Leslie, S.-J. 2013. Essence and Natural Kinds: When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4: 109-164. Oxford UP. Putnam, H. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7: 131-193. Scientific essentialism Mandatory: Ellis, B. 2001. Scientific Essentialism, pp. 32-55. Cambridge UP. Recommended: Bird, A. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics. Oxford UP. Ellis, B. 2002. Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism, pp. 9-21. Routledge. Khalidi, M. A. 2009. How Scientific is Scientific Essentialism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40: 85-101. Lowe, E. J. 2005. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Clarendon Press. Neo-Aristotelian essentialism Mandatory: Koslicki, K. 2012. Essence, Necessity, and Explanation. In Tahko, T. (ed.) Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, 187–207. CUP. Recommended: Kung, 1977. Aristotle on Essence and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 31: 361-383. Lennox, J. G. 2009. Form, Essence and Explanation in Aristotle’s Biology. In G. Anagnostopoulos, ed. A Companion to Aristotle, pp. 348–367. Blackwell. Oderberg, D. 2007. Real Essentialism. Routledge. Essentialism in chemistry Mandatory: LaPorte, J. 1996. Chemical Kind Term Reference and the Discovery of Essence. Noûs 30: 112- 132. Recommended: Hendry, R. F. 2006. Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical Kinds. Philosophy of Science 73: 864-875. Needham, P. 2000. What is Water? Analysis 60: 13-21. Vandewall, H. 2007. Why Water Is Not H2O, and Other Critiques of Essentialist Ontology from the Philosophy of Chemistry. Philosophy of Science 74: 906-919. Essentialism in life sciences Mandatory: Hull, D. L. 1986. On Human Nature. Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2: 3-13. 4 Recommended: Boulter, S. J. 2012. Can Evolutionary Biology Do without Aristotelian Essentialism? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 70: 83-103. Devitt, M. 2010. Species Have (Partly) Intrinsic Essences. Philosophy of Science 77: 648-61. Okasha, S. 2002. Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
    Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science.
    [Show full text]
  • Aristotle's Essentialism Revisited
    University of Missouri, St. Louis IRL @ UMSL Theses Graduate Works 4-15-2013 Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited Yin Zhang University of Missouri-St. Louis, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis Recommended Citation Zhang, Yin, "Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited" (2013). Theses. 192. http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/192 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Accommodating Species Evolution: Aristotle’s Essentialism Revisited by Yin Zhang B.A., Philosophy, Peking University, 2010 A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri – St. Louis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Philosophy May 2013 Advisory Committee Jon D. McGinnis, Ph.D. Chairperson Andrew G. Black, Ph.D. Berit O. Brogaard, Ph.D. Zhang, Yin, UMSL, 2013, p. i PREFACE In the fall of 2008 when I was a junior at Peking University, I attended a lecture series directed by Dr. Melville Y. Stewart on science and religion. Guest lecturers Dr. Alvin Plantinga, Dr. William L. Craig and Dr. Bruce Reichenbach have influenced my thinking on the relation between evolution and faith. In the fall of 2010 when I became a one-year visiting student at Calvin College in Michigan, I took a seminar directed by Dr. Kelly J. Clark on evolution and ethics. Having thought about evolution/faith and evolution/ethics, I signed up for Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • 5. Essence and Natural Kinds: When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition1 Sarah-Jane Leslie
    978–0–19–954696–1 05-Gendler-Hawthorne-c05-drv Gendler (Typeset by SPi) 108 of 346 February 5, 2013 6:20 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF,5/2/2013, SPi 5. Essence and Natural Kinds: When Science Meets Preschooler Intuition1 Sarah-Jane Leslie INTRODUCTION It is common practice in philosophy to “rely on intuitions” in the course of an argument, or sometimes simply to establish a conclusion. One question that is therefore important to settle is: what is the source of these intuitions? Correspondingly: what is their epistemological status? Philosophical discus- sion often proceeds as though these intuitions stem from insight into the nature of things—as though they are born of rational reflection and judicious discernment. If these intuitions do not have some such status, then their role in philosophical theorizing rapidly becomes suspect. We would not, for example, wish to place philosophical weight on intuitions that are in effect the unreflective articulation of inchoate cognitive biases. Developmental psychology has discovered a range of belief sets that emerge in the first few years of life, and which plausibly go beyond the evidence to which the child has had access in that time period. In such cases, it is reasonable to suppose that the belief sets do not derive solely from the child’s rational reflection on her evidence, but rather show something about the way human beings are fundamentally disposed to see the world. (In some cases, the deep-seated dispositions are also shared with non-human animals.) There are many explanations of why we may be fundamentally disposed to see the world in a particular way, only one of which is that metaphysically or scientifically speaking, the world actually is that way.
    [Show full text]
  • The Anti-Essentialism Paper
    The New Pragmatism, Anti-essentialism, and What is Universal: It’s The Situation All The Way Down C. F. Abel Stephen F. Austin State University [email protected] The New Pragmatism, Anti-essentialism, and What is Universal: It’s The Situation All The Way Down C. F. Abel Stephen F. Austin State University [email protected] A well-known scientist once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the Earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man," said the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!" Introduction “New Pragmatism” attacks the very foundation of pragmatic thought by denying that we may ever have any definitive experience. As what we are experiencing is up for grabs, we can never know any situation that we may encounter, and we are left to ground both our knowledge and our values in our language games alone. This paper argues that this set of claims is founded on two errors, one regarding the nature of language games and the other regarding the nature of deconstruction. The “Old Pragmatism,” by way of contrast, is non-essentialist but not anti- essentialist, and it resolves the problem of how we might know “the situation,” given the subjectivity of our observations and the contingencies of our language games, by suggesting that our experiences can be understood as existing in, and constituted by, the totality of their particular instances or modes at the time of inquiry.
    [Show full text]
  • PLATO's ESSENTIALISM Aporiai, Essences, and Forms
    Professor Vasilis POLITIS Trinity College Dublin PLATO’S ESSENTIALISM Aporiai, Essences, and Forms University of Uppsala An intensive graduate and staff seminar Twelve seminars, Wednesday 19 April to Thursday 27 April, 2017 Wed 19 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Thu 20 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Mon 24 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Tue 25 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Wed 26 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Thu 27 April 10-12 and 14-16; room K-2-1072 Why does Plato believe in essences, and why does he conceive of essences as he does? Why does he believe in Forms, and why does he conceive of Forms as the does? These are the two major questions that I want to consider in this seminar. I have defended an answer to the first question, in The Structure of Enquiry in Plato’s Early Dialogues (Cambridge, 2015). It says that Plato thinks we have reason to believe in the existence of essences, and that he conceives of essences as that which is designated by a general, unitry and explanatory account of what a thing is, because he thinks that in this way, and in this way only, can we properly engage with certain important and especially difficult questions: radical aporiai. I want to use the first three, of these twelve seminars, to consider the first question and this attempt at answering it. The reading for this topic includes: Plato: Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno and Hippias Major.
    [Show full text]
  • Putnam's Theory of Natural Kinds and Their Names Is Not The
    PUTNAM’S THEORY OF NATURAL KINDS AND THEIR NAMES IS NOT THE SAME AS KRIPKE’S IAN HACKING Collège de France Abstract Philosophers have been referring to the “Kripke–Putnam” theory of natural- kind terms for over 30 years. Although there is one common starting point, the two philosophers began with different motivations and presuppositions, and developed in different ways. Putnam’s publications on the topic evolved over the decades, certainly clarifying and probably modifying his analysis, while Kripke published nothing after 1980. The result is two very different theories about natural kinds and their names. Both accept that the meaning of a natural- kind term is not given by a description or defining properties, but is specified by its referents. From then on, Putnam rejected even the label, causal theory of reference, preferring to say historical, or collective. He called his own approach indexical. His account of substance identity stops short a number of objections that were later raised, such as what is called the qua problem. He came to reject the thought that water is necessarily H2O, and to denounce the idea of metaphysical necessity that goes beyond physical necessity. Essences never had a role in his analysis; there is no sense in which he was an essentialist. He thought of hidden structures as the usual determinant of natural kinds, but always insisted that what counts as a natural kind is relative to interests. “Natural kind” itself is itself an importantly theoretical concept, he argued. The paper also notes that Putnam says a great deal about what natural kinds are, while Kripke did not.
    [Show full text]
  • Richard Swinburne's Arguments for Substance Dualism
    Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. MA by Research in Theology and Religion David Horner September 2018 Richard Swinburne’s arguments for substance dualism. Submitted by David Horner to the University of Exeter as a dissertation for the degree of MA by Research in Theology and Religion in September 2018 This dissertation is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the dissertation may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 1 Acknowledgements. I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Jonathan Hill and Dr Joel Krueger for their support and encouragement in the writing of this dissertation and for their patience in trying to keep me on the straight and narrow. I want to acknowledge the many conversations, on this and other topics, I have had with my friend and philosopher, Dr Chris Boyne, who sadly died in June of this year. I thank all my other chums at The Bull, Ditchling, for listening to my metaphysical ramblings. And finally, I thank my wife, Linda, for once more putting up with this kind of thing. 2 Abstract This dissertation is a contribution to debates in the philosophy of mind and of personal identity. It presents a critical account of arguments for substance dualism to be found in Richard Swinburne’s Mind, Brain, and Free Will (2013).
    [Show full text]
  • The Metaphysics of Natural Kinds
    THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL KINDS Alexander Bird Abstract Rev.8.2—Thursday 12th August, 2010, 11:20 This paper explores the meta- physics of natural kinds. I consider a range of increasingly ontologically com- mitted views concerning natural kinds and the possible arguments for them. I then ask how these relate to natural kind essentialism, arguing that essentialism requires commitment to kinds as entities. I conclude by examining the homeo- static property cluster view of kinds in the light of the general understanding of kinds developed. 1 Introduction The principal aim of this paper is to examine the various options concerning the metaphysics of natural kinds, in particular as regards their ontology. Initially pro- ceed by posing a series of questions whose positive answers correspond to a se- quence of increasingly metaphysically committed views about natural kinds. In sec- tion 2 these questions concern the naturalness and kindhood of natural kinds. This leads, in section 3 to the question whether natural kinds are themselves genuine en- tities. In section 4 I present an argument for a positive answer to the existence ques- tion, that takes essentialism about natural kinds to imply their existence: (having an) essence implies existence. In section 5 I consider the objection that kind essen- tialism reduces to individual essentialism, which would undermine the import of the essence-implies-existence argument. In sections 6 and 7, I put this machinery to work, asking first what sort of entity a natural kind may be (e.g. a set, an uni- versal, or a sui generis entity), and, finally, how homeostatic property cluster view fares when compared to the general conception of natural kinds developed in the preceding sections.
    [Show full text]
  • Essence, Plenitude, and Paradox
    PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES Philosophical Perspectives, 25, Metaphysics, 2011 ESSENCE, PLENITUDE, AND PARADOX Sarah-Jane Leslie Princeton University Essentialism in philosophy is the view that there are in principle two ways of having properties and including parts: the essential way and the accidental way (e.g, Fine, 1994, 1995; Johnston 1984, 2006; Kripke, 1980; Salmon 1986, 2005; Yablo 1987). As I understand the view, even an extreme essentialist — who takes every property and every part to be had essentially — should agree with the in-principle distinction while arguing that certain metaphysical considerations mean that the second way of having properties is not, and cannot be, exemplified. Such a view would contrast with the view of an anti-essentialist like Willard van Orman Quine who repudiates the very distinction between the two ways of having properties. Quine’s view is not that all properties are accidental, for that would be to use what he calls the “invidious distinction” (1953), rather than repudiate it. His view is that there is not even in principle these two ways of having properties (or satisfying predicates, as he would put it), about which we can ask “Which of these two ways do things have properties?” What then ostensibly distinguishes the essential way of having properties from the accidental way? An object’s essential properties are conditions on what it is to be that object, and this set of conditions fixes just which possibilities or possible worlds the object exists in, namely just those in which it satisfies those conditions. An object’s essential properties also fix how long it exists, namely only at those times at which it satisfies those conditions.
    [Show full text]
  • Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism
    SAMIR OKASHA DARWINIAN METAPHYSICS: SPECIES AND THE QUESTION OF ESSENTIALISM ABSTRACT. Biologists and philosophers of biology typically regard essentialism about species as incompatible with modern Darwinian theory. Analytic metaphysicians such as Kripke, Putnam and Wiggins, on the other hand, believe that their essentialist theses are applicable to biological kinds. I explore this tension. I show that standard anti-essentialist considerations only show that species do not have intrinsic essential properties. I argue that while Putnam and Kripke do make assumptions that contradict received biological opinion, their model of natural kinds, suitably modified, is partially applicable to biological species. However, Wiggins’ thesis that organisms belong essentially to their species is untenable, given modern species concepts. I suggest that Putnam’s, Kripke’s and Wiggins’ errors stem from adopting an account of the point of scientific classification which implies that relationally-defined kinds are likely to be of little value, an account which is inapplicable to biology. 1. INTRODUCTION The nature of biological species is a topic that continues to generate considerable controversy among biologists and philosophers of biology. However on one point, there is a large measure of consensus: that essential- ism about species is incompatible with both Darwinian theory and modern taxonomic practice. This view was first articulated by the evolutionist Ernst Mayr, who launched a powerful attack on the essentialist or “typological” species concept of pre-Darwinian biology, recommending in its place his famous “biological species concept” (Mayr 1963, 1970). Though Mayr’s positive views on species have been much criticised over the years, and rivals to the biological species concept have proliferated, his attack on essentialism has met with almost universal acceptance among both bio- logists and philosophers of biology.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philosophy of Biology a Companion for Educators Kostas Kampourakis Editor
    History, Philosophy & Theory of the Life Sciences Kostas Kampourakis Editor The Philosophy of Biology A Companion for Educators Kostas Kampourakis Editor The Philosophy of Biology A Companion for Educators Editor Kostas Kampourakis Secretariat of Educational Research and Development Geitonas School Vari Attikis, Greece ISSN 2211-1948 ISSN 2211-1956 (electronic) ISBN 978-94-007-6536-8 ISBN 978-94-007-6537-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6537-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London Library of Congress Control Number: 2013938263 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifi cally for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • A Trip to the Metaphysical Jungle –How Kripke's Intuitions Revived
    https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-51675 A Trip to the Metaphysical Jungle – How Kripke’s Intuitions Revived Aristotelian Essentialism Sebastian Krebs (University of Bamberg) Besides his substantial influences on other fields of philosophy, Saul Kripke is famous for smoothing the way for a new type of Aristotelian essentialism. However, Kripke’s comments on essentialism are utterly vague and are built entirely on fundamental intuitions about the use of language and necessity de re in modal logic. He famously disproved Willard Van Orman Quine who, a few decades earlier, had banned necessity de re into the metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism – a jungle that a true empiricist must not enter. But not only Kripke’s refutation of Quine, but also his own essentialism is based on intuition. Kripke thereby overcomes an anti-essentialist dogma that was established by Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. But because of its vagueness, one might well call Kripke’s intuitive essentialism a ‘metaphysical jungle’. Nevertheless, a trip to Kripke’s jungle is a promising milestone on the way to a refreshed Aristotelian metaphysics. 1. Travel arrangements: The rejection of Quine’s anti-essentialism In Two dogmas of empiricism, Willard Van Orman Quine rejects the traditional distinction between synthetic and analytic truths. Among others Immanuel Kant suggested this distinction in his Critique of Pure Reason. Quine criticizes it as a relic from metaphysical dogmas which a pure empiricism (as Quine wants to pursue it) has to overcome: [O]ne is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.
    [Show full text]