INDICATOR VOL.3 WINTER 19 8 5

Cycles of civil unrest, in ever increasing frequency, have come to form an intricate pattern of black protest politics in South Africa over the last twenty-five years. 1 South Africa's Urban Crisis: The Need for Fundamental Solutions 7 Cycles of Civil Unrest 1976/84 13 Brutal Lessons in Township Administration 17 The South African Security Forces and Riot Control 19 The Praetorian March on Pretoria All South Africa is BOB-laiad A Bob card means you can deposit money; check your balance; receive a mini statement; order a full statement; transfer money from current account to savings account; order a cheque book and pay your Barclaycard account. Bob's easy to talk to; tells you what to do and brings you all the benefits of faster, easier, cheaper banking. And he's just a touch away. Bob down to your local Barclays branch and get yourself a BOB card.

Only from BARCLAYS itieBank tMMlAYS NATIONAL BANK LIMITED • REGISTERED COMMERCIAL BANK THE AGENCY 2781/e p. -

SOUTH AFRICA'S (URBAN CRISES The Need for Fundamental Solutions

By Prof Lawrence Schlemmer

he widespread urban riots that plague South African society today inevitably invite comparison to the earlier, shorter-lived and more fragmented militant black protests witnessed during 1976/77. In the following diagnosis, Prof Schlemmer identifies the most disturbing features of the current civil unrest - which set it distinctly apart from Tearlier periods of instability - as the increased role of disaffected adult householders alongside the angry youth, and the explicit political nature of their joint activity. In the context of revolutionary street politics, African town councillors and policemen have become the principal victims of politically motivated attacks on perceived 'collaborators'. In the midst of social turmoil, the familiar 'agitation' bogeyman, linked to exiled black nationalist manipulation, raises its head once more. Prof Schlemmer dismisses such single-stranded theories of civil unrest because of their inherent tendency to crudely reduce a complex matrix of social, economic and political conditions to an overly simplistic relationship of cause and effect. In looking for ways out of the maze of violence, he identifies the many variables which shape African townships as social 'pressure cookers' prone to simmering instability. He concludes that a unified government approach presented as a package of reforms, rather than an incremental reformist response to single issues, is more likely to reduce urban conflict levels and alleviate social stress.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& RegionalMonitor 1

from an abstract distance as symptoms prevented .... planned disciplined non- A growth in of a general malaise. From these violent resistance becomes disorganised, youth militancy theoretical perspectives, the civil unrest with disorganised violence cropping up ' is deemed to be indicative of alternately, in all directions' (BS 5/85). and in the South Africa's industrial revolution and In other words, the legislative and de political modernisation process; the 'violent confidence of facto suppression of initially peaceful evolution' of reform; the group tensions demonstrations can be linked to the urban African of a plural, racially structured society; later manifestation of anti-authority 'insiders', among black perceptions of relative deprivation; tendencies by township dissidents, in the others, partially or lastly, of class struggle within a form of attacks on perceived collaborators capitalist crisis made of historic, (African councillors, policemen and explain the new economic contradictions. unrest cycle businessmen). In the context of a cyclical These models provide a useful historical pattern of action, response and counter overview, but their simultaneous limitations response, the short-term and recurring riot stem from a complacent acceptance of triggers have come to include: massive violence as an inevitable social • the levying of rent and service charge phenomenon in a time of transition. increases by the newly constituted Unfortunately, these macro-theories African town councils, to raise self-finance concentrate on structural causes and pay The suppression little attention to the need for an urgent, • police and army conduct, especially of initially practical problem- solving exercise by the alleged excessive use of force against peaceful government and its opponents, in terms of mobs armed with petrol bombs and reconciling political and socio-economic stones, rather than the incremental demonstrations escalation of a security response (see can be linked to demands across a vast ideological spectrum and ending the tragic violence. Baynham article: pl7) the later anti- Destabilising aspects of the surrounding • the arrests and detentions of authority socio-economic environment should not community leaders and others in response tendencies by be construed as direct causes of political to the coordinated organisation of township revolt per se. Instead, they serve to boycotts, stayaways and protest marches/demonstrations dissidents contextualise the current riots and attempt to demonstrate how structural factors, in • activist factionalism and internal power combination, increase the likelihood of struggles within urban black reactive social unrest. communities, over organisational loyalties and tactics. At the political level, the following primary factors partially explain the emergence The internal momentum of the unrest cycle of a new cycle of regional unrest between is reflected in the approximate 1984/5: correlation of riot peaks and massive Regular • continuous African rejection of the security force intervention. In mid- army/police tenets of the bantu education, influx October 1984, after the initial wave of action to seal off control and homeland policies since the rioting had subsided somewhat, two major joint police/army house-to-house the townships 1950s, related to inadequate opportunities searches of PWV townships witnessed an seems to have for upward social mobility or political expression immediate upsurge of civil unrest. Also, had an after the police shootings on a funeral exacerbating • the upsurge in youth militancy since march in Langa township (Uitenhage) on the Soweto revolt of 1976, associated with effect on existing 21 March, Sharpeville Day, which left a resurgence of black nationalist between 20 (official figures) to 43 people conflict levels activism, organisation and sentiment; dead (CP 24/3/85), a fresh wave of accompanied by a second urban guerilla, defiant protest swept through the Eastern sabotage campaign Cape and elsewhere. Subsequently, • the renewed growth in the political regular army/police action to seal off the confidence of urban African 'insiders', akin townships through erecting security to the 1950s era, expressed through the cordons seems to have had the same multiple formation of civic, student and exacerbating effect on existing conflict labour organisations since the late 1970s. levels. But for the geographic isolation of most Short-Term Triggers The Political Scale African The increased spiral of violence since But for the geographic isolation of most August 1984 has naturally given rise to African townships and the effective townships, its own dynamic, wherein other short-term security cordon created by conflict would issues emerge and have their own spin- policies over time, the site of conflict undoubtedly be off effect. For example, critics of the would undoubtedly be located in or near located in or near government's coercive response to the the inner 'white' cities. And if this were the inner 'white' expression of black grievances over a the case, terms of classification on a broad range of legitimate political issues political scale from revolt, insurrection, cities - particularly the early resort to use of the uprising to civil war would be more army in joint operations with the police appropriate to measure the extensive and the blanket banning of political nature of the current unrest. The meetings in many areas - maintain that question of terminology may seem to be a where 'orderly organised protest is rather academic point, but the West

8Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985

fl'MSA). traditionally a loose umbrella- 1976/77. type of 'united front of all democratic The high profile of army intervention in Common to both forces' aimed at creating common the volatile townships is an unrest cycles is ground on the basis of a minimal, non- unmistakeable indicator of the extreme the extent of collaborationist platform (UMSA severity of the current unrest. On 4 President Dick Dudley, Star 28/4/85). April, the Deputy Minister of Law and militant Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, announced organisation and The Regional Spread that, 'the SAP, the SADF and the SA protest in the Railways Police will combine in order rural hinterland A common feature of both recent unrest that law and order can be restored in areas cycles has been the extent to which affected and to maintain internal in the Cape and militant organisation and protest has security' (NM 5/4/85). And later in the Orange Free penetrated thc rural hinterland in the Cape month, a police spokesman confirmed State and Free State provinces, bringing that soldiers were being issued with live hitherto unknown townships into the ammunition and had already opened fire political limelight (see map). In the on a mob on one occasion, killing a man second cycle beginning in January this in Langa township (NM 19/4/85). year, the rioting spread quickly to the northern, south-west and Karoo Cape There are too many variables involved to interior, and continued to simmer in the make for accurate comparison, but central and northern Free State, with considering that the police now have the The open and renewed outbursts in the Transvaal also advantage of extensive preparation and regular use of the (SAIRR 10/5/85). Altogether, incidents proper riot control equipment, the injury army to suppress related to the general unrest have and fatality rates (see Schlemmer: pi) rioting sets the already been reported in more than 155 produced by security force intervention townships during the 1984/85 period, remain extremely high. Between June present unrest equitable in number to the total 160 1976 and February 1977, the official unrest cycle apart from trouble spots affected by the 1976/77 death toll was 575 persons (unofficial the 1976/77 unrest. estimates ranged from 700 dead), with 78 unrest cycle Apart from limited election violence in percent of the fatalities attributed to coloured and Indian suburbs in August police action (CT 15/5/85). In comparison, 1984, the current riots have wholly between August 1984 and April 1985, occurred in the African community. This is the official death toll was 381 persons, with in striking contrast to the events of 78 percent of the fatalities due to police 1976, when intense rioting broke out over action (Le Grange 22/5/85), representing August/September in coloured suburbs no comparative reduction in civilian in the Western Cape, leaving 50 people casualties sustained during the security dead and 191 schools damaged (Kane- force response to riots. Berman 1978). Otherwise, there have been Because tough security action has self- Between isolated incidents of unrest in Natal, evidently failed to bring the townships September 1984 basically related to Inkatha/UDF tensions under control, police shootings have been and March 1985, and also at the Crossroads squatter described as a counter-productive 'policy 10 000 people of elimination without trial, amounting to camp on the outskirts of Cape Town. In were arrested in general though, as demonstrated by the summary execution' of rioters (CT map, both Natal and the Western Cape 4/5/85). In this regard, Northern Ireland's connection with have been relatively quiescent compared civil war is often presented as an the unrest, to the riots in these regions in 1976 or to appropriate analogy of what South Africa's compared to the rest of the country today. security situation could degenerate into. 5 930 arrests in However, this parallel is of more value in illustrating the relative restraint shown 1976/77 Riot Control by British security forces under more One of the most qualitative differences extreme conditions of urban guerilla between the unrest cycles of 1976/77 and war. Since 1969, official security action has 1984/85 in terms of the security response, led to 150 deaths only, half of the 2 400 has been the open and regular use of total fatalities have been civilians and the the army to suppress rioting, in an Loyalist and Republican paramilitary increasingly direct policing role. factions have been responsible for 1 050 of Injury and fatality Although the defence force played an these fatalities (GW 2/12/84). rates due to unacknowledged support role to the security force police then, today soldiers have been used in large numbers on patrol, to cordon intervention off townships, and to conduct house-to- Comparative Targets remain extremely house searches. Since early November 1976/85 high, considering 1984, the police have refused to comment Writing before the outbreak of that police now on 'the day-to-day activities of the army internecine conflict between extra- have proper riot in the townships' (IPSA Vol2/No4, parliamentary opposition groupings, control UM:P9). During the course of massive Witwatersrand University Law Professor security raids conducted between Tony Matthews warned against reading equipment September 1984 and March 1985, 10 000 too much into the inward expression of people were arrested in connection with black violence: 'The elaborate system of the unrest (SAIRR 11/5/85), compared legal controls and enforced geographical to the equivalent total of 5 930 arrests in separation means that blacks lack the

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 11 capacity to strike out much beyond the direct, coercive form of rule. Whereas in confines of their community, even if The targetting of African participants by previous cycles they wanted to' (op cit: p25). However, township dissidents would appear to reflect other commentators have pointed to the a proactive extension of the traditional of unrest attacks politically motivated atttacks and were on non- collaboration strategy, which to date assassinations on African councillors and has stressed relatively passive, reactive government policemen as the most disturbing feature protest tactics, such as the community institutions, which sets the current level of violence boycott and stayaway strike. Political attacks now distinctly apart from the 1976/77 cycle (Du scientist Andre du Toit, of the University Toit 1985). centre on of Stellenbosch warns that the new property owned The major noticeable trend is obviously ruthless form of activism signals the failure of 'the government's strategy of divide by the small the shift from attacks on government institutions manned and controlled by and rule, coupled with the selective and urban A frican white officials (administration board and progressive co-optation of various middle class post office buildings, etc), to attacks on sectional elites' (CT 27/4/85). In the light the public and private property manned of fresh constitutional manoeuvres to or owned by members of the small, urban integrate all ethnic groups into new African middle-class. By March 1985, at regional bodies, the consequences of a The targeting of least 255 homes of town councillors and political vacuum at the third tier level, ie policemen had been damaged in mob local government, are especially grave. police vehicles attacks, already surpassing the 'catch-all' and busses, but figure of 250 riot damaged houses of especially of unspecified township residents for the Conclusion perceived 1976/77 cycle. In addition, 12 councillors In mid-June 1985, the deadly state of collaborators are and six policemen have been killed during deadlock reached between the security the course of at least 109 murderous significant forces and dissident mobs continues, and attacks on African officials, according to running street battles and barricades are dimensions of the Department of Foreign Affairs the order of the day in townships the riots (RDM 12/4/85). throughout many parts of the country. The recent anniversary of 16 June 1976, Over the last year, another significant commemorating the day that saw the dimension of the riots has been the rebirth of militant black political activity, increased targetting of police vehicles generated further confrontation between and busses by mobs throwing stones and In the light of the government and its extra-parliamentary petrol-bombs. In comparison to 1976/77, proposed opposition. The unrest cycle has come when 599 buses and 466 official vehicles full circle, as the tumultuous events of the integrated were badly damaged by rioters (Cillie past twelve months and fresh tragedies regional bodies, Commission figures), by April 1985, 1 088 give rise to yet more commemorative buses and 3 156 police vehicles alone the landmarks on South Africa's political had been damaged (CT 15/5/85). The consequences of calendar. escalation of this kind of militant a political activity is probably accountable to the At the time of writing, it is an vacuum at third greater confidence and mobility of the impossible task to predict whether the tier level are much bigger crowds of dissidents in those current riots will yet run a fuller course especially grave townships which have been commonly or if incoming reports of further rioting described as 'ungovernable'. reflect the tailend of the unrest. However, the latent conflict which The Collapse of Co- periodically and with greater frequency The latent breaks through the surface will only be conflict will only optation? properly resolved - rather than simply be properly contained - if the government is prepared However, there can be no disputing the resolved if the to initiate open-ended negotiations with most persistent and consequential political a range of authentic black leaders. Until government is strand running through the almost year- then, an untenable dilemma will prepared to long spate of rioting witnessed in South continue to face constitutional planners, no initiate open- Africa's townships. Since September matter how innovative their designs are. 1984, dissident wrath has been focussed on ended Essentially, the major import of the perceived collaborators and in the negotiations with intractable political crisis is that the process has exacted a terrible vengeance. houses that Minister Heunis built, as chief authentic black In the wake of vicious attacks on coordinator of the political reform leaders persons and property, at least 240 African process, are missing one of their principal councillors had resigned by June 1985, foundations: local and national African leaving between three to six town councils participation. ACRONYMS operative nationwide (DN 14/6/85). BO Business Day BS Without functioning local authorities, the BIBLIOGRAPHY CP City Press CT Cape Times most basic civic services such as rubbish Cillie Commission of Inquiry into the Riots at Soweto and Olher Places.... GW Guardian Weekly removal and sewerage have been RP 55/1980: Vols 1/2. IPSA UM Indicator SA A du Toil. Unrest Proves Failure of Co-optation Policy. CT: 27/4/85. Urban Monitor suspended for long periods in some J Kane-Berman, Soweto-Black Revolt, White Reaction. Ravan Press, 1978. NM Natal Mercury NW Natal Witness townships. Even worse, due to the collapse T Matthews. Political Violence in South Africa. Leadership SA Vol3/No3. RDM Rand Daily Mail of this latest local government initiative J Rantete, The Third Day 01 September. Ravan Press. 1984. SAIRR SA Institute ot Race M Whisson, Containing Unrest - a Small Town Perspective, Reality, March Relations in urban African areas, the security forces Sow SM Sowetan Sunday Mirror 1985. have stepped in and imposed the most Indicator SA press clippings.

12Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 lerw VWi

BRUTAL IESSONS IN TOWNSHIP ADMINISTRATION

Mr Steven Kgame, President of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa (UCASA) speaks to Indicator SA Copy Editor Graham Howe, on the experiences of the Town Councillor Class of 1983/85

he rent and service charge increases levied by the newly constituted black local authorities undoubtedly formed the T immediate trigger for the township riots which broke out in the Transvaal and from mid-1984 onwards. Although the widespread civil unrest has since gathered an anarchic momentum of its own in 1985, African participants on the revamped community councils remain a primary target for mob assassination and assault. By June 1985, as ongoing waves of regional revolt continued to engulf the Eastern Cape, at least 240 councillors had resigned in response to brutal physical pressure, and only between three to six out of a planned 103 new town councils were actually in operation (SACC/Urban Foundation estimates). In short, many African townships have simply become 'ungovernable', as daily street clashes occur between security forces and mobilised township dissidents. Indicator SA approached UCASA president Steven Kgame at a recent 'in-house' conference on local government reform, held at the University of Durban-Westville for the benefit of municipal officials from throughout South Africa. Mr Kgame is the chairman of the Dobsonville community council on the West Rand and is acknowledged by government as a prominent spokesperson for urban Africans within an unfolding political framework of reform. During the current unrest, he too has been subjected to rough treatment by rioters, who have stoned and petrol- bombed his home in the township, like the many other government participants they have victimised. In the following interview, Graham Howe discusses some of the central issues of the conference with Mr Kgame - the politics of finance and revenue distribution, the prospects for some measure of integration of segregated local authorities, and the role of party politics at the municipal level. In addition to these problem areas common to incumbents of local government in all communities, Howe also invites comment from Kgame on conflict issues of particular relevance to local authorities in the African community. These touch on aspects of African political rights, township underdevelopment, and the problem of legitimacy encountered by town councils in raising revenues from unwilling township residents. Lastly, Kgame speculates on the prospects for ridding these bodies of their stigma and rebuilding viable local authorities from the ruins of the government's most recent constitutional initiative for urban African participation.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 13 Howe: UCASA is a relative newcomer on the Howe: A second aspect of your mid-1983 UCASA views national political scene. Can you give me some statement was that the new constitution was itself primarily as background on the origins of UCASA? rejected on the grounds of it being based on Kgame: It was formed in 1968, within the old racial forms of government. Yet surely the new a civic Urban Bantu Council system. I was the regional service councils are based on the association, founder of UCASA. premise of general (multi-racial) affairs, which rather than a can be dealt with at a regional level, and own Howe: How has it sustained itself? What sort (segregated) affairs, which are handled by the political force, of recognition have you had from the and aims at different types of authorities at a local level. government over this period? So you have a separation of local government improving the Kgame: UCASA has carried itself through according to ethnic communities. Are you still quality of life for very well, in spite of all the difficulties over dissatisfied with these political arrangements? urban Africans the years we have had. We struggled for Kgame: The new system of local government recognition ever since 1968 until only last won't work. It won't work in the sense that year in September, when the government you can't try and separate races or nations, recognised us. About three weeks ago (March yet still try to bring them together through 1985), the State President announced that the back door via the regional service UCASA would be fully recognised as an councils. It must be worked out in a more organisation which the government is suitable and equitable manner. However, we The new system prepared to work with. have elected to go into the regional services of local Howe: What is the need for UCASA? What councils, but not because of political government is political function does it fulfil? aspirations ... we would simply like to get a unworkable Kgame: Well, UCASA does not play so much share of the money that is being collected, so that we can also develop our areas. because ethnic of a political function but it fulfills a role in civic matters. It is a civic association which groups cannot be Howe: Self-finance is obviously the most must provide for the improvement of the crucial issue when it comes to the autonomy of integrated at the quality of life of people in the black regional level, local authorities. Do you think that the various residential areas of the Republic. forms of financing which have been proposed while segregated We must not be seen to be filling up the by the Croeser finance liaison committee - at the lower level political vacuum. That political vacuum will employee and industrial floor space levies, be dealt with by political institutions. GST redistribution, etc - would go some way Nevertheless, we do not keep aloof from towards solving the current problems that politics, because politics is part and parcel of African town councils have experienced in the daily life of the people. raising revenues? Howe: Now where do African town councils fit Kgame: The proposals can't solve the present Even the into - or do you anticipate fitting into - the setup because that money is still inadequate if proposed new local government dispensation and the it has to be shared by so many local authorities. The majority of the local employee and regional service councils? authorities are not viable and there are many turnover taxes Kgame: Room has been made for African things that money is going to have to do . . . will be participation. We really knocked hard on the after it is distributed for transport and inadequate for door of Pretoria in order that we might be essential services, there will be just peanuts admitted into the regional service councils. left! Revenues won't be sufficient in order to the purposes of We form part of these regions . . . therefore financing general provide for township development. we must also enjoy the benefits from those Now the other issue which is more important services as well regions, through the redistribution of monies is the money which is being wasted on as township levied. duplication of services, all of which is development Howe: UCASA made a joint statement with six unnecessary. You have a toilet here . . . one homeland administrations and other leaders in for coloureds, one for Indians, one for mid-1983, rejecting the new constitution. There Africans, one for whites. Unless the were two major points made in that statement. government sees the necessity of dismantling Firstly, UCASA supported the concept of a apartheid in total, they cannot go on talking Apartheid National Convention. about the present economic recession when they themselves are extravagant spenders. policies Kgame: Correct. necessitate the Howe: To what extent does the informal multi- wasteful racial forum, announced by PW Botha at the Howe: What alternative is there for duplication of opening of parliament in 1985, go towards constituting local authorities? You say you services, an meeting this demand? reject having three townclerks, three treasurers - that such duplication is a waste of revenue. Kgame: Well, there is no way in which the extravagant What sort of unified local authority would government can avoid a roundtable luxury, especially meet the demands of UCASA? conference — there is no way in which they in a time of can avoid that. In fact, in the present unrest Kgame: Well, let's say for instance in Durban economic African people are 'dying hard' in order that there must be one local authority. The recession such a thing should take place. There is no solution is as simple as that. Why have way in which we can talk apart ... we must separate coloured, Indian, white and African talk together! local authorities? They should be geographically based instead. Howe: But does this informal forum meet your Howe: The regional services council may be demands? removing some decisionmaking functions - Kgame: It is building up towards that. including the key financial power that

14R ural& Regiona lMoni tor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 currently resides at the various provincial and authorities are tried out? city council levels - out of local hands, so that Kgame: There is no time for motions — there Because African vriu have a centralisation of power. Some is only time for action. areas are critics argue that one should devolve power Howe: Talking of action, if we can turn to the underdeveloped, rather than centralise. Do you have any strong ongoing instability in the Eastern Cape and they should feelings on this issue? Transvaal African townships since last Kgame: No, I don't think the regional service September. One of the first steps that many of receive the lion's councils are taking any power from the local the new town councils took was to increase share of the authorities. They are just there to collect the rent and service charges. In the context of anti- revenues to be new sources of revenue which have been election and school boycott activity in 1984, do distributed by the identified and can be redistributed . . . you not think there was a serious regional service therefore you must have a regional kitty. miscalculation as far as timing? I don't know councils Prom there you can distribute it to the local whether the rent boycotts are over, but there authorities. I have said to the Minister (of was an extensive rent boycott in the Vaal Constitutional Development and Planning) Triangle last year? — the blacks, because they are underdeveloped, they must get the biggest Kgame: Yes, it is still going on even now. share of revenues which will be collected in that particular region. The whites must get Howe: Was it not a major miscalculation on less. the part of the town councils - overestimating the extent of their popular legitimacy and Ihwe: Yet what would seem likely to happen is raising rent in the middle of a political crisis? that the regional service councils will - on the Kgami: No, I would not say so. The town basis of the revenue that is collected in the councillors have done so in good faith, but different areas - return those revenues to the they did it at a time when there was unrest in same communities they came from, with some the country. I would not say that people have marginal redistribution. rejected the councils as such, but because of Local authorities Kgame: No, no, no! That is not the idea. We intimidation that is going on. In spite of the should be have dealt with this in depth and we have physical intimidation, the people still went to multiracial said in no uncertain terms that the whites the polls and if the people were left by entities within a must not tell us that the bulk of the money themselves — either to go or not to go — comes from them. They must not tell us that there would have been a better turnout. (Ed: larger integrated because we say, 'they have had their towns the overall poll for the 1983 town council society and their cities developed by us, the blacks'. elections was 21%, dropping to 10.7% for It is their turn now to develop the black Soweto). tow ns. That is agreed upon and I think legislation is going to indicate that. It is just because of the political connotation attached to African local authorities. They Howe: Yes, so that you would redistribute GST are based on foundations which were very paid by black consumers who spend their bad right from the beginning. You have had money in the white cities. Do you think these the advisory board — very bad. You have the are viable mechanisms? urban bantu council — very bad. You had Kgame: Yes. When you talk of GST, who the community council — very bad. It is now spends more? The blacks spend more, even if the money is spent in the white areas. It is West Rand Development Board police. Since the outbreak of unrest in still the black person who spends the money. September 1984, many African town councils have created their own police force. Howe: Mayor Sam Buti of the Alexandria Town Council has proposed that some of the big industrial park areas should be incorporated into the townships, so that the land rates would then come to the African town council. What is your response to this suggestion? Kgame: Well, I fully supported that statement. I would say that neighbouring land adjacent to the black areas owned by white farmers should be expropriated to make room for industry. That would generate money for the particular local authority. Howe: But ideally you would like to see that the local authority is part of an integrated local unit of government. Do you think that is on the cards? Kgame: Well of course. It must of necessity be an integrated society. Much must be scrapped to defuse the dynamite in our hands . . . and make us come together. Howe: Are we not first of all going to go through a series of motions where these local

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 15 the local authorities . . . (the village and town that it is not just a question of saying 'the The raising of councils). But the people do not see the black people pay for everything'. They will difference between the local authorities and see in white areas that the whites pay more rents by African those three stages in the past. They still think than the black areas. They would want to town councils it is the same thing and yet it is not. know, 'But why do you pay so much for during election Howe: In the context of the very deadly electricity, for water, for rubbish removal?' I and school expression of opposition to the town councils . . mean it is all to do with the way in which boycotts was councillors have been brutally killed in local government works. perhaps a serious townships both in the Transvaal and the Howe: Is this not something that could be miscalculation of Eastern Cape. And taking into account the institutionalised, in the same way that when new safety and income tax legislation is timing and same stigma that the town councils now have, do they have a future? introduced, employer bodies discuss it with popular Kgame: The town councils can get rid of that their workforce and establish communication legitimacy stigma as long as they can get economic channels and programmes. Could UCASA not viability and produce results. Now that the play a role in promoting this very pragmatic councils are starting to produce results, the suggestion? United Democratic Front (UDF) has Kgame: We have already approached the heightened opposition. They can get rid of minister (of Co-operation, Development and that stigma if they can be seen to be really in Education) on that issue, to introduce charge, because the people think that the legislation to make civics a compulsory blacks are not in charge yet. Yet they are in subject in the schools. The children must charge. learn from school, then they can educate Earlier African Howe: The van der Walt investigation into the their parents and things like that. local government township unrest - it was alleged that there was Howe: There are many alternative civic initiatives, the a lot of misunderstanding amongst residents associations that have sprung up in South advisory boards about the new town councils. Would you agree Africa since the early 1980s. Do you think they and urban bantu/ that there was miscommunication of what have a role to play in local government? community constitutes rent? Kgame: Well, they have rejected playing a role in local government — the whole lot of councils, have all Kgame: Oh yes, there is a misconception there. You see site rent is static, but what the them. They say no, they do not want to be been stigmatised people are paying for is service charges. seen to participate in government created Those are the things that escalate. For institutions, and that is the long and the short instance, we get water from the Rand Water of it. Board and if they say this service is running Howe: But perhaps within a seriously revised, at a loss ... we have no option but to accept new local government framework, such as the the increase. But the people do not integrated one you are suggesting, where race understand — they just take the whole does not play such a determining role . . . then The present town package and say it is rent. is there any way of integrating the civics? They It is a lack of education, but we are trying to councils can get seem to have become a political force on their set up a system whereby we can show in the own. I suppose that's open to debate of course! rid of their stigma receipts for rent and services that, 'Now look, Kgame: Well, I am rather sceptical, because if they are this month your rent is so much, it is still the you know you can lead a horse to the well, perceived as same. What has changed here is service but you can't make it drink! The civics see being charges. You paid 10 cents three months ago, the good that the councils do. They see that today now you are paying 25 cents'. We must economically they can advise the councils on what to do, explain that because Escom has increased its but they don't want to do the job themselves. viable and tariff, we cannot afford Escom's account. produce material That, 'Now we must increase also and you, Howe: Do you see them in any way as results the consumer, must therefore accept the emerging as rivals, as political representatives? service charge increase. If you do not, Escom Kgame: No. They are not political is going to cut your electricity supply and we representatives. They are self-appointed will then fold our arms'. people. Howe: I see. Now you also mentioned in a lecture this morning that you thought Howe: Do you see any way of closing the Even if local employers had an important role to play in divide between those extra-parliamentary opposition groupings and the town councils? authorities are explaining to their African employees what the nature of rents and electricity accounts are . . . Kgame: No, there is no way because they integrated, the spring up all the time. Every morning you civic associations among other civic responsibilities. Do you think this is something you could take up with find out there is another association with the are unlikely to an employer body? same ideas. What the hell is all this? What do participate in you achieve with 20 organisations trying to Kgame: Employer participation is very, very do the same thing? government important because here you talk to one created person at a time, rather than talking to Howe: So you think local politics should be left institutions people at a meeting where people do not in the hands of the town councils? understand, where there is going to be a lot Kgame: No, not necessarily in the hands of of heckling and misunderstanding. But if the town councils, but do we need so many employers talk to an employee and say: 'Now organisations? Do we need Azapo, do we you see, these are my rent, water and need Azaso, do we need Cosas, do we electricity charges, this is my refuse removal need them in the cause of fighting for our account' . . . then the employee will realise rights? 0P3&

16R ural& Regiona lMoni tor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 >erspectlve THE SLEDGEHAMMER & THE NUT The South African Security Forces & Riot Control

By Dr Simon Baynham, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

Over the last decade the South African Defence Force (SADF) has come to the fore in the dual roles of civilian law enforcement and policy formulation. Political scientist, Dr Simon Baynham claims that the current use of the SADF to suppress domestic unrest in the country's African townships threatens to undermine the supposed political neutrality of the military. Although he sees no easy way out of the dilemma, Baynham suggests that increasing the size of the police force to its authorised complement and creating a new paramilitary unit might offer ways of alleviating heavy-handed riot control techniques. he regular deployment of troops in the The armed forces' direct role in this regard African townships since September should be restricted to certain cases where The use of the T1984 has provoked fiery protest that the their training and equipment may be more South African appropriate. One instance would be the use South African Defence Force (SADF) is Defence Force being thrust into an explicitly political role. of military forces to handle violent At last year's Transvaal National Party confrontations with heavily-armed hijackers (SADF) in an Congress, Minister of Law and Order Mr or terrorists, such as the British Special Air explicitly political Louis le Grange announced that army Service assault on the Iranian Embassy in role has given rise cooperation with the police was to be 1981, which involved split-second timing, to much unorthodox skills and a very high level of increased, a major step which UCT sociology controversy professor Michael Savage categorised as 'a training. tragic manifestation of a country that is at There are other occasions when the military war with itself (End Conscription Campaign is legitimately called upon to provide press conference). Later, in November, came specialist skills and equipment over and a government ban on information relating to above those familiar to the police, eg in cases the SADF's role in combined police/army of bomb disposal or electronic operations, a decision that added fuel to the eavesdropping. The use of military personnel anti-conscription movement in the white and facilities in a peripheral capacity to community. enable the police to fulfill their role is Most white South Africans regard the SADF publicly acceptable if this reduces the element as an instrument of defence against external of risk and the likelihood of casualties. But aggression, but in this country, as in most the occasional provision of assistance is of a others, the armed forces are also trained to qualitatively different nature to the more undertake internal security duties. And this is delicate issue of using troops alongside where the paradoxical position of the military policemen for maintaining public order in the face of violent demonstrations and riots. is thrown into sharp focus. For while Within the Napoleon's maxim that 'without an army there is neither independence nor civil liberty' democratic may be true, Edmund Burke's warning that Joint Operations tradition, the 'an armed, disciplined body is in its essence In South Africa, the precedent for joint army police force is dangerous to liberty' is equally valid. What and police operations stretches back more publicly then is the answer to this apparently than 70 years. Violent worker strikes led to recognised as the intractable dilemma? the restoration of order by burger commandos under General J H de la Rey in both 1913 proper and 1914. The 1922 Rand Revolt is probably constitutional Assistant Role the best known case, when armed workers agency to maintain A basic premise of democratic government is were subdued in an operation that involved law and order that as long as democracy is allowed to artillery, aircraft and thousands of troops. flourish, the police force is the only proper There were more than 1 200 casualties, with agency to maintain law and order. They are 200 fatalities. Until October 1984, the SADF constitutionally designed for, and publicly had been used to assist policemen in the recognised as the proper agent for dealing suppression of civil unrest on isolated with individual or collective law-breakers. occasions, especially during the 1976

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 17 upheavals, when it was alerted mainly for many conscripted soldiers relish. Riot-control stand-by duties as a 'second line of defence'. strains and in some cases splits the loyalties In mainland Britain, as distinct from of national servicemen, thereby undercutting In South Africa morale and discipline within the SADF. This there are a number Northern Ireland, troops have not been utilised in a law and order role since the 1919 argument may be all the more apposite if of valid objections August Bank Holiday disturbances in attempts are still to be made to conscript to the deployment Liverpool. During the early 1960s in the coloured and Indian males. oftheSADFinthe United States, part-time national guardsmen Finally, there is also the danger of fuelling suppression of were used in the southern states to enable international rejection of the new black people to exercise their electoral rights domestic unrest constitutional dispensation, as army aid to in the face of widespread white opposition. the civil power is presented as another However, in the socialist bloc and manifestation of the supposed authoritarian throughout most of the Third World, the influence of the military and intelligence armed forces are regularly deployed in an establishment. internal security role. Premature Deployment Few would dispute that the SADF has an Criticism and Response internal security role in the final resort. And In contemporary South Africa there are a many would support the existence of number of valid objections to SADF contingency plans for military assistance to deployment in the suppression of domestic deal with situations of protracted violence or political protest. In the first place, there is the armed insurrection beyond the capacity of police containment. What is worrying is that Military weaponry problem of increased force. Where highly trained and powerfully armed soldiers —who the initial deployment of troops in African and training are are equipped for a combat role and thus may townships during the last quarter of 1984 designed for killing take on the appearance of an army of appeared to be unusually premature. Since on a battlefield, not occupation — are called in to support the then, especially after the tragic Sharpeville civil power, it is almost inevitably going to Day shootings at Langa in the Eastern Cape, for subduing the military has been regularly utilised to crowds escalate the level of violence. Military weaponry and training are designed for actively support the police. Unless this killing on a battlefield, not for subduing worrying trend is quickly reversed, the crowds. Using a sledgehammer to crack a nut overall result will be counter-productive, is unlikely to achieve the desired result. rather than conducive, to the restoration of peace. Indeed, as Lord Haldane, British Secretary of State for War, said as long ago as 1908: 'The So long as the government enjoys a measure soldier is a person who is armed with a of consensus, upholding the law and public deadly weapon ... if he appears order should be a police matter. The police unnecessarily, he is apt to create an must have the capability to match and beat impression of a hostile character. His anything that mobs of rioters or urban menacing appearance may lead to the very guerillas can do, but they should creep up thing which it is his purpose to prevent: civil slowly on the use of responsive force. There In the final resort are four overlapping stages in the gradual the SADF has an disturbance'. On the other hand, South African police spokesmen argue that often escalation of police force to deal with internal security the need to use weapons does not arise, since corresponding forms of public violence: role, but the use of the mere appearance of camouflaged troops is • the issue of special protective clothing troops in the last frequently sufficient to disperse a hostile (shields, visors, helmets), accompanied by anti-riot drills quarter of 1984 crowd. In any case, they point out, SADF personnel are rarely involved in frontline • the use of non-lethal missiles such as fire was unusually duties, but rather perform a back-up role to hoses premature assist the police in duties such as cordon • the further resort to incapacitating riot operations and road blocks. control agents such as plastic bullets and tear gas A second problem area relates to the wider • the use of live ammunition and normal constitutional implications of deploying a military weapons. putatively apolitical force not against external enemies but to quash internal dissent. This course of action undermines the A Third Force alleged political neutrality of the Defence If the police are to deal successfully with the The use of SADF Force. In fact, a number of senior military several stages of escalating civil unrest, then conscripts in officers are clearly reluctant to see troops cast perhaps a new paramilitary unit should be African townships once again in the role of an auxiliary police established. The existence of a separate riot force, as it diminishes their public credibility could split the squad — independent of both the military and undermines the thrust of the SADF's loyalties of national and the police — is common in Western civic action programme to win the 'hearts Europe: the French 'Compagnies sen/icemen and and minds' of black people. Rather than Republicaines de Securite' (CRS), the Dutch undercut morale being perceived as in conflict with ordinary 'Koninklijke Marechaussee', the West German people, the SADF would like to be perceived 'Bereitschaftspolizei' (police alert units), etc. as society's protectors. This would enable the regular police to Thirdly, deployment of a citizen army to cultivate an image of serving the interest of patrol African townships is not a task that all members of the community, thus

18R ural& Regiona lMoni tor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 divorcing them from those duties that have policemen do not become insulated from given the SAP an unfortunate stigma as conventional police duties and public enforcers of internal order. contact, a syndrome which appears to affect the special reaction squads within the SAP. To cope with a On the other hand, paramilitary bodies like the Trench CRS, unmellowed by daily The Minister of Law and Order should also rapidly growing contact with the public, tend to develop an take immediate steps to implement his population, the aggressive character of their own. They are recently announced intention of bringing the police should take only deployed under conditions when SAP from its actual complement of about immediate steps to disorder has reached an advanced stage, so 47 000 personnel to its authorised increase its actual enter a hostile situation whereupon their very establishment, in the context of a rapidly compliment to appearance tends to further escalate violence growing population to be policed. Measures levels. should also be implemented to upgrade the 47 000 personnel quality of recruits, including a special scheme to attract more university graduates from all Conclusion communities. Clearly, there is no simple solution to the Ultimately, however, none of these measures issues confronted here. However, one will be of much moment unless concurrent appropriate course of action might be to political and socio-economic policies are adopt and adapt the London Metropolitan introduced to alleviate the grievances that Police model. There, specially-trained riot trigger off violent unrest in the first place. reserves are made up of normal constables, The South African government should each with at least three years' regular service address itself more keenly to the roots of civil and each returning to conventional duties conflict instead of concentrating on al ter a maximum of three years in the riot administering the bitter medicine that follows unit. This procedure ensures that riot in its wake. POfii

THE PRAETORIAN MARCH ON PRETORIA A review of Philip Frankel's study of 'Civil-Military Relations in South Africa', by Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel

olitical scientist Philip Frankel's treatment of the The extensive role played by the SADF and SAP in changing composition and role of the South imposing a direct form of martial rule in the townships PAfrican Defence Force (SADF) is an important was reflected in Minister of Defence Magnus Malan's and timely contribution to an understanding of the recent request to parliament for a supplementary gradual militarisation of South African society. The defence budget (Natal Mercury 27/4/85). At the time, publication of this overdue study coincides with he remarked that 'if outside threats, coupled with growing public controversy over the military's present internal revolutionary threats, continue to increase at incursion into the realm of civil law enforcement and the present rate, there can be no cuts in the Defence political decisionmaking in South Africa (see preceding Budget'. article by Dr S Baynham). Unfortunately, Frankel completed this study prior to the outbreak of widespread township unrest in August Predictions 1984, which has since witnessed the regular The evaluations of the political and civil performance involvement of SADF troops and equipment in of the military offered in the book are firmly set in the maintaining internal security. His speculative context of most 'non-western' nations confronting socio-political crises. Frankel's short-term prognosis is conclusions on the prospects for further military one of a low-key movement by the military into civil involvement, through maintaining and possibly affairs, a process promoted by 'continued executive directing South Africa's turbulent reform process, may support, social crisis and/or basic shifts in the coalition already have been overtaken by recent events.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 19 structure of white politics' (pi82). in counter-insurgency operations conducted in rural For the longer term, he discounts the possibility of the areas of South Africa, Namibia and further afield SADF being willing or capable of installing itself in • the role played by military intelligence in power on a relatively permanent basis, for purposes of determining development priorities and managing either reform or reactionary control. He notes instead regional politics that most defence forces, if they do go this far, • joint SADF/SAP efforts to maintain internal 'civilianise' government a short while after taking security (see Baynham for historical examples). power, through frustration at their inability to shape society according to military dictates and practice. Black Recruitment Another critical area investigated by Frankel is the Total Strategy incorporation of black manpower into the SADF, their Frankel gives detailed attention to a central dynamic occupational mobility and the paradoxical security which, he argues, explains why military and political problem they may come to pose for the white state. A leaders have adopted a total strategy approach to recruitment programme, associated with the 'hearts security (pp 14/28). Simply stated, this is the and minds' counter-insurgency strategy, has reached 'Kommando' ethic inherited from the Boer War, with the extent where some 40 percent of the SADF its blurred distinction of civil and military roles in the (including the South West African Territorial Force) governing of a garrison state. are black soldiers (p 121). Furthermore, a pool of potential recruits in excess of requirements exists, The book astutely traces the reappearance of this probably because of the equitable employment traditional defence ethic within an unfolding siege prospects offered. Numerous ethnic units and an elite, culture. Frankel shows how international and domestic 'multi-racial unit' are described in the book. pressures since 1960 have effectively promoted the modernisation of the SADF and shifted the inter-play Frankel notes that military decisionmakers are hesitant of civil and military relations away from the liberal, to continue enrolment in the African community, while Commonwealth model based on a separation of the citizenship issue is still unresolved and a growing functions. Frankel observes that the SADF advocates body of negative black opinion exists towards coordinated action between all government participation in 'the system'. Nevertheless, he foresees departments and institutions to counter the perceived an increasing racial dilution of the SADF, resulting multi-dimensional onslaught against the RSA in the perhaps in the military playing an increasing role in ideological, cultural, political and diplomatic fields. promoting reform within South Africa's broader Today, the military is dependent on promoting the political structures. However, the study does not total strategy concept in order to lay claims to both discount the prospect of black soldiers 'turning their political influence and fiscal resources. weapons on the State structures they have been armed to defend' and concludes that this Pandora's box reflects on the ultimate fragility of the garrison state Responsive Militarisation (pi60). In an unstable society going through the violent throes of change, the loyalty of the defence forces to The dynamics of responsive militarisation in South government and the prospects of disaffection by black Africa, especially the management of the Defence soldiers or policemen is a strategic area worthy of Budget, are gone into in great detail. Although the further comparison and discussion. funds allocated by government for defence spending have remained relatively stable in real terms over the past eight years, Frankel points out that 'the building blocks of South Africa's garrison state are far more Conflict and Concession complex and wide-ranging . . . than the relatively In the final chapters, Frankel sets out to develop more simple and publicly visible process of soldiers tapping fully some of the issues raised in his treatment of total the public coffers'. onslaught, the; 'toenadering' of civil-military The study documents the growth of South Africa's relationships and particularly the militarisation military-industrial complex and the receptivety of the process. He examines both the social conflict resulting private sector to the burgeoning defence industry. It from the SADF's greater role in society and the locates Armscor alongside Anglo-American and positive impact exerted by the 'integrating and Barlow Rand as the three biggest financial homogenising forces' of the military with regard to undertakings in South Africa (pp81/90). The most improving race relations in South Africa itself. striking example of joint military/private enterprise is Unfortunately, as publication of the study pre-empted the development of the G6 (a motorised cannon), SADF suppression of township unrest, the impact of produced and marketed by Armscor and some 50 domestic operations on black attitudes and potential private companies, which is based on a range of white conscriptees is insufficiently explored. technologies supplied by various western states. Ultimately though, the South African parliament has The implications of the 'Kommando' ethic are further had little experience of the predatory praetorian tradition, in striking contrast to South America where explored in terms of SADF participation in the civil military domination of government is an 'accepted defence system and in executive struggles over the element of political life and social thought'. A tradition formulation of state policy. Those forces promoting of debate has ensured an ambivalent public response to approachment between the civil and military powers in 'total strategy', a conspiracy theory which, as Frankel this regard are well covered in the book, particularly warns, reduces society's complexities 'to a few easily the inroads made by SADF officers in promoting the graspable and stereotypical formulae from which only as the country's top the security of the white state emerges'. QIMJ^ decisionmaking body at present (p 104/7). Other linkages between the two spheres have included: P Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians, Cambridge University, 1984. Price • the assistance provided to the police by SADF units R30.95.

20 Political Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985

1 Population & Poverty: The Truths and Truisms behind High Growth Rates 7 Economic Outlook 12 The Great Free Market Debate 13 Marketing Private Enterprise We're as important to the man in the street as we are to the men in Diagonal Street. Being one of the top performers on the stock exchange means a better standard of living for our shareholders. But being involved in the country's , economic development means the creation of more wealth and an improved standard of living for every South African. It's an involvemenMhat has seen us establish coal mines, stainless steel works, cement, glass and other factories to effectively utilise the country's vast resources, to generate more exports, create more jobs, and contribute significantly to the nation's growth. Involvement means responsibility — in education and training, in helping to establish more businesses, and playing a meaningful role in the community — ensuring not only the country's future, but yours too.

•IIOWRAND

Mining, cement! electronics, building supplies, earthmoving equipment,irnptor^ehrdes, hbusenoi^ food, packaging and textiles. Diagnosis,

the Truths & Truisms ind High Growt

By Prof Jill Nattrass, Head of the Development Studies Unit at the University of Natal

Jill Nattrass examines some of the linkages between poverty and population growth, and concludes that in South Africa, a general change in overall government policy will ultimately have a far greater hope of success in decreasing population growth rates than any population programme based on existing policies.

I t is often said that a major cause of poverty in third world countries is their rapid I population growth. The recent report of the President's Council (PC) on South In South Africa, the • Africa's demographic trends went so far as to state that, 'Leaders in general and institutionalisation of particularly those in communities with a high population increase are not sufficiently apartheid has aware of the misery in store for their communities should present growth trends distorted predictable continue' (PCI/1983). development patterns It is undeniably true that a given bundle of goods and services shared out equally and their relationship amongst a large population will yield less per head than would be the case if it were shared amongst a smaller community. At the same time, it is also true that one cannot with demographic simply project this simple equation into a dynamic situation where a host of change complicating factors come into play. In a developing country, the linkages between poverty and population growth are extremely complex and this makes it very difficult for planners to plot the future with any degree of accuracy. In South Africa's case, the links are made even more convoluted by the fact that the institutionalisation of apartheid has distorted predictable development patterns and their relationships with demographic change. Population Growth Rates In general, although there are a number of categorical statements made by so-called 'authorities', other demagogues and politicians on the subject of demography, we know very little about either population growth or poverty. There are actually no definitive

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Reg ionalMonitor 1 conclusions, despite the fact that a great deal of research has been undertaken in this Changes in the rate of area. population growth are There are some generally accepted 'truths' though in relation to population growth in a the result of changes developmental context. These research findings can be summarised as follows: in the underlying • Population growth is the outcome of three demographic forces — the mortality or death rate, the fertility or birth rate, and the migration rate. All of these forces react demographic forces of differently to changing levels of economic and social development. fertility, mortality and • Population profiles (age and sex structures) differ, depending on the degree of migration rates modernisation of the population and the level of economic development. • Population growth rates are higher in poor regions and countries than they are in wealthy regions and countries. • Population growth rates are also higher in rural areas than in urban areas. • Rapid population growth rates will lead to increasing poverty. It is clearly no more than a mathematical truism to explain that changes in the rate of population growth are the result of changes in the underlying demographic forces of fertility, mortality and migration. Beneath the surface, the actual causes of changes in these three primary demographic forces themselves are of far more interest.

Development and Mortality Rates Although a great deal of emphasis is always placed on the role the birth rate plays in population growth, the actual impact that changes in mortality rates have had on the Fertility Rates

It has been argued one should make a clear-cut to assume the added cost burden of providing their distinction between the sexual and medical factors children with sufficient education and training to be that physically affect fertility; and the structural able to enter this labour market. Moreover, family ties factors that influence the choices of potential parents are usually weaker in the urban situation. The in respect of the number of children they would like to economic implications of this trend are that the conceive. chance of the parents being able to recoup some of this financial outlay, through securing care in their old Factors affecting fertility per se are: age by their offspring, is also significantly less than it • The level of general health, nutrition and medical is in the rural situation. care in the population. Improved standards of health All in all, because the costs of raising a child are advance the age of puberty, increase the frequency of highier and the returns from the child to the parents sexual intercourse and the general level of fecundity, are lower in towns, urban parents are more likely to and reduce the percentage of children that are choose to have smaller families than rural parents. stillborn. • The average age at which marriage takes place and (2) The educational level of the parents the existence of practices that make births out of It is generally accepted that the average family size wedlock socially acceptable, such as the African declines as the educational level of parents rises. This practice of proving fertility before contracting effect is particularly noticeable in respect of the rising marriage. educational levels of women in society. • The extent to which contraception is practiced, Firstly, exposure to education develops a realisation of which in turn is related to parental choice regarding the benefits that flow from it, and consequently family size. increases the determination of parents to educate their children — thus increasing the care costs per Factors that will affect a couple's choice in relation to child produced. Furthermore, education itself the number of children they will plan to have are: develops rationality and reduces the impact that (1) The degree of urbanisation superstition and fatalistic attitudes have on fertility In general, the costs to a family in an urban situation patterns. of having an additional child are higher and the (3) Mortality returns lower than they are in a rural area. In urban Studies in developing countries have shown clearly society, housing and care costs are higher, as are the that child and infant mortality rates have a feedback indirect costs that stem from the mother's loss of relationship with fertility patterns. This process occurs mobility. Furthermore, in a rural area children through the impact that the expectation of represent a significant source of labour, whereas in a successfully raising a child to adulthood has on the town there are virtually no opportunities for child parents' choice of the number of infants they will labour. produce. In many cases, it seems that a reduction in In addition, because most urban labour markets infant and child mortality rates is actually a require more sophisticated labour supplies than their prerequisite for any reduction in the birth rate to take rural counterparts, there is pressure on urban parents place.

2 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 A migrant worker collects his pay. This type ot migration, where the worker leaves his family behind in the rural area, puts upward pressure on the population growth rates in the rural areas. world population over the past 50 years is in fact significantly greater than that of The average family changing birth rates. size declines as a In poor communities, life expectancy at birth is low, not usually because people live result of increasing short lives on average, but because the chances of survival beyond the age of five years urbanisation and are poor. Due to poor nourishment and inadequate social conditions, both infant rising educational mortality rates (deaths amongst those under one year) and child mortality rates (deaths amongst those 1-5 years) are high. The reduction of these death rates usually yields levels dramatically to relatively small improvement in the average quality of life. This is largely as a result of the impact of modern medicine through the introduction of such things as vaccination programmes, malaria eradication, antibiotic treatment, oral rehydration practices and improved overall hygiene standards. Reducing the infant and child mortality rates not only reduces the overall mortality rate, but also has a very significant second round impact on the birth rate, because Family planning these children will now grow to adulthood to raise their own families. Exactly how large this impact could be, can be gauged from the fact that in Brazil in 1975, 48 campaigns and social percent of all registered deaths comprised children under five years, whereas the change may succeed equivalent percentage for Sweden was only one percent! The South African mortality in reducing fertility statistics, incomplete as they are, also contain some telling data. In 1979, 25 percent of rates fairly rapidly all recorded African deaths comprised infants, and another 33 percent comprised children under five years old. What these statistics mean is that family planning campaigns and social change may succeed in reducing fertility rates fairly rapidly. However, the impact of improved living conditions on the mortality rate are sufficient in themselves to counteract such gains and instead generate a significant increase in the population growth rate. The complex relationship between these factors illustrates how misleading it is to simplistically link poverty to rapid population growth. Improved living conditions however, Development and Migration can counteract these gains and instead Because development tends to be concentrated from a spatial viewpoint, it usually generate a significant generates significant movements of people who are drawn by the new opportunities opening up in the developing region. Migration undoubtedly affects population growth increase in the rates. Most importantly, the direction and size of its impact is related to the nature of population growth the migration process itself. Three distinct types of migration — in-migration, out- rate migration and circulating-migration — can be identified and their effects on population growth differ. Clearly, net in-migration will increase the rate of population growth, simply because of the increase in numbers due to the migrants themselves. There may, however, also be

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 3 secondary demographic effects from migration. International statistics show that the The migration process migration process is age and education selective, favouring young well-educated men. Consequently, the size of the secondary impact will depend upon whether or not the is age and education migrants affect the overall adult sex ratios in a manner that is conducive to the selective, favouring production of more children. Married migrants at the start of their reproduction cycle young well-educated will be a force for a secondary increase in the birth rate, whereas older migrants or men those who do not find a long term partner, will probably not have this. Permanent out-migration from an area, on the other hand, will reduce the rate of population growth quite significantly. Not only does it too directly affect population numbers, but it also tends to be concentrated amongst the age groups most likely to produce children. Circulating migration such as we have on a large scale in South Africa between the towns and the African rural areas, is a system under which only the worker (usually the man) goes to town to seek work. He leaves his family behind in the rural area, to live on what subsistence they can eke out of tribal agriculture and the remittances he may Feedback loops send back to them. This type of migration puts upward pressure on the population between birth, growth rates in the rural areas: mortality and • Firstly, remittances from migrants will help to curb infant and child mortality rates migration rates affect • Secondly, this form of migration perpetuates the tribal system, which itself has a the population growth value framework which encourages large families rate in various subtle • Thirdly, it also effectively prevents women from urbanising and thus insulates them and diverse ways from the social forces in the towns that would lead them to elect to have smaller families. Overview In general terms, whilst one must accept that the population growth rate is indeed a function of the birth, mortality and migration rates, one must also realise that the relationships are not simple ones. A number of feedback loops exist between the three sub-components which affect the final outcome in various subtle and diverse ways. Poverty and Income Distribution A well-established view of the relationship between poverty and population growth relates two factors in a fundamental way. There are two versions of this relationship: Although population • The more acceptable interpretation holds that population growth rates can be growth rates are expected to be higher in poor countries and regions than they are in wealthier ones. lowest in the industrial • The alternative is a Malthusian view of the poorer areas of the world, which argues economies, the that these areas are poor largely because people living there have too many children. second lowest group In actuality, statistics do not support either of these views in a concrete form, although is constituted by the as a loose generalisation, the first view could be accepted. The accompanying table poorest countries gives some data illustrating these points.

Table 1 INCOME LEVELS AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES IN SELECTED REGIONS IN 1981

Region Average Population Fertility Mortality Life income growth rates per 1 000 expectancy per head rate at birth US$ % % (crude) (years)

Low income countries 270 1.9 4.3 12 58 Middle income countries 1 500 2.4 4.8 11 60 Lower middle 850 2.6 5.2 12 57 Upper middle 2 490 2.2 4.2 9 65 High income oil 13 460 4.9 7.1 12 57 Industrial market 11 120 0.7 1.8 9 75

SOURCE: Woild Development Report 1983. World Bank.

4R ural& Region alMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 From the table, it is clear that although population growth rates are lowest in the industrial economies, the second lowest group is in fact constituted by the poorest High fertility rates are countries rather than those in the middle income group. Indeed, the highest growth related to a flow of rates are instead found in the group of countries which have the highest average per capital incomes, ie the oil-producing nations. wealth from child to parent. To lower these An interesting view of the way in which fertility declines as a society progresses relates this process to the direction of the net flow of wealth transferred between children and rates, the direction of parents. In primitive and traditional societies, the direction of this net wealth flow is the flow must be nearly always from child to parent. As long as this remains true, high fertility rates are reversed entirely rational. It is only when societal changes reverse the direction of this net flow in favour of the children, that one can realistically expect fertility rates to decline.

Apartheid Policies and Demography The effects of racial discrimination from all sources on South Africa's demographic structure flows from the impact that it has on the economic variables that will, under more normal circumstances, be set to generate demographic change. Specifically, racial discrimination has slowed down both the rate of urbanisation and modernisation of the Influx control laws African community in general, and probably even more importantly, of African have resulted in women in particular. African under- urbanisation, which in Apartheid and Urbanisation turn has encouraged The group of laws known'collectively as the influx control system have, together with the persistence of the earlier historical patterns of economic development, institutionalised a vast system high population of circulating rural-urban migration among the African groups in South Africa. This in growth rates turn has resulted in a substantial degree of African under-urbanisation. One of the most detrimental effects of apartheid policies of influx control and resettlement is that too low a proportion of the African population lives in the urban areas, in terms of the average level of economic development. Not only is the overall level of African urbanisation lower than one would normally expect but, in addition, the under-allocation of state revenues for the development of the black urban areas has resulted in the generation of an urban environment for black people that is of a very poor quality. The unattractiveness of conditions in the African townships reinforces the purpose of the influx control laws and tends to further discourage urbanisation. To the extent to which Since empirical studies have shown a clear link between a reduction in the fertility rate modernisation has and urbanisation one must expect that a policy such as apartheid, which discourages permeated rural the urbanisation of the African group, will inevitably also encourage the persistence of communities, it has high population growth rates. Indeed all the studies done on African family structures in South Africa have shown that rural families are larger than urban families and that acted to increase rural women have significantly more children. rather than decrease Another negative by-product of apartheid policies, in terms of impact on demographic the population growth patterns, stems from the way in which the laws are actually applied. In practice, while rate an African man from the rural areas has at least a 60/70 percent chance of legally getting into the town, it is extremely difficult for African women to obtain the necessary permission. Rural African women are, therefore, effectively cut off from the modern sector labour market and the relatively high returns offered there. For them, the returns from wage labour dramatically increase the cost of having children, in terms of income loss during the maternity cycle. In other words, the exclusion of rural African women from the urban labour market significantly reduces the cost of child bearing to them and again encourages high population growth rates. The impact of circulating migration on the rural labour supply also reinforces this tendency. The high absentee rate among men in the rural area resulting from the high Modern medical care rate of male out-migration puts extreme pressure on the labour supply. This in its turn and income from places a premium on child labour, which must again exert an upward pressure on the rural birth rate. migrant remittances have reduced child mortality rates and Apartheid and Modernisation lengthened average The practice of race discrimination in general and the effect of influx control in life expectancy, particular has also significantly retarded the process of modernisation among the thereby increasing the African communities. Education and urbanisation are the major forces generating modernisation and both development processes have lagged significantly among the population growth African groups. The result has been the persistence of a set of tribal or traditional rate beliefs, one of which places a high value on a large number of children. Although racial discrimination has retarded the modernisation process among the African group, it has not prevented it entirely. It is somewhat ironic that, to the extent to which modernisation has permeated these communities (in a partial form), it has

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 5 acted to increase rather than decrease the rate of population growth. This is largely Rural-urban because limited though it may be, the impact of modern medical care and the increase migration, in rural incomes flowing from migrant remittances have acted to reduce infant and child mortality rates and to lengthen the average life expectancy. concentrated as it is among men, has Rural-urban migration, concentrated as it is among men, has virtually no modernising effect on the women who remain behind. Their only direct contact with the changing virtually no values of the modern industrial and urban environments has been through: modernising effect on • the medium of the radio, a limited exposure due to the lack of electric power and the the women who high cost of batteries remain behind • their schooling experiences • conversations with returning migrants • the impressions gained from any temporary visits they make to the towns.

Education and urbanisation, the major forces generating A Population Policy for the Future modernisation, have lagged One of the first tasks assigned to the President's Council was to study demographic significantly among the trends in South Africa and to make recommendations in respect of their findings. The African group. Council's major finding was that present population growth rates would generate a population too large to be sustained in the long term, given South Africa's resources. Water was seen as the binding constraint and a population ceiling of 70 million people was estimated to be the cut-off point, beyond which water shortages would be increasingly felt. The Council recommended the adoption of a population policy based upon the development of the people. In this context, they correctly emphasised the need for Since urbanisation increased spending on education, health care and the general social upliftment of the poorer segments of South African society. The Council was indecisive in its plays a key role in recommendations regarding urbanisation. While accepting that urbanisation had a generating negative influence on the rate of population growth, the Council did not recommend demographic change, the adoption of a policy to encourage further rapid urbanisation in South Africa. It a comprehensive tended instead to emphasise the negative aspects of urbanisation and made urbanisation policy recommendations designed primarily to alleviate these, rather than to encourage urbanisation per se. must be one of the cornerstones of any Since urbanisation plays a key role in generating demographic change, a comprehensive population urbanisation policy must be one of the cornerstones of any population programme. However, it must also be evident from the preceding discussion that present programme government policies actually encourage a rapid population growth rate. A general policy change will ultimately have a far greater hope of success on the demographic front than will any population programme that is grafted on to existing policies. Of particular importance will be measures to encourage the modernisation of African women and their participation in the modern industrial work force.

6 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Economic Outlook

By Dr Merle Holden and Prof Mike McGrath of the Department of Economics, University of Natal

The increased output of the agricultural sector RETROSPECT was the main factor behind the hanges in the real Gross Domestic tighter hire-purchase regulations. increase in overall Product (GDP) show the course of the Economists are now in agreement that the GDP in the last business cycle in the South African r earlier buoyancy of consumption quarter of 1984 economy. The years from 1979/81 were expenditures in the previous four quarters characterised by positive rates of growth of had largely contributed towards the mini- output, stimulated by the high price of gold boom. Real government consumption in this period. During 1982 and the first half expenditure, which too had contributed of 1983 the economy was in recession, due to substantially to the mini-boom, also declined the falling gold price, world-wide recession, in the third quarter before increasing once and the severe drought. The economy then again in the fourth quarter of 1984. Real experienced what was called a 'mini-boom' in gross domestic fixed investment started the second half of 1983 and the first half of declining earlier in 1984, with an overall 1984. The gold price had risen somewhat and decline of 2.5 percent for the year. Both high During the both fiscal and monetary policy had been interest rates and the slowdown in economic downswing in expansionary. activity led businessmen to curtail their plans 1984, the Unfortunately, the revival in the economy for expansion. depreciated rand was shortlived. Real output declined in the During the downswing in 1984 the volume of and world-wide manufacturing, commerce, transport and exports grew by 12 percent, while their value economic growth construction sectors in the last two quarters increased by 28 percent and acted as a of 1984. The index of gold and non-gold dampener to the recession. The depreciated were catalysts for mining production increased by 2 percent rand and world-wide economic growth were an export growth and the real output of the agricultural sector the catalysts for this export growth. Over the of 12 percent grew by almost 14 percent over the year. The year, substantial increases in the value of increased output of the agricultural sector, exports of mineral products (64%), base largely caused by an above average wheat metals (57%), textiles (41%) and Chemicals crop, was the main factor behind the increase (52%) occurred. in overall real GDP in the last quarter of 1984. Overall real GDP increased by 4.5 percent in 1984 compared with the decline of Employment Trends 3 percent in 1983. Trends in employment and unemployment also reflect the changes in GDP. From 1979 to 1981 non-agricultural employment Between 1982 and Gross Domestic Expenditure increased steadily, whereas in the recession of 1984, employment A consideration of the components of the 1982/83 declines were registered. During the GDP provides some understanding of the mini-boom employment in non-agricultural levels fell in the changes that have occurred. Gross domestic activities once again increased, but during the manufacturing, expenditure, which is the sum of latter part of 1984 employment in the non- construction, consumption, investment and government agricultural sectors of the economy fell by 1.1 wholesale, retail expenditures, displayed similar cyclical percent. Over the whole period between and transport patterns to GDP. Consumption expenditure 1982/84, the level of non-agricultural declined sharply in the third quarter of 1984, employment declined by 0.2 percent. This sectors followed by a further decline in the fourth decrease was unevenly spread across race quarter. The decrease was largely due to the groups, however, for white and Indian restrictive monetary policy of August 1984, employment actually increased by 2.0 percent the increase in general sales tax (GST) and and 1.8 percent respectively, while coloured

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Region alMonitor 7 and African employment fell by 0.2 and 1.5 Research (BER) Economic Opinion Survey Some cushioning percent respectively. for the first quarter of 1985 shows that the of the workforce The decline in total employment was a result number of firms reporting lay-offs has from the current of falling levels of employment of all the race increased in the manufacturing, wholesale groups in the manufacturing, construction, and retail trade, which are the sectors recession was covered by the survey. Moreover, this provided by wholesale and retail trade and transport sectors, in which 130 700 jobs were lost reduction in employment will not be employment between 1982 and the end of 1984. This is not tempered in 1985 by increasing levels of expansion in the yet as large as the decrease in employment public sector employment. The BER reports mining, banking, which occurred in these sectors in the post- that in the first quarter of 1985: insurance and Soweto economic slump, where 134 000 jobs • in manufacturing, 37 percent of firms surveyed reported reductions in the number public sectors were lost between the second quarter of 1976 and the last quarter of 1977. However, an of factory workers expansion in employment in the mining, • in wholesaling, 56 percent of firms banking and insurance sectors of 26 000 jobs reported staffing cuts and an increase in public sector employment • in retailing, 30 percent of firms reported of 84 000 jobs, provided some cushioning of staffing cuts. the workforce from the current recession. African/White Wage Ratios Notwithstanding these increases, the downswing in the business cycle has been so Although employment fell during 1984, real severe that the level of employment in the salaries and wages increased. In real terms, economy has actually fallen. The average remuneration per worker in the non- unemployment problem, however, is more agricultural sectors was 3.9 percent higher in severe than these numbers indicate, for the the first nine months of 1984 than in the natural growth of the workforce, which corresponding period in 1983. Although results from population growth and the African unemployment increased markedly between 1982 and 1984, African real wages The persistence of underemployment in black rural areas, must also be taken into account. rose by 2.2 percent per annum. In unemployment Between 1982 and 1984 (for South Africa and comparison, white real wages rose at a slower problem is, all the independent and self-governing 0.8 percent per annum and as a consequence, however, more homelands), this population growth would the ratio of white to African real wages have increased the workforce by continued to fall. Indeed, over the decade severe, for the between 1975 and the end of 1984, African natural growth of approximately 77 000 whites, 59 000 coloureds, 13 000 Indians, and 391 000 real wages in the non-agricultural sectors the workforce Africans. (excluding domestic service) rose at a faster must also be real rate than white real wages, thereby taken into reducing the wage ratio disparity between First Quarter, 1985 whites and Africans from 4.72 in 1975 to 3.87 account The results of the Bureau for Economic in 1984.

The wage ratio disparity between whites and Africans has THE BUDGET reduced from 4.72 in 1975 to 3.87 in 1984 ^^ t the present time, the South African percent in the United States and 5 percent in economy exhibits all the characteristics the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the " " of stagflation — real output is falling, choice of economic policy in South Africa is unemployment is rising, and it is likely now complicated by the existence of a that real wages are also falling. Yet despite disenfranchised African labour force which, these deflationary trends, the rate of inflation as we have seen, bears the brunt of the high has accelerated. We are in a situation not levels of unemployment. Policymakers here unlike that which both the United States and have declared that a reduction of the The choice of Britain faced in the late 1970s. It will be inflation rate is indeed the target of policy, economic policy recalled that at this time there was and to this end the cost of money has soared, in South Africa is disagreement as to the remedy for this form with a prime rate of 25 percent. This has been coupled with increased taxes and a 1985/86 complicated by of economic malaise. Conservative policymakers favoured strongly deflationary budget which is strongly deflationary in its the existence of a monetary and fiscal policy to deal with the stance. disenfranchised problem of inflation, whereas those of a more African labour liberal bent were concerned about the costs force of rising unemployment which would ensue. In the event, conservative policies in the form Restoring Business Confidence of Reaganomics and Thatcherism prevailed, This approach has been applauded by unemployment soared, but eventually businessmen as a step in the direction of inflation was significantly reduced to 3.6 restoring economic health. Business

8 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Table 1 • GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, REVENUE AND DEFICIT • (R Million)

80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 Total Expenditure 13 642 16 455 19 532 22 954 27 194 30 892 Total Revenue 13310 14416 17 172 19 081 23 835 28 322 Deficit 332 2 039 2 360 4 028 3 359 2 570 Deficit/GDP % 0.5 2.8 2.9 4.4 3.4 2.2 Expenditure/GDP % 20.5 22.6 24.0 25.1 27.5 26.4

Table 2 • BUDGETED VS ACTUAL EXPENDITURES • (Ft Million)

80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85

Actual Expenditure 11 506 13 642 19 532 22 954 27 194 Budgeted Expenditure 11 190 13 083 18 238 21 276 24 945 Overspending 316 559 1 294 1 778 2 249 Overspending/Budgeted % 2.8 4.3 7.1 8.4 9.0 Overspending/GDP % 0.5 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.3 confidence had been eroded by rising Reducing the Deficit Black union inflation rates, a rapidly depreciating rand spokesmen are and a depressing recession. The Business The budgeted reduction in the absolute size Times/Markinor Top Executive Survey of the deficit has been achieved at the less enthusiastic shows that more than half of the top 69 expense of rising taxes and a reduction in real than businessmen executives interviewed rated the 1985/86 terms of expenditure. Total state expenditure about the state's budget as good or very good, and 67 percent as a percentage of GDP increased from 20.5 economic percent of GDP in 1980/81 to an historic of them viewed the attempt to restrict policies, as government spending as the best aspect of the high of 27.5 percent in 1984/85, increasingly workers are less budget. On the other hand, 71 percent diverting resources from the private sector to expected the budget to affect their company's the public sector (see table 1). able to 'tighten profitability adversely and 72 percent felt that Furthermore, as shown in table 2, their belts' it would depress the economy. Verbal self- overspending by government (the excess of flagellation seems to have become the order actual expenditure over budgeted of the day, with corporate spokesmen making expenditure) has contributed towards frequent use of metaphors about 'biting the increasing the deficit as a percentage of the bullet' and 'tightening their belts'. GDP since 1980/81. In 1984/85, The spokesmen of the emerging black unions overspending amounted to 2.3 percent of are far less enthusiastic about the state's GDP and was solely responsible for raising economic policies. They have pointed out the proportion of state expenditure to GDP that whereas management can tighten their over that of the previous year. It is to be belts for a considerable time without feeling hoped that at least budgeted expenditures the pinch, that is not the case for their union will be controlled this year and that the new members, especially those who have lost their finance minister will be more effective in this jobs. regard than his predecessor. The two most negative aspects of the budget The budgeted decrease in real government relate to taxes and the level of The most expenditure will undoubtedly contribute to unemployment. The tax burden has been negative aspect of reducing the rate of inflation and the deficit increased by 20 percent, taking the rate of as a proportion of the GDP. It will also ease GST to 12 percent. In combination with the the buget is the the level of upward pressure on interest rates. introduction of a surcharge of 7 percent on increase in the tax These factors will contribute positively income taxes, these rates must place South burden at a time towards restoring business confidence. Africa in the ranks of high tax countries. At a of increasing However, increasing unemployment has time of increasing unemployment and rising unemployment undoubtedly raised the level of social tension prices, economic burdens on low income in the already explosive township situation, households become severe and it is shameful and rising prices and this must have an adverse effect on local that the state should place an additional tax and foreign confidence. Direct police burden on them. The budget also did nothing intervention only seems to exacerbate the towards extending the coverage of the social situation. security network.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Region alMonitor 36 In view of high interest rates, ooneQErrc increased I kUDI LL i D personal taxes and other factors, exports are the only likely source of economic i ttempting to predict the individual annum in December 1983 to 28.9 percent in growth components of the GDP will enable us November 1984. to arrive at a rough assessment of the The Bank defended itself by reflecting that future course of the economy. If we assume the more rapid rise in the money supply that interest rates are likely to remain high during this period did not reflect an increase for the rest of the year, and take into account in monetary demand, as the velocity of the increases in personal taxes and the 2 circulation had declined. Here we find the percentage point increase in GST, private Reserve Bank implicitly using what Nobel consumption expenditures are not likely to Prizewinning economist James Tobin has increase in real terms. Investment called 'the velocity adjusted money supply'. expenditures will also remain depressed as a In November 1984 the annualised increase in result of high interest rates and low economic Assuming that the M2 was 28.9 percent, while velocity decreased activity. Real government expenditure is also by 5.7 percent, giving a velocity adjusted rand maintains its budgeted to decline. Therefore the only likely increase in the money supply of 23.2 percent. real effective source of growth in the economy is via Thus the increase in bank credit far value, exports exports. outweighed the decline in velocity, with an should remain The International Monetary Fund has inevitable upward pressure on the price level. competitive and predicted that the United States' growth rate will continue to should fall from 6.8 percent last year to 3.4 Interest Rates percent in 1985, and that the average growth increase in real in 20 other industrial countries will slow a Short term interest rates generally increased terms little from 3.5 percent to 3 percent. As over 1984. This trend was briefly interrupted approximately 11 percent of our non-gold in November 1984, when the Reserve Bank export trade is with the US, the slowdown in felt that the economy had cooled sufficiently the US economy will cause South Africa's and the rand strengthened. In December, exports to grow more slowly than in 1984. however, the price of gold declined further However, assuming that the rand maintains and the rand depreciated yet again. In its real effective value, exports should remain response to this, rates were again raised. competitive and will continue to increase in Short term interest rates, in particular, real terms. Overall, the immediate outlook depend upon the Reserve Bank's policy as to In 1984, the monetary control and on the demand for Reserve Bank for the economy is not good and at best, we will bounce along the bottom until at least money. once again early next year. Economic activity has slackened off, but demonstrated its expectations as to the price level are such as inability to control to maintain fairly high interest rates. A prime the growth in the Inflation Rates rate of 25 percent is not excessive in the face money supply of an anticipated rate of inflation which may Current inflation had its origin in the be as high as 20 percent. If the size of the consumption based mini-boom, which was government deficit is kept to below 3 percent fuelled by easy money policies and state of the GDP, the crowding out effect of spending. Although the pressure of demand government expenditure in the capital market eased in the last two quarters of 1984, prices will be minimised. There may even be a continued to rise, reflecting the 'feed- reduction of interest rates toward the end of through' of the depreciated rand into import the year, provided that deflationary policies prices. Consumer price increases accelerated are successful in reducing the inflation rate. from 10 percent per annum in February 1984 If the government to 13.9 percent in January 1985 and predictions of the inflation rate by forecasters Balance of Payments deficit is kept for 1985 vary from 15 percent to 20 percent. The current account of the balance of below 3 percent The acceleration or deceleration of the payments, which had been in deficit for most of the GDP, the inflation rate will depend heavily on the of 1984, moved into surplus in the last crowding out future level of exchange rates and also, on the quarter of 1984, reflecting the dampening effect of growth in the monetary aggregates. down of economic activity. Although merchandise imports increased in rand terms, government In 1984, the Reserve Bank once again due to the depreciated rand, this was demonstrated its inability to control the expenditure in the outweighed by the increase in rand terms of growth in the money supply. During the capital market will both merchandise exports and gold. second half of 1984 the various monetary be minimised aggregates accelerated as follows: Over the course of 1984 on the capital • M3 accelerated from 12 percent per annum account, there was a substantial long term in December to 24.7 percent in November inflow (R2 671 million) to purchase securities 1984 on the Stock Exchange, plus • M2 accelerated from 16.5 percent per net borrowing on the part of the Treasury,

10 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 banks and public corporations. However, the rand is not excessive, given the differences in net outflow of short term capital amounted the rate of inflation between South Africa The outward to R3 059 million. Combined with the deficit and her trading partners. South Africa's movement of on the current account of R1 041 million, inflation rate in 1984 was 11.7 percent, as short term funds this implied for the year a sizeable decline in compared with a median inflation rate for developing countries of 10 percent and for in 1984 was the net gold and foreign reserves of R1 429 result of traders million. The outward movement of short the mature industrialised economies of 4.1 percent. Recent calculations of the real term funds has been attributed to and investors effective exchange rate for the rand show the anticipating a unfavourable leads and lags, which occurred same trends. In other words, the rand has as a result of traders and investors declined in value in real terms, as well as in further anticipating a further depreciation of the nominal terms. This means that the depreciation of rand. This phenomenon also explains why it competitive position of exporters is greatly the rand is possible for high interest rates and high enhanced, as is also the position of import- rates of growth in money supply to coexist. competing producers in South Africa. Depreciation of the Rand The most notable economic feature of 1984 The Gold Price was the depreciation of the rand. Before Something should also be said about the September 1983, the Reserve Bank had determinants of the price of gold. In the past, actively intervened in the foreign exchange political events played a significant role, as market to maintain the value of the rand. illustrated by the invasion of Afghanistan The decline in After September, the Reserve Bank stated when gold hit $800 an ounce. In recent times tint it would only intervene in the foreign it has been the world rate of inflation, US value of the rand exchange market in order to smooth out interest rates and the value of the dollar in real and erratic fluctuations in the value of the rand. which have become important factors. The nominal terms Since then the effective exchange rate of the size of the US budget deficit has pushed up has enhanced the rand has declined, in particular since July US interest rates, which has attracted capital competitive 1984. into the US and away from gold, with a concomitant drop in the price of gold. position of In January 1985, the announcement by the exporters and Western Group of Five of policies to prevent Any hint of a decline in US interest rates has further appreciation of the dollar, and the import-competing affected the value of the dollar and the price producers introduction of measures to alleviate pressure of gold. As to the future, US policymakers on the South African spot market, supported have warned of a decline in the size of the US the value of the rand and led to some deficit and a fall in interest rates. This will appreciation of the domestic currency. The discourage capital inflows, and with the very varying value of the dollar continued to large trade deficit on the US's Balance of affect the value of the rand, with a further Payments will leave the dollar overvalued. depreciation and then an appreciation after We can conclude therefore that the price of February. gold is likely to rise in the future. When this It is often said that the depreciation of the might happen is a matter for conjecture.

To alleviate the burdens of unemployment, IPOL ICy DIRECTIOhS the social security network should | f it is the intention of policymakers in announcement in May by the state of an be extended and I South Africa to reduce the inflation rate emergency relief programme of R100 million work-sharing 'substantially, one year of deflationary is to be welcomed, although the benefits schemes could be policies will be insufficient. Inflationary which can be paid from this scheme may be expectations have become so engrained that as small as R170 per head per annum. created several years of stringent monetary policy Extending the social security networks would would be required to eradicate these have a mediating effect on the most harshly expectations. Even then, close control would felt effects of monetarism and would have to be exercised over the velocity undoubtedly contribute to restoring social adjusted money supply, so as to ensure no stability in the townships. Trade unions could assist by further refuelling of the inflation rate. Another possibility is for work-sharing schemes to be created, which could be concentrating on The cost of this policy will inevitably be an negotiated between the state, employers- and employment increase in the rate of unemployment. The unions. In this the state might be able to use creation as a goal, big questions which remain are: the negotiating platform which the unions • whether South Africa can afford similar rather than provide, as a force for creating social demanding higher increases in the rate of unemployment stability. Some reduction in real wages will be • what do policymakers intend to do to necessary before employment growth can real wages alleviate the burdens of unemployment? occur without inflation, and here too trade One possibility which must be considered is unions could assist by concentrating on to extend the social security network for employment creation as a goal, rather than workers unable to find employment. The demanding higher real wages. 05>3£\

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 11 THE GREAT FREE MARKET DEBATE

Over the past century, the South African economy has developed on the basis of a set of economic and political rules that have produced an economic system best described today as a mixed market economy. Although it is a system predominantly based upon private enterprise or capitalism, the state not only sets and administers the background rules for the economic game, but has come to be a major economic player itself. South Africa is not unique in this respect, since all supposed free market, private enterprise or capitalist economies are in actuality mixed market economies in which government plays a significant role. Where the South African economy is unusual, however, is in the fact that the rules governing access to the economy are significantly biased against the black group in the society. The past decade has seen a growing and ongoing discussion on the exact nature of the South African economy and on the ways in which it should be changed. There are two distinct aspects to these discussions, which are often subsumed under the heading of 'Moving to a Free Market Economy', and their amalgamation causes some confusion. The first aspect is the need to generate a set of non-racial rules to give South African black people equal access to economic opportunities at all levels. The second aspect relates to the economic role of the state itself. The questions asked in this respect are: • is the government playing too great an economic role? • are the present rules governing the economy appropriate to the needs of the society of today? The debate has ranged widely and has called into question a variety of economic institutions in particular, including the agricultural marketing boards, the public corporations, the urban labour markets, the urban property markets, the public services and even the role of big business and the banking sector. The nature and direction of the debate varies almost as widely as the issues under discussion and not surprisingly, there is often a strong link between the line taken and the economic, racial circumstances of the contributors. In general, South African whites treat the continuation of the capitalist system as axiomatic and focus their criticisms on the perceived excesses of government intervention in the economy. Many black people, on the other hand, question the continuation of the capitalist system itself but take the need for government intervention in an economy as axiomatic. There is also a small but growing middle group comprised of somewhat unlikely bedfellows, including very big business, liberal white academics, middle-of-the- road trade unionists of all colours and black entrepreneurs with small businesses. They argue that what is needed in present day South Africa is a South African solution that will set up social and economic rules to create a 'Just Economic Order', described variously as a caring society, a social market economy, caring capitalism and social democracy. The following article by Professors van der Ross and Thomas is essentially a discussion in this vein. Since the black challenge to the continued existence of capitalism, economic libertarianism or private enterprise (call it what you will) is gaining momentum daily, they raise crucial issues that must be faced.

12 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Marketing Priwate Enterprise TOWARDS A 'SOCIAL MARKET' ECONOMY

By Rector R E van der Ross and Professor Wolfgang Thomas of the University of the Western Cape Since the late institutions which enshrine the profit motive 1970s, attempts to and genuine competition, the fervour of this market private I n the white-centred business community ideological advertising campaign raises both enterprise have I of South Africa, few doubts are expressed expectations and suspicions. Hopes that they aimed to promote I nowadays about the economic system may be allowed to participate effectively in described as 'private enterprise', a 'free the market economy remain tempered by the black market economy' and so on. In fact, the hereditary and statutory restrictions that participation in larger economic system which these terms continue to hamper the growth of private encompass is currently being lauded to such the South African enterprise outside of the townships. Black economy an extent in the media by government and businessmen can hardly fail to notice that business leaders, that the impression might even the cautious recommendations of the almost be given that South African society Riekert Commission of 1978 with regard to has only recently been converted to this the opening of segregated central business ideology and is now in the midst of districts have not yet been implemented. implementing it. Whilst there have always been 'ways around' The truth is, of course, that it is only since these restrictions and other racial barriers, it the late 1970s that the necessity for the full should be clear that the enthusiasm of black The Carlton and and unhampered participation of South people for the 'free' enterprise system is likely Africa's black majority in the economic to be seriously dampened as long as it seems Good Hope system has been officially recognised. to operate in a selective manner. The conferences Following the Good Hope and Carlton expectations of black businessmen are that resulted in Conferences of 1981 and 1982, the they may (at last) also be able to participate government and private sector have sought government and effectively in commerce and industry, as long private sector actively to market the private enterprise as: philosophy, through constantly reiterating initiatives to the need for the development of small • certain key legislative stumbling blocks in promote the free the way of the expansion of black business business in the urban black community and market for industrial development in the homelands. are removed • determinate steps are taken to rectify the philosophy adverse effects of past restrictions, through Image and Reality some sort of 'affirmative action' Among middle-class, black South Africans, • the Group Areas Act is abolished, opening who are generally positively inclined towards up access to commercial, industrial and

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 13 agricultural land and services. important role in black society, a dual Recent Until the lifting of these barriers to market approach seems to be called for, based on: government access is effectively accomplished, a • the pursuit of a more serious dialogue with efforts to promote justifiable and healthy scepticism may be these leaders, with the intention of breaking free enterprise expected to remain in the black business new ground community. Unfortunately, recent steps • the concurrent development of a new have created concept for an overarching socio-economic suspicion in the taken by government to implement the supposed move towards the free market system, to reconcile some of the opposing black business system have tended to fuel prevailing sentiments. community scepticism. One of the early steps in the evolution of the private enterprise drive in Delivering The Goods the late 1970s was the establishment of the Small Business Development Corporation. In short, irrespective of what statistics and Instead of However, closer observation of the lending carefully analysed trends claim to prove, the man in the street tends to associate the promoting black programme of the SBDC indicates that relatively more loan support is now given to private enterprise system with wide, racially- business, the white small businesses than to black based income and wealth inequalities, which Small Business businessmen, because their track record often in turn are seen as the very cause of black Development indicates a proven profitability. Furthermore, poverty and unemployment. This view may Corporation in contrast to the old Coloured Development not be in line with current thinking among economists, that a certain degree of income seems to favour Corporation, there is now no body constituted to promote commercial inequality is an inevitable side-effect of rapid small white enterprises in coloured townships. economic growth, which itself is the pre- enterprises condition for any serious efforts to overcome mass poverty. Yet the sentiments outlined above undoubtedly exist and one should not Working Class Perceptions expect that they can be easily drowned by Among the black working class and the public campaigns conducted by the SABC or population at large, a far tougher and less other organisations to promote the free Some black trade equivocal set of attitudes as regards the enterprise system. private enterprise philosophy is observable. unionists, student The 'free market' concept raises strong People at the lower end of the socio- leaders and emotional reactions, which might be economic scale, as is the case with all other intellectuals visualised as the 'we-they' syndrome. The communities, are convinced by results, not by believe that black man struggling to meet the basic needs glib public relations efforts. At best they may of his household — in times of high inflation, find sympathy for a system if it explicitly private enterprise takes into account their needs and has some is responsible for tightened hire purchase and widespread unemployment — sees himself as the programmatic content relevant to them. racial inequalities powerless, economic and political underdog, After all, very few individuals in this group in South Africa as opposed to the economically secure and can visualise themselves as the future politically powerful (white and wealthy) business owners. They are looking instead for 'capitalist' stereotype. better wages, housing, education and health services, stable employment and some say in The rise of black trade unions has heightened the economic and political decisionmaking the general awareness of this 'we-they' Working-class processes. The free market philosophy does relationship and the constant exhortation of not emphasise the welfare aspects of society, blacks are looking the media, business and government and many black workers believe that the for better wages, spokesmen about the virtues of this system achievement of their priority goals may be housing, make many black people even more made even more difficult within such a education and suspicious. They cannot but note that the rise system. in the free market ideology occurred at more health services, or less the same time that food subsidies and are not started declining, a general sales tax was Positive Connotations impressed by glib introduced and rapidly increased to 12 public relations percent, rentals on council houses escalated, Before proceeding with an evaluation of what kind of compromise might be embodied in efforts hospital admission fees increased, train and bus fares doubled and so on. the new socio-economic order, it should be The black working class is to a certain extent stressed that a significant number of people influenced by highly articulate criticisms of in the black community have welcomed the capitalist system as a whole, advanced by government reform in South Africa over the black student leaders, trade unionists and past few years. In their eyes, the influence The connotations upon government of the white private sector of the free market other leading intellectuals in urban black communities. These radical critics argue that may be linked to changes such as: philosophy are private enterprise is not merely incapable of • the liberalisation of the labour market not sufficiently solving the social and economic problems of • the broadening of scope for black linked to the the masses, but is in fact the very cause of entrepreneurs in black townships welfare aspects of black/white inequality and of racialism per se • the lessening of and the gradual abolition society in South Africa. of petty apartheid measures The influence of this critique in black • the recent formal abolition of the coloured communities, which may be identified as 'the labour preference policy Left' on the political spectrum, should not be • the extension of the 99-year leasehold underestimated. Because these groups play an concession.

14 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Where the free market encourages the further approach. In fact, the final chapter contains development of black trade unions and the detailed proposals as to how the free market The progressive expansion of black residential rights in urban system should be publicised. After role played by the areas, it obviously has positive connotations. recommending that the Economic Advisory private sector in Council of the Prime Minister should be On the other hand, it would be rather naive the deracialisation to assume that the incremental extension of requested to undertake the task of publicising long-overdue 'rights' such as the freedom of the market system, the committee elaborates of the economy is movement, association and domicile —which (ibid, chapter 10.35) on the following possible acknowledged in should be taken for granted as the courses of action and concludes that: some quarters of cornerstones of any democratic society — • normal marketing, advertising and the black will he perceived by the black community as promotion methods are inappropriate for community the benevolent granting of 'privileges' by publicising the system [•overnment under pressure from white • there should first be an in-depth commerce and industry. Black South preliminary investigation by the Human Africans feel, and there can be few Sciences Research Council as regards a exceptions, that they have been historically suitable publicity programme for each deprived of rights owed them by society, population group which have never been withheld from their In a major report, white compatriots. • specialist educationalists should be approached for advice on how to use the the President's The private sector has undoubtedly played a school syllabi to stimulate the interest of the Council (PC) progressive role within white society to help child as well as the school Committee deregulate the economy and pave the way for » the media should be used extensively, replaced the 'free some measure of deracialisation. augmented by lectures, discussion groups and market' concept Nevertheless, the concept of 'free enterprise' seminars, to promote a coordinated by the more will never capture the imagination of South campaign of a market economy year or a Africa's black majority, except to give rise to slogan of 'prosperity through market realistic term feelings of hostility. From their point of view participation'. 'market- the free market system as we know it is not orientated' regarded as an acceptable basis for the future restructuring of our society. The progressive Widespread Misconceptions economy role played by the private sector in contemporary South Africa cannot be Underlying these recommendations and expected to remove overnight from the minds much of the PC report is the assumption that of many black people their historical black people do not seem to understand the association of business with the development free market economy and therefore, do not of the apartheid system. appreciate the virtues of the system. This is particularly ironic when one considers the range of non-market, racial restrictions which virtually suffocate black households. The The PC report The President's Council report (chapter 6 and annexure 10) also suggested that reveals a vast array of restrictive policies, the Prime Report many of which hamper the evolution of Minister's In a memorandum presented to the market-oriented activities in the black President's Council (PC) in 1983, the authors community. However, the committee does Economic suggested that the concept of a social market not suggest that these be dismantled, Advisory Council economy would be more appropriate for probably in the light of certain restrictive should actively South Africa at this stage than either terms of reference of the investigation itself. market the free capitalism (private enterprise/free market) or The widespread misconception that black enterprise system socialism (as implicitly proposed by people do not easily accept the realities of a supporters of the Left). In a recently market economy is largely unfounded both in completed report (PC 1/1984), the PC South Africa and in much of black Africa, if Committee for Economic Affairs has for the one looks at grassroots behaviour in rural as first time replaced the free market concept by well as urban areas and takes into account the more realistic term 'market-orientated' the wide range of market-restricting economy, at least in some parts of the report. practices. Any close observer of the day-to- Furthermore, the key second chapter consists day life in poverty stricken communities will know that people of all ages (including even of a lengthy discussion of legitimate reasons The widespread for and forms of government intervention, small children) are intensely aware of the linking them to the need to redistribute principles of supply and demand, market and informal sector income, stimulate development and overcome prices, etc. Informal sector activities are most activities of black the racial discrimination of the past. In laying prevalent in these strata of society, and it is entrepreneurs down guidelines and criteria for evaluating here that the economic model of the free explodes the market still has some relevance — if only government policy, the report emphasises myth that they are that legitimate criticism of the perceived local and other authorities would allow it to inefficiencies of bureaucratic action by function. unfamiliar with free market government should not be equated with If one looks at the multitude of restrictions government action per se, which may be fully placed on informal sector activities in terms mechanisms justified in the light of the particular needs of of hundreds of laws, the question arises as to society. exactly who should be the target of such a Unfortunately, later chapters of the report campaign. One shudders at the mere thought show less signs of such a differentiated that conventional school books include 'Our

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 15 free market economy' as a prescribed topic implications of their demands. For example, demands for subsidised housing should be Adding the for black school children in townships like Soweto, Sebokeng and Nyanga. judged in the light of higher taxes and epithet social' to possibly lower economic growth. Or, a the 'market radical deregulation of our towns may result economy' A Social Market Economy in a lot of messy developments, including concept will squatting and informal sector activities, but The adoption of a new concept symbolising a signal that this may be the crucial step to reduce the synthesis of socio-economic systems could population pressure on our black rural areas, business and give credence to the existence and legitimacy thereby facilitating much faster growth in government are of the market as the basic mechanism of our black agriculture. However, in order to sensitive to the economy. Judging by the experience of black bridge the wide gap between white and welfare needs of Africa, where socialist experiments have on black 'perception of the status quo and of the whole ended in disillusion if not disaster, black people policy priorities, a commonly acceptable we neither have nor desire either a planned socio-economic framework for the future economy or a socialist economy. As a market should include elements with which both economy we obviously want to retain a major communities can identify. A social market private sector, since markets are usually economy might make this possible, given the (though not exclusively) associated with fact that social concerns currently dominate competition and private enterprise. On the black society, whereas concern about market A 'social market' other hand, there can be no serious talk of efficiencies seems to dominate in the white economy would largely dismantling the public sector, neither community. symbolise a in South Africa nor in other industrialised countries. synthesis of Conclusion socio-economic By adding the epithet 'social', one signals an The social market concept, first propagated systems and awareness among the private sector and government of the social dimension of our in post-war West Germany under its legitimate the economic life. White voters have learned in Economic Minister, Ludwig Erhard, also market as the the past that government does have their embodies a dual purpose. After the war the basic mechanism social needs in mind, after decades of implementation of a free market economy of the South political action originating in the socio- would have been unacceptable to all those who lost almost everything during the war, African economy economic upliftment policies of the 1920s and 1930s during the 'Poor Whites' era. and trade unionists and socialists would have rejected such a framework altogether. Under In this context it seems only natural that its system of 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft' the black people from all social strata are now government steered a fairly liberal, market- looking upon government and the private orientated course, but also maintained a sector for an explicit sensitivity and broad range of social policies aimed at responsiveness to these issues. Denial of their Denial of the particularly underprivileged groups in social needs could well result in a rejection of society. development the present economic system itself. needs of black In South Africa, we find ourselves at a rather communities strange and complex turning point in our Two Dimensions political and economic history. While could well The juxtaposition of 'social' and 'market' potentially far-reaching reforms are in the produce economy indicates the need for a balance pipeline, rapid urbanisation and a severe vjidespread between two dimensions: economic recession coincide with escalating rejection of the • the social responsibility of government and political demands among our black present mixed the private sector, which inevitably costs communities. At the same time, it is true that money and will use up scarce resources notsingle identifiable 'black man's view' economy system exists on the merits or demerits of the free • the demands of the market economy to enterprise system. Attitudes range from finance all activities in a non-inflationary way pragmatic accommodation to outright and to mobilise all possible resources. scepticism, with a highly critical and It may sound overly simplistic to just link combative outlook prevalent among certain these two concepts. Alternatively, one may leading groups within the black working To maintain argue that such a balance is impossible. Yet, class. political stability, in essence government continuously strives The unqualified propagation via advertising for a compromise in order to meet social techniques, however sophisticated, of the decisionmakers demands within the framework of a should cultivate 'free market' concept will fail to overcome functioning, mixed market economy. The present cleavages and will not be able to an overarching compromise has to be negotiated every day, provide the integrating ideology necessary to socio-economic with black and white interest groups actively prevent further polarisation. To maintain goal which will participating. This task cannot be left up to peace in such an atmosphere will require, the magic free market, an illusion entertained among other things, the emergence of some secure black and by the free marketeers who ignore the white overarching socio-economic goal which is realities of income inequalities, racial acceptable to both black and white people. commitment discrimination, influx control and poverty Business leaders in particular, must seriously cycles; nor can we leave it to government or contemplate the need for a more acceptable parliament. socio-economic system for all South Africans To achieve compromises all citizens will have and should take steps to facilitate the to be aware of the stakes involved and the necessary debate among policymakers. tJM£i

16 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 At the forefront of South African retailing. And we're dependant. On people. They're our future. Essential to our operations. An investment for growth. Theirs and ours. And by keeping tabs on trends, meeting needs with action and exerting corporate influence for change The Econo-political we endeavour to serve consultant to decision makers people. in industry, mining, finance, government - and development organisations AAA 'IfS^llilkli®'. WWf

PO Box 87094 Houghton 2041 Johannesburg South Africa WOOLTRU Telephone (011) 646-9370

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE In the sign language of the road our highly- visible Emblem stands for moving power and product excellence. But there is another, a far less obtrusive face of Shell. One that is focussed on tomorrow's world, seeking out the problems and finding viable solutions. That is why Shell are actively involved in developing natural resources like coal and metals. Researching innovative oil and chemical products. Encouraging the development of | human resources with bursaries and scholarships. Working to make tomorrow a good day for South Africa

Go vveiLGo Shell & 3*

.!«'! 1

Western Deep Levels Mine, Carletonville. Safety hazards and the high underground fatality rate in the South African mining industry have become controversial labour issues in the 1980s. 1 Debating Safety Standards in the Mining Industry 2 The Loss Control Scheme: Worker Safety Undermined 8 Improving Safety Performance Over Time 12 Shop Steward Training 14 Labour on the Industrial Periphery 18 Miners & Migrants: Case Studies of Labour Conflict THE LOS ccoifmoL

Worker Safety Underm te Weikom Gold Mine. The value of gold: weighing up the human costs.

By Paul Benjamin, Labour Lawyer, Government Legal Resources Centre (Johannesburg) statistics show that over 8 500 miners were he last two years have witnessed the IHS have focussed attention on ihe mining emergence of occupational health and killed in industry. Tsafety as an industrial relations issue of • In September 1983, the Nl'M organises a accidents on major importance. Nowhere has this 3() minute work stoppage in the mining South African development been more marked than in the industry to protest the deaths nl 68 mines between mining industry. The prominence of safety as coalminers in the Hlobane collier\ disaster. 1974/83 a labour issue in this industry reflects the The inquest reveals disquieting c\idenee as to high level of exposure to hazard and risk the implementation of safet\ measures at the faced by workers employed on the mines. In mine. the ten years from 1974 to 1983, over eight • In January 1984, workers at the openca-t and a half thousand workers were killed in Rietspruit colliery near Witbank down tools accidents on South African mines twice after two workers are killed when a (GME/DMEA Annual Reports). The emergence pylon collapses. An inquiry holds the shift of an active black boss and a more senior emplo\ee lesponsible The current profile of industrial health and for the accident. miners union has safety (IHS) is also related to the presence of • In July 1984, Hlobane colliei\ is lined brought home an active black trade union aware of the R400 for failing to maintain s.ileu equipment the intensity of intensity of worker feelings on the issue. According to the General Secretary of the in flame-proof condition and two employes worker feelings rapidly expanding National Union of are fined R200 each for breach ot •>alety about safety Mineworkers (NUM), Cyril Ramaphosa, 'In regulations. conditions on the the mines, health and safety is the top • In February 1985, 1 OOOwoikeis al mines priority — it is more important than wages. Rietspruit stop work after a disagreement You have got to be alive or uninjured to earn between NUM shaft stewards and the wages' (SA Labour Bulletin Vol 9/No management over a memori.il mimw to; a 7:p66/7). miner who had died in an acLident two weeks earlier. Seventy miners are subsequently In addition, a number of incidents related to fired. 2Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 including irregularities in all three major In the mining The Mines and Works Act areas of safety precautions in coalmining industry, there aimed at preventing methane explosions. Yet may be a The Act still retains many of the features those methods of ventilation and gas found in the original statute of 1911 and the detection used complied with the appropriate tendency to view reflations had their most recent major regulations. However, draft regulations have statutory safety revision in 1970. The most notable since been published which significantly regulations as requirements of the Mines and Works Act increase the range of safety equipment setting maximum are: , . , required to be used in coal mining. instead of • the mines inspectorate must hold an enquiry into all accidents causing death or minimum serious hodily harm The Mines Inspectorate standards • mine managements are obliged to report a The legal provisions for IHS in the mining wide range of accidents to the inspectorate industry are laid down in the Mines and • any organisation of workers active in the Works Act. The regulations promulgated in industrv mm request the Government terms of the Act are enforced by the GME MiningT.ngmcer (GME) to hold an enquiry and his inspectors. From a comparative into unsafe conditions at a mine perspective, the mines inspectorate in this The Hlobane • the GMI-: is obliged to then investigate, but country is understaffed. A recent study disaster inquest has a discretion as to whether to (Eisner 1984) shows that in 1981 there were subsequently hold an enquiry. found fault with the same number of qualified inspectors in major safety To applv to lhe differing circumstances of South Africa (98) and the United Kingdom, different mines IHS regulations must, of in spite of the fact that the local mining precautions at necessity, he very general. Many of the industry employs over three times as many the colliery which regulations issued in terms of the Mines and people as its British counterpart. aim to prevent Work* Act are thus devoted to minimum methane standards to be complied with in mining. Even though the authorised complement of While this is the most common legislative inspectors in South Africa was increased by explosions on method of regulating IHS, it is not without some 30 percent in November 1983 and the coal mines its disadvantages and limitations. size of the workforce has declined, the ratio of inspectors to workers remains In the mining industry itself, there may be a considerably worse than in the United tendencN to view what are intended to be Kingdom. The size of the inspectorate has a minimum standards as maximum standards distinct impact on safety standards. The instead. As a result, actual mining practice GME noted that a previous increase in the Despite often does not comply with the strict letter of number of inspectors 'had a beneficial effect the law as found in the Mines and Works on discipline and on mining personnel's inadequate regulations. At I he Hlobane Colliery Inquest, compliance with the Mines and Works resources, the the mine ventilation officer said he did not Regulations' (Annual Report 1982). Despite government know of a colliery in Natal that complied the lack of resources the mines inspectorate mines fully with the regulations concerning performs valiantly in policing an enormous inspectorate ventilation (Inquest Record: p414). and hazardous industry, as demonstrated by The inquest also revealed a lengthy catalogue its investigation into the Hlobane Colliery performs a of inadequate safety procedures at the mine, disaster. valiant task in policing an enormous and hazardous industry

Maclear, . A former migrant labourer, who was paralysed from the waist down in a mining accident, was sent back to the independent homeland, where he is now looked after by his family. After medical treatment, he was given a disability grant of approximately R1 000 in cash and receives a small pension.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 3 Underqualified The Safety Hierarchy Energy Affairs (MEA) called on mine owners and and unions to advise the government on how to amend statutes. A legislative shift from the inexperienced on The Mines and Works regulations institutionalise a hierarchy of command and current, racially determined 'scheduled' average, the responsibility running from the mine person, to a non-racial definition of a - white miner manager down to the white miner. Although 'competent' person will be initiated by the bears frontline general responsibility resides with the cabinet in August this year (MEA Minister, RDM 12/4/85). responsibility in manager, all of these officials are obliged to the safety 'take all reasonable measures to provide for the safety and proper discipline of mine Unfair Labour Practice hierarchy and employees' (regulation 2.9.3). With the performs the exception of the ventilation officer, all In November 1983, the status of the miner's crucial pre-shift officials with responsibility for safety are right to refuse to work under unsafe safety test engaged in production-related or technical conditions was at issue in the Industrial activities. Court case, NUM versus Driefontein Consolidated Ltd. In the landmark case, it The white miner bears frontline responsibility was argued on behalf of 17 miners who were for safety levels, as he performs the crucial fired after a work stoppage, that a dismissal pre-shift safety examination and is obliged to where an employer had failed to assuage With additional withdraw workers from a workplace that worker fears for their safety amounted to an earnings made becomes unsafe. In many ways the miner is unfair labour practice (ULP). up from the least able to perform these functions. The qualifications and experience required to In ordering the temporary reinstatement of production become a miner in South Africa are, by the workers, the Court did not rule out the bonuses, the international standards, exceptionally low. possibility of an ULP involving company white miner Consequently, a high proportion of conduct of safety disputes in the mining industry, even where there had been reflects the prosecutions for breaches of the Mines and compliance with the regulations. conflict between Works Act are against white supervisory staff (Eisner, op cit). In addition, the white miner Furthermore, the Court found that 'the safety bears most critically the conflict between strange reticence' of the company to inform supervision and safety supervision and production. He is the workers and NUM of an impending production goals employed in both of these capacities, and a inspection of the area by the Chief Inspector large part of his income is made up from of Mines had contributed to a 'wide chasm of production bonuses. distrust' between the parties (ILJ Vol5/no2: p84/92). Under regulation 8.3.2, workers have a limited individual right to refuse to work The judgement was an attempt to harmonise under unsafe conditions. A mineworker who the Labour Relations and the Mines and The Mines and believes a mining area to be dangerous may Works acts, which failed to distinguish Works Act inform the miner in charge, who must then sufficiently between different aspects of focusses on withdraw the workers, investigate and, if safety. The Mines and Works Act is essentially concerned with objective aspects: objective aspects necessary, make the area safe. The white miner is not required to call in senior mine the setting of minimum safety standards and of safety officials, however, and African workers who the allocation of responsibility for performance and remain apprehensive have no right of compliance with them. It does not deal with does not deal recourse to such officials. the perception of hazard and risk by adequately with employees in a work situation, or with the communication of these perceptions. worker Although NUM eventually withdrew the perceptions of Job Reservation subsequent ULP case, the initial court action hazards African employees in the mining industry are has had a seminal effect on the mining unable to gain access to the hierarchy of industry, focussing attention on the need for safety positions. At present, 'non-scheduled adequate statutory or internal company persons' — the Mines and Works Act's procedures for the resolution of disputes euphemism for African workers — are about safety. unable to obtain a blasting certificate, the A recent qualification for becoming a miner [Section Industrial Court 12(2)(a)]. However, the GME is empowered Noise Levels case drew to exempt mines from job reservation The Mines and Works regulations do not attention to the provisions, and a wide range of tasks that exhaustively cover the IHS hazards faced in would normally be performed by white the mining industry. One of the most need for miners are therefore carried out by African prominent safety areas left unregulated is improved in- employees. This exemption system has that no maximum level or exposure period to house profoundly negative consequences for safety noise is stipulated. This is in contrast to the procedures to on the mines. It can result in African workers Factories Act, which sets a limit of 85 performing work they are not formally resolve safety decibels (db/A) over an eight-hour day, in trained to perform at rates lower than those keeping with international standards. In the disputes on the paid to white workers. American mining industry the limit is 90 mines In this respect, IHS standards will db/A for the same period and no exposure in undoubtedly improve once the remaining excess of 115 db/A is permissible (J McAteer, legislative provisions for job reservation in Miner's Manual: p84). about 13 categories are repealed. In March According to the Chamber of Mines' 1985, the Director-General of Mineral and Research Organisation, 'the high noise levels

48Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Noise levels are one of the most prominent safety areas left unregulated by the Mines and Works Act. Unlike other South African industrial sectors or the American mining industry, no maximal levels or exposure periods to industrial noise are stipulated for local mines.

associated with certain occupations in the government. Its rationale is that accidents in Continuous mining industry are a source of concern, which workers might be killed or injured exposure to high especially as noise-induced deafness may actually constitute only a small percentage of noise levels compromise safety standards (1982 Annual all unplanned events causing financial loss to Report). A study of sound levels in gold a company. Safety in the canon of loss reduces a miner's mines conducted in 1980 found that 68 control is the control of all accidental loss. capacity to percent of all noise levels measured at drilling The philosophy's central tenet is that safety detect warning points in development ends and an equivalent improvements will increase productivity and signals of 60 percent in stopes were in excess of 100 profitability. impending db/A (Schroder and van der Walt 1981). The The trouble with industrial safety is that it authors concluded that, 'This indicates a high rockfalls or has earned itself a bad name: people think it exposure of drillers to noise and hence a high pressure bursts costs money. To the contrary, Bird writes, risk of noise induced hearing loss ... in 'When administered with the unified conformity with previous findings' (ibid). approach in mind (there is a right way, not a For workers exposed to levels of 100 db/A, safe way to do the job), the objectives of the possibility of impaired hearing, assuming safety — quality and production — are best a working life of ten years, is one in three achieved' (Loss Control Survey, May 1983). The loss control (SABS Code of Practice). In addition, The Chamber and its representatives have approach to workers in these areas are the most exposed embraced the gospel of loss control and the safety to hazards such as pressure bursts and IMSR with the fervour of new converts. The management rockfalls, which cause many fatalities in the chairman of the Chamber's executive tends to goldmining industry. A miner's capacity to committee has stated that, 'Improved safety, detect warning signals of impending danger is productivity, mutual trust, team spirit and subordinate vastly reduced by high noise levels. In short, peace of mind are benefits which flow from safety standards the effects on the victim's quality of life, of one all-embracing discipline, namely the to production continued, unregulated exposure to industrial IMSR scheme' (1981 Annual Report). goals noise are extreme (Ashford, Crisis in the Workplace: p74/5). Profits and Safety The inevitable linkage of productivity and The Loss Control Approach safety is the cornerstone of the loss control The Mine Safety Division (MSD) is the philosophy and there are times when this 'Industrial safety central IHS organisation for the Chamber of linkage is valid. But there are equally times is only profitable Mines. In order to promote safety when the two factors must come into conflict when the direct with each other, a point which has been made consciousness in the industry, it runs safety and indirect competitions and administers the in a number of critical analyses: 'Industrial International Mining Safety Rating System safety is only profitable when the direct and accident costs (IMSR). This system has been developed indirect costs associated with accidents (ie exceed the cost since 1978 by the Chamber's MSD in production shut-downs, damaged equipment of eliminating conjunction with Mr Frank E Bird Jnr, Head and materials, increased workers' these accidents' compensation assessments, etc) exceed the of the International Loss Control Institute of (Ft Sass) Atlanta, Georgia. cost of eliminating these accidents' (Sass). The system has also been criticised because it The IMSR embodies the approach to IHS undermines the democratic process by which is known as 'total loss control', a term denying any need for worker or public that Bird has registered with the American participation in the setting of IHS standards

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 5 'Conditions and (T Ison, Accident Compensation). employed in particularly hazardous practices that The aim of loss control is to identify the occupations and areas, the levels of exposure to risk are considerably higher. could result in point of optimum safety up to which the cost accidents may of eliminating accidents will be less to the Although the reportable accident rate in the company than the cost of the accident had it mining industry has been halved in the last very well be occurred. Within this realm there will be no ten years (see graph 2), the fatality rate has tolerated conflict between safety and production. not declined since the introduction of the consciously after According to Bird, The safety professional IMSR system in 1978 (see graph 1). The proper risk recognises that it is neither economically contrasting pattern of declining reportable evaluation' feasible nor practical to prevent all accidents accidents and static fatality rates raises . . . Certain conditions and practices that serious questions about the effectiveness of F Bird, Loss could result in certain accidents may very loss control approaches to IHS on the mines. Control Founder) well be tolerated consciously after proper risk The Chamber's Vice-President, Mr G T evaluation' (op cit). Nisbet, describes IMSR as 'the most The overall effect is to subordinate safety to advanced of its kind in the world and has the demands of productivity and to ignore proved its effectiveness in reducing accident the inevitable conflicts between the two rates and improving efficiency both in South factors, among other tensions: African and overseas countries' (Mining • between the pressure to meet production Week 29/2/84). However, accident rates are goals and the safe performance of tasks internationally regarded as a poor measure of In accepting the • the time consumed in making the safety performance because a number of loss control workplace safe and the production time socio-economic factors tend to distort the available reportable accident rate (Senneck 1975). dogma, a • the conflicting perceptions of danger that These include pressure from supervisors and managerial have their roots in differing exposures to risk colleagues, bonus and incentive systems, approach to • the basic conflict of interest between improved medical and nursing services and safety, the workers and management over priorities, eg the like. Consequently, the fatality rate is the government profits or safety. most accurate indicator of the safety hazards faced by miners. mining engineer abandons his The GME and Loss Control Conclusion role as arbitrator The Government Mining Engineer and his of standards last department have entirely accepted the dogma The consistency of fatality rates over the of'loss control' (1981 Annual Report), a seven years in both gold and coal mines managerial approach which undercuts his indicates that there has been no significant department's supposed objective arbitration decline in the hazards in either sector. Yet 24 of safety standards in the mining industry. mines in South Africa had received a five-star The fullest statement of the GME's duties IMSR rating as of August 1983, even though was made by the Marais Commission (RP no overseas mines have been given this top 21/1963), appointed in the wake of the rating. And at the time of the Hlobane disaster, the colliery had a four-star IMSR Underground Coalbrook disaster of 1960 in which over rating. miners and those 400 miners lost their lives. The commission's who undertake sophisticated appreciation of conflict over The consistently high fatality rate is IHS standards stands in sharp contrast to the ultimately the best indicator of the particularly simplistic approach of loss control ineffectiveness of the loss control approach to hazardous tasks ideologues: 'A perpetual conflict of interest safety in the mining industry. Loss control, are exposed to arises between employer and employee as to with its stress on the linkage between safety far more risks the nature and extent of the safety measures and profitability, cannot assist the mining than surface that may be considered reasonably practical industry in addressing those deep-rooted and and necessary . . . the arbiter whose duty it is systematic features that are the cause of so workers to hold the scales evenly is the GME' many of the fatalities. The mining industry (paraphrased, ibid: p3). might well consider whether loss control principles, which were originally developed for use in continuous process industries, are Fatality/Accident Rates appropriate to the far more complex and The comparative analysis of fatality and changeable industrial safety problems The contrasting encountered in an extractive industry. IP3S " pattern of injury statistics is often an unrewarding activity because of differences in mining declining conditions from country to country. As the accident rates Chamber of Mines constantly points out, BIBLIOGRAPHY and static fatality there is no equivalent to South African deep- Annual Reports of the Government Mining Engineer (GME), the Department ol Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) and the Chamber rates shows the level gold mining. However, more accurate Research Organisation comparison is possible in the coalmining F Bird Jnr, A Unified System lor Safely and Production, Loss Control loss control Survey Vol2/No 2 May 1983, sector, as reflected in the notes with graph 1. H Eisner, Aspects ol Supervision and Inspection ol SA Mines: Comparison scheme to be with the UK 1984, ineffective With reference to the accompanying table South African Bureau ol Standards (SABS), Code ol Practice lor the and graphs, it needs to be emphasised that Assessment of Noise-Exposure During Work lor Hearing Conservation Purposes. the fatality and accident rates are expressed R Sass, The Underdevelopment of Occupational Health and Safety. in relation to the total workforce employed in S Senneck. Over-Three-Day Absences and Safety, Applied Ergonomics the mining industry. As table 1 demonstrates, Vol4/No3: p147/53. H Schroder and W van der Walt, A Summary of Noise and Illumination for underground miners and those workers Returns from Gold and Coal Mines, Research Report No 12 1981

6 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Graph 1 FATALITY RATES ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD AND COAL MINES, 1975/84 (Statistics tor Chamber of Mines only) CO CL

Q> 0.67 Q. C—D' CO CC sz CO 0) Q

Graph 2 REPORTABLE INJURY RATES ON SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD AND COAL MINES, 1975/84 (Statistics for Chamber of Mines only) 51.12 51.89 ^ 47.56 47,47 i d 42.66 o 37.66 Injury rate on gold mines > i ill | 32:42 32.00 C , 2993 27.06

§ 22.75 22.72 23.59 ^ ^

a> 14 98 1 Injury rate on coal mines Q. 12.46 11.61 i, £ 8.66 8.97 781 c>c 'Ep T

Table 1 COMPARATIVE UNDERGROUND AND SURFACE FATALITY RATES, 1978/84

(Statistics for Chamber of Mines only)

GOLD MINES COAL MINES Underground Surface Underground Surface No. of Rate per No. of Rate per No. of Rate per No. of Rate per Fatalities 1000 Fatalities 1000 Fatalities 1000 Fatalities 1000 employees employees employees employees 1978 613 1.93 32 0.35 69 1.46 19 0.63 1979 531 1.59 32 0.33 80 1.72 15 0.53 1980 582 1.69 37 0.34 61 1.37 18 0.62 1981 560 1.60 43 0.41 72 1.58 21 0.65 1982 573 1.66 23 0.22 72 1.58 21 0.61 1983 607 1.70 23 0.22 104 2.46 12 0.44 1984 560 1.56 32 0.29 48 1.03 6 0.21 • in South Africa, the fatality rate in the coal mining sector has ranged from a low of 0.67 per thousand employees to an equivalent high of 1.32 employees, between 1975/84. • In the United Kingdom, the fatality rate of the coal mining sector has ranged from a low of 0.18 per thousand employees to an equivalent high of 0.25 employees, over the same period. • All the tabulated fatality and injury rates are based on the Chamber of Mines statistics, because the DMEA records include workers employed at the parastatal SASOL's three oil-from-coal plants. SOURCES FOR GRAPHS AND TABLES: Chamber ol Mines Newsletter. April/May 1984:p2/3. H Eisner (See Bibliography).

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 49 H "k% >\ " THE aX MINE ^^ RATING ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ SYSTEM

Improving Safety Performance Over Time

By Gordon Grange, Technical Adviser, Chamber of Mines

It would be much he case for the South African mining African mining industry, in the face of more difficult to industry rests on the fact that it has expansion and increasing depths of mining, make safety a Tsucceeded in dramatically reducing the has actually managed to halve the rate of number of serious injuries in mining over the serious injuries over the past ten years. major issue if the past decade. mining industry Paul Benjamin's paper, as the author himself was seen to be notes, was written against a background in improving its which the National Union of Mineworkers Safety Indicators safety record has been campaigning to make safety a major issue. It would of course be that much more Given the vast size of the industry — it difficult to make safety a major issue if the employs over 700 000 people — and its mining industry was actually seen to be consequently relatively large number of improving its safety record. injuries, no expert statistician or any The facts are that Benjamin disputes that it is in fact doing so, reasonable person can surely conclude that a reduction of 50 percent in the injury rate is the South African with an argument that hangs on a single slender thread, namely that one cannot judge not statistically significant and that it does mining industry safety performance on the basis of the not reflect an improvement in the industry's has actually incidence of injuries. Confronted with the safety performance. managed to halve only measurement of safety performance Yet Benjamin asserts that injury rates are 'a the rate of available and utilised internationally — the poor measure of safety performance', without serious injuries number of people who are injured and the giving any supporting evidence beyond an number who are killed — he arbitrarily and over the past ten unsubstantiated claim that such statistics are illogically asserts that the one measurement years distorted by a number of socio-economic (fatality rates) is valid and the other (injury factors. He maintains that these include rates) is not. 'pressure from supervisors and colleagues, Acceptance of injury statistics as a valid bonus and incentive systems, improved measure of the industry's performance would medical and nursing services and the like', of course destroy his case, because the South and goes on to say that 'the fatality rate is

52Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 the most accurate indication of the safety hazards faced by miners'. On the contrary, fatalities, because of the much smaller numbers involved and the random nature of their occurrence, do not give as accurate a picture of overall trends as do injuries which relate to tens of thousands of accidents. For example, one major accident such as the Hlobane colliery disaster of 1983 can distort the whole year's figures. •IB Objective statistical analysis shows that as safety management improves, there is a commensurate improvement in the incidence of the type of accident over which management can exercise control. In South African gold mines, as in other mining industries in the rest of the world, accidents caused by human factors are to a very large 1119 degree controllable by good management and safety practices. Rockburst Fatalities South African gold mines, because of their great depths and the rock pressures encountered, have long experienced a phenomenon which is less controllable. This is the rockburst, which has only recently appeared in other mining industries and accounts for about one half of all fatalities, including rock falls. Even allowing for this factor, Benjamin is still wrong in his assertion that 'the fatality rate in the mining industry has not declined since the introduction of the IMSR system in 1978'. In fact, the South African gold mines have witnessed a considerable reduction in their fatality rate, from 1.48 fatalities per 1 000 people in service in 1978 to 1.18 last year — a reduction of no less than 20 percent. What Benjamin does not mention in his article, is the tremendous effort being put into tackling the uncontrollable factor in mine accidents, namely rockbursts. The Chamber of Mines research organisation is leading the world in expenditure and research mines which have successfully implemented Controlled blast at in this field and its expertise is sought after the system, there is clear evidence of its Rietspruit Colliery, by the Canadian and other mining industries. effectiveness. Witbank. Three fatalities at surface A study, undertaken in 1981, showed that level between 1984/5 Reduced Accident Rates mines with three, four and five-star ratings have led to under the IMSR system had significantly considerable labour However, I must now move on to Benjamin's lower fatality and reportable accident rates unrest, including a second major unsubstantiated allegation, than all other gold mines. An examination of work stoppage by namely that the loss control or International the fatality rates on the gold mines for the 1 000 NUM members Mining Safety Rating (IMSR) system is an period 1982-1984, shows that the five mines in February this year. ineffective approach to safety performance in with the lowest rates are all either five or four the mining industry. star mines. For the year 1984 alone, the As indicated earlier, the dramatic reduction picture is even more positive with 10 of the in the reportable injury rate and the first 11 mines, including the first six, having downward trend in the fatality rate has in four or five stars. fact coincided with the introduction of the IMSR system. IMSR Standards The mining industry is firmly convinced that But what is the IMSR system? The system this is no coincidence, and that the identifies and sets standards for the work improvement in the industry's safety which has to be done to control injury to performance can largely be ascribed to the people, damage to property and unplanned widespread use of the IMSR system. If one interruption of operations. It enables the looks at the results achieved by individual performance of this work to be measured by

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 9 The dramatically means of internal and external audits or should take precedence. reduced inspections. The IMSR system is certainly no universal reportable injury Contrary to what Benjamin implies, the panacea nor an instant solution for all safely rate and the IMSR system was introduced with the problems. It is a tool whereby management" can control adherence to safety standards decreased fatality express purpose of reducing accidents. Although it is built on the concept of loss and accident prevention measures through rate can be control, it is not built on the concept of total more effective monitoring. Its basic tenet is ascribed to the loss control which is strongly geared to thus, safety through good managemen t. widespread use productivity. of a safety rating Loss control techniques developed, system principally in the United States, provide a Human Fallibility means for the more efficient management of In the regulations laid down in the Mines and safety. Its principles were adapted into the Works Act, the safety standards referred to IMSR system, with the help of Mr Frank are not regarded as 'minimum' or Bird, to suit South African mining 'maximum'. They are simply the standards conditions. In the past, safety management which are acceptable. Furthermore, and as was concerned with exhorting people to work Benjamin states, 'To apply to the differing safely and to try to analyse the causes of circumstances of differing mines the accidents. Today, loss control is concerned regulations must, of necessity, be very with identifying and analysing risks, and general'. creating management controls to ensure that Loss control In any event, legislation cannot provide lor the work is carried out according to techniques every possible eventuality no matter how predetermined safety standards. provide a means comprehensive it may be. Just as laws cannot for the more It is logical to assume that adherence to eradicate crime, legislation cannot eliminate efficient mining safety standards, as well as to all accidents. Sub-standard acts or human accepted mining practice, will bring about fallibility have been shown by experience and management and safer working conditions. The IMSR system research to be the major cause of accidents control of safety ensures this adherence to standards. The use (Heinrich, etc). The mining industry is standards of such standards and training in their use is tackling this aspect of safety performance even more important in the South African through emphasis on management controls, context, where the vast majority of motivation and training. mineworkers are poorly educated and illiterate. The Hlobane accident is a case in point. Although it was a freak occurrence on a mine By comparison, 75 percent of the coal miners which hitherto had maintained a good safety in the United States have at least a high record, human negligence was evident. Let it school education ('Towards safer be said, too, that this was by far the worst The Chamber of underground coal mines', National Academy accident in the coal mining industry since the Press, 1982). In the face of this vast training Coalbrook disaster more than 20 years earlier Mines' safety problem, the most effective way of making policy states that and the whole industry should not be judged sure that a man works safely is to train him on the basis of one incident. Accidents occur accident in 'the right way to do the job', rather than not because of but in spite of regulations. prevention must confusing him with two approaches, one take precedence involving his job and one safety. In this way, safety is built into the job. And this is what over production the IMSR system aims to ensure — that work Other Safety Issues demands in must be carried out to, and can be measured cases of conflict against standards. Benjamin raises several other issues related to safety standards, which are open to dispute: • On the question of the ratio of government inspectors to workers, figures supplied by the Production/Safety Conflict Government Mining Engineer (GME) At the same time, it would be naive to indicate that in the one sector where pretend that there is never a conflict between reasonable comparisons are possible, ie coal production and safety in a working mines, South Africa (with a ratio of 1:2521) environment. But this does not negate the compared to the UK (with a ratio of 1:2793) Experience and principle that safety management can be an would appear to be better served, contrary to research show integral part of the overall management Benjamin's assertion. system. that human • Regarding the 'scheduled persons' clause of the Mines and Works Act, the Chamber fallibility, rather While there is a definite productivity spin-off from the implementation of a loss control has publicly stated that it is anxious to see than inadequate programme such as the IMSR system, it is the removal of this last remnant of labour legislation, is the primarily concerned with the prevention of discrimination. It looks forward to the major cause of personal casualties. Therefore, there can be conclusion of negotiations currently under industrial no conflict between safety and production, as way, which are aimed at achieving the final accidents safety and not productivity is the system's abolition of racial job reservation in the objective. In fact, the Chamber of Mines' mining industry. safety policy issued by the executive • Where lines of communication are committee on behalf of all its members, states concerned, workers do in fact have the right that accident prevention must be an integral of recourse to senior officials. Non-scheduled part of production and in case of conflict workers are certainly not incommunicado 10Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 A black miner assists white surface officials to weigh gold, Welkom Gold Mine. Current labour negotiations aim at the final abolition of racial job reservation in the mining industry.

The Chamber of Mines research organisation publications Mines puts all show, the mining industry is concerned about workers through should they have doubts or fears about safety noise levels and has been investigating the extensive training conditions in a particular work situation. In issue. Following a pilot study on noise- programmes fact, anyone who makes people work under induced deafness by the Chamber's research which cover all organisation, a committee was appointed to dangerous conditions is liable to prosecution, aspects of the job draw up a code of practice for the either in terms of the regulations or the to be performed common law. implementation and control of a hearing conservation programme in the mining 0 Regarding Benjamin's allegation that the industry. exemption system 'has profoundly negative consequences for safety on the mines', This code of practice has now been regulation 2.10.2 stipulates that: 'The completed and a draft regulation on noise manager . . . (shall) not permit any control is being prepared for submission to incompetent or inexperienced worker to be the GME. This regulation will be employed on dangerous work, or work upon promulgated as soon as practicable. The the proper performance of which the safety industry's task has not been helped by the of persons depends'. lack of worldwide consensus on noise control. But it is the intention that the South The institution of a satisfactory training African legislation on noise control will be in course is required as a condition of the keeping with practices in developed The mining exemption which now allows non-scheduled countries. accident figures (black) workers to perform some of the tasks for 1984, the allocated to the certified (white) miner. The In conclusion, let me say that the accident lowest recorded mines, incidentally, have extensive training figures for 1984 were the lowest ever recorded facilities covering all aspects of the jobs to be in virtually every category, as the in virtually every performed. Additional courses are also accompanying tables show (see p7). While category, are offered on most mines to enable workers to the figures are encouraging and are proof proof that the upgrade their skills and thus move up the that we are on the right track, there is obviously much room for improvement. Chamber is on promotional ladder. the right track Through the continuing research efforts, which are already bearing fruit, and through Noise Level Code more effective management of safety, the On the question of industrial noise levels, as mining industry is confident that it will Benjamin's quotations from Chamber of continue to improve its safety performance. mm

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 53 SHOP STEWARD TRAINING

In the context of increased unionisation and the negotiation of complex recognition agreements, shop stewards have a crucial role to play in facilitating a constructive management/worker interface in modern labour relations. In fact, the trained communication skills of the shop steward at the negotiating table should enjoy equal status with the trained technical skills of the worker on the job. Trade unionist Mike Morris argues a persuasive case that it is in management's own interests to both allow and pay for workers to have time off to attend union-organised training seminars.

By Mike Morris, former Branch Secretary of the General Workers' Union (Natal)

The need for hop steward training continues to be a • prioritise these demands in order to workers to have fairly contentious issue in industrial negotiate solutions based on compromise relations. The demand by unions to paid time-off to S • understand the issues agreed upon in all have time off to attend training seminars run their complexity. attend union- by trade unions has become a standard part organised shop of most recognition agreements. However, If these conditions are met, orderly and steward training the necessity for shop steward training is efficient industrial relations are facilitated in often not recognised by management. Or, if it the particular factory floor or industry level seminars is context. Of course this does not mean that seldom met by is, then the right to have paid time off in order to attend such training courses is not such relations will take place to management accepted. managements' ideal satisfaction or according to their perceived interests though. Even if these two principles are accepted, managements often still do not perceive that Negotiating complicated and sophisticated for such training to be effective the training issues with a shop steward committee that is courses have to be run and directed by the unable to adequately represent its members is union. This attitude can be summed up in the often a waste of time for all concerned. words of a manager when confronted with Negotiations take twice as long to complete these training courses in a recognition and there is also absolutely no guarantee that agreement. 'Why', he said, 'should I provide the settlement reached has the acceptance of paid time off for union officials to teach my anyone else apart from the shop stewards workers to fight me. I'm not in the business sitting around the negotiating table. Unless of assisting to cut my own throat!' the shop stewards fully understand what the various procedural agreements entail, they An industrial relations manager who adopts cannot hope to ensure that such agreements this sort of attitude is heading straight for are stuck to. confrontation with whatever union his company is involved with. As the Furthermore, the main point in setting up a unionisation of black workers proceeds apace negotiating forum with a representative trade in South Africa, industrial relations issues union is, as far as is possible, to avoid the become more complicated and recognition situation of having to resolve a dispute after Negotiating agreements become more sophisticated. it has already blown up. But this presupposes that the shop steward committee is complicated Consequently, shop steward training will be even more necessary and trade unions will be sophisticated enough (ie trained) to negotiate agreements with even more insistent in their demands for problems with management before they an formalised rights. become crises. unrepresentative The problems that most concern factory shop steward managers are the daily problems of committee is a Trained Negotiation Skills individual grievance and disciplinary As management faces a future of complex waste of time for procedures. Management needs to resolve negotiation with its work force, it is better to these issues with the shop steward committee all parties negotiate with union representatives who: members without having to involve union • have the necessary skills to acquire a officials all the time. If they are to be proper mandate from their members resolved at all then the shop stewards have to • present the wishes of their members in a feel that they have been given the clear and concise fashion opportunity to present all their arguments

12Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 and counter management positions. This separated from the matrix of relations and Because obviously requires some substantial prior priorities that defines a trade union. The organisational imperatives, priorities, duties management also training in the details of applying and benefits from handling a grievance and disciplinary and responsibilities of the union are therefore procedure. central to any shop steward training ensuring that programme. Only the union can effectively shop stewards and responsibly undertake or delegate such receive training, Why Paid Time Off? training under its direction and in line with they should bear While accepting all the above advantages, its policies and practices. some of the costs management might well still ask why paid The relationship between workers (hence the time off should be granted for the training of union) and management is fundamentally shop stewards. Firstly, there are considerable one of conflict. The two parties have different benefits for management in ensuring that interests and for the most part these interests shop stewards receive training. Therefore, it are diametrically opposed to each other. is perfectly legitimate for the union to require Management, or a management inclined management to bear some of the costs. industrial relations agency, could no more Given the objectively train the shop steward committee Secondly, paid time off is granted to shop inadequate stewards in order that they may perform their than the union officials could objectively duties effectively. Caucus time is granted to train the management in industrial relations. educational shop stewards before meetings with opportunities for Finally, some managements agree that the management in order that the shop stewards union should be responsible for the training black workers, may be properly prepared. This is done to of shop stewards, but still request that they management facilitate negotiation and ensure that proper attend such training programmes as 'neutral cannot ethically communication, the essence of sound observers'. Clearly, the very terms are industrial relations, occurs. Training is refuse to grant meaningless. Management can be neither similarly part and parcel of effective them paid time- neutral nor observers in such a situation preparation and the acquisition of sound without violating the need to maintain the off to upgrade communication skills is the very foundation independence of the two parties in the communication upon which effective negotiation rests. collective bargaining situation. Certainly, no skills Thirdly, communication skills are just as worker is seriously going to freely discuss the important as technical skills. If they have problems they are having with line equal status, then there is no sound reason management if the very same management is why such training should not be on the basis present in the discussion. of paid time off. Finally, given the highly inadequate Conclusion educational opportunities available to black workers in this country, the private sector The responsibility for ensuring that the union Management has a social obligation to upgrade the keeps its side of the bargain struck with could no more education and training levels of its employees management lies with the shop stewards. objectively train They in effect have to 'carry the can' and wherever possible. Therefore management the shop cannot ethically refuse to assist, by granting take the consequences, whether these be stewards paid time off, in upgrading the beneficial or negative. But these same shop communication skills of certain of its stewards are simultaneously the union committee than employees at the request of the union. representatives in the factory who are directly union officials answerable to the worker members could train themselves. Unions and Shop Stewards management in The break from the liaison committee system industrial A shop steward committee is not a liaison to the trade union system has to be a full and relations committee or, in the words of the workers, 'a complete one if a credible negotiating bosses committee'. Trade unionisation results forum is to be established. It is the most in a fundamental break with the labour extreme form of paternalism for any practices, policies and relations of the past. If management to engage in an equal management, or an industrial relations relationship of collective bargaining, with all agency on their behalf, were to attempt or to the duties and responsibilities that this insist on doing the training or having a part implies for the shop stewards as union in such training, then the shop steward representatives, but to simultaneously claim committee would immediately be discredited the right to train these very same shop The shop in the eyes of the workers. stewards or say who should in fact train steward is The collective bargaining situation them. responsible for presupposes the complete independence of The emergent trade unions are committed to ensuring that both parties involved in it. In every industrial the development of a worker leadership. The workers adhere relations encounter, management has to most fundamental aspect of such to the conditions acknowledge it is facing an independent development is the unions' emphasis on shop negotiating force. If management attempts to of any agreement steward training. The shop stewards are the negotiated with blur the clearly delineated line between itself worker leaders of tomorrow and the union and the union, it lays itself open to the leaders of the future. The responsibility for management perfectly reasonable charge of subverting the their actions rests on the union as an collective bargaining framework. organisation. Hence the training of these Since shop stewards are an essential part of worker leaders must be the responsibility of the union's primary activities, they cannot be the union as well. Q[P8£\

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 55 LABOUR ON THE INDUSTRIAL PERIPHERY The Homelands & South A frica

By Alan Whiteside, Development Consultant mm There is an increased awareness that the policies of grand territorial apartheid are having • impractical consequences which were not anticipated by ideological planners. In • particular, the development of a legislative gap between the A frican homelands and • South Africa in the sphere of labour relations has fallen under the spotlight in recent •I months. The first comprehensive investigation into the separate constitutional development and problematic co-existence of different bodies of labour law in each of ZM the ten homelands was published in the previous Industrial Monitor (Indicator SA Vol m 2/No 4). •I Alan Whiteside of Natal University's Economic Research Unit concludes the focus on jj| homeland labour issues with a summary of his own seminal research findings on the actual 'nuts and bolts' of legislative provisions for trade union activity, wage JM determinations, health and safety, and worker training in the industrialising homelands of W , and KwaZulu. He has recently completed a major two-volume M| study of 'Labour Relationships between South A frica and Neighbouring States' (including •I the homelands), commissioned by the HSRC for the National Manpower Commission.

The divergent outh Africa and the homelands amount of its own legislation. Although it nature of labour constitute an economic entity with a has passed its own Shop Hours Act, it has legislation in the Shigh degree of interdependence. The not altered the Shops and Offices Act it policy that brought about the homelands as inherited from South Africa. A separate homelands and separate polities has also given rise to the Bophuthatswana Act was necessary because South Africa fragmentation of labour legislation within the shop hours are governed by provincial raises the costs larger economic entity. Because the ordinances and Bophuthatswana is located in of homelands inherit diverse bodies of labour three provinces. Most of the other legislation implementation legislation which are 'frozen' on reaching passed by Bophuthatswana is based on the self-government and thus fall out of date, South African legislation without subsequent for government they subsequently adopt or formulate new amendments. and industry legislation. This is an expensive and time consuming process, however, which is not The biggest difference between the industrial always successful. The diversity in legislation legislation of Bophuthatswana and South also means that the cost of implementation is Africa is in the field of labour relations. In increased for government or industry. 1984 Bophuthatswana promulgated the Industrial Conciliation Act, a statute which Homeland labour legislation is beginning to differs considerably from the equivalent make a considerable impact on labour South African Labour Relations Act: relations in South Africa itself and the • the industrial court in Bophuthatswana activities of national trade unions. does not have the power to decide on unfair Ultimately, the labour policies of the labour practices homeland governments will affect both union • not more than one union is permitted to activity within these areas and the operate in one industry unionisation of migrants and commuters. Homeland labour This article focuses on labour legislation in • the conciliation process is intended to be industry-based rather than plant-based policies affect the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei, two homelands • the process that must be followed before a unionisation of which have attained constitutional independence, and the self-governing strike can become legal is even lengthier than workers in these homeland of KwaZulu. These three areas are in the central economy areas, and of the most industrialised of all the homelands • the president can prevent a strike by migrants and and present a clear picture of the problems declaring a determination binding. commuters in resulting from the diverse bodies of labour South Africa legislation. The most important feature of the homeland's Industrial Conciliation Act is that it will only permit a trade union to Bophuthatswana operate in Bophuthatswana if its It can be seen from the accompanying table headquarters are located within the country that Bophuthatswana has passed a fair and its officials are employed there. This

14Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rustenburg Platinum Mine. Because the Bophuthatswana/ South Africa border intersects the mine property, workers fall alternately under homeland and central labour legislation, depending where they work for the day, an irresolvable problem for management and unions alike (see case study, p18) effectively prevents South African based legislation. However, the homeland unions from expanding into government is not prepared to allow these Bophuthatswana, As might be expected, this national unions to hold meetings within the statute has had a very negative impact on borders of Bophuthatswana. This obviously those South African unions who had begun creates major logistical problems for the to organise in Bophuthatswana. Unions labour movement in general. affected include the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), the Commercial Catering and Allied Workers (CCAWUSA), and the South African Ciskei Allied Workers Union (SAAWU). The Ciskeian government initiated a spate of labour legislation in 1984 when it passed the Union Attitudes Conditions of Employment, the Machinery While KwaZulu The attitude of national trade unions towards and Occupational Safety and the Manpower the effective banning of their activity in Training Acts. All this legislation was based tolerates Bophuthatswana is that they do not recognise on the equivalent South African legislation as unionism, homeland governments as politically it stood in 1984. Although it appears that legislation and legitimate bodies. They are not prepared to Ciskei intends to partially keep its labour repression in relations in step with South Africa in certain negotiate on the issue or to set up new, Bophuthatswana separate unions, thus complying with areas, it has not introduced any legislation to Bophuthatswana's legislation and implicitly regulate collective bargaining as such. and the Ciskei recognising the homeland. They argue that prevent national South Africa, including the homelands, is one Ciskei claims to be adopting a free enterprise trade unions economic unit and should therefore be one policy to encourage investment and from operating political and legislative unit. employment creation. It is interesting to note that the 1984 legislation is based on the there Industrialists do not appear to have South African acts and does not make any formulated a position on these issues yet. For major changes to reflect this philosophy. example, employees on a Union Carbide However, the enactment constitutes a mine located in Bophuthatswana are joining progressive step as it reduces the diversity in NUM, a national trade union which is labour legislation. organised in the company's plants in South Africa (see accompanying database). The Trade unions are not tolerated in the Ciskei union is not actively recruiting workers but is in any form and there is no legislative allowing them to join. Management is framework within which they can operate. adopting a Nelsonian posture. The crunch Commuters who join unions at their place of will come if and when the union tries to work are liable to be harassed or imprisoned negotiate for all employees including those in Ciskei, although there is no legal provision working within Bophuthatswana. for such action. The Ciskeian government reacts violently to union activity and it is Anti-union It is clear that the Bophuthatswana clear that the Ciskei and its borders will policies in the government expects homegrown unions to become the scene of considerable industrial Ciskei and develop. There is evidence to suggest this conflict. process is indeed happening, that the unions Bophuthatswana will be depoliticised and tightly controlled are bound to and that there is likely to be a clash between KwaZulu cause labour the homeland and South African trade As the table shows, the KwaZulu government unrest in border unions. has passed very little labour legislation of its industry as well The position of migrants and particularly own. KwaZulu does, however, provide a very as the homelands commuters is also unsatisfactory. The good example of how confusion can arise out attitude of the Bophuthatswana government of the legislative gap which has evolved is that these categories of workers may join between the homelands and South Africa. trade unions at their place of work, as they The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act are legally entitled to under South African (ICA) passed by the homeland government,

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 15 COMPARISON OF LABOUR LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA & THREE INDUSTRIALISING HOMELANDS

AREA OF LEGISLATION1 SOUTH AFRICA BOPHUTHATSWANA CISKEI KWAZULU

Health and Safety, Basic Conditions of Shops and Offices Conditions of Employ- Shops and Offices73/64; Conditions of Employ- Employment 3/83 75/64 ment Regulation Factories, Machinery ment Machinery and Occupa- Factories, Machinery 35/84 and Building Work 4 tional Safety 6/83 and Building Work22/41; Machinery and Occu- 22/41 Shop Hours 25/79 pational Safety 35/84

Labour Relations LabourRelations28/56 Industrial Concilia- Black LabourRelations Industrial Concilia- tion 8/84 Regulations 48/53 tion 28/56 Industrial Concilia- tion Amendment 10/81s

2 Vocational Training Manpower Training Training of Artisans Apprenticeship 7/73 Training of Artisans 56/81 38/51 Manpower Training 38/51 Apprenticeship 4/74 33/84 Apprenticeship 9/78 Black Employees In- service Training 86/76

Wages Wage 5/57 None ! Wage 5/57 Wage 5/57

Placement of Work- Black Labour 67/64 Labour 4/79 Black Labour 67/64 ' Black Labour 67/64 seekers Guidanceand Placement Registration for Employ- Registration for Employ- Registration for Employ- 62/81 ment 34/45 ment 34/45 ment 34/45

Social Welfare > Unemployment Insur- Unemployment Insur- Unemployment Insur- Unemployment Insur- ance 30/66 ance 17/78 ance /833 ance 30/66 ! Workmen'sCompensa- \ Workmen'sCompensa- Workmen's Compen- | Workmen's Compen- tion 30/41 It ion 12/79 sation 11/82 sation 30/41

Levies Contribution in res- None Black Services Levy Black Services Levy pect of Black Labour : 64/52 64/52 29/72 Contribution in res- pect of Black Labour 29/72

KEY FOOTNOTES • Name of act, number and year are given: Labour Relations 1 All acts inherited from South Africa were 'frozen' as they stood 28/56. on the date that each homeland attained self-government: • Acts passed by the homeland legislature are indicated by Bophuthatswana (June 1972), Ciskei (August 1972) and italics: Conciliation Act 8/24. KwaZulu (February 1977), respectively. 2 All three homelands also inherited the Electrical, Wireman and • Inherited acts have name, number and year given according Contractors Act No 20 of 1939, in identical form. to the South African act at the time of attaining 3 This Act was not numbered by Ciskei. self-government: Shops and Offices 75/64. 4 KwaZulu passed a Factories, Machinery & Building Work Continuations Act in 1977. 5 As stated in the text, until the anomaly is sorted out the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act will apply.

KwaZulu has which also legislates the intent to incorporate into the problems posed by labour law. declared that the future South African amendments, enjoys KwaZulu subsequently passed a cabinet South African dubious legal status. In fact, the South resolution declaring that: African act it is modelled upon cannot be Industrial Court • all South African legislation, except for utilised by a non-independent homeland, in discriminatory or repressive clauses, would should sit in terms of South African proclamation R84 of be adopted Ulundi when 1970. • the South African Industrial Court should necessary and its The KwaZulu version of the ICA would have sit in Ulundi when necessary and national national brought the homeland into line with South precedents would apply. judgements Africa in the area of labour relations. The Because of the legal anomaly with regard to should apply only significant difference between the two KwaZulu's attempted adoption of the ICA, governments is that KwaZulu allows a union there is no legislative framework for union to affiliate to a political party. In 1984, the activities. However, the cabinet resolution of homeland government commissioned a study November 1984 will certainly go a long way

16Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 in meeting the resultant problems in labour legislation, all apprentices must be African. The diversity of relations. The KwaZulu government This means that it is impossible for an labour legislation industrialist to transfer or employ an probably has the best record with regard to within a central, labour rights and union activities. South apprentice of another race in the relevant African unions are allowed to operate in homeland. unified economy KwaZulu and their presence is tolerated if has a not encouraged by the KwaZulu authorities. Wage Determinations problematic Although the unions do not recognise the Bophuthatswana has no Wage Act, having impact on KwaZulu government, it is likely that some repealed the inherited legislation governing industrial form of working relationship will develop wage levels. Although Ciskei and KwaZulu and that union activity will increase in inherited the South African Wage Act, in decentralisation KwaZulu. terms of Proclamation R84 of 1970, wage policies determinations set for the central economy Industrial Decentralisation do not apply in the homelands. In order for Ciskei or KwaZulu to set their It is likely that the complicated divergence of own wage determinations they would have to homeland labour legislation vis-a-vis the establish a Wage Board. As these homeland central economy will have an impact on governments have shown no signs of doing decentralisation policies. This can be so, this effectively means that an employer illustrated by looking at a number of labour For example, an based in these areas can pay his employees as issues and problems encountered in the three industrialist with little as he wishes. Considering that over 30 homelands. percent of strikes in the country as a whole plants in more Health and Safety are caused by grievances over wages, it is than one In South Africa these areas are governed by clear that this situation is likely to lead to homeland may two 1983 acts : the Basic Conditions of considerable labour unrest in these states. have to operate Employment and the Machinery and under different Occupational Safety Acts. Ciskei has passed Conclusion sets of health and very similar acts, so legislatively it is in much the same position as South Africa. The likely trends are that the legislative gap safety legislation Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu on the other between older and modern South African hand inherited archaic South African labour statutes, providing contrasting models legislation in this sphere. for homeland inheritance or adoption, will continue to grow within these separate Examples of some of the differences between political entities. The growth of unions and the older and modern statutes are: their politicisation has spread to the border • under the old Shops and Offices Act, industrial areas and will probably penetrate overtime is limited to 6 hours per week, the homelands too, unless this is preempted Homelands whereas under the Basic Conditions of either by legislation, as has occurred in demand that Employment Act, overtime may not exceed 3 Bophuthatswana, or by repression and hours per day or 10 hours per week violence as in Ciskei. The most likely trend apprentices be • casual workers may only be employed for will be towards increasing conflict between African, 8.5 hours under the old act, compared to 9 the independent labour movement and consequently an hours and 15 minutes under the new act homeland governments. industrialist • the Machinery and Occupational Safety Industrialists operating within the central cannot transfer Act sets up a system of safety representatives economy in South Africa have gradually an apprentice of and committees. The archaic Factories Act, learned to live with and deal with trade another race to a however, makes no provision for such a system unions. It is an open question as to whether plant situated ® a pregnant woman is allowed 12 weeks they are willing to live with trade unions and there maternity leave in South Africa, the political tensions that are arising in the Bophuthatswana and KwaZulu, but only 6 homelands and border areas. The practical weeks in Ciskei. problems associated with differential labour legislation and the resultant tensions in These discrepancies will clearly create labour relations will have to be increasingly problems for an industrialist who considered when making investment decentralises to a homeland, as he will decisions. probably have to operate under a different The practical set of legislation there. If he has plants in It seems that almost all are losers as a result problems of of the co-existence of differential labour more than one homeland, he may have to differential operate under as many sets of industrial regimes within a common economy. The best health and safety legislation as there are solution would be to introduce uniform labour legislation homeland governments. labour legislation, but this would be will have to be impossible without simultaneously decreasing considered by Worker Training the powers of the homeland governments. industrialists The stage is therefore set for the legislative In theory, an industrialist moving to a when making balkanisation of South Africa. homeland is eligible for a training grant investment which is provided in terms of South African decisions legislation. However, as equivalent legislation BIBLIOGRAPHY does not apply in these homelands, it is A Whiteside. Labour Legislation in South Africa and the Black Slates, unclear on what basis these grants are made. Industrial Law Journal Vol 5/Part 4 A more practical problem concerns C Cooper, Bophuthatswana's Industrial Conciliation Act, SAIRR Topical Briefing, May 1984. Also, The Homelands and Trade Unionism, SAIRR apprenticeships. In terms of homeland Topical Briefing, July 1984.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 17 MINERS & MIGRANTS Case Studies of Labour Conflict

By Indicator SA Researcher Mark Bennett

Case Study 1 NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS AND THE HOMELANDS: Union Carbide and NUM vs Bophuthatswana's ICA

The detrimental impact of Bophuthatswana's new labour laws following day, however, the Bophuthatswana Department of on relations between homeland employers and employees Manpower telephoned UCAR to warn them that they should not became evident in the strikes which wracked Union Carbide's deal with NUM. Although UCAR's hands were now tied, the (UCAR) vanadium mine in the homeland in early 1984. The workers responded by downing tools for a further three days. problem began when miners, assisted by the National Union of What should have been a simple case of negotiating a Mineworkers (NUM), attempted to negotiate for higher wages, recognition agreement had turned into an acrimonious better working conditions and recognition of the union and industrial dispute. shop steward's committee (SALB Vol9/No4: p103). In December At the same time, NUM, together with other national trade 1983, UCAR management had indicated that they were prepared unions such as the South African Allied Workers Union and the to recognise NUM, but warned that the Bophuthatswana Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union, received authorities were openly hostile towards independent trade letters from the homeland authorities forbidding them from unions based in South Africa, particularly NUM. operating in the homeland. The homeland's Minister of After meeting with the Bophuthatswana government to Manpower, Mr Rowen Cronje, argued that it was inconceivable negotiate the issue, UCAR informed NUM in mid-January 1984 that 'foreign' unions should be allowed to operate in a sovereign that the homeland had indicated that: country (RDM 24/1/84). NUM, on the other hand, rejected the • South African trade unions would not be allowed to operate notion that while foreign multinationals were allowed to operate in the territory across international borders, South African based unions were • A Bophuthatswana Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) would prevented from doing so. be passed, with retrospective effect, to ratify this ban (ibid: In the meantime, UCAR has managed to temporarily restore p101). good labour relations at the mine. It has circumvented the ban A suggestion by UCAR that NUM should make representations on NUM by recognising the shop steward's committee. The to the Bophuthatswana authorities in order to solve the impasse committee in turn has been negotiating wages, grievance was rejected by the union, because they do not recognise the procedures, grades and other working conditions, while homeland's status as an independent state (Cooper 1984: simultaneously retaining links with NUM by telephone and by p176). Although UCAR undertook at this point to verbally holding its meetings outside the homeland (SALB op cit: p99). assure the miners that it would recognise the union, the Unfortunately though, it is probably only a matter of time workers were not convinced and downed tools for two hours before the Bophuthatswana authorities clamp down on NUM until management agreed to discuss formal recognition. On the activities, souring employer/employee relations once more.

Case Study 2 TWO LABOUR SYSTEMS GOVERN MINE The Dilemma at Rustenburg Platinum

The dissimilarities between homeland and South African labour African side, yet find that he spends most of his working day in a legislation is predictably causing serious problems for national tunnel that is technically part of Bophuthatswana. companies with plants based either at border growth-points or As an interim'response to the ludicrous problem, mine inside the homelands (see Whiteside article). The headaches management has apparently erected signs underground to for labour relations at JCI's giant Rustenburg Platinum Mine inform workers when they are leaving or entering Bophuthat- (RPM) began when South Africa's constitutional planners swana (RDM 1/2/85). RPM's consulting engineer, Mr Bruce decided to arbitrarily zigzag the national/homeland border Sutherland, says the company is waiting for the homeland right through the centre of the mine's property. This resulted in authorities to agree on whether the actual point of work, or the four of RPM's shafts being situated in South Africa, while two location of the shaft where the miners go down, determines others, and the main administration building, were officially which labour laws should be observed. But, even if there was a located in Bophuthatswana. strict determination on this technical point, RPM would still However, in terms of the homeland's ICA, 'foreign' unions are have to deal with two sets of labour laws: Bophuthatswana's outlawed from operating inside the territory, and unions that and South Africa's. want to function in Bophuthatswana have to situate their head It appears that the Bophuthatswana authorities are not going to offices there. Consequently, when the mine owners signed a let the issue rest. RPM has already been approached by the recognition agreement with the non-racial, South African Bophuthatswana National Union of Mine Employees based Federated Mining Union (FMU) in January 1985, many (BONUME) for access rights. The union, according to the legal complexities came to the fore. In the process of territory's industrial registrar, Mr E V McCormack, will be establishing the same union at the same mine located on both receiving assistance from his government 'in every way possible' sides of the border, either the mine owners, the FMU or the (ibid). RPM management have no objection to recognising a miners would be breaking the law. homeland union, provided that all the South African and On the surface of the mine it is relatively easy to establish which Bophuthatswana laws applicable to the mine are complied trade union mineworkers may belong to, but underground, with. But how the mine will cope with future labour scenarios workings weave back and forth across the border. Conse- where, for example, two different unions might ask for two quently, a miner could go down a shaft located on the South different wage increases remains to be seen.

18Rural & Regiona lMonitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 At Rustenberg Platinum Mine, miners at work underground cross into a different labour relations zone as they enter neighbouring Bophuthatswana (see case study 2).

Case study 3 THE LEGAL STRIKE OF SEPTEMBER 1984 : NUM and Police Intervention

When African mineworkers embarked upon their first ever legal favour of a strike while only 207 were against such action. Two strike in September 1984, the Chamber of Mines negotiated a days before the strike was due to begin NUM approached the last-minute agreement to settle the dispute, but in ensuing Chamber stating that their members still wanted to avoid any confrontations between miners and police ten miners were conflict. I n renewed negotiations NUM accepted the Chamber's killed and scores of others injured. In February 1985, 164 revised offer on behalf of its members, but the strike could not miners who were injured in these clashes initiated a law suit be called off in time. against the Minister of Law and Order for personal damages. Even after painstaking negotiation and the proper conduct of a The case also represents a collective attempt by NUM to legal strike, there were violent confrontations between the dissuade the police from similar future intervention (RDM police and tens of thousands of African miners. History seemed 18/2/85). to be repeating itself: Since the formation of NUM in 1982, many labour disputes on • in the 1922 white miners' 'Rand rebellion', the government the mines have involved the extraneous intervention of the declared a state of emergency and called in the army and the police. Even the less dramatic activities of the union, such as police the recruitment of hostel dwellers on mine property, has led to police action and prosecution under trespass and security laws • in 1946 a strike by 60 000 black miners was crushed by the (see Indicator SA Industrial Monitor Vol 2/No4: p8/10). The police 1984 mine strike was interpreted by some as a victory for • in July 1982, after a series of illegal wildcat strikes, ten miners collective bargaining, but other labour commentators noted its were killed during bloody confrontations with the police. violent nature and argued that the loss of life and limb made a The regular intervention of the police in the realm of collective mockery of the conciliation mechanisms which, in principle, bargaining, a sphere which should be left up to employers and seek to achieve consensus between employers and employees employees, has caused concern among both groups. Workers (IIR: p2/6). and their unions view the trend with much suspicion; often one After a series of wage increase negotiations, beginning in May hears allegations from workers and unions that their bosses 1984, NUM reduced its demands from an average 43 percent to collude with the police. The Institute of Industrial Relations has an across-the-board increase of 25 percent, while the Chamber succinctly noted that, while it is the duty of the police to protect upped its initial offer from 8 percent to between 13 and 15 both life and property, authoritarian intervention may actually percent. After negotiations deadlocked, a conciliation board incite the very violence it is trying to suppress (IIR op cit: p4). appointed by the Minister of Manpower failed to settle the In 1985, there have already been numerous confrontations dispute. The Chamber then revised its offer with a range of between miners and the police. Within days of the announce- increased fringe benefits, but the union rejected these ment that 164 miners were suing for damages, a massive strike increments and dropped its final wage demand to 18 percent. at the East Driefontein mine resulted in furtherviolence. Barely NUM's next move was to hold a strike ballot, even though as an a month later, some of the more than 40 000 miners at the Vaal. unregistered union it was not legally required to do so. The Reef'sgold mine were involved in anotherviolent confrontation outcome was a foregone conclusion: 43 271 miners voted in with the police.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural& Regiona lMonitor 19 Migrant dockworkers employed in Cape Town's harbour rest in Breakwater prison, a converted single-quarter hostel. The migrant labour system draws in workers from throughout the sub-continent. 1 The Geopolitics of Labour Supply 6 Bophuthatswana's State Farming Projects 10 Out on the Border - Botswana, Bophuthatswana & the ANC 13 The Valley Trust - Changing Horizons Soon the trees we're busy paper. It's a natural product, generations will have the raw growing will be ready to be one that can be regenerated materials for nature's most turned into paper. again and again. And that's versatile product — paper. But rest assured there'll be why every year we at Sappi more new saplings to take plant more trees than we cut their place. down. That's the beauty about To make sure future sappi

Paper — the natural choice.

Every year SAPPI produces over500 000 tons of fine paper, packaging paper, newsprint, tissue, particle-board and timber products. Every year we plant over 12 million saplings in our 140 000 ha of beautifulforest lands. A nd our continuous in vestment in technology and new plant ensures thai all the 21st century's requirements for forest products will be fully met.

GREY-PHILLIPS, 8UNT0N, MUNDEL & BLAKE 75651 THE GEOPOLITICS OF LABOUR SUPPLY Redefining Migrant Boundaries in Southern Africa

By Indicator SA Researcher Jeff Zingel

'Political boundaries have been established which cut across an order which is being perceived as a single economic entity and which has developed as such.' Dr Cornelius Human, Chairman, Federate Volksbeleggings (RDM 25/10/84).

A high level of interest and negotiation is currently taking place in Southern Africa over important economic areas of common interest and mutual dependency. The historic Trade and Investment in South Africa conference held in October 1984, saw delegates from every country in the region rub shoulders at an occasion which would have been considered an impossible event before the signing of the . At this significant juncture, when a major re-think is occurring among leaders of neighbouring countries who have long distrusted the South African government, Jeff Zingel considers how geopolitical developments affect one of the more enduring features of the Southern African economy. He documents the supply of labour from both frontline states and the homelands, and shows how South Africa will continue to manipulate local and regional labour supplies to mining and industry, in order to protect the interests of people in its urban areas. Zingel concludes that this will occur at the expense of the growing labour force in the homelands and frontline states, who clamour for employment in South African industry.

ntil the 1970s, the supply of labour to South Africa's mining industry was Udominated by a singularly important, post-war trend. The development and expansion of the industry relied considerably on the utilisation of increasing numbers of black mineworkers from neighbouring countries. By 1973, about 475 000 foreign black people were employed in the country, the majority (70 percent) as contract migrants on the mines (Wilson 1976: p457). Table 1 documents this trend.

Local Labour Policy The decade saw a number of significant, interacting events, however, which contributed to changing this pattern of regional interdependence, with long term consequences for both the supplier countries and South Africa. Major developments which effected the redistribution of local and regional labour supplies at the time included: • a three-year long series of unprecedented violent confrontations between both foreign and domestic mineworkers, leaving about 300 people dead • a labour shortage in 1974, when Malawi withdrew 100 000 contract workers after a Crowding for recruitment. Workseekers present documentation for possible jobs recruiting aircraft crashed, killing 71 people on diamond mines. Ondangwa, Namibia.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 1 potential labour supply, represents a Figure 1 THE LABOUR 'ONION' decreasing priority in terms of Pretoria's allocation of job opportunities in South Africa's industrial areas. In the model outlined by Wilson, the central core of the geopolitical hierarchy includes the mines, factories, cities and towns of South Africa surrounded by white farming areas. The first ring represents the non-independent homelands and the second, the independent homelands. The third ring represents the former High Commission Territories of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, while the outer ring includes Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe. Within (the first three rings of the diagram), a process of increasing state management of the labour supply system has occurred, characterised by three main trends. Three Main Trends Firstly, a selective process of granting residence and employment privileges to those South African workers with legal rights to live in the common core has been adopted by government. One estimate suggests that 5 300 000 urban Africans, including many The Labour Onion: A • Mozambique obtained independence in local migrants, might qualify in terms of the schematic the same year, creating further uncertainty now renowned Section 10 legislation (Lacey representation of over labour supplies South Africa's 1984). • South Africa experienced increased geopolitical labour Secondly, through changes in citizenship tied hierarchy, after political isolation after the collapse of the F Wilson, SA Outlook colonial power bloc in the region, along with to the granting of homeland independence, 1980. Pretoria's detente efforts. an 'international' commuter workforce has been created, travelling daily to work in The simultaneous, rapid rise in the price of South Africa's commercial and industrial gold extended the life of many mines and core. The policy of urban removals, whereby allowed uneconomic, marginal mines to be an estimated 750 000 Africans have been brought into a more viable position. This relocated from metropolitan and other areas 'freeing' of the gold price also prompted the into townships within designated homelands During the 1970s, mining industry to increase wages and in (Baldwin in Spies 1983), constitutes an a series of conjunction with the above factors, to essential part of this process. Table 2 details embark on a policy of employing more uncannily the massive increase in the number of labour from within South Africa (ibid: commuters per homeland. interlocking p464/7). In 1975, a government commission events changed of enquiry set a target of 60 percent local Thirdly, with the establishment of the the face of the labour and 40 percent foreign labour. homeland programme, the iabour market in rural areas has been subject to two distinct regional labour Finally, the granting of independence to Transkei in 1976, and subsequently to forces. On the one hand, the continuing supply system Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei focussed policy of rural removals and resettlement has attention on the political implications for the placed about three million people (Surplus central government of the employment crises Peoples Project Report 1983) within the in these areas. boundaries of independent and semi- independent homelands. On the other hand, labour recruitment and allocation procedures The selective The Labour 'Onion' have been systematised and centralised for Cumulatively, one result of these major these areas. These mechanisms ensure a granting of urban supply of labour to sectors in the central residence rights policy changes and institutional developments has been to change the format economy which require categories of workers and mass of South Africa from an essentially labour unavailable in urban areas. removals to the absorbing economy to a highly regulated homelands labour extruding economy. A process of The Homelands characterise the contraction and relocation of traditional new priorities in labour supply sources occurred during this Table 3 demonstrates that the trend is for the period, reflecting the changing relationship homelands to remain absolutely dependent job allocation between political boundaries and labour on incomes from this allocated migrant supplies which has been well illustrated by labour workforce. At the same time, the Francis Wilson (SA Outlook March 1980). homelands are placed in a disadvantaged Peeling the symbolic onion from the core position with no claim to the central outwards (see fig 1) each ring, or area of economy, as their citizens are considered to

2 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Aspirant miners, no longer assuming available migrant contracts in South Atrica undergo health checks in recruiting offices. Maseru,

I Lesotho.

Homeland Administrations policy with the South African Government are in that all migrant labour should be drawn competition with exclusively from the four national states, and neighbouring be guest workers or foreign citizens. that the present procedure amongst mining Available statistics for the period 1979 to states for and other industries to import labour from available 1981 indicate a trend of increasing neighbouring independent states should dependency (Spies 1982). cease' (Swart Commission Report 1983: p83). employment At present, urban workers have greater prospects in the occupational and residential mobility within central economy this geopolitical hierarchy, and in Neighbouring States combination with a local labour preference The neighbouring independent states have policy and the re-zoning of labour supply clearly suffered a reduction in traditionally areas, the number of workers recruited from secure employment prospects in South A regional homelands is likely to be reduced. The Africa, due to the relocation of labour Labour Supply homelands are effectively becoming 'the supplies outlined above. By 1982, the Commission, repository for the spent and redundant' Chamber of Mines had almost reached its with members (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1985: pl9). target of 60 percent local supplies, a from all frontline dominant trend which is reflected in table 4. Homeland government concern over their states, devises predicament is reflected in a recent The supplier countries' response has been to projects to development plan for the Ciskei which form, in 1980, the Southern African Labour redeploy labour proposes that 'Ciskei pursue as a matter of Supply Commission (SALC), in order to withdrawn from South Africa

Table 1 LOCAL AND REGIONAL SOURCES OF MIGRANT LABOUR SUPPLY FOR CHAMBER OF MINES, 1946-1975

1946 1960 1970 1973 1975

(000)s % (000)s % (000)s % (000)s % (000)s %

South Africa 126 41.3 145 36.7 97 24.1 86 20.4 122 33.4 Lesotho 38 12.5 51 13.0 71 17.7 87 20.7 86 23.6 Botswana 7 2.3 16 4.0 16 4.0 17 4.0 17 4.6 Swaziland 6 1.8 6 1.4 5 1.3 5 1.1 7 1.9 Mozambique 96 31.5 95 24.1 113 28.2 99 23.6 118 32.3 North of Lat. 32 10.6 83 20.9 98 24.5 128 30.3 16 4.3 22°S.

TOTAL 305 100.0 397 100.0 401 100.0 422 100.0 365 100.0

Source: P Wilson, International Migration in Southern Africa, International Migration Review Vol10/No4 1976.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor 3 /As employment coordinate policies with regard to the supply potential for internal growth and opportunities in of labour to South Africa. Member countries development. South Africa include Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia. With the The human side of this predicament is vividly dwindle, Lesotho aim of reducing and later eliminating the described by Guy and Thabona in a Carneuie faces perhaps the supply of migrant labour, the SALC is Conference paper. They note, 'the fact thaf most radical attempting to develop a uniform approach to able bodied men can no longer assume that bilateral agreements with South Africa. It they can obtain contracts to work in South changes in its Africa is potentially, perhaps, the most history concentrates on recruitment, employment and living conditions in South Africa, as well radical change in Lesotho's history since its as on projects for the redeployment and loss of political independence and training of labour withdrawn from South incorporation in the South African economv Africa (Maasdorp 1984: p69). at the end of the 19th century' (Paper 114: pi). Further Reduction Of the other supplier states, Botswana's The numbers registered labour complement in South game: South Prospects for the achievement of the SALC Africa has fallen from 13 percent of its total goals of reduction vary from country to labour force in 1971, to seven percent 11 Africa's ability to country. Lesotho's predicament is the years later (Whiteside 1985). Studies manipulate extreme case, having been, at times, undertaken there, however, indicate regional labour dependent on South Africa for employment considerable potential for expanding the local supplies to of 75 percent of its adult male labour force. use of labour (Maasdorp 1984: p71). achieve political In 1982, miners deferred pay and remittances Swaziland and Malawi received R9,2m and amounted to R111,8m (ibid: p71). Decreases R18,9m respectively from the deferred pay goals emerged in the number of jobs available in South and remittances of miners in 1982, and the again at Nkomati Africa threaten Lesotho's already limited South African labour market continues to

Table 2 HOMELAND COMMUTERS: INCREASES DURING 1976/81

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

Transkei 7 100 7 100 7 600 8 900 9 000 9 100 Bop 136 400 148 200 151 800 155 400 161 200 162 200 Venda 3 700 4 500 5 100 5 600 5 600 5 700 Ciskei 34 200 34 600 36 200 37 100 38 100 38 400 KwaZulu 279 200 291 300 321 700 352 300 363 900 384 200 Qwaqwa 1 800 2 100 2 000 2 500 6 800 9 500 Lebowa 44 000 46 000 54 400 57 900 65 800 72 200 Gazankulu 6 300 6 300 6 700 7 800 8 800 9 700 KaNgwane 23 000 25 200 28 500 33« 100 35 600 40 000 KwaNdebele 1 100 1 300 3 500 5 900 8 700

TOTAL 536 100 567 000 615 300 664 100 700 700 739 700

SOURCE: P H Spies (Ed), Urban-Rural Interaction in Southern Africa. Unit for Futures Research, Slellenbosch 1982.

Table 3 INCOME DEPENDENCY IN SELECTED NATIONAL STATES National State Gross Domestic Product as a Percentage of Gross National Income in Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Transkei 38 39 39 40 42 43 Bophuthatswana 37 39 34 35 40 41 KwaZulu 24 25 25 22 22 21 Lebowa 36 34 30 28 32 30 Gazankulu 30 32 32 32 35 33

SOURCE: J Natlrass, Fiscal Aspects of Dependency, indicator SA Vol2 /No4.

4 Rural & Regbnal Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Table 4 REGIONAL REDUCTION IN LABOUR SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1975-1983

173 876 160 634 152 188 155 623 152 032 150 738 150 422 145 797 140 746 140 719

111 257

68 232 61 550 56 424 59 391 59 323 61 218 49 108 43 527 39 308 43 159 38 525 35 803 37 919 34 664 32 319 30 602 37 016 32 716 32 463 27 558 29 622 27 494 23 200 29 169 26 262 20 750 21 547 25 697 16 390 18 195 19 853 16 965 13 659 12 761 14 054 16 773 12 412 13 006 10 377 13 417 11 332 7 742 8 897 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

SOURCE: S A Yearbook 1975/1983.

fulfil a most useful role for these countries in geopolitical cooperation in the sub-region. providing foreign exchange (ibid: p73). Current efforts to promote trade and In contrast to the stated SALC objectives investment in Southern Africa can contribute outlined above, SADCC (Southern African to increasing employment prospects both Development Coordination Conference) has within and without South Africa. However, stressed a different strategy in a report on Pretoria's ability to manipulate labour labour and employment. It favours a policy supplies to achieve short-term goals of of maximising benefits from the migrant detente with the frontline states and medium- labour system, while preparing contingency term goals of establishing a relatively plans to reduce the costs of a sudden privileged urban African group is likely to reduction or termination of opportunities for continue to occur at the expense of the needs migrant labour supply to South Africa (ibid: of the homeland states. The inherent P73). limitations of this intricate, shifting system of geopolitical priorities and labour allocations in an unstable subcontinent will have The employment Conclusion ramifications far beyond the neat political needs of the Today, the neighbouring frontline states and legislative boundaries constructed to homeland states face an ambivalent predicament. Nowhere is date. were neglected in this more apparent than in the case of the recent Mozambique. Medium term needs for BIBLIOGRAPHY Accord employment opportunities in South Africa H Giliomee and L Schlemmer, Up Against the Fences: Poveity, passes and privilege in South Africa, David Philip 1985 negotiations, and the resultant foreign exchange earnings M Lacey, Feudalism in the Age of Compulers — an analysis of undoubtedly formed an important part of the recruilmenl strafegies to reserve and allocate labour. Black Sash News which Nkomati negotiations. Recent reports on the February 1984. G Maasdorp, SADCC: A Posl-Nkomali Evaluation, South African Institute emphasised granting of legal status to the 150 000 of International Affairs 1984: p69. political stability Mozambican farmworkers in the eastern P Spies (Ed), Urban-Rural Interaction in Southern Africa, Unit for Futures Research, University of Stellenbosch 1983 Transvaal, and the increase in recruitment of F Wilson, International Migration in Southern Africa, International Migration mineworkers (Natal Mercury 15/11/84), ReviewV OI10/NO4 1976. F Wilson, The Real Heart of Apartheid, S A Outlook March 1980, indicate South Africa's ability to manipulate A Whiteside, personal communication. Economic Research Unit labour supplies to provide its own brand of (University of Natal)

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor BOPHUTHATSWANA'S STATE FARMING PROJECTS An Aggro Business? By Monty J Roodt of the Development Studies Unit, University of Bophuthatswana

There has been very little informed analysis of the large-scale capital intensive agricultural projects undertaken in South Africa's homeland areas. These projects, a major part of the development initiatives of the South African government and homeland administrations, represent a particular kind of rural development. They require substantial financing and highly centralised management, with a primary goal of increasing gross agricultural production. Monty Roodt, a researcher at the University of Bophuthatswana's Development Studies Unit, describes the context for the two largest dryland maize projects in the homelands, presently being developed in Bophuthatswana's Ditsobatla region. Drawing on a cost- benefit analysis of prior conditions and project inputs/outputs, he argues that programmes of this type are incapable of supporting the costs of production and the colossal management infrastructure involved. Roodt notes that local project participants fail to gain an equitable or even sufficient supplementary income. His sober conclusion is that these projects provide an expanded market for agribusiness and agrimanagement, while for individual landholders, the schemes represent yet another more sophisticated method of dispossession of the little land over which they had control prior to implementation.

Project initiatives n 1977, the central government Structural Changes are directed at amended the Promotion of Economic proving the IDevelopment of the National States Act The decision to develop the agricultural (No 46 of 1968), in order to scrap provisions sector of the homelands by means of large- viability and self- for the Bantu Investment Corporation and scale capital intensive projects has been sufficiency of replace it with a Corporation for Economic influenced by changes in structure and form homeland Development (CED). Legislative revision of the South African economy since the regions allowed for an almost uninhibited flow of 1960s. Together, the increase in foreign capital investment from the central economy investment and the centralisation of mining, into the homelands, by scrapping a number manufacturing and agricultural capital have of racial prescriptions. This move represented promoted the organisational and financial a major policy shift from government infrastructure required for large-scale attempts to create a black entrepreneurial investment in homeland agriculture. class in the homelands, as the statutory Of particular relevance here is the growth in Government, compulsion to include Africans directly in the Transvaal and Orange Free State of large private sector any of the undertakings was dropped. food processing/milling companies and companies, The CED's efforts were to be concentrated white-owned agricultural cooperatives, white-owned on the development of large agricultural and headed by the central retail organisation, cooperatives and industrial projects, transport and financial Vetsak. The cooperatives have become involved in the financing and management of local white support, while other functions were transferred to the National Development projects since a decision in 1976 by the farmers are Corporations. The new development Cooperatives Board of the South African involved in the initiatives, particularly the establishment of Agricultural Union to aid homelands in the financing and large agricultural projects, have been aimed development of their agricultural potential. management of at boosting the viability and self-sufficiency projects of South Africa's independent homelands. In retrospect, however, they need to be seen Prior Conditions against the background of the expulsion and The stateland farms on which the large restriction to homeland areas of a mass of Mooifontein and Sheila dryland maize unemployed and urbanising people, by means projects are situated make up nearly 48 of the government's relocation policies. percent of Ditsobatla region. The farms were

6 Rural & Regional Monilor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 bought from white farmers and the African contractors for sharecropping arrangements. European Investment Company by the South African Native Trust, after the amendment of The Sheila-Verdwaal the Released Areas Act (No 18 of 1936). Today, the resident population partly Project consists of former employees of white In 1976, the relatively smaller Sheila- farmers, who chose to remain in the area and Verdwaal dryland maize project was initiated Most Ditsobatla were allocated land rights and small plots. by the Bophuthatswana Department of residents have The majority of residents are the victims of Agriculture, who approached Noordweslike been removed evictions from urban areas in the western Kooperatiewe Landboumaatskappy to act as from white farms financiers and agricultural advisors. Transvaal and from white farms in the and urban areas surrounding districts. After the land had been Ministerial permission was granted through subject to betterment planning in the late the South African Registrar of Co-operatives, in the western 1950s, variously sized plots emerged: and a firm of agricultural consultants was Transvaal ® most residents received ten morgen arable appointed to provide management and allotments technical advice. A committee of four local ® older residents retained or were allocated white farmers was appointed to give practical half morgen plots advice during the planning stages. ® newcomers received a quarter morgen. Each of the 200 landholders who had rights (One morgen = 0,856 ha.) on the three stateland farms comprising the Redelinghuys (1981 study) ascertained that 56 project were allocated a 15 ha arable plot. percent of farmers in the Ditsobatla region This involved the loss of some communal Allocated dryland cultivated their own land prior to project grazing land, yet most farmers approved of and maize plots implementation. The rest, many consisting of the scheme as it represented an overall represented an households headed by females, relied on increase in arable land. overall increase Table 1 in arable land for PRE-PROJECT NET INCOME FROM MAIZE, 1979/80 PRICES local African participants Gross Income from 15 ha R1 059.00 Less: Cultivation costs R 268.05 Cost treshing and transport R 176.23 Equals: Net Income per 15 ha R 614.72 Net Income per ha R 40.98 ANALYSIS • Farmers were capable of earning a net income of R41 per ha before the The Sheila implementation of the programme. project promoted • Using pre-project methods of cultivation, had farmers been given a larger allotment of 15 ha they would, on average, have earned an average net income of R614.72. small farmers as contractors. After many withdrew, the cooperatives Table 2 PROJECT INPUT AND OVERHEAD COSTS, took over AGRICOR MOOIFONTEIN EXPANSION PROJECT ploughing and cultivating Average input costs per ha per Average overhead costs per ha farmer per farmer

Item R/ha Item R/ha Seed 7 Management costs 9 5 Fertiliser 57 Management fees Herbicides 3 Interest 9 Pest control 6 Training fee 1.20 Labour 7 Total 24.20 Transport 10 Tractor and implements '75 Harvesting 17 Total 182

ANALYSIS • The study took a yield of 2.4 tons per ha as the average yield, at R100 per ton, giving a per ha income of R240. • Subtracting production costs leaves a gross margin of R58 per ha. • Subtracting overhead costs leaves participants with a net income of R33.80 per ha, or R507 per 15 ha allotment. • In the second year of operation the contractors fee would further lower net income by R4 to R29. • During the first few years the participants had to pay an additional R22 per ha for phosphates, further reducing the average net income which farmers received to R7 per ha.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monitor Management The first stage of the project involved the of their allotments, yet it has become dear systems on contractor system, whereby certain farmers that the majority are not actively involved in Mooifontein have were given a 'package' of tractors and the actual production process. This is due to implements, as well as an extra 15 ha. In a number of reasons, the most important' been strongly return, these farmers undertook to plough for being that an adequate living cannot he made influenced by other farms. By 1982, however, twelve of the from the 15 ha of maize cultivation. original farmer contractors had withdrawn Israel's Moshav Approximately 40 percent of participants from the project and much of the ploughing system also work outside of the project on a and cultivating was taken over by the permanent basis. The remaining participants cooperatives. It is too early to tell whether are older and retired people, who are in any they will be successful as small groups of case incapable of making a full contribution semi-independent private farmers. to the aims of the scheme. The survey investigation (Roodt) carried out into both The Mooifontein Project projects revealed that participants, other than contractors and hired drivers, are farmers in The Mooifontein project, constituting half of name only. Consultation as to choice of The production all the land presently under development by crops, fertiliser applications, crop spraying, process has Agricor, has grown into the largest dryland weeding and harvesting is virtually non- maize project in Southern Africa. Covering a moved out of the existent. Furthermore, 87 percent "of total 22 940 ha, mainly under maize, the respondents are dissatisfied with the v.av hands of local project serves 1 305 participating deductions for these operations are made (see participants, with households. Here the management system table 2). The survey revealed that 57 percent committees has been influenced by Israel's Moshav of farmers wished to leave at the end of 1983 becoming a system. Instead of using contractors, and attempt to farm on their own account machinery is owned by 15 production instead. rubber stamp for cooperatives which make up the project and white employ drivers to operate machinery at hire (1) Pre-Project Income Estimates management charges to farmers. From a survey conducted by this author, it decisions Participants are also allocated 15 ha arable was established that maize yields obtained allotments. Agricor is responsible for prior to project implementation were 12.5 seasonal inputs such as seed fertilizer, weed bags per morgen, or 1.04 tons per ha. Figures killers and fuel, and all capital costs are from four other studies were obtained (Ardri. shared by Agricor and the CED. The 15 Seobis, Redelinghuys, Pretorius) and a primary cooperatives are said to form the computed total average of 8.9 bags per basic units of Agricor's 'Temisano' strategy morgen, or 0.706 tons per ha, emerged as tlu- for rural development, which has four reputable norm. This estimate would give the thrusts: average grower a gross income of R70.60 per • agricultural production ha. As the project participants have since • community development been allocated a 15 ha allotment, for the sake Recent surveys • a training function of comparison, it is estimated that the pre- showed 57 • promotion of secondary industries. project gross income from maize yields lor percent of local Each primary cooperative has a management this area size (see table 1) would have been farmers wished committee, elected on an annual basis, which R1 059. to leave the is officially in control of the projects. In Using Seobis' figures for average costs scheme, as the practise, however, the committees seem little incurred during cultivation, harvesting and small plots more than a rubber stamp for decisions made transport in an agricultural season, the by white management. The original intention picture set out and analysed in table 1 cannot provide was that local participants should become emerges. It needs to be stated that the yield an adequate responsible for the supervision of cultivation estimates are rough averages which, in income

Table 3 COMPARATIVE INCOMES PER HA ; PRE-PROJECT AND PROJECT STAGES

Ditsobatla farmers (pre-project) R40.98 " Agricor project (including phosphates) R 7.00 The tables detail Agricor project (excluding phosphates) R29.00 factors contributing to the effective Table 4 ACTUAL AVERAGE NET INCOMES OF PARTICIPANTS decrease in incomes. FOR WHOLE PROJECT Phosphate costs Total income from 15 ha R2 970.00 are a major drain Total income per ha R 198.00 Total average costs: Sheila and Mooifontein R 233.39 Net income loss per ha R 35.99 Net income loss per 15 ha R 539.85

8 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 reality, would vary from year to year, Implications Participants have depending on the climate and other factors lost an average such as time of ploughing, the calibre of What are the implications of the negative or R36 per ha, a contractors and so on. Another consideration very low net incomes achieved on these major considerable is that while all farmers grew maize, the projects so far? It has become increasingly majority also grew crops such as sunflowers, obvious that 15 ha arable allotments in a amount when grain sorghum, beans, wheat, watermelons marginal maize area — where drought is the compared and pumpkins as dietary supplements as well rule rather than the exception — are unable against the R41 as for sale. Thus it is conceivable that some to support the capital intensive production made prior to farmers might have received higher pre- techniques and the cost of the management implementation prnjcct incomes than the net R41.00 per ha infrastructure, as well as provide project calculated in table 1. participants with an equitable or supplementary income. (2) Project Costs and Benefits On the advice of the major investor, the The incorporation of two farms into the South African Department of Foreign Mooil'ontein project in 1979/80 provides a Affairs, Agricor has decided to reduce inputs good example of the costs and benefits on its new project, in order to suit the real Incurred by participants. The calculations in potential of the area. It has also been decided tables 2 and 3 are derived from details of this that maize farmers need 71 ha to earn expansion programme, which were The wisdom of R5 000 per year. Far fewer farmers would documented in a study prepared by the thus be accommodated. In Ditsobatla region, concentrating on planning and development division of for example, where 70 000 ha of high dryland maize Agricor at the time. All prices recorded in potential arable land has been identified as initiatives in an tables 2-4 are for the 1979/80 season, unless suitable for dryland summer grain crops, 71 otherwise stated. area where ha sized farms would mean that only 986 drought is the The figures here represent project income for farmer families could be accommodated in participants under ideal conditions, and in fulltime crop farming. rule must be reality yields have often been much lower. questioned Even with the advantages of modern methods It has been calculated that 27 000 livestock of cultivation, yields obtained on units may be kept on the remaining 166 000 Mooifontein between 1978 and 1983 have ha, giving a further 90 to 100 cattle-farmers a been a low 1.86 tons per ha. On the smaller living. Feasibility studies by the CED Sheila project, however, due to its closer propose related agro-industries which would proximity to the maize triangle, yields of 2.4 create only 483 basic job opportunities. tons per ha were obtained (see tables 2/3). Backward and forward linkages, infra- On the basis of these actual average yields for structural projects and other small informal both projects, a total average of 1.98 tons (on sector activities would not provide many more employment opportunities in the long Recent a ha ratio basis) was obtained. This provides assessments project participants with a gross income of term. indicate the need R2 970 per 15 ha allotment. Table 4 sets out At the end of 1984, Ditsobatla's population the actual average gross and net incomes for was approximately 148 000 people, and is for larger the project as a whole. expected to double in 24 years at present individual growth rates. This implies that under optimal allotments, and a (3) Pre-Project/Project Comparison conditions of employment, utilising arable reduction in the Taking the calculations in table 4, it is argued land and cattle production, agro-industries number of farmer that participants in the schemes have lost and the few civil servant jobs available, less (until 1983) an average of R36.00 per ha, as than 35 percent of inhabitants will be able to families opposed to the R41.00 they were making find full-time employment in the region in the before the implementation of the project. near future. These figures represent averages, and in reality debts vary enormously. In many instances participants owe over RIO 000, and Conclusion the 1984 drought has contributed to even The inherent limitations and intrinsic pitfalls Even under greater debt burdens. in the programmes demonstrated here, and optimal planning Agricor has stated that the aim is to provide their irrelevance as total solutions for long each participant with a net income of R5 000 term goals of the central and homeland conditions, only (at present prices), the amount considered governments, should be taken note of. In the 35 percent of the necessary to keep a full-time farmer on the early 1950s, the Tomlinson Commission region's people land. With present input costs as high as they showed that at least 80 percent of the then would find jobs are, particularly those of phosphate 'reserve' population would have to find there, application, this appears an impossible task employment outside agriculture. Since then, to accomplish on 15 ha allotments. As in however, Bophuthatswana has witnessed the emphasising the other homeland areas (see Ingwavuma relocation of viable urban communities into pipe-dream article, Indicator SA Vol 2/No 4), project rural sub-regions such as Ditsobatla. This vision of reversal of the urbanisation process has planners seem willing to decrease individual homeland net incomes in order to achieve gross further exacerbated the crisis of poverty, production targets. This pervasive inclination employment and expectations. The self-sufficiency would appear to be prompted by the desire to alternative means of employment creation prove in the eyes of the world, the within the confines of the homeland system agricultural viability of the economies of the have since proved to be an expensive pipe independent homelands. dream.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No I Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monilor 74 By Patrick Laurence, Indicator Correspondent

One immediate consequence of the Nkomati Accord signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984, has been to shift political and military attention to security problems on the Botswana-South Africa frontier. Senior members of the South African government allege that the country's north-western border has since become an infiltration point for guerillas of the outlawed African National Congress. The ongoing war of words over security breaches has put diplomatic relations between South Africa and Botswana under the spotlight again. Caught in the regional crossfire, Bophuthatswana's ethnic composition and interceding boundaries form a significant complicating factor amidst white and black nationalist struggles for political autonomy in South Africa. Freelance journalist Patrick Laurence reports on the recent border incidents involving ANC guerilla movements in the western Transvaal platteland.

At least 15 n the eve of the first anniversary of the burnt-out vehicle belonging to the murdered incidents have signing of the Nkomati Accord, a couple was found 30 kilometres from the occurred near OSwartruggens farming couple, Mr and Derdepoort border post, between South Mrs Hannes Joubert, were murdered by three Africa and Botswana. the Botswana men in their isolated rural store near a In the same address, Mr Le Grange disclosed border since Bophuthatswana homeland border. On the that at least 15 incidents, involving some 48 August 1984 same day Mr Louis Le Grange, Minister of suspected black nationalist insurgents, had Law and Order, informed the South African occurred near the Botswana border since Parliament that the killers were suspected August 1984. Members of the banned Pan African National Congress (ANC) insurgents. Africanist Congress (PAC), a smaller Abandoned AK-47 rifles, the standard nationalist faction in exile, were involved in firepower of ANC guerillas, were said to have six of these incidents according to a report been found near the scene of the attack. A published in Beeld.

10 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 The New Conduit homeland state and their kinsmen located in Recent guerilla Botswana. There is considerable potential for insurgency via civil war, in the strict fracticidal sense of the These developments added fuel to earlier Bophuthatswana statements made by senior military and word. In terms of the wider African kinship police officers, who allege that Botswana has system, the number of Tswana brothers — in raises the spectre become the main conduit for trained ANC literal terms — on both sides of the border of fratricidal mierillas re-entering South Africa, The probably runs to tens of thousands. The violence, as negotiation of security pacts with maiden home of the wife of the Botswana Batswana people President is situated in Bophuthatswana. Mozambique and Swaziland has apparently live on either side resulted in the closure of the older infiltration These border anomalies have their roots in of the border routes on the north-east border. the last century, when the Batswana people Similarly, South Africa's Foreign Minister, were arbitrarily divided by a colonial M'ik' Botha, warned in October last year that boundary which established the British there were 'indications that Botswana is Protectorate on the one hand, and the Cape increasingly being used as a channel for Colony and the old sabotage, or as a refuge for sabotage' (RDM on the other (see map). 14/9/84). In January 1985, he again bluntly warned Botswana that the situation could not continue (Star 14/1/85) and gave a catalogue Hot Pursuit Raids of confrontations with insurgents in transit in A colonial legacy of geo-political Bophuthatswana on their way to South 'Hot pursuit' Africa. Since September last year, configurations in Southern Africa ® five insurgents have been arrested in undoubtedly infringes on current events. In warnings are Bophuthatswana late 1984, Bophuthatswana's Foreign labelled as Minister, T M Molatlhatwa, warned • two have escaped back across the border 'invasion threats' Botswana that his government reserved the to Botswana right to conduct hot pursuit operations in the historical a three have died in shoot-outs with security against insurgents fleeing from the homeland context of forces territory back to Botswana. Dr G Chiepe, colonial border • two Bophuthatswana policemen have been Botswana's new Foreign Minister, reacted anomalies killed in anti-insurgent operations (ibid). sharply to the warnings and labelled them as 'invasion threats'. Two Batswana States Such 'hot pursuit' raids could easily The involvement of Bophuthatswana in these precipitate clashes between the South African incidents has increased tensions between the trained Bophuthatswana forces, and the Batswana people of this fragmented British and Indian trained Botswana Defence

/ ^MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA J^ALAWIj v. > . Si ANGOLA^ ZIMBABWE i I 1 \ < t ) i i INDIAN OCEAN < ) , CD Dukwe • V (Refugee Camp) \ ( / k 5 BOTSWANA

THE OTHER' TRANSVAAL COMRADES 4tf , MARATHON: Gaborone r-r Derdepoort (Border posl) / * ANC GUERILLA /'BOPHUTHATSWANA INFILTRATION f Swartruggens ^ ) « ROUTES IN J Johannesburg / M SOUTHERN AFRICA } r" '/ORANGE FREE STATE/ NATAL ) /

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No I Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monilor 11 The strained Force. In spite of these political tensions, borders en-route to South Africa. In earlier relations between however, relations between Batswana people, statements, President Masire has argued that, on both sides of the border, are essentially 'South Africa and Bophuthatswana, with Pretoria and pragmatic and friendly at the grassroots level. their large security forces and armies, should Gaberone have a The problems arising from the cross-border be able to seal their boundaries against ANC long history ties of Batswana ethnicity and kinship are infiltration, which Botswana, with its small related to the further compounded by international police force, army and severely limited presence of rejection of the Bophuthatswana homeland's resources, is unable to do' (Botswana Daily News). suspected ANC parochial, 'independence' status. Therefore, refugees in the non-aggression treaty negotiated by In February 1985, after a meeting between South Africa with Bophuthatswana after the Botswana foreign ministers Dr Chiepe and 'Pik' Botha homeland attained independence in 1977, in Pretoria, Mr Botha declared that South enjoys dubious legal validity beyond South Africa had accepted an assurance by African frontiers. The treaty commits the Botswana that it would not allow 'subversive homeland to preventing guerillas from using elements' to operate from its territory. its territory as a springboard to launch Therefore, he added, there is no need for a attacks on targets based in South Africa formal pact of any kind (Star 23/2/85). itself. Chiepe's assurances at this year's meeting were a mere restatement of Botswana's previously applied policy, which had been consistently rejected by Pretoria. It is unclear m Bophuthatswana why they should have suddenly become E3 is committed by Non-Aggression Treaties In i acceptable to South Africa in early 1985, treaty to prevent Since March 1984, South Africa has put unless an informal understanding had been its territory from constant pressure on Botswana to sign a non- reached in the interim. E13 becoming a aggression pact similar to the high profile Nkomati accord (Africa Report July/Aug Subsequently, the fact that in March this year springboard for 1984). Relations between the two countries South Africa apparently submitted a list of ANC attacks on have long been strained, principally due to Botswana-based ANC members whom it South Africa Botswana's perceived tolerance of an ANC wanted expelled, would seem to substantiate presence. Pretoria has accused the Botswana such speculation. A similar list of black government of conveniently showing a blind nationalist exiles, too close for comfort on eye to ANC activities, through refusing to Pretoria's terms, was submitted to the negotiate formal measures to combat Lesotho government in 1983. According to terrorism in the region (RDM 14/9/84). Lesotho, South African pressure at the time, including a threatened economic squeeze, led Botswana's contrary position was formally to the 'voluntary exodus' of about 24 ANC bull stated by President Masire in mid-1984: members. A similar strategy would seem to Botswana feels 'Botswana's policy towards refugees derives have been applied to Botswana, as the that the from our international obligations as frontline state had earlier expressed regret at combined SA/ specified in the Geneva Convention. All Mr Botha's 'oblique suggestion' that those who come to Botswana and qualify as economic ties between the two countries Bophuthatswana refugees are specifically prohibited from depended on the signing of the non- forces should be using Botswana as a base to attack their aggression pact (RDM 14/9/84). capable of countries of origin. This policy has been effectively implemented successfully for the past 18 sealing their years and applies to all refugees, irrespective of their political affiliations' (Press borders against statement). ANC infiltration Conclusion Masire's government accuses Pretoria and Mafikeng (Bophuthatswana's capital) of A dramatic turn of events in June 1985 has unfairly holding it responsible for ANC since overtaken the steady diplomatic progress fighters who may have slipped through made by the governments of Botswana and Botswana en-route to South Africa, without South Africa towards reaching an informal the knowledge of the frontline state's security security understanding. Following forces. handgrenade attacks on two coloured parliamentarians' homes in Cape Town - The recent SADF presumed to be the work of ANC guerillas - attack on alleged the South African Defence Force carried out a ANC bases in reprisal attack on alleged ANC bases in Gaborone will sour Subsequent Developments Gaborone. On 14 June, a lightning strike on diplomatic ten homes located in Botswana's capital left 14 people dead, including three exiled South relations far South Africa is reported to have since changed its approach. Instead of trying to African artists, two Batswana domestic beyond the persuade Botswana to sign an accord, servants, a visiting Dutch academic, a child and Botswana/South Pretoria has sought to reach a less formal several other refugees. International outrage Africa frontier 'working agreement', providing for over the apparent indiscriminate nature of the cooperation between their respective security attack, which seemed to be misdirected at and intelligence forces (RDM 11/9/84). In civilians and ANC sympathisers rather than theory, the policy shift is aimed at trying to activists, will no doubt sour diplomatic help Botswana enforce its avowed policy of relations far beyond the Botswana/South preventing ANC guerillas from crossing its Africa frontier. OlPOfii

12 Rural & Regional Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985

AGRICULTURAL NEEDS SURVEY The Trust recently asked INDICATOR SA to publish results from a survey initiated in order to determine felt needs and thus facilitate priorities for extension work by the VT agricultural staff. Interviews were undertaken at 100 randomly selected households, some belonging to VT projects, others not. At both the Qadi and Nyuswa areas, five places were picked randomly and a sample of ten households were interviewed. FIELD SIZES The first table indicates the scale of field crop/vegetable production in terms of the average field size cultivated. RESPONDENTS AVERAGE FIELD SIZE 51 1-2 Tennis courts 47 1 Football field 2 2 Football fields The limited size of land used may be explained by a combination of factors: • overall land pressure • the costs of hiring mechanical or animal drawn cultivators ® shortages of domestic labour • the costs of time and effort expended in agricultural labour relative to investment in other activities, which provide a higher cash or status return. CULTIVATION The second table indicates the mode of cultivation. Ownership of machinery and animals is extremely limited in this sample, with a select minority making a small living from hiring out their animals and tractors. RESPONDENTS MODE HIRE OWN 44 Oxen 38 6 8 Donkeys 7 1 38 Hand 0 38 10 Tractor 10 0 YIELDS Seasonal estimates of yields for both maize and beans were also requested in the survey. The results are difficult to quantify exactly, as households obviously do not keep records, and it is unclear whether the estimates are for proportions of the crops consumed, or consumed and stored. Overall, the low yield levels are a source of concern. MAIZE BEANS Respondents Average yield Respondents Average yield 39 0-1 bags 63 0-1 bags 61 2-5 bags 37 1-5 bags EXTENSION AND ADVISORY SERVICES Inquiries were made into the major requirements for extension advice and are tabulated thus: RESPONDENTS TO BE ADVISED ON 75 Improving soil fertility 57 Weed control 40 Pest control 17 Livestock control 6 Timing of planting 4 Ploughing 3 Soil conservation 3 Crop rotation 2 Good seed varieties 2 Timing of harvesting POULTRY KEEPING Some 70 percent of respondents keep chickens, the majority for egg and meat consumption at home, with only five percent selling live chickens. Fifty percent buy week old chicks, whereas 20 percent hatch their own birds. The major problems encountered are theft and diseases. Sixty percent would like to keep more fowls, through buying more one week old chicks. FRUIT TREES Seventy two respondents have fruit trees pianted around their homes and in gardens, and would like to plant more, either in a fenced orchard (50 percent) or with a small fence for each tree (22 percent). Those without trees cited reasons such as ignorance about where to obtain them (22 percent) or lack of capital (6 percent). WOOD LOTS Wood comprises the most important source of fuel. At the time of the survey, 30 percent had used open wood fires the previous day for cooking. Fifty five percent had used a wood and coal stove and 15 percent a paraffin stove. Fifty percent buy their fuel wood, largely from those who collect firewood and sell locally, and 37 percent collect it themselves from the dwindling natural bush.

14 Rural & Regional Monilor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 Alcoholics Anonymous course. A youth club valley. Internationally has been set up, with more than thirty By last year a total of 15 communal gardens acclaimed members, dealing with a range of personal, had been built, representing an involvement of community and recreation issues. terracing ana people from over 250 households. Each year composting Overall, the Trust offers practical educational 15 to 20 individual gardens are established. methods form the courses to individuals from the area, (as well as These achievements are a practical expression to seconded people from all over Southern of the VTs efforts towards 'education for focus of Africa) in nutrition education, primary and nutrition'. agricultural secondary health promotion, gardening, spring development protection, fencing, and water tank and toilet strategies in the building. One indication of the considerable Survey Summary valley impact and interest aroused by VT is the number of visitors: during the course of 1984, The (selected) results presented in the 2 220 outsiders, including 970 members of the accompanying box imply low returns from medical profession, visited the Trust. sustained engagement in agricultural production. The shortages of land, domestic Agricultural labour, capital and implements, combined with survey results Agriculture perceived low levels of soil fertility reflect the constraints facing ordinary households in any indicate The other major involvement of the attempt at increasing agricultural production. shortages of VT programme in the area is in the field of The survey results need to be viewed within the land, domestic agriculture. The Valley of a Thousand Hills is changed context of modern conditions and labour, capital unsuitable for fulltime subsistence agriculture, and implements consisting largely of steep, rocky slopes circumstances affecting the area. Over the past interspersed with valleys and gullies, and a two decades, the renowned valley has changed as major factors population density now approaching the level considerably, beginning with an influx of constraining of peri-urban settlements. Despite this adverse families evicted from farms as far afield as production environment, the Trust has promoted, with Estcourt, Newcastle and Richmond. The local considerable success, its own concept of community has also been augmented, as have appropriate agricultural development. The most areas surrounding Durban, by further system, comprising the development of the rural-urban migration as well as by people from Primary health care, now internationally acclaimed terracing and the overcrowded townships of Durban and nutrition education composting methods, essentially serves as an and a relief/ ancilliary programme to the health and Pinetown. Familiar shack settlements, although rehabilitation project nutrition projects. It also involves promoting small, proliferate, indicating the changing for mothers and their the establishment of both individual and nature of the rural or 'tribal' system, and the children form an community run gardens on suitable sites in the ecology and resource base of the area. integrated programme.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No I Winter 1985 Rural & Regional Monilor 15 elsewhere, and emphasise that development strategies undertaken in areas beyond the cities can no longer be directed at only agriculture and rural subsistence. Instead, the most appropriate response to the inevitable encroachment of a modern environment would encompass a combination of the following approaches:

• The Valley of a Thousand Hills, like many other peri-urban and rural areas, reflects the need for multiple development strategies, which take into account household dependence on wage labour in the cities and on non- agricultural methods of survival, for example through the creation of small businesses. • Agricultural strategies might be more successfully directed at identifying those individuals who can farm, and concentrate on promoting these entrepreneurs as local suppliers of produce. D Cleaver/Valley Trust • Others who are incapable of sustained agricultural production might successfully be drawn into the construction of a supportive infrastructure - markets, irrigation, roads, as well as more modern facilities such as water supplies, housing, electrification and so on.

Conclusion As an experienced agency of intervention in the field of overall community development, the role of the Valley Trust is successfully expanding in step with the changing context already outlined. In the area of agricultural production, participation levels and the survey results would seem to indicate further changes in the role of the Trust, which are evidently being accommodated by VT personnel. Their projects are no longer motivated by a founding strategy aimed at the holistic promotion of

D Cleaver/Valley Trust agricultural production and domestic health, as the Trust adjusts to local socio-economic The Trust's new The area has seen a fragmentation and ventures promote the circumstances which are of a completely construction ol disruption of 'traditional' outlooks, as people different order today. necessary facilities have become reliant on desperately needed for valley residents wage labour opportunities available only Present VT initiatives are now directed at the and provide outside the valley. This process of change is demanding but rewarding process of educational advice in accentuated by the effects of the current developing the important skills of social various fields. economic recession. With dependence, an organisation, technical management and urban orientation has developed, along with a democratic procedure through the range of consumer requirements and tastes out implementation of projects by the community. of keeping with the actual or potential returns The learning of these skills is an invaluable The learning of from intensified agricultural production. exercise for households that are forced to adopt social Perhaps the high proportion of treated cases multi-faceted survival strategies - of which agricultural production is but one - to cope organisation, for both adult hypertension and sexually with a modern commercial and industrial technical transmitted diseases at the VT Centre could be said to be an indicator of the changed environment. Other modern priorities in the management and valley call for the coordinated provision of democratic socio-economic profile of the area. Indeed, the recent widespread 'unrest' has not bypassed the appropriate facilities such as roads and procedural skills valley and bus boycotts occurred not far away. transport, electricity, sewerage and housing. assists In combination, all of these initiatives would adjustment to promote successful adjustment by the people of rapid Broader Implications the valley to the demands of the modern world modernisation These circumstances have implications over the hill.

16 Rural & Regional Monilor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 1 Winter 1985 The photographs of Bophuthatswana in the Economic, Industrial and Rural Monitors are reproduced from the photographic study, THE BORDERS OF APARTHEID, published by Gallery Press, CapeTown, 1983. We thank photojournalist Paul Alberts for allowing us to use these pictures. Proceeds from the book go towards the Bophuthatswana Educational Foundation; available, do PO Box 3772, Mmabatho, 8681. Price: R36, incl GST.

We've got what it takes to pack what you've got.

Nampak is the largest packaging group on the African continent. Catering for the needs of thousands of companies throughout Southern Africa. So whatever your packaging needs Nampak offers the full package.

Nampak Croup for a great deal in packaging. Nampak Limited: Head Office, 114 Dennis Road, Athol Gardens, Sandton. Tel.784-0418

DMten&€anfuv 210538 M ON I TOR Uff'RAN - - 1 INDICATOR VOL.3 N04 SOUTH AFRICA AUTUMN 19 8 6

As the tide of anti-apartheid opinion has grown to global dimensions over the last two decades, the sport tour boycott and the larger isolation campaign of South Africa have become inseparable in their political interests and objectives.

1 Sport & Society: The Real Boycott Issues 7 An Unfinished School Crisis in the Cape of Storms 11 Handling an Own Affair: Tricameralf Coloured' Education 14 Beyond the Blackboard: Teacher Associations & Politics 18 The New Frontier: Rebellion in the Eastern Cape Through our wide range of products we serve farming, shipping and industry. Through our resources we serve education culture and numerous charities. Oh yes, and through our pumps we serve petrol. Mobil, serving the needs of the nation.

M@hil With us you are Number On&

"I've tasted creamy chocolate before, but I've never felt it.

Your answer is Metropolitan. Prepare yourself for a new sensation from a sensational new full cream milk chocolate. As Beacon's new silky-smooth, delicious creamy chocolate melts over your tongue doing strange METROPOLITAN but wonderful things to your mouth. LIFE A sensation that goes beyond anything LTD. you've ever experienced before. Reg NO0V32491/06 A NEW BEACON CHOCOIATE.FEELTHE TASTE. Perspective SPORT & SOCIETY The Steal Boycott Issues

W.

yk- 1 m V w. 1 • i u , . - An overgrown and unlikely lootball pitch' at a high school in Umlazi township. Durban.

Douglas Booth in By Douglas G Booth, Development Studies Unit, University of Natal (Durban)

For South Africa, the advent of each new sports season seems to bring a cancelled or surrogate international tour, producing a slow action replay of the opposed pro-tour and pro-boycott argument. Douglas Booth, a visiting Australian sportsman studying over here, takes a firsthand look at the apartheid in sport controversy. Although his approach is undeniably partisan in support of the boycotters, Booth persuasively demonstrates the inextricable linkages between broader racial and sports inequalities in our society. Commenting on the article, Prof Lawrence Schlemmer points out that 'it is an interesting example of the type of social analysis which South Africa's formal racial divisions invite and make legitimate. In any society, access to sporting opportunity is to a lesser or greater degree influenced by social status and privilege. The writer barely concedes that the children of the ghettoes in the US, the slums of Latin America or the far flung hinterlands of the Soviet Union probably do not have remotely the recreational privileges of their compatriots in urban middle class suburbs! 'In one sense the pattern of sports inequality in South Africa is not unique, in qualitative if not quantitative terms. Yet whites in South Africa have allowed themselves to be defined as unique because our categories of inequality are formally defined in terms of the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Separate Amenities Act. Thus while the article is perhaps lacking in comparative perspective, our laws make this kind of analysis inevitable and necessary. Until South Africa takes meaningful steps to eradicate formal racial differentiation - as well as informal disadvantages of a more universal kind - Indicator SA has a duty to carry this kind of comment.'

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 In the townships, he recent cancellation of rugby resources (eg parks and playgrounds) are particularly scarce. The prospects for exposure to and tours of South Africa by the All Blacks and the British Lions, and youth involvement in organised sport are participation in T poor under these conditions, where the unofficial 'rebel' tour by Australian sports activities cricketers this summer have once again parental support, guidance and supervision are severely highlighted the issues surrounding the are retarded by the long hours spent curtailed by Republic's sporting isolation. Is the away from home, and low wages. social conditions sports boycott a meaningless strategy that Of the basic health status indicators, at school or at does more harm than good or is it an nutritional status among children is important weapon in the war on apartheid? home explicitly related to sporting apathy and Pro-tour supporters claim that sport in sporting performance. Mortality patterns South Africa is fully integrated and among Africans indicate that diseases multiracial, and that sport fulfils an related to low socio-economic and poor important role as a racial equaliser cutting environmental conditions are the major across artificial barriers. They argue that killers: the denial of international sporting contact • kwashiorkor, marasmus, pellagra, is grossly unfair and hypocritical in the rickets and scurvey - specific syndromes of face of buoyant trade links. The anti-tour malnutrition - have been widely reported protesters dismiss these claims out of among Africans (Scragg and Rubidge 1977: hand and add that international sports tours p265) of South Africa in fact aid government • malnutrition is reported to be the cause propaganda. of a third of African child deaths in Durban Contact with • more than 30 percent of African pre- Pre-Conditions for school children and almost 60 percent of sports requires Participation African school-age children are affordable underweight for age (Jinabhai et al 1984: expenditure, Wider social, economic and political p60) leisure time, forces undoubtedly prevent people from utilising multiracial sporting resources, recreational which in turn do not automatically Sport Inequalities facilities, proper guarantee clubs a multiracial diet and good membership. Participation in sport requires In the actual school environment, the health exposure to sport and a disposable gross inequality in per capita government income large enough to include expenditure expenditure on education between white on leisure. An individual's exposure to and African school children (in the order of sport will take place either at school or at a ratio 7:1) is reflected in sport (see table home. In the African townships, 1). White schoolchildren are exposed to a opportunities for contact with sporting wide variety of competitive sports and activities are severely curtailed in both recreational games in both physical milieux. education classes and in compulsory extra-curriculum activities. The majority of Family life is typically disorientated in white secondary schools and many the townships, mass worker migration to primary schools have several well-kept the white cities is a daily phenomenon, The Umlazi cycle and playing fields, a swimming pool and athletics track, a and unemployment among Africans is tennis courts, plus a range of other sports barren recreational exceptionally high. While the townships equipment. dustbowl in one of are chronically underserviced in general, Durban's townships. community and other recreational In stark contrast, African children (for wh,om school is not even compulsory) are denied these resources and opportunities. Numerous factors mitigate against sport in African schools: the lack of qualified staff; the lack of financial resources to purchase equipment; and the lack of playing space. In the absence of libraries, where shortages of textbooks and stationary are common, and where computers and video equipment are non-existent, it is not difficult to understand why sporting equipment is scarce. There is a prevalent bias against sport in African schools, which stems not only from wholly inadequate resources but is related to a high examination failure rate. There is a natural tendency among dedicated staff to allocate time to extra lessons as opposed to sport. Also, older staff and headmasters who were not educated in a tradition of physical education place little emphasis on it today. From interviews conducted by the

2 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 INEQUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN SPORT

Table 1 Some Comparative Statistics on Government Expenditure

SPORT EXPENDITURE White schoolchildren R9 900 000 R10.14 African schoolchildren R14 700 R0.39 Department of National Education @ Sports Budget R5 700 000 R4.161 • Grants-in-aid to Sports Administration R1 700 000 R1.24 • Sports Facilities R250 000 R0.18 • Cruising (Yachting) R129 000 R75.882 • Cycling R47 000 R35.98 • Fencing R20 000 R33.33 • Tug-of-war teams R35 000 R35.98 Total Per Head FOOTNOTES 1 Refers to expenditure on total registered sportspersons. 2 Refers to department! expenditure on visiting teams, divided by registered number of South African participants

SOURCES Republic of South Africa, House ol Assembly Debates (Hansard) 1983. Voi 106: cols 6122/23; and Vol 110: cols 395/400. SAIRR Race Relations Survey 1982: p473 and 491. Case Study: Sport in KwaZulu Schools The KwaZulu Department of Education has allocated physical education one period (35 minutes) per week to pupils in standard 6 and above, and two periods per week for standard 5 and below. Out of ten schools the author surveyed in Umlazi and KwaMashu, however, three did not include physical education in the curriculum. For the remaining seven schools, the period was devoted to basic physical exercise. Only four out of 93 schools in Umlazi have what is commonly referred to as a playing field —areas without marked boundaries, bare of turf, strewn with stones, and littered with weeds. Upkeep and maintenance is financially impossible. The deparment employed its first fully trained physical education teacher in 1981, and today there are 15 fully qualified physical education teachers. While schools in peri-urban areas struggle to offer, at best, meagre resources, those in remote homeland areas are considerably worse off. Although all schools allocate one afternoon per week to school sports — invariably soccer, netball and athletics — given the lack of both space and equipment, it is estimated that sports afternoons effectively include only ten percent of pupils. (Personal correspondence with circuit inspector.)

Table 2 Recreation Resources in the Durban Metropolitan Region

UMLAZI LAMONTVILLE DURBAN Population 220 0001 30 000 211 711 Soccer fields 12 5 1463 Tennis courts 64 1 all privately owned Swimming pools 1 1 15 Cricket pitches Nil Nil 465 Other Golf course; Bowling green cycling and athletics track6 FOOTNOTES 1 Unofficial estimates range between 300 000 and 312 000- Umlazi is bordered by two densely populated squatter settlements, Malukazi (estimated at 55 000), and Kwamagaga (78 000), neither of which have any sporting resources, 2 Official figures fist 10 fields but only the Umlazi stadium is fit for competition The remaining 9 fields' are stone-strewn dust bowls without delineated boundaries, nets, changing or toilet facilities 3 Refers to venues, some venues having more than one field. 4 These have not been resurfaced since they were built in 1966. SOURCES 5 Refers to venues Various personal communications. 6 Both are in advanced state of deterioration Durban Publicity Association.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 Tab|e 3 White Opinions on Sports Integration Yes No 'Do you believe that sport is integrated at all levels?' 42% 56% 'Do you think that South Africa will ever enjoy normal sporting contacts under a white government?' 45% 52% (n = 1 000)

SOURCE 'Sports integration poll', Business Day, 4/12/85. Conducted by Markinor Research Group among 1 000 urban white adults.

Table 4 African Opinions on International Sporting Tours Right Wrong 'Do you think that international sporting 83% 17% organisations are right or wrong not to play against South African teams unless the apartheid system is changed?' (n = 400)

SOURCE Sunday Tribune 25/8/85. Commissioned by the London Sunday Times, and undertaken by Markinor (a South African affiliate of Gallup International), interviews conducted among urban Africans in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.

The emergence author with ten local headmasters, it expense in terms of time and money. of some appears that sport in black schools has Secondly, mixed sport is played in the main multiracial largely evolved into a token and at senior and/or professional level. A unsystematic exercise. barrage of red tape prevents government facilities and schools from playing multiracial clubs has not A comparison of recreational resources offered in Umlazi, Lamontville and Durban interschool sport. resulted in the reveals a gross maldistribution of these Resistance to multiracial sport is still integration of resources (see case study). It also illustrates strong and in some white communities, sport in South a pronounced hierarchy of facilities that segregation is reinforced rather than African society favours whites and gives preferential relaxed. For example, in early 1984 the treatment to Africans living in white- Potgietersrus Town Council banned administered townships, over those living in multiracial cricket at the municipal cricket homeland townships. White authorities grounds (RDM 11/2/84). Later that year, can afford to finance 93.1 percent of their the Middelburg Town Council threatened to expenditure on sport, but black withdraw its annual R16 000 subsidy to authorities only 12 percent (Institute for the golf club if it continued to allow Indian Recreational Studies 1985). golfers to use the course (STimes 9/12/84). A consequence of this unequal distribution of resources is that Africans living in Inter-racial comradeship developed Statutory and Umlazi (administered by the KwaZulu during the course of a game is rarely customary government) and the surrounding shack nurtured in a multiracial post-match areas depend on the sport facilities social setting because of other restrictive segregation has provided in either Lamontville or racial legislation and the customary the effect of Durban. A total of 286 teams compete for practice of segregation, so carefully fostered limiting use of the ten soccer fields in several by the government. The not unexpected multiracial townships under the Natalia Development result of all the above circumstances is contact between Board's jurisdiction. token black membership where white facilities are now multiracial. sportspeople in a post-match Universally, there is a natural tendency social setting for people to gravitate towards the sport Multiracial Sport that is most accessible socially and To argue that the emergence of some financially, ie individual sports have a multiracial facilities and clubs has integrated specific class base. In South Africa, sport in South Africa is invalid (see apartheid works to channel the majority of survey box). Firstly, the few existing blacks away from sport and the majority multiracial facilities are unevenly of black sportsmen into virtually one sport. distributed and concentrated in white Soccer has developed as the predominant metropolitan areas, which forces black black sport in response to township sportspersons to commute at their own conditions - soccer is a low cost sport,

4 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 attracts numbers and at a social or recreational level, it can be played on almost any surface and in confined areas. Also as a professional sport, soccer BMi enables players to make a living. The Pro-Tour Lobby Pro-tour lobbyists advance several arguments in favour of international sporting contact with South Africa. Most of these propositions are easily refuted and are summarised below: • Sport is a racial equaliser that aids in the alleviation of racial tensions. The vast majority of black people simply do not have the opportunity to meet whites on common sporting ground. They are precluded from many sporting opportunities by poor health, limited opportunities and meagre resources. How can contact with international sporting teams improve race relations when other efforts, such as social contact in the workplace, have not long term (STimes 25/8/85). There are ten dilapidated 'football indented racial prejudices? • Governments should not dictate where fields' used by In South Africa, the only sport that in sportspersons should play and against whom countless amateur fact transcends racial barriers on any sportspersons should compete. sides in Umlazi. significant scale, albeit small, is black By its own actions the South African administered professional soccer - where government has done more to politicise players in integrated clubs live together sport than any other nation. The most in multiracial five star hotels while on tour. infamous cases occurred in 1965, when Despite the pleas by white administrators Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd for foreign sportsmen to tour South Africa banned Maori rugby players from touring to help improve race relations, the South Africa with the All Blacks. Then in Apartheid works greatest progress in desegregation has been 1968, Prime Minister B J Vorster banned in a manner made by black sportsmen. If sport is Cape Town-born coloured cricketer Basil d'Oliveira from touring South Africa which channels such a powerful catalyst for change, then black people why are sporting bodies not at the with the English team. These incidents, and away from most forefront lobbying the government for many like them since, riveted world multi-racial school sport? attention on South African sport. sports, while developing • Sporting tours benefit the wider In the isolation 'war' in which South soccer as the community. Africa finds itself, sport has since become On the contrary, visiting sportspersons are an offensive weapon and international predominant cocooned in white South Africa - they tours are encouraged by the government. township sport play on or in white facilities; they are The Minister for National Education, Dr accommodated in white areas; and they Viljoen, has made it clear that government use private city transport. Coaching clinics expenditure on sport is decided upon in conducted by visiting sportspersons are terms of the overall publicity generated for most often held in white areas. These are South Africa (see table 1). Commenting superficial exercises for black on the West Indian 'rebel' cricket tour in sportspersons because the infrastructure 1983, he commented that, 'The tour struck an important blow not only in the that enables practice and competition is The only sport non-existent in the townships. sporting field but also in general against the concentrated efforts to isolate South that transcends Revenue raised by international tours is Africa internationally' (Hansard 1983 racial barriers on used to cover costs and few, if any, tours V0IIO6: Col 6194/50). any scale is generate surplusses for sports development. Tours promote competitions The government has directly aided the professional between sporting elites, who exchange financing of sporting tours by offering tax soccer, where ideas among themselves on such things as concessions to companies sponsoring sportspeople training methods, strategies and such events. In early 1986, after intense lobbying by the SA Cricket Union play in integrated techniques, diet, equipment, injuries and clubs fitness. This information is not quickly (SACU), the government (acting without disseminated to the ordinary recreational parliamentary approval) increased the sportsperson to enable them to improve rebate for international sporting events their game. Any sport advantage will only from 50 percent to 90 percent. accrue over a number of years of Government priorities need challenging repeated touring, which is why the South when more is spent on a touring tug-of- African Tennis Union has publicly war team visiting South Africa than on denounced tennis exhibitions as being sporting activities for black school detrimental to the game and fans in the children; and when only 4.4 percent of the

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 Sport has Department of National Education's boycott lobby's renowned sign, 'No normal become an sports budget is spent on sports facilities. sport in an abnormal society'. The UDF argues that sporting tours generate racial offensive weapon polarisation as they invariably serve in the isolation Quest for Legitimacy? white interests. Prior to the proposed 1985 campaign, and All Blacks tour of South Africa, Tours of South Africa are not merely games SACOS, the UDF, and other opposition the South African between sports enthusiasts - any government is groups sent a telex to the New Zealand's international contact raises white public rugby football union. They warned that the keen to morale, and enormous amounts of tour 'will be regarded as a complicity in encourage money are spent each year by the the crime of apartheid and a total disregard international government, business and sporting bodies for the inhuman killings of innocent on 'Freedom in Sport' lobbyists, to attract black people' (Rand Daily Mail 26/6/84). tours international sportspersons to South Africa. The apolitical stance frequently A representative of the UDF, the adopted by visiting sportspersons also Reverend Arnold Stofile, gave evidence to allows the government to project an image the New Zealand high court during an of a 'normal society'. Visitors on tour are application for an interim injunction to easily trapped into making innocuous block the All Black tour. A rugby player statements on arrival, such as 'looking himself, he pointed out that white South around things don't seem too bad'. These African Rugby Union (a SACOS To prevent comments are readily seized upon by the affiliate) players had been prosecuted for apartheid from state media for use in the counter illegally playing for black clubs and that dividing propaganda war. the issue of multiracial permits to white, African and coloured clubs, could not be international South African sporting administrators, sport, the construed as integration (Daily News with their ability and will to plunder the 10/7/85). boycotters must world's best sportspersons, have caused remain united - if divisive cracks in several international In South Africa, black solidarity is only for the sake sports-controlling bodies. In January this frequently demonstrated on sports issues year, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh refused and sporting fixtures coinciding with of sport itself entry permits to four members of the commemorative political services have England B cricket team because they had been cancelled. On 10 July 1985, 3 500 played in South Africa. When the workers at Volkswagen's Uitenhage plant English Test and County Cricket Board downed tools for six days after management challenged Zimbabwe and Bangladesh refused their union's request that the with an 'all or nothing' ultimatum, the tours company should not lend 12 microbuses for were cancelled. To prevent apartheid use by the All Blacks (DN 15/7/85). from dividing international sport, the During last year's black consumer boycott Inside South boycotters must remain united, if only of white businesses in Port Elizabeth, Africa, although for the sake of their sport. one white trader, Dan Watson, was most whites exempted. This political gesture was in Further manifestations of the recognition of his own anti-apartheid stance oppose boycotts, government's anti-boycott offensive are many black in earlier quitting a local whites-only efforts by the state to crush critics of rugby club and then joining an African people appear to South African participation in international township club. support the sport, especially leading officials of the South African Council On Sport (SACOS). isolation In 1973, Mr M Naidoo, then president of Conclusion campaign a SACOS swimming affiliate, had his passport withdrawn to prevent Sport cannot be compartmentalised in attendance at the world swimming body's any society. Firstly, to argue that (FINA) conference in Belgrade. After multiracial sporting facilities and clubs the (white) South African Amateur exist in South Africa, denies the complexity Swimming Union was expelled from of forces operating to channel black FIN A at the conference, Mr Naidoo was sportspersons away from them. Secondly, it ignores the fact that in some areas The UDF banned under security legislation for five years. discrimination in sport and recreation has maintains that actually been reinforced rather than international reformed. Neither international tours nor sporting tours Black Boycott Lobby domestic sport can fulfil any meaningful role as a racial equaliser as long as serve white How widespread is the support for apartheid persists throughout South interests only international sporting boycotts among African society. JlPJii and invariably South Africans? Although most white South Africans oppose the sports isolation SOURCES increase racial campaign, international sporting boycotts polarisation Institute lor Recreational Sludies. University of Potchefstroom. in Natal appear to have been given a popular Mercury 28/8/85 mandate by black people inside the country Jinabhat G C. H M Coovadia and S S Abdul-Karim, 'Socio-Medical (see survey box). indicators for Monitoring Progress Towards Health for all in Southern Africa' SALDRU. UCT Carnegie Conference Paper No 165. 1984 SACOS Secretariat Report. Sixth Biennial General Meeting. Durban 1985 The pro-boycott organisation, SACOS, has Scragg J N. and G J Rubidge. SA Medical Journal Vol 51 1977, quoted in won international recognition and Apartheid and Health. World Health Organisation 1 983 represents 24 national sporting bodies and Streek B. 'Illusion and Reality in Soulh Africa's Sport Policy", South Atnca International Vol16/No1 1985 eight councils of sport. It coined the Press Clippings

6 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 H Mabu/a AFRAPIX In-fa* C*f* of Storms

By Prof Owen van den Berg and Senior Lecturer Brian O'Connell, Faculty of Education, University of the Western Cape

After a staggeringly low poll in 1984 for the House of Representatives, especially in the greater Cape Town area, events in 1985 contrived to further seriously damage the little credibility enjoyed by the new . The unrest at black schools, which have since 1976 been a major flashpoint of resistance to state policies, has seriously divided the coloured community in the Western Cape. In this article, Prof Owen van den Berg and Brian O'Connell discuss the developments leading up to the extensive education crisis of 1985, the major thrust of which was aimed, for the first time, against 'coloured' administrators co-opted from their own ranks.

M\ partheid has always been organisations face vast dilemmas of Muslim youth wearing characterised as a system which affiliation and internal cohesion. And the the Kalliyeh head- 4r Hdivides. In the Western Cape, own police have suffered a total collapse of dress douse teargas legitimacy - even to report an ordinary cannisters during a affairs in 'coloured' education has turned a conlrontation with community upon itself. School staffs are crime to them is likely to excite suspicion police at a Peninsula tense, divided and suspicious. Student and hostility. school. August 1985. communities are wracked with similar strains, and for many the cost of the 1985 In the coloured community the civil strife is unlikely ever to be tricameral architects are viewed, if redeemed. anything, as worse than their '' Politicians, both parliamentary and extra- predecessors. For the city of Cape Town, parliamentary, are viewed with even more which prided itself on something called 'a resignation or distrust than before. more relaxed racial atmosphere', last year's Parents are sharply divided on the most events have laid bare the realities of inflammatory issue possible - the life division and self-protection. Apartheid has chances of their children. Community done its separating well.

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 The planned Build-Up to Crisis continuation of unrest and confrontation, march to with a combination of approaching Initially, the extensive incidence of anti- examination dates, government Pollsmoor prison government activity in various parts of the 'kragdadigheid' and excessive police gave students the country during the early months of 1985 reaction to public protest serving to opportunity to left the Western Cape strangely unaffected. perpetuate and deepen the regions's crisis. display their This hiatus was especially apparent given The Labour Party appeared to be dissatisfaction the volatility of the region during the lead- committed to establishing by coercion the up to the elections for the tricameral legitimacy denied them at the previous with unequal and parliament in August 1984. year's election polls. It systematically closed segregated down all face-saving escape routes either Two national events in mid-1985 served, education for themselves or their adversaries. however, to spark an always simmering Large numbers of students, now so close in stituation in the Cape Peninsula. The examinations that to write on appointed first event provided the mood for action - days seemed futile, felt that a continuation the assassinations in late June of the of resistance was as good an option as Eastern Cape civic leader Matthew Goniwe any, and acted accordingly. Other students, and three of his UDF associates. The believing that the process of decision to send local representatives to the 'conscientisation' now demanded the funeral was coupled with a growing sacrifice of academic progress, also One of the feeling that school boycott action should be refused to participate in the seemingly dramatic instituted. The political temperature of fraudulent examination exercise. Yet consequences of the Western Cape soared. others feared recrimination, and stayed the aborted The second issue provided the focus for away too. march was the action - the declaration of a partial State of closure of Emergency on 20 July. In a fascinating The 'forces of law and order' stoked the coloured schools way the government called into question flames of endemic violence and the commitment of the people of the in the Cape radicalised the population far more Western Cape to the liberation struggle, for effectively than any other agency did or Peninsula for the magisterial districts of the region could have done. Riot police mayhem on 15 about three were not regarded as sufficiently dangerous October in Thornton Road — the infamous weeks to the state to be placed under box-crate ambush - sickened the people of emergency regulation. A widespread and Cape Town and appalled the watching immediate feeling among activists was world. So brutal was the state response and that the state had to be proved wrong. so deep the impact that clergymen now advocated civil disobedience and Muslims The arena for action was provided by began debating 'jihad' (a holy war). Reverend Allan Boesak's call in mid- August for a march on Pollsmoor prison Through brutal to demand the release of Nelson Mandela. Extension of Emergency actions, the In this event all the unfinished business 'forces of law and of the past would again coalesce. It would The extension of the state of emergency to Cape Town on 26 October created the order' radicalised provide tangible evidence of the region's circumstances for some students to the population commitment to fighting apartheid in its new manifestation, the tricameral parliament. decide to go through the motions of writing far more It would give the UDF the opportunity to examinations, at venues secured by large effectively than flex its 'coloured' organisational muscles concentrations of guards. Thousands did any other agency and display its political credibility. not write, however, setting an agenda of conflict and divisions for 1986. Systematic did or could have In 'coloured' schools and colleges, and action followed against sympathetic done the two local universities these events teachers who were in breach of contract would give the students of the region the when they refused to conduct or opportunity to resume their display of invigilate examinations. dissatisfaction with an unequal and segregated educational dispensation, now in Any pretext of democracy disappeared and the hand of a 'coloured' minister in the countless organisations were banned new House of Representatives. from holding meetings, while several gatherings that were called by 'unbanned' Thousands of organisations were also stopped. Hundreds coloured Resistance and were taken into detention from a wide students did not Crackdown section of the political spectrum, many of write end-of-year whom were young children. Amidst the riots and street confrontations, the death exams, setting an The consequences of the planned march on 28 August were dramatic and visible. toll rose steadily. agenda of Boesak was detained, and marchers and unresolved Ever since the of 1976, bystanders were harshly treated by the South Africa's schools have been a major conflict and police, plummeting the streets of Cape flashpoint of resistance to the policies of the division for 1986 Town into mayhem. Only a few days later, state. Schools constitute both a major the responsible minister, Carter Ebrahim manifestation of apartheid and one of the (see following interview), closed most of few places of congregation and organisation the Peninsula schools under his left in a society pared of civil liberties. jurisdiction for about three weeks. As a venue perceived as both a principal The rest of 1985 witnessed a tragic instrument of state ideology and a prime

8 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 The 'coloured' suburb of Athlone was at the centre of civil strife in the Peninsula between August/ November 1985.

For the first time, damage had already been done. the school boycotts were For the boycotters, over-the-edge brinkmanship has also had consequences directed against distributor of life chances, resistance in and which are as yet unclear and unresolved. 'coloured' around schooling is of major symbolic A vigorous debate now rages about administrators significance. When the principal actors are boycotts as a strategy for bringing about co-opted from vulnerable young people, a further edge change. The question of solidarity, which the ranks of the is given to this symbolic struggle. binds all participants to end a boycott together in spite of the fact that different excluded The all-pervasive rejection of apartheid institutions join the action at different in and around the school is therefore a times, is a further potentially divisive drama of many acts, constituting a major aspect. dimension of unfinished business in the forging of a new South African society. The mix of student-parent-teacher solidarity The schools boycott of 1985 in the Western on the issues is a development seemingly Cape was significant in a number of very different from school boycotts of 1980 ways. It all points to a continuing in the region. Nevertheless, this linkage A vigorous occurred so unevenly that it is hard to unresolved conflict, which is likely to be debate now rages repeated, in some or other form, in the ascertain its significance in terms of a near future - for there is no indication possible new direction in the strategies of about boycotts that the political fundamentals at the heart resistance. as a strategy for of the protests are to be changed. change, and the Surrogate Apartheid question of tactical solidarity Boycott Brinkmanship For the politics of reform, the events of is a potential One way in which the boycott was 1985 contrived to destroy the credibility of significant was that for the first time its the new constitutional design even cause of division major thrust, in the schools under the further, if that were possible. Mandela House of Representatives, was directed remained in Pollsmoor and the new against 'coloured' administrators co- members of parliament in the Western opted from the ranks of the excluded. Its Cape largely remained in hiding. central figures, in their first year in The 1984 poll for the House of The tricameral office, made strenuous efforts to show that Representatives had been staggeringly parliament faced they could control the situation. The low in the Greater Cape Town area. What major consequence was the perpetuation of little credibility the new dispensation had its first test in a situation over which they in fact had rested in the attitude that perhaps one 1985 and failed little or no control, for far longer than should 'wait and see'. What was disastrously, might otherwise have been the case. available to be seen during 1985 was, losing the little In the past, other school boycotts have however, by no means edifying - the credibility the also indulged in brinkmanship, only to tricameral parliament had faced its first test and failed disastrously. Apartheid at the new dispensation withdraw from the precipice in time for had accrued the examination and credential ritual to hands of 'whites' was one thing, its recur. The business of 1985, however, perpetuation by surrogates entirely having been allowed to remain unfinished, another. immediately became the agony of the For the teachers employed by the House start of 1986. The new ministers eventually of Representatives, the impact of the events gave in on virtually every issue, but only of 1985 was complex. The leadership of when the new year was already shuddering their established organisation, the Cape to a start, and only when irreparable Teachers Professional Association

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 If the education (CTPA), did some behind-the-scenes supposedly errant principals - and that department negotiating and also tested Ebrahim's retribution is likely to be spread out regains its decision to proceed with examinations in evenly over a number of years. The settling the Supreme Court, For the rest, the of scores by an 'own affairs' ministry is previous grip, the CTPA confined itself to press statements daunting prospect, given the fact that the status of teachers rather than community action and new dispensation offers a whole new could become involvement in the crisis. By the end of the avenue of patronage for the faithful by the further year, any change in its standing in the new mainstream politicians. region was hard to ascertain. emasculated due to increased A new body, the Western Cape An Unfinished Drama unilateral policy- Teachers' Union (WCTU), emerged and grew quickly, but without making any For most parties, like the peace-makers making serious dent in CTPA membership. This of Versailles, there is the hope that it will was perhaps because it was composed of not happen again. The dislocation of the those, of more radical persuasion, who had schooling system and its credentials In never been prepared to join the CTPA. brinkmanship for a while was a tactic The CTPA stuck to its policies of understood by both sides in previous professional negotiation with the periods of confrontation. It was a passion authorities and remained uncomfortable play always enacted against the backdrop of with progressive bodies such as SACOS an unwritten rule that the situation Last year's and UDF. In contrast, WECTU was non- would not be allowed to become school unrest left racial, and took an avowedly SACOS irredeemable. so much and non-collaborationist stance. By the end of the year, however, WECTU had yet The unfinished drama of 1985, however, unfinished sketched for the first time the prospect business that to resolve the issue of how it could function without being prepared at least to admit of the collapse of the entire educational education may to the existence of the employing authority order. One year of muddling through be embarking for purposes other than denigration. may just be possible, but two or three years on an of similar scenarios cannot but profoundly Both organisations are faced with the atomise the social order. The events of last uncharted path in likelihood that if the education year left so much unfinished business the forging of a department were to regain its previous grip, that education may now be embarking new society it would be the status of the teachers along an uncharted path. What the that would become increasingly emasculated educational future holds is uncertain, but it under a steady increase of unilateral will probably depend less on the policy-making. Few doubt that the architects of apartheid than they would like department has 'black lists' - not only of to believe. U1P3

Street barricades, mob stonings, arson and police retaliation brought mayhem to mo streets ot Cape Town and surrounding suburbs in 1985.

10 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Minister of Education and Culture, Mr Carter Ebrahim, from the House of Representatives, speaks to Indicator SA Researcher Monica Bot

Coloured education was hit by turmoil from the middle of 1985, the first year that its institutions fell under the control of a tricameral 'own affairs' Department of Education and Culture, headed by Minister Carter Ebrahim. The schools were closed for one and a half months during this period and end of year exams were organised under difficult circumstances. Many, including principals, teachers and parents, were critical of the fact that exams were being written at all after three months of school boycotts in the Cape Peninsula. Minister Carter Ebrahim has been at the receiving end of a volley of criticism because of his 'hard-line' handling of the crisis. Dr Stuart Saunders, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, described the Minister's and the department's approach as 'confrontational', and alleged that 'the crisis had been fed by ministerial threats and ultimatums, and police and military action employed to handle it' (Daily News 11/12/85). In March 1986, Indicator S/4 researcher Monica Bot spoke to Minister Ebrahim about last year's crisis, and the impact the new department hopes to have on the quality of education provided to coloured pupils and students.

b ould you describe the problems allowing pupils into teacher/parent After the 1985 m encountered in maintaining order and meetings addressed by people such as school unrest, discipline in coloured schools last Reverend Allan Boesak, who had talked some 4 000 out year? How widespread was it, and were of 'turning the country on its head'. of 16 334 pupils 'willing converts' or was there • The unrest was mainly confined to the pressure and coercion? Peninsula, where a fundamentalist Islamic coloured matric Minister Ebrahim said that various movement had also contributed to the pupils did not factors contributed to last year's unrest: unrest. return to write • Too few principals realised that the their finals responsibility for ensuring discipline at As a result of the schools unrest in 1985, schools rested on their shoulders. some pupils and students did not write their Instead, they had delegated power to the year-end exams. What numbers were staff and student representative councils involved, and how many pupils were writing the postponed exams in March? (SRCs). According to the Minister, 11 052 pupils • Both pupils and teachers had been the wrote the senior certificate exams at the victims of intimidation, although many end of last year, out of a total of 16 334 pupils had been 'easy prey' to radicals candidates. Of this number, 7 115 (often university students). (64.4%) passed, of which 1 381 obtained • The state of emergency was another matric exemption and 15 pupils an A- factor. Teachers had made the mistake of

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 aggregate. officials had been planned to work out a Of those matric pupils who did not write, mechanism agreeable to the various parties. 1 1 (i2 applied before 6 January 1986 to write the March exam, and 977 have in Does the Department expect a large fact since written. More pupils had applied increase in the number of African pupils as to sit for the exam, but gave certain a result of this move, and how will conditions which could, said Minister schools cope? Ebrahim, not be considered. About 4 000 The Minister replied that there are pupils did not return at all. obviously limits to the number of pupils At teacher training colleges, exams were that can attend a school. There are still a postponed for a fortnight. Students who number of coloured schools where the failed or did not write in 1985 have been system of 'double shifts' takes place due given the opportunity to write in May. to lack of accommodation. Furthermore, Those who wrote and passed some the geographical factor must be taken subjects are teaching at a lower level this into account, in that a school serves a To cope with the year and must rewrite their exams at the certain area. boycott's end of 1986. A number of coloured schools have in the backlog, In February 1986 you said that principals past already accepted African pupils, individual and staff would be responsible for either with a maximum per school of schools were promoting std 6-9 pupils on the basis of approximately 12 pupils. Therefore, given the option their previous academic record, or to let Minister Ebrahim felt that the 'local option', where an individual school can to promote them write an exam instead. How has this plan of action to overcome last year's decide on quotas, seemed the most likely pupils, repeat the disruptions worked out? option at present. The admissions policy year or give an In response, the Minister said that three is going to be discussed at a meeting of" the exam options were given in fact, 'left to the Ministers Council. careful decision of the staff in consultation What are the advantages of having an 'own' with the inspector': minister for coloured education? • promotion to the next standard The Minister feels that more impact can • repetition of the year be made on two levels: • writing of an exam. • a more effective articulation of needs The aim is to avoid bottlenecks, and at parliamentary level, where one is in a Now that therefore it has been left to the individual position to trade off, bargain and veto; coloured schools schools to decide which option to • one can more effectively make demands choose. Minister Ebrahim felt that these on the treasury. The budget, however, are open to all, options have defused the situation, runs in five year cycles, and the present the 'local option', especially in those instances where parents budget was started prior to the present whereby schools and pupils have been consulted. In tri-cameral system. can set quotas March, school attendance was quite high, He feels that the new tri-cameral system (or other races, with well over 90 percent of pupils will accelerate the process of eliminating present in the various schools. The situation the educational backlog. Group politics seems the most at the teacher training colleges and the likely solution are the most effective way to move forward University of the Western Cape has also despite opposition to the segmental stabilised for the moment. tricameral system. In February 1986, coloured schools were The priorities set by his Department are: opened to all races. How has this move • teacher training and upgrading, in order been received? to build up an adequately trained teacher corps, and According to Minister Ebrahim there • accommodation, especially on the have been no negative responses from any secondary level, where there was an quarters. He felt the move was upswing in pupil numbers. welcomed by parents and pupils. Minister Ebrahim Furthermore, white teachers presently Is one department of education essential? feels that the new teaching in coloured schools have been fully Although a move towards one system tricameral system accepted and are generally good would nave symbolic value, the Minister will accelerate a teachers. The other education ministers believes that it will not solve all the process of have given no official reaction yet but problems and should not have the status of none have been hostile, while teacher 'a holy cow'. It would be difficult to eliminating the associations had welcomed the move. decide, for example, which race group the education Concern has been expressed about the minister would be drawn from. Also, backlog for possible implications of the new policy because educational needs vary across the coloured pupils for the vast number of underqualified country, one department would be coloured teachers, whose 'upward impractical. mobility' might be threatened by increasing In Natal, for example, coloured student numbers of better qualified white teachers had asked for less emphasis on teachers. A policy of 'affirmative action' language instruction, whereas was introduced in 1985, though to be in other areas in the country English was ensured of 'permanent employment', all hardly used and the opposite option was teachers have to meet academic asked for. Similarly, the department had standards of course. A meeting of senior been asked to decentralise some supply

12 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 functions. I [e sees his primary task in also recently been increased to make the A predecessor to the parliament as to get rid of statutory race profession more attractive. tricameral institution legislation, and 'after that ... if Germany Furthermore, the department hopes to - the administration ol coloured affairs - has 11 education ministers, why not us?' improve teacher motivation through was the target of 'tightening up' their teacher guidance and With regard to the quality of education, protestors during the support system. In addition, teachers were (coloured) Minister of Health Services 1980 school boycotts. being encouraged to upgrade their and Welfare, Chris April, said in January qualifications, either through in-service 1985 that 48 percent of coloured pupils training programmes, part-time colleges left before or at the end of standard 2. What of education or correspondence courses. are the reasons for this and what is being done about the drop-out rate? In October you said that you will The Minister replied that the recession, continue to take a hard-line attitude to coupled with poverty among the coloured school boycotts. Earlier this year you community, forced children to work at reaffirmed that your primary aim would be an early age in order to augment family to restore order and discipline to the income. Little could be done about this, schools. How is this being done, and do you An improved but attention was being given to shifting the foresee trouble in 1986? content of syllabi from their heavy salary structure, In response, the Minister said that he felt teacher academic bias to more technically-based the options given to the schools with education, because the former did not regard to the current academic year have guidance, and in- make people capable of being productive. defused the situation to a certain extent. service training Another contributory factor to the drop- Furthermore, some 'hard-line activists' were and upgrading, out rate was the lack of school readiness, and attention was being focussed on pre- surprised at being allowed back to school aim to improve primary education, to 'lay foundations'. this year, which he felt had had the effect teacher of 'softening' them and their followers. motivation Last year, you said you were appalled by In addition, a series of meetings are held the lack of dedication among some countrywide for the headmasters to teachers. Is this a serious problem, what are inform them 'on the basis on which heads the causes and what is being done to must act, their powers of suspension etc'. address it? At last year's 'trouble spots', school security The Minister replied that there were a guards have been employed to protect tremendous number of factors causing the property. low motivation among teachers, among Although he does expect trouble this others: year, especially on commemorative days • the limited job opportunities open to the such as 16 June and Sharpeville day, coloured community before job which 'could be used as spark-off points', reservation was lifted, resulting in many he does not think it will be as effective people who were not necessarily as in 1985. The likelihood is lessened by the motivated going into the teaching failure of last year's boycotts, as profession evidenced by the high exam attendance • the lower salaries paid to coloured figures, and the disillusionment and teachers before parity was implemented. demoralisation among pupils, many of Salaries to underqualified teachers have whom now have to repeat the year. iPM

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 By Roger Burrows, PFP MP and Former Professional Secretary of the Natal Teachers' Society

Professional teacher societies have had to define more clearly their role in South African society amidst the turmoil in black schools over the last ten years. In the classroom and the community, teachers are caught between the traditional viewpoint that politics should be kept separate from education, and the increasing pressure, especially on black teachers, to join in condemning and actively opposing 'apartheid education'. At the last conference of teacher associations, held in Cape Town in July 1985, the secretary of the Federal Council of Teachers Associations, Mr J F Steyn, said that 'it is undeniably true that teachers' organisations in South Africa are in many cases directly or indirectly involved in the politics of the day'. Despite the fact that teachers and their organisations must function within the parameters of official institutions, he acknowledged that there are many who 'claim that the structures .. . have been unilaterally arranged by the white sector and are therefore unacceptable'. At the same conference, the president of the African Teachers Association of SA, Mr R L Peteni, stressed that 'the mood of our members, especially the younger members, is that the teachers' associations should adopt militant methods to supplement the usual methods of memoranda and deputations to the Education Department'. He recommended that teacher associations should try and work together, and negotiate with student organisations in seaching for 'a just South African society. . . otherwise we are in danger of becoming the targets of the anger of our own students, as all supporters of the system have become the victims of our angry young people'. During the schools unrest of 1985, some teacher associations did in fact strongly oppose certain departmental decisions. In November, the newly-formed Western Cape Teachers Union decided not to administer exams because the school year for coloured pupils, disrupted by widespread boycotts, had not been held according to sound educational practice, and further, there were alleged irregularities in the exams (Cape Times 3/12/85). Similarly, the Cape Teachers Professional Association threatened court action over the exams, to force Minister Carter Ebrahim, House of Representatives, to allow supplementary exams to be written in 1986 (Cape Times 2/12/85). In January, however, their application was dismissed with cost. Also indicative of the rapid politicisation of educational issues is the Union of Teachers Associations' call for the release of all political detainees, the implementation of a uniform, equal system and for fundamental political change (City Press 24/11/85). This organisation also sought a Supreme Court interdict asking for an order nisi to stop the Minister from implementing 'provocative' new regulations at boycott-torn schools (Sunday Tribune 6/11/85). On the other hand, while various other organisations called for non-racial education and a single ministry of education, the Transvaal Onderwysersunie warned that this would meet with determined resistance from Afrikaans-speaking teachers. It is obvious that viewpoints differ strongly between the various teachers associations with regard to the role they could and should play in South African society. In this article, PFP MP Roger Burrows, former professional secretary of the Natal Teachers Society, takes an in-depth look at the political leanings of the various teachers associations in South Africa (see list of organisation acronyms in box).

Teachers are complex education situation in members as expressed at congresses or often seen as South Africa has created an equally general meetings. Political views are neutral figures intricate structure of teacher sometimes susceptible to fairly rapid change manning the bodies. These are divided one from another as leaders come and go, or as the overall by race, by language, by principles, by political position in South Africa alters. educational geographic areas served and by educational establishment constituency. The views of each teacher The political stance of an organisation is association are determined by their generally not reflected in classroom leadership, interpreting the positions of relationships or in individual member

14 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 behaviour. In fact, teachers, in their eve rv day work situation, are widely seen by observers as neutral figures manning the educational establishment. Increasingly, however, as individual teachers adopt overtly political positions, they are perceived as extremely threatening to those in authority and action has been taken against them. Teacher associations can be easily grouped into two broad areas - those recognised by the state and those not; and secondly according to membership of the tour major racial groups. Several of the recognised teacher bodies have open membership but none has more than a scattering of members outside of the major racial group it is perceived to represent. Their diverse positions on political and educational issues are briefly discussed in the following outline of the many teacher associations operating in South Africa today.

Recognised by Government

ATASA: African Teachers Association of South Africa This is the largest teacher body in South Africa, seen as representing all African teachers, including the independent homelands. ATASA has been in existence for over fifty years, during which time political events and pressures have caused many difficulties for the organisation and its various provincial bodies. ATASA is a federation of geographically based organisations, wherein homeland boundaries are not recognised for purposes of representation. In general terms, ATASA's goals are the same as those of most black political movements - representation of all South Africans in a single parliament in one Council of Education (SACE), a research Rector R E van der country. The association has constantly committee (RECES), and on Ross ot the University stressed its belief in a democratic political Department of Education and Training ot the Western Cape solution for South Africa and totally (DET) committees. On the other hand, leads 2 000 staff and opposed apartheid, striving for its abolition students on a protest ATASA representatives have also been in march, 19 September in education. It has not followed the contact with student organisations such as 1985. trade union route and sought to remain a COS AS (before it was banned), and professional association. Nevertheless, attempted to intercede on behalf of ATASA has reiterated its belief in the protesting students, supporting many of political aims of a grouping of teachers, their demands. and placed conditions of service as a ATASA has secondary matter. It is the only teachers organisation recognised by the international body constantly ATASA has been under fairly regular (WCOTP) as representing South stressed its belief attack both within and without South Africans, and as such attends both world in a democratic Africa for not adopting a far more radical and Africa teachers conferences and political future political position. Yet it has been congresses. There is no strong full-time remarkably successful in remaining in touch administrative organisation, the and strives for with all sides in South Africa - except for secretary-general (Mr H H Dlamlenze) the abolition of those of its provincial groups viewed as being a Soweto school principal. The apartheid in being too close to the homeland long-standing president is Mr Randall education administrations. The association has Peteni and other leaders include Prof A accepted the need to represent their J Thembela (NATU), Mr F M Tonjeni members on various government structures, CATU) and Mr L M Tuanyane and participates on the South African TUATA).

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 When overtly FEDCO: Federal Council of supporter, the association is now far mow political matters critical of the government of the day. arise and the Teachers Associations There is little doubt that the TO represents This all-white body consists of one of the most significant forces (white) federal representatives of the eight white teacher retarding progress towards one ministry of council of bodies recognised by the provincial and education and free association in teachers cannot central government. They divide themselves education. This is the only teachers' group establish into two language groups - three into the to refuse to join in the signing of a consensus, no English-speaking Teachers Association Teachers Charter drafted by JOCTASA. (ESTAS), and the three Afrikaans and which explicitly condemns apartheid in single view is two other bilingual associations into the education. forced through Federasie van Afrikaanse Onderwysersverenigings (FAO). The Federal Council is dominated by matters SATC: South African Teachers of conditions of service, and when overtly Council political matters arise on which the Council is deeply divided, no single view is The SATC, with which all white teachers forced through. In fact, very few votes in white departments have to register The English- are taken at all. compulsorily, is a further dividing point between the English and Afrikaans speaking Federal Council administration is language groups. The ESTAS bodies associations outstanding and its secretary, Mr Koos have consistently called for a multiracial support the Steyn, is renowned for his ability in teachers register and council, while FAO concept of one administration and in the preparation of groups want a racial council. There are education documents. The chairmanship of currently discussions in progress on FEDCO is occupied on a two-year cycle linking SATC and the Federal Council into ministry, but with English and Afrikaans speakers one white umbrella body, with possible have slightly alternating. The current chairman is Prof legislation pending. The various differing stances Hennie Maree (TO) and vice-chairman is associations' positions on this issue are on school Mr Dudley Schroeder (SATA). There are still developing. admissions two very small teacher bodies with observer status on the Federal Council, who represent white teachers in African and UTASA: Union of Teachers coloured schools. Associations of South Africa This body represents the provincial English-Speaking Teacher Assoc's 'coloured' teacher associations. The major These three, the Natal Teachers Society force is the Cape Teachers Professional (NTS), the South African Teachers Association (CTPA) under Mr Franklin The Transvaal Association (SATA) and the Transvaal Sonn, who is also leader of UTASA. Onderwysersunie, Teachers Association (TTA) can generally UTASA is strongly committed to a non- previously a be termed as 'anti-apartheid' in outlook, racial future for South Africa. It is the and support the concept of one ministry of staunch National most recently created of the national education. On school admissions they Party supporter, teacher bodies and stems from a history have slightly differing stances, which of community division over the issue of is now far more broadly centre on the issue of parental participation in state structures. critical because control of school admissions. UTASA's current position is that it has to of possible The three bodies are strong take its place in certain official government administratively, and a large amount of institutions such as SACE and RECES, in reforms their energies is devoted to conditions of order to represent the views of its service and limited professional matters. members. However they are generally weaker in The CTPA is at this time under especial research and in developing theoretical pressure from more radical elements within principles for their positions. An the education community. There is a umbrella body, ESTAS, provides a non- UTASA's total state of flux and stress within the teacher formal link with no administrative community, reflected within the teacher rejection of the structure or statutory recognition. associations. The relationship between tricameral UTASA and the House of constitution has Afrikaans and Afrikaans-Majority Representative's Department of Education brought it under Associations and Culture is formal and frequently the severely This group is made up of three provincial strained. UTASA's total rejection of the associations (TO, NOU and OFSTA), a tri-cameral constitution has fairly critical gaze of national union (SAOU), and an naturally brought it under the severely Minister Carter association for technical educationalists critical gaze of Minister Carter Ebrahim. Ebrahim (SAATVE). The latter body and OFSTA UTASA and its affiliates have a strong are representative also of a small group of organisational and administrative base. English-speaking teachers. More than any other teacher body, it has a The largest white teacher body, the strong research department and Transvaal Onderwysersunie, is critically theoretical base to its positions. UTASA placed at the current interface between and ATASA are linked in a loose National Party and Conservative Party affiliation, JOCTASA, which holds politics. Previously a staunch government intermittent meetings.

16 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 TASA: Teachers Association of A GUIDE TO TEACHER ASSOCIATIONS South Africa IN SOUTH AFRICA The Racial, Language and Political Divide TASA is a strong unitary body, representative of eight thousand Indian For African Teachers AT ASA African Teachers' Association of South Africa teachers in South Africa. It is the smallest NATU Natal African Teachers' Union hut most highly organised of national CATU Cape African Teachers' Union teacher organisations. With solid assets and TUATA Transvaal United Teachers' Association a skilled financial benefit operation for OFSATA OFS African Teachers' Association teachers, TASA has developed an important mediating role. On occasions For White Teachers FEDCO Federal Council of Teachers' Associations this is tangibly evident, as at its most recent FAO Federasie van Afrikaans Onderwysersverenigings (Afrikaansj congress where representatives of all TO Transvaal Onderwysersunie other recognised South African teacher NOU Natalse Onderwysersunie bodies were present; or through the efforts SAOU Suid Afrikaanse Onderwysersunie of its president, Mr Pat Samuels, to OFSTA* OFS Teachers' Association promote contact and teacher unity. SAATVE* SA Association for Technical and Vocational Education ESTAS English-Speaking Teachers' Association (English) Traditionally, it has had good relations NTS Natal Teachers' Society with the and remains SATA South African Teachers' Association strongly opposed to the tri-cameral TTA Transvaal Teachers' Association constitution. It clashed publicly on a number of occasions with the South For Coloured Teachers UTASA Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa African Indian Council and its leader, Mr CTPA Cape Teachers' Professional Association A midland Rajbansi. Currently (like SO NAT Society of Natal Teachers I: TASA) it has decided to work with the OFSTA OFS Teachers' Association 1 louse of Delegates' Department of TAT Transvaal Association of Teachers Education and Culture. The fact that Minister Kassie Ramduth is an ex-school independent or Non-Racial JOCTASA Joint Council of Teachers' principal perhaps tempers contact at the Associations of South Africa moment. TASA Teachers' Association of South Africa NEUSA National Education Union of South Africa TLSA Teachers' League of South Africa Non-Recognised Teacher WECTU Western Cape Teachers' Union Groups Other Educational Bodies WCOTP . World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession I lie bodies named here are merely COSAS Congress of South African Students representative of a number of others RECES Research Committee on Educational Services which exist across South Africa. Generally SACE South African Council of Education they are splinter groups from existing SATC South African Teachers' Council bodies, but one or two have an ' These also represent a small number ol English-speaking teachers- independent, and long-standing basis. They suffer the dual disability of not having a good funding base nor being able to longer. It generally draws members from The political offer efficient delivery on members' ATASA's base. profile of non- individual problems. Their political profile is generally greater than that of recognised recognised bodies. TLSA: Teachers League of teacher groups South Africa such as the TLSA is an 'underground' body of newly NEUSA: National Education coloured teachers which exists in the established Union of South Africa Western Cape area. It is underground to the extent that it was suppressed in the NEUSA and This body developed in the aftermath of the 1950s because of its political links with WECTU is 1976 student uprising in Soweto and its the Congress and Unity movements. It still generally greater supression. Initially based in Johannesburg regularly prints a publication of its views only, and then with only a few hundred than that of which could be characterised as strongly recognised members, it has gathered many more socialist in tone. TLSA regularly attacks adherents to its strong non-racial, anti- the apartheid education system and any bodies apartheid, non-participatory stance. It does body participating in its structures. not seek recognition by the state authorities and is developing an alternate organisation to all existing teacher WECTU: Western Cape bodies. Teachers Union NEUSA has strong links with the United A newly established body drawing members Democratic Front and its affiliated from CTPA, CATU and some from organisations. Since the suppression of TASA and SATA. It has received COSAS in late 1985, NEUSA has taken up particular attention during 1985 for the cause of student demands. While not articulating the radical position in yet taking a high public position against the opposition to authoritarian measures recognised associations, this reticence implemented in DET and House of cannot be expected to continue much Representatives administered schools. tMi£\

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 Rebellion in the Eastern Cape

n dla ya,a f the Eastern p * ^esPresdsJ^sf k l ° ™™e Herald Z7n?,rTy 6 21 March 1966 commemorated the first tmgs m Lan a H community demands h^JH^ t V township outside Uitenhage. local?"7 ^arch' ma"V dcte'h^eshavebtpnfpi^6 w the formal stateof emergency was recently hum J'? 'eaders are b*ng lifted -the mSZ/Zn*^'-and the March banning orders placed on * bovrntt reports on the ^rment o f 1985?Rfi jn¥h >ssues remain- Mand'a a seasoned foryn^ resu™d in East London and JiltiV** reg'°n> as the Powerful black consumer for negouauons expires. d elsew^re ~ even before the all-pervasive April deadline pEBCO has re mm— •J" WO of the most significant emerged as a emerge from relative inactivity to declare Political force I developments during the months of war on the community council system. befn £t)UICtin the Easte™ Cape have With all the UDF affiliates in the region with UDF been the emergence of the United affiliates in the rallying behind it, PEBCO put its new- ( DF as a found clout to effective use. It did not region rallying fo STte.ST ,V > Political iorce to be reckoned with, and the confine its fight to affordable rents and behind its boycXysbayn^iCfS °f ^e contmer demands for decent housing but tackled ooycott as an effective weapon in the consumer struggle to have inequalitie^edressed. other issues too, such as bus fare boycott and increases and hikes in the price of petrol. The regional superstructure of the UDF By early 1986, after months of rent and other defiance despite being hard-hit by mass detentions service charge boycotts, the East Cape campaigns of its members and leadership failed to Development Board acknowledged that arrears owed to it by township residents S?SSaendUring the State °f -urgency 3 C im ttces stood at R12 million. instead asS tthre resistanc°" ' e movemen were formet d Port Elizabeth was to get its first real taste consolidated its position in towmJ ps throughout the Eastern Cape UDF of black consumer power when a affiliates, from the Port Elizabeth Black PEBCO call in March 1985 for a 'black weekend' (a stayaway strike) received Civic Organisation (PEBCO) to trade overwhelming community support. For a whole weekend the city was virtually devoid of black faces. At the time, the first indications of the consumer boycott that was to strangle smaller white businesses surfaced. PEBCO president, Qaqawuli Godolozi, disclosed at a mass meeting that 'We have another ace up our sleeve'. PEBCO's Revival Meanwhile, African community councillors The beginning of 1985 saw PEBCO had come to bear the brunt of Urban Monitor community anger at the system they INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 represented. Certainly the most hounded a third force was playing a catalytic role. Only 17 out of 45 councillor was Mr T B Kinikini, the While no conclusive evidence was community KwaNobuhle (Uitenhage) councillor who forthcoming, all fingers pointed at the councils and two refused to resign after all his colleagues security forces, who had everything to gain stood down in mid March 1985. For five while resistance groups had their energies out of four black months his funeral parlour had been misdirected. In early July, government local authorities boycotted, his home stoned and his rejected the UDF's accusations of are operational in family threatened. After the Langa complicity. the Eastern Cape shootings, he was beaten to death and The struggle for power has left AZAPO today then set alight by an incensed mob. a spent force in Port Elizabeth. Following the expulsion in early 1986 of AZAPO's Bowing to Pressure 'Reverend' Mzwandile Ebenezer - who was frequently accused of stirring up trouble Since the outbreak of unrest nationwide, between AZAPO and the UDF - it seems The feud Af rican councillors have been attacked, as if the UDF is set to further expand its between the UDF forced to resign, and had their houses and support. Currently, AZAPO which has businesses burnt down. During 1985, the been plagued by internal squabbles and and AZAPO dreaded necklace emerged - a means of adverse public opinion, is further being centred on eliminating people perceived to be destabilised by escalating tension personality collaborating with the system, by placing a between Africanist and black consciousness burning tyre around their necks. clashes, political elements within its ranks. differences and In two months of civil unrest, from 21 manipulation by March, the day of the of 20 funeral marchers, to 29 May 1985, 108 Cradock's Revolt an unknown third people died in the Port Elizabeth/ Since 1984, Cradock has been another force Uitenhage district. During this stormy boiling cauldron in the Eastern Cape. A period, councillors finally bowed to the school boycott started in February 1984 pressure. Entire councils resigned in in support of educational demands and to Cradock and Uitenhage townships. Many protest the dismissal of prominent disrobed for keeps in Port Elizabeth and community figure and respected school Grahamstown but a few chose to cling to teacher, Matthew Goniwe. He had been their positions, carrying pistols on their instrumental in establishing the Cradock Community advisor persons and having their homes placed Residents Association (CRADORA), which and mediator, Molly under police guard. under his presidentship brought about Blackburn, at the site By the time the state of emergency was the collapse of the Ilingelihle Community of the Langa killings. Council there. After her fatal car declared on 21 July - covering 16 accident, 20 000 magisterial districts in the Eastern Cape Goniwe's involvement in civic issues had black people attended alone - at least 240 beleaguered African apparently perturbed his employers, the the funeral on 2 councillors had handed in their Department of Education and Training January 1986. resignations nationwide. In small towns like Despatch, Beaufort West and Somerset East, councillors resigned en bloc. The government, determined to keep an evidently detested system intact, has since appointed white administrators for Cradock, Uitenhage and Oudtshoorn townships, to assume the functions of the councils. The councils in Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown continue with a limp. In the Eastern Cape today, only 17 out of 45 community councils, and two out of four fully-fledged local authorities, are functioning, and there are vacancies in 173 of the 284 wards. Opposition Feuding The feud between the UDF and the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO) erupted at the beginning of May 1985. Although there is decades-old tension between the rival ideologies of black consciousness and non-racialism, no single leader has ever been able to say exactly what ignited the clash in Port Elizabeth's townships which went on to claim scores of lives. Personality clashes between prominent figures in both camps were cited as one possible reason. It was also widely held that

INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 Urban Monitor 87 Faceless death (DET). A move to transfer him to about setting up meetinqs with boycott squads have Graaff Reinet in late 1983 was widely leaders, made representations to the been linked to construed as a bid to decapitate police and took up certain issues at central CRADORA, and Goniwe refused to move. government level. 'I think white the After his subsequent dismissal, Goniwe businessmen have finally come to disappearance became a rural organiser for the UDF. One understand the frustrations of detention and killings of of his primary functions was to organise without trial and the general suffering in leading anti- affiliates in the conservative platteland the black community', observed a apartheid towns. boycott committee spokesman in Port Elizabeth. activists, a He was detained for nearly six months. chilling Some time after his release, Goniwe was With boycott leaders having satisfied brutally murdered in mysterious development themselves that the local chamber of circumstances, together with two other commerce was genuine in its efforts to Cradock community leaders. An estimated meet demands that were within its power, 40 000 people attended their funeral on the boycott was conditionally suspended 20 July 1985, which drew worldwide in late 1985. The move was mandated by 50 attention. The murders sparked 000 township residents at a rally on 1 consternation in the Eastern Cape as it December, at the Dan Qeqe stadium in The consumer became apparent that unknown 'death Zwide, outside Port Elizabeth. A boycott was squads' were out to annihilate any active tumultuous year of black challenge and suspended in opposition to apartheid policies. This protest tapered off with relative calm. December after chilling development was evident elsewhere in the country - by early July, 11 local business opposition leaders had been assassinated The April Deadline tried to meet and another 27 activists had disappeared. those demands An uneasy lull hangs over Port Elizabeth Earlier in Port Elizabeth, three executive as 1986 takes tentative shape. The consumer that were within members of PEBCO, including president boycott received more than 90 percent its power Qaqawuli Godolozi, disappeared support in 1985, and now that it has drawn mysteriously while driving to the local blood, the community sees it as an airport on 8 May. Their families made vain effective tool for 'getting at them'. At last attempts to secure court orders, to force year's rally, April was set as a deadline the police to produce them, if they had in for the government to address certain fact been detained. Yet they have never demands which are not within the power been seen since, and again the faceless of the local authorities. April has been death squads are held responsible by the black community at large. If the government fails to deliver the set as the goods by then, the organisers have deadline for threatened to launch a consumer boycott government to The Consumer Boycott coordinating committee, which would call meet other for a national boycott. This is planned to A fragile peace was achieved in the demands that coincide with the economic sanctions that AZAPO-UDF feud in the second half of Commonwealth leaders have threatened supersede the 1985, following a series of peace talks which to impose, if their demands for reform are influence of local began in May. The UDF and its affiliates not met. authorities now concentrated their energies on organising a consumer boycott of white With student bodies also looking at April as businesses, which was to bankrupt scores of a deadline for resuming student protest small-scale entrepreneurs, especially in action, black communities in the Eastern Port Elizabeth and Queenstown. Cape are holding their breath. Students returned to school on 28 January 1986 after The aim of the boycott, according to its last year's widespread classroom organisers, was to withhold trade from boycotts. Anger is again white businessmen until they brought rising because of pressure to bear on the government to meet Anger and resentment has been building up in the townships because of the re- the redeployment certain demands. These include: • the release of political prisoners and deployment of troops which were of troops in the leaders detained in terms of emergency withdrawn in December 1985. Much to the region's regulations irritation of many activists, the townships, the • the scrapping of Black Local authorities have also continued to ban banning of Authorities gatherings, including church services. • the bringing to justice of the Goniwe The level of anger was evident when the meetings and police detained more than 70 UDF activists, and murderers • the production of missing community marshals, after enforcing stringent police shootings leaders restrictions on the funeral of a 13-year • the removal of troops from the old victim of a police shooting earlier this townships; year. • the lifting of the emergency; and In the next few months, pressure will • the consideration of student demands. almost certainly be on community leaders With their profit margins drastically to call for some act of defiance, to appease reduced, white traders were forced to sit those who are already hot under the up and pay attention to the black collar and to resume the momentum of last community's grievances. They scurried year's resistance campaigns.

20 Urban Monitor INDICATOR SA Vol 3 No 4 Autumn 1986 AECI Ltd Africa Institute of SA Afrox Ltd Andrew Levy and Assocs Anglo Alpha Ltd Anglo American Corp of SA Ltd Anna Starcke Assocs Barclays National Bank Ltd Barlow Rand Ltd Beacon Sweets & Chocolates Beares Ltd Beier & Co Ltd BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd Burroughs Machines Ltd Carlton Paper of SA (Pty) Ltd Chase Manhattan Overseas Corp New York Citibank NA Ltd Control Data Corp Continental Bank Development Bank of Southern Africa Dow Chemical (Africa) (Pty) Ltd Dow Chemical USA Durban Chamber of Commerce Durban City Council Durban City Council — Personnel Services ESSO Everite Ltd Ford Foundation French Embassy Gilbeys Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd Grinaker Holdings Ltd Henred-Fruehauf Trailers (Pty) Ltd IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd Johnson & Johnson KwaZulu Development Corp Liberty Life Metropolitan Homes Trust Ltd Metropolitan Life Mitchell Cotts (Pty) Ltd Mobil Oil Corp Mobil Oil Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd Nampak Ltd p The Natal Witness (Pty) Ltd i Netherlands Embassy Pick & Pay Premier Group t . ' Rupert International (Pty) Ltd SA Foundation Sanlam SAPPI Ltd SASOL Ltd SA Permanent Building Society SA Sugar Ass SEIFSA • Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd Smith Kline and French Laboratories The South African Breweries Ltd Southern Life 3M Company Unilever SA (Pty) Ltd Union Carbide UNISA Library United States Government Urban Foundation USSALEP P G Wood Industries Wooltru INDICATOR PROJECT SOUTH AFRICA Centre for Applied Social Sciences • University of Natal • King George V Ave • Durban • 4001 • Tel. 816 2525 or 816 2369 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence.

To view a copy of the licence please see: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/