UNIVERSITY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE ACADEMY

SFRATLY8: m AREA OF FUTURE GOJ^FL^GT ©R PEACE ?

BY ARUJUNAN NARAYANAN

NOVEMBER 1989

A SUB-THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES I

CONTENTS

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. MAPS.

ABBREVIATIONS.

GLOSSARY.

1. INTRODUCTION.

2. THE SPRATLYS.

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISLANDS.

(a) Strategic significance.

(b) Economic significance.

4. THE CLAIMANTS, AND THE BASIS OF THEIR CLAIMS.

(a) Peoples' Republic of .

(b) Republic of China.

(c) Socialist Republic of .

(d) Philippines.

(e) Malaysia.

5.ASSESSMENT0F EACH CLAIM.

6. FUTURE PROSPECTS.

(a) Reemergence of the PRC as a maritime power in the South

China Sea.

(b) Possibility of maintaining the status quo.

(c) Possibility of cooperation amongst the other contestants

against the PRC

(d) Super power intervention.

(e) Emergence of Malay regionalism.

(f) Reemergence of Japan as a military power.

(g) Joint authority.

(h) Negotiation & settlement II

7. CONCLUSION.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

APPENDIX. 111

DEDICATED TO: MY FATHER NARAYANAN FOR TEACHING ME THE VALUE OF WORK. MY MOTHER VEERAMAH WHO TAUGHT ME TO LOVE HUMANITY. MY WIFE ANGAMAH FOR HER PATIENCE. IV

Preface and acknowledgement.

This sub-thesis is the result of assistance given by many good-hearted individuals. Without their help, it would not be possible for me to pursue the study and to complete the work within the given time. At the University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, I was fortunate to have Dr. Carlyle A. Thayer, to whom the credit, if any, should go. His encouragement, advice and guidance were of great help. Without his help, I doubt, I could have finished this work.

I am equally grateful to a few in Malaysia. I am thankful to Datuk

Nasruddin bin Bahari (Secretary-General, Ministry of Defence Malaysia), Mr.

Abdul Hai bin Haji Zawawi (Undersecretary, Policy Division), Mr. Abdul

Rahim bin Daud (Principal Assistant Secretary, Policy Division), Mr. Ramli bin Johari (Principal Assistant Secretary, Training Branch) and the members of the Selection Committee at the Ministry, for giving me an opportunity to pursue my study at the University College, Australian

Defence Force Academy. I deeply appreciate their kindness and support.

My sincere thanks also go to Professor John McCarthy, Dr. Hugh

Smith and Dr. Roger Thompson, at the University College, for their contribution to my knowledge in defence matters. I am equally grateful to

Captain John Mould, who did much to make my study and stay pleasant. I also take the opportunity to thank my friend, Captain (Navy) Juan De Leon for encouraging me to write the sub-thesis. I deeply appreciate the staff at the Library, Department of Politics, the Computer Centre, especially Mr.

Phillip Berrie and the Administration for their generous help.

My thanks also go to the Australian Government, particularly the

Department of Defence, for sponsoring my study and the stay of my family in Canberra. It made us to appreciate and to learn the Australian way of life. V

My thanks also go to my children, Dharmashaktini and Saravanan, who were deprived of my love and care, during the period of my study.

Above all, my thanks go to my brother, Mr. Subramaniam Narayanan for educating me with much sacrifice.

University College Arujunan Narayanan.

University of New South Wales

Australian Defence Force Academy

Canberra.

November, 1989. VI MAPS. 1. The Southern Seas (785-1644). 2. The Southern Seas (1844). 3. Islands of the . 4. The (2 maps). 5.Conflicting claims. 6. The Kalayaan Island Group and location of Kalayaan 7. Oilfield Flashpoints. 8. PLA Navy deployments. VI I

Abbreviations

ASW Anti-submarine Warfare.

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian nations.

BC Before Christ.

BR Beijing Review.

CE Christian Era.

COCC Coordinated Operations Control Committee.

COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export

Controls.

COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

COMELEC Commission of Election (of Philippines).

DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1954-75).

ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone.

FBIS-EAS Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia.

PEER Far Eastern Economic Review.

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.

JDW Jane's Defence Weekly.

OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

PDR Pacific Defence Reporter.

PRC People's Republic of China.

PRG RVN Provisional Revolutionary Government, Republic of

South Vietnem.

ROC Republic of China.

RVN Republic of Vietnam (1955-75).

SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication.

SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered.

SWB Summary World Broadcast. yiii

UNCLOS United Nations Conference on the Laws of the Sea.

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organisation.

US United States.

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. VTOL Vertical Takeoff and Landing. IX

GLOSSARY

Atoll a circular or almost circular coral reef, the crest lying at a

low height above sea level, sometimes interrupted, enclosing a central lagoon.

Bank an elavation in the floor of a river or a shallow sea, usually

of sand, mud, gravel (not of solid rock or coral).

Cay a bank or reef of sand.

Coral a hard calcareous, rock-like substance formed either by the

continuous skeleton or fused skeletons of members of a group of sedentary marine animals that live in colonies- only in clear, warm shallow seas, or by the skeleton or fused skeletons together with polyps that secrete it/them.

Island a piece of land entirely surrounded by water.

Isle a small island.

Islet very small island.

Reef a mass of rock or coral, sometimes of shingles or sand, occuring in the sea, usually covered at high tide, but often partly exposed at low tide. X

Shoal a shallow part of a river, sea or lake; an accumulation of sand mud, pebbles creating such shallow water and in many cases dangerous to navigation. Introduction

The South China Sea is a large expanse of water, 648,000 square

nautical miles in area,'' that links the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean.

Its main axis stretches from Singapore in the south-west to , a

distance of 1,500 nautical miles wide. The shortest axis is from Vietnam

to Sabah and is about 480 nautical miles. It is linked to the Indian Ocean,

by the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and the Lombok. With the

Pacific it is linked by the Straits of Balabac, Formosa, Luzon and Mindoro.

Its water washes the coasts of 11 states - the People's Republic of China

(PRC), Republic of China (ROC), Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV),

Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong, Thailand

and Macao. It carries the most important sea lane that links the Far East

with Southeast Asia, Middle East and Europe. For centuries this route has

been used by traders of many nations - Chinese, Malays, Indians and others.

The Spratlys gained in strategic importance after the Cold War, as

the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR),

began to deploy their Pacific Fleets in this region. Sino-Soviet rivalry in

1969, added further to the strategic significance of this region. In early

1970, the forecast of potential hydrocarbon resources also added to an

important economic factor to the strategic equation. All this led to the

scramble for the few island groups that lie in the South China Sea. In 1975

the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) moved

closer to adopting the 200 miles territorial sea limit. Presently, with the

extension of jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles, almost all the area is claimed by different states and in certain areas the claims overlap (Figure

1). This has brought the claims of different nations bordering the South

China Sea into conflict with each other. This may threaten the innocent passage of ships.^ Figure 1 Conflicting Claims 2 In the South China Sea, there are four important archipelagoes -the Pratas, Macclesfield Banks, Paracels and the Spratlys (Figure 2). They lie within a semi-tropical zone with average annual temperature ranging from 18° C in January () to 2>2^ C in July (). The region is a major catchment area for the summer monsoon and rainfall averages from 1750 mm in the north to 2500 mm in the south. Most of the islets are covered with brush, grass, coconut palms and in some, mangrove swamps. Fresh water can also be found on most of the principal islands.^

Among these four island groups, the jurisdiction of Pratas and the Macclesfield was never a point of contention and were accepted as part of China unlike the Paracels and the Spratlys,.^

(a^ Pratas Islands and Reef (Tuno-sha chun-tanV It is located 190 miles southeast of Hong Kong and 250 miles southwest of Taiwan. It consists of Pratas Island which is four miles long and about one mile wide, and two submerged sand bars.^

(b) (Chung-sha chun-taoV It is an area of submerged coral reefs about 90 miles long and 40 miles wide and lies 190 miles east-southeast of the Paracels. No part of the bank reaches closer to the surface than nine metres. The area may have oil potential. It is considered possible that new islands could be formed here.^

(c) Paracels fXisha QuandaoV

It is a group of 120 islands within an area 125 miles long and sprinkled over 200 km wide of water. It lies 135 miles southeast of Hainan and 215 miles east of Vietnam. A group of 15 low lying coral reefs and tiny islands, covers in total only 3 square km of land. About 300 km by 150 km 100°

100

100 200 300 <100 500 Miles Chinese claim area 0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometres

Figure 2 Islands of the South China Sea

Source: Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China

Methuen, New York, 1982. 3 in area the western most extermity of which is only 300 km from Danarg and approximately same distance from Hainan/ The major islands a-e Woody Island, Lincoln Island, Tree island, West Sand Island, Pattle Island, Money Island and .®

The Paracel group which has about 50 atolls, coral reefs and shoals has long been contested by China (both ROC and PRC) and Vietnam (both SRV and RVN). In 1954, the French ceded the islands to Vietnam. In 1956, when the French withdrew from the Paracels, China sent its troops to occupy the eastern islands of the archipelago.^ In early 1959, there was a major confrontation between PRC and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) when Saigon landed troops on the islands, kidnapped dozens of Chinese fishermen and tore up the Chinese flag hoisted on the island. In 1961, Saigon announced the incorporation of the Paracels into Quang Nam province. This led to a strong Chinese protest. In July 1973, Saigon stationed a garrison on one of the and offered oil exploration rights to foreign companies. During 16-20 January 1974, PRC amphibious forces combined with MiG 21 and MiG 23 aircraft, forcibly evicted the Republic of Vietnam garrison from the Paracels. On 21 January 1974, the PRC declared its sovereignty over the Paracels. Since then, the islands have remained under the physical control of the PRC. The question which arose was whether the Chinese occupation of the Paracels was a signal for a more aggressive PRC campaign to exert Its strength in other disputed areas. Chinese actions aroused security concerns in Saigon, Manila and Taipei.

The Soviet Union made political capital of the clash. Pravda accused the PRC of pursuing an expansionist policy while a 'Radio Peace and Progress' program from Moscow charged Peking with 'aggression against the Vietnamese people' and warned Southeast Asia of Chinese hegemonism."'^ The RVN appealed to the United Nation's Security Council. 4 the International Court of Justice and others for help. At that time, as the PRC did not want to risk its newly developing relationship with the US, it did not move southwards into the other contested group of islands, the Spratlys."" Following the 1979 war with the SRV, China took steps to strengthen its position in the Paracels. It opened a permanent settlement, and moved hundreds of civilians and an unspecified number of troops on to the islands. On 23 July 1979 the PRC declared 'danger zones' covering part of the Paracels and the surrounding international water. All aircraft were banned indefinitely from a radius of 30 nautical miles. In late August, the entire Paracels were integrated with the mainland through communication links with Hainan island. A twice weekly air service was also begun. By May, 1980, the PRC had installed two new light houses and one air traffic guidance tower on the Paracels. Local government was established with residential blocks, banks, hospitals, post offices and other facilities. In July, 1981 a desalinating factory was established. There was also an elaborate air defence system on the archipelago. In June, 1982 a harbour was completed on the southern most tip of the Paracels."'^ By July 1982, the PRC had a small naval base.''^ On May 25,1985 it was reported that the PRC had improved the port facilities in the Paracels but it would not be possible to construct airfields capable of taking military aircraft. 5 Footnotes. 1. Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Poiitical Boundaries of the World, Mathuen, London, 1985. p. 209.

2. Katchen, Martin H., "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: Dangerous Ground for Asian Peace", Asian Survey, Vol. xviii No. 12 December, 1977. p. 1169. 3. Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest for the South China Sea, Mathuen, New York, 1982. p. 8.

4. iQQ,. cil. 5. FEER, 1 August 1981. p. 33. 6. iQ^. iOii. 7. Cloughly, Brian, "Tension Lies Around Paracels and Spratlys", JDW, 25 May 1985. 8. Asiaweek, 3 December 1982. 9. FBIS -EAS-88-059 28 March 1988. p. 50. 10. Chanda, Nayan," Sino-Soviet Rivalry, Islands of Friction", FEER, ^2 December 1975. 11. Newsweek, 25 February 1974. 12. Pao-min, Chang, "Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", manuscript Thayer Collection, Paracel and Spratly Islands folder. 13. Strategy Week, 19-25 July 1982, Vol.viii No. 28, Number 112 (New Series) p. 1. 2 THE SPRATI Y.q

The Spratlys archipelago is called Nansha in Chinese and Truong Sa in Vietnamese. The Spratlys are located at latitude 4 ° to 11° 30' N., longitude 109 ^ 30' to 117° 50'E. The archipelago stretches approximately 1000 kilometers (km) from north to south. The island group is about 650 km east of the Vietnamese coast, about 750 km south of Paracels. The northern most islands in the Spratlys are located about 1000 km from Hainan Island. The Spratlys are located about 250 km west of Sabah, about 160 km west of Sarawak and about 100 km west of Palawan Island. The archipelago comprises more than 100 unnamed and uninhabited small islands, cays, reefs, shoals and shallow banks scattered over 180,000 square kilometres''(Figures 3 and 4). The major habitable islands include Spratly Island, Amboina Cay, Itu Aba, Flat, Nanshan, Thitu, Loaita, Song Tu Tay (Southeast Cay). Namyit, Sin Cove, West York, Commodore. Northeast and Islands.^ Most of the Spratlys are made of seamounts, probably volcanic, rising from the sea floor. The area east of Spratly Island and Amboina Cay appear to be made from sedimentary depositions from the Mekong and from another river that flowed into the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand about 10,000 years ago. Some of the areas are yet to be fully surveyed and thus there is no clear identification.^

The islands do not form the natural geographical extension of any land mass, thus complicating the legal claims made by coastal states. Due to the distances involved, neither China, Vietnam or France occupied the islands permanently for any sustained period at any time in the past. The general geographical features of the Spratlys are as described in Appendix A.4 Following defeat in the Paracels on 20 January 1974, the RVN forces retreated southwards. In February 1974, the RVN - occupied six ^i^tife- 3 Sgr^atl^lslaii^^-

Source Marwyn" ^Samuels China-

Methuen, New York, 1982 I 16

112 114

PI Phi 1 i ppl n«i

TW T«1nan

VN VIatn^m

MY

Figuire 4 Spratly- Islands • 7 islands in the Spratly archipelago. The RVN feared that the PRC might also seize the Spratlys. The Chinese did not move south, however, but merely reiterated its claim. The ROC and the Philippines already occupied some of the islands. It was only in 1983 that Malaysia moved into the southern part. ^

The long anticipated PRC move into the Spratlys came on 14 March, 1988. When PRC and SRV naval forces clashed on and near Sin Cove island, China was said to have 'killed two birds with one stone'. It had established a foothold for the first time in the Spratlys, threatening Vietnam on its southern flank, while keeping up pressure on Vietnam's northern border. Neither the USSR nor the West dared to put pressure on the Chinese during the conflict, although they all held that China was responsible for the clash. With the defeat of the SRV, the PRC occupied eight reefs and islands, and now holds seven. The SRV occupied another five islands and now controls nineteen. The closest one is only one mile from an island occupied by the Philippines. Presently, the Philippines occupies seven islands. Malaysia occupies three islands, claiming that they are part of its continental shelf and also within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).^

In addition to the islands already occupied, there are roughly 100 rocks, reefs and shoals in the Spratlys. Under the Law of the Sea, they could be considered "land" by whoever should erect a lighthouse on them. The nation erecting the lighthouse could claim this "land" as their own territory. The claiming of these rocks, reefs and shoals would be necessary for any nation desiring to claim the Spratly Islands areas as an archipelago. Thus, the scramble for territory in the Spratlys may by no means be over. 8 At the moment five nations claim the islands in the area. The PRC, ROC and the SRV claim the entire group, while the Philippines claims most of the whole group. Malaysia claims only certain islands (Figure 2). At the moment, all parties have stationed garrisons in this area.^

Besides the five nations mentioned above, France also maintains claim to the islands on the basis that they are French possessions which were not handed over to the Vietnamese in 1956. There is also a likely claim from Brunei. If it declares a 200 mile EEZ around the nearby Louisa Reef which it claims, that zone would extend into the southern portion of the Spratlys.® Two individuals, Tomas Cloma, a Filipino and Morton F. Meads, an American also claim the islands on the principle of discovery. 9 Footnotes. 1. Katibag, Jose, "Spratlys, Paracels Dispute May Go To World Court", The Nation Review (in English), 17 December 1983.

2. FB/S-EAS-88-033 26 February 1988. 3. Richardson, Michael, "Watch On The Spratlys", PDR, September 1984. p. 9.

4. Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest For South China Sea, Methuen, London &

New York, 1982. p. 188-194. 5. Valencia, Mark., " A Cooperative Regime Could Be The Solution. Maritime Claims Bedevil The Spratly Islands", Centerviews, May/June 1989. p. 3.

6. iQQ.. cil. 7. L^. cil.

8. Loc. cii. 10 3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISLAND.q

For many centuries, the Spratly Islands were used by fishermen from neighbouring countries. They were also hideouts for pirates. Because of its numerous shoals, mariners always referred to them as "dangerous grounds".

The main resource of the islands is said to be phosphorous but none of the countries claiming them have developed it."^ There is also a possibility of magnesium and other minerals.^ Some of the islands have fresh water. Ocean turtles used to lay eggs. There are also guano deposits. These reserves have been mined commercially since the early 20th Century, and are still considered a principal asset of the islands. It was the competititon for guano supplies that became the source of considerable tensions between China, Japan and French Indochina during the 1920's^. Coral limes, high silicate sands, gem-quality coral, natural pearls and such food delicacies like birds nest and sea slugs are also permanent resources. According to the Naga Expedition of the California University, in the Spratlys area there are many kinds of midwater fish, numerous flocks of birds, and shoals of fish near the surface of the water. The expedition confirmed that the area is extremely rich in fish."^ On some islands, the soil is fertile for agricultural crops such as coconut, bread-fruit, tung-oil trees, pineapple, banana and papaya.^ There is also some animal husbandry, especially pigs. However, it is the strategic location of the archipelago and the possibility of hydrocarbon deposits that raised the strategic significance of the Spratlys, especially since 1970.

(a). Strategic Importance. The Spratly Islands have great strategic importance. To the east of these islands are located the important sea lanes and air routes that 11 link the Far East with Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe. It is the main shipping route for oil cargoes from the Persian Gulf to East Asia/Japan via the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This accounts for 30% of world trade in oil. Similarly, just about 30% of the world trade passes through this route. This trade includes strategic minerals, chromium, cobalt, manganese and the platinium group.^ As the whole trade of this region passes through the South China Sea, it is of great importance to all the countries concerned.

It is also along these sea lanes that the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the US 7th Fleet move regularly. The Spratly islands lie between the US military bases in the Philippines and the Soviet bases in Vietnam. Hence, the Spratlys are of great strategic significance to the US, USSR, China and Japan.^

These islands being volcanic in origin could withstand massive construction activities and some of them can accommodate air fields and naval facilities.^ Any one of the contesting nations could place the sea lanes passing through the South China Sea in their territorial archipelagic waters simply by considering other islands across these lanes from the Spratlys and the Spratlys itself as one large South China Sea archipelago. In the case of the ROC and the PRC, these islands would be the Paracel Islands, Hainan Island, Tungsha Island (midway between Hainan and Taiwan) and Taiwan. In the case of Vietnam, these islands are Con Son, Grande Catwick and Hon Khai approximately 25 miles off the coast of Vietnam. Therefore, the main sea lanes in the South China Sea would fall under the control of PRC or Vietnam if any of the two possess all the Spratlys and choose to assert itself.^

In the case of the Philippines, the Spratlys could be considered as part of the Philippines archipelago. The unilateral declaration of 200 miles 1 2 territorial sea would create new conflicts as each claimant could claim the 200 mile territorial sea from its land mass. For instance, the Palawan Passage between the Spratlys and the Philippines would fall within the territorial waters of Philippines on the basis the island is in its possession. This adds to the significance of the South China Sea for both the super powers and other marine powers as well.

For the contestants of the Spratlys, the islands have their own strategic significance. It can function as bases for sea lane defence, interdiction, surveillance of surface vessels, submarines and can be used as jumping off points to launch an attack on any state in the region. It is known to contain many island banks, reefs, shoals and cays separated by deep passages. If a hostile nation can map the area to a degree which will enable navigation of submerged ballistic missile submarines without danger of running aground, that particular nation could station Polaris -type submarines in the island group and be able to control or threaten an area within a radius of 4,000 km, containing a region that has 1/3 of the world's population, including the whole of ASEAN. The areas' bathymetry makes submarine detection, hence counteraction, virtually impossible.^ ^

For many ASEAN states, the islands are the first line of defence. The weakening US military presence in contrast to the increasing Soviet presence, the emergence of Vietnam as a regional power, and the modernisation of the armed forces of the PRC, especially its navy, has made the ASEAN nations concerned about their defences. As a consequence, ASEAN states have given thought to alter their internally oriented defence policies to meet this potential external threat. Measures have also been taken to acquire modern naval and air forces to bolster the military installations on the disputed offshore islands. This in turn may lead to arms race in the region as each country in the region has its conflicts, doubts and suspicions with the other. 13

fa) Peoples' Repuhlin of Ohin^

Since the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1969, the islands became strategically more significant for the PRC. The USSR is a threat to the PRC in the north, while China's southern frontier is not strong and susceptible to attacks. When the SRV aligned with the USSR in the 1970's following US-PRC rapprochment, the threat to its southern frontier increased. It is this worry that made the PRC occupy the Paracels in January, 1974, so that it could have another base further to the south.

This concern was well reflected in the words of an article published in the Kuang-ming jih-pao (Canton), ten months after the occupation of the Paracels. It stated:

As it lies between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, the South China Sea is a vital, strategic area. It acts as the gateway to the outside world for the mainland and offshore islands to China. The [Paracel and Spratly] archipelagos occupy a position central to the shipping lanes connecting Canton, Hong Kong, Manila and Singapore. [Hence] their geographical position is extremely important.''

The South China Sea also important for China's trade. Excluding direct trade with Japan and North America, more than half of all foreign transactions by value occur via South China Sea. This trade with the West, Japan, Southeast Asia, Oceania and North America is increasing. With China's access to the main shipping lanes of the world, especially in the West Pacific, the South China Sea has become more important.^ ^ 14 In late February 1974, Moscow warned Peking that settling territorial disputes by force could have dangerous consequences,"'^ adding further to the threat. This threat, along with the need to thwart Vietnam's military adventure in Kampuchea, and its desire to deter Vietnam from being adventurous in the south, made the PRC attack the SRV in 1979. Following this clash, the Soviets were given greater access to Cam Ranh Bay for its Pacific Fleet. This enabled an immediate increase of Soviet activity off Vietnam. By November 1982, a Soviet fleet of about 12 vessels was permanently stationed in Cam Ranh Bay with at least 12 or so operating in the South China Sea."''^ Since 1974, the PRC had constructed several harbours and a naval base in the Paracels. The naval base on Woody Island can service frigates and can be used to launch any attack in the South China Sea, especially the Spratlys.""^ In June 1983, the Peoples Liberation Army greatly expanded its naval, air and amphibious forces on Hainan Island.^ ^

In mid-April 1984, there was a joint amphibious exercise between the SRV and the USSR in the Gulf of Tonkin. In response to this and to show the PRC Navy's ability, in early May, for the first time since 1946, a naval squadron consisting of two frigates, one troop ship, and an oiler, sailed for the Spratly Islands."*^ The fleet did not land anywhere but sailed around the islands to show that the PRC Navy had the capability to patrol the area. Immediately back from the Spratlys, the fleet joined with other ships for a three week long amphibious exercise involving 2,000 marines.'' ^

On 8 June 1984, Chinese warships cruised in South China Sea, paying particular attention to the Spratlys, to show that they were not intimidated by Soviet-Vietnamese deployments.

According to western sources, by July 1987, the Vietnamese naval 15 bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang had been equipped with anti-aircraft installatio ns. Later the Soviets had an average of 22 naval ships in the Cam Ranh Bay, half of which were combatants. At times these have included up to four nuclear and conventional powered submarines. Nine 1,500 mile-radius Soviet TU-16 Badger medium bombers were also deployed. This access to Cam Ranh Bay gives Moscow the opportunity to threaten the sea lanes and the southern flanks of the PRC, besides being capable of supporting Vietnamese moves in the Gulf of Tonkin. In 1985, it was reported that 25 Soviet naval ships and submarines operated out of Cam Ranh Bay in the South China Sea area. Some of the submarines were nuclear powered and both submarines and major surface combatants could be used to deliver nuclear weapons.

The USSR is also trying to establish close relations with the ROC. If successful, then, with its position in Vietnam, the USSR would be able p rj to encircle China.Thus, with these developments, the potential threat was much closer to the PRC. Hence, China saw a need to further enlarge its defences in the south.

In May 1987, the Chinese Navy sent a flotilla on an extended sortie through the South China Sea to the Spratlys as far as the Tsengmu Reef which is about 48 km off the coast of the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. In the opinion of some geographers the Tsengmu Reef is not part of the Spratlys. This suggests that China had the intent to underscore its maximum claim to the area. During the May trip, China was believed to have established an oceanographic reasearch platform on , which is about 150 km from Sin Cowe Island.^ ^

In October 1987, the PRC declared that Hainan Island, China's southern most mainland territory close to the Spratlys, would become a new province and was to be promoted as a superspecial economic 16 development zone. It was felt the instability around the Spratlys and doubts over the access to oil prospecting rights would dissuade foreign investment in Hainan. Therefore, it was felt that it would be in China's interest to deal with the Spratlys issue as soon as possible.^ ^

It was partly this concern that forced the PRC to move into the Spratlys on 14th March, 1988. It is quite clear that the Soviet threat has expedited the PRC's entry into the Spratlys. China considers the Spratlys as a strategic link to allow its maritime interests into the Indian Ocean. According to a Chinese naval officer, the Spratlys cannot be seen in isolation, as the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf have become more important to China's security, as an increasing volume of China's trade passes through the area in which India has a strong naval strength.^ ^ Therefore, the Spratly Islands were needed to project Chinese naval power into the Indian Ocean. From Fiery Cross, the PRC could conduct surveillance against the USSR operating in the Cam Ranh Bay or the US forces passing through South Ch ina Sea to or from the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines.^"^

On 31 March 1988, the South China Sea Fleet under the Peoples' Liberation Army held a victory meeting to commend units and individuals for their successful Chigua Reef battle of 14 March. It was also said that the PRC attack on 14 March 1988 was also undertaken to gauge the extent of current Soviet regional support for Vietnam's position on the islands.^ ^ It was also to show to the SRV that with the Sino-Soviet rapprochment, the USSR would not come to its assistance if there were to be any conflict between Vietnam and the PRC and it would be in Vietnam's interest to accept the PRC as the leading military power in the South China Sea region.

(b). Republic of China. The ROC always had the fear that one day it would be attacked by 1 7 the PRC and annexed to the nnainland. When the ROC withdrew from the Paracels in 1956, there was no defence left for its southern flank. In the early 1950's, it was the US military strength which provided the security umbrella and deterred the PRC from moving into the ROC. With the US-PRC rapprochment and the Nixon Doctrine in the 1970's, the ROC felt that it had to defend itself. This fear has increased since January, 1974 with the PRC's occupation of the Paracels. The ROC expected the PRC to attack its position in the Spratlys, hence it fortified itself on the Itu Aba Island. When Peking decided to upgrade the status of the Hainan Island, the United Daily News of ROC editorialised that it was part of a Chinese expansionist plan that would create instability in South-East Asia. The paper also said that by strengthening Hainan, the PRC intended to put the whole South China Sea and all the islands in the area under its control by expanding its southern strategic defence up to the Sptratlys. ^^ It is obvious ROC fear increased further with the PRC's presence in the Spratly Islands since 14 March, 1988.

(c) Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The traditional relationship between the PRC and the SRV has been characterised by hostility, distrust and suspicion, except at the time of the Vietnam War, when both cooperated against the United States. Vietnam has boundary problems with the PRC in the north and in the Gulf of Tonkin. At the time of the Vietnam War, as both nations were facing a common enemy, there was a cordial relationship, and Vietnam was dependent on the PRC for military assistance against the US and its allies. Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the PRC, proclaimed that the 700 million Chinese people would provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese and the vast expanse of Chinese territories would be their reliable rear area.^^ At that moment, the Spratlys were under the control of Saigon regime and the DRV was not in a position to exert any authority. On June 15, 1956 Pham Van Dong acknowledged that from the historical point of view the 18 Spratlys were Chinese territory (Figure Following the PRC-US rapprochment and the Sino-Soviet conflict, Vietnam tilted towards the USSR, antagonising the PRC. The old rivalry resurfaced and the border incidents in the north increased. Vietnam's expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese exarcebated this animosity.

On 3 November 1978, the SRV signed the Vietnamese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which further contributed to Sino-Vietnamese hostility and the Soviet fear of the PRC. The relationship plummeted when Vietnam in December 1978, attacked Cambodia and replaced the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime with the pro-Soviet Heng Samrin. In retaliation PRC attacked Vietnam in February/March 1989. The issue became more complicated with both parties supporting the opposite groups in the Kampuchean power struggle. Finally, due to the territorial dispute, border tensions and the flux of ethnic Chinese refugees into China, war broke out between the two 'old comrades' in February/March 1979. The war only added fuel to the burning dispute and worsened the relationship.

Following the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War, the SRV granted the USSR the use of naval facilities at the Cam Ranh Bay which is only 450 km from the Spratlys. This has become the Soviet Pacific Fleet's principal forward operational base. Since September, 1980 VTOL aircraft carriers, missile cruisers, nuclear powered attack and missile submarines and other warships have been supported logistically from this installation. Floating docks, submarine tenders, extensive ship maintenance and repair facilities are also available. The nearby twin 3,000 metre runway air facility has for a number of years, supported maritime surveillance aircraft, fighter bombers and anti-submarine helicopter deployments. Cam Ranh also houses underwater fuel storage tanks, submarine pens and a long range electronic surveillance and intercept centre. Cam Ranh, which has excellent harbour facilities, can accommodate 30-35 major warships. Soviet Forces in Cam 1 9 Ranh can interdict the West's strategic SLOC. In 1984. a squadron of nuclear strike aircraft and their refuelling tankers were deployed there. The air station has also become a storage location for reserve VTOL fighte rs used aboard the two Kiev Class aircraft carriers now operating with the Soviet Pacific Fleet. As many as 20 Soviet surface ships plus four or more submarines stage on a regular basis out of Cam Ranh Bay which the Soviets are continuing to expand.

According to the US Pacific Commander-in-Chief, the Soviets maintain a nine TU-16 bomber contingent there in order to provide a quick strike and interdiction capability of sea lanes in the South China Sea. This poses a direct challenge to the US facilities in the Philippines. The Soviets are also using the Kampuchean port of Kampong Som, which could be another useful deepwater naval port for the USSR along with its co-located large capacity airport. All these USSR activities in the region arise from the Soviet fear of being encircled by Japan-PRC-USA.^^ Hanoi also took measures to strengthen its military position on six Spratly islands which were under its control. In June 1980, Vietnam began construction and training activities. By May 1981, logistical support from mainland Vietnam to the six Spratly islands was reported to have improved to ensure uninterrupted supply of large quantities of goods to the troops stationed there. In August 1981, naval and anti-aircraft units stationed in two other Spratly islands - Quang Vinh and An Giang, were trained there. Following the visit of Marshall Nikolay V. Ogarkov, Chief of General-Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Vice-Minister of Defence, there were reports of the construction of a naval base at the Con Son island by several hundred Soviet military advisers and technicians. This island is the closest point to the Spratlys from the mainland and the purpose seemed to be to increase the cruising range of the Vietnamese and Soviet navies in the South China Sea.^^ 20 In April 1983, Hanoi occupied another five islands in the Spratlys. On the Spratly Island it built a paved, 1,500 foot runway, capable of accommodating short take-off and landing aircraft, an operations building and a control and communications tower. Vietnam also fortified its holdings heavily with artillery, anti-aircraft guns,^'' troops and hardened bunkers. Vietnamese troops in the Amboina Cay were also increased from 50 to 150 on learning of the Malaysian plan to occupy the Terumbu Layang Layang.^^

In May 1984, Vietnam accused the PRC of planning to annex the Spratlys and vowed to defend them at all costs.^^ By mid-June 1984, Vietnamese troops in the Spratlys were reported to have been equipped with amphibious tanks and one of the islands was reported to have 600 troops stationed on it. In June 1984, Hanoi protested Chinese incorporation of the Spratlys in the Hainan administrative region and warned the PRC to get out of the Spratlys and expressed its determination to defend these territories.^

On 13-16 April 1984, in the Gulf of Tonkin, Hanoi had joint amphibious landing exercise with the Soviet troops for the first time off the coast of Vietnam about 145-160 km south of Haiphong, under the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.^^ A total of 600 Soviet marines and a number of Soviet reconnaisance and anti-submarine aircraft and a fleet of 8 Soviet ships including the 37,000 ton aircraft carrier, Kiev and a 14,000 ton assault ship, Aleksandr Nikoleyev also participated. They were escorted by the anti-submarine carrier, Minsk.

On 3 June 1984, six of the Spratly islands were garrisoned by Vietnamese troops. On the 21 June, according to the Philippines intelligence reports, the Vietnamese troops in the Spratlys were supplied with two amphibious light tanks. Besides scattering. detachments 21 throughout the islands, Vietnam also rebuilt a 600 metre airstrip on one of the southern most islands and had equipped its marine troops with amphibious vehicles.^^ On 29 April 1989. when the Vietnamese Defence Minister, Vien Tien Dung visited Cam Ranh Bay, he exhorted the military personnel to consolidate the Spratlys archipelago into 'steel fortress' to defend Vietnam's sovereignty.^®

The presence of the PRC forces in the Paracels and the occupation of some Spratly Islands brought the Chinese threat much closer to the SRV. Vietnam's military strength in the Spratlys would be no match to that of the PRC. If the threat from China were to become more serious, there is a likelihood, Vietnam might permit the USSR to occupy one of the islands that is currently under its control in the Spratlys archipelago. That would make the situation in the Spratlys much more complicated.

(d) Philippine?.

The Spratly islands are also of strategic importance to the Philippines. During the Second World War, the Japanese used the islands as a staging ground for its invasion on the Philippines. Now, with the current insurgent problem in hand, if an unfriendly power were to occupy the islands, it would be easier to supply the insurgents with men and equipment further endangering the internal security of the Philippines. It was this fear, besides the desire to occupy potential petroleum sites that made the Philippines change its policy and annex some of the islands as part of its territory.

In April 1983, the Philippines reportedly had about 1,000 troops on its islands in the Spratlys and had also constructed an airstrip on the 75 acre Pagasa Island.^^ This airstrip could handle jet fighters and C-130 Hercules transports. It also has 9 bunkers, 40 mm anti-aircraft guns. 22 tanks, a radar system and a fresh water welL'^^ A supply plane flies in once a week.'^"' Philippines believes that it could invoke the 1954 Manila Pact to call for US assistance if its forces were attacked."^ ^

On 27 August 1988, Foreign Affairs Secretary, Raul Manglapus and Defence Secretary Fidel Ramos after a closed door meeting said that the Philippi nes could not match Malaysian forces around the Spratlys and they agreed to beef up naval forces around the Spratlys.Their response in this manner may be due to the arrest of Filipino fishermen in the Spratlys on 5 April 1988, the long misunderstanding over the claim to Sabah, and the proximity of the islands claimed by both nations.

(e) Malaysia.

The PRC claim also includes the few islands that Malaysia has occupied. Malaysia has always perceived the PRC as a potential threat to its national interests and security. In the past, the PRC supported the banned Malayan Communist Party. At the time of Confrontation, China strongly sided with Indonesia.

Looking at the development of events, and the manner the PRC has moved into the Paracels, and the Spratlys, Malaysia concluded that it would only be a matter of time before the PRC might move against Malaysian-claimed territory in the South China Sea. If the PRC were to occupy the islands in the south, it would bring China very close to East Malaysia. This could only add to Malaysia's fear, anxiety and threat perceptions, especially as communist insurgency still lingers along the Malaysian-Thai border. Also, communal tensions between Malay and Chinese populations is a major internal problem for Malaysia. The Malaysian government White Paper "Towards Preserving National Security" on 23 March, 1988 reported on the meeting in Peking between Malaysian radical students and Chin Peng, the Secretary-General of the Malayan 23 Communist Party.This miglit indicate that the Chinese still support illegal communist activities in Malaysia. This, in turn, could only add to the fear that China is Malaysia's long-term threat. This concern intensified with China's entrance into the Spratlys.

With this potential threat, the Malaysian defence procurement programme has been planned with the situation in the South China Sea in mind. On 1 February 1988, the Malaysian News Agency, Bernama reported that the Malayisan Navy would intensify its patrolling in the South China 4R Sea. Despite the effect of the recession in 1988, there are plans to buy 40 Skyhawk jet fighters, and the has ordered offshore patrol vessels costing M$100 million (US$42.6 million). The two vessels are small corvettes of 1,300 tons believed to be capable of patrolling the sea up to the limits of its exclusive economic zone.

Due to the recession, the government shelved its plan for an airforce base at Gong Kedah, on east coast of West Malaysia, which was estimated at M$1.4 billion. However, priority had been given to upgrade the Royal Malaysian Air Force base in Labuan, Sabah at a cost of M$20 million and to build a new base in Miri, Sarawak at a cost of M$350 million. Three F5E Rghters were moved to Labuan from Kuantan and they are expected to provide air cover for the commandoes stationed on the three Spratly reefs, while the Miri base is to provide air cover for the liquefied natural gas port of Bintulu and for future oil platforms and modules off Sabah and Sarawak. According to some sources, the Malaysian government planned to spend about M$350 million on maritime patrol aircraft to give the navy its own capability and about M$1 billion to purchase 20 multirole combat aircraft. And there are also plans to build an early-warning radar system in East Malaysia."^^ 24 Meanwhile, in September 1988, Malaysia ordered high-technology weapon systems and other arms from Britain for US$2.5 billion. The inventory included a squadron of eight multirole Tornado combat aircraft, two second-hand Oberon class submarines, medium-range artillery, naval helicopters, ground-to-air missiles. Its future purchasing list includes Rapier point air-defence missiles, six more submarines, three patrol boats, Lynx anti-submarine helicopters and a triservice communications package. Malaysia might also add more to its two squadrons of F5E fighters. A military delegation went to Taiwan to look into its F5E, which the Taiwan Air Force might discard. It had been reported that Malaysia had some minor skirmishes with Vietnam in the Spratlys."^®

(fV Brunei.

Brunei as a small, rich, conservative Malay nation in the region would be threatened, if the PRC were to extend its boundary up to the area that it presently claims. At the moment, Brunei is not a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). Nor does Brunei have any military alliance with any other nation. The Chinese threat may alter this situation as Brunei would fear Chinese expansion. It would either join the FPDA or would make defence arrangements with Indonesia, Malaysia or Britain.

(g). Incionegia.

The Indonesian island of Natuna is also claimed by the PRC.

Indonesia also has a problem related to territorial claims with SRV. The

Indonesian Air Force is already operating an airstrip in the area and has plans to build gas processing facilities.^^ Indonesia considers China the main long-term strategic threat to Southeast Asia.^^ The southward move of the PRC would cause some concern for Indonesia, although the Defence

Minister Benny Murdani said on 1 April 1988 that the Spratly dispute posed no threat to Indonesia. But, he was confident, due to the strategic 25 importance of the region, there would be a deterrent move against China from the superpowers.

Jusuf Wanandi, the Executive Director of Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, has commented that for the first time since 1974, the PRC was asserting itself in a military way in an area that was of vital concern to non-Communist countries.^'' In fact the Chinese move in the Spratlys had caused a setback in recent Indonesian moves to begin cordial relation with the PRC.

In an article in the Indonesian newspapers Merdeka and Indonesian Observer on 25 March 1988, Dr. R. Abdulgani, adviser to Indonesian President Suharto, wrote on the "illegal and unjust" character of the Chinese provocation in the Spratlys and on China's long-term plans in Southeast Asia. He stressed that China was causing new tensions which could upset peace and stability in Indochina and Southeast Asia and it was likely that China was testing its naval capability to see how well it could intrude into Indonesian waters and the Indian Ocean. He also said that Beijing's red dragon was spitting fire over the Spratlys and creating new tensions in Indochina and Southeast Asia.^^

Therefore, it is clear that Indonesia has concern over the situation in the Spratlys.

(b) Economic Significance. Petroleum is a substantial import and export commodity for the ASEAN countries. It forms 70% of Indonesian exports, 27% of Malaysia's and 99% of Brunei's. Thailand and Philippines are developing their own resources. Singapore is the second largest non-US refining centre. The low sulphur content of ASEAN petroleum is attractive to Japan and the US. The 26 ASEAN countries export their high quality petrol to other nations and import crude oil from the Persian Gulf for their own use. The ASEAN countries use the revenue from the sale of petroleum for their economic development which is urgently needed.^^

The earliest offshore well in Southeast Asia was drilled in 1957 by Dutch Shell on the North Borneo continental shelf. But the high cost and availability of onshore fields discouraged the interest in offshore fields and no significant discoveries were made until 1963. In 1969, completed surveys indicated convincing geological structures in the South China Sea (Figure 5). In early 1970s seismic studies indicated the prospect of potential petroleum in the continental shelf from Singapore to Seoul. The discovery of larger offshore resources in Brunei further activated exploration. By 1974, about 60 offshore sites were identified for drilling around the South China Sea. Many observers of the developments in the South China Sea region were of the opinion that one of the main causes of the scramble for the islands in the Spratlys was the prediction of the presence of large reserve of hydrocarbons since 1970. This desire was further inspired by the high prices in 1973 for petroleum that came with the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) boycott. Prior to 1974, an offshore well had to produce a minimum of 2,500 barrels per day (b/d) in a field capable of generating 50,000 b/d to be economically viable. By 1978, these figures were halved into 1,500 b/d and 25,000 b/d respectively. Despite the low volume, the rate of return on investment is almost guaranteed as there was an increase in the price of crude oil. This provided the impetus to look for new offshore production sites.^^

(a) Peoples' Republic of China.

The PRC is one of the most promising oil producers in Asia. It has an estimated reserve of about 100 billion barrels from all its sources and current total production is about 2 million barrels per day. For a long time FIGURE 5 - OIL FLASHPOINTS

SOURCE: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, I5 MARCH 1984 / 27 the PRC was dependent on its inland fields in the north for its petroleum needs. However, the onshore production has been decreasing at 5% a year since 1979, the consumption has been increasing. For instance in 1983 alone the increase of consumption was 4.3%.^^

The Soviet threat in the north, reminded China of the vulnerability of its oil fields in that area. Therefore, the PRC felt it should look for oil resources in the south, hence moved into the islands of the South China Sea, especially when the RVN offered contracts to foreign companies. In June 1974, the PRC decided to explore for off-shore fields. In 1975, the South China Sea emerged as another potential source of petroleum. In 1976, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) geological survey forecast prospects in the South China Sea basin. Chinese exploration confirmed this and the South China Sea program became a major element in its 'four modernisation' development plan. Beijing is counting on the export of petroleum to gain the hard currency needed to buy western goods and technology.

On 26 September 1979, the PRC issued a declaration that the Spratlys were Chinese territories and any encroachment on the islands for exploitation or any other activity undertaken by any foreign country as 'illegal and impermissible.'^^ The warning has been repeated many times subsequently.

On 17 September 1982, the PRC announced that it planned to conduct geological surveys around the Spratlys.^^ On 5 March 1984, the Beijing Review reported that general oil exploration was being conducted in 30,000 sq. km. in the western part of the South China Sea. Twenty-seven petroleum companies from eight countries were operating in nine Sino-foreign cooperation zones and at least nine drilling vessels and more than twenty support ships were involved.^^ 28

On 24 July 1987, the Chinese magazine, Kexue Bao (Science News) reported that Chinese scientists had discovered 'rich oil and gas reserves' in the Spratlys areas, especially near the Zengmu Shoals during a survey carried out by the research ships, Experiment 1, 2 and 3 in April and May

1987.^^ On 22 December 1988, Xinhua reported that the Chinese scientists had discovered rich oil, minerals and aquatic resources on the Spratlys.

The reserves included 25 billion cubic meters of gas, 105 billion barrels of oil and 370,000 tons of phosphorous. A large basin of more than 90,000 sq. km in the northwest Zengmu Reef of the continental shelf was discovered to have an estimated oil reserve of 91 billion barrels.^^

(b) Philippines.

The Philippines is also dependent on imported petrol and desperately needs local sources. It was the potential discovery of petroleum that motivated the Philippines to move and occupy the Kalayaan islands.

Oil exploration in the Philippines began in 1970 off the northwest coast of Palawan Island. In March 1971, test drillings had begun in an area 50 miles west of Palawan Island. In July, these test drilling operations confirmed the likelihood of off-shore oil. It is this discovery off Palawan that made the Philippines look for offshore fields. Then, in 11

March 1976, the first commercial field was discovered in the Nido Complex area about 35 miles from Palawan. Later, two other fields were discovered nearby at Cadloc and Matinloc. In June 1976, two months after the discovery at the Nido Complex, the Philippines, with a Swedish company, began drilling in the Spratly archipelago. Oil was subsequently discovered in the in an area claimed by the PRC^^ and developed by Manila despite protests from Hanoi and Peking.^^ By 1979, approximately 9 offshore wells were producing oil on the Palawan continental shelf with a 29 despite protests from Hanoi and Peking.^^ By 1979, approximately 9 offshore wells were producing oil on the Palawan continental shelf with a projected annual output of 9.1 million barrels or 1.3 metric tons. In short, by mid-1970s, the Philippines claim to Kalayaan was thoroughly interwined with the scramble for off-shore oil in the region.^^

(c) Vietnam.

In Vietnam, the search for petroleum in the South China Sea began in 1971. On the advice of the Vietnam Petrol Corporation, the RVN and later the SRV moved into the islands to capture the potential petrol deposits on the advice of the Vietnam Petrol Corporation. In 1971, eighteen exploration blocks were mapped for international bidding off the east and southeast coast of South Vietnam. Political pressure delayed drilling until 1973. At this time, the RVN adopted low profile in its oil activities to appease

American anti-war sentiments. On 20 July 1973, Saigon officially announced the awarding of eight oil exploration contracts to Shell, Exxon,

Mobil and Sunningdale. The companies went into drilling operations immediately. In early 1974, Shell officially announced that a well drilled in Block 08 had begun to flow at a rate of 2,200 barrels per day. At the same time, Mobil announced that a well drilled in Block 04 was flowing at

2,400 barrels per day. Both were on the western edges of the Spratlys. The discovery confirmed the probability of commercially viable fields.^ ^

However, these contracts were declared null and void by the Provisional

Revolutionary Government (PRG), when it came to power. On 16 March

1975, the PRG published a map showing the Spratlys as its territory. Four days later a Soviet geological team under the Vice Minister of Geology, V.A.

Yarmoluk arrived in Hanoi to assess the offshore oil potential around the 6 islands occupied by Vietnam in the Spratlys.^^

In 1977, the SRV awarded exploration leases to a three-company 30 consortium composed of Bow Valley (Canada), AGIP (the oil exploration subsidiary of Italy's EN! group) and Deminex (West Germany). Until December 1979, they drilled about five wells but none produced oil.

In July, 1979 two foreign owned oil rig supply vessels, Alexanderturm and Nordertov were fired on by a Vietnamese gunboat off the coast of Vietnam.^^ On 27 September 1979, one day after the PRC reasserted its claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands, Hanoi declared that any activities by any foreign country to occupy, explore, survey and exploit the Spratlys would be illegal.^ ^

In May 1980, the SRV awarded major rights to the USSR to tap the offshore oil deposits in the southern region of Vietnam. In July, it entered a formal agreement with Moscow to cooperate in exploration of oil and gas on Vietnam's southern continental shelf in the area adjacent to the Spratlys. As a member of Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for Communist bloc nations (COMECON), Vietnam also signed agreements with the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to aid in its surveys for oil.^®

On 26 September 1982, the SRV warned foreign companies undertaking operations near the Spratlys and other areas that the area belonged to the SRV, and it would not tolerate such activities without its permission and they would be responsible for the conquences. This warning in fact came as a result of knowing that China had engaged international oil companies to prospect for oil and gas in the area.^^ In June, 1983, Vietnamese gunboats forced a French operated drilling rig to move east several kilometers/^ In January 1987, the SRV reiterated its previous warning. 31 The SRV is dependent for about 90% of its petroleum upon the Soviet supplies from the Black Sea and it is said that has caused some irritation among other allies of the USSR. Thus, there is enormous incentive and urgency for the SRV to find its own local supply with the help of the Soviets.

(d) Malaysia. Unlike other nations, Malaysia was already involved in offshore exploration in the South China Sea, both on the northeast of Sarawak and east of peninsular Malaysia, before the oil resources in the Spratly islands became an incentive to make claims over the islands. The suggestion that large reserves of petroleum might be found in the offshore region is one of the reasons that led Malaysia to occupy the islands. The Tsengmu (James) Shoal area off Sarawak is an area of potential supply which falls within the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Malaysia but the area is also claimed by the PRC as its territory. According to Petronas, Malaysia's national petroleum company, in 1983 there were 44 gas fields and 44 oil fields in the arc running along Malaysia's coastline from west to east and within the EEZ.^"' Like other countries, Malaysia utilizes the revenue from petroleum for its economic development.

Therefore, the actual and potential offshore oil reserves in the South China Sea, especially around the Spratlys after 1976 have become an important factor for the scramble of territories, adding significantly to the tension in the area. 32 Footnote?^. 1.JDW, 25 May 1985. 2. Belluck, Pam," Free For All Islands", Nation, 23 May 1987. 3. Samuels. Marwyn S., Contest For The South China Sea, Methuen, New York, 1982. p. 3. 4. FBIS-EAS-88-038 26 February 1988. p. 45. 5. Samuels, nu- oil., p.3. 6.Questions on notice for Defence Minister Kim Beazley, reprinted in DFA Backgrounder, No. 478, 15 May 1985. 7. Jara, Manola B., "Boundary Disputes In South China Sea", Business Times (Kuala Lumpur), 2 May 1983. 8. The Kalayaan Islands, Serial One, Monograph No. 4, Ministry of Defence Philippines, Development Academy of the Philippines Press, 1982. p. 7. 9. Katchen, Martin H., "The Spratly Islands And The Law of the Sea: Dangerous Grounds For Asian Peace", Asian Survey, Vol.xviii No. 12. p. 1171. 10. The Kalayaan Islands, QSL-oil-, p. 11. 11. Samuels, Qsi. oil., p. 139. 12. Ibid. 13. Newsweek, 4 March 1974. 14. Pao-min, Chang, "Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", Manuscript in Thayer Collection, Q^. cii., p. 83. 15."China reinforces South China Sea Islands?", JDW, 14 July 1984. 16. Richarson, Michael, " Eyewitness at the dragon's mouth", PDR, June 1983. 17. The Age, 4 June 1984. 18. Fisher, Richard D., "Brewing Conflict In The South China Sea", Backgrounder, Asia Studies Centre, Heritage Foundation, Washington, 25 October 1984. 19. Strategy Week, July 19-25, 1982, Vol. viii. No. 28 No.112. 20. PDR, May 1985. p. 13. 33 21. Jenkins, David, "A Bloody Island Grab In The South China Sea", Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May 1988. p. 13.

22. FEER, 17 March 1988. p. 24. 23. Gushing, Jerry., "The Dragon's Long Reach. China Flexes Its Muscles In The Spratlys At Hanoi's Expense", FEER, 15 May 1988. 24. Greene, Dorian D., "Chinese Stratregy In The South China Sea", Defence and Foreign Affairs, October/November 1988. p. 38. 25. FEER, 17 March 1988. p. 24. 26. SWB FE/8665 A 3/2 5 September 1987. 27. Pao-min, Chang, " The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", Asian Pacific Community", Spring 1980, No. 8 p. 134. 28. Loa. ^lii. 29. Hann, Bradley, "Maritime Dangers In The South China Sea", PDR, May 1985. p. 15.

30. Pao-min, Chang, "Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", q^. oil., p. 31. Kelfors, Sheliah Ocampo, "Easing Toward Conflict", FEER, 28 April 1983. 32. FEER, 29 September 1983. 33. Richardson, Michael, "Watch On The Spratlys", PDR, September 1984. p. 9. 34. Pao-min, manuscript in Thayer Collection, q^i. iiii., p. 84. 35. Mi., p. 85. 36. Ml., p. 86. 37. Fisher, Ricard D., "Brewing Conflict In The South China Sea", Backgrounder, Asia Studies Centre, Heritage Foundation, Washington, 25 October 1984. p. 9. 38. FEER, 21 June 1984. 39. FBIS -ASIA & PACIFIC, 2 May 1989. P. K. 14. 40. Kelfors, qH. 41. World Report, Vol. 2. No. 12, 18 April 1988. p.3. 42. Belluck, Pam, "Free For All Islands", Nation, 23 May 1987.. 34 43. Valencia, Mark, "Oil In The Trouble Water", FEER, 15 March 1984. p. 31

44. SWB FE/0242 A 3/7 29 August 1988. 45. FBIS -EAS-88-169 31 August 1988. p. 73. 46. FBIS -EAS-88-064 4 April 1988. p. 29. 47. PDR May 1988. p. 6. 48. FEER, 29 September 1983. p. 41. 49. FEER, 6 October 1988. 50. Fisher, QSI. QH., p. 5. 51. SWB FE/8609 A3/3 2 July 1987. 52. PDR, May 1988. p. 5. 53. FBIS -EAS-88-068 8 April 1988. p. 51. 54. Fisher, p. 6. 55. Samuels, Qii. p. 164. 56. Fisher, iiit., p. 6. 57. Pao-min, Chang, QH., p. 82. 58. FEER, 17 August 1982. p. 8. 59. PDR, May 1988. p. 6. 60.Xinhua , 22 December 1987. 61. Katcher, o^. oil., p. 71. 62. Fisher, OD.- Oil-, P- 43. 63. Samuels, QSL. cil., p. 92. 64. Mi., p.99. 65. Newspaper cutting, 4 January 1988, Thayer Collection, Paracels and Spratly Islands folder. 66. Melinda Lau, Lauriat George, FEER, 28 September 1979. p. 19. 67. Pao-min, manuscript in Thayer Collection, QSI. ^lii., p. 84. 68. Melinda Lau, Q^. cii. p. 69. Canberra Times, 27 September 1982. 70. Fisher, QSL. oil., p. 71. Das K. " Perched On A Claim", FEER, 29 September 1983. p, 40. 36 4 THE CLAIMANTS AND THE BASIS

OF THEIR CLAIMS.

As noted earlier, there are many claimants to the Spratlys -the Peoples' Republic of China, Republic of China, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia. France.There are also two individuals, namely Morton F. Meads'" and Tomas Cloma, who have advanced claims. The different claimants use different names to describe the islands (Figure 6). Currently the most important claimants are the first five and the following discussion will focus on their claims.

(a^ Reoublic of China.

Both the ROC and the PRC claim the whole Spratly island group based on Chinese history. At the moment, the ROC only occupies the Itu Aba island. Following World War II, with the defeat of the Japanese, the ROC moved into the Spratlys in July 1946. In accordance with the directive of the Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, the ROC was given the task to occupy all the areas north of latitude 16° North. There was no mention to whom the former Japanese possession should be given. This directive obviously excluded the Spratlys as they lie south of the latitude 16° North. However, in the course of accepting the surrender of the Japanese, the ROC also received the surrender of the Japanese troops that were occupying the Spratlys. It received the surrender of the Japanese forces there and took over what was left by the Japanese forces -a submarine base, a narrow garage railway, barracks, warehouse, a power plant and fresh water wells.^ Figure 6 pCCUPIED ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Chinese Name Filipino Presently Siandard Name (Pinyin) Vietnamese Name Name Claimed by Occupied by

Paracel Islands Xisha Qundao Quan Dao Hoang Sa China, Vietnam Beijing Praias Island Dongslia Qundao China Taipei Spraily Islands Nansha Qundao Quan Dao Truong Sa Kalayaan China, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam'' ^ Anbo Shazhou Dao An Bang Kalantiyaw China, Malaysia, Philippines, Hanoi Vietnam Commodore Reef* Siling Jiao Rizal Reef China, Mala)sia, Philippines, Manila Vietnam Flat Island Antang Dao Patag China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila Iiu Aba Taiping Dao Dao Thai Binh Ligaw China, Philippines, Vietnam Taipei Lankiam Cay Yangxin Zhou Panata China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila Loaita Nanyue Dao Dao Loai Ta Kuta China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila Namyit Hangxue Dao Dao Nam Ai Bingago China, Philippines, Vietnam Hanoi Nanshan Mahuan Dao Lawak China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila Beizi Jiao Doa Song Tu Dong Parola China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila Pearson Reef liisheng Dao Hi/on China, Philippines, Vietnam Hanoi Bailan Jiao Dao Son Ca China, Philippines, Vietnam Hanoi Sin Cowe Jinghong Cao Dao Sin Tonh Rurok China. Philippines, Vietnam Hanoi Soiiihwest Cay Nanzi Jiao Dao Song Tu Tay Pugad China, Philippines, Vietnam Hanoi Spraily Island Nanwei Dao Dao Truong Sa Lagos China, Vietnam Hanoi Danwan Jiao China; Malaysia. Philippines, Kuala Lumpur Vietnam Thitu Zhongyc Dao Dao Thi Tu Pagasa China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila West York. Xiyuc Dao Dao Ben Lac Likas China, Philippines, Vietnam Manila

SoUKCC.—Fmr Emtem Eronomie Rrrinr, April 28. 1983. 'MaLiy^un name it riiUii Kccil Aiiib>>yna. ^(niiiia, Mj|j)'vij, niilippiiici. ;iii)l Viciiiani cbim ill or part of the Four Gaim Area (Spraily Itlandi). 'Mjb)-iun name it 'rrriiml>ii ijkuiiiaiia. ''.Matipun name it 1'cruMibu l^pnK l^jranf. 37 When Nationalist China returned the control of North Vietnam to France in March 1946, the status of the islands were not mentioned.^ On 27 July, on knowing the movement of some French ships, the ROC Navy sent a battleship on patrol to the South China Sea and to take possession of the Spratly Islands. Besides some American ships, it found a small French task force and Vietnamese on a number of islands. In October 1946, a French battleship named the Chevreud was reported to have landed crews on the Spratly Island and Itu Aba Island."^ The crew placed a marker on Itu Aba Island, which recorded the 1933 French occupation of the Spratlys and the renewal of French authority on 5 October 1946. The French action prompted the ROC to send two ships Tai-ping and Chung-yeh to occupy Itu Aba Island.^ On 1 December 1947, the ROC announced the incorporation of the Spratlys with the Kwangtung Province and said the actual administration would be under the 'Tung-Hsi Nansha Archipelagoes Administration District', temporarily under the command of the Chinese Navy. To implement this decision, on 12 December 1947, the first Chinese naval administrator for the Spratlys arrived on Itu Aba Island. At this time, there was no protest from France as it was fighting the Vietminh in Indochina. With the emergence of Vietnam as an independent nation and the withdrawal of France from Indochina in 1954-55, France's direct interest in the Spratlys came to an end.

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in September, 1951, Japan relinquished its claim over the islands in the South China Sea. However, Japan's renunciation did not devolve the islands to anyone. Having failed to gain entry to the San Francisco Peace Conference, the ROC negotiated a separate treaty with Japan on 29 April 1952. Article 2 of this Treaty, was almost synonymous with that of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 2 of the ROC-Japanese Treaty stated:^ 38

It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951, Japan had renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Peng-hu (Pescadores) as well as the Paracel Islands.

After this the ROC official view has been that Japan had renounced the islands in favour of the ROC.

In 1950, with the loss of mainland China to the Communists, the ROC withdrew itself from the Spratlys. From May 1950 to July 1956, the ROC base on the Itu Aba Island was abandoned. With this withdrawal, the Spratlys were effectively deserted, but the islands were continually used by fishermen from Hainan, Vietnam and other areas.^ On 15 May 1956, the Filipino 'explorer', Tomas Cloma announced that he had discovered the island group and claimed his 'Kingdom of Freedomland'. Immediately, there were protest notes from the ROC, the PRC and Vietnam to Manila.^ This prompted the ROC to dispatch a naval force on 1 June to exert its jurisdiction over the islands. From 1 June to 24 September, three different ROC task force units were sent on patrol to reclaim the Spratlys for the ROC. The earliest arrived on 5 June off the North Danger Reef. After a complete circuit of the archipelago, it returned and reported the presence of no one. However, it recorded some 20 signs left by Japanese fishermen, 4 notices by Cioma's group and another 10 written in English but of unclear origin, and some 11 signs written in Chinese in favour of the PRC. They dismantled them and replaced them with that of ROC. After patrolling the area, the ROC forces returned to Taiwan. 39 The ROC naval fleet paid another visit in July 1956. There were no sign of Cloma or his men. At this time, they deposited a few soldiers and established a garrison on Itu Aba Island. The ROC flag was raised on 11 July. Taiwanese crews were dispatched to construct prefabricated housing units. Additional water wells were opened and a base was established for operation.^ On 24 September, a resupply mission left Taiwan and reached the Itu Aba Island on 28 September. While on the way back on 1 October, the fleet came into contact with one of Cloma's ships, PMl-IV off North Danger Shoals. The ROC navy after snatching their armaments, released the crew after a warning not to interfere with the ROC territories any more.

Following this incident, the ROC incorporated Itu Aba Island as part of the ROC. Later on, when the Phillippines announced its claim over the islands, the ROC reacted by returning to the Spratlys to exert its authority and from then started to strengthen its position. The island was also used as a fishing base and is governed through the Kaohsiung Municipality in southern Taiwan."'^

Fearing the PRC, in October 1963, Taiwan sent a large resupply and reconnaisance task force to Itu Aba Island. Representatives from the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and the ROC Navy inspected all the major islands and the garrison on the Itu Aba Island was reinforced. Following this, a routine patrol system was established. Throughout 1960s, ROC teams were dispatched to occupy and erect boundary markers on Thi Tu, Nam Yit and other islands.'' Taipei also announced that a regular mail delivery system had been established. In 1973, when Saigon moved into and annexed some of the Spratly islands into the Phuoc Tuy province, ROC lodged a protest. 40 In 1971, Philippines accused the ROC of firing on a Philippines vessel. Later, it called upon the ROC to withdraw from the Itu Aba Island as it was established without the consent of the Allied Powers. Taipei announced its refusal to withdraw and denied that any ROC patrol craft had fired on the Philippines vessel. On 12 July 1971, it sent a formal note of protest to Manila reiterating the ROC's sovereignty over the whole Spratlys.''^ In September 1973, when Saigon included the Spratlys into the Phuoc Tuy Province , ROC again lodged a protest."* ^

Following the defeat of the Vietnamese in the Paracels by the PRC, the ROC reinforced its garrison in the Spratlys, as it expected PRC to attack its position there. The fear was also increased as at that time there was closer US-PRC rapport. The ROC soldiers had been given directives that if they were to meet the soldiers of the Philippines or the SRV, they should try to mediate first, while on the sighting of any PRC soldiers, they should shoot first. In February 1978, according to the Philippines, the ROC had about 600 troops on Itu Aba."*"^ On 1 June 1983, the ROC restated its claim over the Spratlys. ^

With the rise of tensions in 1988, on 29 February, Chen Yu-chu, a spokesman of the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Spratlys were part of the ROC and the government would never drop its claim to sovereignty, despite the claims of other nations. Meanwhile, Major-General Chang Hui-yum said that the vigilance of the armed forces of the ROC had been heightened to observe the Chinese vessels operating near the Spratlys.^

The displacement of the SRV from some of the Spratly islands by the PRC on 14th March, 1988 obviously increased-the anxiety 41 of the ROC. On 15 March, ROC troops were placed on full alert to face any challenge.''^ On 17 March, Ting Mao-shih, the Foreign Minister of the ROC reiterated that the Spratlys belonged to the ROC and its claim was indisputable. He also said the existence of the ROC garrison on the Itu Aba Island since 1946 fully justified its territorial claims."'®

On 23 March, Cheng Wei-yuan, the Defence Minister of the ROC said that ROC's troops stationed in the Spratlys would do whatever necessary to defend national territory against invasion. He also said that China, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia were all jockeying to control the Spratlys. Foreign Minister, Ting Mao-shih said that from the viewpoint of both international law and history, the Spratly Islands belonged to the ROC."'^

On the same day, Taiwan's Defence Minister, Cheng Wei-yuen reportedly told a secret meeting of the Legislative Yuan members that in case there was battle for the Spratlys, Taiwan would help China against Vietnam as the islands were Chinese territories. This marked a radical change in ROC's attitude towards the PRC in relation to the Spratlys.

On 22 August 1988, it was reported that a Taiwan task force (warship numbers 915, 927 and the like) successfully completed a cruise mission to the Spratlys. The task force had also conducted a surface hunt-and-attack military manoeuvre, code-named 'Dingyuan' in the Bashi Channel.^^

On 26 August, Chen Yu-chu, the Foreign Minister of the ROC, reaffirmed Taiwan's claim over the Spratlys and said that a unilateral claim by any foreign country over the islands would not change this fact. This was said in response to the report that the Philippines was 42 planning to publish a new map that included the Spratlys as its territory.^

Taiwan Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated its sovereignty over the Spratlys on 29 September and again on 10 October. On these occasions Taiwan said that those islands occupied by neighbouring countries would be recovered by whatever means necessary at an appropriate moment.^^

On 3 July 1989, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Hsu Shui-teh, Taiwan's Interior Minister, had vowed to erect stone markers in the Spratlys by the end of 1989.^^

Once again on 14 July, Chen Yu-chu, the Foreign Minister of the ROC, reaffirmed Taiwan's sovereignty over the islands. He said the sovereignty could not be changed by a unilateral decision by any other party as the Spratlys and the adjacent waters belonged to the ROC. This was an indisputable fact in his opinion. He recalled that in the past the ROC had stated many times that it was the only country that had legitimate sovereignty over the Spratlys. This statement was made in response to the resolution by Vietnamese State Council that included the Spratlys and adjacent waters as Vietnamese territory.There have been no reported incidents between ROC and any other nation's claiming the Spratlys.

(b). Peoples' Republic of China. The PRC claims that all the islands in the South China Sea are its legitimate territories, as for centuries the South China Sea was a Chinese lake (Figure 7 and 8 ). China adheres to the notion that it has the sole right over this vast expanse of water, extending just under 2,000 km south of Hong Kong encompassing the Spratlys.^^ Chinese 100°

125°

0 100 200 300 400 SOO Milei Chinese claim area 1 . -I • I H—^ h 1 0 100 200 300 400 500 Kilometres

Figure 7 The Southern Sea (785-1644)

Source: Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea Methuen, New york, 1982. "-ft" iuu ' . jiuu' ~30cr -auo • 500 -M«t«s — Chinese claim area I—•-'T—H r 1 T— 0 100 200 -300 400 SOO -Kilomelfju

Figure 8 The Southern Sea (1730-1884)

Source: Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea Methuen, New York, 1982. 43 claims are based on discovery, exploration, occupation and usage. It claims that since the second century BC, from the time of Emperor Wu Di of the Han Dynasty, Chinese explorers, fishermen and others had been using the South China Sea and after long years of navigation they had discovered the Spratlys.^^

The Chinese fishermen conducted their business on Shuangzijiao, Xiyere, Nanwei, Taiping and Zhongye islands. There, they built temples, wells and graves of Chinese fishermen on these islands.^^The geographical features of the Spratlys along with the Paracels has been described in Nan Zhou Yi Wu Zhi ( Strange Things of the Southern Provinces) by Wan Zhen and Fu Nan Zhuan (An account of Fu Nan) by Kang Tai. Both these documents were written in the Three Kingdoms period (220-265).

China says that Chinese discovered the islands, after surmounting all kinds of difficulties. It also claims that their voyages to the Spratlys and their productive activities on the islands for more than 1,000 years were recorded in: Meng Liang Lu (Record of a Day Dreamer) of the Song Dynasty, Dao Yi Zhi Lue (Brief Accounts of the Islands) of the Yuan Dynasty, Dong Xi Yang Kao (Studies on Oceans East and West) and Shun Feng Xiang Song (Fair Winds for Escort) of the Ming Dynasty, Zhi nan Zheng Fa (Compass Directions), Hai Guo Wen Jian Lu (Records of Things Seen and Heard About the Coastal Regions) of the Qing Dynasty and Geng Lu Bu (Manuals of Sea Routes) by fishermen of various generations. In these works, the Spratlys along with the Paracels were variously named as Jiuruluozhou (nine isles of cowry), Shitang (rocky reefs), Qianlishitang (thousand-// rocky reefs), Wanlishitang (ten thousand-// rocky reefs), Changsha (long sand cays), Qianlichangsha (thousand-// sand cays). The numerous islands, reefs. 44 sand cays and banks of the Spratlys (and the Paracels) were given many descriptive names.

China also claims that not only did it explore and develop the

Spratlys but successive governments exercised jurisdictions over them.

During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the officially completed local chronicles Guong dong Jong Zhi, Qiongzhoufu Zhi and Wanzhou Zhi recorded that Wanzhou covers Qianlichangsha (thousand-// sand cays) and Wanlishitang (ten thousand-// rocky reefs). China claims that these demonstrate the Spratlys were under the administration of Wanzhou of

Qiangzhou Prefecture (now Wanning and Lingshui Counties, Hainan

Island), Guangdong Province.

China also bases its claim on the fact that these islands were also listed in many official maps, such as Huang Qing Ge Zhi Sheng Fen

Tu (Map of the Provinces Directly Under the Imperial Qing Authority) made in the 20th year of Qianlong (1755), Da Qing Wan Nian Yi Tang Di Li

Quan Tu (Map of the Eternally Unified Great Qing Empire) made in the

15th year of Jiaqing (1810) and Da Qing Yi Tong Tian Xia Quan Tu (Map of the Unified Territory of the Great Qing Empire) made in the 22nd year of Jiaqing (1817).

Based on these historical records, China claims that it was the first to discover, develop and administer the Spratlys. Consecutive jurisdiction was exercised over the islands by successive Chinese governments for more than 1,000 years, hence the Chinese are the indisputable owners of the Spratlys.

China also claims that in the 9th year of the reign of Guangxu

(1883), when Germany carried out surveys on the Spratlys, they were stopped under the pressure of the Qing Dynasty. Some consider this 45 event as the first implicit Chinese claim to the Spratlys but that it did not represent an unequivocal statement of sovereignty.^^

The earliest official Chinese claim on the islands of South China Sea and the first international agreement came as part of the Convention respecting the Delimitation of the Frontier between China and Tonkin as a result of Sino-French War of 1884-5 signed on 26 June 1887. China had argued that as a result of that Convention, the Spratlys were part of China and was recognised by France as such.

There are no further recorded claims to Chinese sovereignty until 1931, when France challenged China's claim. In 1933. when France occupied the islands, China protested. It said at that time, China was threatened by Japanese imperialism, and was unable to prevent the French occupation. In 1946, the islands fell to the Japanese.

Besides it records, China also produced many publications and archaelogical evidence and maps and atlasses printed by foreign countries to document its claims. According to China, many world atlasses published showed the Spratlys and other South China Sea islands as Chinese territories. The PRC also claimed that books published in Britain, Japan, West Germany, France and United States also listed the presence of Chinese people on those islands and had indicated that the area from the Spratlys to the was Chinese territory.^^ It further claimed that Vietnam's historical records confirm that the islands belonged to China. It claims that official maps published by Vietnam had marked the Spratlys as part of Chinese territory. It cited for example, the world map published by the Map Department of the General Staff of Vietnam Peoples Army in 1960 which marked the Spratlys in Vietnamese language as Nansha Islands (China). Vietnamese maps published by the Vietnamese Department of 46 Cartography in May 1964, world maps printed in May 1972, and the second edition of the world political maps printed in March 1974 by the Vietnamese National Survey and Drawing Bureau marked the Spratlys as 'Nansha Islands' and not as Truong Sa.' A lesson on China In a ninth grade geographic text book published by Vietnam Educational Printing House in 1974 says "the arc made up by the Nansha and the Xisha islands, Hainan Island, Taiwan and Penghu Islands and the Zhousha Islands form a great wall to protect the Chinese mainland." There were also other similar descriptions in earlier Vietnamese text books.^^

On August 5, 1951, on seeing the US/UK Draft Treaty of the San Francisco Conference, the Foreign Minister of PRC, Chou En Lai declared:

whether or not the US/UK Draft Treaty contains provisions on this subject, and no matter how these provisions were worded, the inviolable sovereignty of the PRC over the Spratly and Paracel will not be in any way affected.^

In the September 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, due to the controversy of the legitimacy of Chinese representation, both PRC and the ROC did not attend. Article 2 of the 2nd Chapter of the San Francisco Treaty specified that the Japanese renounced all right, title and claim to the islands in the Pacific and Antarctic, Spratly and the Paracels archipelago.^^ No nation was indicated as the recipient of the islands of South China Sea.

At the Conference, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Andrei Gromyko pointed out that the Spratlys and the Paracels were China's 'inalienable territory'.^^ The Soviet Union brought an 47 amendment to the Article 2, so that the PRC could receive them. The proposed amendment by the Soviet Union was:^"^

Japan recognises full sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the Penlinletao Islands (Pescadores), the Tunshatsuntao (Pratas Islands), as well as over the Islands of Sishatsuntao and Chunshatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of Amphitrites, and the shoal of Maxfield [sic ]), and the Nanshatsuntao Islands including the Spratlys, and renounces all right, title and claim to the territories named herein.

The amendment was proposed clearly for the benefit of the PRC as at that time the PRC was one of the closest allies of the Soviet Union. The proposal was defeated on a vote of 46 to 3 with 1 abstention and the original wording retained. Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union did not sign the final document.

Since the San Francisco Peace Conference, the PRC had adopted different measures to exert its sovereignty over the Spratlys. In most occasions it issued warnings and reminders in response to claims made by other countries. In March 1988, it resorted to military means to exert its claim against Vietnam. On other occasions, it carried out unilateral activities such as patrolling, conducting studies, taking administrative and legislative measures to incorporate the Spratlys.

Amongst the other claimants, it was Vietnam posed the most challenge over its claim. Hence, at most occasions, it had reacted to Vietnam, compared to other countries. In September 1973, when the RVN announced the incorporation of the Spratlys with the Phuoc Tuy 48 province, the PRC immediately issued its protest and reaffirmed that it has indisputable sovereignty over all the islands and natural resources around them.^^

On 4 February 1974, when the RVN moved into the Spratlys, Peking issued a stern warning that it would not tolerate Saigon's encroachment on Chinese territories in the Spartlys. On 28 November 1982, In response to the SRV claim over the Spratlys, China reminded that in the past Vietnamese leaders had acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys. It accused Vietnam of trying to annex Chinese territory and reaffirmed that the Spratlys are Chinese sacred territory.^ ®

On 15 April 1987, the PRC warned the SRV that it had illegally invaded the Baojio Island in the Spratlys and that China would use force to retrieve the island. Beijing demanded the SRV withdraw all its troops from all the islands^^ and claimed that it reserved the right to recover the islands at an appropriate time.^® Two days later, China reminded Vietnam that there was no reason why it should remain in the Spratlys. Peking has warned that if Hanoi refused to listen to the warning, it would have 'to reap what it has sown'.^^

On 17 June 1987, in reaction to Vietnam's Foreign Ministry's statement about the Chinese naval patrolling from 16 May to 6 June, China replied that the Spratlys always has been its sacred territory and China has indisputable sovereign rights over them and the adjacent waters. It further warned Vietnam that it was Vietnam that had illegally occupied China's Spratlys and should withdraw from them.^^

On 22 February 1988, Vietnam protested to China over the presence of its naval vessels near the Spratlys. In response, China said 49 that the vessels were around the Spratlys which were Chinese territory and that China has indisputable sovereignty over those islands.'^"' On 2

March 1988, Vietnam was warned that if it disregarded the Chinese position in the Spratlys, it would have to bear responsibility for all the consequences that would result from any conflict. Finally on 14 March, both countries clashed in the Spratlys. In relation to the clash, China insisted that the Chinese vessels were in its territorial waters and that it was Vietnam which illegally intruded into Chinese sea water in the Spratlys and attacked the Chinese vessels that were carrying out normal activities. The Chinese vessels were forced to counter attack in self-defence."^^ In its protest note to Vietnam, China expressed its indignation against Vietnam's acts and demanded Vietnam to withdraw from the Spratlys immediately."^^

On 23 March 1988, China sent another note to Vietnam and once again reiterated its indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and indicated that it was not keen to hold talks with Vietnam in relation to Spratlys.^^ It also demanded that Vietnam withdraw from the Spratlys and stop all its provocative activities in the area. On 5 April, China demanded that Vietnam stop its invasion and occupation of any island in the Spratlys and should withdraw immediately."^^

On 11 May 1988, when Vietnam protested over China's survey around the Spratlys, China said that the survey was conducted within the Chinese territory and Vietnam had no right to interfere.On 1

December 1988, in response to Vietnam-Philippines foreign ministers communique to settle the Spratlys issue, China said all discussions by any other countries on the Spratlys would be an act in disregard to

China's territorial sovereignty. It called upon Vietnam to withdraw from all the islands and atolls it had unlawfully taken. 50 On 21 May 1988, in response to the statement by Vietnamese Navy Chief that Vietnam's sea territory include the Spratlys. China said that this claim ran counter to the hope for improved relations between the two nations.Later on, when Vietnam celebrated the 14th anniversary ceremony of the liberation of the Spratlys with visits by key Vietnamese officials, China warned that such activities were a flagrant provocation of Chinese sovereignty. It demanded that Vietnam stop immediately such activities.^^

On 13 July 1988, in response to Vietnam's move to incorporate the Spratlys into the Khanh Hoa Province, China reminded Vietnam the move would be absolutely illegal, null and void."^^

Besides Vietnam, China also warned other claimants. On 16 July 1971, when the Philippines moved into the Spratlys, the PRC protested against the Philippines' claim and reasserted China's sovereignty over all the island-atolls in the South China Sea.

On 27 November 1987, in response to the claims by Jose Ingles, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and Leticia Ramos Shahani, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee of the Philippines, that the Philippines has sovereign rights over the Spratlys, the PRC stated that a small group of people in the Philippines were trying by legislative means to take Chinese territory. It stated that such acts were 'illegal and invalid which the Chinese people will never tolerate'. It also recalled when diplomatic relations were established between Philippines and China in 1975, the two governments agreed that the relationship should be based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and disputes over territory should be solved through friendly consultations at a suitable time. It also 51 recalled that the attitude of those who claimed the Spratlys would be

detrimental to Sino-Philippines relations.^^

On 2 December 1987, in response to Raul Manglapus,

Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs statement that the Spratlys

are part of Philippines, and the issue could not be settled through

negotiation, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that

the Spratlys have always been an inalienable part of the Chinese

territory and the stance of China on this matter had been stated on

many occasions. He also restated that any attempt to occupy the islands

by any country by means of occupation, legislation or delimitation 'are

illegal and null and void'.^^

In similar fashion, the PRC also reacted to Malaysia over its

claim to a few islands. In May 1980, in response to Malaysia's inclusion

of certain Spratlys islands in its national map, China in a diplomatic

note to Malaysia said that unilateral demarcation without negotiating

with China was a violation of Chinese sovereignty.^^ In late September

1983 when the Malaysian troops occupied the Swallow Reef (Dan Jiao in

Chinese) the PRC called it illegal.

Apart from verbal warnings and declarations, the PRC has

also exerted its rights by many unilateral activities. On 4 September

1958, it proclaimed a territorial sea of 12 nm and stipulated the use of

the straight base line method to delimit the boundary. The straight base

line method, if applied would make the South China Sea into a Chinese

lake, and the Spratlys Chinese territory.^^

Since 1958, all official maps of the PRC show the Chinese boundary extending into the oceanic heart of South China Sea. China explicitly stated that this applies to all territories including the 52 Spratlys.^"^ In 1972, Japan recognised the PRC. Both signed the Joint Sino-Japanese Communique in which Japan had mentioned the devolution of the territory it gained during the war. This Communique along with the ROC-Japanese Treaty of 1972 gave the impression that the islands were the territory of China.^^ In April 1983, the PRC made public the Chinese standardised names of all islands in the Spratlys. In May 1984, a bill was presented to the 6th National People's Congress to establish a separate administrative region for Hainan Island which was to comprise of all the South China Sea islands, including the Spratlys.^^ During the 22nd Session of the Chinese National People's Congress Standing Committee in September 1987, and 13th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 1987, it was decided to upgrade the administrative unit of Hainan, including the Spratlys into China's 30th province.^^

Between 16 May and 6 June 1987, the PRC carried out a sea patrol from the Northeast Cay in the north to James Shoal in the south.In December 1987, China had set up 167 observation stations in the Spratlys and conducted many studies. Between December 1987 and January 1988, China established its presence in the Spratlys. On 14 March, Vietnam and China clashed in the Spratlys and China evicted Vietnam from its occupation of some islands and occupied four islands. By 4 April 1988, the Chinese occupied six islands-Chu Tap, Chan Vien, Gaven, Kennan, Ga Ma and Subi.^^ On 13 April 1988, the 7th National People's Congress of the PRC adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Hainan Province which included the Spratlys and their adjacent waters. On 26 May 1988, it was reported that China has sent a naval fleet to the Spratlys. On 2 August, it had an ocean observation post completed on the Yongshu Jiao island to collect data for global oceanic observation and to provide navigation assistance. The completed facilities include observation posts, engine room, living quarters, some 53 annexes, a 300 metre civilian berth that can hold a 4,000-ton class ship, a helipad all completed and ready for use.^^ In early 1988,

Chinese Navy Engineering troops carried out a survey in the Spratlys for five months. In July/August 1988, the Spratlys Scientific Survey Team of the Chinese Academy conducted a survey in the Spratlys.The

Navigation section of the Chinese Navy offered improved services of navigation, meteorology and life-saving for foreign vessels in the

Spratly areas. Chinese local navigational troops have erected two solar energy beacons and navigational signals on four reefs in the channel.

Since August 1988, naval meteorological observers were also providing regular long-term and daily weather forecasts. A salvage fleet had been organised to refloat sunken ships and retrieve bodies from the water.^^

On 15 March 1989, it was reported that the Spratlys Frontline Headquarters was formed at the Canton Naval Base.^^ On 25 May, it was reported that the PRC had taken over an atoll previously held by Vietnam at the end of April, 1989. Since 26 July 1989, Chinese personnel on the Yonghujiaon Island were able to receive programs from the Chinese Television station of China.®^

All these events indicate that the PRC, with its increasing physical presence and a permanent military command in the islands, is bent on exerting its claim over the entire island group of the Spratlys.

(c). Socialist Republic of Vietnam

The SRV's claim is also based on history. Just like the PRC, the SRV produced many old historical documents to prove its claims.

According to Vietnam, the Chinese Emperor, Zhang Zu of the Ming

Dynasty sent forces under General Cheng Zu to invade Vietnam early in 54 the 15th century. The General was ordered to take back to China all

valuable Vietnamese books and to burn the rest. Thus, most of the books written before the 15th century were lost.^^

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RVN in 1975, published

a White Paper on the Paracels and the Spratlys. In the booklet

"Vietnam's Sovereignty Over The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes- published in September 1979, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SRV

made public a number of historical documents and juridical evidence to prove its claim. In 1981. it produced another booklet, "The Hoang Sa and

Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories" to prove its claim over the two archipelagoes.

The document claimed that ancient Vietnamese books and maps referred to the Paracels and the Spratlys as Bai Cat Vang (Golden

Sandbanks) or Hoang Sa or Van Ly Hoang Sa or Dai Truong Sa or Van Ly

Truong Sa. It also claimed that western navigation maps had referred to the islands under a single name as Paracel or Parcel or Paracels. The following were produced as evidence for Vietnam's claim over the

Spratlys:^^

(a) Toan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do Thu (Route Mao From The Capital To

Four Directions.

This is a Vietnamese atlas compiled and drawn by Do Ba alias

Cong Dao, in the 17th century. In the notes attached to the map of Quang

Ngai District of the Quang Nam Province is a note that refers to "an elongated sandbanks lying In mid-sea known as the Golden sandbank and every year, in the last month of winter, the Nguyen would send 18 boats to Bai Cat Vang to retrieve ship-wrecked cargoes, which included jewels, coins, arms and ammunition." 55 (b) Giao NOP Binh Nam Do.

This is a map of South Vietnam drawn in 1774 by tho Duke of Doan, Bui The Dat. In this map too, the Bai Cat Vang was specified as part of Vietnam.

(c) Phu Bien Tap Luc.

This is a book written by a scholar, Le Qui Don (1726-1784) on the history, geography and administration of Dang Trong (Southern Vietnam). Here also, the Truong Sa (Spratlys) and the Hoang Sa (Paracels) were described as islands belonging to Quang Ngai district.

(d) Dai Nam Nhat Thona loan Do.

This is a Vietnamese atlas, completed circa 1838 which also showed that Hoang Sa-Van Li Truong Sa were part of Vietnam.

Vietnam also claimed it had conducted many geographical and resource surveys of the Spratlys and the result of the surveys had been recorded in Vietnamese literature and on geography and history documents published since the 17th century. Vietnam quoted excerpts from the following documents to show the involvement of Vietnam in the islands of Hoang Sa and Truong Sa.

(!) Joan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi La Do Thu (17th century).

(11) Phu Bien Tap Luc. (1776).

(iii) Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien (1884).

(iv) Dai Nam Nhat Thong Chi (1882).

(v) Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (1848).

(vi) Lich Trieu Hien Chuong Loai Chi (1821).

(vii) Hoang Viet Dia Du Chi (1833).

(viii) Viet Su Cuong Giam Khao Luoc (1876). 56 The SRV also claimed that the Vietnamese feudal state in the past had exercised its sovereign rights over the islands and many expeditions were sent there to exploit the resources. As evidence of these expeditions, it quoted excerpts from the following books:^^

(i) Joan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do Thu (17th century).

(ii) Phu Bien Tap Luc (1776). (iii) Dai Nam Thuc Luc Tien Bien (1884).

Vietnam also argued that the Tay Son, who succeeded the Nguyen, also maintained their presence on the islands. Besides this, it also claimed that Nguyen Emperors, who returned to power in 1802, exercised Vietnamese sovereignty over the islands until the signing of the 1884 Treaty with France. From the book Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (1848), the SRV indicated in chronological order the various Vietnamese expeditions to the islands for surveying, construction and other purposes. The document also mentions Vietnamese markers in the islands to help foreign vessels navigate.

Besides the historical claim, Vietnam argues that as a successor of France, it has sovereignty over the Spratly islands. Vietnam claims that following the Treaty with China on 6 June 1884, France took over the responsibility to exercise Vietnam's sovereign rights over the islands and French gunships often went on patrol to the Spratlys.

In 1927, the S/S Lanessan carried out a scientific survey in the Truong Sa (Spratly). A survey in the Spratlys by the French laboratory ship De Lanessan in 1926 and 1933, had indicated that

Vietnam's geological limit followed the 100-fathom isobath which is the limit of Vietnam's continental shelf and that covers the Spratlys.

Between 13 April 1930 and 12 April 1933, on orders from the French 57 government, various naval units were successfully stationed on the major Islands of the Truong Sa archipelago-Truong Sa proper (Spratlys), An Bang (Amboina Cay), Itu Aba, the Song Tu cluster, Loai Ta and Thi Tu.

In the same month, France declared formal possession of the Spratly Island. Three years later, France also declared its sovereignty over the Itu Aba Island, Thi Tu Island and a group of a small islets and sand-banks. On 26 July 1933, the Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise announced to the world that these islands belonged to France. China was silent over the announcement. The only protest came from Japan. It served a notice on the French home government, informing it that it was an infringement of Japanese commercial interests on the islands, as the Spratlys had been occupied and mined for years by various Japanese phosphate companies.^®

On December 21. 1933 Cochinchina's Governor, M.J. Krautheimer signed a decree to annex the Truong Sa, An Bang, Itu Aba, the Song Tu cluster, Loai Ta and the So Thi Tu to Ba Ria province (presently Dong Nai province).

In 1938, the French built a meteorological station and a radio-transmitting station on Itu Aba Island in the Truong Sa archipelago. Similarly France claims that the French had protested against foreign encroachment of the Spratlys. For example on 24 July 1933, France protested against the stationing of Japanese troops on the major islands in the Truong Sa archipelago.

On 30 March 1939. Japan occupied the Spratlys and on 9 April, Japan declared their complete occupation. France filed a strong protest against the Japanese actions. On 4 April 1939. France protested again 58 to Japan over the latter's decision to place a number of islands in the Truong Sa archipelago under Japanese jurisdiction.

Just like the PRC, Vietnam also tries to exert its sovereignty on the Spratlys by different means. It has published many booklets, occupied many islands, sent protest notes to other countries over their moves and even fought a battle with the PRC in March 1988.

In August 1956, when Tomas Cloma announced his claim to the Spratlys, RVN immediately sent a patrol boat to exert its claim. On 22 October 1956, Saigon took measures to merge eleven major Spratly islands with Phuoc Tuy province.^^ In 1973, RVN sent its troops to the Spratlys and occupied five other islands and established an RVN headquarters on Nam Yit Island.^^ Following its defeat in the Paracels in January 1974, more RVN troops moved into six more islands in the Spratlys and the garrisons were strengthened. In 1975, before the its defeat, the RVN published a White Paper on the Paracels and the Spratlys. Following the defeat of RVN in April 1975, SRV troops occupied the islands that were previously occupied by the Saigon government. In 1975, Hanoi printed new maps showing the Spratlys as Vietnamese territories.^^ In September 1979, the SRV Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a booklet "Vietnam's Sovereignty Over The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes". In 1981, it produced another booklet "The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories". In 1982, Vietnam issued another White Book, "The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories" in the United Nations, claiming its sovereignty.^^ Aside from the government publication, Nhan Dan frequently carries articles claiming Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys while disclaiming that of China. 59 In order to repudiate the Chinese claim, Vietnam refers to the

decisions of the 1943 Cairo Conference, 1945 Potsdam Conference and

the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and argues that in accordance

with the agreements of the above Conferences, the Spratlys are not

Chinese territory. On 30 May 1987, Nhan Dan accused China of trying to

seize the Spratlys7^ In the following month, Vietnam condemned

China's National Assembly's decision to declare sovereignty over the

islands. Vietnam accused China of planning to annex the Spratlys and

vowed to defend them at all costs.On 13 June 1987, it condemned

China for its 16 May-6 June naval patrolling near the Spratlys.^^ On 14

March 1988, Vietnam fought a battle with China to retain some of the

islands but was defeated. On 16 March 1988, it referred the matter to

the United Nations and to get support from other nations.^^ At the time

of the clash, Vietnam also briefed ambassadors and charge d'affairs of

a number of countries, especially those bordering the South China Sea.

On 25 March 1988, Vietnam Foreign Ministry condemned the

Chinese act and demanded its immediate withdrawal from the Spratlys.

On 14 April, Vietnam referred to the PRC's 7th National People's

Cong ress resolution to include the Spratlys in the new Hainan province

as illegal and invalid.^^ Four days later, it criticised China's plan to

send a oceanographic study team to survey the Spratlys^^ and termed it

as a plan to acquire more Vietnamese territory in the Spratlys.^^ On 25

April, it repeated its call for the PRC to withdraw from the Spratlys

and reaffirmed its sovereignty over the islands.®®

Vietnam also criticised the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan over their moves in the Spratlys. On 28 November 1987, on knowing that there were legislative and administrative moves in the Philippines to include the Spratlys as part of its territory, Vietnam announced that any action to annex the Spratlys would be illegal, invalid and" a violation 6C of Vietnam's territorial sovereignty.®"' On 7 September 1983, Vietnam's Foreign Ministry sent a note to Malaysia affirming its sovereignty over the Spratlys, including the Malaysian-occupied island of Terumbu Layang Layang. The note urged Malaysia to dismantle the markers and withdraw its troops and stop all violation of Vietnamese territory.® ^ On 22 February 1982, Vietnam also condemned Taiwan for violating its territorial rights in the Spratlys by maintaining a garrison on the Itu Aba Island.

Just like China and other claimants, SRV also has carried out many unilateral activities to assert its sovereign rights. In 1979, it built a meteorological station which became operative on 1 June 1979. In April 1983, it fired on a West German yacht.®® On 27 August 1983, it was reported that Vietnam had occupied another five islands with 350 ft 4 soldiers.There were also many visits by Vietnamese military and civilian leaders to the Spratlys, especially after the battle with the Chinese on 14 March 1988. In early May 1989, it celebrated the 14th anniversary of the liberation of the Spratlys. In June 1989, there was a photo exhibition of soldiers life in the Spratlys. In July, it commissioned an oceanographic meteorological station on the Song Tu Tay (Southwest Cay) Island to collect data for weather forecasts.®^ The Vietnamese Maritime Meteorology and Hydrology Department also carried out a survey on the Spratlys between June and early July.®® On 24 September, Vietnamese engineering units built thirteen bungaloes and brought six floating facilities to the islands. Vietnam also mobilised its naval transport force to overcome difficulties caused by shortage of materials and spare parts.On 27 March, 150 Vietnamese fishermen with fifteen trawlers and a ship from the Phu Khanh province went to the Spratlys. It was reported that they had caught more than 35 tons of shark and 200 kilograms of pyramid shells.®® On 30 March, Vietnam had a naval conference of commanding cadres -to discuss 61 measures to build various projects in the Spratlys On 3 April, it was reported that Quang Nanfi Da Nang and Phu Khanh provinces had sent

population census cadres to the Spratlys to conduct population 90 survey.^^ In June, the M-31 Naval Engineering School and other forces were involved in some construction on the Len Dao Reef in the Spratlys.^'' On 11 August it was reported that the Vietnamese soldiers in the Spratlys were involved in animal breeding and vegetable gardening.^^

With all these actions, it is clear that Vietnam has shown a firm resolve in making the islands part of its national territory and asserting its sovereignty over them.

(d) Philippines.

With regard to the Spratlys, the Philippines occupies 7

principal islands-Thitu (Pagasa), Northeast Cay (Parola). Flat Land

(Patag), Loaita (Kota), Nanshan (Lawak), Lonkiam Cay (Panata) and West

York (Likas). It also claims a group of 53 islands, totalling in area

70,150 square nautical miles, which it calls as Kalayaan (Freedomland

[Figure 9]). According to the Philippines, the Kalayaan group of islands

are not part of the Spratlys but a separate archipelago. However,

Vietnam and China consider them as an integral part of the Spratlys.

According to the Philippines, in ancient times, Filipinos had been to the Kalayaan islands before the Spanish period and used some of them as bases for fishing expeditions. However, due to the distance from the mainland, they were not permanently occupied.

in the early part of the 20th century, Japanese sailors came to exploit the islands' phosphate deposits. During the Second World War,

Japan used the islands as a forward base to attack the Philippines. Source: Kalayaan Islands,. Series 1, Monograph No 4,

Ministry of Defence, Development Academy of the

Philippines Press, Manila, 1982.

114' 30' IIS 30'

i^TlidentSN ^AD I nvROLA I CSWCoyX, ®(NECay) SRVNj^ V ^-{"Lys Shi

Menzies Rf ^^ LIKAS I tWestYork I) PAGASA I RP (ThifU I) tf RP IrviDQ Rf^ PATAG I ^ Lootto Bank end Reefs (Plot I) & RP ® PANATA I (LonkiamCcy) LAWAKI • KOTAI RP (Nonshonl) (Loaital) fP JocksonAfoil • OO Bdod RT UGAW I OtuAbol) ROC c^Hoppc Rf UuockRf Souttihampton Resf*. *ANO CAY* ' eiNAGO I MVN (Namyif I) SRVN MROLA I DSsccwery Smon Rf Pa«AOI 9 \ / «UKA»I RUROK I ^^VMtsun Rf O / ^^Ki^AYA AN I (SmCowel) Wsctii»fRf@> I PA«A

•riATur

Alicia Annie

1J4' •CALf: 1:1.00^000 30' 115 30' 9 KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP Figure LOCATION MAP OF KALAYAAN 62 However, following its defeat, and the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Japan relinquished ownership over the islands. Since then the status of the islands remained terra nullius until the time of Cloma's discovery.

The Philippines' claim that its sovereignty over the islands is based on the claim by a Filipino citizen, Tomas A. Cloma, who in 1947 discovered the islands and set up his own kingdom called The Kingdom of Freedom Land'. Since then Filipino settlers have been domiciled on the islands and gradually developed them. It was only in 1962, that they were evicted from Itu Aba Island by ROC forces. It was reported that Cloma's men remained in the Kalayaan until 1972, when they were arrested by the government of President Marcos following the declaratio n of martial law and they were forced to cede the islands to the Manila government.

On 9 July 1971, a Congressional hearing on the status of the archipelago was initiated by Ramos J. Mitra, Jr., a representative from the Palawan province. It was his sport fishing vessel that was fired by the ROC vessel. During the Congressional hearing, he said that the ROC garrison was a threat to the security of Palawan. He drew particular attention to reports that Spratly Islands were sitting in the middle of a rich potential oil resource deposit.^ ^

Claiming that an unarmed Philippines vessel operating in the

Spratlys had been fired by ROC naval boat, on 10 July 1971, President

Marcos called an 'emergency session' of the Philippines National

Security Council to address the status of the Spratlys. Later, an official claim was announced for the 53 island group. These islands had been explored and occupied by Tomas Cloma from 1947 ta 1959 as 63 Philippines territory.^^ Thereafter, Philippines Navy and Marine units were sent to the islands. Protests were lodged with the ROC, PRC and Vietnam, but unlike before the Philippines stood its ground. Through 1972, the Philippines reinforced its position on the islands. In April 1972, Kalayaan was officially made part of Palawan Province and administered as a single township. A special advisory council was established for the civilian administration of the area and Tomas Cloma was named Chairman with 11 other commission members drawn primarily from Palawan.^^ This resulted in the Philippines declaring its sovereignty over the remaining islands where there were Filipino residents.

In September 1973, when RVN declared the Spratly islands a part of the Dat Do District, Phuc Tuy Province and established its headquarters on , the Philippines lodged a protest with Saigon.^® Recently it was reported that Cloma has filed a claim for the islands with the government of President Corazon Aquino.^^

During the first week of February 1974, after the clash between RVN and PRC forces in the Paracels, Manila began the reinforcement of its forces in five main islands- Lawak (Nanshan), Pagasa (Flat), Kota (West York), Likas (North Cay) and Parola (Thi Tu). The Philippines perceived threats from Vietnam, PRC and ROC. On 5 February, Manila sent protest notes to Saigon and Taipei. As tension mounted in the region, on 13 February, Philippines troop took positions on two more islands.

In 1975, when Malaysia advanced its claim over the Amboina

Cay, the Philippines protested the claim. The Philippines claim was formalized by the Presidential Decree No. 1596 on 11 June 1978 by

President Ferdinand Marcos. Later, Thitu (Pagasa) was made part of the 64 Palawan Province, although at that time there was in existence a

formal agreement with Vietnam to settle any dispute by peaceful

means. The Philippines also had similar understandings with the PRC

and the ROC. Since 1968, Philippines troops had moved into the seven

islands mentioned. The Philippines has indicated that the issue could be

negotiated or brought to the judgement of the International Court of

Justice or any other internationally constituted body. In April 1983, the

Philippines Prime Minister, Caesar Virata, visited the Kalayaan islands

and stated that any offensive action against the Kalayaan would be

considered as an assault against the Republic of Philippines. On 27

April 1983, it was reported that the Philippines had stationed about

1,000 marines on another six islands.

On 19 November 1987, Leticia Ramos-Shahani, Chairman of

the Senate Foreign Relation Committee of the Philippines, presented a

bill and openly stated that the Spratlys were part of Philippines

territory. On 24 November 1987, Jose Ingles. Under Secretary of Foreign

Affairs stated that the Philippines had sovereignty over the Spratlys.

This brought an immediate rebuke from the PRC. On 31 December 1987,

Raul Manglapus, Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary, repeated

Philippines claim over the Spratlys. He also said that the Spratly issue

cannot be settled through negotiations.^® On 18 January 1988,

Philippines held an election in Kalayaan.^^ In November 1988, the

Philippine Congress discussed a bill that reiterated its claim to the

Kalayaan and this produced a strong response from the Chinese. Since

then, it has been reported, the Philippines has backed down. While

President Ferdinand Marcos exhorted his troops to defend the Kalayaan at all costs. President Corazon Aquino's commitment to Kalayaan seems less fervent. Reports indicate that the big guns on the islands were rusting and that troops strength had been cut.^^^ 65 On 17 March, following the clash between Vietnam and China in the Spratlys, the Philippines Foreign Affairs Department expressed its concern over the event and expressed its hope that the dispute concerning the sovereignty over the islands would be settled peacefully so that the countries involved would not take unilateral action in violation of Philippines' sovereignty."'^"'

On 14 April 1988, just before leaving with President Corazon Aquino to China, Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus said that he would not discuss the Spratlys issue with the Chinese officials as the Philippines had already stated its position over the Kalayaan."'^^

In June 1988, Radio Veritas and Manila newspapers reported that Manila had sent Marines, tanks and artillery to the Kalayaan Islands. The Manila Times and Malaya, both Manila papers, also reported that more troops and artillery has been sent to Kalayaan.''^^

In February 1989, it was reported that a skirmish had occured between a Chinese warship and a Philippines Navy ship in the Spratlys. It was reported that they had exchanged gun fire and both ships incurred minor damage. However, according to diplomats, the clash arose out of 'confusion' over the rules of engagement, rather than any new moves in the territorial disputes.^ ^^

On 8 March, the Philippines Commission of Elections (COMELEC) approved an election in the Kalayaan on 28 March. COMELEC said that the election would assert Philippines authority over the islands.^ ^^

On 19 June, an election was held in Pagasa. The island had

147 registered voters. Only 85 of them cast their ballots.''^^ Half of 66 the voters were fishermen while the rest were soldiers. A Muslim fisherman, Alawit Tulawi won the election. On that occasion, Ching Reynoso, the former election registrar, said that it was one way to prove that Kalayaan Islands really had come under the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Brigadier-General Napoleon Angeles said that the election reflected the government's determination to uphold the rights of Filipinos in the Kalayaan.''^^

(e) Malavsia.

Malaysia is the most recent country to advance a claim to the Spratlys. In May 1975, when Vietnamese troops occupied the Amboina Cay, Malaysia protested that the Amboina Cay was part of Malaysian 10 8 territory. ' In 1979, Malaysia published a map showing the three islets close to Sarawak and Sabah as its land."*^^

On 5-12 June, 1983 the Five Power Defence Arrangement exercise 'Starfish' was held in the South China Sea with 18 ships, 16 aircraft and 3,000 officers and men."'"'^ Following this exercise, Malaysia launched a top secret operation "Exercise Pahlawan" with the aim to test its capability to land a commando force quickly and secretly on the Terumbu Layang Layang.''On 22 August, 1983, a 20 member Malaysian naval commando unit landed in the Terumbu Layang Layang.^ ^^

On 9 September 1983 the Malaysian government received a protest note from Vietnam in relation to the occupation of Terumbu Layang Layang. In response to the protest, the Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister, Abdul Kadir Sheikh Fadzir, replied that Terumbu Layang Layang was always part of the Malaysian territory and had nothing to do with Malaysia's claim of an EEZ. Instead, Malaysia protested Vietnam's occupation of Amboina Cay,^^^ On the same day, the General Tan Sri 67 Ghazali Seth, the Chief of Malaysian Defence Forces, said that Malaysia had stepped up its surveillance over the Malaysian waters in the South

China Sea, to protect its 200 mile EEZ, and aircraft from the Royal

Malaysian Air Force base in Kuantan, on the east coast of West

Malaysia, would make frequent surveillance flights."'''^ On 27

September 1983, Malaysia's leading daily, the New Straits Times wrote an editorial in relation to Malaysia's sovereignty over the islands it had occupied.The paper wrote that Malaysia had the legitimate right to safeguard its territory and the resources within them like any other nation, as they are indisputable Malaysian possession. It further stated, although Amboina Cay is a Malaysian territory occupied by Vietnam,

Malaysia did not precipitate that into an issue in the interest of the stability of the region. However, the scaremongering of PRC and SRV would force Malaysia to stand up to defend its interests in the South

China Sea.

On 13 October 1983 China and Vietnam both protested Malaysia's occupation of Terumbu Layang Layang. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad dismissed the Chinese protest as unjustified and rejected that of Vietnam."'''^

On 24 February 1988, the Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister,

Dr. Fadzil Che Wan said that Malaysia categorically declared that the

Spratly Islands and their surrounding forts are under its sovereignty

and Malaysia did not recognise any other countries' claims over the

islands and believed that those countries should take no action which

might lead to tensions and physical confrontation.''^

On 26 February, according to Bernama, the Malaysian national

news agency, Ghafar Baba, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, said that Malaysia would not budge from its decision to reject claims of 68 other countries in the islands that Malaysia had occupied in the

SpratlysJ"'® Malaysia had also indicated that its Navy would increase its patrolling of the area.'' ^ ^

In 5 April 1988, the Malaysian Navy detained 49 Filipino fishermen near Rizal Reef for fishing without permits. A modern 800-ton fishing vessel equipped with sonar radar, F. B. Jasmine and its two trawlers, Rangers XVI and XVII, were seized between the Philippines-occupied island of Likas Point, near the Malaysian occupied Commodore Reef, which is also claimed by the Philippines. Both countries claimed that the area was within their respective EEZ. It was in this area that the navies of both nations almost clashed in 1979 and 1981. The captain of the fishing crew claimed that they were fishing inside the territorial water of the Philippines declared under Presidential Degree 1956. In contrast, the Malaysian Foreign Ministry said that the boats were found 120 nautical miles north-west of Sabah in Malaysian waters. The boats were placed in the custody of the Malaysian Fishery Department in Labuan, while the Captain and the crew were detained in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah.The matter caused some tension but with the speedy interference of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the Malaysian Prime Minister and President Corazon Aquino, the matter was resolved peacefully and a potential clash was avoided.

On 1 October 1988, Malaysian Navy Commander, Vice-Admirai

Datuk Sri Abdul Wahab Nawi said that the Royal Malaysian Navy would continue to deploy its personnel to protect Malaysian islands in the

Spratlys."'^"'

In mid-May 1989, there was a border talk between Malaysia and Philippines. The Talk reached a deadlock due to Malaysia's claim of the Rizal Reef. Malaysia's claim included a fishing ground of 50,000 69 square nautical miles which was also shown on the Philippines map as its territory, based on a law passed by Manila in late

Presently, Malaysia occupies three coral reefs off the coast of Sarawak-Terumbu Layang Layang, Mantatani and Ubi atolls-and maintains a small troop presence on each. These garrisons are supported by the new military base at Sibu, Sarawak. 70

Footnotes.

1. Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest For The South China Sea, Mathuen, New

York, 1982. p. 81.

2. Canberra Times, 22 January 1974.

3. Samuels, QSI- ilii-. P- 75.

4. iQSi.

5.Mi., p. 76. 6.SWB FE/0116 A 3/3 4 April 1988. 7. Samuels, QXL. cii., p. 81. 8. \m., p. 84.

9.m. p. 85. 10. Fisher, Richard D., "Brewing Conflict In South China Sea", Backgrounder, Asia Studies Centre, Heritage Foundation, Washington, 25 October 1984. p. 4. 11. Samuels, cm. cii., p. 89. 12. m. p. 90. 13. Ml., p. 99. 14. Tasker, Rodney, "Stake-Out In The Spratlys", FEER, 24 February

1978.

15. SWe 1 June 1983.

16. SWB FEy0090 A 3/2 3 March 1988.

17. SWB FE/0101 i 16 March 1988.

18. SWB FE/0103 A3/1 18 March 1988.

19. SWB FE/0109 A 3/3 25 March 1988.

20. SWB FE/0238 A3/3 24 March 1988.

21. SWB FE/0245 A 3/4 1 September 1988.

22. FBIS -CHI-88-190 30 September 1988.

23. FEER, 3 July 1989.

24. Siva FE/ 0511 A3/6 18 July 1989.

25. Sydney Morning Herald, 3 May, 1988. 71

26. Prescott J. R. V., The Maritime Boundaries of the World, Mathuen

London & New York, 1985. p. 209.

27. SWB FE/8545 A 3/3 17 April 1987.

28. Samuels, Mi-, p. 52.

29. SWB FE/8545 A 3/4 13 April 1987.

30. BR. No. 21. Vol. 22, 25 May 1979. p. 26.

31. BR, No. 7, Vol. 23, 18 February 1980. p. 18. 32. SWB FE/0116 A 3/3 4 April 1988. 33. BR, No. 28, 12 July 1982. p. 14.

34. Samuels, QSL. p. 78.

35. Pao-min, Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", Asian

Pacific Community,"* Spring 80, No. 8. p. 136.

36. New York Times, 29 November 1982.

37. Canberra Times, 18 April 1987.

38. SWB FE/ 8544/ i 16 April 1987. 39. SWB FEy8545 A 3/4 17 April 1987. 40. SWB FE/ 8597 A 3/2 18 June 1987. 41. BR, 7-13 March 1988. p. 9. 42. BR, 21-27 March 1988. p. 9. 43. SWB FE/0100 1 15 March 1988. 44. SWB FE/0109 A 3/2 25 March 1988. 45. SWB FE/0119 A 3/1 7 April 1988. 46. SWB 12 May 1988. 47. SWB FE/0414 A3/3 21 March 1989.

48. SWB FE/0468 A3/3 29 May 1989.

49. SWB FE/0508 1 14 July 1989. 50.SIVB FE/0012 A 3/1 28 November 1987. 51. SWB FE/0016 A 3/4 3 December 1987.

52. Cioughly, Brian, "South China Sea Confrontation", JDW, 28 May 1988.

p. 1073. 53. BR, 12 July 1982. 72 54. Ibid. 55. Samuels, Q^. p. 80. 56. Fisher, qji. cii., p. 4. 57. FBIS -EAS-88-061 30 March 1988. p. 51. 58. World Report, Vol. 2, No. 12, 18 April 1988. p. 3. 59. FBIS -EAS-88-067 7 April 1988. p. 47. 60. SWB FE/0220 A 3/5 3 August 1988. 61. SWB FE/0238 A 3/3 24 August 1988. 62. SWB FE/0349 A3/4 4 January 1989. 63. SWB FE/0410 i 16 March 1989. 64. SWB FE/0524 1 2 August 1989. 65. Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. p. 6. 66. The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1981. p. 8. 67. pp. 9-13. 68. Samuels, QQ,. cil., p. 64. 69. Mi., p. 86. 70. Samuels, osi. cil-, p. 99. 71. Canberra Times, November 1975. 72. Canberra Times, 18 April 1987. 73. 18 March 1985. Question on notice for Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, DFA Backgrounder, No. 478, 15 May 1985. 74. The Age, 4 June 1984. 75. SWB FE/8594 A 3/4 15 June 1987. 76. FBIS -EAS-88-053 18 March 1988. 77. SWB FE/0126 A 3/1 15 April 1988. 78. FBIS -EAS-88-079 25 April 1988. 79. Hiebert, Murray, "No, Not Another War, Hanoi Calls For Talks, But Beats The Drums of Fear", FEER, 5 May 1988. p. 24. 80. FBIS -EAS-88-079 25 April 1988. p. 52. 73 81. SWB FE/0013 A 3/1 30 November 1987. 82. SWB FE/7434/i 9 September 1983. 83. Fisher, QXL, ciL,. p. 84. New York Times, 28 August 1983. 85. FBIS -EAS-88-130 7 July 1988. p. 53. 86. FBIS -EAS-88-163 23 August 1988. p. 75. 87. SWB FE/0265 A 3/2 24 September 1988. 88. FBIS -EAS-89-102 p. 53. 89. FBIS -EAS-89-063 4 April 1989. p. 85. 90. FBIS -EAS-89-063 4 April 1989. p. 85. 91. FBIS -EAS-89-112 13 June 1989. p. 59. 92. FBIS -EAS-89-154 11 August 1989. 93. Samuels, Q^. cil., p. 92. 94. Mi., p. 90. 95. m. P- 91. 96. Mi., p. 99. 97. Belluck, Pam, "Free For All Islands?", Nation, 23 May 1987. 98. SWB FE/0016 A 3/4 3 December 1987. 99. SWB FEZ 0052 B/1 19 January 1988. 100. Asiaweek, 3 May 1988. 101. SWB FE/0103/i 18 March 1988. 102. FBIS -EAS-88-072 14 April 1988. p. 41. 103. The Age, 1 June 1988. 104. FEER, 30 March 1989. p. 8. 105. SWB FEy0405 i 10 March 1989. 106. SIVB FE/ 0488 i 21 June 1989. 107. LOil. cii. 108. FEER, Year Book 1984. 109. Cloughly, Brian, op. cit. 110. FEER, Year Book 1984. 111. FEER, 29 September 1983. 74

112.18 March 1985. Question on notice for Defence Minister, Kim

Beazley, DFA, Backgrounder, No. 478, 15 May 1985.

113. Statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Abdul Kadir bin Haji

Sheikh Fadzir on Terumbu Layang Layang, September, 1983. Vol. 16,

No. 3, Foreign Affairs Malaysia.

114. SWB FE/7434 A 3/1 9 September 1983.

115. New Straits Times, 27 September 1983.

116. PEER, 29 September 1983.

117. SWB FE/0084 1 25 February 1988.

118. SWB FE/0086 i 27 February 1988.

119. Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 May 1988. p. 1072.

^ 20.FBIS -EAS-88-036 4 May 1988. p. 46.

121. SWB FE/0273 A 3/3 4 October 1988.

^22. SWB FE/0467 A 3/2 26 May 1989. / D 5 EVALUATION OF THE CLAIMS.

(a^ Peoples' Rftpuhlic of China.

The historical basis of the Chinese claim over the Sprat'ys appears to be disputable. Marwyn S. Samuels, in his book, Contest for South China Sea holds the view that the Spratlys were never mentioned in Chinese historical records. He says that based on historical records, it is difficult to say precisely when the South China Sea and its islands came to be known to the Chinese. It was believed that the South China Sea would have been discovered by the seafaring Nan Yueh people at the time of the Han Dynasty around 112-46 BC. It was also believed the it was not until Ma Yuan led a fleet of some two thousand vessels to the conquest of Jih-nan (North Vietnam) in BC 53 that the Chinese fleets might have frequented the area. It was after this that the South China Sea area was studied by Chinese historians and geographers, but there were no references made regarding the islands for centuries.^

The earliest reference seems to have been made in the late third century chronicle, Nan-chou l-wu-chih (Record of Strange Things of the South) by Wan Chen. The most relevant passage reads:^

Over the rough Chang Hai the water is shallow and the magnetic rocks [tzu-shih] are many. Men who sail greatvessels beyond the frontiers [chiao-wai] must rely on the iron needle [tieh-chen] to reach this place, [but]having arrived at this passage, [they] are unable to proceed because of the magnetic rocks.

Some doubt had been raised in relation to this work. It is argued that the word 'Chang Hal' might have referred to the South China Sea or only to the Gulf of Tonkin. Paul Wheatly, in his book,the Golden Chersonese argued that the word referred to the Gulf of Thailand. Thus, it is difficult 76 argued that the word referred to the Gulf of Thailand. Thus, it is difficult

to establish where those islands were located exactly. However, the

mention of "magnetic rocks" were considered theoretically as appropriate

for the period. The mention of "iron needle" or mariner's compass creates

some doubt as the use of compass for navigation could not probably be

dated before tenth century. The text is also not clear about the origin of

the 'men' who sailed those great vessels. It is also worth noting that the

islands were clearly indicated as 'situated beyond the frontier'.^

Some archaelogical evidence was found in the Paracels but not in the Spratlys. They confirmed some early contacts as early as the Wang Mang period (CE 9-23). However, the evidence did not prove that the contacts were exclusively Chinese. By the first century, the sea route connecting Tien-chu (India) and Fu-nan (Cambodia) with Canton (known as Nan-hai chun or Commandary of the Southern Sea) was well established. This route was dominated by non-Chinese seamen for many centuries. There was the barest textual evidence to suggest any official Chinese cognizance of the island-atolls. Even the well recorded voyages of the monks Fa Hsien (CE 444) and I Ching (CE 689-95) only made indirect reference to the islands of South China Sea. The absence of any reference to the islands was said to be due to the traditional trade route that avoided the islands, except some part of the Paracels. In fact the islands were known for their hazards on the route that led from Kun-lun Island (Paulo Condore) off the Mekong Delta, and which followed the Champa (South Vietnamese) coast to Vijaya (Chaban) and then crossed the Gulf of Tonkin, close off Hainan Island for the passage to Canton.'^

Besides this, it was also argued that before the ninth century,

there was no major Chinese shipping presence in South China Sea. It was

said although there was mention of sea-going vessels (po) in the third century, the ocean-going Chinese junk was a product of the ninth through 77 twelth century. Most of the shipping during the medieval period was Malay. Cambodian, Indonesia, Persian or Indian. Therefore, it was not possible to expect detailed Chinese records about the islands. High-seas navigation charts did not appear in China until 15th century. Any information that was obtained, was believed to have come second-hand. It was only in 8th century that a text seemed to mention the area of the Paracels, but the information was derived from second-hand sources.^

H^in T^nq (New history of the Tang Dynasty), a record of sailing directions compiled by Chia Tan for the period 785-805, added more insights about the standard route that linked Canton with the states of the Southern Sea. The text incidentally mentioned several rocks and islets along the way. The most relevant section reads:^

Going by sea 200 // southeast of Kuangchou [Canton] one reaches Tun-men Mountain. [Sailing] according to the winds for another two days to the west one reaches Chiu-chou [Nine Island] Rock. Two days further south and one reaches Hsing [Elephant] Rock. Another three days to the southwest and one reaches Chanpu-lang Mountain [which is] a mountain in the sea located 200 // from the state of King Huan. Going further south for two days one reaches Ling Mountain. Another day and one comes to the State of Men-tu. Going another day one arrives at the State of Ku-ta. Another half-day and one comes to Pen-to-lang Island. Another two days and one arrives at Chun-tu-lung Mountain. Another five days and one comes to the strait the barbarians call Chih. From north to south [the strait] is a hundred [or hundreds of] // in length. On the northern shore is the State of Lo-yueh. On the southern shore is the state of Fo-shih. 78 During the late 12th century and especially from the late ISth century to mid-15th century, the China trade "took off". By the 12th century, the Chinese nautical engineering skills had grown sufficiently for the development of long-distance water fleets. In the 12th century, a number of chronicles describing the route across the South China Sea appeared in the Chinese literature.^

In Ling-wai-tai'ta (Information on What Lies Beyond the Passes), written by Chou Chu-fei in 1178, there were accounts of voyages, its dangers and indirect references to the island-atolls of the South China Sea. Chou Chu-fei's description of the long-gravel embankments (Chang-sha shih-tang) somewhere in the Great Eastern Ocean and to the south of Hainan Island sounds like a number of sand and gravel banks strung along the eastern edges of the main shipping lanes in the South China Sea. Some have taken his Chang-sha shih-tang to be a direct reference to the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. Others taking into consideration his association of the gravel banks with the wei-lu, a mythical drain where the waters of the world converge and descend into the underworld, the 'long gravel embankment' was simply the religio-geographical convention of an outer concentric ring.®

Another important chronicle was the Chu Fan Chih (Record of Foreign People), compiled and written by Chau Ju-kua, sometimes between 1225 and 1242. Apart from explaining the trade routes, it provides sufficient information to confirm the identification of the 'long sandy banks' with the islands of South China Sea. In this work, Chao Ju-kua's 'thousand // sand-bank and ten thousand // rocks were in fact the Paracels and the Macclesfield Bank. Unfortunately Chao Ju-kua failed to provide anything more concrete in the way of further information about the exact location of the sand and rock banks of the Southern Sea or about their role or function.^ 79 Meng Liang Lu (Dreaming about the Capital), a chronicle written by Wu Tzu-mu in 1275, talks about an area with awesome waves, shallow seas, smashed ships and overfed fish. It advised to avoid the islets, reefs and rocks of the South China Sea. Wu Tzu-mu and many later writers refer to the waters east of Hainan Island as Chi-chou Yang or the 'Sea of Seven Islands' which was believed to be a reference to the waters of the Paracels and the Macclesfield Bank."*^

Another book, Tung hsi yang-kao (Examination of the Eastern and Western Oceans) written in 1618 by Chan Hsieh. describes the escape of two Southern Sung Emperors. Ching Yen and Tuan Tsung, from the Mongol Fleet. The account of the escape refers to the Chi-chou Yang or the 'Sea of Seven Islands'. His reference of 'Sea of Seven Islands', east of the Hainan Island, identify with the waters of the Paracels. His directional notation, including the proximity of the ten thousand li gravel bank (Wan-li shih-tang) slightly east of the seven islands and his reference to the Sea of Banks east of Wan-chou (i.e., on the southeastern corner of Hainan Island) suggests identification with the reefs, rocks, sand-banks and waters of the Paracels and Macclesfield Bank. Some even say that Chan Hsieh wrote the account about 300 years after the event, hence there could be errors.^ ^

With the decline of the Sung Dynasty in 1279, the Mongol Dynasty came to power. For the next 60 years, the Mongol Fleets dominated the Southern Seas. There were two important works written during this time. One was Kuang Yu Tu (Enlarged Atlas of the World) written by Chu Szu-pen in 1320. The other was Tao-i-chih-lueh (Record of Barbarian Isles) written by Wang Ta-yuan, based on his own journeys in the Southern Sea sometimes before 1350. Both texts give a vague impression of the islands of South China Sea. Chu Szu-pen did not mention Chi-chou Yang, the Wan-li-shi-tang or the Chien-li chang-sha by name. But his description and 80 map of the area reveal a host of islets, archipelagoes, rocks and reefs in the general vicinity of the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratly Islands. Similarly, Wang Ta-yuan also barely touches upon this area but notes that the various states of the Yueh Sea were commonly called Wan-li shih-tang. Both of them referred to the area under the general category of 'barabrian islands' occupied by the I or 'Southern Barbarians'. Whether these descriptions were actually intended for all the islands of the South China Sea or specifically to the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and the Spratlys is difficult to ascertain. Both writers left the impression that despite the great power of the Mongol Navy, the islands of South China Sea were not apparently absorbed into the empire or colonized. The islands of South China Sea remained chiao-wai, i.e., beyond Chinese civilisation in the zone of the barbarians on the frontier.^ ^

The lack of information in relation to the islands of South China Sea persisted even during the heyday of the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century (1368-1643). During the early 15th century, maritime ties with the states of Southeast Asia were enhanced by the naval expedition of Admiral Cheng Ho. Unfortunately, owing to late Ming anti-maritime policies, most of the official reports and records of Cheng Ho voyages were either lost or destroyed. Nevertheless, two roughly contemporary accounts survived and several other Ming period texts including one atlas compiled during the 17th century are available.^ ^

The earliest one was Ying-yai sheng-lan (Triumphant Vision of the Ocean Shores), written by Ma Huan in 1435. In this document, the Chin-chou Yang and the Wan-li shih-tang was referred as the gate way to Champa. Ma Huan add nothing about the islands of South China Sea. The same could be said about another account, Hsing-cha sheng-lan (Triumphant Vision of the Starry Raft). The text Hsi-yang chao-kung tien-lu (Record of the Tributary States in the Western Ocean) written by 81

Huang Sheng-tseng in 1520 has some information on the islands of South China Sea. In this book, the Pratas Island and Reef were referred as Tung-sha (Eastern Sands). Huang mentioned one islet in Chi-chou Yang that was covered with vegetation. Possibly, it was the first reference to the Woody Island in the Paracels.''^

Wu Pei Chih (Treatise on Armaments), an atlas of the Ming Dynasty, compiled in 1628 by Mao Yuan-i, shows that the Ming navigators were aware of the island-atolls, reefs and sand banks on the eastern margins of the Sea of Seven Islands, it included two primary groups, i.e., shih-tang or gravel bank and Wan-sheng shih-tang (a misprint for Wan-li Shih-tang), located almost precisely where the Paracels and Macclesfield Bank should appear.^ ^

From the above account, it is clear that none of the sources cited mention the Spratlys. The vague references to the Wan-li shih-tang might have included all the reefs, rocks, sand-banks and islets of South China Sea. Assuming that Chi-chou Yang meant the seas immediately southeast of Hainan Island, the most likely identification of the gravel bank referred would limit its location to the Paracels and Macclesfield Bank. Chi-chou Yang and Wan-li shih-tang which were important to the traditional trade, skirted the Spratly islands far to the west. The Paracel islands or Chi-chou Yang and the Wan-li shih-tang, rather than the Spratlys were long considered China's southern most maritime frontier.^ ^ By the end of 15th century, Chinese interests in maritime exploration and power came to an end due to Ming official policy and the arrival of the Europeans marked its end.-'7

Besides this, in Chinese history, there was no concept of sovereignty as meant in the western political sense. The territoriality of state was not a function of legal limit but of social organisation, history 82 and loyalty of subjects. In other words, the Emperor and officials ruled men and not space. Areas or places lacking in human use and organisation were regarded as being on the margin in frontier and wilderness or simply off the map as zones beyond civilization. The idea of oceanic sovereignty or the extension of legitimate state authority over a water column played little or no part in the traditional Chinese legal and political doctrines. The concept of 'ocean frontier' was limited to the coastline of the state. The question of sovereignty over the South China sea and its islands became an issue only in late 19th century, as a function of the domination of the sea by Britain, France and Japan.

Chinese records themselves confirm the absence of a formal claim to the archipelago prior to the Japanese occupation in 1939. In 1928, the Shen Peng-fei's Paracel Commission stated that the Paracel Archipelago was China's southernmost territory. The Spratlys were not considered as Chinese territory in 1928. The Chinese claim over the Spratlys seemed to be a legacy of World War II and the dismantling of the Japanese 'empire'.^ ^

Amongst the contestants, it is Vietnam that openly challenges the validity of the Chinese historical claim. Vietnam says that the Chinese claim that Vietnam's Truong Sa is not the present Spratlys but some coastal islands and sand-banks off the coast of Vietnam, and its argument that Vietnam's Truong Sa and the China's Nansha do not refer to the same archipelago, is a made-up Chinese story. Vietnam claims that the writings of Nan Zhou Yi Wu Zhi and Fu Nan Zhuan were vague. In relation to the other six documents written between the Sung and Qing dynasties, Vietnam claims that they were records of contemporary geographical positions, history and customs of foreign countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia and the sea routes from those countries to China. Nothing was mentioned about Chinese voyages to the Spratlys or engagements in any production 83 activities. Vietnam also asserts that the geographical names used in the

Chinese texts were used to denote geographical features of foreign countries or to describe navigation routes in these sea areas and therefore added no legal value to the Chinese claim to the Spratlys. Even if it were true that Chinese discovered the islands, it would not constitute a legal basis for China's claim that they have been under China's jurisdiction. Even if it shows exploitation work carried by Chinese in the Spratlys, it would not create sovereign rights for China over the Spratlys, since this was done by individuals. Vietnam says the answer given as to when and how the

Chinese state took possession of the Spratlys is unsatisfactory.^^

In relation to Peking's claim of Wanii Shitang as reference to the

Spratlys as part of Wanzhou in the district of Qiongzhou, Guangdong province, Vietnam quotes the Daqing Yitongzhi, the official geographic book edited by National Institute of History of Qing dynasty with a foreword by

Emperor Xuangzong in the 22nd year of Daoguang (1842). Vietnam claims there was not a single mention about Wan li Shitang as part of the district mentioned above. Vietnam says Peking deliberately failed to mention that document to hide the fact that Spratlys were not part of China.^'^

In relation to three maps of China of the Qing Dynasty as Chinese evidence for the claim, Vietnam asks why the Chinese had not made them public. Vietnam says all maps of China drawn from that time till the early years of the Zhunghua Minguo (the Chinese Republic) did not include the

Spratlys as Chinese territory.^^

Therefore, there is some doubt about the historical claim of

Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys.

(h). Republic of China.

When Japan surrendered its control over the Islands in the South 84 China Sea in 1951, the islands were not renounced in favour of any country. As stated earlier, with the defeat of Japan, China was only given authority to occupy the areas controlled previously by Japan, north of latitude 16° North. The Spratly Islands were clearly excluded. ^^At the time of the ROC-Japan Treaty in September 1952, the ROC claim over the Spratlys was also discussed. The ambiguity with Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was retained at the insistence of Japan in the Minute of Sino-Japanese Peace Negotiation initialed on 5 March 1952. Japan also insisted that the territories treated in Article 2 of the 1952 Treaty be restricted to those related to the ROC. As a result of pressure from the ROC negotiators, Japan finally agreed to include the Spratlys in Article 2 of the Treaty, which gave it a different meaning, as if the Spratlys were ROC (Chinese) territory.This was invalid as at the time of the ROC-Japan Treaty, Japan had no claim to sovereignty over the islands to make any devolution valid. Whatever devolution given by Japan became null and void. Even if it were valid, then ROC's position as the legitimate recipient of the islands on behalf of the Chinese sovereign state would then be at issue, as China too makes similar claims. Therefore, the ROC's claim to the whole of the Spratlys and its occupation of the Itu Aba Island is an issue of contention. In short, it can be said that the ROC's claim over the Spratlys is flimsy.

(c). Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The SRV historical claim also appears to have some problems. Firstly, China did not accept the Vietnamese claim and claims that the Vietnamese Truong Sa is not the Nansha, but some other islands along the coast of Vietnam.^^ In the past Vietnamese leaders themselves had acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the Spratlys and it was recognised even in Vietnamese official documents, books and atlasses. The Vietnamese claim that they did so due to pressure of circumstances during the Vietnam war is hardly acceptable as an expiation. 85 According to a map published by Nhan Dan on 5 May 1975, the eastern part of Vietnam's territory is at 109 ° and 29' East. The

Vietnamese Natural Geography and Natural Geographical areas of

Vietnamese Territory, published respectively in 1970 by the Vietnarr.

Educational Publishing House, and the Vietnam Scientific and Technologica!

Printing House, stated that the eastern most point of the Vietnamese territory is at 109° and 21' East and not 109° and 29' East. Even with this, its claim of the Spratlys as part of its territory would fail as the Spratlys are located east of 109° and 30' East.^^

In relation to this claim, there is a conflict between international law and Vietnam's claim as the French at the time of the independence did not hand over the Spratlys to the Vietnamese, as they did for the Paracels.^^ The Vietnamese effective occupation of the Spratlys only took place in 1971, after the recommendation of the RVN's Petroleum

Board. As France had insisted that there was no devolution of the Spratlys to Vietnam (like the Paracels) the legal status of Vietnam's claim is dubious. However, Vietnam has a valid position on the grounds of effective occupation for the islands it occupies at the moment, as there were no nations occupying those islands when Vietnam moved into them.

(d) Philippines.

The Philippines claim over the Kalayaan is based on the principles of discovery and occupation. The principle of discovery seems to be questionable as others had been in the islands before Tomas Cloma. For instance, Japan was mining guano on the Spratlys in 1917 and continued without hindrance until 1929.^® Then in 1933 the French occupied those islands and stayed until they were driven out by the Japanese in 1937. The

ROC occupied the islands immediately following the Second World War.

Then there is the case of Morton F. Meads and his men. In 1951, President 86 Magsaysay sent a delegation to make contact with Morton F. Meads and his Kingdom of Humanity/Republic of Morac-Songhreti Meads.^^

In response to Tomas Cloma's claim of 'Archipelago of Freedom (Kalayaan), in 1956 Vice President Garcia said that the Spratlys were under the de facto trusteeship of the Allied Powers with respect to their future disposition. As long as those islands retained that status, he said, they were open to economic exploitation by nationals or any members of the Allied Powers. When Tomas Cloma publicized his claim to the Spratlys, there were immediate objection and a barrage of protest to Manila from Peking, Hanoi, Taipei and Paris. Manila quickly dispatched messages to Saigon and Taipei to the effect that the Philippines had made no official claim on the area.^^ Thus, the argument that Tomas Cloma was the discoverer of the Kalayaan appears to be questionable.

The Philippines also claims that the Kalayaan is a different group of islands from the Spratlys. But many argue that Kalayaan refers to the same group, and it encompasses most of, the Spratly islands.

The Philippines unilateral declaration that the Kalayaan islands are res nullius while the status of the other islands are yet to be determined by the Allied Powers, seems contradictory. The Philippines' argument that it is the nearest Allied Power nation, and so it should be given the islands, has yet to be determined.^'' However, as the islands come within the Philippine's 200 nautical miles EEZ, the claim has some validity under the Third United Nations Conference on the Laws of The Sea. However, the Conference has yet to be ratified by most of the signatories. Therefore, it could be concluded that the Philippines' claim too is not very concrete. 87 (e). Malaysia. Prior to the origin of the concept of EEZ, Malaysia did not make any claim over any of the islands in the South China Sea. It was only in 1973 with the UNCLOS III, when the idea of EEZ came into use that Malaysia claimed rights over the islands. Its troops only moved into the Spratlys in 1983. As the UNCLOS III has still not been ratified, the Malaysian claim too appears fragile. The claim that the Terumbu Layang Layang was always part of Malaysian territory and had nothing to do with the EEZ appears mere rhetoric. It was not part of the political boundary of Malaysia when Malaysia was constituted as a state. However, under the EEZ doctrine and from the principle of effective occupation, Malaysian claim, like that of other claimants appears, to be valid.

From the above, it is clear that none of the claimants has any clear legal title to claim the whole or part of the Spratlys as their national territory. Discoveries and other historical claims as reasons for territorial rights can not be accepted for reasons of non-occupation for a long time. International law recognises effective occupation as a better ground for territorial claims, provided no other countries had occupied the same area. This may be acceptable for some claimants, but not for the PRC which only recently moved into the area. The claim based on 200 mile EEZ would be equally difficult as there would be overlapping claims between the claiming nations. In short, based on present available information and the current nature of international law, it would be difficult to decide on the territorial rights of the claimants. The issue needs a much more detail study by an independent organisation with no members of the contestants, so that its findings could be genuine. 88

Footnotes.

1. Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest For The South China Sea, Methuen, London & New York, 1982. p.10

2.

3. LOG. GU.

4. m. p. 11

5. iQ^. cil.

6. U^. oil. 7. m. p. 15. 8. p. 16. 9. cil. 10. i^., p. 17. 11. ItM., p. 18. 12. mid., p. 20. 13. Mi., p. 21. 14. iQQ,. Q\i.

15. liiM., p. 22.

16. ii^., p. 23. 17. Mi.,p. 24. 18. Mi., p. 51. 19. Mi., p. 68. 20. The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Socilaist Republic of Vietnam, 1981. pp. 30-31.

21. Ibid., p. 33. 22. Loc.cit. 23. Samuels, oa* Oil-* p.75.

24. IM., p. 79.

25. The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa, oa.sil,. p. 30.

26. BR, No. 21, Vol. 22, 25 May 1979. p. 26. 89 27. Samuels, Q^I. p. 77. 28. Canberra Times, 22 January 1974. 29. Samuels, Q^. p. 29. 30. Ibid., p. 84. 31. The Kalayaan Islands, Series One, Monograph No. 4, Ministry of Defence, Secretariat to the Cabinet Committee on the Law of the Sea Treaty, ISBN 971-152-004-4, Development Academy of the Philippines Press, 1982. p. 14. 90

6 FUTURE PROSPECTS

The Chinese entry into the Spratlys had caused fear not only for other claimants but also for others who have interests in the South China Sea and the region. It all depends on how China acts in the near future. If China were to exert its military muscle further, the situation in the Spratlys could become more tense and unstable. That may lead to more militarisation of the region, including the Far East. Southeast Asia would experience a different sort of scenario as there may be a likely collaboration of Southeast nations against China. The following are the possible outcomes of the Spratly issue if the situation in the Spratlys became worse.

(a^. Reemeroence of PRC As A Maritime Power In The South China Sea. For the PRC, the South China Sea is of great importance. China has to defend its economically important coastal areas, such as Hainan Island, and watch over the disputed Spratlys, the territorial water claimed by the SRV, and the Soviet build up at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.'' At the moment, the PRC is trying to modernize its navy and a 'blue water* fleet is being developed. In fact on 18 May 1980, the PRC successfully launched two ICBM-type carrier rockets some 8,000 nautical miles into the South Pacific and was able to retrieve their nose-cones near the Solomons.^ On 5 June 1981 the Chinese naval squadron including a trio 3,250 ton Luta class destroyers, each equipped with six surface-to-surface missiles roamed in the South China Sea.^ In May 1983, a PRC training squadron is reported to have reached the southern most part of the Spratlys, the Tsengmu Ansha which is just about 32 km off the coast of Sarawak.^ Between mid-October and late November 1987, the PRC conducted military manouevres in the western part of the Pacific and the southern part of the South China Sea, causing much concern for the ASEAN nations. 91 Meanwhile, the PRC is also looking into the possibility of building its own aircraft carrier. Senior Chinese naval officers for the first time visited the US Navy aircraft carrier, USS Nimitz in early 1989. There is speculation amongst analysts that the PRC may be planning to build a small (40,000-60,000 tons) aircraft carrier to fill the gap in its naval air defences. According to the Hong Kong newspaper Hsin Wan Pao, there were predictions by foreign analysts that by the year 2000, China will have five aircraft carriers, including a nuclear-powered one.^ In December 1988, the Hong Kong newspaper, Da Gong Bao, reported on the existence of a training course for prospective aircraft carrier captains. The course is being held at a Naval Academy in Guangzhou province and the students were said to be half way through a four year programme. Most of the participants were junior officers, ranging from lieutenant to commander and most were naval pilots. In recent years, there have been numerous reports in PRC newspapers highlighting the need for aircraft carriers, especially , after the Sino-Soviet clash. The PRC has bought an old Majestic class carrier from the Australian Navy, the HMAS Melbourne, a few years ago for scrap and this would have provided insight into carrier designers. It has also been reported that the PRC asked Australia about its operation.® The Chinese also had discussions to buy a World War II US carrier but progress has been stalled for some time. From this, it is likely that PRC has plans to have an aircraft carrier in the near future, with which it would be possible to control the South China Sea.

In recent years, Chinese naval aviation had also been boosted with new bombers, fighters and missiles. Emphasis is also focused on developing anti-submarine warfare bombers, missiles, fighterbombers, ship-based helicopters, flying tankers and reconnaisance aircraft. Chinese attempts to get UK-made in-flight refuelling equipment, failed due to the refusal of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the western technology watchdog body. If this equipment were 92 made available, then the PRC would have the ability to project its power in the Spratlys. At the moment, Chinese fighters could only spend a few minutes over the Spratlys after the take-off from Hainan Island.^ Finance has been a problem in acquiring an aircraft carrier but it is reported after the Spratlys incident, the government has provided additional funds specifically for improving naval capabilities. Chinese shipyards have the capability to construct vessels up to 120,000 tons and China could acquire the required technology from abroad.

Development plans to the end of the century call for a 3-stage expansion of the Chinese Navy, concentrating on more and better warships, nuclear and conventional submarines and aircraft, probably including aircraft carriers. Current Chinese naval combat strength numbers five nuclear submarines, two of which carry 12 intercontinental ballistic missiles with the range of 2,000-3,000 km, 113 conventional submarines and 44 ocean-going surface combatants with a whole host of other coastal craft. Three marine divisions which would be the spearhead of any naval power projection capability are also deployed. The expansion plan will transform the Navy from its present coastal status to a blue water force that would be able to operate in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.® (Figure 10)

At the moment the US Navy has a close relationship with the PRC and has already indicated that it has no interest in the Spratly issue. Some US officials have made it known to the Philippines that it would steer clear of any dispute related to the disputed territory.^ At the time of the Paracel incident between the PRC and the RVN troops in January 1974, the US expressed concern but chose not to involve itself in the conflict on the side of the RVN and turned down RVN request for assistances^ During the conflict, one US adviser was captured but later returned by Chinese authorities. Based on past precedent, the US is capable of changing friends Source: I'ACIIK DER-NCI KI I'()IMI:K OCK^HI U I«>HX A-> l^i'gvie 10 • PLA Navy Deployments 93 according to the demands of its own national interests. These were well reflected in its treatment of Japan at the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the abandonment of ROC in preference of the PRC and the withdrawal from the RVN in the 1970's. Therefore, there is some doubt whether the US would side with the Philippines if there were to be a threat to the Kalayaan from the PRC. The presence of the US bases in the Philippines would restrain the PRC from further military action in the Spratlys but the future of the bases is difficult to predict. If the US were to reduce its presence or pull out of its bases in the Philippines, the PRC might be tempted to settle its claim by force."''' The US must also consider the concern of ASEAN nations. Some analysts indicate that the US may not choose to support ASEAN nations on the Spratlys issue due to its own political alignment with China and due to its inability for forward deployment in the Western Pacific as a result of its economic decline in recent years.

In relation to the USSR, there is a possibility that it may take a similar stance as the US. During the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, the USSR sent its Soviet Pacific Fleet into the Gulf of Tonkin but there was no commitment of Soviet troops on behalf of the SRV. Similarly, at the time of the Spratly incident of March, 1988, there was no support from the USSR for the SRV. However, according to Soviet sources, Vietnam made no request to Moscow for assistance.^ ^ The USSR only advised both the parties to solve the problem peacefully. With the current trend towards rapprochment with the PRC, it is doubtful whether the Soviets would support the SRV,^^ if the PRC were to exert its military muscle further in other parts of the archipelago. In fact, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Manila, Aleksander Losiukov, declared that the Spratly Islands have no strategic value to the Soviet Union. 94

The next point of concern for the PRC would be the possible reaction of the members of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore), to the possible southward move of the PRC to occupy the islands currently occupied by Malaysia. The FPDA nations in the past have fulfilled their defence commitments more successfully and they have a good record of reliability, compared to the US or the USSR. If there were to be any indication that the FPDA members would not come to the assistance of Malaysia in the event of a clash between the PRC and Malaysia in the Spratlys, there is the possibility that the PRC would move further southwards to evict Malaysia, to make the South China Sea a Chinese lake.

On 5 May 1988, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that a Chinese naval officer has said that Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines along with Taiwan had occupied China's Spratly Islands in the 1970's, at the time of the Cultural Revolution, when China was unable to defend its national interests. Now with its defence capabilities developed sufficiently, China could consider military force as an option to resolve the dispute. The US 'containment policy' also defined the limits of effective PRC action in the region in the 1970s, providing opportunities for the ROC, RVN and Philippines to move into the Spratlys. At the moment China has not sought to use military power to settle the issue. However, as in the past, Peking has sent warnings, conducted demonstrations of military strength, exchanged diplomatic messages and leaked information pertaining to China's preparedness to indicate the seriousness of its intention before embarking on war."*^

It is evident that China's role in Southeast Asian security affairs is certain to become more significant. While there is some indication that the PRC may agree to negotiate, there are also statements by Chinese Foreign Ministry officials that China would rule out any international 95

mediation in relation to the Spratlys and would insist that its ownership over the islands is non-negotiable.''^

(b) Possibility of Maintaininn The Status Quo. The other likely possibility, at least in the near future, would be the decision by the PRC to maintain the status quo. Currently, the PRC has adopted a friendly foreign policy towards the ASEAN members, especially with an intention to check the influence of the USSR and the SRV in the ASEAN region. If the PRC makes further moves into the area, then it may antagonise the regional block which is very significant to China commercially.''^ In fact, China has been wooing ASEAN assiduously for the last ten years trying to overcome the legacy of distrust generated by its Ideological and material backing during the Mao Tse-tung era of 'wars of national liberation'.^ Similarly, if there is any indication of possible interference either from the US. USSR or the FPDA nations, then the PRC might find it in its interest to maintain the status quo. Some analysts feel that Malaysia would be in a strong position politically to maintain its claims. Its links with ASEAN and the FPDA. they believe, would deter China from attempting politically or military confrontation that could result in action by Malaysia's allies.''® Therefore, given this likelihood, the status quo may be maintained for some time. However, observing Chinese moves in the past, other nations would take measures to improve their defences, especially the navy and the air force. There are already some indications from Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines that they favour the peaceful settlement of the disputes, without including the PRC. As the ROC has indicated its support for the PRC, if there were a clash in the Spratlys between Vietnam and the PRC, the ROC's position in relation to the other claimants is difficult to forecast. 96

(c) Possibilities of Cooperation Among The Other Contestants Against

The PRC.

All the claimants in the Spratlys are fully aware that none of them could match the military might of the PRC individually. In 1974, when the PRC attacked the Paracels, there were some suggestions for cooperation between the ROC, RVN and the Philippines.^ In the future, if there is a real threat from the PRC, collaboration against the PRC might

eventuate. The non-Communist nations, along with the SRV, do not wish to

see China moving close to their shores. Besides the desire to exploit the

likely petroleum resources, it is this fear that motivated some of the

countries to occupy some islands in the group and claim others.^^

(d) Interference Bv The Superpowers.

Given the strategic significance of the region, there is the

likelihood that the superpowers might move into the region to safeguard

their own interests. If the non-communist nations in the region were to

exclude the SRV in their joint reaction to the PRC, then the SRV would be

left alone and would not be in a position to resist the challenge of the PRC.

Without the help of the USSR for the SRV, the PRC could dislodge the SRV

from the Spratlys easily, as the battle would be away from the mainland

and, as in the Falklands War, the victory would be mainly dependent upon

the naval and air power of the contestants. If such a development were to

occur, the position of the USSR in the South China Sea, vis-a-vis the PRC

would be weakened as there is a possibility the PRC could deny passage for

the Soviet fleet with its control of the South China Sea.^^ Therefore the

USSR would not prefer China to achieve its claims successfully. Hence, it

would be in the interest of both the USSR and the SRV to have Soviet

troops in the Spratlys. 97

In 1984, the USSR deployed about 18 TU-16 medium bombers to Cam Ranh Bay. It is expected that these TU-16s and other fighter bombers will be transferred to the Vietnamese air force. This would be a clear threat to the US forces and the SLOCs.

According to the Japanese Self Defence Agency's 1988 White Paper, at present one-third of the entire Soviet forces are stationed in the Far East and there is continuous improvement and expansion. It is also believed that Soviet forces have one-fourth to one-third of their all strategic nuclear missiles including ICBMs and SLBMs, deployed in the Far East, besides various non-strategic nuclear arms. Amongst the non-nuclear arms are medium-range Backfire bombers, sea/air-launched cruise missile and tactical nuclear weapons. The Backfire bombers based on the west of Lake Baikal have combat radius of approximately 4,000 km. and are capable of carrying AS-4 air-to-ground (ship) missiles. In addition the ground forces are equipped with nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), such as FROG and SS-1 SCUD. Furthermore, an Akula class, strike-type nuclear powered submarine was deployed carrying SS-N-21 sea-launched cruising missiles that have been recently in service. The ground force has also been increased since 1965. Approximately 390,000 troops of 43 divisions are deployed in the Far East region. Recently its firepower has been improved through the introduction of T-72 tanks, armoured infantry combat vehicles, surface-to-surface (air) missiles and multiple launch rockets amongst others. The Soviet Pacific Fleet commands about 845 ships and is the largest fleet of the Soviet Navy. It has about 100 major surface combatants and about 140 submarines (about 75 are nuclear powered). The fleet's capability has been modernized by deploying two Kiev class aircraft carriers and nuclear powered submarines such as Delta 111 class SSBNs. Newly built destroyers, such as a Sovremenny class guided-missile destroyer and a Udaloy class 98 guided-missile destroyer have been added recently. The Pacific Fleet also

has the Ivan Rogov class amphibious assault ships and Ropucha class

landing ships. A naval infantry division, the only unit of its kind in the

Soviet Navy, is also assigned to the fleet. Reinforcements have been made

in the merchant ships which can be used for military purposes. A quarter of

Soviet aircraft (2.430), are deployed to the Far East. There are about 470

bombers, about 1,760 fighters and about 200 patrol aircraft. Older types of

are being replaced by higher performance types including TU-22M Backfire

bombers. About 80% of the aircraft are MiG-23/27 Flogger and SU-24

Fencer, MiG-31 Fox-hound and SU-25 Frogfoot.^^

According to the Soviet Military Power 1988 published by the US

Defence Department, the Soviet naval and air presence in the South China

Sea at Cam Ranh Bay has grown during the 1980s and comprises about 25

ships, two to four submarines and nearly 40 reconnaissance, ASW, strike

and fighter aircraft. The Cam Ranh Bay facility is the largest Soviet naval

base outside the Soviet Union. Soviet forces there pose a limited threat to

SLOC to and from the Indian Ocean, and to US bases and forces operating

out of the Philippines.

It is believed that if the USSR were involved in the Spratly issue, it would automatically attract US involvement. In the event of conflict with the USSR, the US is expected to seek the help of Malaysia and

Indonesia to check the Soviet fleet in the Straits of Malacca. Japan, as an ally of the US, would be expected to block Soviet ships in the Soya La

Perouse, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits. In September 1987, the US and

Japan held a joint naval exercise involving such a hypothetical contingency.^^ This possibility is in congruence with the view of the

Soviet Embassy in Manila on 21 April, which warned that the dispute over the Spratlys would erupt into a major international conflict and the claimants should resolve it peacefully.^^ There is a possibility that the 99 Soviet Union, which is searching for oil on behalf of SRV, and the US, on behalf of its oil companies, could be brought face to face in the disputed area in South China Sea by two ancient and bitter enemies.^^

For the US, the South China Sea is strategically and economically of great importance. ASEAN is a fast growing area and it is collectively an important trading partner for the US. The maritime routes that link the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean is important for the US Navy to meet its commitment in Asia and the Persian Gulf. If a conflict were to develop in the Spratlys, the US could be expected to provide military assistance to its allies if it is meant only to deter the Vietnamese or the Soviets.^^

To counter this threat, it is said, the US should keep one US aircraft carrier in the South China Sea at all times. However, for reasons of maintenance and the need to deploy the carriers to 'hotter' areas like the Persian Gulf and Central America, it would not be possible to keep the carrier in the South China Sea at all times. Therefore, it was suggested the US keep its F-111 attack bombers stationed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines as they are comparable to the TU-16 in their performance.^^

It is worth noting that the US did not support its allies in the Spratly claims but it has not repudiated any of them. Thus, it could be seen that as a result of the strategic significance of the South China Sea, somehow the superpowers could be pulled into conflict in the region.

(e) Emergence Of Malay Regionalism. If the PRC becomes dominant in the Spratlys, it is obvious that it would be a threat to the ASEAN nations, possibly with the exception of the Thailand and Singapore which have no claims in the area. China has been claiming that its international border includes most of the South China 100 Sea, including offshore areas which the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia also claim. If the FPDA and the ASEAN were to be perceived as ineffectual, there is the strong likelihood of the emergence of a military front amongst the states of the Malay race, especially between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei (possibly the Philippines) as they have commonality in terms of race, religion, language and ideology as well as a traditional dislike for Chinese hegemonism. There was a move in this direction in 1963, with the formation of MAPHILINDO, but it became defunct within a short period. At the moment, Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed on the ownership of Natuna Island and its offshore islets and they have also mounted a joint naval patrol to deter Vietnam. On 15 November 1983 General Benny Moerdani, Chief of Indonesian Armed Forces, said that Indonesia was ready to help Malaysia, if attacked, refering to Terumbu Layang Layang. He said that 'if Malaysia is pinched, Indonesia will also feel the pain.'^® Such a coalition could provide deterrence against PRC military adventurism in the southern portion of the South China Sea.

In December 1987, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta had set up a Coordinated Operations Control Committee (COCC) to supervise future joint-operation of the armed forces of both countries.^^ It is a reasonable expectation that Brunei, being a Malay state, will align with Malaysia and Indonesia.

(f) Reemeroence of Japan As A Militarv Power. If the PRC were to emerge as primus inter pares in the Spratlys, one of the nations whose interests would be threatened would be Japan as the survival of Japan is dependent upon the sea lanes in the South China Sea which link her with Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and Europe. 101 The Sino-Japanese Treaty between the China and Japan has been in existence since 1978. Although relations between PRC and Japan are cordial, there is also some historical antagonism between the two. Japan has some contested areas with the PRC in the Yellow and East China Sea.

Indeed, Japan had been served notice in the 1970 feud over the Tiao-yu tai

(Senkaku) Islands. The PRC is in sharp disagreement with Japan over the rights to oil and gas deposits presumed to lie within East Asia's continental shelf. In early March 1974, the PRC vehemently denounced

Japan for negotiating an agreement on joint exploitation of the area 'behind

China's back'.^^

With the US increasingly finding forward deployment in the Far

East more costly, it has requested Japan to share the defence of the region.

The US has pressured Japan to assume responsibility for the Sea Lanes of

Communication (SLOC) protection for 1,000 nm. At the same time pressure has been building up in Japan to acquire aircraft carriers to assist its

Maritime Self Defence Forces to safeguard the territorial waters and sea lanes up to 1,000 km from the Japanese mainland.^ Given the long held

Palmerston's maxim that there are no permanent friends or enemies in politics, only permanent interests, and the maxim that a neighbour is always a potential enemy, in my analysis, there is a strong likelihood that

Japan would rearm and reemerge as a regional military power in the near future.

(g) Joint Authority.

Economic and strategic considerations have spurred various nations to advance claims to territories in the Spratlys. The occupation of the islands are such that clear subdivision of boundaries is not possible. In such a situation, international companies are unlikely to be involved in hydrocarbon development as some of the claimants could threaten their investment. In such a situation it would be mutually advantageous to solve 102 the problem. Some argue that a military solution by any single claimant would be undesirable as currently none of the claimants would be able to withstand naval bombardment.^^ Chinese H 6 Badger bombers, which are Pek ing's only combat aircraft capable of reaching the Spratlys from mainland bases, would be of little match for Vietnam's MiG 23 and SU 22 fighters. In addition, China's Navy lacks sophisticated anti-aircraft defences. Si milarly, without air cover, Vietnam's position would be vulnerable to the Chinese Badgers, which are armed with the C 601 air-to-ship missiles. The area of likely combat would be near the maximum range of Vietnam's fighters. Only with Soviet intervention, would Hanoi be in a stronger position. It is said that the reefs and the islands are at or beyond the range of the claimants' bombers and fighters, as none of the claimants have aircraft carriers.^^ The airstrips on certain islands are not long enough for conventional war planes and ground cover and the radars are said to be equally inadequate.

It is also believed that the expected hydrocarbon resources would not be economical to be exploited by a single nation. Similarly, given the nature of military alliances of the nations contesting territory in the Spratlys, no one could forecast the nature of the likely future conflict, if any. A military solution would not provide a panacea that would guarantee peace in the Spratlys.

Therefore, it would be in the interests of all the claimants if a joint authority could be established to explore and exploit the resources of the area. This authority could try to reduce if not eliminate hostility, facilitate exploration and development of resources, facilitate the management of fisheries and environment. Legitimate shipping and international cooperation in scientific research could be allowed by the joint authority. All claimants could be members while others with interests in the region, like Indonesia, USSR, US and Japan could be 103 associate members. They could assist in the exploration or help in mediation if there were to be any disagreement amongst the claimants. With this move it would be possible to freeze the claims, demilitarise the whole region as it would be in the interest of all the parties. The joint-authority could be based on the Antarctic model. There are certain precedents on this even in this region. For instance, Malaysia and Thailand have undertaken joint offshore oil exploitation near their borders. There is also cooperation between Australia and Indonesia in the waters of East Timor. Similar ventures are also carried out in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Japan. At the Third UNCLOS, China proposed the incorporation of a clause on the continental shelf suggesting joint development as an interim alternative to boundary resolution. China and Japan seemed to have explored such a scheme for the Senkaku area.^"^ Paragraph 3, article 74 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea includes some provisional arrangements.^^ These examples could also be adapted for the Spratly situation. A possible formula acceptable to all has to be found. The internationalisation of the Spratlys could be the first step towards the realization of ASEAN's ideals of zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) as well as a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ).

Professor Peter Yu Kien-hong believes rather than waging war, China would be prepared to work with some ASEAN countires for oil and other mineral sources as it needs the capital and technology and does not have the naval capacity to cruise permanently around the Spratlys.^^

It would take a great deal of diplomatic work and much wisdom to achieve this objective. However, a deep commitment to peace, especially by China and Vietnam, would make the task much easier. ASEAN should take this as a proposition worthy of pursuing with the PRC and the SRV, in solving the dispute. 104

(h^ Neootiatinn And Settlement.

Due to the complexity and the intricacy of the issue, lasting peace in the Spratlys can only lie in a negotiated settlement between the claimants. This multilateral solution, however, seems to be closely related with the overall ASEAN-Vietnam-PRC-Soviet relationship. This in turn is related to the settlement of the Kampuchean issue which appears likely, based on recent developments.

The legal status of the South China Sea must also be considered. In the near futu re, bilateral negotiations to delienate economic zones offer the best chance of success as the UNCLOS affirms the right of states to claim a 200 mile EEZ. But the claims overlap. The existence of several bilateral agreements might establish a set of precedents for future multilateral negotiations. They have to find a solution that would be acceptable to all, which would be hard to find. A concerted effort to find a solution at any time would be a better first move, than trying to find an answer by military means which in the end would only contribute to the instability of the region. While there are bilateral moves, there should be an international conference convened by the UN on this matter, as the area is not only significant for the claimants but for the whole world. There is some hope in this direction as leaders of the countries concerned have expressed the view that the issue should be handled by peaceful means.

In February 1974, following the PRC-RVN clash in the Paracels,

Manila informed Saigon and Taipei that the problem could be referred to the United Nations for resolution.^^ On 24 September 1975, the former

Vice-Premier, Den'g Xiaoping and the late Vietnamese General-Secretary,

Le Duan discussed the disputes relating to the Paracels and the Spratlys. In

July 1976, a Vietnamese Deputy Minister declared that the dispute in the 105 Spratlys (and the Paracels) must be settled by negotiation on the basis of mutual understanding and equality.^^

In 1977, when the SRV asserted its sovereignty over the Spratlys, the Vice-President of the PRC, Li Xiannian. while reminding Pham Van Dong of Hanoi's earlier acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty over the islands, called for peaceful means to resolve the problem.^^

In March 1978, both the Philippines and the PRC agreed to establish a military command on Palawan and garrisons on seven Islets. It seemed that China was prepared to accept the de facto ownership of the Philippines by 1987."^^

The PRC has indicated that the issue could be settled through discussion.'^"' In November, 1981 Vietnam submitted a proposal through Laos to the United Nations that if ASEAN agreed to deal with the Indochinese states as a bloc, disputes with Malaysia over the Amboina Cay could be settled promptly.On 17 December 1983 Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach in an interview in Hanoi said that at the moment Vietnam had no plans to take the dispute to the World Court but did indicate that he could not say whether in future Vietnam would not consider such a possibility as Vietnam's policy was always to settle disputes by peaceful means."^^ Vietnam had also indicated that all the differences between the disputants should be settled in accordance with international law and practice in the interest of peace and stability in the region. Vietnam has also agreed with a visiting Philippines Congressional defence group that any dispute between the two countries over the Spratlys should be resolved peacefully. President Corazon Aquino of the Philippines and Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, have reaffirmed an earlier Sino-Philippines agreement to shelve their conflicting claims in the Spratlys indefinitely. 106 On 17 March 1988, Vietnam in its protest note to the PRC proposed that peace talks should be held concerning the Spratlys and the

Paracels. It stated the governments of the two countries should send their representatives to the negotiating table and the level of the delegation, the time and the place for the negotiation would be agreed upon by the two sides. On 18 March 1988, Nhan Dan in its commentary 'Our Just Stand and

Good-Willed Attitude' wrote:

we are awaiting a positive response from the Chinese side

towards Vietnam's constructive proposal. Chinese leader,

Deng Xiaoping said some 12 years and more ago that the two

countries could hold discussion to settle their disputes over

these two archipelagoes; why then, should we not do so

today.

Since to enter into negotiations with Vietnam to settle disputes is to act according to reason, how could the Chinese side not be ready to do so?

Embarking on talks with Vietnamese to solve disputes is to act with reason. Wouldn't China be unprepared?.^"^

On 23 March 1988, Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Dinh Nho Liem, handed over to the Chinese Ambassador, Li Shihchun, a note from the

Vietnamese Foreign Ministry to hand over to the Foreign Ministry of China.

In that note, Vietnam proposed that the two governments should appoint foreign ministerial or vice-ministerial representatives to hold talks in

Beijing at the earliest date to be agreed upon by both sides.^^

Between 28-31 March, the National Defence and Security

Committee of the Philippines House of Representatives headed by Jose C.

Yap visited Vietnam at the invitation of Commission for External Relations of Vietnam's National Assembly. Following discussions both sides agreed:^^ 107

(a) the entire territories of the Philippines Republic and the SRV will not be used by foreign countries as hostile bases to oppose each other.

(b) the Philippines Republic and the SRV will not use force to settle differences including that involving the Spratlys. The only way to solve problems is through holding talks.

(c) the Philippines Republic and the SRV will remain each others friends for ever.

On 19 April 1988. the Malaysian Deputy Foreign Minister. Toh Muda Dr. Fadzil Che Wan after his talk with his Vietnamese counterpart. Iran Quang Co, indicated that Malaysia was prepared to solve the problem through negotiation."^^ On 14 April, the Indonesian Antara News Agency reported that Iran Quang Co had urged all countries that have a stake in the Spratlys to settle it peacefully."^® On 25 April 1988. after his meeting with the Philippines Foreign Affairs Undersecretary. Manual Yan and Iran Quang Co. the Deputy Vice-Foreign Minister of Vietnam, urged the creation of an organisation that would unify the whole of Southeast Asia and diffuse tensions in the region. In response to a question whether Vietnam wished to become a member of ASEAN, he said that Vietnam wished that the whole of Southeast Asia had only one organisation. He also said that Vietnam support ASEAN's concept of ZOPFAN."^^ On 27 April, he said that Hanoi was willing to sign a non-aggression pact with ASEAN and said that Vietnam wished to solve the Spratlys issue through peaceful means and not to use military force.^^ In a note that the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry sent to Malaysia on 7 September, 1988 in protest of Malaysia's occupation of Terumbu Layang Layang, Vietnam also indicated that differences should 108 be settled through negotiation.^'' On 15 Septennber, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines was reported to have told the Manila Rotary Club members that China was willing to hold peaceful talks on its claim over the Spratlys.^^ On the same day, President Corazon Aquino confirmed that Philippines would meet Malaysia on the Kalayaan islands issue.^^ Malaysia and the Philippines, as members of ASEAN, could use their influence in ASEAN with the PRC and other interested parties.The Organisation of Solidarity of the People's of Africa, Asia and Latin America had also voiced its hope that both China and Vietnam would be able to solve the differences through peaceful negotiations. On 28 March, all ASEAN nations called for a negotiated settlement in the Spratlys. The US and the USSR are also in favour of peaceful settlement of the disputes.^^ On 28 March, Pravda supported the proposal of Vietnam. On 29 March, the head of the Information Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. Gerasimov, said that the Soviet Union supports Vietnam's peace moves to settle the differences with China through negotiations.^^ Four of the claimants are good friends of the US and that would enable the US to play a role as diplomatic intermediary. As the USSR is trying hard to develop friendship with the ASEAN countries, it could persuade the SRV to place more emphasis on peaceful means to solve the disputes. Thus, in the midst of all the potential for conflict, there are also some indications that the dispute could be solved by peaceful means.

6 .CONCLUSION. At the moment there are five countries with garrisons in the Spratlys -the PRC, ROC, SRV, Philippines and Malaysia. Given the situation, open warfare is a likely consequence as each claimant seems to become more rigid in its claim. It is also a reminder that peace and security of Asia hangs on a delicate thread. The possibilities of any agreement in the near future seem to be remote but not unlikely. If the present situation were to continue in the Spratlys, a military conflict would be difficult to 109 avoid. The PRC, as the most powerful military nation in the region, would determine the direction of events in the islands. If the PRC cannot be deterred, there is a strong likelihood it would move further south into the South China Sea to convert it into a Chinese lake. In such a situation, the PRC would reemerge as the most dominant maritime power in Asia, as in the past. This could increase instability in the region as it may become a threat to the non-Communist nations in the region, especially Malaysia, Indonesia. Singapore, Philippines and Brunei. This in turn could result in an arms race amongst these" nations as there are mutual conflicts, suspicion and distrust amongst themselves. If there is an effective deterrent, the PRC may conclude that it is too costly to exert its military muscle in the area. The PRC may find it in its interests to maintain the status quo. But that may have the effect of prolonging the issue. It would be a mere postponement of the problem. However, it would be a good short-term solution as it would give time for the claimants to consider peaceful means to overcome the dispute. Given the nature of the dispute, there may be no easy solution to the problem but there should be a concerted effort by all the parties who have interests in the region to find an answer that would bring peace and stability to the area. An effort towards a joint authority might be a possible and desirable move that would reduce tension. A delay in this direction could only worsen the situation, as the claims become more rigid and complex.

However, there is some hope for a peaceful solution, as all claimants have indicated their desire to find a solution through peaceful negotiation. The chances of success are also greater as all other parties with an interest in the region are also in favour of a peaceful solution. However, the direction of the solution is certainly in the hands of the leadership of the claimant nations. There should be a concerted commitment and effort to avoid the use of military force. The leaders of these nations should take the interest of the whole region into 110 consideration rather than their own nationa! interest. The PRC as the most powerful nation amongst the claimants has to show its centuries old wisdom, while the SRV should take this as an opportunity to cement its relationship with other nations in the region. The leaders of the claiming nations should realise that use of violence would not give a lasting peace but only bitter memories that would breed enmity for long. Seeking by violence to solve a common problem would not reflect on the leaders as civilised men. They should totally dismiss war as a means to solve the issue and take measures to find an answer that would be acceptable to all. The UN rather than being an observer should take more concrete steps to resolve the matter and bring peace to the region. 111

Footnote?. 1. PDR, Annual Defence Edition 1989. p. 50.

2. Samuels. Marwyn S., Contest for the South China Sea, Mathuen, New York. 1982. p. 148

3. Asiaweek, 5 June 1981. 4. Dzurek, Daniel J.. "Boundary Resource Disputes In South China Sea" in Borgese, E.M.. and Ginsburg, N., Ocean Yearbook 5, University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London, 1985. p. 273.

5. SWB FE/0324 i 2 December 1988. 6. JDW, 8 April 1989. p. 583. 7. Mi., 18 March 1989. p. 429. 8. PDR, Annual Defence Edition 1989. p. 51. 9. Jara, Manola B., "Boundary Disputes In South China Sea", Business Times, Kuala Lumpur, 2 May 1983.

^0.Canberra Times, 21 January 1974. 11. James A. Gregor, " The Key Role of US Bases in the Philippines", The Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Centre, Backgrounder, No. 7, 10 January, 1984.

12. JDW, 28 May 1988. p. 1072.

13. Buszynski, Leszek, ASEAN: Security Issues of the 7950s, Working Paper No. 165, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Reasearch School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. 1988. p. 8.

14.FEE/?, 5 May 1988. p. 23.

15. Richardson, Michael, "Storm Signals In The Spratlys No. 1- Revived Fears of Chinese Expansion", PDR, May, 1988. p. 5.

16. Buszynski, op. cit.

17. Palmer, Ronald D. and Reckford, Thomas J., Buiding ASEAN, 20 Years of Southeast Asian Cooperation, New York, 1987. p. xiv. 112 18. Cloughly, Brian, "South China Sea Confrontation", JDIV, 28 May 1988. p. 1073. 19. Samuels, o^. dl-, p. 105. 20. Richardson, o^. di., p.5. 21. Katchen, Martin H., "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: Dangerous Ground for Asian Peace", Asian Survey , Vol. xvii. No. 12 December 1977. p. 1177. 22. XVII Question and Answers, Answer to question 176, Kim Beazley, DFA Backgrounder, 19 March 1985. 23. World Report, Vol. 2, No. 12, 18 April 1988. p. 4. 24. FBIS-EAS-88-077 21 April 1988. p.53. 25. Valencia, Mark, "Oil In Trouble Water", FEER, 15 March 1984. p. 31. 26. Fisher, Richard D.. "Brewing Conflict In The South China Sea", Backrounder, Asia Studies Centre, Heritage Foundation. Washington, 27 October 1984. p. 10. 27. p. 11. 28. Despatch from Kuala Lumpur, Kompass, 17 November 1983. 29. FEER, 24 November 1988. pp. 23-24. 30. Newsweek, 4 March 1974. 31. JDW, 18 March 1989. p. 429. 32. Valencia, Mark, "A Cooperative Regime Could Be The Solution. Maritime Claims Bedevil The Spratly Islands", Centerviews, May/June 1989. p. 3. 33. Cushing, Jerry, "The Dragon's Long Reach. China Flexes its Muscles In The Spratlys At Hanoi's Expense", FEER, 5 May 1988. p. 25. 34. Valencia, QJ^. iiit., p. 33. 35. Kim Chung, Le. "The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Her Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) In Relations With Neighbouring Countries in Southeast Asia", SRV 8, 1987. 36. Hoon, Shim Jae, "Blood Thicker Than Politics. Taiwan Indicates A Military Preparedness To Back China", FEER, 5 May 1988. 37. Samuels, QQ.. oil., p. 104. 113 38. Pao-min, Chang., "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", Asian Pacific Community, Spring 1980, No. 8. p. 229. 39. BR, Vol. 22. No. 13, 30 March 1979. p. 22. 40. Cloughly, Brian, p. 1073. 41. Pao-min, Chang, oil., p. 155. 42. Valencia,Mark, "Oil In Trouble Waters", QSi.. cii., p. 30. 43. Katigbak, Jose, "Spratlys. Paracels, Disputes May Go To World Court", The Nation Review (Bangkok), p. 17. 44. FBIS-EAS-88-053 18 March 1988. p. 45. 45. FBIS-EAS-88-056 23 March 1988. p. 62. 46. SWB FE/0116 A 3/1 4 April 1988. 47. FBIS-EAS-88-076 20 April 1988. p. 24. 48. FBIS-EAS-88-072 14 April 1988. p. 37. 49. FBIS-EAS-88-079 25 April 1988. p. 43. 50. FBIS-EAS-88-081 27 April 1988. p. 35. 51. SWB Monitoring Report FE/7434/i 9 September 1983. 52. SWB FE/0259 i 17 September 1989. 53. SWB FE/0259 A 3/6 17 September 1988. 54. FBIS-EAS-88-059 28 March 1988. p. 49. 55. Fisher, cil-, pp. 8 and 10. 56. FBIS-EAS-062 31 March 1988. p. 49. 114

BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS. 1. Buszynski, Leszek, Asean: Security Issues of the 1990's, Working Paper No. 165, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. The Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1988. 2. Clark Andrey N., Longman Dictionary of Geography, Human and Physical, Longman Group UK Ltd., Essex, 1985. 3. Court, Dianne and Mediansky F. A., The Soviet Union In Southeast Asia, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1984. 4. Dzurek, Daniel J, "Boundary and Resource Disputes in South China Sea" in Borgese, Elisabeth Mann and Ginsburg, Norton, Ocean Year Books, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1985. 5. Prescott J.R.V., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Methuen , London & New York, 1985. 6. Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest for the South China Sea, Methuen, London & New York, 1982. 115

B. DOCUMENTS. OFFICIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.

7. Defence of Japan 1988, Defence White Paper, Japan.

8. Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement (VNA-May 19, 1988),

Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Canberra. 9. Hoang Sa And Truong Sa Archipelagoes and International Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hanoi, April 1988.

10. News Bulletin, The Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Canberra, 25 March, 1988. 11. Press Release. Summarized Developments on Truong Sa (Spratley) Archipelago Between 14 March and 6 April, 1988, Embassy of

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Canberra. 12. Press Release, Vietnam's National Assembly Statement On Sovereignty of Offshore Islands, Embassy of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Canberra. 13. The Kalayaan Islands, Ministry of Defence, Series One. Monograph No. 4. Secretariat to the Cabinet Committee on the Law of the Sea Treaty, ISBN 971-152-004-4, Development Academy of the Philippines Press, 1982. 14. Socialist Republic of Vietnam Stand on Paracels, Spratlys Supported, Phnom Penh SPK in French, 6 June, 1984.

15. Soviet Military Power. An Assessment of The Threat 1988, Department of Defence, United States of America, 1988. 16. Statement by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Encik Abdul Kadir bin Haji Sheikh Fadzir on Terumbu Layang Layang on 9 September, 1983, Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Volume 16, No. 3, September 1983.

17. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, 17 March 1988. (unofficial translation).

18. The Hoang Sa And Truong Sa Archipelagoes. Vietnamese Territories, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1981. 116

19. White Paper On The Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam, Saigon, 1975. 117

C. ARTICLES. Articles with authors are in alphabatical order. Unattributed articles are according to dates of publication.

20. Belluck, Pam, "Free For All Islands ?", Nation, 23 May 1987. 21. Chanda, Nayan, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry, Islands of Friction PEER, 12 December 1975. 22 . "The Deep Freeze", FEER, 14 June 1984. 23.Cheung, Tai Ming, "Looking Outwards: expanding Sino-Foreign Military Relations", PDR, February 1988. 24 . . "China No. 2 - Challenge to US and Soviet interests in Asia", PDR 1989 Annual Reference Edition. 25. , "Enemy Spotting Malaysia Buys Military Muscles At Last To Defend Itself", FEER, 24 November 1988. 26. Cushing, Jerry, " Beached Again On Shoals, Sino-Vietnamese Relations Deteriorate Over Spratlys", FEER, 17 March 1988. 27 . , The Dragon's Long Reach. China Flexes Its Muscles In The Spratlys At Hanoi's Expense FEER, 5 May 1988. 28 . , Tension Lies Around Paracels and Spratlys", JDW, 25 May 1985. 29 . . "No-2- Challenge For Vietnam", PDR, May 1988. 30. Das, K., "Perched On A Claim", FEER, 29 September 1983. 31. Donner, Fred, "Disputed Islands", FEER, 28 April 1988. 32. Fisher, Richard D., "Brewing Conflict In The South China Sea", Backgrounder, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation, Washington, 25 October 1984. 33. , "The Siddharta Disappearance", FEER, 28 April 1983. 34. Grazebrook, A. W., "The Chinese Maritime Force", PDR, June 1978. 118 35. Greene, Dorian D., "Chinese Strategy In The South China Sea". Defence and Foreign Affairs, October/November 1988. 36. Gregor, A. James, 'The Key Role of US Bases In The Philippines", The Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Centre. Backgrounder No. 7. 10 January 1984. 37. Han, Bradley, "Maritime Dangers In South China Sea", PDR, May 1985. 38 . "Ch ina Third Ranking Maritime Power-And Growing" , PDR, October 1988. 39. Hiebert, Murray, " Vietnam and China Clash Over Disputed Islands", PEER, 24 March 1988. 40 . No, Not Another War, Hanoi Calls For Talks, But Beats The Drums of Fear", PEER, 5 May 1988. 41. Hoon, Shim Jae, "Blood Thicker Than Politics. Taiwan Indicates A Military Preparedness To Back China", PEER, 5 May 1988. 42. Jara, Manola B., " Boundary Disputes In South China Sea", Business Times, Kuala Lumpur, 2 May 1983. 43. Jenkins, David,. Tetroleum Funds Fuel Disputes Over The South China Sea. Trouble Over Oil And Waters", PEER, 7 August 1981. 44. , The Spratlys A 2,000-Year-Old Claim", PEER, 7 August 1981. 45. Katchen, Martin H., 'The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: 'Dangerous Grounds' For Asian Peace", Asian Survey, Vol. xviii No. 12 December 1977. 46. Katigbak, Jose, " Spratlys, Paracels Dispute May Go To World Court", The Nation Review (In English), 17 December 1983. 47. Kelfors, Sheilah Ocampo, "Easing Toward Conflict", PEER, 28 April 1983. 48. Kim Chung, Le, " The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and her Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) In Relation With Neighbouring Countries In Southeast Asia", SRV August 1987. 119 49. Know, Captain I. W., "Contennporary Develpoments In The Law Of The Sea", The Australian Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1,

April 1978. 50. Liu, Melinda and George Lauriat, " Territorial Disputes Pouring Trouble On Oily Waters FEER, 28 September 1979.

51. Loi, Quang. "Vietnam's Indisputable Sovereignty Over The Hoang Sa

and Truong Sa Archipelago", Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. 52. Long, Jay H., "The Paracel Incident: Implications For Chinese Policy", Asian Affairs, March/April, No. 4, 1974.

53. Milivojevic, Marko, "The Spratly and Paracel Islands Conflict", Survival, January/February 1989. 54. Pao-min, Chang, "The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", Asian Pacific Community, Spring 80, No. 8. 55. , "Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute", manuscript in Thayer Collection. 56. Richardson, Michael, " Taming Wild Cat", FEER, 28 April 1983. 57. ."Eyewitness at the dragon's mouth", PDR, June 1983. 58 . , "Storm Signals In The Spratlys. No. 1- Revived Fears of Chinese Expansion", PDR, May 1988.

59 . , "Cambodia and the Bangkok-Beijing Connection",

PDR, February 1989. 60 . , "Year of Uncertainty", PDR, 1989 Annual Reference Edition. 61. Sacerdoti, Guy, "Foreign Relations. Smoothing Troubled Waters", FEER, 12 December 1980. 62. Sutopo, A. R, "Tensions In The Spratly Islands", The Indonesian Quartely xvi/3 ,

63.Tasker, Rodney, "Stake-Out In The Spratlys", FEER, 24 February,

1978. 120

"Calculating The Risk Factor. A Chinese Invasion Would Imperil Good ASEAN Relations". FEER, 5 May 1988. 65. Valencia, Mark, "The 5th Column, All-For-Everyone Solution", FEER, 30 March 1989.

" Oil Under The Troubled Waters", FEER, 15 March 1984. _,"A Cooperative Regime Could Be The Solution. Maritime Claims Bedevil The Spratly Islands", Centerviews, May/June 1989.

68. Zhiping. Yin. "China's Sovereignty Over The Nansha Islands Indisputable" BR, Vol. 37, No. 21. 23-29 May 1988. 69. "Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian's Talks With Premier Pham Van Dong, June 10, 1977". BR, No. 13. Vol. 22. 30 March 1979. 70. "The Truth About the Sino-Vietnamese Boundary Question". BR No. 21. Vol. 22. 25 May 1979. 71. "China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands". BR, No. 7, 8 February 1980. 72. "False Claims To China's Islands. On Vietnamese Foreign Ministry's White Book", BR, No. 28. 12 July 1982. 73. "China and South China Sea", Strategy Week, July 19-25, 1982, Vol. viii. No. 28, Number 112, 1982. 74. "Spat Over The Spratlys", FEER, 17 September 1982. 75. "Claims Disputing The Islands", Asiaweek, 3 December 1982. 76. "Malaysia Quarrel Over Little Island", Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 5, 31 October 1983. 77. "Indonesia To Help Malaysia If Attacked", Kompas, Jakarta 17 November 1983. 78. "Islands In The Sea", FEER Asia 1984 Yearbook. 121 79. "Exploring For Oil In South China Sea". BR, No. 10, Vol. 27, 5 March 1984. 80. "Spratly Build-up", FEER, 21 June 1984. 81. "Vietnam Must Quit Nansha Islands". BR, Vol. 31, No. 12. 21-27 March 1988. 82. "Vietnam and China Clash Over Disputed Islands", PEER, 24 March 1988. 83. "Report on the Work of the Government (Delivered at First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on 25 March, 1988), Li Peng, Acting Premier of the State Council, BR. Vol. 31, No. 17, 25 April-1 May 1988. 84.''Disputed Islands", FEER, 28 April 1988. 85.''Communist Ships Clash In Sea Battle Over South China Sea Islands". World Report, Vol. 2, No. 12, 18 April 1988. 86. "Watch The Spratlys", PDR, May 1988. 87. "Relieved Ally". FEER, 2 June 1988. 88. "Beijing's Designs As Revealed By Its Recent Action In The Truong Sa", Vietnam Courier, No. 5, 1988. 89. "China Continues Hostile Acts At Truong Sa", Vietnam Weekly, 2 May 1988. 90. "Asiaweek Eyewitness, Hot Spot", Asiaweek, 13 May 1988. 91. "Some International Documents Related To The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelago", Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. 92. "Statement Of The External Relations Commission Of The SRV National Assembly", Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. 93. "Notes Of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The SRV To The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The PRC", Vietnam Courier, No.6, 1988. 94. "China's New Crimes In The Truong Sa Archipelago", Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. 95. "Supplies For Truong Sa", Vietnam Courier, No. 6, 1988. 122

96. "Foreign Relations", FEER, Asia Yearbook 1989.

97. "Spratlys Engagement", PEER, 30 Marcii 1989.

98. "Spratlys Tensions", FEER, 25 May 1989.

99. "Spratlys Engagement", PEER, 30 March 1989.

100. "Spratly Tensions", FEER, 25 May 1989. 123

D. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS. Asia Research Bulletin. Asian Pacific Community. Asiaweek Australian. Backgrounder, Asian Studies Centre. Beijing Review. Business Times (Kuala Lumpur). Canberra Times. Centerviews (Honolulu). Far Eastern Economic Review. Jane's Defence Weekly. New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur). Newsweek. New York Times. Pacific Defence Reporter (Australia). Strategic Week. Sunday Times (Kuala Lumpur). Sydney Morning Herald. The Age (Melbourne). Vietnam Courier. Washington Post. Washington Times. West Australian.

E. RADIO MONITORING SERVICES. US FBIS Daily Report (East Asia and Pacific). British Broadcasting Corporation Summary World Broadcast Pt.3 Far East. 1

F. DATA BASE.

World Reporter.

G. THAYER COLLECTION. South China Sea, Paracel and Spratly Islands, 1 Volume; Paracel and Spratly Islands, 1 file, held at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. This is a collection of published, and unpublished material relating to the Paracel and Spratly Islands gathered by Dr. C. A. Thayer covering the period from 1974. Among the materials included: copies of published journal articles; copies of selected cuttings from the Australian, the US and Southeast Asian regional press; unpublished conference papers; transcripts of radio reports from the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts and the US FBIS' Daily Report, and other material. 125 Appendix A

A. The Western Spratlvs. All of the most important islands of the archipelago are located on the western edge of the archipelago. They are:

(a) The North Danger Reef. It is located at latitude 11° 28' N.. longitude 114° 20' E. The outer reef acts as the north-western boundary of the archipelago and consists of 2 small cays. The North Danger Reef area is a favoured fishing ground for Chinese, Vietnamese and other fishermen.

fi) Northeast Cay. It is 1 km long and 0.4 km wide, and is covered with grass and trees.

(ii) Southwest Cav. It is 0.5 km long and 0.3 km wide. There is fresh water, abundant grass and brush.

(b) Trici^nt $hQal. Located about 16 nautical mile (nm), (30 km) east of North Danger Reef. It is about 7.5 nm (14 km) long and 6 nm (11 km) across.

(c) Lys Shoal, Located 2 nm (4 km) south of Trident Shoal. It is about 5 nm (9 km) long.

The North Danger Reef, Trident Shoal and the Lys Shoal act together to delineate the north-western boundary of the Spratly archipelago.

(d^ Thi Tu Island and Reef. It is located at 11^ T N., longitude 114° 16' E. The island and reef constitute a small 'reef arch' including 2 atolls:

(i) Thi Tu Island. It is about 1.5 km long and 1km wide. It is covered with vegetation and has abundant fresh water.

(ii^ Sandy Cav. A tiny islet located in the same lagoon as Thi Tu Island.

(e) . It is located at latitude 10® 55' N., longitude 114° 6' E. The reef is about 2 km south of Thi Tu Island. The reef forms an almost perfect 126 circle about 4 km across. There are no breaks in the reef, and the surrounding coral outcropping is extremely dangerous to ships.

(n Loai Ta Island & Reef. Located at latitude 10° 42' N., longitude 114° 25' E. It is roughly 21 nm (39 km) long and about 7 nm (13 km) across. It includes one major island and one major cay or sand bank. They are:

(i) Loai Ta Island. It is only 0.3 km long and covered with vegetation, including a mangrove swamp.

(ii) Lam Kiam Cav. It is about 7 nm (13 km) northeast of Loai Ta Island. It is about 4 nm. (7 km) long.

(g) Tizard Banks & Reefs, It is located at latitude 10° 22' N., longitude 114° 22' E. The reef complex is about 30 nm. (56 km) long and at its widest point, stretches about 8 nm. (15 km) across. It includes 2 principal islands and 3 main reefs:

(!) Itu Aba Island. It is located at latitude 10° 22' N., longitude 114° 22' E., and is located in the northwest corner of Tizard Bank. It is 1 km. long and 0.4 km wide. It is rich with vegetation and fresh water is available. Historically, it has been a major guano mining site.

(ii) Nam Yit Island. It is located at latitude 10° 11' N., longitude 114° 21' E. It is situated just south of Itu Aba Island. It is about 0.5 km long, has abundant fresh water and is covered with vegetation.

Gavan Reef. It is located in the southwestern corner of Tizard Bank, and southwest of Itu Aba Island.

(iv) Petley Cay, It is located at the far northwest tip of Tizard Bank. The Petley Reef is about 10 nm. (19 km) north of Itu Aba Island. It is extremely dangerous for fishing vessels and receives good rain.

(v) Sand Cav. It is located at about 6 nm (11 km) east of Itu Aba Island and it is thickly covered with grass. The passage between Sand Cay and Itu Aba Island is extremely shallow and a major shipping hazard. 127

(8) Great Discnvftry Rppf It is at latitude 10° r N., longitude 113^ 51' E., and located at the southwest of the Tizard Bank. It is about 7 nm (13 km) long.

(9) Lesser Discovery Repf Located about 10 miles east of Great Discovery Reef.

(10) Flora Temple or West Rppf It is at latitude 10° 15' N., longitude 113° 37' E. It is located about 17 nm (32 km) west-north-west of Great Discovery Reef and is about 1 km long.

(11) Fiery Cro^.^ R^^f It is located at about 55 nm (101 km) southwest of Great Discovery Reef and is about 14 nm (26 km) long. There are several inner reefs within the atoll lagoon. Entrance to the lagoon is possible through an opening at the southwest corner.

(12) Dhaull Shoal. It is located at latitude 9° 32' N., longitude 112° 24' E. and lies about 54 km west of Fiery Cross Reef.

(13) Hie London Reef Complex. It is located at latitude 8° 51' North, longitude 112° 12' East and is 21 nm (39 km) north of the Spratly Island. It composed of the following four reefs.

(\) West Reef About 4 nm (7 km) across, the lagoon is open in southeast corner. A tiny sand cay lies in the centre of the reef.

(ii) Central Reef. It is located about 8 nm (15 km) northeast of West Reef and is only about 1 km across.

(iii) Cuarterpn Rg^f. It is located about 9 km (17 km) southeast of East Reef. It is about 3 nm (6 km) long.

(iv) East Reef. Located about 16 nm (30 km) east of West Reef. It is about 7 nm (13 km) long and 4 km wide. 128

(14) Soratlv l.^lnnH It is also known as Storm Island. It is located at latitude 8° 38' North, longitude 111 ^ 55' East. It is 0.75 km long and 0.4 km wide and covered with vegetation and has abundant fresh water. There are two good bays on the northern and northeastern coast, one being 4 fathoms and the other 7-8 fathoms deep.

(15) Ladd Reef. It is at 8° 40' N., longitude 111° 40 ' E., located about 30 km west of the Spratly Island. The reef is about 3 nm (6 km) long and 1 nm (2 km ) wide.

(16) Owen Shoal. Located about 25 nm (46 km ) south of the Spratly Island.

(17) Amboina Shoal or Cav. It is located at 7"^ 52' N., longitude 112° 55' E., and is about 60 km southeast of Owen Shoal. The cay is covered with vegetation.

(18) Bombay Castle. It is located at 7° 56' N., longitude 111° 42' E.

(19) Orleans Shoal. It is located about 30 km south of Bombay Castle.

(20) Kinoston Shoal. It is located about 20 km southwest of Orleans Shoal.

(21) Rifleman Bank. It is located about 42 nm (78 km) directly south of Ladd Reef and 20 km west of Orleans Shoal. It is quite large, about 30 nm (56 km) long and 13 nm (24 km) wide.

(22) Alexandra Bank. It Is located about 100 km northeast of Rifleman Bank, and is about 5 nm (9 km) long and 3.5 nm (6 km) wide.

(23) Gringer Bank. It is located about 5 nm (9 km) southwest of Alexandra Bank. 129 (24) Prince of Rp^nk, It is located at latitude 8° 9' N., longitude 110° 27' E. It is about 4 nm (7 km) northwest of Alexandra Bank and is about 14 nm (26 km) long and 7 nm (13 km) wide.

(25) Prince Consort Bank It is located about 50 km southwest of Prince of Wales Bank and is about 16 nm (30 km) long and about 9 nm (17 km) wide.

(26) Vanguard Bank. It is located at latitude 7° 30' N., longitude 109° 55' E. It is about 16 nm (30 km) southwest of Gringer Bank and about 20 km south of Prince Consort Bank. It is about 34 nm (63 km) long and 6 nm (11 km) wide. Vanguard Bank, Prince of Wales Bank and Prince Consort Bank together constitute the western most points of the Spratlys and serve as the southwestern boundary for the archipelago as a whole.

(B) The Southern Shoals. Some ten reefs and shoals act as the southern boundary of the Spratly archipelago. They are important as shipping hazards.

(1) Frigndship Sho^i. It is located at latitude 5° 59 ' N., and longitude 112° 32' E.

(2) North Luconia Shnal. It is located about 2 km south of Friendship Shoal. It is about 190 km west of Brunei.

(3) Seahorse Breakers. It is located at the southern tip of North Lucanio Shoal.

(4) South Luconia Shoal. It is located about 15 km south of Seahorse Breakers and consists of five small submerged atolls.

(5) Herald Reef. It is located immediately south of South Luconia and is about 155 km west of the Tanjong Peninsular Sarawak.

(6) Sierra Blanca. It is located 1 km south of Herald Reef.

(7) James Shoal. 130 It is located at latitude 4° N., longitude 112° 15' E. It is about 160 km west of the Sarawak coast and about 350 km east of the Indonesian island of Natuna Besar (on the same latitude). It is the southern most point of the Spratly archipelago.

(8) Lousia Reef. It is located at latitude 6° 10' North, longitude 113° 14' East. Movement southward from the Palawan Passage must by-pass this reef via one of the two routes: the Friendship Shoal-Lousia Reef Channel or the Lousia Reef-Royal Charlottee Reef Channel.

(9) Roval Charlottee Reef. It is located about 42 nm (78 km) northwest of Louisia Reef.

(10) Swallow Rgef. It is located about 27 nm (50 km) northeast of Royal Charlottee Reef. Passage between Royal Charlottee Reef and the Swallow Reef is extremely dangerous due to many submerged sands and rocks.

(C) The Dangerous Area. This area is extremely dangerous for shipping. Charts for the area are poor to non-existent. It consists of numerous uncounted shoals, reefs and rocks. The main ones are:

(1) Ardasier Breakers. it is located at latitude 7° 36' North. longitude 114° 10' East.

West York Island. It is located about 50 km southeast of Lys Shoal.

(3) Union Bank and Reefs. It is located about 30 km southeast of Tizard Bank and about 25 km south of Lessor Discovery Reef. This group of banks and reefs includes one small island named Sin Cowe Island. 131 (4) Reeci BanK. It is located at the far northeastern corner of the Dangerous area. It acts as the northeastern boundary of the Spratly archipelago.

(D) Eastern Spratlvs. There are approximately 11 major shoals and atolls on the eastern margins of the Spratly archipelago which act to shape the western edge of the Palawan Passage. Most of those on the northeastern edge are controlled by the Philippines. The remainder are unoccupied. Academy Library Spratlys: an area of future conflict or peace? / thesis 1989 Narayanan BARCODE: 428657