Bernard Lonergan's the Triune
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Bernard Lonergan’s The Triune God: Systematics1 Copyright © Lonergan Institute for the “Good Under Construction” 2009 Chapter 1 The Goal, the Order, and the Manner of Speaking 1. The Goal Lonergan begins his study of the theology of the Trinity on a methodological note. He begins by clearly distinguishing systematic theology from dogmatic theology.2 The difference or distinction between the two has roots which can be traced to Aquinas and a differentiation which he achieved when, in his day, he clearly distinguished between these two basic kinds of theology. Dogmatic theology has to do with affirming truths of the faith and with providing arguments which demonstrate why it is reasonable to believe that a particular dogma is true and why also it is unreasonable to hold a contrary thesis. Every well rounded discussion about a particular issue in dogmatic theology presents both kinds of arguments. Systematic theology, on the other hand, attends to a species of analysis which seeks a greater understanding about what has been already professed in the dogmas that one believes in. The object is intelligibility, the meaning of received truths. Recall the Augustinian maxim: “I believe in order to understand.” Credo ut intelligam. In systematics, a different kind of question is asked. Instead of asking “why is this true?” or “how can this be true?”, one asks “what is the meaning of this particular truth?” or “how does the meaning of this truth relate to the meaning of this other truth?” “How do these things fit together?” How, for instance, can we speak about the reality of our human freedom and our need for grace if, as human beings, we are to be saved?3 One wants to grasp a 1Please note that this compilation of notes on the first chapter of Lonergan’s The Triune God: Systematics was written to help beginners – persons who are attempting to work through Lonergan’s theology of the Trinity with little or no previous understanding of Lonergan’s philosophy and theology. Lonergan’s theology of the Trinity is seeped in Aquinas and, by using Aquinas to help explain Lonergan’s own thought, one has a perhaps useful tool in aid of better understanding the significance of Lonergan’s own contribution – how it builds on the earlier work of Aquinas and how it works from a more nuanced understanding of human cognition in a way which reveals why a systematic theology of the Trinity can continue to work from a heuristic that is grounded in the meaning of psychological analogies if one wants to move toward a more profound understanding of divine things as this applies to the Christian doctrine of God. Please note, however, that this text should not be read as a substitute for not working or reading through Lonergan's original text as this is given in his The Triune God: Systematics. One works and reads through Lonergan's text with the possible help that can be given through consulting these explanatory notes. In preparing this edition, special thanks are owed to Mr. Anthony Russo and Mr. Ron Shady for all the proofreading which they had done and for their suggestions about how things can be explained in a better way. In order to improve the quality of anything that is said in these notes, it would be an act of charity if you, as a reader, would contact us to inform us of any errors which have been overlooked or which have somehow crept in as a consequence of any misinterpretation or lack of understanding. If the work of theology can be regarded in its own right as a vocation, this is especially verified in the experience which we have of our having always to move toward a deeper understanding of many different issues. Every experience of understanding seems to suggest that there is more to be understood. 2See also J. Michael Stebbins, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 3-4, for an account on what Lonergan has to say about the difference between dogma and speculation. 3Stebbins, Divine Initiative, p. 28. 2 greater whole of some kind which can reveal a greater significance in the faith that one professes, a significance which raises one’s understanding to reveal an absence of contradiction in the truths of faith which one professes (an absence of contradiction which encourages a living of faith which is both fuller and more authentic).4 Recall a decree issued by the First Vatican Council on the relation between faith and reason entitled, Dei Filius. As Lonergan quotes from De Filius (4th paragraph of chapter 4 “On faith and reason”) on the kind of understanding which is the object of systematic theology: Reason illuminated by faith [ratio per fidem illustrata], when it inquiries diligently, piously, soberly, reaches with God’s help [Deo dante] some extremely fruitful understanding of the mysteries both in virtue of the analogy of things it knows naturally and in virtue of the interconnection of the mysteries with one another [nexus mysteriorum inter se] and with man’s last end.5 In often frequently referring to De Filius, Lonergan argues that, while an exhaustive understanding of divine things is never given to us in this life (to our created human understanding), any advance whatever in our understanding is of the greatest value for us as we can be changed by our understanding in a way which can help us live better, more joyful lives.6 What is broken and wounded 4Stebbins, Divine Initiative, pp. 29-30. 5Bernard Lonergan, “Doctrinal Pluralism,” Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980, eds. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Express, 2004), p. 90. See also Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 321, where this same issue is discussed. See also Philip A. Egan, Philosophy and Catholic Theology: A Primer (Collegeville, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2009), pp. 10-16, for a fuller explanation about the relation which exists between faith and reason as this is given to us and taught by the First Vatican Council. In reason illuminated by faith, we have the work of theology. “Faith finds the scientific expression of its content in theology.” On the other hand, when reason is viewed apart from faith, we have the “various sciences”: “reason expresses its knowledge in the various sciences...the different 'profane' sciences.” Cf. Giovanni B. Sala, “1. The Encyclical Letter “Fides et ratio”: A Service to Truth,” Vernuft und Glaube, p. 40. 6See Aquinas argues in the Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 8, 49-50: It is useful for the human mind to exercise itself with such reasons, however weak they are [utile tamen est ut in huiusmodi rationibus, quantumcumque debilibus, se mens humana exerceat], provided there be not presumptuous attempt to comprehend or demonstrate. For the ability to perceive something of the highest realities, if only with feeble, limited understanding, gives the greatest joy... Cf. Gilles Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person Thomistic Essays (Naples, Florida: Sapientia Press, 2007), p. 71. See also Aquinas, In Dionysii de divinis nominibus 1, 1, 15, as cited by Emery, p. 71, n. 232. See also Aquinas, Super Boethius De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 1, ad 7 where St. Hilary of Poitiers (d. c. 368) is quoted as saying (in his De Trinitate 2, 10): “He who in pious spirit undertakes the infinite, 3 in how we live and understand can be healed and what before we could not attend to we can now direct our attention or what before we could not do we can now begin to do.7 As Aquinas had echoed an understanding which comes to him from St. Augustine: “to reach God in some way with the mind is a great happiness; but to comprehend him is impossible.”8 As Lonergan argues in his exegesis of Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 4, q. 9, a. 3, one type of theological inquiry which seeks to remove doubts is to be distinguished from a second kind of theological inquiry which seeks understanding.9 In trying to remove doubts about disputed questions and issues, we want to have a knowledge of things that is characterized by a total lack of doubt and this lack of doubt is known as certitude. Something can no longer be doubted since we have shown how its truth can be regarded as self-evident. A grounding can be traced back to some kind of basic, first principle which cannot be doubted without risk of contradiction. With respect to matters of faith then, we can show that a particular teaching is grounded in scripture or in apostolic tradition. Something has been revealed as a truth of faith. A proposed article is shown to belong within the deposit of faith because a chain of reasoning has reached back to a set of primary sources or, through another chain of reasoning, we have moved from a set of primary sources to a proposition which states a belief or a dogma. However, if the object of our theological inquiry is a grasp of relations which can reveal how different things are joined with each other in a previously unknown inward unity, instead of lack of doubt, the object is a lesser degree of obscurity. We desire experiences of meaning or understanding which reveal a new, larger world within which we can believe and live. Instead of confusion and disorder, new distinctions, as they are apprehended, introduce clarifications or they reveal nuances in the meaning and understanding of things. Previously unsuspected depths of meaning present themselves to us to create a new context for living our lives.