COCA-COLA European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions, EUROPEAN PARTNERS

Anticipation of change and the sustainable management of structural changes: Promoting innovative actions to strengthen employee involvement and social partners’ cooperation

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN

EFFAT COCA-COLA European Federation of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions, EUROPEAN PARTNERS

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE IUF A comparative study of Collective Bargaining Agreements in CCEP: MEMBER OF THE ETUC

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2 3 A Project co-financed by the European Commission VP/2016/0295 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN COCA-COLA EUROPEAN PARTNERS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CROSS-BORDER COLLECTIVE PREFACE 1 BARGAINING COOPERATION.

This analysis has been carried out within the framework of the EFFAT Collective bargaining cooperation promotes the exchange of informa- project: Anticipation of change and the sustainable management of struc- tion about how working and employment conditions are set out in the tural changes: Promoting innovative actions to strengthen employee in- various countries where a company operates. volvement and social partners’ cooperation. Although industrial relations systems across Europe differ greatly, such The project aimed at identifying effective actions to be taken by EWC exercise allows workers’ representative to learn more about rights and members, EFFAT Coordinators in Transnational companies (TNCs) and standards negotiated by their colleagues in other countries. Moreover, European Works Councils (EWCs) and Trade Union officers dealing with it facilitates the identification of good and bad practices as well as the multinational companies to foster cross-border trade union cooperation establishment of common goals to be negotiated at national level. In and deal with the anticipation of change at company level. this regard, collective bargaining cooperation can be considered as the first step to be taken towards the establishment of a minimum floor of In order to achieve this important target, an innovative and pragmatic ap- rights and standards across the countries and the sites where a trans- proach has been implemented focusing on the following main objectives: national company operates.

EFFAT believes that, when European Works councils are unionised and well-coordinated by an EFFAT representative, they are one of the most appropriate platforms where a collective bargaining cooperation should be carried out. This is mainly because EWC meetings are a unique opportunity for workers representatives to meet on a regular basis with the support of translation and interpretation facilities. Such structure gives EWC members the opportunity to strengthen synergies and build up a successful cooperation. To better allow such coordination, thanks to this project EFFAT has developed a clear methodology and working tools that are now at the disposal of the EFFAT EWC-TNC network through the EFFAT TNC-EWC Portal.

6 THE USE OF TRANSNATION- negotiate agreements with transnational companies. Moreover, thanks to the experts’ contributions and the debate carried AL COMPANY AGREEMENTS out in the framework of the project, EFFAT has developed a Template TCA Agreement on responsible restructuring. Such agreement is avail- (TCAS). able for all EFFAT affiliates and aims at achieving the following priorities 2 in transnational companies:

●● Improving the anticipation of change, through a constructive so- If the development of a cross-border collective bargaining cooperation cial dialogue and through effective and timely information and can be considered as the first step in identifying a floor of minimum consultation mechanisms that see the full involvement of EFFAT rights and standards across the various countries where a company and its national affiliates operates, the signature of a TCA is surely a concrete tool to implement such standards. ●● Preserving and developing the competences and skills of employees to enable them to adapt to change Moreover, the adoption of a TCA and its implementation at European and national level represents a valid and fair procedure to tackle so- ●● Building a robust mechanism for addressing organisational cial dumping and ensure equal treatment among workers and across change by minimizing negative social implications of this change borders. and strengthening workers’ employability.

EFFAT is involved in the current debate at EU level among the ETUC, ●● Setting out a minimum set of standards to be respected and Business Europe and the European Commission on the future of TCAs. actions to be undertaken when restructuring is announced an- Although EFFAT’s main priority is the strengthening of national and ywhere in companies’ sites. sectorial collective bargaining agreements, we must acknowledge that TCAs are becoming an increasing practice since quite some years. Over the last decade, TCAs drew also the attention of EU Institutions and the ILO. EFFAT took part in the recent ETUC – Business Europe TWO CASE STUDIES project on TCAs Building on experiences: a win-win approach to trans- In order to develop the above-mentioned actions in a pragmatic way, the national industrial relations in multinational companies. This project put EFFAT EWC-TNC Coordinators network has specifically targeted two trade unions, employers’ organisations and companies around the ta- transnational companies operating in the EFFAT sectors: Coca-Cola Eu- ble and initiated a debate based on 8 case studies and on previous ropean Partners and McDonald’s. These two companies served as case projects on TCAs carried-out by both the ETUC and BusinessEurope. studies on which the appointed experts have developed two reports. Both EFFAT believes that the autonomy of social partners may be exercised the finding and the conclusions of the case studies are included inthe in different ways, and TCAs are certainly one important tool that trade respective reports. unions and multinational companies may make use of, considering the In addition to these case studies, two practical working tools have been specific national circumstances. Differences in social dialogue and col- created: lective bargaining practices across European countries are often regarded as an unsurmountable obstacle for the deployment of transna- ●● The collective bargaining cooperation questionnaires and; tional industrial relations in Europe. ●● the above-mentioned TCA agreement on responsible restruc- Nevertheless, experience shows that such barriers can be overcome turing by applying a pragmatic and inclusive approach. The success of a TCA indeed resides in the capacity to involve all concerned actors in both The two reports and the working tools have all been disseminated through the adoption and practical implementation of its provisions. the EFFAT EWC-TNC network thanks to the project’ events and the EFFAT TNC-EWC Portal. Along the project’s period EFFAT has insisted very much on the need for Trade Unions to control the TCA phenomenon. An internal discus- sion on the role of TCAs has been launched in EFFAT governing bodies on the basis on the already existing internal procedures for EFFAT to The analysis on the grounds of which this study was conducted covers all the Collective Bargaining Agreements (hereinafter CBAs) that were transmitted to the author by the Trade Unions represented in Coca-Co- la European Partners plc. affiliated to EFFAT. In some cases, Indus- trial Relations are governed by Interprofessional and Sectoral CBAs, DISCLAIMER in other cases mainly by law. This means that not all the aspects of how Industrial Relations function in practice in each country are taken into account in this study. On the contrary, the author is aware that there may be gaps and omissions, or simply implicit content that do not emerge in this study, when such aspects are not explicitly mentioned in the CBAs that were analysed.

Furthermore, all practitioners of Industrial Relations are aware that the practice does not always correspond to the rules defined in writing, es- pecially when interpersonal relationships have a direct, yet intangible, effect on the practice.

Thus this study should be considered as an attempt at drawing a pic- ture of what relations may look like, rather than having the pretence of being a “single source of truth”.

Against this backdrop, the readers are asked to look at this study as “work in progress” and that their input is most welcome to complete and improve this study, as well as addressing unclear or unresolved items. 2. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CCEP 31

2.1 Comparative Key Figures 32 TABLE OF Collective Bargaining - Levels and Coverage 33

2.2 The Sources: Collective Bargaining Agreements Analysed 34 CONTENT Homogeneity and Heterogeneity 36 Introductory Note 2 2.3 Comparative Overview: 46

Shift Patterns and Working Hours 46 1. CCEP - A MERGER OF MERGERS 4 Holidays and Leave of Absence 52

Remuneration Structure 57 1.1 The Merger in Summary 7 Performance Related Pay 67

Pension Schemes 73 1.2 The Influence of The Coca-Cola Company 9 Pre-or Partial Retirement Schemes 76

Work/ Life Balance 78 1.3 Overview of the 3 Merging Partners: 11 Vocational Training Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. 11 81 Stress at Work / Health and Safety Coca-Cola Iberian Partners, S.A.U. 15 85 Anticipation of Change - Information and Consultation 88 Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetränke GmbH 20 Anticipation of Change and Restructuring: Germany 97

Anticipation of Change and Restructuring: France 101 1.4 Expected Benefits of the Combined Company 22

Competitive Strategies of CCEP 25 3. CONCLUSIONS Anticipated Risks Connected to the Merger 27 106 INTRODUCTORY NOTE mitigating, potential effects on employment. Thus, the EFFAT Coca-Cola Coordination Group was set up, and subse- quently its Steering Committee, which decided to focus on cooperating mainly in two areas: The “Coca-Cola System” is one of the largest employers in the world. Be- tween TCCC, CCEP and Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company, the “sys- the exchange of information in case of labour disputes, so as to allow for tem” employs almost 45,000 people in the EU. And many more in indirect mutual support and the creation of an Early Warning Network for real time positions depend on it. According to a rough estimate (official information information on potential restructuring exercises and labour disputes; being unavailable), the Coca-Cola system has created over one million jobs worldwide. More than any other Transnational Companies, Coca-Co- the exchange of information on national collective bargaining, with the in- la’s corporate image is directly connected with the “brand Coca-Cola”. tent to share and compare information and explore the possibility to estab- This combination has been the main key for success over many decades. lish shared goals for collective bargaining. However, in the last 30 years, it has increasingly become an element of vulnerability and has led the Company to become more permeable to part- A number of Europe-wide action days (2006, 2010 and 2014) were or- nerships with organisations representing the interest of civil society, such ganised to create awareness among the workforce of the risks to jobs that as Greenpeace and the WWF, but also advocates for public health and consolidation brings, as well as to ask Management to open up to a pro- civil rights. active dialogue.

For the international and European trade union movement the Coca-Cola As of 2014, an increased number of conferences have taken place in Brus- System is of primary importance, not only as one of the largest employers, sels, Antwerp, Athens, Madrid and Berlin organised by EFFAT and its affili- but also because of its high visibility and permeability to public scrutiny. ated Unions to address, among other aspects, the labour dispute in Spain, the conflict in Fuenlabrada (see page 10) and the various restructuring Since 1997, EFFAT (at the time its predecessor organisation ECF-IUF) processes that are constantly taking place within the European Coca-Cola has facilitated an exchange of experiences among TU members in the system. Coca-Cola system and coordinated the negotiations for the establishment of European Works Councils. The first negotiations for the establishment of Given the fact most of the decisions whose negative impact is to be dealt EWCs initiated in 1997 with TCCC, which at the time tried unsuccessfully by EFFAT affiliates at national level are taken at centralised level, EFFAT to avoid the establishment of a proper EWC in which EFFAT would be has been asking since a number of years the establishment of a perma- involved. Coca-Cola Enterprises followed another approach and created nent high-level dialogue structure with CCEP Senior Management with a its first EWC in 1998 in collaboration with EFFAT, even before TCCC con- view to anticipate change proactively. Unfortunately, this request has al- cluded its negotiation process. CCE’s example was followed by Coca-Cola ways been rejected so far. Hellenic in 2003 and later by CCIP in 2016. Developing a coordinated collective bargaining platform is one of the most European Coca-Cola workers representatives’ conferences took place urgent steps in this direction, also considering what it is clearly stated even with the aim to facilitate the exchange of information, coordinating the set- in official Company documents, that the European workforce of CCEP is ting up of European Works Councils and to foster mutual support in case of highly unionised, and with very few exceptions employees work under con- labour disputes. The first conference was held in Marne-la-Vallée, France, ditions established in CBAs. in 1997. Other meetings followed in Brussels, Ischia, Rome and Frankfurt. The importance of “People”, the risks associated by the Company with Col- The progressive consolidation of the Coca-Cola system, in particular of lective Bargaining, and the clearly announced plan to create efficiencies the bottlers in Western Europe and the Nordic countries, brought about through “optimisation” and “synergies” and the integration of “cultures” into an intensified collaboration and exchange of information. In considera- a new “corporate culture” need to be seen as both risks for the established tion of the market saturation, the declining per capita consumption of Co- systems of Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining in CCEP, as well ca-Cola products and the production overcapacity in the bottling system, as an opportunity to collaborate more effectively and disseminate best it became clear to EFFAT that the cooperation needed to be intensified practice among the employee representatives and their organisations, with with the purpose of anticipating the potential impact of the consolidation of the aim to mitigate, if not offset, the potential negative effects of CCEP’s the bottling system on the workforce, and wherever possible, engage with organisational strategy. the Management in a constructive dialogue aimed at offsetting, or at least 2 3 On 6 August 2015, Coca-Cola Iberian Partners S.A. (CCIP), Coca- Cola Enterprises, Inc. (CCE) and The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) communicated publicly, that by a number of previous transactions, CCIP, CCE, Orange MergeCo, LLC, Orange US HoldCo and the German entity held by TCCC, Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetränke GmbH (hereinafter CCEG) would form a new Company called Coca-Cola European Partners plc. (CCEP), a company operating under the laws of England and Wales.

As a part of this transaction, the shares of CCEP plc. were registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and submitted to the New York Stock Exchange, Euronext Amsterdam, Euronext London and Euronext Madrid. The transactions were formally concluded on 28 May 2016.

On that same date, Olive Partners S.A., transmitted the shares of CCIP S.A.U. (nowadays CCEP Iberia) to CCEP plc. and CCEP plc. forwarded them to one of its subsidiaries, Black Bottling Holdings UK Ltd, which is its only shareholder.

Each of the three partners in this Merger - CCE, Inc., CCIP and CCEG was formed by mergers and acquisitions that occurred over a period of time of over twenty years.

The most recent integration occurred in Spain and Portugal, where a number of independent companies were merged into CCIP. This happened over a relatively brief period of time in account of the fact that the different companies were mainly privately owned.

Through these transactions, the ownership of CCEP plc. can be summarised as follows:

Name of Holder Equity Proportion

Olive Holdco is Olive Holdco 34% controlled by COBEGA S.A.1 01 Red (TCCC) 18%

Shares held by the 48% of which 5% are held by CCEP A MERGER public The Capital Group2 Coca-Cola European Partners (CCEP) is a leading Western European consumer goods company and the world’s largest independent Co- OF MERGERS ca-Cola bottler. 4 5 CCEP had a revenue of approximately €11 billion and volume of approximately 2.5 billion-unit cases in 2017. It serves over 300 million THE MERGER IN SUMMARY consumers across 13 countries: Portugal, Spain, Andorra, France, Monaco, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK and Iceland. CCEP was incorporated on 4 August 2015 as a private limited compa- It enhances the Coca-Cola system to compete more effectively and ny under the laws of England and Wales and under the name Spark drive growth across developed European markets with a world-class Orange Limited, with an issued share capital consisting of one ordinary sales, production, and distribution platform. CCEP is expected to re- share, nominal value £1.00, fully paid up in cash. alise annual run rate pre-tax savings of approximately €315 - €340 million by mid-20193. CCEP is a wholly owned subsidiary of Olive HoldCo.

Listings on the Euronext Amsterdam, the New York Stock Exchange, CCEP is the parent company of Orange U.S. HoldCo, LLC, a Dela- Euronext London, and Spanish stock exchanges, and trades under the ware limited liability company (‘‘U.S. HoldCo’’) and Orange MergeCo, symbol CCE. LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (‘‘MergeCo’’). CCEP, U.S. HoldCo and Orange MergeCo have not conducted any business operations other than those, which are incidental to their formation and in connection with the transactions contemplated by the Master Agree- CCE CCIP CCEAG ment. The Merger Agreement provided that CCE merged with and into MergeCo, with MergeCo continuing as the surviving company and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of CCEP. Until the consummation of the Merger, CCE was a public company incorporated in Delaware, U.S.A and CCE Common Stock was listed and traded on the NYSE NORWAY and Euronext Paris under the ticker symbol ‘‘CCE’’. Upon effectiveness ICELAND of the Merger, the listings of CCE shares on the NYSE and Euronext Paris were cancelled. SWEDEN On 4 May 2016, CCEP was re-registered as a public limited company GREAT BRITAIN with the name Coca-Cola European Partners plc. Following the Com- bination, CCEP is the holding company of the combined businesses NETHERLANDS of CCE, CCIP and CCEG and CCEP shares are traded on the NYSE, Euronext London, Euronext Amsterdam and on the Spanish Stock Ex- BELGIUM GERMANY changes. LUXEMBOURG From the completion, the principal executive offices of Orange are located at Enterprises House, Bakers Road, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 FRANCE 1EZ, United Kingdom. PORTUGAL ANDORRA

SPAIN MONACO

1. Cobega S.A. holds approx. 56.6% of Olive HoldCo 2. The Capital Group Companies is one of the largest Capital Investment Funds worldwide. With 6 over 1,7 Trillion US$ managed, it holds stakes in many of the world’s largest corporations. 7 Source: CCEP Annual report 2017 3. Source: “EU Prospectus” This simplified organisational chart below shows the structure before the merger4: THE INFLUENCE OF THE COCA-COLA COMPANY CCEP While Olive HoldCo, the holding company where the owners of the Ibe- rian component to the merger gathered their shares6, is formally the US HoldCo largest shareholder and can designate the greatest number of members on the Board of Directors of CCEP plc., The Coca-Cola Company exercises an extremely relevant, if not dominating, influence.

MergeCo As is stated in the “Prospectus relating to Coca-Cola European Part- ners plc.”, which was filed with the UK Financial Conduct Authority (the ‘‘FCA’’) in the United Kingdom as part of the information to investors prior to the listing of the company’s shares on the Stock Exchanges in London, Madrid and Amsterdam:

●● “CCEP’s business success following the Merger, including The simplified chart below shows the Company Structure after the 5 its financial results, depends upon CCEP’s relationship with Merger : TCCC.

●● CCEP has entered into bottling agreements with TCCC under the following terms:

CCEP ●● CCEP purchases its entire requirement of concentrates and syrups for Coca-Cola Trademark Beverages (sparkling beverages bearing the trademark ‘‘Coca-Cola’’ or the ‘‘Coke’’ brand name) and Allied Beverages (beverages of TCCC or its US HoldCo CCIP CCEG subsidiaries that are sparkling beverages, but not Coca-Cola Trademark Beverages or energy drinks) from TCCC at prices, terms of payment, and other terms and conditions of supply CCIP CCEG determined from time to time by TCCC at its sole discretion; MergeCo Subsidiaries Subsidiaries ●● there are no limits for the prices that TCCC may charge for concentrate, however, TCCC will maintain current con- CCE centrate pricing at the same levels that CCE, CCIP and Subsidiaries CCEG had in place prior to the Merger, provided certain specific mutually agreed metrics are achieved;

●● much of the marketing and promotional support that CCEP receives from TCCC are at TCCC’s discretion. Programmes may contain requirements, or be subject to conditions, established by TCCC that CCEP may not be able to achieve or satisfy. The terms of most of the marketing programmes will

4. Source: “EU Prospectus” 6. According to the “SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENT Coca-Cola European Partners Plc and Olive Partners. S.A. and European Refreshments, Coca-Cola GMBH and Vivaqa 5. Source: “EU Prospectus” 8 Beteiligungs Gmbh & Co. Kg” 9 not contain an express obligation for TCCC to participate in future programmes or continue past levels of payments into OVERVIEW OF THE 3 MERGING PARTNERS: the future;

●● CCEP’s bottling agreements with TCCC are for fixed terms, COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC. and most of them are renewable only at the discretion of TCCC at the conclusion of their terms. A decision by TCCC not to renew a fixed-term bottling agreement at the end of its term could substantially and adversely affect CCEP’s finan- Introduction cial results; and CCE was incorporated in Delaware in 2010 and was a publicly traded ●● CCEP is obligated to maintain sound financial capacity company listed on the NYSE and NYSE Euronext Paris. to perform its duties, as required and determined by TCCC at its sole discretion. These duties will include, but not be CCE was TCCC’s strategic bottling partner in Western Europe and one limited to, making certain investments in marketing activities of the world’s largest independent Coca-Cola bottlers. to stimulate the demand for products in CCEP’s territories However, CCE, Inc. was the successor organisation of Coca-Cola En- and making infrastructure improvements to ensure CCEP’s terprises Inc. (the difference in the name lies only in the comma), which facilities and distribution network are capable of handling the was TCCC’s largest bottling partner, covering large territories in the demand for these beverages. USA and Canada, and Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France Disagreements with TCCC concerning business issues may lead and Great Britain in Europe. TCCC to act adversely to CCEP’s interests with respect to the relation- In a move to re-vamp the struggling North American business, CCE’s ships described above. main shareholder (TCCC) decided to restructure its bottler as follows: Following the Merger, CCEP has been (and partly still is) dependent ●● the North American bottling operations were acquired by on TCCC for some period of time for certain specified business and IT TCCC and renamed Coca-Cola Refreshments (or CCR); services. ●● TCCC’s own bottling operations in Norway and Sweden were merged with the existing CCE countries, to form a new company, named CCE, Inc.

The acquisition of European franchise operations by the American “anchor bottler” CCE began in 1996 in the Netherlands and was completed in 2010, with the changes described above. In the mid-to-late 1990s, CCE acquired Schweppes in the UK, the franchise rights for Belgium and Luxembourg, the operations in France including those owned by COBEGA, one of the largest shareholders in Olive Holdings, and there- by presently, among the main shareholders in CCEP.

While as of 2010 its operations were exclusively located in Europe, CCE was listed in the USA and headquartered in Atlanta. Employees, their representatives and members of management often complained about this setup, which brought about additional costs and obliged the Company to operate in distant time zones. This regarded in particular IT services, which were based in the US. 10 11 CCE also created the Shared Services Centre in Sofia (Bulgaria). After In November 2008, the Abbey Well water brand was acquired by an outsourcing part of its transactional finance operations to Cap Gemini in affiliate of TCCC. CCE’s use of the Schweppes name with the brand Poland and India, proved to be less viable and effective than planned, it is pursuant to, and under the terms of, the Schweppes Agreements. decided to back-source these operations and centralise them in Sofia, Abbey Well is a registered trademark of Waters & Robson Ltd., and following the model established successfully by the other large Europe- CCE has been granted the right to use the Abbey Well name until 10 an bottler, Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling Company. February 2022, but only in connection with the sale of Schweppes Ab- bey Well products. CCE had 10-year bottling agreements with TCCC for each of its territories, which extend to 2 October 2020, with each containing the right for CCE commenced distribution of Schweppes and Dr Pepper products in CCE to request a 10-year renewal. Products licensed to CCE through the Netherlands in early 2010, pursuant to agreements with Schweppes TCCC and its affiliates represent more than 90 per cent of CCE’s sales International Limited. The agreements to distribute products such as volume, with the remainder of its volume being attributable to sales of Schweppes and Dr Pepper were renegotiated and effective as of 1 non-TCCC products. January 2014 for five-year periods each, replacing the previous agreements. The terms of these agreements include certain annual volume Around two-thirds of products sold by CCE are brands owned by targets for Schweppes and Dr Pepper in the Netherlands, but do not TCCC. Other brands are owned by Monster, Schweppes, Wild and include any monetary remedies if these targets are not met. Fernandes. WILD Employees CCE distributes Capri-Sun beverages in France, Belgium, the Neth- At 31 December 2015, CCE had approximately 11,500 employees. Ac- erlands, and Luxembourg through a distribution agreement with WILD cording to information provided by CCEP’s Group Labour Management GmbH & Co. KG (‘‘WILD’’). CCE also produces and distributes Ca- in February 2018, the total of employees in the former CCE countries pri-Sun beverages in Great Britain through a manufacturing and license in September 2017 was 10,893, including 554 employees in Bulgaria. agreement. CCE signed a new pan-European distribution agreement for France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and a new license A majority of CCE’s employees in Europe are covered by Collective and manufacturing agreement in Great Britain, effective as of 1 January Bargaining Agreements, the main exceptions being Bulgaria and part 2014. The new terms extended the agreements for an initial period of five of GB employees. years expiring on 31 December 2018, and will be renewable for an additional five-year period, subject to achieving certain performance criteria. Territories CCE also reached an agreement with WILD to extend the pan-European master distribution agreement to Sweden. Distribution of Capri-Sun bev- CCE’s bottling territories consist of Belgium, continental France, Great erages commenced in Sweden effective as of 1 June 2015, for an initial Britain, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. period of three years. The agreement in Sweden will be renewable for an The aggregate population of these territories was approximately 170 additional five-year period, subject to performance criteria. million as of 31 December 2015.

CCE generated US$7.0 billion in net sales and sold approximately 12 Monster billion bottles and cans (or 600 million physical cases) during 2015. CCE distributes Monster-branded beverages in all of its territories (including Norway as of June 2015) under distribution agreements with Schweppes Monster Beverage Corporation. These agreements, for all territories In Great Britain, CCE distributes Schweppes, Dr Pepper, Oasis, and except for Belgium, have 20-year terms from November 2008, com- Schweppes Abbey Well, pursuant to agreements with an affiliate of TCCC prised of four five-year terms, and can be terminated by either party (the ‘‘Schweppes Agreements’’). These agreements cover the market- under certain circumstances, subject to a termination penalty in some ing, sale, and distribution of Schweppes products in Great Britain. The cases. In Belgium, the agreement has a 10-year term, comprised of Schweppes Agreements run to 2 October 2020, and will be automatically two five-year terms, and can be terminated by either party under cer- renewed for one further 10-year term, unless terminated by either party. tain circumstances, subject to a termination penalty in some cases. In 12 13 Great Britain, CCE also produces selected Monster-branded beverages through a manufacturing agreement with Monster Energy Limited. OVERVIEW OF THE 3 MERGING CCE renewed this agreement for a new term that will expire on 2 Oc- tober 2018, with the possibility of renewal for two successive periods of five years each. PARTNERS: COCA-COLA IBERIAN As of 13 June 2015, as part of a global transaction between TCCC PARTNERS, S.A.U. and Monster Energy Company, Monster acquired full ownership from TCCC of the following energy brands: Relentless, Nalu, and Burn CCE will continue to have the exclusive right to prepare, package, distribute, and sell these energy brands within its territories under bottling agreements currently being finalised (with the exception of Norway and Introduction Luxembourg, which are limited to distribution only). CCIP is a Spanish company and began its operations as a result of the integration of eight existing beverage businesses in the Iberian re- Other Agreements gion. It was incorporated in October 2012 under the name Ibérica de Bebidas no Alcoholicas, S.A., and in March 2013 changed its name to CCE distributes Ocean Spray products in France, subject to a new Coca-Cola Iberian Partners, S.A. Since 29 December 2015, the com- agreement with Ocean Spray International, Inc. commenced on 1 Feb- pany’s name is Coca-Cola Iberian Partners, S.A.U. On 11 November ruary 2016 until 31 May 2019. This agreement may be extended by 2015, pursuant to the framework agreement dated 30 July 2015 (the mutual agreement between the parties. ‘’CCIP Framework Agreement’’), CCIP became a subsidiary of Olive Other agreements concern the distribution and is some cases manu- Partners, S.A., a private company incorporated in Spain with registered facturing of products with the Appletiser brand and products of the Fer- office in Madrid (‘‘Olive HoldCo’’), and after that the shareholders nandes family brands in the Netherlands by agreement with Holfer B.V. effected a reorganisation as a result of which Olive HoldCo acquired shares in CCIP representing approximately 98.3% of the share capital of CCIP and CCIP transferred its shares in CCEP to Olive HoldCo. On 29 December 2015, Olive HoldCo acquired a further final minority stake and became the owner of the shares in CCIP, representing 100% of the share capital of CCIP.

From an operational point of view, CCIP still operates 7 different bottling companies in Spain: Compañìa Asturiana de Bebidas Gaseosas, S.A.U. (short ASTURBEGA); Bebidas Gaseosas del Noroeste, S.A.U. (short BEGANO); Compañia Castellana de Bebidas Gaseosas, S.L., (short CASBEGA); Cobega Embotellador, S.L.U. (short COBEGA); Compañia Levantina de Bebidas Gaseosas, S.A.U. (short COLEBE- GA); Refrescos Envasados del Sur, S.A.U. (short RENDELSUR); Com- pañia Norteña de Bebidas Gaseosas, S.A.U. (short NORBEGA) and 1 bottler in Portugal: RefrigeS.A.

Each of these companies has its own collective bargaining structure, in some cases with CBAs that normally cover part, but not the entirety of the bottling territory. As a result of this, there is a plurality of CBAs in Spain. 14 15 Product Bottling and Distribution Agreements with ment with an affiliate of Monster Beverage Corporation. CCIP produces TCCC and sells Nestea beverages in Spain, Portugal and Andorra under product bottling and distribution agreements with an affiliate of Beverage CCIP produces, markets and distributes TCCC’s products in Spain, Partners Worldwide SA. Portugal and Andorra under product bottling and distribution agreements with TCCC, extending to 21 February 2023. These agreements CCIP’s bottling territories consist of Spain, Portugal and Andorra. The do not renew automatically and must be re-negotiated. aggregate population of these territories was approximately 57 million on 31 December 2015, and in 2015 some 78 million tourists visited CCIP has the exclusive rights granted by TCCC in its territories to pro- these territories giving a total market of approximately 135 million con- duce, bottle and sell the beverages covered by the relevant product sumers. CCIP has bottling rights within its territories for various bever- bottling and distribution agreements in containers authorised for use by age brands, including products with the name ‘‘Coca-Cola.’’ TCCC (including pre- and post-mix containers). CCIP is prohibited from selling covered beverages outside its territories, or to anyone intending Labour disputes and legal proceedings to resell the beverages outside its territories, without the consent of TCCC, except for sales arising out of an unsolicited order from a cus- In January 2014 Coca-Cola Iberian Partners (CCIP) unveiled a redun- tomer in another Member State or for export to another such Member dancy plan affecting 1800 workers. The company declared that nobody State. The product bottling and distribution agreements also contem- would be made redundant forcibly, but on a voluntary basis. plate that there may be instances in which large or special buyers have Subsequent evidence showed these promises were false. A few days operations transcending the boundaries of CCIP’s territories and, in after CCIP announced the closure of 4 factories out of 11 in Spain such instances, CCIP agrees to collaborate with TCCC to provide sales namely Colloto in Asturias, Alicante, Palma de Mallora and Fuenlabra- and distribution to such customers. da, Madrid. 821 dismissals were carried out, of which 236 forced redun- The product bottling and distribution agreements provide that sales by dancies in Fuenlabrada. All Fuenlabrada employees that didn’t leave TCCC of concentrate, syrups, juices, mineral waters, finished goods, the company on a voluntary basis were made redundant on 1st April and other goods to CCIP are at prices that are determined from time to 2014. time by TCCC at its sole discretion. These agreements provide TCCC A major labour dispute began with strike actions mainly in Fuenlabrada with the ability, at its sole discretion, to establish its sales prices, terms (Madrid). Attempts of convincing or coercing the workers into ending of payment, and other terms and conditions for CCIP’s purchases of the strike were made by different means, including police repression, concentrates, syrups, juices, finished goods and other goods from resulting in violence against the workers on strike and selected individ- TCCC. Concentrate prices follow an incidence-based concentrate uals, including the chair of the Fuenlabrada Works Council. pricing model that generally tracks CCIP’s annual net sales per case growth. In June 2014, in response to claims brought by unions representing the laid-off workers, the Spanish National Court declared the collective Employees dismissal null and void, because CCIP had not adequately informed workers of its layoff plans and had illegally circumvented their right to CCIP employed approximately 4,600 people as of 31 December 2015. strike through “blacklegging”, i.e. replacing strikers with other workers. According to information supplied by CCEP’s Group Labour Manage- The Court ordered that the workers be reinstated under previous terms ment in February 2018, the total of employees in the former CCIP and conditions. Coca-Cola then appealed to the Supreme Court. countries in September 2017 was 4,504 employees, wherof 4,107 in Spain and 397 in Portugal. All are covered by Collective Bargaining In January 2015, the company dismantled a number of sites including Agreements. the Fuenlabrada plant using external staff. A large number of police officers were brought in to stop trade union representatives from entering Agreements with other Licensors the facility. Several colleagues who were staging a protest at the Dignity Camp on the gates of CASBEGA were beaten. CCIP produces and sells Burn and sells Monster beverages in Spain, Portugal and Andorra under a product bottling and distribution agree- 16 17 In January 2015 CCIP lost its appeal before the Spanish Supreme Court and was ordered to rehire any worker who had not accepted the layoff package under the same conditions as prior to dismissal.

CCIP has reopened its facility in Fuenlabrada (Madrid) as a logistics centre and has offered employment to those workers, who had been laid off. On 9 October 2015, CCIP received the court ruling arising from a further claim in which the labour unions with CC.OO and UGT requested that 272 workers be reinstated to their former positions and job functions. The court ruled that Fuenlabrada employees were correctly reinstated in the logistics centre even if their functions were not identical, and the court rejected the unions’ request to reopen the Fuen- labrada centre as a production plant. In addition, the court held that employees who were offered a job doing the same tasks but in different locations to their original workplaces, could not be effectively reinstated, and should be paid severance and accrued salaries. This ruling has been appealed by the unions to the Spanish Supreme Court, and unex- pectedly the Supreme Court confirmed workers had been reinstated in a proper manner on 18 January 2017.

In reality, the work and the working environment in Fuenlabrada are far from what they used to be before the closure. The production lines have been dismantled, part of the site is closed off and the conditions in which the employees operate, as well as the tasks they are asked to carry out, cannot be seen as anything else than a punitive assignment from CCIP’s management for those workers who dared to take action against the Company to defend their employment. Part of the site is completely closed, while in the other part there is no real work and employees are shifting crates of empty bottles by hand.

After 5 years of conflict and struggle workers of Fuenlabrada were able to achieve a successful outcome to the labor and social conflict started in 2014 thanks to the adoption of an agreement that workers consider ‘a social triumph’. Coca-Cola will close the logistical centre in Fuenlabrada. At the same time, the multinational soft drinks company will open a manufacturing centre in Madrid, which will employ the staff who have defended their jobs tirelessly since January 2014. If Coca Cola does not finally comply with its commitment to install its factory in Madrid or the surrounding area, the social plan that has been incorporated into the agreement will be activated, as a guarantee for the entire workforce. Inter alia, the plan contemplates the payment of salaries according to age until retirement and early retirements and indemnities for those close to pension. 18 19 In 2006, in order to receive merger control approval in Germany, CCEG OVERVIEW OF THE 3 MERGING sold its Schweppes brand to a subsidiary of Krombacher Brauerei Bernhard Schadeberg GmbH & Co. KG. In connection with this divest- ment, on 11 May 2006 CCEG entered into a toll-bottling agreement with PARTNERS: COCA-COLA Schweppes Deutschland GmbH pursuant to which CCEG manufac- tures and packages Schweppes beverages on behalf of Schweppes ERFRISCHUNGSGETRÄNKE GMBH Deutschland GmbH at its site in Bad Neuenahr, Germany. The agreement will expire in 2019.

CCEG is the exclusive distributor of the energy drink brands Monster and Relentless in Germany pursuant to a distribution agreement en- Introduction tered into between CCEG and Monster Beverage Corporation in July 2015. Coca-Cola franchise bottlers were established in Germany as early as 1923. In consideration of the brand’s and beverage’s popularity, TCCC established many different franchise agreements with local brewing Employees and beverages companies. In the 1990s, when TCCC’s strategy shift- On 31 December 2015, CCEG had approximately 9,500 employees, ed towards the establishment of large “anchor bottlers”, dedicated pre- all of whom were located in Germany. According to information provid- dominantly to the sale of TCCC’s products, a long period of consolida- ed by CCEP’s Group Labour Management in February 2018, the total tion into a “single bottler” for the German market began, and CCEAG number of employees in Germany in September 2017 was 7,777. (Coca-Cola Erfrischungsgetränke A.G. was established. Substantially, all of CCEG’s employees, with the exception of so called On 20 January 2016, as the result of many acquisitions and mergers, leading-employees and its board members, are covered by collective CCEG changed its legal form (Formwechsel) from a stock corporation bargaining agreements either due to their membership of the compe- (Aktiengesellschaft) into a limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit tent trade union (NGG) and/or due to a reference to such collective beschränkter Haftung) organised under the laws of Germany. CCEG bargaining agreements within the individual employment agreement. was an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of TCCC, representing TCCC’s strategic bottling partner in Germany and Germany’s largest beverage company based on volume and revenue. Territory CCEG’s territory is Germany, a country with a population of about 80 Bottling Agreements million people. CCEG generated US$2.4 billion in net sales and sold approximately 680 million unit cases during 2015. A specific aspect of CCEG operated under a product bottling and distribution agreement the German market is that CCEG’s two largest customers - Edeka and with TCCC and The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, a Delaware sub- Rewe - account for approximately 25% of sales. sidiary of TCCC. The structure of this product bottling and distribution agreement is substantially similar to agreements between TCCC and Another distinctive aspect is the common use of returnable and refill- the remaining partners in CCEP. able packaging, around which a rather decentralised production and distribution model was built, with its own “red fleet” of company vehicles The product bottling and distribution agreement had a 10-year term, ex- and drivers in charge of deliveries and collections of empty packages. tending to 31 August 2017, and contained the right for CCEG to request Until recently TCCC and CCEG tried to fight this model and lobbied a 10-year renewal. for the abolition of deposit on returnable bottles and cans. In the last CCEG prepared, packaged and distributed Nestea products in Germa- months, a change of strategy dictated by concerns for the environment ny pursuant to a bottling agreement between CCEG and a joint venture may bring about a re-orientation of the company’s policy towards keep- between TCCC and Nestlé S.A., dated 1 October 2009. The agreement ing the “red fleet”. was terminated and as of 1 January 2018, CCEG bottles and distributes Fuze Tea, a brand of TCCC. 20 21 and overheads in the Combined Group, and improving opera- EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE tional efficiencies, including procurement savings; ●● the management teams of CCIP, CCE and CCEG share a COMBINED COMPANY common vision to drive growth in Western Europe, which is expected to facilitate the integration of the businesses and better enable the combined company to effectively leverage the best of each entity to be more competitive. The Merger was consummated to enhance the alignment of the Co- ca-Cola system to compete more effectively across Western Europe The Company is domiciled and headquartered in the UK, which: with world-class production, sales and distribution platforms and to generate Synergies, including Supply Chain Benefits and Operating ●● has a stable and well-developed legal system that encour- Efficiencies. ages high standards of corporate governance and provides shareholders with substantial rights; It was expected that the Merger would provide the following opportunities to enhance the overall offerings, strategic position and growth of ●● will enhance the Company’s ability to develop relations with the Combined Group7: potential European institutional investors and diversify the in- vestor base of the Company; ●● the combination of CCE, CCIP and CCEG will result in a combined company with an enhanced financial profile, including and strong operating cash flows and an increased operational scale, including the ability to serve over 300 million consum- ●● will enhance cash management flexibility, including access ers across a larger continuous area that includes 13 Western to non-U.S. cash flow with associated financial benefits, as European countries; compared to incorporation in the United States;

●● as compared to CCE, CCIP or CCEG on a stand-alone basis, and CCEP should be better-positioned to innovate, compete and drive growth across developed European markets in multiple ●● while CCEP will be organised in the UK, CCEP Shares will be product segments and categories due to broader procure- listed on the NYSE, which will facilitate trading in the United ment capability, cost-efficient production, expandable infra- States by U.S.-based CCE Shareholders who will, following structure and flexible and efficient logistics; the Completion, own an interest in CCEP.

●● the Combined Group should benefit from a stronger partner- Restructuring and Synergy Programme8 ship and an aligned strategic focus across Western Europe with TCCC, its most significant supplier, which will have, During the full-year 2017, CCEP recognised restructuring charges to- through CCEG, approximately 18% indirect ownership inter- talling €235 million. These charges principally related to proposed re- est in CCEP; structuring activities under the Integration and Synergy Programme including those related to supply chain improvements such as network ●● based on estimated numbers prepared in June 2015 and pri- optimisation, productivity initiatives, continued facility rationalisation in or to the announcement of the Merger by a consultancy firm Germany, end to end supply chain organisational design, and cold drink jointly engaged in May 2015 by the partners to identify and operational practices and facilities. The proposed restructuring activi- analyse opportunities for synergies arising from the Combina- ties also include the transfer of Germany and Iberia transactional tion, the Combined Group could realise annual pre-tax sav- related activities to the shared services centre in Sofia, Bulgaria, ings in a range of US$350 to US$375 million / EUR 315 to streamlining of the HR organisation, and other central function initia- EUR 345 Million within three years of the Completion, as a tives. Since the Merger the Company has recognised restructuring result of the increased scale of the Combined Group, eliminat- charges totalling €495 million (over an 18-months period of time). ing overlapping selling, general and administrative expenses 22 7. Source: “EU Prospectus” 8. Source: CCEP Annual Report 2017 23 The Company remains on track to achieve pre-tax run rate savings of €315 million to €340 million through synergies by mid-2019. Since the COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES OF CCEP Merger, €155 million in synergies have been achieved, and approximately 75% of the total target is expected to be reached by year-end 2018. Restructuring cash costs to achieve these synergies are expected to be approximately 2 times expected savings and includes cash costs associated with pre-transaction close accruals. According to the “Prospectus”, the management team of CCEP has adopted long-term targets that are designed to drive shareholder value.

The core target is to grow cash from operations in the long-term by:

●● growing net sales in a low single-digit range and operating income in a mid-single-digit range;

●● investing approximately 4 to 5% of annual net sales in capital projects with an attractive return;

●● increasing conversion of net income into free cash flow to approximately 100 per cent.

At the time of the Merger, the Company declared its financial targets to be the following:

CCEP “intends to maintain financial discipline by:

●● maintaining an optimal capital structure by targeting a net debt to EBITDA ratio of 2.5x to 3.0x (CCEP has a goal of reducing its net debt to EBITDA ratio to approximately 2.5x by the end of 2017) and an investment grade rating;

●● pursuing disciplined and attractive investments (e.g. incremen- tal capital expense, mergers and acquisitions and restructuring), where the short-term use of cash is expected to pro- duce positive cash flows over the longer term, intended to result in a positive net present value for total shareholder return. Any investments would be evaluated against alterna- tives, including returning cash to [CCEP] Shareholders;

●● returning cash to [CCEP] Shareholders. CCEP will target an initial dividend pay-out ratio of 30 to 40% of net income (and the Company will also consider returning excess cash to CCEP Shareholders via share repurchases and/or special dividends).

CCEP expects that, if it achieves these targets, it will be able to drive long-term earnings per share growth in a mid to high single-digit range, ahead of the growth in operating income and improve return on invested 24 25 capital by 20 basis points or more annually. ANTICIPATED RISKS CONNECTED TO According to the Financial Statement in the Annual Report 2017 these were the Company’s results: THE MERGER

in Million EUR Vs. 2016 In the “Prospectus”, investors are warned about a series of risks deriving from the Merger. Revenue 11,062 +3% Given the subject of this study, the “employee” and “culture” related risks seem the most relevant. Profit after Taxes 6,88 +15%1 “The difficulties of combining the operations of the companies include, among others: Diluted Profit per in EUR 1,41 +15% share ●● managing a significantly larger company; Debt/ EBITDA Net 3.1 Adjusted 2.8 Ratio9 ●● coordinating geographically separate organisations;

●● the potential diversion of management focus and resources from other strategic opportunities and from operational matters;

●● retaining existing customers and attracting new customers;

●● maintaining employee morale and retaining key management and other employees;

●● integrating three unique business cultures, which may prove to be incompatible;

●● the possibility of assumptions underlying expectations regarding the integration process proving to be incorrect;

●● issues in achieving anticipated operating efficiencies, business opportunities and growth prospects;

●● consolidating corporate and administrative infrastructures and eliminating duplicative operations;

●● issues in integrating information technology, communications and other systems;

●● changes in applicable laws and regulations;

●● changes in tax laws (including under applicable tax treaties)

9. The ratio of net debt to Adjusted EBITDA is used by investors, analysts and credit rating agencies to analyse operating performance in the context of targeted financial leverage. 26 Net debt enables investors to see the economic effect of total borrowings, related foreign 27 exchange impact and cash and cash equivalents in total and is calculated as being the net of cash and cash equivalents and currency adjusted borrowings. and regulations or to the interpretation of such tax laws or reg- same, time creating an inclusive culture, retaining essential talents and ulations by the governmental authorities; motivating the workforce, given that it is key to its success.

●● managing costs or inefficiencies associated with integrating the The contrast between these two aspects relating to “people” is empha- operations of CCIP; sised, once more, in the Annual Report 2017:

and “Since its creation in May 2016, CCEP has been devoting significant management attention and resources to integrating its business practic- ●● unforeseen expenses or delays associated with the Combina- es and operations. The remaining stages of the integration programme tion”. to 2019 may disrupt the business of CCEP and, even if implemented successfully could preclude realisation of the full benefits expected. […] Also in other documents the Company acknowledges the crucial role of In addition, the on-going integration programme may result in material “people”, meaning “employees”, and their contribution to CCEP’s suc- unanticipated problems, expenses, liabilities, competitive responses, cess. The chair, Sol Daurella, is often quoted as referring to the sales loss of customer relationships, and diversion of management’s attention, force as “our front line heroes”. In the opening comments to the Annual and may cause CCEP’s stock price to decline. The risks associated with Report 2017, she states: “CCEP’s employees continue a proud legacy the integration programme include, among others: […] in Western Europe and combine expert, local knowledge with a passion for our brands and business. I am grateful for their dedication and all ●● Maintaining employee morale; they do every day to serve our customers and communities”. A few lines below, in the same Annual Report 2017, the CEO Damien Gammel con- ●● The possibility of assumptions underlying expectations regard- firms that: “Our success is built on three fundamental elements: our port- ing the integration process proving to be incorrect;[…] folio of great brands, the great service and execution we provide to our customers, and our great people who make this happen every day”, and ●● Industrial action in territories where change is being imple- again: “Our success is made possible by our culture and the passion and mented, our Marseille site, in France, has had strikes and as a commitment of our employees”. result significant work stoppage”.

While the Company insists on the importance of employees as a key el- Other relevant risks mentioned in the “Prospectus” are: ement to success (“Our employees: Our success depends on our people – growth for our business goes hand in hand with growth for our employ- ●● Increases in the cost of employee benefits, in- ees. We respect each other and support a workplace where people with cluding pension retirement benefits, could im- different perspectives belong, are heard and have equal opportunity. We pact CCEP’s financial results and cash flow. build the engagement and development of our employees into our busi- Unfavourable changes to the costs of CCEP’s employee bene- ness plans, enabling a diverse and local workforce that contributes to the fits, including pension benefits and employee healthcare, could communities where we operate. We also make long-term investments in materially impact CCEP’s financial condition or results of oper- technology and facilities that equip our people for success”) it also quotes ations. Orange sponsors a number of defined benefit pension Collective Bargaining and potential labour business as one of the risk plans. Estimates of the amount and timing of CCEP’s future factors for the financial performance of the business. funding obligations for defined benefit pension plans are based upon various assumptions, including discount rates, mortality In fact, one of the elements of cost in the “Restructuring and Synergy estimates and long-term asset returns. In addition, the amount Programme” is linked to the cost of severance and other employee ben- and timing of pension funding can be influenced by funding efits (see next page). requirements, negotiations with pension trustee boards or actions of other governing bodies. Thus CCEP seems to be caught up in a rigid dichotomy between creating synergies and reducing cost by, among other initiatives, reducing If CCEP is unable to renew existing labour bargaining agreements the workforce and employment in general, leveraging favourable labour on satisfactory terms, if CCEP experiences employee strikes or work arbitrage (Shared Services Centre in Sofia), renewing wage agreements stoppages, or if changes are made to employment laws or regula- to its favour, introducing new productivity measures and tools, and at the tions, CCEP’s business and financial results could be negatively impacted. 28 29 The majority of CCEP’s employees are covered by collectively bargained organisational strategy. labour agreements in the countries in which CCE, CCIP and CCEG currently operate. If CCEP is unable to maintain labour bargaining agreements on satisfactory terms, or if it experiences employee strikes or work stoppages, or if changes are made to employment laws or regulations, its financial results could be negatively impacted.

●● The terms and conditions of existing or renegotiated agreements could also increase the cost to CCEP of fully implementing any operations changes, or otherwise affect its ability to do so.

●● The majority of CCE employees are covered by collectively bargained labour agreements, most of which do not expire. However, wage rates must be renegotiated at various dates through 2017. CCEP currently believes that it will be able to renegotiate subsequent agreements on satisfactory terms.

●● All of CCIP employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements that are valid through 31 December 2016. The collective bargaining agreements that expired on 31 Decem- 02 ber 2015 have been extended and will be re-negotiated in due course. ●● Substantially all of CCEG employees are covered by a collec- COLLECTIVE tive bargaining agreement relating to wages and salaries that may be terminated after 31 December 2016.

CCEP’s operations may be negatively impacted by employee strikes and work stoppages. In the last two years, Olive has experienced labour unrest and work stop- BARGAINING pages that have had a negative impact on its operations. CCIP has experienced labour unrest at its facility in Fuenlabrada (Madrid) following an internal restructuring in January 2014 that involved the closure of four factories (including the facility in Fuenlabrada) and the collective dismissal of 840 workers. The unions representing the laid-off workers organised protests against CCIP and lawsuits challenging the collective dismissal.” IN CCEP

30 31 Before entering into the comparative analysis of the CBAs, it is necessary to take into account some social and economic information on the COLLECTIVE BARGAINING – LEVELS countries, which allows for better comparison. AND COVERAGE 16

COMPARATIVE KEY FIGURES The following table intends to summarise the levels of Collective Bar- gaining, which define the two most common areas in collective bargaining: pay and working time. It also shows the percentage of the workforce, whose terms of employment are regulated by collective bar- The table below intends to give an overview of the selected countries of gaining agreements. this study, and the size of its CCEP workforce. Coverage TU Density Popula- CCEP GDP X Country Pay Working Time (in private Unemploy- Minimum in terms of tion in Employ- Capi- sector) Country ment Rate Wage active Millions10 ees (Sep ta12 (2016)13 (2018)14 employees15 (2017) 2017)11 (2016) INTERSECTORAL INTERSECTORAL (2013) BEL SECTORAL SECTORAL 89% COMPANY COMPANY 1562,60€/ 11.4 2099 34400 7.8% 55% BEL month SECTORAL SECTORAL DEU 66% COMPANY COMPANY 8,84€/hour DEU 82.8 7777 34500 3.6% 1497,80€/ 17.7% month COMPANY COMPANY ESP 89% SECTORAL SECTORAL 707,60€/ 46.5 3568 23700 19.6% 17% ESP month SECTORAL COMPANY FRA 96% COMPANY INTERSECTORAL 1498,50€/ FRA 67 2515 31700 10.1% 7.7% month INTERSECTORAL INTERSECTORAL NOR SECTORAL SECTORAL 67% COMPANY COMPANY NOR 5.2 624 67800 4.7% NO 51.9% SECTORAL SECTORAL SVE 85% COMPANY COMPANY SVE 9.9 716 42500 6.9% NO 69% COMPANY COMPANY UK 27.9% GBP SECTORAL SECTORAL 7.83/ hour 65.8 3568 31400 4.8% 25.1% UK 1462,60€/ month DOMINANT Important BUT NOT DOMINANT

10. Source: OECD 16. Source: Eurostat 11. Source: CCEP 12. Source: OECD 32 13. Source: OECD 33 14. Eurofound (2018) Statutory Minimum Wages in the EU - 2018: First Findings, Eurofound, Dublin 15. Eurofound (2018) Statutory Minimum Wages in the EU - 2018: First Findings, Eurofound, Dublin THE SOURCES: COLLECTIVE Colebega Casbega Cobega Baleares Rendelsur BARGAINING AGREEMENTS ANALYSED Spain Valencia Food and Bev- Sweden erages CBA Supplementary (Blue Collar with supple- CBA for Brewery The comparative analysis in this study was carried out by taking into Workers) mentary agree- workers account the Collective Bargaining Agreements which were transmitted ment Brewery to EFFAT by its affiliates. 1601 - Food and Beverag- The agreements analysed together with a summary of their content can Sweden es CBA with be found here. (White Collar supplementary Workers) agreement The table below best illustrates the number and titles of Brewery these CBAs

Country

Belgium Harmonisation Ouvriers Ouvriers Ouvriers Ouvriers 2001 (Blue Collar Ouvriers 1-998 2007 2011 2017 Workers)

Réorgani- Belgium Employés Employés SSD & CS Employés 2007 Employés 2011 sation Bis (White Collar 2015 2017 2018 Workers 2010

France Salaires 2017 Salaires 2018

GB Distribution

Manteltar- Gesamt- Altersteilzeit Entgelt ifverträge Struktur betriebsrat Arbeitszeit Working Part-time prere- Remuner- Regional Restruc- Joint Germany hours tirement ation sectoral turing Works CBAs Council

Special Agreement 148-Breweries between Coca-Co- Norway (Blue and Mineral la Enterprises Collar Work- waters CBA AS and the local ers) 2016 Branch of NNN

34 35 approach these systems from the outside and from a viewpoint, that HOMOGENEITY AND HETEROGENEITY very often is strongly influenced by the individual’s own experience of Industrial Relations.

The evident differences between the levels of collective bargaining can The body of CBAs analysed for this study is varied and heterogene- be explained in an extremely simplistic way as follows: ous. They share only one common trait: on the employees’ side, the signatories are all Trade Unions and all of them are EFFAT affiliates in On the extreme ends of the chart, there are Sweden and GB. In Swe- the food and beverages sector. The heterogeneity is, of course, the ex- den, all contractual conditions are established in the CBAs for the pression of different systems of Industrial Relations, in which collective entire food and beverages industry and the supplementary CBA for bargaining is carried out at Sectoral level and, partly, at Company level. the Brewery sector. There are no Company CBAs. All CBAs have na- The graph below aims at positioning the CBAs between Sectoral and tion-wide scope. Company bargaining levels. In Great Britain, on the opposite side of the graph, there is only one national CBA. It is not applicable to the entire Company, but only to “distribution” employees. There is no link to any other CBA in the Company Predominantly Sectoral or the beverages industry. In fact, the CBA’s geographical scope is limited to GB (not Northern Ireland, where CCEP has no operations, thus it is not a “UK” CBA) and in particular to warehouses and distribution centres, of which there are 1 in Scotland and 3 in England. Unfortunate- ly, the Company announced that one of the sites (Northampton) will be closed in early 2019.

Spain has adopted a decentralised model for collective bargaining. CBAs are negotiated at the level of the single bottling companies, which are regional organisations, with sub organisations. This can be explained by the Company’s recent history, with CCIP being formed by merging the existing 8 bottling companies in Spain in Portugal, which each had CBAs in place. Many of these CBAs had just been renewed at the time of the merger. The social partners did not have a direct interest

Predominantly Company in re-arranging the model of collective bargaining, even though as of 2017, the Company announced that it is revising all CBAs in place and is considering a “harmonisation” and possibly, to establish a single CBA for CCEP Spain. Presently, according to the Company, there are 27 Explanatory Note: CBAs in place. Of these, 11 were submitted to EFFAT by its affiliates. Industrial Relations are the expression of historic developments over Most of these CBAs cover all employees of the same bottling company. the last two centuries. They are normally structured in a complex sys- However, in the largest bottler, COBEGA, there are different territori- tem of laws and collective agreements, with almost as many “special al agreements (e.g. Cobega Asturias, Cobega Tenerife, and Cobega regulations” and exceptions as “rules cast in stone”. On top of that, they Baleares). are the expression of human relations, individual and collective initia- These CBAs follow a very similar matrix and are extremely comprehen- tives and actions, which have lead to established conventions, rules sive, as they determine job descriptions, groups and levels of remu- and laws, but are not always reflected in them. These few lines do not neration, shift patterns, working time, trade union rights, insurance pol- intend to give a comprehensive overview of the systems of Industrial icies, holidays, paid and unpaid leave, etc. None of these agreements Relations in the selected countries, neither of the entirety of established contains specific references to sectoral CBAs, however, they seem to conventional relations within CCEP in these countries, but just to give be built based on a similar core structure in such a way, that a certain some insight and to introduce the countries’ specificities to those who 36 37 level of coordination by the national union federations appears evident, as long as they do not cover, or enter into conflict, with any provisions even though this may well be only due to experience from the past. established in the sectoral CBAs - with one exception: company-wide agreements, which are negotiated between the country company man- Norway has a similar model to Sweden, but allows for specific Compa- agement and the national Trade Union officials. In case the company is ny agreements, as is the case for CCEP Norway. However, the main bound by regional sectoral CBAs, these kind of agreements can only be contractual conditions are established in the sectoral CBA for the Brew- established by clarifying the relationship between the existing regional eries and Mineral Waters industry. sectoral CBAs and the company-wide agreement, in a specific CBA. In the case of CCEP Germany, such an agreement was reached, and thus Also in France, Belgium and Germany collective bargaining occurs at the relationship between regional sectoral and company-wide CBAs is both, sectoral and company level. clearly defined. In France, most conditions are negotiated at interprofessional level, with some specifications at sectoral level. However, increases inre- The following table intends to summarise through muneration are negotiated exclusively at company level, including oth- rough headlines the contents of the different CBAs. er benefits, such as profit sharing schemes, per diems, overtime and night- shift pay and measures regarding organisational flexibility, etc. Title of Country Year Negotiating Partners Contents CBA Belgium and Germany both have a strictly coordinated hierarchy between sectoral and company-wide CBAs. Harmonise working time and pay in all sites following the merger of all CBA “Har- bottling entities in Belgium by tak- The Belgian system is drawn up to “build” on the national interpro- CC Beverages Belgium - monisation” ing the Ghent plant as a reference. 1998 Blue Collar Socialist and fessional and sectoral agreements and only allows for some limited BEL Blue-Collar In any case, no employee will lose Christian Food Workers TUs freedom. Also in Belgium, the history of Coca-Cola plays a relevant Workers any benefits. Working week is 37 role in the present CBAs. In fact, all “normal” CBAs - that is, the ones hours: 40 hours are worked + 18 days compensation. that do not deal with “social plans” - build on the first country-wide CBA of 1998, when following the acquisition of all bottling franchise rights Pay Increase, Years of Service Bo- by Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., a CBA was negotiated to “harmonise” nus, Option of working night shifts CBA 2001 CC Enterprises Belgium- as of age 45, Sick days, Additional contractual conditions for the workforce. All subsequent CBAs update BEL Blue-Collar 2001 Blue-Collar Socialist and Holidays, Time Credits, Pre-Retire- this original first CBA and introduce/add innovative measures, many Workers Christian Food Workers TUs ment, Meal Vouchers, Trade Union of which stem from legal obligations or from sectoral agreements. The Representation, Safeguard of Em- ployment, Training social plans were negotiated following a wave of restructuring and business transformation initiatives, which were taken as of 2007 and con- CBA 2007 CC Enterprises Belgium- Pay Increase, Years of Service Bo- Blue-Collar 2007 Blue-Collar Socialist and tinue at an annual or bi-annual frequency. BEL nus, Hospitalisation Insurance Workers Christian Food Workers TUs The “German model” is probably the most complex and comprehen- Pay Increase, Years of Service CBA 2007 CC Enterprises Belgium- sive of all those analysed. There is a clear distinction between negoti- working Party, Bonus System for White-Collar 2007 White-Collar Socialist and BEL Certain Sales Positions, Hospitalisa- ations on remuneration and related items (e.g. working time, holidays, Workers Christian Food Workers TUs pre-retirement) and more practical aspects, which relate to the “day tion Insurance, Pre-Retirement

to day” life of each site. The general working conditions are normal- CBA 2011 CC Enterprises Belgium- ly established in regional sectoral CBAs. The other aspects in “site BEL Blue-Collar 2011 Blue-Collar Socialist and Performance Related Pay agreements” or “company agreements” can be negotiated between the Workers Christian Food Workers TUs Works Council and management. The working conditions can be negotiated only at sectoral level between Trade Unions and employers’ CBA 2011 CC Enterprises Belgium- BEL White-Collar 2011 White-Collar Socialist and Performance Related Pay organisations, and only at regional level. “Regions” can be single fed- Workers Christian Food Workers TUs eral states or other areas.

The site agreements can be negotiated by the local Works Councils - 38 39 Increase of: Pay, Transport Allow- CBA 2015 CC Enterprises Belgium- ance, Meal Vouchers, Performance Blue-Collar 2015 Blue-Collar Socialist and BEL Related Pay + Temporary Layoffs, Mitigating measures to allow for so- Workers Christian Food Workers TUs PIN Bonus cially acceptable business transformation processes under jointly defined conditions. This CBA defines: Increase of : Pay, Sport & Culture CBA 2015 CC Enterprises Belgium- when the company can restructure, Allowance, Meal Vouchers, Perfor- “White-Collar 2015 White-Collar Socialist and when it can use agency workers BEL mance Related Pay + Temporary Workers” Christian Food Workers TUs and outsource; that in case of Layoffs, PIN Bonus reduction of employment, voluntary Company-wide redundancies come first; that part- CBA 2017- CCEP Belgium- Blue-Collar Increase of: Pay, Performance DEU CBA “Struc- 2015 CCEAG - TU NGG time work and partial pre-retirement BEL 2018 Blue-Col- 2017 Socialist and Christian Food Related Bonus, Additional Days Off, ture” must be made possible to allow for lar Workers Workers TUs Bicycle Allowance as many employees as possible to retain employment; the conditions for internal redeployment; the use CBA CCEP Belgium- White-Collar Increase of: Pay, Performance of time accounts (annualised hours) 2017-2018 2017 Socialist and Christian Food Related Bonus, Additional Days Off, for an optimal distribution of the BEL White-Collar Workers TUs Bicycle Allowance workload, to secure employment, Workers and mitigating measures such outplacement and severance. Mitigating Measures regarding CC Enterprises Belgium- CBA Reorgani- the Restructuring of BIS: Rede- 2010 White-Collar Socialist and BEL sation BIS ployment, Severance, Voluntary Christian Food Workers TUs Redundancy.

Regular working hours, changing Company-wide time, flexible working hours, work Collective Bar- on Saturdays, “time accounts”, gaining Agree- 2015 CCEAG - TU NGG DEU holidays, extra pay or compensa- ment “Working tion, joint workforce requirement Mitigating Measures regarding the Hours” Restructuring of SSC & CS: Rede- planning CBA Shared CC Enterprises Belgium- ployment; Redeployment through Services Cen- 2015 White-Collar Socialist and the Reduction of Working Time; BEL ter 2.0 and Christian Food Workers TUs Severance, Retention Bonus for Cooler Services Knowledge Transfer to SSC, Volun- tary Redundancy; Outplacement. Company-wide Collective Bar- gaining Agree- For employees age 55 or above, ment “Part-time the possibility is established to seek DEU Employment 2015 CCEAG - TU NGG part-time work prior to retirement Prior to and the additional compensation Retirement (or such employees are entitled to. partial retirement)” Company-wide CBA “Struc- tures Accord- ing to the Composition and Operation of the Works Consti- Joint Works Council, its manage- tution Act, Size 2002 CCEAG - TU NGG Base Salaries, Classification and DEU ment committee, economic commit- and Scope of Company-wide Re-classification; reference tables tee and regional sales committees the Joint Works Collective of existing Sectoral Regional or Council (GBR) DEU Bargaining 2015 CCEAG - TU NGG Federal State CBAs salary increase of the CCE Agreement on for 2015 and 2016,It also establish- AG” Remuneration es that new wage negotiations will occur at the level of CCEAG. 40 41 This CBA regulates the relation- Special Agree- Company-wide ship between existing Sectoral ment between Collective Regional / Federal State CBAs and Coca-Cola Bargaining the Company-wide CBAs, so as Enterprises AS This special agreement sets out Agreement to avoid any conflict of authority . and the local the specific rules for working time, “Validity of It is established that the existing branch of the Coca-Cola Enterprises AS shift work; extra pay for night work, industry-wide 2015 CCEAG - TU NGG DEU Sectoral CBAs remain in place, and NOR 2013 and Trade Union Delegates work on public holidays, work on the provisions in the Company-wide of NNN Saturdays, temporary employment, (sectoral) CBAs supplement, but do not take right to consumption of beverages, Collective Bar- away from the rights and benefits Norwegian laundry of work clothes gaining Agree- of employees established in those Food and Allied ments” Sectoral CBAs. Workers Union (NNN) Salary increase, and increase of other benefits, e.g. bonus and In the Agreement the following allowances, paternity leave ad ma- contractual conditions are estab- CCEP France (not CCP!) ternity leave will be treated equally; The Food lished : Remuneration, Working Collective and Trade Union Delegates some flexibility measures to the and Bever- Time, Overtime, Compensation for Agreement on 2017 FRA of CFDT, CFE-CGC, FO and benefit of the company, e.g. when age Industry Swedish Food Federation Business Travel; Annual Leave and Salaries 2017 CGT (did not sign) to take 2 out of 5 compensation Agreement with - Livsmedelsföretagen and Holiday Pay; Paid and Paid Time days; SVE supplementary 2016 Swedish Food Workers Union Off and Leave, Rehabilitation after agreements Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet sick leave, Work clothes, Termina- Increase of retirement bonus (LIVS) tion, Dismissal; Part-time work in (blue-collar preparation for Retirement; Voca- workers) tional Training, Work Environment; CCEP France (not CCP!) Collective Salary increase, and increase of Conflicts, Adaptation to Change in and Trade Union Delegates Agreement on 2015 other benefits, e.g. bonus and the Company Structure FRA of CFDT, CFE-CGC, FO Salaries 2017 allowances and CGT Supplementary Agreement for Additional Public Holiday: Easter Union Representation, Negotiation, the Brewery Eve, Whitsun Eve, Midsummer Eve, Consultation, Information and Sector (annex Swedish Food Federation Distribution - Christmas Eve and New Year’s Eve, Communication, Pay, Working to the Collec- - Livsmedelsföretagen and Best Operating Coca-Cola Enterprises Ltd. - Structure of Remuneration and Job GB 2017 Hours, Shift Patterns, Shift Plans, tive Agreement 2016 Swedish Food Workers Union Practice Agree- Unite the Union SVE Descriptions; Employment Terms, Contracted Work, Holidays, Bonus for the Food Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet ment Staggered Working Time, Overtime, Payments, Annualised Hours, Time- and Beverage (LIVS) Special Terms for Delivery Drivers; off in lieu (TOIL), Training Industry, Entitlement to Beverages at Work (blue-collar This Agreement is made up of 2 workers) parts: part 1 applies to the food sector; part 2 to the brewery, beverages and mineral waters industry. In the Agreement the following con- Employment terms, Remuneration, tractual conditions are established Working Time, Reduced Working 1601 Agree- : Remuneration; Supplements for Time, Part Time Work Prior to 148 Agree- ments for NHO - Food and Drink (em- work on Public Holidays and for Retirement, Overtime, Travel Com- ment 2016 - White-Collar ployers confederation) - NNN Shifts; Working time, Staggered Swedish Food Federation pensation, Holidays, Sick Leave, Breweries and 2016 Workers NOR (Norwegian Blue-Collar Work- (Flexible) Working time; Overtime - Livsmedelsföretagen and Parental Leave; Paid and Unpaid Mineral Water between 2017 ers Union in the Food Sector and Overtime Compensation; SVE UNIONEN (white-collar work- Time off/ leave, obligations and Factories UNIONEN and Holidays; Parental Leave and other ers union) rights in case of labour disputes; the Swedish paid leave; Early Retirement; Sev- Termination/ Dismissal; Vocational Food Feder- erance Pay; Uniforms; Training and Training and Development; Con- ation Development, including apprentice- flicts; Company Development; ships ; Joint Action for Equality and Adaptation to Changes Equal Opportunities; Anticipation of and Adaptation to Change 42 43 General Terms and Conditions of General Terms and Conditions of Employment: Job Descriptions and Employment: Job Descriptions and Roles, Working Time , Shift Pat- Roles, Working Time , Shift Pat- terns, Categories of Remuneration, terns, Categories of Remuneration, Pay & Benefits; Holidays, Hires Pay & Benefits; Holidays, Hires Promotions, and Terminations, CASBEGA and Central Works Promotions, and Terminations, 17th RENDER- Functional and Geographical mobil- CBA 2014- Council & TU members of Functional and Geographical mobil- LSUR WEST 2016 Not Available ity, Retirement and Pre-retirement, 2015 CAS- 2014 UGT, CC.OO. and USO, TU ity, Retirement and Pre-retirement, ESP ESP S.A.U. CBA Health and Safety, Discipline; BEGA delegates of UGT, CC.OO Health and Safety, Discipline; Equality; Uniforms, Insurance pol- and USO Equality; Uniforms, Insurance policies,, Employee Representation: icies, Pension schemes, Employee Works Councils, Central Works Representation : Works Councils, Council, TU delegations, Interpreta- Central Works Council, TU delega- tion of the Agreement and Dispute tions, Interpretation of the Agree- Resolution. ment and Dispute Resolution.

*This Agreement covers all aspects CBA 2014 2015 as in the above but for the purpose General Terms and Conditions of RENDELSUR 2014 Not Available ESP of this study only the part on remu- Employment: Job Descriptions and East Andalusia Roles, Working Time , Shift Patterns, neration was assessed Categories of Remuneration, Pay & Benefits; Holidays, Hires Promo- 3rd CBA CO- Cobega Baleares and works tions, and Terminations, Functional BEGA Embotel- 2016 council members of UGT, a and Geographical mobility, Retire- ESP ladora, S.L.U. local UGT officer ment and Pre-retirement, Health Baleares and Safety, Discipline; Uniforms; *This Agreement covers all aspects Equality; Employee Representation CBA 2014- as in the above but for the purpose : Works Councils, TU delegations, 2015-2016 2014 Not Available ESP of this study only the part on remu- Interpretation of the Agreement and BEGANO Dispute Resolution. neration was assessed

*This Agreement covers all aspects NORBEGA and Central General Terms and Conditions of CBA2016-2017 as in the above but for the purpose 2016 Works Council Members Employment: Job Descriptions and ESP NORBEGA of this study only the part on remu- of UGT Roles, Working Time , Shift Pat- neration was assessed terns, Categories of Remuneration, Pay & Benefits; Holidays, Hires Promotions, and Terminations, COLEBEGA and the Central Functional and Geographical mobil- 6th Colebega Works Council members of 2015 ity, Retirement and Pre-retirement, ESP S.A.U. CBA UGT, CC.OO, and CGT TUS, Health and Safety, Discipline; a local UGT expert Equality; Uniforms, Insurance policies,, Employee Representation *This Agreement covers all aspects : Works Councils, Central Works 2nd CBA CO- as in the above but for the purpose Not Available Council, TU delegations, Interpreta- ESP BEGA Aragon of this study only the part on remu- tion of the Agreement and Dispute neration was assessed Resolution. 44 45 ●● In CCEP’s Supply Chain, shift patterns are similar given that all products belong to same family with similar, if not identical production methods, and the bulk of production is based on concentrates purchased from TCCC.

●● The CBAs allow for different arrangements regarding shift patterns, the main being a “de facto” working week of 40 hours - 5 days of 8 hours - with compensation days or other forms of time-off established in the CBAs in which the agreed working time is less than 40 hours per week (e.g. Belgium has a 37 hours working week, but a de facto working week of 40 hours. The 37 hours are obtained by allowing for 18 additional days off work as compensation.

●● Most shift patterns are 2 x 8 hours or 3 x 8 hours. In most countries, employees need to rotate shifts, so that all get to work the same type of shifts over the year.

●● However, certain CBAs allow for employees to refuse to work night or weekend shifts, or at least the Company must seek the employee’s agreement (e.g. in Belgium, employees aged 45 or above can refuse to work night shifts). In the same way, employees can volunteer to work night shifts and weekend shifts, and in some plants there are specialised teams that only work night and/or weekend shifts.

●● In general, shift patterns are defined by the Company’s manufacturing needs, which are bound to seasonality and the increase of consumption during the warm months and holiday periods, such as Easter and Christmas.

●● Shift plans and the level of manning necessary for production/ warehousing are defined over a fixed period of time. In Germa- ny, this period is 12 weeks, in GB, 4 weeks, in Spain it is annual.

●● In all countries but GB, the shift plans must be agreed with the local employee representation bodies - be it the Works Council or union delegates - and all changes must be approved by COMPARATIVE the employee representatives. In case no agreement can be reached, in Germany the Company may seek external concil- iation. OVERVIEW: ●● In GB, Germany, Norway, Sweden and in some of the Spanish CBAs, Annualised Hours are established. However, the overall SHIFT PATTERNS AND WORKING HOURS amount of Annualised Hours, the way in which time accounts are managed, as well as compensation for overtime differ con- siderably. 46 47 ●● In GB Annualised Hours range from a total minimum of 2,080 ●● Thus, in most countries the aim of Annualised Hours is to (40 hours week), 2,184 (42 hours week), 2,340 (45 hours week) avoid overtime and if overtime is worked, it should be com- to 2,496 (48 hours week). These amounts are “gross” meaning pensated by time-off, so that employees reach a Zero in their that they include holidays. Taking away holidays, they turn into time account balance. However, in Norway and GB overtime the following “net” amounts: 1,816 (40 hours week), 1,906 (42 is paid, and the employee has the option of TOIL (time-off in hours week), 2,043 (45 hours week) and 2,179 (48 hours week). lieu).

●● Even the lowest amount of Annualised Hours in GB is higher The following table provides a rough overview of than in any other country. This is due to the limited amount of statutory holidays in the UK (8 days, vs. 10, 11 or 12 in the shift patterns, weekly working hours, etc. in the se- other countries). lected countries.

●● In Sweden, the country with the highest amount of statutory hol- Normal Work- Work Work on Compensation idays, Annualised Hours range from 1,616 to 1,796. They de- Country ing Hours per Number of Shifts on Sat- Sundays Days pend on the shift pattern, which depending on the amount Week urdays of physical or psychological risks range from 36 to 40 hours/week. In Spain (Rendelsur) the amount of Annualised 3 x 8 hrs BEL 37 Yes Yes 18 Hours is 1,800 and in Germany, based on 47 weeks of work of 2 x 8 hrs 38 hours (37.5 in North-Rhine Westphalia), it is 1,786 (1,766.5 in NRW). In France, where the mandatory 35-hour working week 38 Decided locally was introduced by law, Annualised Hours of work are 1,575. Max. 10 by Agreement (37.5 in NRW) Satur- Yes, as per an- between Works No ●● In all countries, each employee’s Annualised Hours depend on DEU days per nualised hours Council and Man- max. 48 includ- year a number of options that the employee can take, or in the case agement of GB, can negotiate with management (e.g. in Germany an ing Saturdays employee may choose to take 4 additional days off as compen- Yes, but sation for “time for changing clothes” or to work on those days 40 hours, limited, for 600 EUR compensation). In a number of countries there is Monday - Fri- in Co- Yes, for over- also the option to reduce working hours when approaching day; Yes, but bega time and shifts ESP 3 x 8 hrs. retirement or pre-retirement. Thus Annualised Hours allow for RENDELSUR: limited Baleares on holidays and wide-ranging personalisation. 1800 Annual- and Ren- weekends ised Hours delsur ●● In the great majority of countries and in particular those that also only have measures in place for a reduction of working time as partial 35 pre-retirement, Annualised Hours serve the purpose of redis- 2 x 7.5 hrs. tributing the overall workload among the workforce, so as FRA 1,575 hours per Yes Yes Yes to reduce and possibly avoid psychological and physical strain year - 48-51 3 x 7.5 hrs. during peak periods, and above all, to secure employment. days off

●● This is a declared objective in most CBAs, and thus a commit- 2-shift pattern. 36.5 ment for the Company, as well. Only in GB is this objective not 37.5 hours, hrs./week; rotational with reductions shift work: 35.5 hrs./ Yes, un- Yes, but declared and Annualised Hours, in conjunction with other meas- No NOR depending on week til 6 pm limited ures, are to serve the purpose of allowing for increased flexibility, shifts continuous shift in order for CCEP to improve its customer service. work. 33.5hrs/week 48 49 Yes: first 2 hours overtime COMPARATIVE 36 - 40 hours; 2-shift and rotating 3-shift: 38 hours 50%; weekdays and Saturdays: 1,616 - 1,796 Continuous 3-shift: Yes Yes 80%; SVE hours per year, 36 hours depending on Sundays, night OVERVIEW: Continuous night- shifts after holidays, time: 38 hours above 150 hrs. HOLIDAYS AND LEAVE OF ABSENCE per year: 150% Employees hired before August 2014: 40 - 48 hrs. av- Days: 12 hrs. max, Annualised erage Double days: 2 x 8 Hours - over- Annualised hours time will be Hours: average paid or can be time x week x Permanent nights: taken as TOIL Mon - Fri 8 hrs. + 6 (Time off in 52 - holidays Yes Yes UK on Sat; lieu), Employees hired after Au- 3 Shift rotating: if below annual gust 2014: 3 x 8 hours, miss- 2,080 (40 hrs. “continental” : 5 x ing hours be week) - 2,392 12 hrs., 7 days worked (46 hrs. week), Max. 60 hrs./ week

50 51 Holidays and leave of absence- paid and unpaid - are In all Spanish CBAs employees have the right to take paid days off NOT defined in the majority of CBAs analysed in this for personal or private reasons, such as death or hospitalisation of relatives, childbirth, marriage or equivalent, exercising public duties, etc. study. While the situations that determine such additional days are similar - albeit in some cases the list is longer than in others - the amount of days In Belgium, France, Norway and Sweden holidays and additional days of is not always the same. For example, in case of marriage employees leave of absence are defined either in law or in Interprofessional or Sectoral have 15 additional days off in the Rendelsur Agreement, 15 in the high National Collective Bargaining Agreements. In Germany they are estab- season or 18 in the low season in Cobega Baelares and 21 in the Cas- lished in the Regional Sectoral CBAs (Manteltarifverträge). bega or Colebega CBAs. Although reference to rules regarding holidays is made to the law, the Swed- The other countries’ CBAs do not go into this level of detail, for which it ish “white collar” CBA establishes that, if employees do not take a day’s can be assumed, that other laws or CBAs have authority in this matter. holiday, they will receive an additional pay equivalent to 5.4% of their monthly salary per day. Likewise, if they take unpaid leave, 4.7% of their monthly Also in Spain, employees may take a “sabbatical” of up to 5 years (Cas- salary will be deducted for each day. If the absence is for a prolonged period bega and Colebega), 3 months (Rendelsur), and 6 months (Cobega of time, a deduction in pay for unpaid leave will be made as follows: Baleares). They will maintain employment but no pay. Their position and remuneration are maintained for the first year, thereafter, they will ●● Up to 5 days : monthly salary/21 per day; be employed where the Company sees fit, at the conditions of the “new” ●● Over 5 days : monthly salary x 12/365 per day position. The years of “sabbatical” leave will not be considered as years of service with regard to allowances, bonuses, pensions, etc. ●● There are no such provisions in the Blue-Collar CBA or in the supplementary “brewery” CBA in Sweden In the Spanish CBAs, additional provisions can be found regarding parental leave, etc., based on the EU Directive (96/34/CE) on Parental In the GB CBA, holidays are clearly defined, but there are no additional Leave and the Law on Equality. provisions for certain forms of paid, or partially paid, leave of absence, such as parental leave. Similarly, in the French CBA 2017 it is established that “paternity” leave shall be equivalent to “maternity” leave: 11 days off, 18 in case ●● In GB: there are 8 days of statutory holidays and 25 days of of birth of twins. These provisions are independent of those established paid holiday = 33 days. in the transposition law of the EU Directive and refer to the period im- mediately following childbirth. ●● The amount of paid for time-off is calculated by defining the DAY RATE, which is the amount of average hours worked In the analysed CBAs, other specific provisions onParental Leave (not per day. Maternity or Paternity Leave) can be found in the Swedish White-Collar CBA, and a more aspirational goal in the Norwegian Blue-Collar CBA. ●● The Day rate is multiplied by the number of holidays (33), and then divided by 12 to obtain the number of shifts off In Sweden a White-Collar employee with at least 1 year’s service, can work. take up to 3 months leave during the first 18 months after the child is born, or following the day of adoption. Upon completion of the leave, ●● For example: 48 hours per week yield a day rate of 9.6 x 33 the employee will return to the former position and pay. During the leave = 316 / 12 = 26.4 shifts holidays, which is rounded down to of absence, there will be a reduction in pay of approx. 20%. 26 days holidays.

Spain: in each CBA the amount of holidays per year is defined. It ranges from 30 days (Rendelsur) to 22 days (Colebega). In the Colebega CBA, on top of the 22 days holidays, employees are entitled to 2 additional “personal days”. 52 53 The following table summarises the main provisions regarding holidays and leave of absence. Yes: first 2 N.B.: The amount of Statutory Holidays refers only to National Holidays. hours overtime In some countries / regions / provinces or even locations additional Yes: Brewery: 50%; week- The 5 days Must be agreed as days and Sat- Statutory Holidays may be added. before public early as possible urdays: 80%; 12 25 holidays Yes SVE to allow for annual (some fall on Sundays, night Compen- planning Coun- Stat- Addition- Unpaid Saturdays or after holidays, Agreed Rules sation above 150hrs try utory al Leave Sundays) Days per year: 150% Yes: age 50 +1 Longest consecutive period must be tak- age 55 +2 10 25 Yes 18 BEL en between 1 May - 31 August 1 for each 5 years of service • holidays are calculated by Yes, as per the number DEU 10 20? N/A N/A Yes annualised of shifts an hours employee can Begano: 25 take off: Different sets of • the number Casbega: 25 rules in each CBA, of hours per in general: week divided Cobega In case of: by 5 (days Aragon: 25 1. a holiday plan of a week) = DAY RATE Annualised is established death of Hours - over- Cobega Ba- by Management relatives; mar- • the DAY RATE time will be leares: 24 and agreed with riage; child- Yes, for over- is multiplied paid or can be Works council or birth; illness of Yes, up to time and shifts by the by the ESP 10 taken as TOIL Colelbega: vice-versa; close relative; 5 years on holidays allowed num- (Time off in 8 25 No Yes N/A and weekends UK ber of holi- lieu), 2. employees must renewal of ID; days and then Norbega: 23 take part of their public ser- multiplied by if below an- holidays in the vice/ duties; the working nual hours, Rendelsur low season (1 removal, hours per shift missing hours West: 22 October - 15 (12). The final be worked December and 1 figure is the Rendelsur January 30 April) number of East: 30 shifts that can be taken off. 5, as per CBA on 35hrs • e.g. shift FRA 11 25 Yes working week pattern 5 x for change of 12 hrs. = Day clothes rate 9.6 = 316.8 hours Longest consecutive holiday = 26.4 period (3 weeks) Yes: age shifts off 10 25 should be taken Yes No NOR 60 +6 between 1 June - 30 September 54 55 How is an employee’s pay calculated? Which elements are taken into account when calculating remuneration? These are core ques- tions and all analysed CBAs try to answer them, either directly or by COMPARATIVE referring to other CBAs, legislation or arrangements. Remuneration is understood to be a reward for employment in the form of pay (salary or wage) including allowances, benefits (medical insurance plan, pension schemes), bonuses, incentives and monetary OVERVIEW: value of non-cash incentives. Each of these components can be bro- ken down into “subcomponents”. In order to compare pay for work, the REMUNERATION STRUCTURE following is necessary: ●● to break down the different tasks that employees carry out into comparable profiles/ descriptions, and

●● to assess the quantity of cash and non-cash (if possible con- verted into cash), which is paid for employees performing comparable tasks in comparable conditions.

In this analysis, not all job profiles in the business are comparable. The organisation of work diverges from country to country, as do market conditions for beverages (climate determines seasonality; consumer habits and trends reflect on consumption), furthermore, the legislation regarding packaging (returnable/refillable containers; mandatory deposits, etc.) and of course labour law and the national and local practice of Industrial Relations bring about certain specificities in each country.

As announced by the Company, CCEP being the result of a merger of 3 bottling organisations still has a certain room to leverage synergies and standardise the organisation of work and connected profiles and positions. As explained in previous paragraphs, the former CCE organisation is more standardised and integrated than CCIP and CCEG. Subsequent waves of standardisation (Plant Performance Plan - PPP- and Standard- ised Plant Organisation Model - SPOM- were two initiatives for the standardisation of plants. The introduction of SAP- albeit extremely costly and disruptive - was leveraged in both CCE and CCEG to standardise and centralise a number of transactional business processes within administration, but also in sales, and to progressively lift and shift the centralised processes to Sofia. Iberia is still not an integrated organisation and most of the steps that CCEG and CCE have taken over the years have not been introduced so far. Within Iberia, collective negotiations primarily take place at a local level and often job profiles, groups and categories of remuneration do not match. Nonetheless, it is possible to compare some functions and the pay for these across the different countries and CBAs. 56 57 General components of remuneration that are found ●● in Spain: re-imbursement of parking tickets in every CBA: ●● in Spain: right to purchase beverages at discounted rate; ●● Base Salary / Hourly Wage; ●● in Norway and Sweden: right to free beverages. ●● Overtime pay; The following Table provides and overview of the Elements that can be found in most CBAs: most common components of remuneration in the

●● Additional pay and benefits for Years of service; analysed CBAs.

●● Shift pay / shift rotation bonus Base Overtime Years of CBA Bo- Night Shift Country ●● Night work; Salary Pay Service nus Work Rotation

Bonus Pay: BEL yes yes yes yes yes

●● CBA Bonus DEU yes yes yes yes N/A N/A

●● Performance related pay ESP yes yes yes yes yes yes

Fringe benefits and allowances: FRA yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes ●● Transport (to work and back), meal vouchers, sales commis- NOR sions, delivery commissions SVE yes yes yes yes yes

●● Medical insurance, pension funds, company cars, etc. UK yes yes Local specificities: Trans- Perf. Respon- Sales Distrbution Presen- Managing Country port to ●● in Belgium and Spain (Colebega and Rendelsur): “presen- Pay sibility Comm. Comm. teeism Cash teeism bonus” - a special reward for employees, who do not Work miss a single day / hour of work; BEL yes yes yes yes yes ●● in Belgium: “bicycle bonus” - the amount of 0,23 EUR per N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A kilometre is paid to employees for cycling to work and back DEU home; ESP yes yes yes yes yes yes

●● in Belgium: the PIN bonus is given for every 5 years of work; FRA yes it consists of a pin with a zircon and monetary gift NOR yes yes ●● in Spain: bonus for managing cash, all sorts of extra pay for specific family situations (disabled child, parent or spouse, SVE yes yes scholarships), etc. UK yes ●● in Spain (Casbega): bonus for “span of command” / leading at least three employees 58 59 The table below summarises the Classification of Author’s note: employee remuneration by Categories/ Groups and The comparison of “real” remuneration is extremely difficult if not out- Levels in each Group. right impossible, as it is a highly personal and personalised matter and a number of different components need to be taken into account. The simulation, which was used in this study, includes 3 selected job profiles Country Groups/Classes/Categories Levels (depending on the CBA analysed). For each CBA, the lowest and the highest-ranking salary groups and an intermediate position were con- White-collars: 6 Depend on sidered. According to job descriptions in the CBAs these are normally: BEL years of ser- Blue-collars: 6 (9, for employees before 1998) vice a) unskilled workers,

9 in Hamburg/ Schleswig H., Lower Saxony/ 5, only in b) sales representatives (or agents or promoters) or skilled workers with Bremen, Hessen, Palatinate/ Saar; Baden Würt- Baden Würt- some responsibility, and DEU temberg; temberg, namely S, I, II, c) the highest-ranking position in each roster is normally in middle, but 11 in NRW, Bavaria, Berlin, East III and IV not higher management. Asturbega: 5, from A -E, low-high 1 - 9 For the purpose of this study, only Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Begano: 6 (not numbered), low-high NO France and Spain were taken into account, as the salary tables/ros- Casbega: 1 - 7 high - low 3-11* ters were not available for the remainder countries. The previous tables with general information on the selected countries, including minimum ESP Cobega Baleares: 5, A-F, high - low NO wage, where applicable, and GDP per capita are indicators of the gen- Colebega: 5, A-F, low-high 1 -13 eral economic treatment of employees in those countries.

Norbega: 3, A-C, high -low 1 -10**

Rendelsur (East + west): 5, I-V, high low NO

FRA 8 3

There is a differentiation between unskilled workers, skilled workers with a diploma, skilled NOR workers with a diploma in the food and beverages sector

Defined locally SVE 4 “bands” / not in analysed CBA

Wages reflect Wages are hourly, 2 groups: London Area and shift patterns: Outside London, and 2 profiles: Operative 1 UK 6 different and Operative 2 (lower paid( types 60 61 The table below is a simulation of “real” remuneration, excluding Group 11- Group 1 - generic Functional / Group 5A a. Personalised bonus payments; worker Area Manage- DEU East 32.578,39 EUR ment 26.250,12 EUR b. Performance related bonus pay of any type, other than spe / year cifically mentioned; / year 57.253,95 EUR / year c. Fringe benefits, such as meal vouchers, family allowances, Group 9 - Functional / etc. Group 1 - generic Group 5 - skilled Hamburg/ area manage- worker worker DEU Schleswig-Hol- ment Country CBA Lowest Median Highest stein 31.220 EUR/ year 40.026 EUR / year 67.606 EUR/ Class 1 - generic Class 9 year worker Class 5 - 43-45 years of Group 9 Blue-collar 2 - 3 years of 18-22 years of Group 1 Group 5 service BEL Workers service service DEU Hesse 71.673 EUR / 28.798 EUR / year 40.327 EUR / year 51.600 EUR/ year 35740,16 EUR/ 40.704 EUR/ year year year Group 9 - Functional / age 58 - 40 Group 1 - generic Group 5 - skilled age 18 - years of age 40 - 22 years Nieder- area manage- years of ser- worker worker service 0 of service DEU sachsen & ment White-collar vice BEL Bremen 28.952 EUR/ year 37.786 EUR / year Workers 27139,30 EUR/ 41.326,47 EUR/ 64.764 EUR/ 56.110,78 year year year EUR/year Group 1, Group 9 - level 3 Functional / Group 3, level 6 Group 1 - generic Group 5 - skilled Group 7, level 11 Area Manage- Casbega (only 39.833,61 Baden Würt- worker worker 26.361,31 EUR BEL temberg ment DEU base salary + 20.148,04 EUR EUR 30.814 EUR/ year 38.496 EUR CBA Bonus) Lower manage- 73.962 EUR / Unskilled workers Functional / ment year Area management Group 11 - Group 1 - generic Group 5 - skilled Functional/ worker worker Area Manage- BEL Bavaria ment Specialised 26.797,12EUR/ 34.300,28 EUR Sales Represen- Sales Represen- Sales Repre- year / year 71.458,80 tative tative sentative EUR Cobega Bale- Salary 12117,43 Salary 12117,43 Salary Group 11- DEU ares EUR EUR 12957,26 Group 1 - generic Group 5A - skilled Functional / worker worker Area Manage- +75% Bonus = +150% Bonus = +150% Bonus BEL Berlin ment 21205,50 EUR 30293,85 EUR = 32393,15 27.632,93EUR/ 32.578,39 EUR/ EUR year year 60.270,08 EUR / year 62 63 Management Unskilled worker Merchandiser Base Salary: Base salary: Base Salary: 1468,34 EUR 863,66 EUR/ Month 1208,97 EUR / Norbega Month ESP Month with Bonus: with Bonus: COMPARATIVE 22245,70 EUR / with Bonus: 37,413,88 year 30912,86 EUR/year EUR/ year

Unskilled Unskilled Worker, 4 OVERVIEW: Unskilled yorker, 1 Worker, 8 years service Rendelsur year service years service West 17716,80 EUR PERFORMANCE RELATED PAY 15626,40 EUR 19807,20 EUR ESP 2nd level man- (with service 2nd level Manage- 2nd level management, 4 years years, without ment agement, 8 service other bonus) years service 18765,00 EUR 23120,04 EUR 27475,08 EUR

13,40 GBP/ hour Proba- tionary, Out- 10,55GBP/hour, 12,66 GBP/hour side London Probationary, Out- side London Outside London 2496 hours/ year= 2080 hours/ year = 2340 hours/year= 33446,40 GBP 21944 GBP 29644,40 GBP 38023,15 24946,78 EUR** 33700,89 EUR** EUR** GB* Distribution 11,96GBP/hour, 14,34GBP/hour, 15,18GBP/ Post-Probationary, Post-Probationary, hour, Post-Pro- London London bationary, London 2080 hours/year = 2340 hours/year = 24876,80 GBP 33555,60 GBP 2496 hours/ year = 40428,63 EUR** 28.286,26 EUR** 37889,28GBP

43082,15 EUR**

Sectoral CBA Group 8, Mineral Wa- Group 1, level 1 Group 4, level 2 level 3 FRA ters, Beer and 19.285,89 EUR 25.801,49 EUR 55.481,79 Beverages EUR 64 65 In principle, Performance Related Pay is quite simple. A number of Key Supply Chain Bonus Indicators are set and, depending on the level of attainment, a bonus is paid or a part of pay is deducted. Performance Related Pay was intro- All employees in Supply Chain are entitled to a specific productivity duced in France and Belgium as linked to the overall Company perfor- bonus. Productivity is calculated based on 2 indicators: mance, with Revenue being the Key Indicator. The French employees lament that the Company’s results are reported in a misleading way, ●● P, which stands for the amount of product, which can be sold, so that they cannot obtain the deserved bonus pay. In Belgium, bonus counted in physical cases. This is calculated by detracting is paid by taking CCEP’s Operating Revenue for Belgium and Luxem- cases that had to be withdrawn for quality issues directly im- bourg into account. The Performance Related Pay was first introduced putable to employees; in 2011 and has been increased since then, as follows: ●● L, which stands for pallet movement per active employee per month. Bonus Bonus 2012 Bonus 2016 Bonus 2016 Percentage of 2011 in and following and following and following The bonus will be allocated according to the following table, upon Achievement EUR years in EUR years, in EUR years in EUR reaching the objectives established by management, adjusted to the percentage in which the objectives are met. 90% No No 138 313 91% No No 191 366 If the objectives are met 100%, the bonus will be paid as below (in EUR): 92% No No 242 417

93% No No 293 468 Remuneration P L 94% No No 344 519 Group / Level 95% 325 325 395 570 Group 2, Level 5 0 363,91 96% 325 325 426 601 Group 3, Level 6 769,31 291,14 97% 325 325 457 632 Group 4, Level 7 711,47 242,61 98% 325 325 488 663 Group 5, Level 8 654,85 218,35 99% 325 325 519 694 Group 6, Level 9 610,56 194,09 100% 400 450 600 775 Group 7, Level 10 562,54 194,09 101% 450 500 660 860 Group 7, Level 11 524,34 194,09 102% 500 550 720 920 103% 550 600 785 985 104% 600 650 845 1045 105% 800 800 1030 1230

The bonus is paid with the salary for February of the following year;

The Company submits the necessary information to the Works Council to assess the Company’s performance throughout the year.

Another form of Performance Related Pay is defined in the Casbega CBA, where a specific Supply Chain and an Administration performance bonus is paid according to internal benchmarks. 66 67 The bonus pay increases or decreases according to this table, if the ob- The bonus will be increased or reduced according to the percentage of jectives for one or both indicators are not met by 100%, or performance the objectives reached, as follows: exceeds 100%: PRODUCTION SALES % Objective % Objective % Bonus pay +/- EUR Bonus Pay per year +/- EUR Bonus Pay per year +0.5% +0.75% +0.5% +25 +25 +1% +1.5% +1% +50 +50 +1.5% +2.25% +1.5% +75 +75 +2% +3% +2% +100 +100 +2.5% +3.75% 100,00% +/- 0% +/- 0% +3% +4.50% -0.50% -12 -12 +3.5% +5.25% -1% -25 -25 +4% +6% -1.5% -50 -50 100,00% 100% -2% -75 -75 -0.50% -0.35% -1% -0.70% In case both indicators are above the maximum foreseen in the tables, -1.5% -1.05% an overall bonus of 156,44 EUR will be paid at the end of the year. -2% -1.40% -2.5% -1.75% -3% -2.10% In no other position is the bonus as relevant for re- -3.5% -2.45% muneration as in Sales. -4% -2.80% This is best demonstrated through the example of remuneration for sales agents in the Balearic Islands (CBA Cobega Baleares). Depend- ing on their performance, they can almost treble their base salary, Administration Bonus thanks to a generous bonus.

For administrative employees, a similar bonus system is in place. 100% + base 75% + base 150% + base base The indicators are Production and Sales. salary salary salary salary Upon meeting 100% of objectives, the employees receive the following sales bonus: representa- 12.117,43 21.205,50 24.234,86 30.293,58 tives

Group / Level Bonus in EUR (100%)

Group 3, Level 6 449,53 specialised Group 4, Level 7 415,71 12.957,26 22.675,21 25.914,52 32.393,15 sales reps Group 5, Level 8 382,62

Group 6, Level 9 356,73 68 69 Performance Bonus in GB – Distribution

Also in GB a performance bonus is foreseen. It is bound to “SMART” objectives (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time bound).

There are no details of the scheme and the relevant maximum amounts in the CBA.

The CCE GB Distribution bonus for 2016 was based on a maximum payment of 1,587 GBP per person.

Author’s Note

As much as employers try to introduce personalised incentives and performance related pay, in all CBAs the main emphasis remains on permanent, fixed pay, which shall guarantee that employees have a dig- nified life and can benefit of public social security and pensions also in the future.

Against this backdrop, it can be said that in CCEP variable remuneration is an addition to well-defined and guaranteed conditions of employment, and that the CBAs in general tend to defend and improve upon existing conditions.

At the same time, in consideration of the rather modest pay increases (e.g. in Spain below 1%, in most other countries bound to the official Cost of Living Index), Performance Related Pay seems to be a form of compromise, which allows the Company to reward employees and strengthen their motivation, while at the same time offsetting the risk of general cost increases that, from a point of view of profitability and shareholder remuneration, might be less sustainable in less favourable or even adverse market conditions, as those that Coca-Cola has experienced in the last 20 years. The general trend that began in the 1990ies, towards a shift from productivity-oriented to competition-oriented collective bargaining, has established a new balance between capital and labour, and the different forms of Performance Related Pay aim at moving the redistribution of profits away from employees towards shareholders. COMPARATIVE In the global context, where the general aim of “national competitiveness” seems to be of paramount importance, a downward spiral for wages and other collective bargaining matters has gained a foothold. It can be altered or offset only with a clear vision and strategy for Collective OVERVIEW: Bargaining at Company level and in the national sectoral or interprofessional negotiations. COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW: PENSION SCHEMES 70 71 Of the CBAs analysed for this study, some mention Company Pension On top of this, individually employees can pay a minimum amount of Funds directly and others indirectly. Many do not mention them at all. 30 EUR per month / 360 EUR per year up to the legal maximum limit. Similarly, Profit Sharing Schemes exist in some CBAs, but not in others. The “financial participation” of employees in the Company’s perfor- The other Spanish CBAs also refer to an integration into public pen- mance is normally implemented through: sions, in case of early retirement. In the Swedish and Norwegian CBAs, the Company makes a contribution into a “flexi-pension” scheme, which a) Bonus Pay based on profit sharing, which is linked to the Compa- allows employees to reduce the working hours before the legal retire- ny’s financial results; ment age, without loss of income and thus work part-time, or even take early retirement when they reach 62 years of age. b) Performance Related Pay, which is bound to Key Performance In- dicators;

c) through the option of purchasing or being rewarded with stock in lieu of cash, thus becoming an owner of (part of) the company.

This latter form is often bound to profit sharing, which occurs in the form of a dividend pay- out for the shares the employee has acquired, and to long-term investment in the Company, with the establishment of a company pension scheme. These measures aim to both, tying employees to the Company for a long term, and to motivate them to actively pursue the Company’s interest in the employee’s own interest. Often share-owning employees do not participate in labour disputes, as they believe that they may harm their own financial interests.

In many cases, however, pension funds are not linked to the Company shares, and employees belong to a pension scheme, which is paid to a large extent, by the Company as part of the remuneration. Among the Agreements analysed, the Belgian and German CBAs make references to pension funds, as part of the severance terms and conditions. Thus it is understood that such pension schemes exist and are part of the remuneration of German CCEP employees, but the functioning and conditions of subscription to these schemes are not the subject of any of the CBAs analysed. The other CBA in which Pension Funds are mentioned is the CASBEGA CBA in Spain, where the Company is committed to invest into the pension fund on behalf of the employees.

●● Casbega pays 4% above legal requirements;

●● Employees pay -2% below the legal requirements;

●● These amounts are calculated for each individual based on the employee’s total annual remuneration, composed of base salary, bonus payments and commissions. 72 73 As a part of the initiatives agreed with the Company to manage change, the German CBA on Part-Time Employment Prior to Retirement (Al- tersteilzeit) establishes a system that enables employees aged 55 and above to agree with the Company to gradually phase out of work by progressively reducing working time until reaching legal retirement age. The company makes a financial contribution, so that employees who take this option, can benefit from a full pension when reaching legal retirement age. They should also receive a pay increase, so that while working fewer hours, they still receive between 85% and 90% of their full-time pay. The purpose of these measures is also to secure jobs by re-distributing the overall workload, thus creating opportunities of employment for younger workers.

As mentioned earlier, similar provisions are laid down in the Nor- wegian and Swedish CBAs, however it is left to the local partners to define the concrete functioning of such schemes.

In the Spanish CBAs, pre-retirement provisions can be found (not a gradual reduction of working hours) that imply that the employees who accept pre-retirement would lose their income. To partially offset the negative effects of such a choice, the Company offers to pay a “pre-retirement bonus”, which decreases with the employee’s age nearing legal retirement age (65). For example, according to the RENDELSUR West CBA, at 60 years of age employees who decide to pre-retire are entitled to receive 9173,73 EUR per year, until they reach legal retirement age. In the Cobega Baleares CBA, the incentives are linked to years of service, as follows: Age 62 = 1812,66 EUR, Age 63 = 823,99 EUR, Age 64 = 603,66 EUR, Age 65 = 296,62 EUR, Age 66 = 219,71 EUR, Age 67 = 164,80 EUR.

In Belgium, pre-retirement is supported by the Company, as of the CBAs from2001, when the public scheme was still rather generous. The Compa- ny agrees to pay a supplement to the public pre-pension to ensure that employees aged 55 or above with at least 20 years of service would have at least 70% of their income, between 20 and 30 years 75% and above 30 years of service they would pre-retire with a pension equivalent to 85% of their last income. In France and Belgium other pre-retirement options are also defined and offered to employees within a CBA on a social plan COMPARATIVE containing measures to mitigate the effects of restructuring. OVERVIEW: PRE-OR PARTIAL RETIREMENT SCHEMES 74 75 The option of taking pre-retirement or reducing working time prior to retirement is one of the options to improve work - life balance. Although this concept is not mentioned directly as such in any agreement, all CBAs allow for some form or reducing the amount of work to pursue other interests or make it possible to take time off for COMPARATIVE personal or family needs. In Belgium, time-credits are supported by the public welfare system. Employees can reduce their working week by 20 per cent - which normally translates into working 4 days per week - or 50% in agreement with the Company. The period of time for OVERVIEW: taking time-credits ranges from 3 months to 5 years. WORK/LIFE BALANCE The Company can limit the percentage of employees who can take time-credits at the same time. In the CBAs of 2001, the limit is set at 8%. In the CBA of 2010 on the Restructuring of BIS, it is mentioned that the Company is allowing to exceed the 5% limit, as to allow impacted employees to pursue other opportunities.

An employee can request time-credits for one of the following reasons:

●● care of a child (until the child turns 9);

●● for palliative treatment;

●● to assist a member of the household or family who is severely ill;

●● to assist a disabled child (until the child turns 21);

●● to assist a severely ill child that can be considered part of the household;

●● to enrol in an officially recognised training/study course.

The option of taking these time-credits do not in any way limit the opportunities offered by the Interprofessional CBAs on Parental Leave and on the laws about palliative treatment and caring for disabled family members. The only limitation is that they cannot be used cumulatively.

In Spain, CBAs foresee a number of days off for different, personal of family related reasons (e.g. marriage, driving test or university exam, etc.). The Colebega CBAs allow for 2 “personal days”. The Andalusian RENDELSUR CBAs define that in the period of the “fiestas”, the work day finishes at 1 pm.

More interesting and unique to Spain are the provisions, by which the Company supports employees financially in specific family situations, which in the other countries are not regulated in Company CBAs, but 76 77 normally by the public welfare system and sectoral interprofessional CBAs.

For Example: Study and Disability Allowances:

Study Allowance Cobega Baleares Casbega

249,25 EUR per year 148,06 EUR per year Crèche/Kindergarten per child per child

Primary, Secondary and 257,32 EUR per year 249,14 EUR per year Upper Secondary School per child per child

455,00 EUR per year 433,82 EUR per year University per child per child

307,51 EUR per month per child be- 180,37 EUR per child low 18 years of age Disability Allowance per month (COLEBEGA) and 371,33 EUR per month per child aged 18 or above

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW: VOCATIONAL TRAINING 78 79 The “Family” oriented provisions in the Spanish CBAs are most like- competitiveness for the industry in the future. ly also the expression of a different type of relationship between the Company and its employees than those in the more integrated and ●● The Company shall make available means to ensure ad- multinational companies that were already listed on the New York and equate and appropriate training, based on a plan and pro- other Stock Exchanges (CCE) or owned by a Global undertaking such gramme reviewed annually by the partners. as TCCC, as was the case for Germany. The “multi-local” and more familiar structure of the Spanish bottlers also emerges in other aspects, ●● Drivers have the right to (and have an obligation to) carry out such as the organisation of work, different allowances and bonus sys- further training of 35 hours every 5 years. The employer must tems, specific conditions regarding seasonality, which greatly varies be- offer this to permanent drivers. tween the different Provinces of Spain, as well as Training, and Filling of Vacant Positions and Promotions. While all these elements are subject Apprentice Programmes to a series of established business processes and related procedures in the former CCE and CCEG, in the Spanish CBAs a direct form of par- In Norway, there are different apprenticeship programs with various pay ticipation is established. When vacant positions are to be filled, the suit- levels, starting from 40% of the actual entry wage for skilled workers for able candidates are assessed by a joint Panel (“Tribunal”) made up of the first year in the company (after 2 years’ vocational college) ranging an equal number of employee and management representatives, with to up to 80% of the wage for the last 6 months of the apprenticeship. an HR specialist assisting the panel without voting rights. The same The partners are in agreement that apprenticeships and internships are applies to promotions. the best ways of attracting and recruiting the right employees and tal- ent. In Sweden, there are well- established rules for remuneration for In some CBAs (e.g. RENDELSUR) it is even established that when apprentices, starting with 85% of the entry wage for employees aged there are equivalent candidates for an opening, relatives of employees 18, for the first year, up to 95% the final year. or of retired employees shall have precedence - a provision that would never be acceptable in the “politically correct” world of transactional In Germany, while the analysed CBAs do not include specific provi- public companies. sions for vocational training, their levels of remuneration, as well as salary increases, are defined in the CBAs. CCEAG and the Joint Works Similarly, a joint committee has the mandate to establish, or at least Council establish a joint plan to meet the needs for training and upskill- assess, plans for Vocational Training and monitor their implementa- ing to ensure that the workforce is ready for any anticipated changes. In tion. This is an approach that is also common in other countries. In the particular the business transformation and changes that management Nordic countries, for example, great importance is given to Vocational intends to introduce. Within the framework of the CBA on “Vocational Training and to Training and Development. In the Norwegian “Blue-col- Training and Professional Development”, (not part of the CBAs ana- lar CBA” it is emphasised that vocational training should be aimed at lysed), the Company will continue to accept and train apprentices and continuously updating and improving competencies and skills to fit the hire at least 50% of these apprentices per year. The remainder will be business needs: offered an annual contract of employment, except in cases where the local Works Council and management agree otherwise. ●● The partners agree that vocational training is important for the business and will strive to attract and increase the num- In Norway, a joint fund has been established to further education and ber of skilled workers amongst the workforce. It is therefore development for workers focused on productivity, environment, finance important to have a link to and collaboration with vocational and collaboration, financed by employer contributions. A council of 6 schools/colleges and have correct apprenticeship programs, members from both sides manages and administers the fund and etc. its objectives.

●● Management and shop stewards should collaborate to make In Sweden, while the responsibility to fund training rests with the Com- sure that all employees have the opportunity and access to pany, the importance of Dialogue around matters such as education, further education and training to improve and add skills need- training and skilling is emphasised in the CBAs. Training is also seen as ed in new or changed working methods and duties. This is a key element for the “future progress” of the business, and as such a deemed by the partners to be paramount for survival and relevant way to anticipate change in the markets and in the workplace. 80 81 In the Belgian CBAs, language training is mentioned in the country-specific bilingual context as an option for employees, who have to move to another company site. Other specific forms of training, including Trade Union training are mentioned as well. In case of Restructuring (Agreements of 2010 and 2015), a budget of up to 10.000 EUR per person is established, for training impacted employees, so that they can find new job opportunities. The training for these employees will be organised upon recommendation of an Outplacement Provider.

While in the analysed French CBAs there is no reference to training, the GB CBA is the only one, in which employee representatives do not play an active role in training. It is simply stated that “employees will not refuse training and upskilling as requested by the company”.

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW: STRESS AT WORK / HEALTH AND SAFETY 82 83 Psychosocial risks related to the workplace - or in other words, stress time, staffing and work organisation, the consequences of - are not explicitly mentioned in any of the analysed CBAs. In the leg- such changes should be analysed and included in the talks islation of most countries Psychosocial risks are part of Occupational with the aim of defining mutually beneficial preventive or cor- Safety and Health and are dealt with in a similar way. In fact they stem rective measures. to a large extent from the Framework Directive 89/391 which has the aim, among others, “to guarantee a higher level of protection” and with ●● Furthermore, the employer should provide occupational this aim establishes that “it is necessary that employees or their repre- health services necessary for the work involved and training/ sentatives are informed about risks to health and safety and about the induction to ensure all employees are aware of all risks at measures to be taken to reduce or avoid such risks”, and what is most work. relevant is that the directive insists that “it is necessary that they are in the position to contribute through balanced participation […] to the ●● Work environment measures and work should be assessed adoption of such measures”. once a year. All measures and actions are agreed between the partners. Concretely, this translates in employee representation in matters regarding Health and Safety, in the shape of a “H&S Committee”, which The Norwegian CBAs do not mention the subject specifically. often is a joint body with management, or “H&S Representatives”, who The German law (Arbeitsschutzgesetz) regulates the subject clearly are normally designated or elected by and from within Works Councils. and a specific company-wide CBA on Hygienic Behaviour in the The precise modalities of these different representation bodies or dele- Workplace was introduced in 2004, whereas the analysed CBAs do gates are established in national laws. not contain any specific reference to Occupational Health and Safety In GB, a country known for high standards in the field of Occupational or to psychosocial risks. Health and Safety, the CBA refers to Health and Safety standards as In the Spanish CBAs, on top of underlining the Company’s legal obli- being one of the Key Business Indicators for employee performance as- gations, the Company also explicitly recognises that the Works Council sessment and among the criteria for calculation of bonus pay (SMART shall have the right to assess the implementation of preventive meas- objectives). ures and to ensure that the Company implements them correctly (CAS- In France and Belgium, Health and Safety Committees (CSHCT) are BEGA). Furthermore, it is agreed that all training that is organised for mandatory in all establishments with at least 50 employees, and are employees shall contain a specific part on Health and Safety (CASBE- one of the bodies of employee representation. The law determines its GA and RENDELSUR). composition and role. It is a joint body, with the leader of the company (or site) as chair, an elected employee representative as secretary, other employee representatives (depending on the size of the workforce), the company safety officer, company medical officer, etc. As its role, functioning and mandates are clearly laid down in law, there is no men- tioning in the analysed CBAs on pay increase or Restructuring.

In Sweden, where the practice of Dialogue is embedded in the workplace culture, the CBAs state that the local partners are responsible for achieving a good work environment. The employer is responsible for concrete measures to ensure the agreed objectives are met and should carry out regular inspections of working conditions and assess any health or injury risks in the work place.

●● With the aim of anticipating possible negative consequences and take preventive measures, it is established that in any co-determination negotiations on major changes to working 84 85 “Anticipation means the state of being prepared for something upcom- ing and is the action people take when thinking ahead about something in order to figure out how to handle it, or to stop it from happening”.

This definition summarises the importance of knowing what will happen COMPARATIVE next, and the risks that those, who detain this knowledge, face when sharing it with those, who might be affected by it and therefore would rather stop it from happening than handling it. At the same time a quote from Macchiavelli’s “Il Principe”, illustrates how dangerous it is not to OVERVIEW: share this kind of insight: “Thus it happens in matters of state; for knowing afar off the evils that are brewing they are easily cured. But, when ANTICIPATION OF CHANGE for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow until everybody can see them, there is no longer a remedy to be found”.

To ensure that change would not come and hit the social texture like an unforeseen hurricane, the legislator has created a framework of European directives, aiming at improving Dialogue to prepare for, and possibly handle, change. As in the case of the Framework Directive on Health and Safety and the specific directives that complete it, a comprehensive legal framework for regulating the way in which social dialogue within companies and groups of companies should address, amongst other issues, anticipation of change and restructuring events, exists in the EU. Anticipation of Change is based on the principle of information and consultation of employees, through their representatives. These principles are implemented through the national implementation laws of specific European Directives, Collective Agreements and general practice that stem from such legislation, for instance, the European Works Councils.

The EU Directives on Information and Consultation can be summarily split into two groups: the ones with a national scope, meaning that they define singular rights for employees to establish local or national social dialogues, and the ones with a transnational scope. Excluding “historic” Directives, meaning the ones that were replaced over the years by updated Directives, the national information and consultation processes were introduced, where they did not already exist, through the Directives on Collective Redundancies, on Transfer of Undertakings, and the General Framework for National Information and Consultation (Dir. 2002/14 CE). As the titles suggest, the information and consultation processes were initially limited to scenarios involving some form of restructuring or reorganisation. Dir. 2002/14 CE sets a general framework, broadening both the scope of subject matters to discuss and the modalities for information and consultation, as well as the number of employees covered in general.

The second set of Directives have a transnational scope and were 86 87 drawn up to reduce the gap between decision making management, Information and Consultation - the first step towards which is located in another country and location than established em- Anticipation of Change ployee representation bodies, in particular in transnational companies. The Directives on European Works Councils, Cross-border Mergers If Anticipation means to know what is coming next, in formal Industrial and Takeover Bids should allow for employees not only to be heard, but Relations there must be clear information from management about how also to enter into a constructive dialogue with management, with the they intend to lead (and change) the company they manage, transform view to understand the potential implications and effects of changes in it as necessary to remain competitive, or simply how they intend to transnational companies and decide jointly, if possible, on measures to obtain the results that they have pledged to the financial community. be taken to offset the negative effects for employees and employment “Information”, and to follow on, “Consultation”, are therefore together from corporate decisions regarding the introduction of new working the first step towards establishing a Dialogue on Change, and where methods or any other form of structural or organisational change. possible and appropriate, on the Anticipation of its effects.

The recent “fitness check” carried out by the European Commission The definition of “Information and Consultation” in the body of EU Direc- on existing legislation, and in particular on the three above mentioned tives has developed over the years. If in the original European Works Directives with a “national” scope, drew attention to some factors that Councils Directive 94/45 CE “Consultation” was supposed to take place may reduce the effectiveness of the Directives. In particular the follow- as “an exchange of views” between the highest level of management ing stand out: the low incidence of representative bodies, the quality (defined as “Central Management”) and the European Works Council of their involvement (above all the way they are consulted, which is (formed as an autonomous body composed of the employee represent- often limited or formal); their strategic influence; insufficient awareness atives only), in the form of “Dialogue”. In the Framework Directive on of rights and obligations; compliance and law enforcement. Information and Consultation (Dir. 2002/14 CE), it is stated that “timely information and consultation are a pre-requisite of the restructuring and The Commission concluded: “As a result, some of the Directives’ aims, adaptation of undertakings to the new conditions created by the glo- in particular a reduction in the number of collective redundancies, balisation of the economy, particularly through the development of new improved management and anticipation of change, and better adapt- forms of organisation of work” (Dir. 2002/14/CE Whereas (9)) and while ability and employability of employees, appear not to have been fully maintaining the same vague definition of consultation (“consultation achieved. means the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between the employees’ representatives and the employer”), it establishes a Finally, the fitness check pointed to possible inconsistencies between clear mechanism for consultation to occur. It stresses that “the timing, the Directives on information and consultation of workers as regards in method and content of information must be appropriate” and, among particular definitions. Addressing these shortcomings will help improve other criteria, that it must happen “in such a way as to enable em- restructuring at company level as well. ployees representatives to meet the employer and obtain a response, As far as non-legislative actions are concerned, research has highlight- and the reasons for that response, to any opinion they may formulate” ed the importance of establishing a culture of social dialogue, of making and “with a view of reaching an agreement on decisions within the em- both employees and employers aware of information and consultation ployer’s powers”. This last step in the consultation process invites for rights and obligations at company level, and of effectively enforcing more concrete actions than an “exchange of views” and opens the way these rights in the event of non-compliance”.17 to negotiations regarding a potential agreement on the implementation and mitigation of the effects of change for employees. Considering that It would appear that the Commission understands the need for clearer, the consultation process is based on information, this also means that more stringent rules for implementation of Dialogue as a pre-requisite the employer must supply information about the potential effects for the for the management of change and the anticipation of its effects. In the workforce of their proposed decisions. Agreements that were analysed for this study, the definition of “Infor- mation” and above all of “Consultation” differ greatly and the concept of In summary, any implementation law of Directive 2002/14 CE must “Anticipation of Change” is expressed in entirely different ways. include clear provisions about the timing and content of information, specifying that information must allow for consultation, and that consultation shall lead to an agreement between the company and the employee representatives, on how the subject of the information may be

17. Communication from the Commission on “EU Quality Framework for Anticipation of Change and 88 Restructuring”, COM(2013) 882 final 89 implemented, and therefore specific which consequences there may The only other area for consultation is regarding potential changes in be for the workforce. Ultimately, any agreement shall lead to offset, the annual shift plans, depending on customer needs, which may lead minimise and/or mitigate those effects. to a reduction or loss of salary. In that case, at least 60 days’ notice must be given prior to implementing any changes, and following con- In the body of agreements analysed in this study, there is a strong level sultation with the Union Representatives. of heterogeneity also in this regard. The mechanism for consultation remains undefined, as well as the level The Nordic countries do not mention specific information and consul- to which its procedure is binding for management’s decisions. tation processes in their CBAs. This is part of an embedded culture of dialogue, which is typical for Norway and Sweden. However, it is In contrast with the practice in the UK, the German CBAs analysed in clearly stated that the parties must discuss how change can and must this context concern entirely the Anticipation of Change. They define be anticipated, as to avoid disruptive consequences for the business both the context in which change may be introduced in agreement with and the employees. Great attention is therefore given to training and the workforce and how the information and consultation process leading development, apprenticeships and on-going dialogue. to these decisions must take place. They also define the subsequent steps towards implementation of restructuring, with priority to mitigating The French and Belgian CBAs on salaries and salary increases do measures of different types. Thus they form a body of agreements on not tackle the matter at all. For information and consultation, there is their own that deserves to be addressed with specific attention. a clear mechanism defined in the law and which existed prior to the EU Framework Directive. The two Belgian CBAs on restructuring are The first CBA analysed defines the Structure and Functioning ofthe subject to the information and consultation processes and relate to mit- Joint Works Council (GBR). In itself, it is not related to our topic. How- igating measures. ever, it is relevant given the strategic role that the GBR and in particular its management team (GBA) play in the subsequent agreements, which In 2002, the Directive regarded mainly the UK, where no legislation on are dated 2015. information and consultation existed at that time. It was also meant as a reference for candidate countries that joined the EU later on. However, First and foremost, the CBA on “Structure” which has the aim to allow those countries are out of the scope of this study. for “socially compatible restructuring processes” and defines the modes for information and consultation on matters that would lead to changes In fact, the GB CBA is also the only one in which the European Directive affecting the workforce, as well as mitigating measures. is explicitly mentioned. The CBA establishes that the consultation process is binding, that in- “Areas for Consultation formation must be shared by the management about any restructuring process of national scope, including the annual production plan (per 7.2 The Company will consult on areas of the employment relationship site), the use of agency or contract workers and it allows for the GBA that have a significant effect on the employees’ working lives. Consul- to present measures for the secularisation of employment. It also es- tation will be genuine. That is, management decision makers at CCE tablishes that certain restructuring measures, e.g. outsourcing of the will consult with Union Representatives to ascertain the views of the Direct Service Delivery, can simply not be proposed, unless specific workforce prior to CCE’s management making decisions and these circumstances arise. consultations will be taken account of in subsequent decisions. […] CCE will consult widely and always consult on subjects required by the It is agreed that the Supply Chain management establishes a filling EU information and Consultation directive, as implemented by the GB and delivery matrix (annual plan) for the entire year in consultation with government and any other statutory requirements”. the Joint Works Council. Consultation will also take place in case of changes to the matrix. The aim of such matrix is to ensure a balanced Later in the text however, the parties agree to hold consultations at utilisation of the Company’s Supply Chain facilities, in order to maintain least every six months also in regard to “working practices”, and in par- employment within the shift patterns agreed in CBAs. In case additional ticular on the use of temporary, contract or agency workers, but these shifts are introduced, also on Saturdays, these measures cannot be consultations “will not be in advance of decisions taken”. used to close or transfer production lines. 90 91 The “Information” rights are not explicitly mentioned, as they are im- pay or dismissals and about the statistics regarding absenteeism, lost plicit to the practice of Consultation or Co-determination. However, it is time accidents, work environment and preventive measures. the management’s obligation to inform the GBA and the “Consultation Body” made up of two representatives from management, two from the While it is implicit that “information and consultation” must occur in ac- Trade Union NGG and two from the GBA, and in addition, two members cording to criteria established in the law, the details of these process- from local Works Councils in case a specific location is affected, of any es and in particular the timing in which consultation shall occur is not proposed measures. explicitly mentioned. Thus, as it happened, the Company informed the central Works Council of Casbega that the production would be shut In the GB CBA, the annual plan can be changed to respond to cus- down on the same day, as the decision was made public, and while still tomers needs, in Germany, its purpose it to redistribute work among all negotiating a CBA with the same Works Council. sites, so as to maintain them viable. This example visualises the rele- vance of the German co-determination laws and the powers they give According to the theory of “positive” change, not unlike living organisms, to employee representatives if they achieve such an outcome through companies transform themselves to adapt to a changing environment, collective bargaining, like in this case. and they do that seamlessly, in symbiosis with all their components, of which the workforce is the most resistant. The “means” by which they Further in this study the German body of CBAs is summarised, with all achieve this is either by unilateral decisions, where the law and/or the the specific conditions that they address and the provisions that are absence of opposition allow for it - and this is what most companies see established to tackle them. as an ideal flexibility - or else by implementing a constructive dialogue, where necessary or mandatory, as established by the EU legal frame- The Spanish CBAs are all-encompassing and range from the setting up work. The following summary table intends to give an overview of the of a joint body to interpret the CBA’s text in case of disputes, to meas- outcome, in practical terms, of such dialogue and of measures that are ures for the equal treatment of women and men, insurance policies, jointly implemented to support the introduction of change. In the imple- parking tickets and, of course, Trade Union Representation. mentation of all these measures there is, of course, a distinctive feature in the extent to which such measures are legally or ethically binding In that respect, they resemble the GB CBA, which contains a part about and more so, to which extent they are jointly defined and monitored “in the relationship between the Company and Trade Unions. consultation”, or even in “co-determination”. The Spanish CBAs establish the bodies for employee representation as follows: personnel delegates, trade union delegates, works councils and central works councils. Each of them has its own role, including in information and consultation processes. In general, they are informed of the situation and development of the business, production and sales and the probable employment trends, on a quarterly basis; about the Company’s balance sheet and financial results, on a yearly basis; antic- ipatively, before their implementation, on restructuring, reorganisations, closures, etc., the reduction of working hours or overtime; transfer of equipment; training plans.

Furthermore, they are informed about the introduction of new working methods, studies of time management, incentives and bonus plans and their potential effects on the workforce; about planned mergers, active or passive acquisitions or any other change in the legal standing of the Company, whenever they may have an impact on the workforce; about the individual employment contracts that the Company normally uses, with the possibility for the WC to request changes and resort to address the Labour Court to enforce such changes, if necessary; about grave or very grave misdemeanours or errors that lead to suspension without 92 93 Reduction Training / Redeploy- Outplace- of working Pre- Country Reskilling ment ment hours / no Retirement overtime COMPARATIVE BEL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

DEU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes OVERVIEW:

ESP Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes ANTICIPATION OF CHANGE AND FRA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RESTRUCTURING - GERMANY

NOR Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes

SVE18 Yes N/A N/A Yes Yes

UK Yes N/A N/A N/A N/A

Vocational Temporary Limitation on training and Voluntary Lay offs hiring con- personnel Redundan- Country (Chômage tract/ agency planning to cies in lieu of technique) work meet future Mandatory needs

BEL Yes Yes Yes Yes

DEU N/A Yes Yes Yes

ESP N/A N/A Yes Yes

FRA N/A Yes Yes Yes

NOR N/A N/A Yes Yes

SVE18 N/A N/A Yes Yes

UK Yes Yes Yes N/A

18. A general interprofessional CBA in force since 15 April 1982, on company development and greater efficiency, defines secure employment and matters of common interest for the company and the employees alike. The aim of this CBA is to develop a company’s efficiency, productivity, 94 and profitability while ensuring employment, security and career development. This is based 95 on the Swedish Co-determination Act (1976:580) and practical experience. Objectives and methods are all set out in great detail. The German CBAs analysed for this study entirely concern the Antici- However: employees who refuse to accept voluntary redundancy, must pation of Change. They define both the context in which change may be be redeployed at another site. They may refuse the new position. introduced in agreement with the workforce and how the information and consultation process leading to these decisions must take place. They ●● The new position may be considered “reasonable” or “unac- also define the subsequent steps towards implementation of restructur- ceptable” according to objective criteria defined in the CBA ing, with priority to mitigating measures of different types. Thus they form “Structure”. a body of agreements on their own that deserves to be addressed with specific attention. ●● Also, if the Company cannot redeploy an employee, they may serve the employee notice of dismissal. On the grounds of the analysis of these agreements (a more detailed summary of each agreement is attached) and benefitting of a presenta- ●● In case an employee refuses redeployment to a “reasonable” tion delivered by the Chair of the Joint Works Council, Johan Botella position, the employee is entitled to the equivalent of 70% of during the EFFAT conference held in Madrid within the frame of this pro- the severance for voluntary dismissal as per the conditions ject, the anticipative management of change in CCEP Germany can be set out in the CBA Structure; summarised as follows: ●● If the proposed position is “unacceptable”, the employee is The 5 phase information and consultation process (duration 12 entitled to 150% of voluntary redundancy if he/she renounces weeks): legal action or 70% if the employee starts legal action;

●● The Management delivers information to the employee rep- ●● Employees who are dismissed by the Company are entitled resentatives (“the consultation body”); this information must to 150% of the compensation foreseen in the voluntary redun- be complete and contain all the indicators defined in the CBA dancy scheme. “Structure”. Closures of sites and/or lines, transfers of produc- Mitigating Measures tion, etc. are only permitted if the company can prove, on the grounds of the indicators, that there is no alternative solution; The employee representatives first priority is to reduce the scope of closure/ outsourcing of distribution only when a clear business planned dismissals and submit counterproposals (e.g. maintain the site case, based on criteria defined in CBA “Structure” can be prov- in a reduced capacity, with the intent of employing people who due to en (for more details, refer to summary of CBA in Annex). their age could not retire).

●● There is a 3-week internal review by the Works Council, Eco- If those are not viable solutions, other mitigating measures are imple- nomic Committee and external experts; mented as follows:

●● The employees enter a 4-week negotiation phase with man- ●● Voluntary redundancies for employees directly impacted; agement, where they can make counterproposals and additional proposals to safeguard employment; ●● Job swapping solutions (non-impacted employees take voluntary redundancy and their jobs are taken over by impacted ●● The Voluntary Redundancy Programme is opened for a 3-week employees); period; employees can decide to resign and benefit from the severance terms and conditions determined in the CBA “Struc- ●● Hardship regulations ture”; ●● Working time reduction (Saturday work), ●● During a final 2-week period, specific cases of hardship are analysed and discussed with a view of reaching an agreement ●● Utilisation of the supply and production matrix, to redistribute for each case based on the CBA “Structure”. workload among the overall sites in order to preserve jobs;

Only once all cases are settled, can the Company implement the ●● Retraining, including outplacement reorganisation process. 96 97 The 12-week process in Germany as a schematic representation:

CTA Structure “Change Process”

Advisory Body Advisory Phase Volunteer Assessment/ (Negotiation) Program Evaluation Vol- 2 representatives of CCEP COMPARATIVE unteer Program DE GmbH In particular also Employee: Claim possible propos- to rescission con- Follow up, eval- Communi- 2 representatives of Cen- als on employ- tract according uation (eg cases tral Works Committee ment protection to the volunteer of hardship) cation/with program, making submission 2 representatives of local available of all of docu- Works Council vacant positions OVERVIEW: ments/con- in accordance crete date 2 representatives of NGG with the Dismiss- trade union al Protection Act; including job Possibly legal consultancy swapping ANTICIPATION OF CHANGE AND (1 per side) RESTRUCTURING - FRANCE 4 WEEKS 3 WEEKS 3 WEEKS 2 WEEKS

Advisory Body Consultation Volunteer Pro- Assessment/ Phase (Negoti- gram Evaluation Volun- ation) teer Program Oct 4, 2017 Oct 4 - Nov 1, 2017 Nov 22 - Dec 13, Nov 1 - Nov 22, Dec 13 - Dec 27, 2017 2017 2017

98 19. Courtesy: German Works Council, Johan Botella, Madrid, 2017 99 This information is based on a presentation delivered by Cyril Herbin, the “economic redundancies project”, meaning the number of jobs that Central Trade Union Delegate for Force Ouvrière in CCEP, during the will be eliminated, the categories of employees that will be impacted, EFFAT CCEP Conference in Madrid. the criteria for redundancies and the timeline in which they are planned, Given the different forms of employee representation in France, the as well as mitigating measures; (unless there is an Agreement on this process is quite complex and consists of different actors: subject with the TUs, which would make the consultation redundant);

●● the Company and on the employee side, If by the end of the period of consultation the WC has not been able to express its formal opinion, the process is considered to be concluded, ●● the Trade Unions (CFDT, CGC, CGT, FO); with the WC having delivered a negative formal opinion.

●● the Central Works Council; Also the Health and Safety Committee is to be consulted, within the same timeframe and in parallel to the WC. Also, the H&S Committee ●● the local Works Councils; can be supported by an expert of its choice.

●● the Health and Safety Committee. PSE - Plan for the Safeguard of Employment (Mitigating Measures)

The Process begins informally, when the Company informs the works If the Company and TUs reach an agreement on the method, the nego- councils and H&S Committee of its intentions to restructure. tiations can be opened at three different times: The Company then enters into talks with the TUs over what method to follow. Either the parties try to reach an agreement on the mitigating Before the information and consultation process with the WCs; measures, or they do not. At the same time, parallel to the information and consultation process In case an agreement is reached with the majority of the trade union with the WCs; representation, the WCs are informed and consulted formally about the While the information and consultation process has already begun. business case for restructuring, but not about the mitigating measures. The WCs can use an expert, who can assist the WCs and the Trade If not, within 30 - 60 days from this first meeting (R0), the first official Unions. The expert must be designated during the first official meeting information meeting is held (R1). (R1) From then on, the consultation process has the following duration, de- The expert’s role is mainly to assess the economic information received pending on the number of redundancies that may occur: by the Company and its rationale. Often the experts can prove that less than 100 redundancies: 2 months; there is no really stringent business reason and/or that the correct procedures are not being followed. This can be used during negotiations to between 100 and 249 redundancies: 3 months; the benefit of employee representatives.

250 or more redundancies: 4 months.

Consultation of the Central Works Council and local Works Councils

Correct consultation is mandatory. Without it, the “economic redundancies project” would not be legally validated and registered;

The WC is informed and consulted on:

the proposed reorganisation and the modalities of its implementation ; 100 101 Illustration of the Information and Consultation Pro- Voluntary Redundancies cesses in Case of Restructuring, as presented by There are 3 types of voluntary Redundancy Schemes: Cyril Herbin ●● those independent of collective redundancies;

●● an “open” voluntary redundancy scheme that is offered to any Possibly: information Who does what? employee who might be interested, before the official criteria meeting of the WC Gray = works council (‘’’ RO’’’ out of Green = employer for redundancy are communicated; procedural deadline) Dark Red = administration Dark Grey = use of an expert ●● voluntary redundancy schemes within a Forward-looking Possibly: information NEGOTIATION Management of Employment and Skills (GPEC) meeting of the WC with NO (‘’’ RO’’’ out of representative trade NEGOTIATION procedural deadline) union organisations Unilateral Breech of Collective Contract

Possibly: information A new form of breach of contract that allows management to unilaterally meeting of the WC Procedural delays (‘’’ RO’’’ out of 2 months if ‹ 100 redundancies terminate employment without the need to give a business reason for procedural deadline) 3 months if › 100 redundancies its decision. 4 months if › 250 redundancies

1st EC meeting 1st EC meeting 1) no business justification;

2) voluntary redundancies only; Possible appointment of an expert 10 days to request the information from the employer, who responds within 8 days. If necessary, 10 and 8 days again if additional 3) there must be a collective agreement in place covering at least 30% information is required Possible observations / Proposals of the Directorate of the workforce; Submission of the report to the WC And, if necessary, to the TU, ●● the employer needs to inform the authorities of its intentions; 15 days before the expiry of the deadline ●● only employees who leave voluntarily can be subject to this WC consultation : WC consultation : planned operation + plan; planned operation + Draft agreement + Collective redundancy Unilateral document (if partial project ●● an agreement is negotiated, in which the modalities for termi- agreement) nating the contract, as well as the amount of the compensation are defined; Agreement signed (50%) Agreement signed (50%) Sent to the administration Sent to the administration Modification of the project ●● the agreement is sent to the authorities, who must reply within DECISION OF THE DIRECTORATE 15 days to the company and the TUs who signed the agree- 15 days to validate the agreement in a reasoned decision ment; 21 days to approve the unilateral document in a reasoned decision ●● the plan is communicated to the employees; Favourable decision Reasoned decision to (motivated or tacit beyond the 15 or 21 day period) refuse Notification to the employer ●● any employee who accepts the conditions for severance for- + notification to the Works Council and trade union organisations where appropriate feits any rights to pursue the company legally;

Individual notification of redundancies ●● employees who accept this kind of redundancy are not eligi- PES implementation + PES implementation ble to outplacement services or to leave of absence to seek employment, nor will they have priority for re-hire, but they are entitled to unemployment subsidies. 102 103 organisational strategy. Which conclusion can be drawn from the comparative analysis of CBAs in CCEP in the selected countries?

CBAs are the result of years of practice and of negotiations, and thus must be seen as a reflection of how the Company and the relationship between management and employees have changed with time.

Spain has an extremely fragmented reality, and while the Company is reorganising as one entity (CCEP Iberia) within a larger entity (CCEP), its system of CBAs fails to meet these changes.

Strong trade union action is part of the Spanish tradition in CCEP and some form of coordination is necessary to harmonise existing relations and disseminate best practice. The existence of the CCIP EWC is an important step forward in this direction but a better coordination among different sites at national level is absolutely needed.

GB suffers from the lack of legal grounds for trade union action. His- torically established voluntarism has weakened the position of Trade Unions, who continue their brave struggle and actions. However, expe- 03 rience shows that the GB sites are often played off one against each other and this is detrimental to working and employment conditions. It is no a case that GB is one of the countries where Management has more flexibility in changing the working hours without consulting with CONCLUSIONS the employee representatives. Germany, Norway and Sweden, on the contrary, benefit from the co-determination embedded in their systems of industrial relations and of greater social cohesion.

Belgium and France are proof that also a strongly institutionalised system of industrial relations allows for strong forms of protection of employment and employees.

The challenges, that all employees in CCEP will continue to face in the foreseeable future are outlined in the introduction of this study, and bear the names synergies, optimisation and shareholders return.

The question that EFFAT raised is the following: is it possible to find common ground to coordinate collective bargaining?

Thanks to this study and the project events we can definitely conclude that, although industrial relations systems across Europe differ greatly, collective bargaining cooperation is a possible exercise that allow workers’ representatives to learn more about rights and standards negotiated by their colleagues in other countries. Moreover, it allows the identification of good and bad practices, from which learnings can be 104 105 drawn, and facilitate the establishment of common goals to be negotiated at national level.

In this regard, collective bargaining cooperation is a crucial step in the fight against social dumping.

At the same time, the study has proven that Collective bargaining cooperation requires time and resources. A successful analysis cannot disregard an attentive and technical study of the provisions included in each national collective bargaining agreement. Questionnaires can be of help in gathering data and relevant information in the conduction of such analysis, however the assistance of an expert certainly enables a much deeper assessment.

The objectives and modalities for such coordination remain to be defined by the trade unions with membership in the various transnational companies operating in the EFFAT sectors and need to be tailored according to each TNC’s reality. If EWCs are unionised and coordinated by EFFAT, they can also be an appropriate platform where such collec- COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN tive bargaining cooperation exercise is carried out successfully. EWCs can play a crucial role in anticipating structural changes at company level as they are a direct channel towards Central Management and provide for a platform where workers’ representatives can meet and strengthen cross-border cooperation and coordination. COCA-COLA Collective bargaining cooperation becomes a successful exercise when EWC members, their respective Trade Unions and workers’ rep- EUROPEAN PARTNERS resentatives at national level strengthen synergies and learn in getting the most out of the EU social acquis by combining and using the rights they have at EU and national level continuously, strategically and in solidarity.

EWC members should always take advantage of each EWC meeting to be timely and efficiently informed and consulted, but also to learn from each other’s experiences and develop shared approaches to be implemented locally. The collective bargaining cooperation methodology that has been developed thanks to the EFFAT project Anticipation of change and the sustainable management of structural changes: Promoting innovative actions to strengthen employee involvement and social partners’ cooperation, serves this specific purpose.

The enclosed appendix are a summary of all the agreements that were analysed and can be used as a reference when searching for specific topics, as well as to obtain an overall view of the different CBAs and the tradition of industrial relations that they represent. 106 107 108 109