Identity Fusion: the Interplay of Personal and Social Identities in Extreme Group Behavior

Identity Fusion: The Interplay of Personal and Social Identities in Extreme Group Behavior

William B. Swann, Jr. A´ ngel Go´mez University of Texas, Austin Universidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia (UNED)

D. Conor Seyle J. Francisco Morales and Carmen Huici University of Texas, Austin Universidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia (UNED)

The authors propose that when people become fused with a group, their personal and social identities become functionally equivalent. Two hypotheses follow from this proposition. First, activating either personal or social identities of fused persons should increase their willingness to endorse extreme behaviors on behalf of the group. Second, because personal as well as social identities support group-related behaviors of fused persons, the 2 forms of identity may combine synergistically, fostering exceptionally high levels of extreme behavior. Support for these hypotheses came from 5 preliminary studies and 3 experiments. In particular, fused persons were more willing to fight or die for the group than nonfused persons, especially when their personal or social identities had been activated. The authors conclude that among fused persons, both the personal and social self may energize and direct group- related behavior. Implications for related theoretical approaches and for conceptualizing the relationship between personal identities, social identities, and group processes are discussed.

Keywords: self-verification, identity fusion, social identity, personal identity

The attacks on the World Trade towers, the bombings in Madrid In particular, we suggest that extreme behavior emerges when and London, and similar terrorist acts have prompted a perplexed people undergo a process of identity fusion, wherein their stable world to ask why anyone would sacrifice themselves on behalf of conceptions of themselves as individuals become fused with their a group. One prominent answer has been that the perpetrators of identities as group members. such extreme acts suffer from deep-seated uncertainties about the self (e.g., Kaplan, 1981; Post, 1984). Such uncertain self explana- Identity Fusion and the Interplay of Personal tions are reassuring, for extreme acts that are due to a psycholog- and Social Identities ical anomaly occur rarely. However reassuring such conceptualizations may be, systematic Whereas personal identities refer to properties of the individual research has offered no support for the notion that terrorists have such as intelligent or extravert, group identities refer to the groups weak or wavering personal identities (e.g., Sageman, 2004). In this with which individuals align themselves, such as American, Dem- report, we take the opposite position, arguing that firmly held, ocrat, or family member. Although both personal and group iden- rather than uncertain, identities may give rise to extreme behavior. tities are integral aspects of the larger self-system, most people draw a sharp distinction between the two. In fact, just as a physical barrier (the skin) separates people’s bodies from the external world, a psychological divide (the self–other barrier) separates William B. Swann, Jr. and D. Conor Seyle, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin; A´ ngel Go´mez, J. Francisco Morales, and their personal identities from the identities of others. Carmen Huici, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Uni- Some individuals, however, may feel one or fused with a group. versidad Nacional de Educacio´n a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain. For fused individuals, the self–other barrier is blurred and the This research and the preparation of this article were supported by group comes to be regarded as functionally equivalent with the Science and Education Ministry of Spain Research Fund SEJ2004-01537/ personal self. Instances of fusion are particularly common among PSIC to A´ ngel Go´mez, J. Francisco Morales, Carmen Huici, William B. members of relational groups, wherein group members have ex- Swann, Jr., and D. Conor Seyle and by a grant from the Service of tremely close personal relationships with one another (e.g., family Promotion and Mobility of Science and Education Ministry to A´ ngel members, close friends, etc.). Nevertheless, people may also be- Go´mez. We are grateful to Gamze Baray, Nyla Branscombe, Pablo Brin˜ol, come fused with collective groups, even though they are unac- and Jolanda Jetten for their comments on earlier versions of this article and quainted with many, if not most, of the other group members (e.g., to Antonio Bustillos and Greg Hixon for advice on the statistical analyses. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Wil- country or political party). In this report, we focus on fusion with liam B. Swann, Jr., Department of Psychology, University of Texas, a collective group (country), as affinity with such groups reflects Austin, 1 University Place, A8000, 108 E. Dean Keeton, Austin, Texas relatively pure feelings toward the group, feelings that are largely 78712-0187. E-mail: [email protected] or Angel Go´mez, E-mail: uncontaminated by affection toward individual members of the [email protected] group.

995 996 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

We are especially interested in the nature and motivational identities of fused people continue to be salient upon entering consequences of the state of fusion. In particular, we propose that groups, fused people remain vigilant for challenges to these iden- the personal self remains potent and influential among fused tities and respond to such challenges by engaging in compensatory persons. In fact, for fused persons, group membership is intensely activity. Furthermore, because fused people regard their personal personal, for they feel that they care as much about the outcomes and social identities to be functionally equivalent, challenging of the group as their own outcomes. Recognizing that their level of either one should motivate efforts to shore up the other. Thus, for devotion to the group is quite extraordinary, fused persons may example, challenges to a personal identity may cause fused persons develop a feeling of personal responsibility to act on behalf of the to take steps to shore up a group identity with which they are fused. group (cf., Codol’s [1975] discussion of the “superior conformity The theoretical and empirical basis for this prediction comes from of the self” and Deschamps’ [1982] covariation model). If so, then self-verification theory. fused persons are unique not only in the strength of their commitment to the group, but also in what they bring to the group: a Self-Verification Strivings and Response to Challenges motivationally potent personal self. The possession of a potent personal self is especially relevant to the Self here because it may help fuel extreme behavior. That is, fighting or In the tradition of symbolic interactionism (e.g., Cooley, 1902; dying for one’s group represents a profound statement regarding Mead, 1934), self-verification theory assumes that people base one’s allegiance to the group. As such, simply noting that one their identities on the treatment they receive from others. More- shares many qualities with other group members may not be enough over, once they form identities, people begin using them to make to motivate such extreme behavior. Instead, only people who possess predictions about their worlds, guide behavior, and maintain the extraordinarily high levels of motivation should theoretically be perception that the world is knowable and coherent. Because willing to engage in such extreme actions on behalf of the group. identities serve these important functions, people become moti- In short, when called upon to make supreme sacrifices for the vated to maintain them. Furthermore, this motivation emerges group, people must be inclined to ask not what the group can do for 1 whether the identities happen to be positive or negative, as both them, but what they can do for the group. types of identities foster the perception that the world is knowable Readers familiar with social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, and coherent. 1979) and self-categorization theory (e.g., Turner et. al., 1979) Support for the proposition that people are motivated to main- may wonder how the fusion construct that we are introducing here tain their identities comes from over 2.5 decades of research differs from identification with the group. Identification is pre- documenting the relationship between people’s personal identities sumed to be high insofar as a group members’ personal self- and overt behavior (for a recent review, see Swann, Chang- concept comes to agree with the characteristics expected from a Schneider, & Angulo, 2007). Researchers have not only found that prototypical group member. The greater this fit, the argument goes, people gravitate toward settings and interaction partners that sup- the more the person is devoted to the group and finds that he or she port their identities, they have discovered that the desire for self- is valued as a group member (Hogg & Hardie, 1991). There is verification is sufficiently powerful that it can override the well- considerable support for this conceptualization. Researchers have documented tendency for people to prefer and seek positive shown, for example, that highly identified persons are more apt to evaluations (Jones, 1973). For example, when married people with derogate members of outgroups (Brewer, 1999) and are inclined to negative identities find themselves with partners who see them see other group members in a positive light (Klar & Giladi, 1997). more positively than they see themselves, they withdraw by be- Although both fusion and identification theoretically involve coming less intimate with them (e.g., Burke & Stets, 1999; De La strong alignment with a group, there is a crucial difference be- Ronde & Swann, 1998; Murray, Holmes, Dolderman, & Griffin, tween the two. In particular, when people identify with groups, 2000; Ritts & Stein, 1995; Schafer, Wickrama, & Keith, 1996; they theoretically undergo a cognitive process of depersonaliza- Swann, De La Ronde, & Hixon, 1994) or by separating from them tion. The fruits of this process are group members who see them- or divorcing them (e.g., Cast & Burke, 2002). Furthermore, when selves as prototypical of the group and interchangeable with other people’s personal identities are challenged by discrepant feedback group members (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, (either positively or negatively), they compensate by intensifying 1987). Depersonalized individuals may be well suited for falling in their efforts to obtain self-verifying evaluations (e.g., Swann & line and obeying orders issued by the group leader, but they lack Hill, 1982; Swann & Read, 1981; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, the initiative to enact extraordinary actions for the group, as such 1992). activities are, by definition, nonprototypical. The opposite is true The foregoing demonstrations of compensatory self-verification for fused persons. When people become fused with a group, they are especially interesting because they point to the operation of a do not relinquish their sense of personal identity in favor of their broader compensatory process than the one implicated in some group identity nor do they come to regard themselves as undiffer- past research. For example, in a test of self-affirmation theory’s entiated members of the group. Instead, fused persons retain a (Steele, 1988) prediction that people work to maintain their sense strong sense of personal identity. When this strong autonomous of positive identities, researchers found that people responded to self becomes merged with the group, it can provide the motiva- challenges to their positive identities by derogating a member of an tional machinery needed for taking radical action on behalf of the outgroup (Fein & Spencer, 1997). On the basis of self-verification group. But the continued vitality of the personal identities of fused people does not just mean that they are willing to make extraor- 1 With apologies to John F. Kennedy (1961), who used a similar phrase dinary sacrifices for the group. In addition, because the personal in his inaugural speech. FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 997 theory, we suggest that such compensatory activity emerges in Identifying Fused People: Preliminary Studies response to challenges to negative as well as positive identities. We were specifically interested in how compensatory self- To test our hypotheses regarding the interplay of personal and verification strivings might influence the behavior of people who social identities among fused participants, we sought a measure are fused with their group. We began by noting that there is some that assessed the extent to which respondents possess a motiva- evidence that self-verification processes can influence group be- tionally potent personal self that was one with a group. We havior. For example, members of groups who verified one anoth- reasoned that verbal measures of identification would be nonopti- er’s personal identities were more identified with the group and mal because none of these measures focus specifically on per- performed better than members of groups who did not enjoy high ceived oneness with the group. Instead, they focus on qualities levels of self-verification (Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002; Swann, such as satisfaction, solidarity, centrality, individual self- Kwan, Polzer, & Milton, 2003; Swann, Milton, & Polzer, 2000; for stereotyping, and ingroup homogeneity (Leach et al., 2008). For overviews, see London, 2003; Swann, Polzer, Seyle, & Ko, 2004). example, one of the most widely used measures of identification In addition, researchers have demonstrated that people seek veri- (Mael & Ashforth, 1992) measures endorsement of items such as fication for negative (and positive) identities associated with group “If a story in the media criticized my group, I would feel embar- membership. For example, some have shown that people seek rassed” and “I am very interested in what citizens of other coun- verification for their collective identities (personal identities peo- tries think about my group.” To obtain high scores on such scales, ple associate with group membership, as in sensitivity for many one must believe that one shares features or outcomes with the women; Chen, Chen, & Shaw, 2004). Others have demonstrated group, but it is not necessary to have any deep feeling of oneness verification strivings for group identities (convictions about the with, or connection to, the group. A Canadian, for example, may characteristics of the groups of which they are members; Lemay & recognize that one shares many features and outcomes with other Ashmore, 2004). Canadians (producing a high identification score) but nevertheless In this article, we extend this work by considering the implica- have no emotional connection to Canada or its people (and thus tions of self-verification theory for the interplay of personal and feel no fusion with the group). The opposite scenario is also social identities among fused versus nonfused individuals. The possible. For example, one might feel fused with a group that theory predicts that upon entering groups, fused people respond to epitomizes one’s values and ideals even though one might share challenges to their personal as well as social identities by attempt- few qualities or outcomes associated with the group. ing to shore up these identities. Moreover, because fused people To index fusion, we turned to a pictorial measure. Such mea- regard their personal and social identities as functionally equiva- sures typically depict the self and the group as separate entities lent, they should respond to challenges to one class of self-view by (e.g., two circles) and ask respondents to indicate how much the striving to shore up the other class of self-view. For example, when two entities overlap. Such measures were ideal for our purposes fused people encounter challenges to their personal identities, they because they represent a straightforward index of degree of align- may compensate by attempting to shore up their social identities ment with the group that can draw on conscious as well as (e.g., Swann & Hill, 1982; Swann et al., 1992; Swann & Read, nonconscious material. In addition, pictorial measures can offer an 1981, Study 2). In fact, any experience that activates either the option in which an object representing an autonomous self (e.g., a personal or social identities of persons who are fused with a group small circle) that could overlap completely with the object repre- should trigger pro-group activity. This pattern should not emerge senting the group (e.g., a larger circle). We hypothesized that among nonfused persons. endorsers of the fused option would perceive a deep connection In short, the major goal of our research was to test the notion with the group that would motivate extreme behavior. that fusion represents a distinctive form of allegiance to groups. In Our search for such a pictorial measure led us to an instrument particular, contrary to the original statements of social identity and that was originally developed to assess attachment in close rela- self-categorization theory, the fusion formulation assumes that the tionships (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) and was subsequently personal and social identities of fused persons may reinforce, modified to measure identification with groups (e.g., Coats, Smith, rather than compete with, one another. Claypool, & Banner, 2000). Scores on such scales are associated To test this conceptualization, we conducted three experiments. with verbal measures of identification with the group, perceived In the first two studies, we activated the personal identities of fused similarity of one’s own attitudes to those of other group members and nonfused participants by providing them with positive feed- and a measure of connection to the group on the basis of reaction back that challenged several of their negative personal identities times (Schubert & Otten, 2002; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & (of course, feedback that challenged a positive identity should have Wright, 2001). similar effects, but it would be unclear whether self-enhancement The measure we used in our research is depicted in Figure 1. or self-verification strivings produced them). In Study 3, we used The scale is a modified version of the one developed by Schubert a different activation manipulation that was designed to make and Otten (2002). To capture fusion in a manner that emphasized salient either personal or social identities. In all studies, we ex- perceived overlap and nothing else, we had participants indicate pected that activating either the personal or social identities of which picture best represented the way they perceived their rela- fused persons would increase their propensity to endorse fighting tionship with the group instead of choosing the option that best or dying for the group but that this pattern would not emerge reflected their “closeness with the group.” With this change, re- among nonfused persons. spondents reported difficulty discriminating two scale options Prior to testing our experimental predictions, we needed to from neighboring ones, so we deleted those options. The result was validate a measure of fusion. To that end, we conducted five a scale that asked participants to choose among five symmetrical preliminary studies. degrees of overlap (0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%). 998 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

Figure 1. The measure of identity fusion.

Five preliminary studies tested several key assumptions about relationship with Spain as quickly as possible. We timed how long the scale: (a) A reasonable proportion of participants in our sample they took to select their answer. To control for the tendency for our of Spanish Nationals would classify themselves as fused and that Spanish participants to scan written material from left to right fusion would be related to, but distinct from, identification; (b) (which could artifactually result in longer times for the options on participants would perceive a dichotomous distinction between the right hand side of the scale), we counterbalanced the config- being fused with the group versus all other relations to the group uration of the scale so that the options were sometimes presented and, as a result, they would take especially long choosing between as ABCDE and sometimes as EDCBA. In addition, we controlled the fused option and the adjacent option and report that this choice for handedness. was particularly difficult; (c) fused persons would insist that they An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the time participants took were more willing to engage in extreme behaviors on behalf of the to respond to different option of the fusion scale was significant, group than other group members; (d) fused persons would actually F(4, 115) ϭ 8.65, p Ͻ .001, ␩2 ϭ .23. A Tukey post-hoc test endorse engaging in extreme behavior for the group more than indicated that participants who choose the D or E options took nonfused persons; and (e) fusion is not a personality trait, so that more time (M ϭ 9.03, SD ϭ 4.68, and M ϭ 9.27, SD ϭ 6.32 s, being fused with one group would have little relation to likelihood respectively) than participants who chose the A, B, and C options of being fused with other groups. (M ϭ 2.24, SD ϭ 6.36; M ϭ 4.52, SD ϭ 1.85; and M ϭ 50.10, In Study 1, 200 Spanish undergraduates (118 men, 82 women; SD ϭ 3.20 s, respectively; all ps Ͻ .05). No differences emerged mean age ϭ 35 years, SD ϭ 9.23) enrolled in Spain’s National between the D and E option ( p ϭ .87) or between the ABC options University of Distance Education (UNED) completed a survey (all ps Ͼ .49).4 A parallel pattern emerged when participants online for class credit. In counterbalanced order, participants com- indicated how difficult it was for them to pick an option that best pleted the measure of identity fusion and Mael and Ashforth’s represented their relationship with the group. That is, participants (1992) Identification Scale with reference to the group “Spain.” As imputed more difficulty to choosing between the D and E options shown in Figure 2, scores on the fusion scale were distributed (M ϭ 4.09, SD ϭ 0.17, and M ϭ 4.37, SD ϭ 0.11, respectively) bimodally (b ϭ .653; values greater than .555 indicate a significant than among the A, B, or C options (M ϭ 1.92, SD ϭ 0.23; M ϭ bimodal distribution; SAS Institute, 1999).2 In addition, the cor- 2.20, SD ϭ 0.21; and M ϭ 2.09, SD ϭ 0.17, respectively), F(4, relation between identification and fusion was moderate, whether 115) ϭ 55.51, p Ͻ .001, ␩2 ϭ .66. fusion was treated as a dichotomous or continuous variable, Study 3 tested the notion that fused participants would assert rs(198) ϭ .42 and .56, respectively.3 that they would do more for the group than nonfused persons. One Participants reported relatively high levels of identification, with hundred and seventy-seven Spanish undergraduates (76 men, 101 a mean of 3.09 (SD ϭ .96, theoretical range ϭ 1 to 5) and fusion women; mean age ϭ 33.04 years, SD ϭ 12.02) enrolled in UNED with Spain, in that fully 40.5% or 81 participants selected the E completed a survey online for class credit. In counterbalanced option. By comparison, fusion rates in an independent sample of order, participants completed the measures of identity fusion and U.S. participants were about half as high. The relatively high rates identification with the country. Participants then completed (in of fusion in Spain presumably reflects a combination of cultural variables and recent events, such as several terrorist attacks, strife 2 with immigrants, and tension within areas of Spain that want Tests of the distributions of fusion scores in Pilot Studies 2–5 as well Ͼ independence from the central government (i.e., Catalonia and the as Experiments 1–3 also reveal significant bimodality (all bs .555; .555 is the cutoff for bimodality). Parallel tests of the distributions of identifi- Vasque country). cation scores indicated normality (b ϭ .46). Study 2 was designed to test the idea that the choice of the fused 3 Fusion was more strongly related to Mael & Ashforth’s (1992) scale option is a psychologically compelling action that demands more than other identification scales, such as, Jetten et al.’s (2001), r(112) ϭ .26, thought than the choice of other options. To test this possibility, we and Tropp & Wright’s (2001), r(248) ϭ .23. We accordingly used it in all informed 120 Spanish undergraduates (33 men, 87 women; mean subsequent investigations. ϭ ϭ age 33.90 years, SD 6.52) enrolled in UNED that they would 4 Three participants who selected the D option were deleted from all be completing a pictorial measure of their relationship with Spain. analyses because they indicated that their second ranked alternative was C. Participants then received the measure of fusion and were in- All remaining participants indicated that their second ranked alternative structed to choose the pair of circles that best represented their was either D or E. FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 999

100

Frequencies 40

0 1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 5,00

Figure 2. Distribution of scores on the fusion measure. counterbalanced order) measures of willingness to fight and die for willingness to die for the group measure also indicated that fusion the group. They completed these measures twice, once for them- was the only predictor, ␤ϭ.23, t(173) ϭ 3.10, p Ͻ .002, such that selves and once for other group members. For the willingness to fused participants perceived that they were more willing to die for fight for the group items, on 7-point scales ranging from Ϫ3 the group than other group members (M ϭ 0.38, SD ϭ 2.52), (totally disagree)to3(totally agree) participants rated their agree- whereas nonfused participants perceived that other group members ment with these five items: “I would fight someone physically were more willing to die for the group than they themselves were threatening another Spaniard,” “I would fight someone insulting or (M ϭϪ0.61, SD ϭ 1.71). making fun of Spain as a whole,” “I would help others get revenge To better understand the precise nature of the fusion effect, we on someone who insulted Spain,” “Hurting other people is accept- examined the impact of fusion on own versus others’ endorsement able if it means protecting the group,” and “I’d do anything to of extreme behavior, with the later variable treated as a repeated protect the group.” When summed, these items formed coherent measures factor. For the fight variable, a Fusion ϫ Own–Other scales (␣ϭ.75 for the self version, and .74 for the others version). interaction emerged,F(1, 175) ϭ 36.05, p Ͻ .001, ␩2 ϭ .19. For the willingness to die for the group items, participants rated Inspection of means indicated that nonfused participants thought their agreement with two items: “I would sacrifice my life if it that others would fight for the group more than they would (M ϭ saved another group member’s life” and “I would sacrifice my life 0.33, SD ϭ 1.17 vs. M ϭϪ0.4, SD ϭ 1.21), t(112) ϭϪ4.96, p Ͻ if it gave the group status or monetary reward” (␣ϭ.85 for the self .001. In contrast, fused participants indicated that they would fight version, and .83 for the others version). more for the group than others would (M ϭ 0.93, SD ϭ 1.14 vs. To test the effect of fusion and identification on willingness to M ϭ 0.54, SD ϭ 1.14), t(63) ϭ 3.71, p Ͻ .001. The only other fight for the group, we created a difference score: perception of the effect was a main effect of fusion, F(1, 175) ϭ 10.74, p Ͻ .001, self’s willingness to fight for the group minus perception of other ␩2 ϭ .06. group member’s willingness to fight for the group. A positive A parallel analysis of the willingness to die variable revealed a score indicates that participants thought they would be more will- Fusion ϫ Own–Other interaction, F(1, 175) ϭ 9.61, p Ͻ .002, ing to fight for the group than others, whereas a negative score ␩2 ϭ .05. Inspection of means indicated that nonfused participants indicates that they thought others would do more for the group thought that others would be more willing to die for the group than than themselves would. Fusion, identification, and the Fusion ϫ they would (M ϭϪ0.96, SD ϭ 1.88 vs. M ϭϪ1.77, SD ϭ 2.00), Identification interaction were regressed on the composite index. t(112) ϭϪ3.77, p Ͻ .001. However, fused participants thought Only a main effect of fusion emerged, ␤ϭ.43, t(173) ϭ 6.00, p Ͻ that they would be more willing to die for the group than others .001, such that fused participants perceived that they were more would do (M ϭϪ0.03, SD ϭ 1.72 vs. M ϭϪ0.41, SD ϭ 1.93), willing to fight for the group than other group members (M ϭ 0.39, t(63) ϭ 1.98, p Ͻ .05. A main effect of fusion, F(1, 175) ϭ 17.15, SD ϭ 0.81), whereas nonfused participants perceived that other p Ͻ .001, ␩2 ϭ .09, was the only other effect. group members were more willing to fight for the group than they Study 4 was designed to determine if the results of Study 3 themselves were (M ϭϪ0.38, SD ϭ 0.77). Parallel analyses of the might be an artifact of two properties of the fusion scale that 1000 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI encouraged respondents to assume that the fused option required UNED completed a survey online for class credit. In counterbal- the respondent to be not merely fused but “special.” First, we anced order, participants completed a measure of fusion with Spain worried that the central positioning of the self circle within the as well as five other groups. Correlations between fusion with country circle may have suggested that endorsers of the fused Spain and the other groups were all small and nonsignificant: option perceived themselves as central to the functioning of the friends, r(249) ϭ .10; religion, r(249) ϭϪ.01; family, r(249) ϭ group. Second, given that the E option was more distant from the .03; sport-team, r(249) ϭϪ.08; and political party, r(249) ϭ .02. adjacent D option than any other pair of options were from each These findings suggest that our measure of fusion does not tap a other (i.e., the distance from D to E was 0.64 cm; the distance trait. Rather, it appears that fusion is specific to the particular between all other pairs was 0.32 cm), respondents may have target toward which it is directed. decided that endorsers of the E option were quite unique. In summary, the results of the preliminary studies supported our To address these concerns, we introduced a modified version of assumption that fusion is a unique state of oneness with a group, the fusion scale that contained a sixth option in between the a state that is categorically distinct from the state of nonfusion. original D and E options. In the new E option, the center of the self In addition, fusion was related to verbal measures of identification, circle resided in the left-hand portion of the group circle, only 0.32 and it was fairly common for Spaniards to feel fused with their cm from the center of the D circle. One hundred and fifty-one country. Furthermore, although fused participants did necessarily Spanish undergraduates (25 men, 126 women; mean age ϭ 32.28 see themselves as central to the group, they believed that they were years, SD ϭ 8.83) enrolled at UNED completed a survey online for unique among group members in their willingness to act on behalf class credit. In counterbalanced order, participants completed the of the group. Finally, fusion was targeted toward specific groups measures of identity fusion and identification with the country. rather than being a trait. Participants then completed the measures of willingness to fight Having identified a measure of fusion that met our requirements, and die for the group (␣s ϭ .78 and .79, respectively). we conducted three experiments to test our major hypotheses. We were interested in two comparisons: (a) the E and F options Using several procedural variations, we asked whether fused per- (fused) vs. the ABCD options (nonfused), and (b) the E versus F sons would be particularly inclined to endorse fighting and dying option. To make these comparisons simply and directly, we used for their group when their chronic identities had been activated. an orthogonal coding method, the Helmert Contrast (West, Aiken, & Krull, 1996). The resulting multiple regression analysis of Experiment 1: Will a Challenge of a Personal Identity willingness to fight for the group included five predictors: two From an Ingroup Member Increase Extreme Helmert-coded main effects for fusion (the first of which compares Pro-Group Behavior? the two fused groups with the nonfused groups, and the second of which compares the two fused groups with each other), identifi- In this study, we either challenged or verified participants’ cation (centered), and the interaction of identification with each of negative personal identities and then measured their desire to fight the two Helmert-coded effects of fusion. and die for the group (Spain). The design was a 2 (fusion: fused vs. The regression analysis on willingness to fight for the group nonfused) ϫ 2 (challenge of personal identities: verified vs. chal- revealed the predicted main effect of the first Helmert code, ␤ϭ lenged) factorial. Ϫ.30, t(145) ϭϪ3.58, p Ͻ .001, such that those who endorsed the To obtain evidence that the state of fusion would predict re- E and F options (M ϭϪ1.68, SD ϭ 1.22, and M ϭϪ1.31, SD ϭ sponses over time and avoid potential demand characteristics, we 1.59, respectively) were more willing to fight than those who conducted this experiment (and the remaining experiments) in two endorsed the nonfused options (M ϭϪ2.46, SD ϭ 0.79). Also waves. In the initial wave, we measured personal identities and the consistent with prediction, the regression showed no main effect of extent to which participants were fused with Spain. To ensure that the second Helmert code, ␤ϭϪ.10, t(145) ϭϪ1.39, p ϭ .17, increasing the salience of group membership would not contami- indicating no difference between the E and F options. The analysis nate responses to the measure of personal identities, we measured also yielded a marginal effect of identification, ␤ϭ.16, t(145) ϭ personal identities before the measures of fusion. To determine if 1.85, p Ͻ .07. No significant interactions between identification the effects or our pictorial measure of fusion were distinct from and the fusion effects emerged. those of identification and prototypicality, we also administered A regression analysis of willingness to die for the group also measures of both of these variables. The dependent measures were indicated a main effect of the first Helmert code, ␤ϭϪ.25, collected during the second wave of data collection several months t(145) ϭϪ2.91, p Ͻ .004, such that those who endorsed the E and later. F options (M ϭϪ0.29, SD ϭ 1.06, and M ϭϪ0.17, SD ϭ 1.38, respectively) expressed more willingness to die for the group than Method nonfused participants (M ϭϪ1.23, SD ϭ 1.29). The regression also showed no effects of the second Helmert code, ␤ϭϪ.02, Participants. Spanish undergraduates enrolled in UNED com- t(145) ϭϪ0.30, p ϭ .76, indicating no difference between the E pleted this research on the web for course credit. The experiment and F options. Finally, the analysis yielded a main effect of was conducted online in two waves separated by 4 to 5 months. identification, ␤ϭ.25, t(145) ϭ 2.99, p Ͻ .003, but no significant There was relatively little attrition between the two waves, with interaction effects between identification and the fusion effects. 627 students completing the first wave and 602 participants (520 Study 5 tested our assumption that fusion is not a trait but women, 82 men; mean age ϭ 31.17 years, SD ϭ 7.45) completing instead captures people’s sentiments toward a specific target the second wave. group. Two hundred and fifty-one Spanish undergraduates (108 During the first wave, participants were asked to list five neg- men, 143 women; mean age ϭ 33 years, SD ϭ 11.34) enrolled in ative traits about themselves and then write a brief paragraph FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 1001 describing behaviors that exemplified each of the five negative Did fused participants list more qualities related to their Span- traits that they had listed (without naming the traits). A manipu- ish national identity than nonfused participants during the first lation check indicated that they regarded the traits they listed as wave? If, during the first wave, fused participants were more apt to negative (i.e., below the midpoint on a scale ranging from Ϫ3 identify qualities that were related to their group identities than [negative]to3[positive]; M ϭϪ1.67, SD ϭ 0.45), t(601) ϭ nonfused participants, then the challenge manipulation would have Ϫ91.19, ps Ͻ.001). Participants also completed the identification been more apt to activate the group identities of fused as compared and fusion scales for the group Spain, yielding 237 fused and 365 with nonfused participants, which would represent a rival inter- nonfused participants in the final sample. Finally, for the measure pretation of our findings. Examination of the negative traits listed of self-perceived prototypicality, on scales ranging from 1 (not at by fused versus nonfused participants during the first wave of the all)to10(very much), participants responded to this question: “To investigation offered no support for this rival hypothesis. For what extent do you consider yourself a prototypical member of example, the five most commonly listed negative traits, and their your group?” rates of endorsement by fused and nonfused participants, respec- During the second wave, participants returned to the website and tively, were as follows: shy (57.4%, 57.1%), insecure (33.3%, completed a second series of questionnaires. They learned that 32.9%), stubborn (27.4%, 27.9%), nervous (18.5%, 19%), and another participant (whom we will dub the “evaluator”) had read distrustful (12.6%, 13.1%). Note also that none of these traits is their self-descriptive paragraph and generated a list of negative closely linked to Spanish national identity, which emphasizes traits that seemed to describe the participant. Participants were not qualities such as unpunctual, unconcerned with the environment, given the specific traits generated by the evaluator but were told and fast talking (e.g., Sangrador, 1996). Moreover, there was no how the traits listed by the evaluator compared with the ones that difference between the fused and nonfused participants in the rate the participant had listed during the first wave. Participants ran- of endorsement of any of these traits (or the other 21 traits listed; domly assigned to the verified condition learned that the evaluator all ts Ͻ 1, ns). had correctly identified four of five of the (negative) traits that the participant had listed 4–5 months earlier but formed an overly Results positive evaluation of the remaining trait. Those randomly assigned to the challenge condition learned that the evaluator had To determine if fusion and challenge interactively predicted correctly identified one of the five (negative) traits, but on the attempts to shore up participants’ group identities, we performed a remaining four traits the evaluator rated perceived the participant series of multiple regressions of the outcome variables. The pre- more positively than the participant perceived him or herself. After dictors were identification, fusion, and challenge, all two-way participants received this feedback from the evaluator, they com- interactions, and the triple interaction. Both fusion and challenge pleted a manipulation check. Specifically, on scales ranging from were dummy coded and, as suggested by Aiken and West (1991), 1(not at all)to10(extremely), participants indicated the extent to identification was centered. which they believed that the evaluator saw them as they saw Willingness to fight for the group. Our major prediction was a themselves. Finally, participants completed the measures of will- significant interaction between the fusion and challenge variables. ␤ϭ ϭ Ͻ ingness to fight and die for the group (␣s ϭ .80 and .71, respec- Just such an interaction emerged, .17, t(594) 3.29, p tively). .001. Following the procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991; see also West et al., 1996), we decomposed this interaction by creating a coding system. As shown in Figure 3, fused partic- Checks on Our Manipulations and Measures ipants expressed more willingness to fight for the group in the challenge condition than in the verify condition, ␤ϭ.16, t(594) ϭ Was fusion correlated with identification and self-perceived 3.03, p Ͻ .003. In contrast, among nonfused participants there was prototypicality? In this experiment, the correlation between iden- no difference between the challenge and verify conditions, ␤ϭ tification and fusion was moderate (r ϭ .35). In support of our Ϫ.02, t(594) ϭϪ0.45, p ϭ .65. assumption that fused people perceive themselves as unique There was also an interaction between identification and fusion, among group members, the correlation between fusion and proto- ␤ϭ.17, t(594) ϭ 3.22, p Ͻ .001, with identification exerting a typicality was negligible (r ϭ .05, ns). However, in this experi- stronger effect among fused persons (␤ϭ.28) than among non- ment and subsequent experiments prototypicality was not corre- fused persons (␤ϭ.14). The foregoing interactions qualified a lated with identification (all rs Ͻ .07), raising the possibility that main effect of fusion, ␤ϭ.13, t(594) ϭ 3.07, p Ͻ .002, such that our single item measure of prototypicality was invalid. fused participants were more willing to fight than nonfused Was the challenge manipulation effective? To determine if the participants (M ϭϪ1.96, SD ϭ 1.24, and M ϭϪ2.38, SD ϭ challenge manipulation diminished participants’ perception that .77, respectively), and a main effect of identification, ␤ϭ.26, the evaluator saw them as they saw themselves, we conducted a 2 t(594) ϭ 6.55, p Ͻ .001, such that willingness to fight increased (fusion: fused vs. non-fused) ϫ 2 (challenge: verified vs. chal- with identification. No other significant effects emerged from lenged) ANOVA. As expected, only a large main effect of the the analysis. challenge manipulation emerged, F(1, 598) ϭ 149.31, p Ͻ .001, Willingness to die for the group. As in the willingness to fight ␩2 ϭ .20, such that participants were less apt to indicate the data, the analyses revealed the predicted interaction between fu- evaluator perceived them as they perceived themselves in the sion and challenge, ␤ϭ.14, t(594) ϭ 2.76, p Ͻ .006. As can be challenged as compared with verified condition (M ϭ 5.83, SD ϭ seen in Figure 4, fused participants expressed more willingness to 1.86 vs. M ϭ 3.88, SD ϭ 1.91, respectively). No other effects die for the group in the challenge condition than in the verify emerged (Fs Ͻ 1). condition, ␤ϭ.14, t(594) ϭ 2.64, p Ͻ .008. No such difference 1002 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

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Figure 3. Study 1. Willingness to fight for the group. emerged among nonfused participants, however, ␤ϭ.001, groups (e.g., Turner et al., 1987). Nevertheless, the fact that the t(594) ϭϪ0.03, p ϭ .98. challenge manipulation ostensibly came from a member of an The analysis also revealed a main effect of fusion ␤ϭ.14, ingroup may appear to provide self-categorization theorists with a t(594) ϭ 3.23, p Ͻ .001, with fused participants expressing more theoretical toe-hold for a rival interpretation of our findings. That willingness to die than nonfused participants (M ϭϪ0.67, SD ϭ is, encountering self-discrepant feedback from another ingroup 1.48, and M ϭϪ1.26, SD ϭ 1.33, respectively). Identification also member may have disputed our participant’s assumption that self had a significant effect, ␤ϭ.23, t(594) ϭ 5.85, p Ͻ .001, and other ingroup members are interchangeable and thus in agree- indicating that higher identification was associated with more ment (e.g., Turner, 1991). Challenging feedback from an ingroup willingness to die for the group. No other significant effects member may have thus created a tension that was subsequently emerged from the analysis. resolved through displays of group loyalty. If so, then informing participants that the discrepant feedback came from an outgroup Discussion member should not trigger compensatory self-verification activities. Experiment 2 was designed to test this possibility. When participants who were fused with a group received non- verifying positive feedback about their personal identities, they were especially inclined to strive for verification of their group Experiment 2: Will a Challenge of a Personal Identity identities by expressing willingness to fight and die for their group. From an Outgroup Member Increase Extreme Presumably, challenging the validity of participants’ personal Pro-Group Behavior? identities triggered a desire to shore up these identities. Because the personal and social identities of fused people were functionally This study was designed to determine if the findings of Exper- equivalent, they worked to shore up their social identities in the iment 1 would replicate if the challenging feedback came from wake of a challenge to their personal identities. a member of an outgroup (someone from another country in the Our evidence that fused participants engaged in compensatory European Union) rather than an ingroup. As in Experiment 1, activity in response to challenges to their personal identities is the design for this experiment was a 2 (fusion: fused vs. inconsistent with the notion that a depersonalization process di- nonfused) ϫ 2 (challenge of personal identities: verified vs. minishes the salience of personal identities when people enter challenged) factorial.

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Figure 4. Study 1. Willingness to die for the group. FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 1003

Method ␩2 ϭ .24, such that participants were less apt to indicate the evaluator perceived them as they perceived themselves in the Spanish students enrolled in UNED completed this research on challenged as compared with verified condition (M ϭ 6.01, SD ϭ the web for course credit. The experiment was conducted in two 1.80 vs. M ϭ 3.81, SD ϭ 2.09, respectively). No other effects waves separated by 4 to 5 months, with 365 students completing emerged (Fs Ͻ 1). the first wave and 326 participants (278 women, 48 men; mean Did fused participants list more qualities related to their Span- age ϭ 31.06 years, SD ϭ 7.40) completing the second wave. ish national identity than nonfused participants during the first During the first wave, participants were asked to list five neg- wave? Examination of the negative traits listed by fused versus ative traits about themselves and then write a brief paragraph nonfused participants during the first wave of the investigation describing behaviors that exemplified each of the five negative offered no support for this rival hypothesis. That is, the five most traits that they had listed (without naming the traits). A manipu- commonly listed negative traits were the same five most-listed lation check indicated that they regarded the traits they listed as traits in Experiment 1. The rates of endorsement by fused and negative (i.e., below the midpoint on a scale ranging from Ϫ3 nonfused participants, respectively, were as follows: shy (53.25%, [negative]to3[positive]; M ϭϪ1.68, SD ϭ .43), t(325) ϭ 70.64, 51.42%), insecure (30.31%, 28.8%), stubborn (25.12%, 26.23%), ps Ͻ.001. nervous (21.1%, 20.19%), and distrustful (10.2%, 12.11%). The procedure used for the second wave of the experiment was virtually identical to that used in Experiment 1 except that the Results source of the feedback was a member of an outgroup rather than ingroup. We simply told participants that their answers would be To determine if fusion and challenge interactively predicted randomly assigned to one evaluator who came from 1 of the 26 attempts to shore up participants’ group identities, we performed a European countries but did not specify the country itself. As in the series of multiple regressions of the outcome variables in which previous investigations, the fight and die variables were internally the predictors were identification, fusion, and challenge, all two- consistent, (␣s ϭ .73 and .75, fight and died, respectively). way interactions, and the triple interaction. As in Experiment 1, To increase the credibility of the challenge manipulation, we both fusion and challenge were dummy coded and identification asked participants if, in a future experiment, they would like to was centered. evaluate people from another European country. They then indi- Willingness to fight for the group. The analyses revealed the cated their level of interest in being in this role on a scale ranging expected Fusion ϫ Challenge interaction, ␤ϭ.27, t(318) ϭ 3.14, from 0 (totally disagree)to6(totally agree). A Fusion (fused vs. p Ͻ .002. As shown in Figure 5, fused participants expressed more nonfused) ϫ Challenge (verified vs. challenged) analysis of co- willingness to fight for the group in the challenge condition than in variance (ANCOVA) of the interest variable with identification the verify condition, ␤ϭ.29, t(318) ϭ 4.91, p Ͻ .001, but and perceived status of the country (the perceived status measure nonfused participants were not influenced by the challenge ma- is described below) as the covariates showed no significant differ- nipulation, ␤ϭϪ.01, t(318) ϭϪ.09, p ϭ .93. ences ( ps Ͼ .20). The analyses also revealed an Identification ϫ Fusion interac- At no point did we tell participants which country the evaluator tion, ␤ϭ.11, t(318) ϭ 2.29, p Ͻ .023, such that identification had came from. When we asked participants what country they be- a stronger effect among fused persons (␤ϭ.16, p Ͻ .039) than lieved the evaluator was from, there was considerable variability. among nonfused persons (␤ϭ.10, p ϭ .20). The foregoing In all, they listed 23 of the 26 European countries, with the most interactions qualified a main effect of fusion, ␤ϭ.39, t(318) ϭ cited being: France (13.8%), Greece (12.3%), Italy (12%), Portu- 7.71. p Ͻ .001, with fused participants indicating more willingness gal (11.3%), Belgium (11%), Germany (10.7%), the Netherlands to fight than nonfused participants (M ϭϪ1.88, SD ϭ 1.02, and (10.1%), and the United Kingdom (7.7%). Finally, on 7-point M ϭϪ2.55, SD ϭ .43, respectively). There was also a main effect scales ranging from Ϫ3(totally disagree)to3(totally agree), of the challenge manipulation, ␤ϭ.15, t(318) ϭ 3.02, p Ͻ .003, participants indicated their perceptions of the status of inhabitants such that participants in the challenge condition were more willing of the country they chose relative to Spain by responding to the to fight than those in the verify condition (M ϭϪ2.09, SD ϭ .93, following query: “The general status of people from this country is and M ϭϪ2.32, SD ϭ .76). No other significant effects emerged. higher than the general status of Spaniards.” Willingness to die for the group. As predicted, there was an interaction between fusion and challenge, ␤ϭ.20, t(318) ϭ 2.33, Checks on Our Manipulations and Measures p Ͻ .02. As shown in Figure 6, fused participants expressed more willingness to fight for the group in the challenge condition than in Was fusion correlated with identification and self-perceived the verify condition, ␤ϭ.22, t(318) ϭ 3.66, p Ͻ .001, but the prototypicality? In this experiment, the correlation between iden- challenge manipulation had no impact on nonfused participants, tification and fusion was moderate (r ϭ .44). The correlation ␤ϭϪ.01, t(318) ϭϪ0.08, p ϭ .94. between fusion and self perceived prototypicality was negligible The analyses also revealed an Identification ϫ Fusion interac- (r ϭ .03, ns). tion, ␤ϭ.12, t(318) ϭ 2.33, p Ͻ .02, such that identification had Was the challenge manipulation effective? To determine if the a stronger effect among fused persons (␤ϭ.13, p Ͻ .085) than challenge manipulation diminished participants’ perception that among nonfused persons (␤ϭ.09, p ϭ .27). There was also a the evaluator saw them as they saw themselves, we conducted a 2 main effect of fusion, ␤ϭ.42, t(318) ϭ 8.46, p Ͻ .001, with fused (fusion: fused vs. nonfused) ϫ 2 (challenge: verified vs. chal- participants indicating more willingness to die than nonfused par- lenged) ANOVA. As expected, only a large main effect of the ticipants (M ϭϪ0.43, SD ϭ 1.24, and M ϭϪ1.47, SD ϭ .095, challenge manipulation emerged, F(1, 322) ϭ 103.22, p Ͻ .001, respectively). There was also a main effect of the challenge ma- 1004 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

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Figure 5. Study 2. Willingness to fight for the group.

nipulation, ␤ϭ.27, t(318) ϭ 2.25, p Ͻ .025, with participants in Experiment 3: Is Activating the Personal Identities of the challenge condition expressing more willingness to die than Fused People Functionally Equivalent to Activating participants in the verify condition (M ϭϪ0.83, SD ϭ 1.26, and Their Social Identities? M ϭϪ1.06, SD ϭ 1.17, respectively). No other significant effects emerged. To test the generality of our fusion effects, we used a new strategy for activating identities in this experiment. Specifically, Discussion we introduced an identity activation manipulation that did not entail providing participants with feedback. Instead, in one condi- As in Experiment 1, when participants who were fused with a tion, we activated participants’ personal identities by having them group learned that an evaluator evaluated their personal flaws and indicate their willingness to fight for themselves. In a second limitations positively, they were especially inclined to strive for condition, we activated participants’ social identities by having verification of their group identities by expressing willingness to them indicate their willingness to fight for their group. Control fight and die for their group. Moreover, the fact that the challenge participants received no additional activation manipulation. The manipulation ostensibly came from a member of an outgroup design was therefore a 2 (fusion: fused vs. nonfused) ϫ 3 (identity argues against the notion that the feedback triggered more endorse- activation: personal, social, no-activation-control) factorial. ment of extreme behavior because it contradicted the assumption If the personal and social identities of fused participants are that self and other group members are interchangeable and thus in functionally equivalent, then activating either type of identity agreement (e.g., Turner, 1991). should increase the tendency of fused participants to endorse If the personal and social identities of fused persons are func- extreme behavior relative to controls. In addition, because focus- tionally equivalent, as our formulation suggests, then activating ing attention on identities tends to increase the certainty with either the personal or social identities of such individuals should which they are held (e.g., Brin˜ol, Petty, Gallardo, 2007), activating have the same effect. To test this possibility as well as the gener- either the personal or social identities of fused participants should ality of our fusion effects, we conducted a third experiment. increase the certainty of their personal identities relative to con-

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Figure 6. Study 2. Willingness to die for the group. FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 1005 trols. Finally, activating the social identities of nonfused partici- Checks on Our Manipulations and Measures pants should increase their endorsement of extreme behavior relative to controls, but activating their personal identities should Was fusion correlated with identification and self-perceived produce no such increase. prototypicality? In this experiment, the correlation between identification and fusion was moderate (r ϭ .26), and the correlation between fusion and self-perceived prototypicality was negligible Method (r ϭ .04, ns). Did fused participants list more qualities related to their Span- Participants. Spanish high school students taking a psychol- ish national identity than nonfused participants during the first ogy class volunteered to participate in this research with their own wave? Examination of the negative traits listed by fused versus consent and that of their parents. The experiment was conducted in nonfused participants during the first wave of the investigation two waves separated by 10 days. There was little attrition between offered no support for this rival hypothesis. That is, four of the five the two waves, with 435 students completed the first wave and 421 most commonly listed negative traits were the same five most- ϭ ϭ participants (369 girls, 52 boys; mean age 15.81 years, SD listed traits in Experiments 1 and 2. The rates of endorsement by 0.92) completing the second wave. fused and nonfused participants, respectively, were as follows: shy To make the procedure as comparable as possible to that used in (42.16%, 41.40%), insecure (37.25%, 38.26%), nonconformist, the first two experiments, we first had participants complete the (31,16%, 30,68%), stubborn (18,16%, 16.13%), and nervous procedure used in the challenge conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. (13.11%, 12.88%). Participants were asked to list five negative traits about themselves and then write a brief paragraph describing behaviors that exemplified each of the five negative traits that they had listed (without Results naming the traits). A manipulation check indicated that the traits To determine if fusion and self-view activation interactively were perceived as significantly more negative than the middle predicted attempts to shore up participants’ group identities, we point of the scale (0), M ϭϪ1.63, SD ϭ 0.47, t(420) ϭϪ70.91, performed a series of multiple regressions of the outcome vari- p Ͻ .001, and these perceptions were not associated with our ables. The fusion variable was dummy coded, identification was independent variables. Participants also completed measures of the centered, and two orthogonal contrasts were created for the iden- certainty that they possessed each of the five traits, identification tity activation variable. The first orthogonal contrast compared the ␣ϭ ( .88), fusion for the group Spain, and prototypicality. control group with the mean of personal and social identity acti- During the second wave, we first provided participants with vation conditions (Ϫ2, 1, 1). The second orthogonal contrast feedback regarding their personal identities using the same proce- compared the personal identity activation condition with the social dure used in Experiment 1 except that all participants received identity activation condition (0, 1, Ϫ1; see West et al., 1996). feedback that challenged their negative identities (i.e., positive Willingness to die for the group. We expected that fusion feedback). After participants received the feedback, they indicated would interact with the identity activation manipulation such that, the extent to which the evaluator saw them as they saw themselves. among fused participants, both the personal and social identity ϫ A2 3 ANOVA revealed no main nor interaction effects of the activation conditions would express more willingness to die than Ͻ Ͼ ␩2 Ͻ independent variables, Fs(1, 415) 0.19, ps .83, s .001. control participants, but that no such differences would emerge Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: among nonfused participants. Our second prediction was that fused personal identity activation, social identity activation, and control. participants would respond similarly in the personal and social Participants in the personal identity activation condition were identity activation conditions, but that nonfused participants would asked about what they would do for themselves on a five-item express more willingness to die for the group in the social identity scale adapted from the willingness to fight for the group scale: for activation condition than in the personal identity activation con- example, “I would fight someone physically threatening me.” dition. To test these predictions, we conducted multiple regres- Participants in the social identity activation condition were asked sions in which the predictors were identification (centered), fusion to indicate what they would do for the group on the willingness to (dummy coded), identity activation (orthogonally coded), and all fight for the group scale included in the previous experiments. interactions between these predictors. Participants in the control condition proceeded directly to com- To test for the predicted interaction between identity activation pleting the dependent measures. and fusion, we compared the regression model with all predictors The dependent measures were identical to those included in the with a second model that excluded the interactions between fusion previous studies except that we deleted the measures of fight for and the two orthogonal codes. This comparison revealed an Iden- the group (as these items had already been used in the social tity Activation ϫ Fusion interaction, F(2, 411) ϭ 4.50, p Ͻ .01. self-activation condition) and added measures of the certainty of This overall interaction was partially due to an interaction between identities and perception of uncertainty reduction. For the measure the first orthogonal contrast and fusion, ␤ϭϪ.11, t(409) ϭ of certainty of personal identities, participants rated the extent to Ϫ1.97, p Ͻ .05, indicating that the difference between the control which they were certain that each of the five negative traits used in condition and the mean of personal and social identity activation the feedback manipulation described them. They completed this conditions varied as a function of fusion. As can be seen in Figure 7, measure twice, once at the end of Wave 1 and once again after the among fused participants, those in both the personal and social identity activation manipulation in Wave 2. We computed an index identity activation were more willing to die than control partici- of certainty change by subtracting average certainty before the pants, but no such pattern emerged among nonfused. The analysis manipulation from average certainty after the manipulation. also showed an interaction between the second orthogonal contrast 1006 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

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Figure 7. Study 3: Willingness to die for the group.

and fusion, ␤ϭ.16, t(409) ϭ 3.04, p Ͻ .003, such that the had no tendency to increase self-certainty. We test this possibility difference between the personal and the social identity activation in the next section. conditions varied as a function of fusion. As is shown in Figure 7, Did activating personal or social identities increase the cer- fused participants responded similarly in the personal identity and tainty of fused participants’ personal selves? We expected that the social identity activation conditions but nonfused participants fused participants would display high certainty of their personal expressed more willingness to die for the group in the social identities during Wave 2 (controlling for certainty at during Wave identity activation condition than in the personal identity activation 1) when either their personal or social identities were activated. At condition. the same time, among nonfused participants, we expected high The foregoing interactions qualified three main effects. First, levels of certainty of personal self-views during Wave 2 only when there was a main effect of fusion, ␤ϭ.44, t(409) ϭ 10.26, p Ͻ their personal identities had been activated. Just such a pattern of .001, such that fused persons expressed more willingness to die results emerged. A 2 (fusion: fused vs. nonfused) ϫ 3 (identity than nonfused. Second, there was a main effect of the first orthog- activation: personal vs. social vs. control) ANCOVA of certainty onal contrast, ␤ϭϪ.18, t(409) ϭϪ3.16, p Ͻ .002, indicating that of personal self during Wave 2, with certainty of self-views during willingness to die was higher in the two experimental conditions Wave 1 as the covariate,5 revealed the predicted Fusion ϫ Identity 2 than the control conditions. Third, there was a main effect of the Activation interaction, F(2, 414) ϭ 19.49, p Ͻ .001, ␩ ϭ 10. As second orthogonal contrast, ␤ϭϪ.31, t(409) ϭϪ5.74, p Ͻ .000, can be seen in Figure 8, among fused participants, those in the indicating that willingness to die was greater in the social identity personal and social identity activation conditions expressed greater activation condition than in the personal identity activation con- self-view certainty, t(130) ϭ 7.63, p Ͻ .01, and t(127) ϭ 8.05, p Ͻ dition. There were no main nor interactive effects of identification. .001, respectively, than participants in the control condition. How- Besides confirming our primary hypothesis, the data also made ever, no difference was produced between the personal and social ϭ ϭ three additional points. First, the fact that activating the social identity activation conditions, t(107) 1.29, p .20. In contrast, identities of nonfused participants raised their willingness to die to among nonfused participants, those in the personal identity acti- the levels of fused participants in the control condition indicates vation condition displayed higher certainty than participants in the ϭ that contextual variables (i.e., activation of social self-view) as control and the social identity activation conditions, t(161) Ϫ Ͻ ϭϪ Ͻ well as individual difference variables (i.e., fusion) can contribute 8.63, p .001, and t(155) 7.65, p .001, respectively. to extreme behavior. Second, willingness to die for the group Nonfused participants in the control condition did not differ from Ͻ exceeded the mean of the scale among some participants in this their counterparts in the social identity activation condition (t 1). ϭ study. This finding fits with pilot testing indicating that the The interaction qualified main effects of fusion, F(1, 414) Ͻ ␩2 ϭ younger participants (as in Experiment 3) tend to endorse higher 35.31, p .001, .10, and activation manipulation, F(2, ϭ Ͻ ␩2 ϭ rates of fighting and dying for the group than older participants (as 414) 51.47, p .001, .23. The covariate had no effect Ͻ in Experiments 1 and 2). (F 1). Third, our methods and results undermine a rival explanation In addition to confirming recent evidence that focusing on the that assumes that the identity activation manipulation simply self increases self-certainty (Brin˜ol et al., 2007), the self-certainty primed violence. Witness, for example, that the manipulation findings also support our hypothesis that the personal and social simply asked a question, which means that for the many partici- identities are functionally equivalent among fused people. That is, for fused participants (but not nonfused participants), focusing on pants who answered nonviolently it primed nonviolence rather the social self was just as effective in raising the certainty of than violence. Also, the priming hypothesis predicts that among nonfused participants, those in the personal self-view activation condition should have endorsed more extreme behavior than those 5 A t test with certainty during the first wave as the dependent variable in the control condition, but they did not. Finally, if the identity revealed no effect of fusion (t Ͻ 1, M ϭ 6.84, SD ϭ 1.72 vs. M ϭ 6.76, activation manipulation merely primed violence, it should have SD ϭ 1.64, t Ͻ 1). FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 1007

Control 7 Personal identity activation Social identity activation

5 Certainty of personal identities

Nonfused Fused

Figure 8. Experiment 3: Certainty of personal identities. personal identities as focusing on the personal self. Finally, these with group membership), our evidence was consistent with the data offer direct support for our assumption that the identity notion that people sought verification of their group identities activation manipulations did indeed activate the self. This finding (beliefs about the characteristics of the group). Our findings also cannot be explained by the rival hypothesis that the identity dovetail with Lemay and Ashmore’s (2004) evidence that peo- activation manipulations merely served to prime violence. As ple failed to assimilate evaluations that challenged their group such, this finding casts further doubt on the viability of this rival identities. explanation. To the best of our knowledge, our experiments represent the first empirical demonstrations of a link between extreme group behav- Discussion ior and people’s enduring personal identities. Indeed, Hogg (2007) In this study, an entirely different identity activation manipula- seems to have offered the only other account of the potential role tion (having people indicate how willing they were to defend of the personal self in extreme behavior. Hogg has speculated that themselves or their group) increased willingness to die for the people are drawn to extreme groups because such groups offer group. These findings provided further support for our assumption clear and sharply drawn answers to individuals whose self- that the personal and social identities of fused people are function- certainty has been challenged. His hypothesis, which has not yet ally equivalent. That is, activating either the personal or social been tested empirically to the best of our knowledge, deals with a identities of fused persons increased their willingness to die for the phenomenon that is distinct from ours. For example, in contrast to group as well as their desire for group identity verification. Fur- our focus on the propensity to engage in extreme behavior, Hogg thermore, activating social as well as personal identities served to considers the factors that cause people to enter extreme groups. increase the certainty of participants’ personal identities. Moreover, contrary to our contention that the presence of firmly held identities motivates extreme behavior, Hogg has proposed General Discussion that identities that are weak and uncertain (at least temporarily) trigger identification with extreme groups. We proposed that the personal as well as social self may One challenge for future researchers will be to identify the energize group-related behavior. To test this idea, we focused on precise mechanisms underlying the effects of our manipulations. A fused persons, that is, group members who were so thoroughly rival explanation of the results of the first two experiments is that enmeshed with the group that they felt uniquely responsible to act challenging fused people with positive feedback emboldened them on its behalf. The results revealed that activating either the per- to say that they would fight and die for the group. Examination of sonal or social identities of fused persons increased their willing- the specific positive feedback in the challenge manipulation (e.g., ness to endorse extraordinary behaviors such as fighting or dying secure, calm, flexible, and trustful), however, suggests that the for the group. This pattern appeared to be robust, in that it emerged manipulation would have encouraged less rather than more ex- in two preliminary studies and three experiments that used different methodologies (questionnaire and web based), age groups treme behavior. Moreover, nothing in this rival hypothesis indi- (high school students and adults), and periods of time between cates why positive feedback failed to embolden nonfused partici- collection of predictors and outcome measures (4–5 months vs. 10 pants to endorse extreme behaviors in Experiments 1 and 2. days). Together, these findings support our assumption that the Finally, in Experiment 3, the manipulation of personal identity and personal identities of fused people remain salient when they enter social identity increased endorsement of dying for the group be- groups and that their personal and social identities are functionally yond the mere reception of positive feedback. That said, the fact equivalent. that the procedure used in Experiment 3 included both the manip- Our evidence that group members value verification of their ulation of positive feedback as well as the personal identity acti- social as well as personal identities complements recent findings vation manipulation leaves open the possibility that the two ma- reported by Chen and her colleagues (Chen et. al., 2004; Chen, nipulations may have interactively produced our findings. Boucher & Tapias, 2006). Whereas she found that people seek In what follows, we consider the implications of our findings for verification of collective identities (personal identities associated several related theories in social psychology. We begin with two 1008 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI theories that have dominated the study of group relations for the Social identity theorists may also be tempted to characterize last several decades. fusion as nothing more than “identification plus,” “identification with a dash of commitment,” or a subscale of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale. It is certainly pos- Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theory sible that some combination of verbal items might tap into the same perception of oneness that the fusion scale measures with a To date, most analyses of group processes have been guided by single item (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008). Neverthe- either social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or self- less, even if this were true, we would be reluctant to view fusion categorization theory (e.g., Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, as a variant of identification because to do so might obscure the 1994). Our findings are generally consistent with some aspects of distinct theoretical assumptions that underlie the identification and these theories. For example, the fact that identification predicted fusion constructs. On the one hand, identification is associated endorsement of extreme behaviors in some of our studies is con- with self-categorization theory, which posits that a depersonaliza- sistent with social identity theorists’ emphasis on the importance tion process ensures when people join groups. If so, added com- of identification with the group. More important, our findings mitment would simply make a highly identified person more confirm the notion that social identities can have a powerful inclined to embrace the group prototype, a tendency that is un- impact on group-related behavior, even when that behavior (e.g., likely to foment extraordinary action on behalf of the group. Thus, dying for the group) is not in the individual’s self-interest. the “identification plus” characterization of fusion is undermined These overlapping themes notwithstanding, we believe that our by our evidence that fused persons were more apt to endorse findings suggest a fundamentally different understanding of the extreme group-related behavior than nonfused persons. interplay of personal and social identities than the one advanced in On the other hand, we assume that people can become fused the original statements of social identity and self-categorization with a group without forfeiting their personal identities. For this theory. For example, consider Turner et al.’s (1987) principle of reason, fused persons should be quite capable of acting in ways functional antagonism, which holds that increases in the salience that diverge from the group prototype. Consistent with this rea- of any given identity diminishes the salience of other identities. soning, our fused participants seemed compelled by a motivation- Our evidence that activating the personal identities of fused people ally potent personal self to “go above and beyond the call of duty” increased their endorsement of extreme group-related behavior (e.g., Codol, 1975) and endorse fighting and dying for the group. suggests that personal and social identities can be simultaneously From this perspective, the primary contribution of this report is active (e.g., Simon, 2004). Similarly, evidence that activating the not a methodological one centered on the refinement of a pictorial social identities of fused people increased the certainty of their measure of identification. Instead, our primary contribution is personal identities in Experiment 3 provides further evidence that conceptual: Introducing a distinctive form of allegiance to groups the two types of identities may complement rather than compete called fusion. The fusion construct assumes that group-related with one another. Some of our other findings call into question the behavior may be motivated by both the personal and social self. In generality of the depersonalization process (Turner et al., 1987). particular, personal and social identities may combine synergisti- That is, the fact that fused people insisted that they would do more cally to complement and reinforce, rather than compete with, one for the group than other group members indicates that such indi- another. The result is extreme behavior on behalf of the group. viduals do not perceive themselves as interchangeable with other Our findings are also relevant to Abrams & Hogg’s (1988) group members. contention that people enter groups that are viewed both positively Advocates of social identity and self-categorization theory will and distinctively as a means of bolstering their feelings of self- be quick to point out that we are not the first to question the worth (e.g., but see Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Support for this generality of the principle of functional antagonism (e.g., Abrams, self-enhancement assumption has come from dozens of demon- 1994; Baray, G., Postmes, T., & Jetten, in press; Pickett, Silver, & strations of a strong ingroup bias, a tendency for group members Brewer, 2002; Postmes & Jetten, 2006; Reid & Deaux, 1996; to favor their own group (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Dutton, Stephenson, 1981; Turner, Reynolds, Haslam, & Veenstra, 2006) Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Fuller, Barnett, Hester, & Relyea, or the depersonalization process (e.g., Deaux, 1993; Simon, 2004; 2003). It is difficult to see how self-enhancement strivings could Spears, 2001). Nevertheless, acknowledging that these key theo- explain our findings. That is, consistent with self-verification retical propositions are not universally applicable does not change theory, we discovered that participants sought to shore up their the fact that such propositions remain default assumptions of the group identities in response to positive feedback that challenged theories. As such, these assumptions continue to orient researchers their negative personal identities. If anything, it would seem that who use the theory. Perhaps this explains why researchers working challenging participants’ negative identities would be self- in this tradition have failed to propose and empirically test a enhancing and should therefore diminish the tendency of people to conceptualization that predicts the specific conditions under which work to shore up their group membership. personal versus social identities motivate group behavior. This was The unique contributions of our approach notwithstanding, it is the goal of this report. Drawing on self-verification theory (Swann, possible to find considerable common ground between elements of 1983), we predicted and found that the personal and social iden- our perspective and some recent work in the social identity theory tities of fused persons acted in a complementary manner. In tradition. For example, akin to self-verification theory’s assump- particular, manipulations that were designed to activate either the tion that identities provide people with a sense of coherence, some personal or social identities of fused people increased their subse- social identity theorists have recently emphasized the role that quent willingness to engage in extreme behavior for the group. No identities play in making sense of the world (e.g., Ellemers & van such pattern emerged among nonfused persons. Knippenberg, 1997; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Turner, FUSION AND EXTREME GROUP BEHAVIOR 1009

1999). Other researchers have shown that people who identify Beyond these superficial similarities, we acknowledge a host of themselves as having low status embrace these negative identities important differences. For one thing, the rates at which our par- (e.g., Spears, Jetten, & Scheepers, 2002). From this vantage point, ticipants endorsed fighting and dying for the group were below the it is not surprising that the more people face discrimination, the theoretical mean of the scale for adults and only slightly above the more they emphasize that devalued identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, mean for high school students—a finding that is not surprising & Harvey 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears 2001). given that our participants were ordinary Spaniards. There are The latter finding nicely confirms self-verification theory’s many reasons to suspect that these rates would be higher among (Swann, 1983) prediction that as people gather more support for a members of terrorist organizations or other extreme groups. Con- self-view, that self-view grows in certainty and the desire to verify sider that members of extremist organizations may routinely be that self-view increases accordingly. Considered together, these besieged with encouragement to engage in engage in self-sacrifice formulations converge in suggesting that although people may and other forms of pro-group behavior. In contrast, ordinary citi- prefer to think well of themselves in an ideal world, they are at zens are likely to encounter such appeals only when a serious least, if not more, concerned with coming to terms with who they threat to the unity of the group is perceived, as in the case of a clear really are and structuring their lives accordingly (e.g., Spears, et. risk of secession of Basques and Catalans in present-day Spain. al., 2002). Nevertheless, when the conditions are right, it seems reasonable to expect that fused participants would support extreme political Optimal Distinctiveness Theory measures including military actions or being active in extreme groups. Indeed, in some instances, such individuals may come to Optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that humans are of two construe their own extreme pro-group behaviors as the ultimate minds when it comes to groups. Just as they have an inherent drive expression of their own personal need to differentiate from other to affiliate with others, they also have an opposing drive for group members (e.g., Codol, 1975). individuation (Brewer, 1991). The task of the individual is to somehow strike a balance between these competing motivations by Conclusions finding a point of optimal distinctiveness, an identity that simultaneously addresses both affiliation and individuation needs. This We sought to develop a deeper understanding of the interplay of approach shares our assumption that group members remain inter- the personal and social self in extreme group behavior. To begin to ested in being individuated and attaining verification of their fill this gap in the literature, we drew on both social identity theory personal identities while at the same time wishing to affiliate with (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-verification theory (Swann, the group. We would suggest further, however, that people may 1983). Whereas social identity theory offers a rich framework for affiliate (at least in part) as a means of obtaining verification for understanding the role of the social self in group contexts, self- their identities. From this perspective, the need for affiliation may verification theory offers insights into the role of the personal self be an outgrowth of desires to communicate, and receive verifica- in such contexts. We discovered that activating either personal or tion for, their individual identities. social identities of people who were fused with their group in- Self-affirmation theory. As noted earlier, Fein and Spencer creased the extent to which they were willing to fight or even die (1997) have reported support for self-affirmation theory’s predic- for the group. Thus, even when people become deeply aligned with tion that people work to maintain their sense of positive self-worth a group, their personal identities remain potent. (Steele, 1988). In particular, they found that people responded to Our findings challenge the notion that extreme behaviors grow challenges to their positive identities by derogating a member of a out of a chronically weak or wavering sense of self (e.g., Kaplan, stereotyped group. In the tradition of self-verification theory, we 1981; Post, 1984). To the contrary, in our research, participants obtained support for the symmetric prediction that people would were most apt to endorse extreme behavior when they were fend off challenges to their negative identities, precisely the op- strongly aligned with the group and had recently received feedback posite dynamic documented in the Fein and Spencer research. This that challenged their chronic beliefs about themselves. From this finding suggests that Fein and Spencer’s findings may have turned vantage point, extreme behavior did not stem from a lack of on a tendency for most people in unselected samples to have high self-knowledge. Rather, extreme behavior grew out of people’s self-esteem. From this vantage point, what appeared to be self- efforts to maintain their convictions about themselves. affirmation strivings may have in reality reflected self-verification At a more general level, our findings speak to the recent debate strivings. Further research is needed to test this possibility directly. between advocates of the importance of the personal versus social Extremist groups. Our focus on extreme behavior raises the self. One side of the debate has contended that the personal self is question of the relationship of our findings to the activities of primary over the social self (e.g., Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, & members of extremist groups. Some superficial similarities are Iuzzini, 2002). The other side has countered that personal identities worth noting. For example, our major finding was that fused are impotent constructions that are “there to be explained, not in people were more inclined to endorse extreme behavior such as themselves explanations” (Turner et al., 2006, p. 25). Our evidence fighting and dying for their group. Moreover, fused persons felt that both the personal and social identities of group members that they were willing to do more for their group than other group remain salient and active among group members will hopefully members. And when asked how they felt about their country, our refocus this debate. Clearly, both personal and social identities are fused participants reported that they perceived Spain to be good, important and influential. The issue, therefore, is not to determine right, and morally superior to other groups—sentiments that are which form of identity is bigger. Rather, the critical issue is to often expressed by members of extremist organizations (e.g., Cren- identify the personal and situational factors that determine how the shaw, 2000; Smith, 2004). two types of identities interactively guide behavior. 1010 SWANN, GO´ MEZ, SEYLE, MORALES, AND HUICI

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