Western Ukraine Between the Wars Author(S): John-Paul Himka Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes, Vol
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Canadian Slavonic Papers Western Ukraine between the Wars Author(s): John-Paul Himka Source: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December 1992), pp. 391-412 Published by: Canadian Association of Slavists Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40869428 . Accessed: 14/06/2014 03:32 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Canadian Association of Slavists and Canadian Slavonic Papers are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 03:32:57 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions John-PaulHimka Western Ukraine between the Wars Recentdevelopments in Ukrainehave continuedto underscorethe persistent importanceof regionalismin thatcountry. The westof Ukrainestill exhibits a political complexion unmistakablydistinguishable from the norm in the republic. Although all regions of Ukraine voted in favour of national independencein thereferendum of 1 December1991, the percentage voting "yes" was highestin thewest. In thewestern oblasts of Ivano-Frankivskand Ternopil over98 percent of thosewho voted supported independence (compared to 90 per cent in Ukraine as a whole). During the presidentialelections, held simultaneously,only Ukrainians in thewestern part tended to supportthe former dissidentViacheslav Chorno vil overthe former Communist Leonid Kravchuk.1 Butcurrent events only serve as a reminderthat regionalism is "a keyfeature of Ukrainianhistory."" The purposeof theinterpretive essay thatfollows is to examine a crucial component of historical Ukrainian regionalism- the experienceof WesternUkraine in the interwarperiod. The approachto the problemdiffers from that of related studies by treating all theUkrainian-inhabited territoriesthat found themselves outside the USSR in the interwarera and comparingthe individual experiences of thesmaller subunits within the larger region.The studyexamines, in turn,the nuances of thepolitical geography of WesternUkraine, the policies of Poland,Romania and Czechoslovakiatowards theirUkrainian minorities, economic and social developments,and thechanging WestUkrainian political spectrum. THEPOLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF INTERWARWESTERN UKRAINE The conceptof "WesternUkraine" is notentirely a staticone. As a validunit of historicalanalysis it firstappears in the late eighteenthcentury, when the Habsburgmonarchy added Galicia (1772) andBukovina (occupied 1774, annexed 1787) to its collectionof territories;already part of the collectionwas the Ukrainian-inhabitedregion of Transcarpathia(depending on how one counts,it had been Habsburgsince as earlyas 1526 or as late as the earlyeighteenth 1 PeterJ. Potichnyj,"The Referendumand PresidentialElections in Ukraine," CanadianSlavonic Papers 33.2 (1991): 123-38. 2 David Saunders,"Modern Ukrainian History," European History Quarterly 21.1 (1991): 85. Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, December 1992 This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 03:32:57 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 392 JOHN-PAULHMKA century).3Of course, one can also read back certain featuresunifying Western Ukraine prior to the 1770s, such as the culturallyformative influence on all three regions of the medieval Rus' principality,later kingdom, of Galicia and Volhynia, as well as the presence of the Carpathianmountains, which was much more than a matterof mere geology (hence the Russophiles' preferredname for - Western Ukraine Caipathian Rus'). Still, in the centuries prior to their incorporationinto the Habsburg monarchy,the threeregions had experienced such disparate political histories- Galicia as part of Poland, Bukovina of - Moldavia, and Transcaipathia of Hungary thatthere is littlevalidity in treating them then as a historicalunit. The incorporationof Western Ukraine into the Habsburg monarchywent hand in hand with the destruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1772-95) and the absorption of all the rest of Ukrainian territoryinto the Russian empire, so that at the turnof the nineteenthcentury all Ukraine was divided between the Habsburgs and the Romanovs, with the latterenjoying by farthe lion's share. Perhaps the real key to understandingWestern Ukraine is to thinkof it as a unityby negation, as those Ukrainian territoriesnot under Russian rule. In the nineteenthcentury, the age of the national revival,the Ukrainiansunder Russian rule were stunted in their national development by legislation aimed at suppressing a Ukrainian national identity(the prohibitionof the use of the Ukrainian language in print,schools or administration)as well as by the long absence of basic civic liberties. In the Habsburg monarchy,Ukrainians were much freerto develop theirnational culture and political life, although, to be sure, after 1867 the Ukrainians in Transcaipathia, in the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary,lived under conditions similar to those of tsaristRussia as far as the developmentof theirnationality was concerned.4 The exclusion fromRussia, in addition to its entirelypositive aspects with relation to national development,also had a negative side, since this meant that 3 A note on terminology:Galicia, as an Austrianprovince, had about as many Poles as Ukrainians; the west was largely Polish, the east largely Ukrainian. Similarly,Bukovina had about as many Romaniansas Ukrainians;the northwas largely Ukrainian, the south largely Romanian. In Bessarabia, which will be discussed later,the Ukrainianswere a minority.Generally when referringto these regionsI mean only theirUkrainian-inhabited portions. 4 On the stateof the Ukrainiannational movement in the Russian empireand in Galicia, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky,"The UkrainianMovement on the Eve of the First WorldWar," in Essays in Modern UkrainianHistory (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987) 375-88. On Transcaipathia,see Ivan Zeguc, Die national-politischenBestrebungen der Karpato -Ruthenen 1848-1914, Veröffentichungendes Osteuropa-InstitutesMünchen, 28 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz,1965). This content downloaded from 195.78.109.54 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 03:32:57 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WESTERNUKRAINE BETWEEN THE WARS 393 Western Ukraine was also separated from the greater part of Ukraine, the heartland with its Cossack traditions.Perhaps this separation lay at the root of the great identitycrisis that racked Western Ukraine from the middle of the nineteenthcentury, i.e., the oftenbitter internal conflict over whetherthe Eastern Christian, Eastern Slavic inhabitantsof Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia were Ukrainian,Russian or merelyWestern Ukrainian (Ruthenian or Rusyn).5 With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the defeat of the Ukrainiannational revolution in 1919-20, WesternUkraine did not disappear as a valid historical unit. Although divided between three of the Habsburg monarchy's successor states (Galicia became part of Poland, Bukovina part of Romania and Transcarpathia part of Czechoslovakia), the West Ukrainian territorieshad in common their exclusion from the Russian political sphere, which in the interwarera was even of greaterimportance than it had been in the nineteenthcentury. The bulk of Ukraine became the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituentpart of the USSR. Between the wars it underwentsome of the most radical socio-economic changes known to history,and in the 1930s it experienced systematic,extensive terrorthat threatened to eradicate Ukrainian national culture completely. Ukrainian territoriesoutside this maelstrom of destruction formed a unit whose common denominatorwas the survival and indeed, despite oftendifficult conditions, the growthof a Ukrainiancivil society. The exclusion fromRussian rule throughoutthe period of national revival as well as throughthe years of the most virulentStalinism lent a certaincultural commonality to Western Ukraine even after its incorporationinto the USSR duringthe Second World War. The remnantsof thisWestem-Ukrainianness could still be felt decades later, especially in Galicia6 (Lviv, Temopil and Ivano- Frankivsk oblasts; Transcarpathia is now the Transcarpathian[Zakarpats'ka] oblast, Bukovina is Chernivtsioblast). Western Ukraine between the wars was somewhat bigger than it had been under the Habsburg sceptre,because certainUkrainian-inhabited territories from the formerRussian empire were incorporatedinto Poland (especially Volhynia and Polissia) and Romania (Bessarabia). 5 This problemforms the centrepieceof Paul RobertMagocsi, The Shapingof a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus' 1848-1948 (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1978). See also Ivan L. Rudnytsky,"Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Searchof TheirIdentity," in Essays 353-73,and John-PaulHimka, 'The Formation of National Identityin SubcarpathianRus1: Some Questions of Methodology," Harvard UkrainianStudies 2.3 (1978): 374-80. 6 Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication,and LinguisticAssimilation,"