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The Role of Naturalistic Explanation in Hume's Critique of Religious Belief The Role of Naturalistic Explanation in Hume’s Critique of Religious Belief By Elizabeth E. Goodnick A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) in The University of Michigan 2010 Doctoral Committee: Professor Louis E. Loeb, Chair Professor Elizabeth S. Anderson Professor Edwin M. Curley Associate Professor Adela N. Pinch Acknowledgements I would first like to thank my committee: Ed, for always believing in me and for inspiring me to be half as good a writer as he is; Liz, for her insight and encouragement; Adela, for coming through for me when I needed it most; and Louis for his tenacity, his philosophical generosity, and his excellent advising—I would not have finished this project without him. I would also like to thank Victor, for his support as director of graduate studies and for an inspiring conversation at the Chicago APA; and Linda, for all of her help throughout the years. For making me a better philosopher and teacher, I thank all of the members of Michigan’s philosophical community and GEO. To Jill and the other members of the EMU Philosophy Department, thank you for giving me the experience of teaching at EMU. To Ted, Charlotte, Mark, Andrew, Mary, and Bob at IWU—thanks for all of your comments on my work and for making life in Bloomington philosophically rewarding. To my friends in Ann Arbor who kept me entertained and loved: Emily and Greg, Remy and Anu, Alex P., Gabe J.—thank you. For keeping me happy and grounded, I owe much to my beloved dogs Sadie and Banjo. Thank you, Lori, for supporting me, for being a great friend, for editing, and for helping me in more ways than I can name. To my family, who has supported me emotionally and financially, I appreciate you so much. Mom, Dad, Ben, Karoline, Dry, and the rest of my family—I love you. Finally, to my partner Alex, thank you for loving me, supporting me, feeding me, tolerating me, talking with me, and in general making my life wonderful. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………..……………ii Notes……………………………………………………………………………………...vi Abstract………………………………………………………..…………………………vii Chapter 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….1 1.1. Two Questions…………………………………………………………….1 1.2. The Prima Facie Interpretation of The Natural History of Religion………4 1.3. Hume’s Naturalism………………………………………………………10 1.4. The Natural History: Epistemic Consequences………………………….11 2. A Naturalistic Interpretation of Hume’s Epistemology………………………….13 2.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………13 2.2. A Skeptical Interpretation……………………………………..…………15 2.3. Toward a Naturalistic Interpretation……………………….…………….20 2.4. Kemp Smith……………………………………………………………...24 2.5. Other Naturalistic Interpretations………………………………………..38 2.5.1. Problems with Kemp Smith’s View……………………………..38 2.5.2. Proper-Function Interpretations………………………………….41 2.5.3. Stability Theory………………………………………………….46 2.5.4. Reliabilism……………………………………………………….52 iii 2.6. Conclusion……………………………………………………………….56 3. Natural Belief and Intelligent Design……………………………………………60 3.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………60 3.2. The Content of Religious Belief…………………………………………61 3.3. ID Naturalism…………………………………………………………….63 3.4. The Non-Rational Status of Belief in Intelligent Design………………...65 3.5. Evidence from the Natural History………………………………………73 3.6. Evidence from the Dialogues…………………………………………….78 3.6.1. Demea and Pampillius…………………………………………...78 3.6.2. ‘Philo’s Reversal’………………………………………………...80 3.6.3. The ‘Irregular Argument’………………………………………..85 3.7. Skeptical Pressure and Kemp Smith’s Third Criterion………………….88 3.8. Universality and Irresistibility…………………………………………...91 3.9. ‘Weak/Quasi Natural Belief’……………………………………………95 3.10. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...101 4. The Epistemic Status of Religious Belief………………………………………102 4.1. Introduction……………………………………………………………..102 4.2. The Origin of Polytheism and the ‘Core Concept’……………………..104 4.3. The Propensity Toward a System that Provides Satisfaction…………..108 4.4. The Transition to Henotheism………………………………………….113 4.5. The Transition to Monotheism………………………………………….117 4.6. Cleanthes’ Propensity—Religious Belief: A Response to Order? Or Chaos?.................................................................................................120 iv 4.7. Polytheism: The Original Religion of Man…………………………….125 4.8. The Epistemic Status of Polytheism and Henotheism………………….129 4.9. The Epistemic Status of Monotheism…………………………………..137 4.10. The Role of Fear in Hume’s Account of Religious Belief……………...142 4.11. Monotheism Epistemically Inferior to Polytheism……………………..145 4.12. Conclusion……………………………………………………………...148 5. The Role of Naturalistic Explanation in Hume’s Critique of Religious Belief...150 5.1. Hume’s Non-Epistemic Goals in the Natural History………………….150 5.2. Hume’s Epistemic Goals in the Natural History……………………….160 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………173 v Notes References to Hume’s works are as follows: For A Treatise of Human Nature, I cite book, part, section, paragraph number from the Clarendon edition (Hume (2000b)), followed by the page number from the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition (Hume (1978)). For example (T 2.3.9.3; 438). For the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, I cite the section number, followed by the page number from the Gaskin edition (Hume (1993)), followed by the page number from the Kemp Smith edition (Hume (1947)). For example (DNR X; 95; 193). For the Natural History of Religion, I cite the section and paragraph number from the Clarendon edition (Hume (2007)), followed by the page number from the Gaskin edition (Hume (1993)). For example (NHR 1.3; 135). For An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, I cite the section, part, paragraph number from the Clarendon edition (Hume (2000a). For example (EHU 4.1.5). vi ABSTRACT The Role of Naturalistic Explanation in Hume’s Critique of Religious Belief By Elizabeth E. Goodnick Chair: Louis E. Loeb Before the pioneering work of Norman Kemp Smith, most Hume scholars read him as a thoroughgoing skeptic. The dominant view today is that, for Hume, ‘natural beliefs’—paradigmatically, beliefs based on induction—are warranted in virtue of features of the psychological mechanisms that produce them; moreover, Hume would endorse a suitable naturalistic theory of warrant to sustain this position. I survey four naturalistic interpretations of Hume’s epistemology: Kemp Smith’s theory, proper- function theory, stability theory, and reliabilism. I do not argue for one of these interpretations over the others; instead, I focus on what they have in common: Hume provides a naturalistic response to any generalized skepticism. From within this broad interpretive framework, some commentators argue that Hume would extend the class of ‘natural beliefs’ to religious belief. The bulk of the evidence supporting this position is derived from the Dialogues; in particular, vii commentators argue that, instead of being supported by the argument from design, there is a natural propensity that causes one to form the belief in an intelligent designer upon noticing the order and regularity in the world. I argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the claim that, according to Hume, religious belief is a ‘natural belief’. I examine Hume’s Natural History, where he provides an account of the origin of religious belief, in conjunction with his epistemological observations about various belief-forming mechanisms in the Treatise. I show that, no matter which theory of naturalistic epistemology best fits Hume’s own, religious belief is not warranted naturalistically. Furthermore, I argue that on Hume’s view, polytheism, while still unwarranted, is epistemically superior to monotheism. I conclude that, for Hume, the psychological explanation of religious belief, in conjunction with the fact that religious belief cannot be warranted on the basis of any evidence or a priori or a posteriori argument, provides grounds to reject all forms of religious belief. The Natural History is best read as an important piece of a larger destructive project which has as its goal showing that religious belief is not warranted by any means—through reason or experience, by revelation, or by its naturalistic explanation. viii Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1. Two Questions As every enquiry, which regards religion, is of the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular, which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. (NHR Introduction.1; 134) Hume begins The Natural History of Religion, and with the simple stroke of a pen, divides the study of religion into two branches. In so doing, Hume makes a distinction between the reasons supporting religious beliefs and the causes of them. On the one hand, he allows for the examination of philosophical arguments which concern God’s existence and nature. The study of such arguments is commonly called “natural religion,” or, more accurately, “natural theology.”1 On the other hand, Hume allows for an enquiry into the causes of the various religious beliefs and practices that arise in different societies. Presumably, each of these sets of questions can be considered independently: in explaining the causal processes by which a particular person or culture has come to hold 1 Hume used these terms synonymously (see, for example, the Dialogues, where Pamphilus uses both terms (DNR Introduction.5; 30 and DNR 1.1; 32). However, more recently, the term “natural theology” has been differentiated
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