Plutonium Summer 1998 No.22

Summer 1998 No.22

A Branch of the Chang Jiang River Going Across Shanghai

Although Shanghai has achieved rapid economic development in the past, future growth will depend on Shanghai's ability to secure a stable supply of energy. The Chinese government has made plans to supply the coastal region of southeastern China, which has no reliable energy resources, with between 120 and 240 GW by the year 2050 by an expensive nuclear power generation program. It is estimated that, by 2050, the country's total power generation capacity will amount to 1,200 GW, of which 10-20% will be nuclear.

Contents

● Opinion What to Do with Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan?

● Special Report Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy - A Study in Global Governance - Ryukichi Imai

● Pu-Series 18 On Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs Atsuyuki Suzuki ● Pluto 21 Rock Candy Confetti Shigeru Gotoh

● Letters Isotopic Composition of Plutonium - Importance of Discussions Should Be Recognized -

● Nourriture-5 Wine.., My Friend (III) Champagne Yuji Tsushima

● Views of Nuclear Power Stations Fruits, Vegetables and Energy Affluent in Joban Area

● Info-Clip Inauguration of the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Slated for October

● CNFC Information

● Postscript

Plutonium Summer No.22

Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Juzen Bldg.,Room 801, 2-9-6, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan TEL : 03-3591-2081 FAX : 03-3591-2088

Publisher

Takashi Mukaibo

Executive Editor

Shigeru Gotoh

Editorial Office Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Date of Issue: August 12, 1998

What to Do with Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan?

India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared that they were members of the nuclear weapon countries. When I heard the news, the fact that they both had been engaged in nuclear development and had more than one nuclear weapon disappointed me and I could not help thinking that they were unable to see the trees for the forest. What both countries aimed at was not the same as that of the first test conducted in May 1974. Obviously, they wanted to demonstrate that they were armed with practical nuclear weapons and would develop nuclear technology for this purpose.

The P5 and G8 countries issued an urgent joint communique announcing that they did not recognize India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. However, the truth is they both have been developing various nuclear weapons and possess them, and P5 could not take any effective counter measure to cope with this situation. I am not alone in thinking that it is now rather absurd for P5 to insist on keeping nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Then What Should We Do?

The Republic of South Africa said that it abolished all the seven nuclear warheads it secretly had owned. If this announcement was true, it would be the first example in the world, and could provide a good precedent for the India and Pakistan issue. The reason why South Africa abolished its nuclear weapons is that it assumed that its neighbor, Namibia, retreated from Angola and declared independence. Thus, interference by South Africa was no longer necessary. The incentive of South Africa to develop nuclear weapons was based on the fear that the Soviet Union was manipulating the situation behind Namibia and that it could bring in nuclear weapons at any time. The end of the Cold War between the U.S. and Russia also had a strong influence on the situation.

The Kashmir issue lies on the verge of conflict between India and Pakistan, and it does not seem to be easy to settle. But what the whole world should do is to pay close attention to this issue, not to spare any effort for the settlement through cooperation with the UN, and try not to isolate these two countries from the rest of the world, but instead try harder to reinforce the connection with them. A specific step we should take first is to establish a hot line between India and Pakistan.

Of course, I do not believe that such development of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped simply by solving the problem between these two countries. Unless nuclear arms reduction of among P5 is encouraged, and unless the threat of nuclear weapons of P5 is eliminated, someone will follow the example of India and Pakistan. Our greatest anxiety is that this may influence the Middle East.

START-I was established to reduce the number of warheads in the U.S. and Russia to 6,000, and 3,000 to 3,500 by START- II, and 2,000 to 2,500 by START-III; however, the Russian Parliament has not yet ratified START-II. Even though they smoothly reached the START-III stage, the number of warheads is still large enough to fill up a nuclear submarine. What it does is to abolish all the ineffective nuclear missiles on the ground for the purpose of cutting military expense, and it does not seem to reduce the attacking ability of nuclear weapons of the U. S. and Russia. Besides, there is no way to persuade England, France, and China to join this policy by reducing arsenals to 2,000 warheads. As India pointed out, the problem here is that the nuclear powers do not show any specific timetable for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Even so, it does not mean that other countries are free to engage in nuclear development. Just as Samson tied up his own hands and feet, it is most unlikely that nuclear powers will show such a timetable. Prof. Imai of Kyorin University, a director of CNFC and a former ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, suggested in the previous issue of "Plutonium" (Spring 1998 No.21) that Japan should succeed the Canberra Commission and discuss specific procedures for abolishing nuclear weapons. I do not know if Prime Minister Hashimoto has read his thesis, but he has proposed to hold an international forum attended by specialists. Fruitful and substantial results are expected.

Executive Editor

Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy - A Study in Global Governance -

Ryukichi Imai Former Ambassador, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Director, Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (CNFC)

As I work on this paper, I happen to chair two separate study groups under different sponsorships, both working on the same general subject of "global governance". I have not tried to produce common definitions of the two words for both groups. The subjects are sufficiently new and broad. What follows is, therefore, my own understanding of the outputs from these studies. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power are "global" subjects in that they involve a significant portion of the globe, either in their capabilities to bring harm to people or to supply energy. They have been under various "regimes" at different times (for that purpose I divide the post-war half a century into seven separate periods), and its entirety seems to correspond to the overall concept of "governance" in that it consists of different international regimes at different times, yet seemingly accompanied by a set of consistent logic.

In some languages, including Japanese, people sometimes distinguish "nuclear" and "atomic", as between military and peaceful uses of the same energy which is produced from either fission or fusion of nucleus of atoms. I have used these words interchangeably according to normal practices without implying such distinction. This note is attached to explain the title of this paper. Neither of the two groups mentioned above is responsible for the contents of the discussion.

The Early Period of Atom as Big Science

During the Second World War the United States have successfully accomplished its national scientific-technical project code named Manhattan District. Toward that end Washington spent 2 billion dollars which some say is equivalent of 25 billion 1995 dollars(*1) and ended up with three atomic explosive devices by the summer of 1945. One is of the gun-type consisting of two equally divided halves of some 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (in which U-235 was more than 90% compared to about 0.7% in natural uranium) placed at the ends of a gun barrel, so to speak. The two halves are joined within microseconds by high explosives, which become super-critical and produce something like 13,000 tons (13 kilotons) of energy equivalent in high explosive (TNT). The theoretical aspect of this design was straightforward and J. Robert Oppenheimer who was then leader of the Los Alamos National Laboratory did not think separate explosive experiment was necessary. The US airforce B-29 Enola Gay carried it to Hiroshima in August of that year.

*1 : "Four Trillion Dollars and Counting" by the Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project Committee (Stephen I. Schwartz, editor) The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1995, estimates the total cost of nuclear armament (including weapons and infrastructures) to be 4 trillion US dollars

The other type utilized new man-made element plutonium which was produced in nuclear reactors by having U- 238 (which is the majority of the natural uranium) atoms absorb one neutron each. Pu-239 is a fissile material similar to U-235 in that the chain reactions are possible. Pu-239 was easier to produce because as different chemical elements uranium and plutonium could be separated chemically. Isotopic separation of U-235 and U- 238 is a more difficult although we know today that the chemical separation involves far more intense radiation (due to fission products) than does uranium separation which is more physics-based (such as gas diffusion, centrifuge or magnetic). Magnetic isotope separation was considered impractical and US went ahead and declassified the technology, which many years later was picked up by Sadam Hussein. Metallic plutonium sphere of between 5 to 10 kilograms was surrounded by blanket of high explosives which through electronic signal was compressed into the sphere's center in an instant.

Plutonium is a difficult material to handle because it changes phases with temperature very often, giving different atomic lattice. The process was called implosion and it required sufficiently stabilized plutonium as metal. One of the first two bombs of this type was used for explosive test in New Mexico. The experiment was code named Trinity, and it took place before the other bomb was actually used to attack Nagasaki. The bomb is said to have produced 18 kilotons equivalent of TNT.(*2)

*2 : Richard Rhodes wrote two books: The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon & Schuster, 1986, and "Dark Sun" The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, Simon & Schuster, 1995, to describe the processes in detail.

Both the US and USSR built many large natural uranium, graphite moderated reactors to produce many tons of weapons grade plutonium. They have also built many large gas-diffusion uranium enrichment plants in preparation for mass production of atomic bombs. The matter became simpler, it seemed then anyway, by the arrival of hydrogen bomb technology which used atomic bomb as a trigger for massive compression by X-ray laser, of mixture of deuterium and tritium (which are both isotopes of hydrogen).

The same design principles of uranium based gun-type and plutonium based implosion-type are used for building-up of the modern nuclear arsenals although the design have become much more sophisticated. It is said that highly enriched uranium is also used for implosion mechanism. With the progress of electronic technology, material sciences and as a result of so many nuclear testing (most of them underground after the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963) today's designs are much smaller and lighter compared to their prototypes. Smallest atomic bomb publicly known is W-48 howitzer shell which must have diameter smaller than 155 mm, length shorter than about one meter, and weighs about 55 kilograms with sub-kiloton explosive yield.(*3) There are reasons to believe that some of the modern nuclear warheads are even smaller and lighter than W-48. Even 1 Mt (megaton or a million tons of TNT equivalent) warhead or their multiple are capable of being loaded on top of an ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles), a surprising advance in technology compared to the first 13 kt "Little Boy" which had a diameter of 70 cm and length 3 meters and weighed about 4 tons.

*3 : Nuclear Weapons Data Books (vol. 1 US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, through vol. 4 Soviet Nuclear Weapons, by Thomas Cochran et al, Harper & Row, vol. 5 British, French and Chinese Nuclear Capabilities by Norris et al, Westview) are mentioned for the sake of completeness rather than as source of information for individual readers.

The word "Big Science" was coined in this period to express major scientific and engineering projects mobilizing national capabilities, run under government control and with government fund, to serve national purposes. The Manhattan Project was a typical big science which also contributed to the Allied victory in the World War II. The big science was glorified as a great accomplishment of mankind, which promised a great future and prosperity for centuries to come. We have to realize that this was in the mid twentieth century and long before the world became aware of the environmental impacts of science and technology, and the world-wide public opinion was not aware of subjects such as radioactive contamination, contamination of DDT and other man-made chemicals(*4), or possible climatic change due to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse effects gases.

*4 : The most famous is "Silent Spring" by Rachel Carson, Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

Failure of International Control of Atoms

At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman was said to have suggested success of atom bomb test to Marshal Stalin, to which the latter did not show much interest, and an early reaction in America was that Stalin did not understand the gravity of the issue. It became clear much later that the Soviet spy network had deeply penetrated the Manhattan Project so much so that the scientist in charge of the implosion design, Klaus Fuchs, was one of the important member of that network. Not only did Stalin knew about the bomb project, but he was aware of some of the details of the Trinity experiment, and according to Richard Rhodes, telephoned from Potsdam to Lavrenti Beria in Moscow who was in charge of the Soviet bomb program to hurry up Igor Khurchatov, the physicist in charge.

Under the circumstances and in the Soviet move toward its own first nuclear test in 1949, the failure of the US proposal to the United Nations (UN) for international control of atomic energy was almost assured even before the draft of the Baruch Plan was worked out. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Dean Acheson, then undersecretary of state, and David Lilienthall, then president of the Tennessee Valley Authority and later to become the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, worked in late 1945 to work out a proposal to bring all material, technology, facility and weapons under an International Atomic Energy Authority. The idea that such a large- scale energy which could be used both for war and peace should be left unattended in the post war world was scary. This all took place in the era of idealism and reverence regarding what science and technology can do to the world. It was the idea of the three to propose that weapons use as well as the peaceful uses of atomic energy should become completely internationalized.(*5)

*5 : "The Journal of David E. Liliehnthall 1917 - 1950, TVA Years/ The Atomic Energy Years, (two volumes) 1964, Harper & Row" gives some details of how the original plan was conceived, worked out, and later presented by Barnard Baruch as US proposal for internationalization of atom. The International Authority suggested in the plan, although it had the same abbreviation IAEA, was to be a veto-free and much more powerful entity compared with its later incarnation under the 1953 Eisenhower "Atoms for Peace".

The UN was established in the spring of 1945, and its charter was drafted in Damberton Oaks almost a year earlier, of course knew nothing about atomic energy or atomic bomb. The UN was intended as mechanism of collective security and did not pay as much attention to disarmament as did the League of Nations. So it was in 1946 that UN established Atomic Energy Committee in a hurry, to which Baruch Plan was presented as the basic US proposal. There were then some arguments within the United States regarding the organization of the plan, especially concerning veto and verification, two of the subjects that have played prominent role in the US considerations of all the nuclear arms control measures to come. With the Soviet Union's own rush for the first bomb, and probably simultaneous preparatory works for hydrogen bomb, the manner of presentation or organization of Baruch Plan probably did not matter very much. The idea of international control was not acceptable.

US offer of atoms for peace was received by a great enthusiasm throughout the world. A great scientific achievement which people thought was an instrument for destruction, has suddenly turned up as an instrument of peace. These were the eras in which science and technology were looked upon with a great deal of admiration and enthusiasm. Also the entire world was suffering from shortage of energy supply for the reconstruction and development after the wreckage of the world war. With destruction of coalmines in Europe and UK, some coal was even shipped from the United States. The message of cheap and abundant energy, one gram of uranium equivalent to three tons of coal was a gospel. Although, in fact the major energy source which rebuilt and brought prosperity to then OPEC countries and Japan was oil from the Arabian Gulf and not atomic energy, atomic energy continued to supply sufficient dreams to the public. The United Nations sponsored the first of series of UN Conference on Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955 with a huge popular acclaim. New arrangements to distribute technology and material with safeguards against military diversion was created in 1957 as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with a limited authority compared to the one in the Baruch Plan. Furthermore, the United States preferred to arrange atomic energy related assistance through bilateral agreements rather than making use of IAEA, thus leaving it without significant job for quite sometime.(*6)

*6 : It turned out that Japan was more eager to give chances to the multilateral arrangement. It asked IAEA to arrange for purchase of three tons of natural uranium for its research reactor. It insisted that its first commercial power station, a British Calder Hall type should come under IAEA safeguards rather than UK government's. It was through these negotiations that I personally became so involved in handling of nuclear fuel and safeguards vis-a-vis IAEA.

Competition and Monopoly by the Superpowers

1962 was the year of Cuban missile incident which brought the two superpowers to the brink of real nuclear war. The Soviet Union brought into the island some sixty strategic missiles (including spares), each with one megaton warhead, capable of 1,500 miles and 3,000 miles, i.e. capable of hitting Washington, as well as US ICBMs silos in the Midwest.(*7) There were also some seventy tactical missiles including nuclear shell and nuclear rocket as well nuclear-tipped torpedoes in submarines. On the morning of October 30th Monday, if the US marines were to land on Cuban beach as was planned, the Soviet side was going to utilize these tactical weapons in full against which, according to McNamara, US would have retreated by hitting the Soviet Union itself with nuclear warheads, thus starting a full scale nuclear war. It was during the night before that agreement was worked out with Robert Kennedy and Anatory Dobrynin as communication channel that the Soviet missiles in Cuba would be withdrawn while US would pledge never to invade Cuba. On the side was a secret pledge that the US would withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey. The experience led to two results. One was the hot-line telex system between the White House and Kremlin.

*7 : One Hell of a Gamble, The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, W.W. Norton 1997, provides some of the details regarding warheads involved. Former US Defense Secretary McNamara told me on a number of occasions, while we were working on joint study projects, that the warheads involved were in fact far larger and far more extensive than he had thought during the crisis.

The other more important outcome was that the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) excepting underground nuclear tests was agreed in 1963 by the three principals in the UN disarmament processes (two plus UK) and was signed in that year in Moscow by many countries. The understanding of the time was that any country building nuclear weapons would have to carry out explosion tests and prohibiting nuclear explosion in atmosphere, outer space and in water would prevent increase of nuclear weapon states. This assumption turned out to be misguided, for except for India who carried out underground "peaceful explosion" experiment in 1974, there are countries such as Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and possible others who became nuclear country without going through the stage of open testing. If Oppenheimer thought that his first ever in the world gun-type did not require testing before being used to attack Hiroshima, delicacy of this issue may be appreciated, especially if experienced engineers are around to give appropriate, on the spot advises. Another important factor for stopping nuclear tests was the extent of radioactive contamination both in the atmosphere and in ocean which, starting from the Bikini test in 1954 and Novaya Zemlya test of 57 Mt bomb in 1961, had adversely affected the earth's atmosphere so much. The usefulness of underground tests as shown by the progress of weapons technology since then, was much beyond expectation.

While President Kennedy was known to have been very concerned with horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation, he seemed not to have minded very much about its vertical proliferation. Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that the Soviet Union was going full steam in the 1960's to catch up with the US regarding number and destructive power of warheads. Between 1965 and 1975 number of Soviet warheads tripled to about 20,000 (still it was less than US 27,000). US and USSR were in fierce competition to strengthen their nuclear arsenals, whereas they were in full cooperation in making sure that nobody else would become nuclear weapon states, and it was with such intention that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was worked out in Geneva by the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). While the two superpowers were in fierce competition in expanding and refining their own nuclear arsenals, they were in full cooperation regarding nuclear non-proliferation. I was much impressed by the manner of their cooperation when I was serving as chairman of one of the main committees of 1985 NPT Re-view Conference.

Table 1 Transition of U.S.-USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads

Year U.S. Russia U.K. FR CH Total 1945 6 0 0 0 0 6 1946 11 0 0 0 0 11 1947 32 0 0 0 0 32 1948 110 0 0 0 0 110 1949 235 1 0 0 0 236 1950 369 5 0 0 0 374 1951 640 25 0 0 0 665 1952 1,005 50 0 0 0 1,055 1953 1,436 120 1 0 0 1,557 1954 2,063 150 5 0 0 2,218 1955 3,057 200 10 0 0 3,267 1956 4,618 426 15 0 0 5,059 1957 6,444 660 20 0 0 7,124 1958 9,822 869 22 0 0 10,713 1959 15,468 1,060 25 0 0 16,553 1960 20,434 1,605 30 0 0 22,069 1961 24,173 2,471 50 0 0 26,694 1962 27,609 3,322 205 0 0 31,136 1963 29,808 4,238 280 0 0 34,326 1964 31,308 5,221 310 4 1 36,844 1965 32,135 6,129 310 32 5 38,611 1966 32,193 7,089 270 36 20 39,608 1967 31,411 8,339 270 36 25 40,081 1968 29,452 9,399 280 36 35 39,202 1969 27,463 10,538 308 36 50 38,395 1970 26,492 11,643 280 36 75 38,526 1971 26,602 13,092 220 45 100 40,059 1972 27,474 14,478 220 70 130 42,372 1973 28,449 15,915 275 116 150 44,905 1974 28,298 17,385 325 145 170 46,323 1975 27,235 19,443 350 188 185 47,401 1976 26,199 21,205 350 212 190 48,156 1977 25,342 23,044 350 228 200 49,164 1978 24,424 25,393 350 235 220 50,622 1979 24,141 27,935 350 235 235 52,896 1980 23,916 30,062 350 250 280 54,858 1981 23,191 32,049 350 275 330 56,195 1982 23,091 33,952 335 275 360 58,013 1983 23,341 35,804 320 280 380 60,125 1984 23,621 37,431 270 280 415 62,017 1985 23,510 39,197 300 360 425 63,792 1986* 23,410 45,000 300 355 425 69,490 1987* 23,472 43,000 300 420 415 67,607 1988* 23,236 41,000 300 415 430 65,381 1989* 22,827 39,000 300 415 435 62,977 1990* 21,781 37,000 300 505 435 60,021 1991* 20,121 35,000 300 540 435 56,396 1992* 18,340 33,000 200 540 435 52,515 1993* 16,831 31,000 200 525 435 48,991 1994* 15,456 29,000 250 485 435 45,626 1995* 14,111 27,000 300 485 425 42,321 1996* 12,937 25,000 260 450 400 39,047 1997* 12,000 23,000 260 450 400 36,110 (Fig.1) U.S.-USSR/Russian Total Strategic Launchers (Force Loadings), 1945-1995

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council (Fig.2) U.S.-USSR/Russian Total Strategic Warheads (Force Loadings), 1945-1995

Source: Natural Resources Defense Council

NPT was in a sense a declaration of monopoly of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers. France and China did not join it until 1992. Brazil and India were very vocal in criticizing NPT. That Federal Republic of Germany took five years and Japan six years for its ratification are not without reasons. One most talked about is commercial disadvantage of national nuclear technology because of IAEA safeguards. Safeguards arrangements have been modified to treat all the members of NPT equally, theoretically speaking at least. What was more involved in the case of Japan was conservative wing of the governing Liberal Democratic Party who hesitated to give up the "nuclear option." Distribution of memberships in different parties was such that in 1975, if LDP conservatives in the Upper House should be against, the NPT would not be ratified. It took considerable efforts to persuade these people that by examining some of the details of the engineering realities, Japan was not in a position to have a viable nuclear option that may deter either US or USSR nuclear threat. "Do you want to spend a very large sum of money and end up in an arsenal under somebody's license based on ten years old technology?" was the question I often asked them referring, in particular, to SLBM based deterrence capabilities.

Nuclear Deterrence, Nuclear Confrontation, and Nuclear Energy Advancement in technology of strategic missiles have created a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). With development of multiple warhead (MIRV) technology and ban on Anti Ballistic Missile in the 1972 ABM treaty whichever side might start the initial and preemptive strike against the land-based ICBMs was sure to receive reiteration from equally powerful and precision guided SLBMs, so that the complete destruction are assured to the both sides. Table 2 indicates the state of art as of 1990's in that US submarine launched Trident D-5 with 475 kt warheads can travel more than 7,000 km with the terminal precision of less than 100 meters CEP (Circular Error Probable). If both the US and Former Soviet Union (FSU) (Table 3) owned approximately 10,000 warheads of the long-range strategic kind, neither side could start nuclear war. Both worked hard to maintain the balance of deterrence and gain advantage while outwardly showing the full willingness to engage in such strategic exchange.(*8)

Table 2 U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Operational Forces

Warhead/Weapon First Produced Yield User Number Status (kilotons) (warheads) Bombs B61-7 10/1966 sub to 350 AF 350 The Mod-7 is a converted Mod-1 with a Cat D PAL IHE and several yield options up to 350 kt; Weights 763 lbs. B61-11 1996 sub to 350 AF 50 Earth penetrator, modified B61 Mod-7 weighing an additional 450 lbs. B83 6/1983 low to 1,200 AF 600 Strategic megaton-range bomb. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles W76/Trident I C4 6/1978 100 N 3,500 Over 1,500 W76 warheads from retired Trident I SSBNs have been used to arm Atlantic Fleet Trident II SSBNs. W88/Trident II D5 9/1988 475 N 400 Warheads supplement the W76 and arm Atlantic Fleet Trident II SSBNs. Intercontinental ballistic missiles W62/Minuteman III 3/1970 170 AF 610 In a reversal from the Nuclear Posture Review, W62 warheads will be retained. W78/Minuteman III 8/1979 335 AF 915 Some may be used to arm single-warhead Minuteman IIIs. W87-0/MX 4/1986 300 AF 525 Missile will be retired and W87 used for single- warhead Minuteman III if START II is implemented. Air-launched cruise missiles W80-1/ALCM 12/1981 5 and 150 AF 400 Several hundred have been modified to conventional versions (CALCMs).Some 700 ALCMs are in storage with their warheads removed. W80s are used to arm ACMs. W80-1/ACM 1990 5 and 150 AF 400 Operational in 1991. Original program of 1,461 ACMs was cut to 460. Uses W80 warheads from ALCMs. Non-strategic forces B61 Tactical Bomb 3/1975 0.3 to 170 AF 400 Mods-3, -4, -10. The Mod-10 is a converted W85 Pershing II warheads. All three Mods have Cat F PALs and IHE. Each Mod has four yield options. The B61-3 (0.3, 1.5, 60, and 170 kt.), and the B61- 10 (0.3, 5, 10, and 80 kt). W80-0/SLCM 12/83 5 and 150 N 350 Nuclear SLCMs now stored ashore. Original program of 758 for 200 ships and submarines reduced to 367 SLCMs for 25 Sturgeon-class, 62 Los Angeles-class and 3 Seawolf-class attack submarines.

AF:Air Force; N:Navy; Nato:non-U.S.delivery system; ACM:Advanced Cruise Missile; ALCM:Air-Launched Cruise Missile; IHE:Insensitive High Explosive; PAL:Permissive Action Link; SLBM:Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile;SLCM:Sea-Launched Cruise Missile;SSBN:Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine.; In weapons nomenclature B stands for"bomb" and W for "warhead." The number following the letter indicates the order in which it was introduced into the stockpile; for example, W88 followed W87. Source: Nuclear Notebook by NaturalResources Defense Council, July/August 1997 "The Bulletin

*8: What went on behind the scene while US and USSR were negotiating nuclear arms control may be seen from, for example, Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game; Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, 1988) and Alexander G. Savieleve & Nikolay N. Demitorv; The Big Five, Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, Praeger, 1995). It appears that both were complaining expensive and useless buildup of these nuclear weapons "because the other side doesn't want to quit".

Table 3 Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

Type Name Launchers/ Year Warheads×yield Total Total SSBNs deployed (megatons) warheads megatons* ICBMs SS-18 Satan 186 1,979 10× .550/.750 1,860* 1,023 M4/M5/M6 (RS-20) (MIRV) SS-19 M3 Stiletto 150 1,979 6× .550 900 495 (RSM-50) (MIRV) SS-24 Scalpel 36/10 1,987 10× .550 460 253 M1/M2 (RS-22) (MIRV) SS-25 Sickle 345 1,985 1× .550 345 190 (RS-12M) Total 727 3,565 1,961 SLBMs SS-N-18 Stingray 208(13)** 1,978 3× .500(MIRV) 624*** 312 M1 (RSM-50) SS-N-20 Sturgeon 120(6) 1,983 10× .200(MIRV) 1,200 240 M1/M2 (RSM-52) SS-N-23 Skiff 112(7) 1,986 4× .100(MIRV) 448 45 (RSM-54) Total 440 2,272 597 Bomber/Weapons Tu-95MS6 Bear H6 27(4) 1,984 6 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs 186 47 Tu-95MS16 Bear H16 36(21) 16 AS-15A ALCMs or bombs 912 228 Tu-160 Blackjack 6(19) 1,987 12 AS-15B ALCMs or 12 AS-16 SRAMs or 300 75 12 bombs Total 69(113)**** 1,398 350 Grand Total 1,236 7,235 2,900

*: Some SS-18s carry a single warhead, although under START all are counted as carrying 10. **: Numbers in parentheses refer to submarines. ***: Under START the number of warheads on the SS-N-18 is counts as three. ****: The 25 Bear and 19 Blackjack in Ukraine are not operational, though they are counted in START. ALCM: Air-Launched Cruise Missile AS: Air-to-Surface Missile ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (range greater than 5,500km) MIRV: Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicles SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SSBN: Nuclear-power Ballistic Missile Submarine Source: Nuclear Notebook by Natural Resource Defense Council, July/August 1997 "The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists"

Today, after the end of the Cold War there are many who say that neither US nor USSR were serious in their intention to fight the nuclear world war. Those who were in charge then probably wondered about the subject, wondered how valid were the outputs from computer simulated war games, but were in no position to take things less than seriously. Their efforts produced SALT treaties to place limits on the expansion of the arsenals, and TTBT (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) and PNET (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty) and other arrangements.

At the same time, if nuclear balance between the superpowers is maintained with long range missiles flying over the north pole, what will happen in case of medium to short range missiles such as SS-20 are deployed in the European theatre. Is the extended deterrence convincing enough that one can really believe SS-20 attack on Humburg will be countered by Minuteman-III on Leningrad, which may invite SS-19 on Chicago? This de- coupling argument has led to the 1979 NATO two truck decision, and deployment of 572 US medium range missiles (including 108 Pershing-II in Federal Republic of Germany) and at the same time to start disarmament negotiations. Whether Carter nuclear policy of discouraging civilian use of plutonium had anything to do with the de-coupling is not clear. After the first oil shock of 1973, the world was suddenly made aware that inexpensive and abundant supply of oil might not last very long and many turned to nuclear power as the only commercially available alternative. 1977 declaration of ban on plutonium was not more than a year after the US Department of Energy calculated that the end of the century nuclear electricity installation would be more than 3 billion kW (kilowatt) and told its overseas customers that future uranium enrichment contracts would not be entertained unless applicants pledge to accept mandatory plutonium recycle in their power reactors. Nuclear electric capacity throughout the world in 1970 was 20 million kW, 150 million in 1980 and jumped to 250 million by 1985. It is today about 380 million kW, an order of magnitude smaller than the Energy Departments calculation. In any event nuclear electricity was a very important alternative to oil, and Prime Ministers Fukuda and Schmidt went to Washington and protested very strongly against the US policy.(*9)

*9: The author was in Washington in the spring of 1977 to prepare ground for Mr. Fukuda's encounter with President Carter and to obtain US agreement to operation of the newly built Tokai reprocessing plant. My counterpart in the state department was Joseph Nye, and my argument was about energy security and unilateral interpretation of NPT by the United States. Michael Armacost was with NSC (later to become ambassador to Japan) told me that Mr. Schmidt was scheduled to come to Washington a week ahead of Mr. Fukuda and also to protest US policy which made planned large- scale German/ Brazilian nuclear deal difficult. "In five or six months we will be all slightly wiser" I remember him saying, and he was right. Bilateral problems were resolved by September.

Although Japan and Germany had common interest in protesting US policy on plutonium, there is no evidence that at that time Japan was equally concerned about the de-coupling in the East Asia. In fact, there are rumors that when Messieurs. Schmidt and Fukuda met in Europe, the latter was totally ignorant about SS-20 missiles. While the negotiations between US and USSR was proceeding to remove SS-20's from the European theatre in the early eighties, then Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Nakasone had difficult time to persuade President Reagan that these missiles should not be moved to the zone east of Ural, thus creating grave de-coupling concerns. It did not become a major subject of interest among the Japanese people or press and I remember looking at Tokyo from my post with surprise.

Another remarkable development in this period was the involvement of anti-nuclear movements in Europe in the nuclear arms control negotiations. Pershing-II missile has precision guided nuclear warhead, and 108 of them should be enough to destroy all the choke points and stop the second tier of the Russian army to cross into the West. The Soviet Union was counting on anti-nuclear, originally environment based, but turned militant movement to stop installation of Pershing missiles in the West Germany.(*10) If one looks at the number of seats the Greens held in the national congress, it jumped from zero in 1980 to 27 in 1983 and 42 in 1987. With increase in nuclear power stations around the world, the anti-nuclear movement captured sympathy of the society at large, so that even today it is not possible to plan new nuclear stations in Germany. With the Greens in French coalition, even France is finding it difficult to pursue its policy of nuclear electricity to move from LWR (light water reactor) to FBR (fast breeder reactor).

*10: Both Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Max Kampelman have expressed views that the Soviet side may have been relying on anti-nuclear movements than on negotiating tables. There were rumors in Geneva in 1983 that a considerable amount of Deutsch Mark had been paid out by the Soviet agents to the anti-nuclear groups.

Release from Deterrence Doctrine

In 1985 Michael Gorbachev became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and became acutely aware that the Soviet economy and society were at the brink of bankruptcy after years of spending 15% to 20% of GNP for military budget. He felt an immediate need to cut down military spending. In the United States, President Reagan was in his second term proclaiming "strong America" and was continued to be worried that the only way to avoid the wholesale slaughter of Americans was to organize wholesale slaughter of the Russians.

This has led to the famous joint communique from the 1985 Geneva summit that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". At the Reykjavik summit, the two came close to banning all nuclear missiles, were it not for Reagan's insistence on SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative).(*11) It may be argued that both the United States and USSR were looking for such an opportunity to unfold and allow them to disengage from nuclear arms control game. In any event nuclear deterrence could no longer hold the level of defense spending and new INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force) Treaty of 1987 went much further than earlier agreements. While SALT treaties were for the purpose of setting limits for further increase in number of nuclear weapons, INF for the first time agreed on zero-zero option to destroy not only all SS-20s and Pershing and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCMs), but a whole category numbering 1,846 on the Soviet side and 846 on the US side.

*11: Don Oberdorfer, The Turn, from the Cold War to the New Era, Poseidon Press, 1991

As the New York Times claimed editorially, the Peace Dividends of 20 to 150 billion dollars a year in US alone (March 8, 1989) was due and the entire world was prepared for further wholesale reduction of nuclear weapons. It is along the extension of the same line that START-I (1991 between US and USSR) and START-II (between US and Russia) were signed. These treaties were later amended to include Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan on whose territories long range strategic missiles were located. All the tactical weapons in the former Soviet republics were moved to Russia and are said to be in the process of being dismantled. START treaties as amended in September, 1997 to delay the final date for destruction and dismantlement of long-range strategic weapons to 3,500 or 3,000 from January 2003 to December 2007. At the same time there is some talk about START-III process which will reduce warheads to 2,000 each, which is a more reasonable level in view of the force structures of the US and Russia.

Aftercare of the START, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy(*12)

As we saw in Table 1 at the peak year in the late eighties, the world possessed close to seventy thousand nuclear warheads, including some early crude design Russian weapons to the most modern and sophisticated W-88 Trident warheads. Actually to remain in service will be ten to thirteen types as may be seen from Table 2. Types of warheads will have to be further reduced to four or five if only to meet the objectives of the START-II treaty in a rational manner. Compared to 1986 and assuming that UK, French and Chinese numbers stay around 1,100 total, the United States and Russia must be in the process of storing, accounting for, and dismantling very large number of different kinds of nuclear weapons, old and new.

*12: Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr. Richard A. Falkenrath and Steven E. Miller: Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, The MIT Press, 1996 is an interim report of the works the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University has been conducting since 1992. The work represents exactly as the subtitle of the book states. Together with several Japanese colleagues, I have been involved in organizing joint seminars with CSIA on the handling of these nuclear weapons.

Nuclear warheads are complex pieces of machinery with different material, chemicals and electronic devices. Since the "pit" or the core of the weapons is, let's say five kilogram of metallic plutonium surrounded by very compact and shaped high explosive charges, by mishandling them, even avoiding nuclear explosion, one can get plutonium contamination of five kilograms. Since the Chernobyl accident is said to be equivalent of 20 kg of plutonium contamination, one can see that the dismantling is a fairly delicate operation. It is understood that the only plausible way to dismantle warheads is to do it at the plant where the weapons were finally assembled. This means that Pantex plant in Texas and Sverdovlsk 45 and Zlatoust are the only places and their annual throughput are limited to three to four thousand for each country.

In order to serve the arsenals the US and FSU maintained a large nuclear warheads industry. In FSU until very recently information about these plants were closely held secret. Location of these plants were not known other than postal codes. It was reported that 260,000 people lived in these towns. When families are considered this might roughly correspond with the 90,000 employees in US in 1985. Those living in such secret cities were not allowed to travel but lived, received education, medical care etc. entirely within the city limits.

The United States has what is called Nunn/Lugar Act which allocates up to 400 million dollars a year from the defense budget to be spent in making the transition required under the START treaties easier for FSU republics. Details of allocation of this money are available but it is not necessary to go into them here. It will be enough to point out that because of this aid Washington has direct communication with Soviet nuclear weapons personnel. It is understandable that the fund allocation is easier if they are spent in US national laboratories and related industry in counter-proliferation measures to be performed in FSU. An example of that was "blankets" for the safe transportation of warheads as requested and specified by the Russian side. On the other hand, items such as building plutonium pit storage facilities have always been difficult, because for one thing one has to know some details of the weapons design, whereas safety standards are different between the two countries, while cost in local currency is difficult to assess.

Those who are involved in the program say that sometimes-basic thing like number of weapons can be difficult. Russian old practice of producing items a little bit over the norm in preparation for the cases things went wrong. This can easily confuse the official numbers of the weapons in store. The CSIA group thinks that communications with US counterparts have been working well with the Russian military and research laboratories, while those under the Ministry for Atomic Energy and especially at the reprocessing centers things are very much confused and accountabilities mixed up. Japan has also allocated about 100 million dollars worth of aids including contribution to the Science and Technology Center to keep weapons scientists and engineers busy with more peaceful works, as well as to remove radioactive waste discharge from submarines. The Japanese program are also not making visible progress because of various bureaucratic responses that are involved while Russians tend to ask for cash rather than work out assistance in hardware.

What is Going to Happen to the US Weapons?

The total US defense budget is shrinking. It was 6% of GDP in 1989, and is 3% or 266 billion dollars in 1998. On the other hand fund for defense related RD&T seems to be increasing. What is eye-catching in the Energy Department budget is increase of stockpile stewardship program from 4.15 billion to 4.5 billion dollars. (more than 10% of defense R&D). The following four items in stewardship budget are being examined closely by MIT public forum and others:(*13)

*13: What's New by William Arkin, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/ December 1997. a) The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: designed to be the most powerful laser on earth, it will simulate the pressures and temperatures found in thermonuclear explosions. Thermonuclear reaction, or fusion, was always conducted as underground nuclear tests and scientists have never observed actual fusion reaction in laboratory. This experiment will enable them to observe the actual process of X-ray laser fusion. b) The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro-test Facility (DRAHT) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory: a device that will take 3-dimensional photographs of the implosion phase of an atomic bomb. Because plutonium is replaced in these bombs an inert substitute, there is no nuclear explosion. While implosion have been conducted as a part of weapons tests since the Trinity Test in 1945 (within a microsecond or so), nobody has enough time to observe its physical process. c) Subcritical tests at the Nevada Test Site: underground explosions in which plutonium and uranium is shocked by conventional explosives. These tests are sub-nuclear, since they do not generate nuclear chain reactions. On the other hand this is actual implosion of sub-critical plutonium mass and is very visible indications that the bomb-like experiments are being conducted. d) The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI): a multi-sited computer research initiative aiming for 1,000-fold increase in computational speed and data storage. This will enable the refinement of supercomputer codes that simulate nuclear explosions in detail.

The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program as made public by the Department of Energy in May 1995 and updated in February 1996 says that the average design life of US nuclear warheads is 25 years, while in practice maintenance and/or replacement cycle have been taking place every 12 or 13 years for all types of weapons. With the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) and a period of no test which preceded it, the current stock lives are coming close to this line. While the type of weapons are being reduced, the DOE program says that the chances for the common mode failure is increasing. In order to avoid endangering reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, the stewardship and management program will be conducted to make scientists more knowledgeable about the nuclear explosion processes. Such knowledge may, in turn, be used to work on improvements in design of warheads to be replaced, i.e. without tests.

From the beginning of NPT drafting, the problem of definition of nuclear explosion has not been resolved and the same uncertainties continues with the CTBT. If all of the above four items are allowed under CTBT, it is very difficult to say where the line may be drawn between nuclear tests and non-nuclear simulations. There is also need to device some institution for verification that no actual nuclear explosion experiments are taking place in the nuclear weapons countries. This will be very difficult, sensitive and confusing even more than the IAEA safeguards as applied in non-nuclear weapon states. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists claims that the DOE is planning to use these facilities to improve some of the design features of B-83 megaton-class bomb, refurbish W-87 MX missile warheads to fit into Minuteman III, as well as to improve on Trident D-5 Mk5 reentry vehicles. The New York Tomes (Nov. 30, 1997) has editorially warned about "extravagant budget" and said that the stewardship program "must not subsidize unrelated experimentation or allow any effort to design and build more advanced weapons."

Toward the Nuclear Free World

It is clear from the above discussion that START reduction of nuclear weapons are not meant to bring about the nuclear free world as the ultimate goal. It is not clear whether going through the steps intended as START-III would, for instance, interest France and China to join in the club. It is not known at what number a country may hide an arsenal from public and foreign views so that reduction beyond that number may become meaningless. The steps that have been described in this paper, starting from basic accountability to effective dismantlement, decision on what to do with highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WPU) in hundred of tons that will be released from such weapons, and how to verify that nuclear weapon states are abiding by the CTBT even when ways may be found to make this treaty effective. There are very troublesome issues regarding whether Reactor Grade Plutonium can be used to produce effective nuclear explosive devices.(*14) If it can, as US always wants to suggest that it may, then every nuclear electric capacity added to take care of the increasing energy requirements of the world, without emission of the greenhouse effect gas becomes source of nuclear proliferation possibilities.(*15) This concern is sufficiently discouraging for continued development of industrial technology to use such reactor glade plutonium (RPU) as nuclear fuel of future.

*14: I discussed this subject in Plutonium 19 calling for open and worldwide debate.

*15: I have discussed the need for East Asia to increase reliance on nuclear electricity in the coming century. A policy paper from the Institute for International Policy Studies "Population, Energy and Environment" (forthcoming) gives basic data to prove this point.

When the Canberra Commission met in 1996 at the request of the Australian Government to find ways toward elimination of nuclear weapons, the seventeen members were very serious. I think one of the reasons the report did not clearly show ways toward elimination was, in addition to the loss of interest by the newly elected Australian government in the spring of that year, the Commission did not really discuss the detailed steps toward elimination. We spent most of the time discussing that nuclear deterrence was not a viable concept, and I must say the discussion was interesting and stimulating. It would be worthwhile if the Commission's work is picked up again and continued by somebody. In the post-Cold War period, people seem to have lost interest in nuclear issues, or about the fate of the bombs that are waiting around to be dismantled or maintained under various stewardship programs, as well as the large amount of plutonium of various grade. I have discussed this subject in the last issue of this publication (Plutonium Spring 1998 No.21) as I would like to see people and governments interested in this subject.

On Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs

Atsuyuki Suzuki Professor, University of Tokyo Director, Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (CNFC)

In Rokkasho-mura, Aomori Prefecture, there are three kinds of nuclear fuel cycle facilities currently operating or under construction: reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment and disposal of low-level radioactive waste. However, perhaps because of a lack of understanding on the part of local residents, construction of the reprocessing plant in particular is not proceeding as was scheduled. Professor Atsuyuki Suzuki, who has devoted himself to the promotion of Japan's nuclear fuel cycle, gives us the following story. (Editor)

Need for Nuclear Power Is Increasing

There are many factors affecting the development of nuclear fuel cycle, both internal and external, and these are in flux and unstable. I would like to take this opportunity to explain Japan's nuclear fuel cycle program, the current conditions and the directions to which I hope to see this area evolve.

First of all, the need for nuclear power is growing, and is in no way decreasing. In Japan, the primary interest in nuclear power development maintain is to energy security; however, we are also able Prof. Atsuyuki Suzuki to enjoy the contributions it makes to curbing both the increased volumes of CO2 in the environment and global warming. From the perspective of securing energy and solving CO2 problems, forms of recycling energy such as solar power are sometimes mentioned as preferable solutions, and I also feel that, in response to those needs and based on certain situations, recycling energy should be used as much as possible. On the other hand, recycling energy tends to present significant problems when economics is a discussed. As a result, Japan has chosen the policy of having a well-balanced combination of energy resources, and a national consensus has been achieved which sees nuclear power contributing a substantial portion of the nation's energy supply.

When a nuclear power plant starts operation, once every year a part of the nuclear fuel needs to be changed. Fuel that has been used is called "spent" fuel, and the problem of what to do with it invariably arises. Under normal or ideal circumstances, most of the spent fuel can still be utilized as a resource, and if one analyses the content, one will see that 95% of spent fuel is still useable. I therefore believe that we should consider recycling this energy resource. This 95% also contains a small amount, a mere 1%, of plutonium as well, and this plutonium can produce energy almost 100 times more efficiently than uranium. Even though the plutonium is only 1% of the total, if it were to be extracted skillfully, as its value is 100 times greater than uranium, it would become an extremely attractive source of energy.

Recycling or Once-Through?

More than thirty years ago, when nuclear power plants began to be deployed, each country planned to reprocess and recycle spent fuel. However, in the U.S., the once-through formula was initiated in the 1970s in which recycling of spent fuels is denied. That was over twenty years ago. Under this once- through formula, spent fuel was regarded as a waste product. The reason why such a formula came about can be explained by just a single word: economics. In fact, the economic feasibility of nuclear power itself had come under scrutiny in the U.S. in the '70s as well. When the extra economic burden of reprocessing and recycling of spent fuel was added, the power companies began to consider nuclear power a great problem. This situation in effect brought about a curb in demand estimates for uranium.

As you are probably already aware of, the U.S. still remains the world's largest producer of nuclear generated electricity; there have been no plans to construct any new nuclear power plants within the country for the past twenty years. The current situation is that American power companies have estimated future energy demands, and are not moving to build more nuclear power stations in the U.S., seeing them as unnecessary. This view has of course affected the global uranium market, which has largely reduced as a result. I believe that this trend will continue over the next twenty years. Depending on the future U.S. stance toward nuclear power, whether it be positive or passive, the global uranium market will be strongly influenced. This is unavoidable.

In addition, the cost of maintaining nuclear power safety grows more and more expensive. In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, and the Three-Mile Island accident in the U.S., concern over the safety of nuclear power and demands for more strict regulations have become widespread, and this has led to increased requirements in term of money and time for the siting of new nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the risk of nuclear proliferation will be increased if plutonium were extracted from spent nuclear fuel. The American stance is that the entire situation is undesirable.

Although many in Japan say that the U.S. is restricting the use of plutonium in order to avoid nuclear proliferation, I do not believe that this is an appropriate and accurate description of the facts. The U.S. will, as long as an adequate economic justification exists, go so far as to establish international rules in order to achieve its goals. I believe the prevention of a nuclear proliferation is a secondary or even tertiary reason for their restriction on the use of plutonium.

U.S. Once-Through Policy Is not Going Well

It was in the late-1970s when the U.S. turned away from its policy of reprocessing and recycling, and instead adopted the once-through policy. The U.S. claimed that this new once-through policy was going successful; however, this policy also raises a variety of problems, to which the U.S. has now many problems. The reason lies in the concept that "spent fuel is a waste product, and must be subject to final disposal"; the problem is that it is very difficult to find any town anywhere which is willing to accept spent fuel from all the U.S. nuclear power plants. This is commonly referred to as NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) affairs. Rokkasho-mura Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant under construction. (Photo taken Oct. 1997; Courtesy of Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.)

The U.S. Congress decided that the State of Nevada would provide a final disposal site for nuclear waste, but since the decision was made by force of votes, the actual program is running far behind the schedule. The actual site has been decided upon, and the Department of Energy has assumed responsibility for the disposal process, meaning that all should go smoothly, but in reality things are not going so well. We should note that because the U.S. government has assumed responsibility for nuclear waste disposal, some in Japan argue that the Japanese government should also take responsibility. In the U.S., however, special circumstances apply because nuclear energy is utilized by both the military and industrial sectors, and many believe that military nuclear waste should be disposed together with industrial nuclear waste because it would be economical, and convenient from other aspects as well. I believe that such factors were given full consideration by Congress, and even so the project is still not proceeding as planned.

There are a number of reasons behind this project postponements, but I think that the problem lies in the concept that "spent fuel is waste." By January 31 of this year, the DOE was to have accepted spent fuel from power companies and started disposal operations, but was unable to keep its promises, and the secretary of DOE was forced to issue a statement. It seems that there is no clear indication of when the projected site will begin operations. This is the current situation. Therefore, although there is a debate over the superiority of reprocessing versus the once-through system, it seems that reality has shown that shifting over to the once- through policy will not guarantee success.

Fuel Cycle Programs Being Revised in France and Germany On the other hand, it is true that there are problems related to re-processing program as well. In particular, the development of fast breeder reactors has encountered difficulties in a number of areas. In short, the economic burden will increase to an unsustainable degree. Recently the French government has conducted various political maneuvers and interparty negotiations in forming a coalition cabinet, which have finally led to the decision to close down the Super-phoenix FBR demonstration reactor. It is said that this was a bow to the strong demands from Green Peace and other environment groups. However, the continuation of Super-phoenix operations would have resulted in significant economic burden, and perhaps that was the true reason behind its period.

FBR research and development continues using the Phoenix prototype-reactor, but the closure of the Super- phoenix demonstration-reactor very influential. Since the fast breeder reactor offers the ideal means of using plutonium extracted from reprocessed spent fuel once more as recycled fuel, this decision has dealt a serious blow to nuclear fuel reprocessing by throwing out this breeder reactor from the scene.

Another problem posed by the reprocessing is that, although 95% of the spent fuel can certainly be recycled, the other 5% still remains as a waste product. This waste can be fused into a glassy substance and solidified. However, although I mentioned previously that turning spent fuel into waste causes problems with its disposal, vitrified waste must also undergo final disposal, and that process holds equal problems. For example, although the project is not proceeding as scheduled, Germany, like the U.S., has already decided on a disposal site for this type of waste, and France was also once on the verge of such a decision. These plans, however, most likely because they were forced through, became targets of the public debates. Ultimately, substantial debate was engaged on the legislative and administrative levels over plans for nuclear fuel cycles in both France and Germany, and all parties are edging toward a consensus that re-examination of the programs is probably necessary.

In Germany, recycling and the once-through program are adopted in parallel, even though Germany does not possess any reprocessing facilities of its own. Instead, the work is consigned to plants located in France and Great Britain, where the plutonium is extracted and shipped back to Germany where it is used as fuel mixed with uranium (MOX), in a "Pu-thermal" method (spent nuclear fuel is recycled and burned in existing thermal reactors). Up until now, Germany has been extremely dedicated in conducting its Pu-thermal program, and still relies on it today, but I feel it will now be conducted in parallel with the once-through policy as well. Again, the reason may be summed up as economics.

As I mentioned earlier, France has stated that it will close the Super-phoenix reactor. This means that development work on a fast breeder reactor, and its actual operation, have been extended far into the future. In the meantime, it has been agreed that the Pu-thermal program would provide the best method for using fuel produced in French reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. Beyond that into the future, a variety of studies will be conducted aimed at the year 2006 and future policies will be based on results. While I do not believe that the once-through concept will take root in France, I also doubt that any rapid progress will be seen in the area of fuel recycling, as has been the case in the past.

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program in Japan

Japan, as does Germany, at present ships its spent nuclear fuel to France and the U.K. to be reprocessed and fabricated into MOX fuel and then shipped back to be used as Pu-thermal fuel nuclear reactors in Japan. Fabrication of MOX fuel has already begun in countries overseas. When the Fukui prefecture government was asked to approach the national government to apply for MOX fuel use in the Oi Nuclear Power Plant, prefecture officials first requested prolongment of the schedule. It has taken quite some time, but the plan was recently approved. There may have been various reasons for this prolongment, but one of the reasons was the accident that occurred at the Monju reactor.

The Monju accident (December 1995) was not a matter of the release of radiation or radioactive materials, and could not be called a matter of nuclear safety. However, from the general public's point of view, the accident cannot be written off simply. Since it was a sodium fire which broke out, there are problems that must be solved technologically. This process will also take time. In addition, when the nuclear fuel sent to U.K. and France for reprocessing, since the vitrified waste produced actually originated from Japan, it must be shipped back to Japan. These returned waste products are to be storaged at Rokkasho-mura in Aomori Prefecture, and in fact, this operation has already begun. The Aomori prefecture government has, however, made demands that the national government clarify its program for the final disposal of the vitrified waste.

Spent Fuels to Be Storaged

So, what should be done in the future? My opinion is that we need to give our nuclear fuel cycle programs more flexibility, and I tend to think that the debate between reprocessing and once-through has no significant meaning. I think reprocessing and recycling will be the answers in the final analysis. I again think that there should be more flexible choices of timing and the scale of how we conduct reprocessing and recycling.

First of all, the storage of spent fuel is vital at present. While the word "storage" may not be a very common term here, it appeared in a report published at the end of March which had been compiled by a committee examining spent fuel issues which included MITI, the Science and Technology Agency, and a representative from a power company. The exact phrase was "storage of recycled fuel resources," but its use in the report is basically the same as the term spent fuel storage used in this lecture.

These storages are altogether different from those found in the once-through concept. We clearly state that spent fuel is not a waste product, and that we intend to store it for future use. Also, we will decide clearly at the outset of the program on the length of storage, say fifty years. I think that this kind of openness or "transparency" of information is very important.

By doing things in this way, in Japan we can store spent fuel which does not require immediate reprocessing, and with this system the locations of the storage may be either inside or outside of the nuclear power plant sites. This is my personal idea. In the report from the examining committee it is suggested, as a general rule, that spent fuel storages will be located outside any nuclear power plants. Looking at conditions in France, Germany, or even the U.S., I feel the storage concept is of great importance. However, at the same time, it is also important that the nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Rokkasho-mura are utilized as effectively as possible.

Economics Is also Important for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Although construction at the Rokkasho-mura nuclear fuel facility is in progress, the project itself is far behind the schedule. I feel that if there are any further delays electric industry will stand at the edge to judge the possibility of the continuation of the project.

If we assume the Rokkasho-mura nuclear fuel cycle facilities will go into operation ten years from now as planned, we can make a rough estimate that the volume of Japan's nuclear power would be roughly 400TWh (400,000GWh). The present amount of electricity generation in this country totals approximately 1,000TWh, with about 30% (300TWh) of this being nuclear-generated electricity.

In ten years the unit price for nuclear electricity, I believe, will drop below 5 yen per kilowatt hour, as the depreciation of existing nuclear power plants will proceeds, and further cost reductions will be made possible through the introduction of IPPs (Independent Power Producers) and other various factors. At the rate of 5 yen, 400TWh would amount to approximately 2 trillion yen, thus the scale of nuclear electricity generation operations ten years from now would come to 2 trillion yen. This figure would not drop to 1 trillion yen, nor rise to 3 trillion yen.

In comparsion to this figure of 2 trillion yen, what will be the economics of business at the Rokkasho-mura facilities? The followings are merely hypothetical assumptions based on my own calculations. Supposing that the reprocessing plant, the largest facility there, handles about 800 tons of spent fuel in a year, and given that the cost for reprocessing each ton is 500 million yen, then the annual business would total 400 billion yen. In order to achieve the projected 1,500 ton･SWU per year at the uranium enrichment plant, it may cost 50 billion yen. The low-level radioactive waste disposal facility is in operation there. It will be able to continue receiving between 20,000 to 30,000 drums of wastes per year, and if we calculate the cost for the amount in one year, it comes to perhaps 10 to 15 billion yen. If vitrified high-level waste storage facility continues to accept waste until it reaches full capacity, the costs of maintaining that volume in storage comes to approximately 5 billion yen. In addition to these costs, there is also a tax imposed on the nuclear fuel. As a result, the grand total for annual operations would be nearly 500 billion yen, and since the total economic scale of nuclear electricity generation is 2 trillion yen, electric industry would need to allocate 25% of their investment to the nuclear fuel cycle, even considering only Rokkasho-mura facilities.

What I wish to emphasize here is that if such a significant amount is going to be invested, it will be necessary to use it in the most effective manner possible, otherwise the nuclear fuel cycle will be extremely difficult to operate from an economic standpoint; the loss incurred by even a one year delay in the reprocessing program would be an enormous sum.

Obviously, when the local citizens are seriously concerned, it is not advisable to simply push ahead with the plan for reprocessing. Therefore, on the basis of public concern of the local community, we have to propose a program which may proceed in the smoothest manner possible, considering the wise suggestions of all organizations that are involved.

International Perspectives on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

New ideas are needed to enable more smooth progress of a program. For example, in reprocessing plant, in order to ensure the safety of the facility, it is necessary to first conduct a trial operation, cold runs without the use of actual fuel, over a significantly length of time. While going through such practices, changes are made to improve the equipment. For such equipment, changes should be recognized as such in the designs. Although the reprocessing plant now under construction at Rokkasho-mura is intended as a commercial facility, in order for the facility to operate as a truly commercial plant it is necessary to consider the value of further technological development. By doing this, the construction plans should make rather positive progress. I feel that some day, reprocessing technology will be needed to benefit not only Japan but the world as a whole, and that it is important to take these factors into consideration from the long-term viewpoint. On the topic of uranium enrichment, I suspect the cost of enriched uranium produced at the Rokkasho-mura plant will probably be twice the average world price. With urgent requests for eased restrictions and cost reductions, and in particular with the world now in an era of "mega-competition," something needs to be done about this economic situation. The reason for Japan's high costs is simply the size of the reprocessing plant. It is too small. If Japanese plant were to compete internationally with plants in the U.S. and Europe, it would fall short in size by a factor of ten. It is also obvious that the economics of centrifuges are improved by mass-production. And if, for example, China goes ahead as planned with its nuclear power projects, the demand for enriched uranium will increase, and require Japan to pay attention to the Chinese enriched uranium market as well.

Japan's International Contributions to Nuclear Arms Reduction through Peaceful Use Technology

It may be a bit sudden to touch upon the nuclear arms reduction problems, but as you know, nuclear disarmament is progressing between the U.S. and Russia, leading to the necessity of dismantling these nuclear weapons. During dismantling of nuclear weapons, the plutonium mounted in the warheads is extracted and stockpiled. If something is not done about this plutonium, nuclear disarmament will not actually be achieved.

An international consensus is being built which holds that the best use for this plutonium is, naturally, as an ingredient of the MOX fuel that is used in nuclear power plants. The U.S. has said that each country should shoulder the respective investment, and burn this plutonium as fuel.

The problem is with Russia, and with the way in which it plans to use plutonium extracted from the dismantled warheads. I recently attended a conference in London at the end of March, where the main topic of debate was how to provide financial assistance to Russia in this field. The same was true during the Gulf War, and also for KEDO. Japan was required to provide financial assistance in all these efforts to promote international peace. Japan is also in a position where it should provide such assistance, but I myself am not sure whether this is truly the best way for Japan to contribute to the promotion of world peace. There are nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Aomori Prefecture, and Russia is going to employ technology that is clearly of the same type, and I think it would be better if Japan consider sharing technology with Russia, or contributing some other concrete forms of cooperation.

This has already been proposed by the U.S., and other countries as well have made partial reference to this, and I myself have made suggestions to various countries. Russia actually has a surplus not only of plutonium but of highly-enriched uranium as well. Although the U.S. has promised to purchase a large part of Russia's surplus nuclear materials, the remaining amount is still quite significant. What would the reaction be if this were to be diluted into fuel for light water reactor use, processed into forms unsuited for military uses, and Japan would buy them in some volume. Russia would then be able to use those revenues to process plutonium into MOX fuel, and draw up programs for its domestic use.

In this case, Japan would be required to purchase low enriched uranium for use as fuel in power plants; however, since Japanese power companies have already secured their own adequate supplies of fuel, this would result in a surplus. So the next issue would concern ways in which this surplus should be used. Personally, I think that stockpiling the surplus would be an excellent way for Japan to contribute to international nuclear disarmament. For example, oil reserves are already located in various regions throughout Japan, and the same type of program could be created for uranium reserves. Storing this uranium in reserve bases would give a clear sign to the world that Japan is doing its part to promote nuclear disarmament. For Future Promotion of Nuclear Power

Returning to the original theme, I feel that the storage of spent fuel is extremely important. In order to make it clear that spent fuel will be stored in reserves, I believe that it will be necessary to actually reprocess it to a certain extent. Also, it must be concretely demonstrated that it is possible to accomplish final disposal of highly radioactive waste in vitrified form as well. This may not be an easy task to accomplish, but it is also necessary to complete deep underground laboratory as rapidly as possible. Although there is some current discussion of constructing such a laboratory in Gifu Prefecture or Hokkaido, it is impossible for these sites to serve as final disposal sites. It is impossible for a host of reasons. I believe that the parties involved must be clearly told that these locations are definitely not final disposal areas, and only after reaching an understanding on this matter, should they consider conducting research within a certain limited time.

Furthermore, we must acknowledge that the reason the nuclear fuel cycle exists is for the generation of electricity using nuclear power. If power companies encounter difficulty in constructing new nuclear power plants, then they will be forced to resort to the construction of thermal power plants. At present these are the only options available to them. Regardless of how beneficial nuclear power is to the reduction of CO2 levels, if it becomes impossible to build new nuclear power plants, then the opposite effect will be seen. That is why the construction of new nuclear power plants will be necessary in the future as well. Beginning with the closure of the Tokai No. 1 reactor in Tokai-mura in the end of last March, the issues surrounding the treatment of radioactive wastes are growing in importance. It is necessary to find appropriate methods for managing the wastes from the Tokai No. 1 reactor, and active consideration must be given to effective ways for the reactor site to be utilized.

Rock Candy Confetti

Shigeru Gotoh

A fine mist-like shower was soaking the hydrangea flowers. When these May showers stop, the clouds move away quickly. On a Saturday like this, I started reading Nagai Kafu's "HIYORI-GETA." ("Fairweather Clogs")

Kafu paid a visit to Mori Ogai's Kan-Cho-Ro, a tower overlooking the tides, one evening at dusk. Suddenly he heard the bell from afar.

－－Turning around, I looked in the direction of the sound. The vast expanse of the city viewed from the top of the cliff at Sendagi was...

Just now, dark blue evening haze covers the entire city, with countless lights shimmering through the bottom of the misty mattress. There remained a dim light palely yellow and hovering cloud-like above the forest of Ueno Yanaka. ("Cliff").

Whenever I read this sort of passage, I felt an urge to go for a walk around the area. I remembered that one of my friends had suggested that I should go to Asakura Choso Kan, the Sculpture Museum featuring the Works of Fumio Asakura, currently being held in Yanaka. I was also interested in Dango-zaka, where Ogai used to live.

The following Sunday was a beautiful day.

I asked my wife to come with me. We took the Yamanote Line to Nippori, and left the station from the north exit. The very names of the stations in the Yanaka area, such as Nippori, and the next station, Uguisudani, sound very refined and in some way carry our thoughts back to the Edo period.

It was only a three-minute-walk to the Sculpture Museum. Having graduated from Tokyo Art School in 1907, Fumio Asakura settled down at that site, spending many years expanding and remodeling the building over and over again.

The building is an excellent example of the sukiya style, and resulted from arguments between the sculptor and the master carpenter. It is surprising, even mysterious, how the building remained intact during both the Great Earthquake of 1923 and World War II, when most of Tokyo was completely burnt to the ground.

In front of a figure titled "The Grave Keeper," one of the masterpieces of the exhibit, I was petrified.

It seems that Fumio Asakura would see this grave keeper with a hint of Tolstoy's looks almost every day on his way to and from the art school. A few years passed. Asakura wished to sculpt the figure of the old grave keeper, and asked him to pose for him.

"As the man was good at shogi, I tried to copy his innocent smile while he was watching his family play shogi, instead of putting him on a model's stand." ("Choso Yoteki," the Anthology of Fumio Asakura). This "Grave Keeper" figure was exhibited in the Fourth Art Exhibition held by the Ministry of Education, and has been regarded as the turning point in his romantic attitude toward creation.

"Wrinkles tell the individual's story and history," said Asakura. I thought I felt the model's faint smile in his deep wrinkles, and I could not walk away from the statue of the "Grave Keeper" for some time. My mind combined the statue of the grave keeper and the voice of the woman guiding us, saying that the big ginkgo tree in the Yanaka Graveyard has been protecting this building.

The patio with its artesian water fountain was absolutely beautiful.

According to Asakura, five huge stones were placed to represent the five cardinal virtues of the Confucianism: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity. Asakura wrote that as he looked at the fountain, named "Goten-no-Minasoko," he would be freed from all ideas and thoughts, and his spirit would be reborn and push him towards art. As if to react to these words, a black carp swam up to us in a stately manner.

The exhibition room devoted to statues of cats was very interesting, too. Among them, one figure called "Lifted Cat," with its neck grabbed by a big arm, was most charming because of its realistic expression. I meowed to it in spite of myself.

As we left the Sculpture Museum, I noticed a sign advertising "Yanaka Jinenjo." We were attracted by their poster for "zenzai-shiratama" (shiratama dumplings in a thick sweet soup) and went into the teahouse. When we left home that morning, I had grabbed a book called "The Remains Of Edo" (Chuko Bunko) by Ryusei Shibata, and had been reading it in the train.

Ryusei was a writer and a friend of Kafu's. When he saw a tokoroten vendor under a willow tree along the road, with his sacks on the ground waiting for a customer, he said, "No Edokko, no native of Tokyo, could ignore that vendor and pass up this chance." So he treated himself with a bowl of glassy tokoroten noodles. As he swallowed it, coolness of the tokoroten spread to his stomach. "To buy the very feeling of that moment to refresh myself, I would spare no time worrying about the money in my pocket." Thus he generously concluded.

When he happened to see a handbill advertising "shiratama," he said,

－－A few small beautiful red and white flour dumplings boiled in hot water, with some ice cubes and sprinkling of refined sugar over them... I scoop up one of the dumplings and put it in my mouth, and I feel its indescribable smoothness. When it drops into my stomach, it is as if the coldness penetrates to the core of my bones.., The way it cools down a man's guts makes it perfect for an Edokko. ("Tokoroten and Shiratama")

The rhythm I feel in Ryusei's writings is biting and swift. It pushes me to clear my throat. I read the Ryusei's essay aloud to my wife, who was enjoying her "zenzai shiratama."

"Now you see, this is what a Edokko should be," she said twitching her nose with pride as she was born in Kanda, Tokyo, the home ground of true Edokko.

A poem of Kyoshi Takahama; Some sugar stays unmelted on my shiratama, came to mind as I left the teahouse. Walking down Hotaru-zaka, we came to a small park on the left surrounded by trees. It was Tenshin Okakura Memorial Park.

This year, the Centennial Exhibition held by the Japan Art Institute was at the Tokyo National Museum in Ueno. There I saw great masterpieces of such artists as Yokoyama Taikan, Hishida Shunsou, and Shimomura Kanzan. I was even more impressed by the park, as I discovered that it was the birthplace of the Japan Art Institute.

In a hexagonal glassed gazebo in the corner of the park was "Tenshin Sensei," a statue by Denchu Hirakushi, but since the inside was dark we could see it only through the window. These days historic walks are popular with many people, and such tactless treatment of artistic works is rather disappointing to me.

By the way, there are a multitude of slopes with names in this area. Hitsuji-zaka (sheep slope), Kurayami-zaka (dark slope), Dango-zaka (dumpling slope).... There are even Tanuki-zaka (racoon dog slope) and Mujina- zaka (badger slope).

Ms. Mayumi Mori was fascinated by Mori Ogai, and wrote his biography based on a careful re-tracing of his footsteps. Her book was titled "The Slopes of Ogai" (Shinchosha). This excellent book gives us a clear picture of how Ogai walked these slopes.

We finally reached the bottom of Dango-zaka. Absolutely nothing remained to remind us of Edo, not even a fragment of the Meiji era. But we stopped at a rice cracker shop called Kikuya because the shop seemed to have been rebuilt as a recreation of the classic style. There we bought a package of the well-known "Kikumi Sembei."

From the Edo to the Meiji era, Dango-zaka was famous for its chrysanthemum figures. That fact points to the origin of the name of the shop, because "kiku" means chrysanthemum. Ogai was said to have liked these crackers very much.

The Dango-zaka street was opened roughly over six hundred years ago, to connect the Nikko Road of Honor and Nakasendo. It used to be much narrower and steeper than it is now, and when people went up the slope, they said it was as if "a man was coming out of the ground." As I looked up the slope, I thought I saw a scene from Hokusai's ukiyoe print. According to Ms. Mayumi Mori, there are several stories about the origin of the name of the slope. Some say that it is called Dango-zaka, meaning dumpling slope, "because horses and people roll down the slope like dumplings. Others say because there were many round rocks like dumplings, or because there used to be a shop called Iseya, famous for its delicious dumplings (including shiratama)." ("The Slopes of Ogai")

To me, the story about a dumpling shop on the top of the hill seems to be the most feasible one. I can see the travelers eating the shiratama dumplings roasted on skewers in the shop on the top of the hill.

At a humble dumpling house, people flick the beads on their abacus. (The image of abacus beads echoing dumplings on a skewer.) By Yanagidaru

Kan-Cho-Ro stands on top of the hill. It used to be a favorite gathering place for men of literature but now it has turned into the library of the Ogai Memorial Hall. Although it was surrounded by houses and buildings and had no view of the ocean, it still reminded me of the descriptions of Kafu's "Cliff," as I looked down onto the streets below.

In Nippori, there used to be more than hundred wholesalers of cheap sweets lined up side by side. Now, there are only nine of them left. (May 21, "Report on Daily Life," Yomiuri Shimbun) In this neighborhood, the good old cheap sweets sellers had disappeared, and we could not find any dumpling vendors, either. But there was a certain atmosphere that made the walk a lot of fun. We consulted a map and visited the five-storied pagoda described in Rohan Koda's novel "Goju no Tou," as well as the old residences of Kotaro and Chieko Takamura, and Yuriko Miyamoto. When we finally reached Soseki's "house of the cat," we felt like we were back in the bosom of literature. The walk was the first one in many years to provide me with a satisfaction of the heart.

It was Utaro Noda, a poet, who said that Tokyo was a city of slopes, water, and bridges. But Tokyo as we see today is filled with leveled slopes, filled-in moats and sea shores, and arrogant cars going to and fro over the bridges. Such scenes spoil the title "the city of slopes, water, and bridges." There is no longer any trace of the old days, when the city had a measured atmosphere that created the mood of its downtown.

Recently, I have been fascinated by the novels of Shuhei Fujisawa. His historical or period novels are interesting, but what I enjoy most are the stories about the people in the street. The joys and sorrows of people and human nature are depicted fully in a clear and transparent style. I always forget to put down the book and stop reading.

Today, I read the "Honjo Shigurecho Story."

－－ Osayo finished work at the kimono cleaners in Hayashicho unexpectedly earlier than usual. She left the kimono cleaner and went to a nearby seafood store to buy some dried foods, and dropped in a confectionery across the street to buy smooth glutinous rice cakes mixed with mugwort. She felt cheerful and happy. She thought her husband would be bored while waiting for her. ("Breasts")

When Osayo opened the shoji, "she saw a man and a woman intertwined as if in a scene of those richly-colored obscene drawings." I will leave the plot of the story in the hands of my readers. Of course, "Shigure-cho" is an imaginary town. But the description of stores on the front and back streets, the mugwort rice cakes, and the steamed bean jelly all remind me of the lives of good old people in the downtown. This is what I like about the literature of Fujisawa.

I got off the subway at Ningyo-cho station the other day. This is the birthplace of the great writer Junichiro Tanizaki. I remembered that it had been a long time ago that I had read Tanizaki's early work, "The Boy," containing descriptions of the surrounding area. I headed for Suitengu shrine and reached Amazake Yokocho alley. There should have been some stores selling amazake, or sweet rice liquor. The origin of the alley name was similar to that of Dango-zaka, mentioned earlier, and I was happy to know that a name such as Amazake Yokocho still remained in this town.

I happened to come to a narrow lane, which can be found in the novels of Shuhei Fujisawa. The most amusing thing about downtown may be such lanes and slopes.

As I walk through the lane, I cast a glance upon this weary world, hidden behind the window blinds. By Megumi

We can talk from my upstairs to your upstairs across the lane, and above the lane is a wide stretch of beautiful moonlit night. By Zanka

These are introduced in "Downtown in Tokyo" by Zanka Sugiura as examples of Japanese informal verse called Dodoitsu. In some lanes, I thought I could hear the verses accompanied by the plucking sound of samisen (a Japanese string instrument.)

Along the main street was an old sign for the Kyoto confectionery, "Kotobuki-do." The shop frontage is 3 ken (approx. 5.4 meters) and the depth is 4 ken (approx. 7.2 meters). As I entered, I found showcases crowded next to the entrance, and cake boxes were stacked up on the sides and toward the back.

I purchased some of the popular "Koganeimo." A list of sweets on sale around 1895 was printed on the bag. Koganeimo looked very much like baked sweet potatoes. I even felt their warmth when I held them in my hands. Though I have no intention to advertise that shop, they certainly tasted good, and their resemblance to natural potatoes made it a unique and rare product of the confectionery's distinctive technique.

It was the first time for me to go into that store. And my purchase was small. But a lady who seemed to be the proprietress of the house offered me a cup of roasted tea on a tea coaster.

Suddenly I remembered an essay called "Round Boro Cookies" written by Mr. Sukemasa Irie, the former Grand Chamberlain.

He bought round boro cookies at Eiyo-do in Kojimachi. "Do you deliver?" "Yes, we do." "What is the minimum amount?" "Amount doesn't matter." ----- While they conversed, the package was ready.

Mr. Irie came out of the store and wondered if he had paid the money. He hurried back to the store. "Didn't you think the customer was out of his mind when he didn't pay?"

"My wife just asked me if that customer had paid any money. No, you didn't. But a bird like you will return for sure."

While I drank the roasted tea to quench my thirst, I felt peace of mind over the kindly hearted people living downtown today.

A few days passed after that. I was on the streets crowded with buildings in the Marunouchi district across from the Imperial Palace moat, which is lined with beautiful green of pine trees. I came across a cheap sweets shop in the basement of the Imperial Theatre in an area closer to Hibiya. The combination of the pompous staging of the Takarazuka Opera Company performance and the cheap sweets shop more suited to a smaller old- fashioned theatre was quite interesting.

Among the shop's many cheap sweets from all over Japan, I found "Tohenboku" from Hyogo prefecture, which used to be called Banshu.

"Tohenboku" is a curse word from the Edo era which may also be found in "Ukiyo-buro" by Samba Shikitei. The word has been adopted as the name of a simple sweet from the Banshu area, my homeland. I was so happy to have found it that I bought extra pieces of those fried dough cookies, "Tohenboku."

－－ In the area of Banshu, trading with foreign countries had been active since Japan's age of civil wars. The records say that many visitors came, mainly from the Netherlands and Portugal. Western sweets as a whole were called "Orandagashi" meaning Dutch sweets. The word Dagashi, Japanese for cheap sweets, is said to have been a transformation of the word Orandagashi.

To say that Dagashi has its roots in Orandagashi is a very interesting theory.

The following words are printed on an explanation sheet in the sack of cheap sweets made in Himeji, Banshu: The origin of Japanese sweets is in China. Later, another way of making sweets, Western sweets, was imported, tea became popular, and sugar was introduced to enhance the development of Japanese sweets.

Sugar was brought to Japan in 745 A.D. (the 6th year of Tempyo-Shoho era) by the Chinese Priest Ganjin. It was known as Ishimitsu, or rock sugar, and was presented to the Emperor Seimu. The domestic refinement of sugar is said to have started only in the Tokugawa era, many years after it was first introduced to this country.

Western sweets were imported even later when a Portuguese ship was shipwrecked on the shores of Bungo in 1541. Missionaries also arrived and brought unusual sweets which were different from those from China.

Among other things, the strangest was "kompeito," or rock candy confetti (taken from a Spanish word confeitos): horned candies made from sugar. Kompeito in a glass bowl was presented to Nobunaga Oda in 1569 (the 12th year of Eiroku era). For a long time, people did not know how it grew those horns on its surface.

The Genroku era playwright, Ihara Saikaku, reported in "Nippon Eitaigura (1688)" that many people tried to find out the secret of making kompeito with no success, and their bewilderment in those days. "Confectioneries in the capital think very hard, but do not realize that a grain of sesame seed is the essence of making kompeito."

Put a sesame seed in a large flat-bottomed pot like a basin, and rotate the pot while holding it obliquely at an appropriate angle. Constantly heat it from below and sprinkle in some powdered sugar. When the grains dry, add sugar again. Repeat this process and horns will start to grow and the grain will become larger. This process makes the best use of the adherent properties of molasses and its solidification." ("Encyclopedia of Confectionery" by Katsuya Shibasaki)

Usually, we can guess how to make any Japanese or European sweet once we hold it in our hand and taste it. But growing the horns on konpeito is not easy to imagine, no matter how thorough the explanation is. Torahiko Terada, who was a physicist and a superb essayist, tried to explain the process to his students like this: People in the old times made it with something like a poppy seed as a kernel, and put sugar around it. The strange thing is that those horns will gradually grow on the surface. According to the basic hypothesis of today's physics, however, when things grow equally, they will form a sphere.

So I took out the anthology of Torahiko Terada's essays and read "Confetti" one more time.

－－－ In physics, when equal possibility is assumed in all directions, the rule is that equal mass is given to all directions based on the rule of symmetry. Current speculation concludes that confetti should grow to form a perfect sphere. Nevertheless, the confetti does not care what logic defines, but grows horns, one after another. (The Essays, 1927).

Chances of seeing confetti are getting rare these days. The horns do not grow properly if the angle of the pot is inappropriate, or the speed of rotation is too fast or too slow, in which case it will make a mere ball of sugar. I feel disappointed when I have confetti only to find many of them are of inferior quality.

The other day, I happened to read a book called "The Confectionary Land of Kenji Miyazawa" (Heibonsha) by Yuki Nakano, and I was filled with great awe. We can find an abundance of sweets in Kenji Miyazawa's world of juvenile stories. Confetti are scattered all over.

According to research by Ms. Nakano, confetti was very popular among the populace, and there were 26 confetti stores in the city of Edo alone during the Bunka-Bunsei era (1804-1830). In addition, "there was an assertion in those days that each confetti had to have 36 horns. ---- It is said that seventy officers in charge of kitchen works of Shogun were specially organized to inspect the number of horns, which were then called "ibo," or warts, in order to maintain the quality." The idea was that 36 horns were supposed to symbolize the entire universe.

Now we are in the month of June. As I walked along the back streets of Sakai City, I found colorful confetti colored vivid red, yellow, green, and white. Though small, they have wonderful horns, all in uniform shapes and sizes.

Torahiko Terada used to say, "Interestingly enough, the number of horns on confetti is usually the same. What factor determines the number? This is one of the most intriguing questions." Ukichiro Nakaya, a physicist who studied under the instruction of Torahiko Terada, heard his professor talked about sparklers and confetti over and over again. In his essay, he quoted his professor's comment on confetti, "If we hypothesize an electron is like a confetti, it may explain quantum more easily than we expect.... If there is confetti in other countries, then there must be several theses titled 'On Kompeito' by now." ("Memories of Torahiko Terada"）

When I go for a walk, I am always absentminded. But this time, I think this adorable confetti taught me a lesson about how to view things. So I had another one today.

Counting the horns on a confetti, I find myself dozing off during the day. By Shigeru

(Former Member of the House of Representatives)

Isotopic Composition of Plutonium

Importance of Discussions Should Be Recognized

Former ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had written an article "Call for More Active and World Wide Debate over Plutonium of Different Isotopic Composition" in Plutonium No. 19 Autumn, 1997.

He had been frustrated with the unsubstantiated and unscientific assertion that Light Water Reactor Grade Plutonium makes perfectly feasible explosives. Nobody had shown when, and using what isotopic composition material, of now many kilograms, and under what design had this been demonstrated. Everybody seems to agree that, given the choice, anyone will use weapons grade plutonium of Pu239 isotope higher than 93% to make a bomb.

They seem to add, however, that reactor grade plutonium is equally good, and given sophisticated design (unspecified), the bomb will be as reliable and effective. This creates the situation that there are unidentified not based on scientific data, an allegation that light water reactors spent fuel, when reprocessed, is as dangerous as those plutonium especially made for the weapons purposes. Given the gravity of energy problems in the coming century, and considering greenhouse effect gas and so forth, whether nuclear power is a viable and economic source of energy is a very serious matter. Ambassador Imai called for more candid and clear debates worldwide over the use of plutonium fuel, based on technical judgment and not on somebody's unspecified allegations.

Mr. Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus and a long time friend of Ambassador Imai responded, to which Imai wrote again to explain his point. He especially emphasized that couch-potato scientist designing an abstract explosive device in an instant is very different from some country seriously building nuclear arsenal on the basis of plutonium to be produced (in this case dedicated weapons grade plutonium production reactor). Some developing country trying to have a bomb for a short while, or a group of terrorists constructing a big-bang, are different from the case of serious arsenal. Garwin replied again, and the editor of Plutonium thought printing these exchanges is interesting, useful, and provide sufficient insight into this delicate problem. Ambassador Imai's original article may be found in http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/cnfc/.

March 20, 1998

To the Honorable Ryukichi Imai

I have read your article "Call for More Active and World Wide Debate over Plutonium of Different Isotopic Composition" from "Plutonium" No. 19, Autumn 1997 (pp. 3-5).

I am very disappointed to see this paper, in view of your participation as an international member in the American Nuclear Society Special Panel Report "Protection and Management of Plutonium" of August 1995. I attach page 25 from that document which discusses exactly this point, even to saying

"While recognizing that explosives have been produced from the material, many believe that this is a feat that can be accomplished only by an advanced nuclear-weapon state such as the United States. This is not the case. Any nation or group capable of making a nuclear explosive from weapons-grade plutonium must be considered capable of making one from reactor-grade plutonium."

I send you again also pages 32-33 of the National Academy study of January, 1994 "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium" which notes

"With a more sophisticated design, weapons could be built with reactor-grade plutonium that would be assured of having higher yields."

So unless you are accusing many scientists of collective incompetence and dishonesty-- Holdren, Panofsky, Garwin, and Agnew, to name but a few-- you must accept this conclusion.

It seems to me in regard to your statement "I have been impressed that such a debate has been going on for a long time without reaching sensible resolution" one of the principal reasons that it has not reached sensible resolution is that you, personally, have been encouraging confusion. I don't know whom you mean by American "specialists", but the people I name have not been involved as you charge "The misunderstandings and intentional confusion spread by American 'specialist' have had great influence in the past."

If I understand what you are asking for, I believe it would be most inadvisable for Japan to undertake the analysis or the design of a nuclear weapon using civil plutonium or military plutonium, but it seems to me that is the only thing that would persuade you of the utility or the lack of utility of civil plutonium for making nuclear weapons.

As stated in the ANS study, it would be nice if the world were such that civil plutonium could not be used to make effective nuclear weapons, but "unfortunately" civil plutonium can indeed be so used.

Richard L. Garwin

March 31, 1998

To Mr. Richard Garwin

I am glad that you found time to read my pieces, and am sorry that I still don't seem to have you understand my main point. Maybe I can divide the arguments into the three phases.

1. Whether as an ultimate theory one can build viable nuclear weapon out of the reactor grade plutonium or not depend on "who" we are talking about, what is the "nuclear weapons" and what is the "reactor grade plutonium" in question. All three are interrelated, and without clarifying each one, it not possible to come to meaningful conclusions. 2. a) If we are talking about modern industrialized states such as Japan or Germany, they should be able to accomplish technical achievements which some other equally capable have succeeded. (i.e. provided that they have no access to more convenient material), b) If we are talking about developing countries, I do not know if a state like China can turn "reactor grade Pu (depends on definition)" into viable weapon (those which are reliable in yield, timing, and uniformity or whatever is assumed for such weapons). I do not have sufficient knowledge about Chinese nuclear industry to judge that it is about their normal industrial level. c) If we are talking about one of the rogue states, I assume they will try all other ways to get hold of a WMD one way or the other rather than going through the tedious and complicated way both in technology and in design, fabrication, extraction, etc. unless they bumped into a chunk of such material.

3. I am not sure what kind of plutonium we are talking about. If it is the typical LWR extracted (35,000 MWD/Te or so) no one has tested such a material. One can of course, find all sorts of devices such as using only fuel pellets near the edge of the reactor core material with lower burn-up etc. but that is not very important here.

What I understood from talk with Robert W. Selden of Los Alamos years ago was regarding higher burn-up and lower Pu- 239 fuel from UK reactor. He did not give exact shape, weight, phase, of the material (of course not) nor about the time it took to achieve implosion, nor about the time it took for sequential events of nuclear explosion. It seems that is all everybody else who says "we made reactor Pu explode" seems to know (or at least willing to say). Then we do not have scientifically exact knowledge about what kind of Pu under what conditions underwent what sort of nuclear (I believe it was nuclear) explosion. This is a very thin ice to base a general statement "you can make nuclear explosive from reactor grade plutonium, and we know that it works, etc." The claim is not adequate to base scientific judgments.

4. All we have as the basis of the claim is a sort of non-dimensional point in space, time, material, engineering, etc. and not even a band. If some correlation is given about the a)extent of sophistication in knowledge and technical know-how required, b) composition, impurities, heat treatment, etc. of the material, and c) the amount of time, personnel and efforts one is willing to pour into such an adventure, we may be talking about something more meaningful.

5. Answers to these questions are always denied because of military secrecy. Then it would be more honest to say that how and why a certain category of plutonium (don't say its all and any plutonium, because then you are making fool of listeners) can be made into nuclear explosive cannot be explained. (Not in detail, but even it the roughest of the terms). Then we can realize that there has not been a dialogue from the beginning.

Some people will draw conclusion from the fact that even Sadam Hussein or Kim Il Jong took the hard way of producing the weapons grade material to start their nuclear program. For the US to keep insisting that plutonium is a harmful and "bad" material is the easiest way to discourage the world in cooperating nuclear weapons reduction, and to declare, unilaterally, without evidence, that plutonium can be a useful energy resources, which has to be handled carefully because of its toxicity. At the same time one has to realize that the US is conducting 45 billion dollars stockpile stewardship program for the sake of reliability of its arsenal and refusing to admit that they represent nuclear explosion. Can you really see the thin lime between the two kinds of explosion? It looks to me that the DOD had taken up convenience rather than science or logic to defend their position.

6. Very soon the world will be demanding as a part of the measure of "cut-off" agreement to inspect Hanford, Tomsk and others to make sure that you are not producing weapons grade plutonium. Are you (and Russians) going to say "here is another pile of non-weapon grade plutonium which has been produced as by-product, but these are also bad material." The problems of energy in the 21st century is very complicated and cannot be explained easily, but that is a good enough reason that one should not abandon plutonium's candidacy as one of the important energy resources of future. The world (not necessarily IAEA type) should be demanding verification that your and Russian warheads pits are dismantled and adequately disposed of. Would you keep saying that plutonium is a bad thing, so we are going to burn them as LWR MOX fuel, and turn them into less harmful isotopic composition plutonium?

from Ryukichi Imai

April 17, 1998

To the Honorable Ryukichi Imai

Thank you very much for your letter of 03/31/98. I think it is useful to be precise on these points, even if not to fill the entire parameter space with useful weapons designs.

In reply to your questions, those who are knowledgeable in this area (and I include Panafsky, Holdren, myself, Mike May, and Ray Kidder) would all agree on the following technical statement:

1. We are talking about plutonium with perhaps 60% Pu-239, 24% Pu-240, 9% Pu-241, and 1% Pu-238.

The results are insensitive to the composition. So that is the kind of plutonium we are talking about.

2. The nuclear weapon we are talking about is an implosion weapon. We say that a weapon using this material (but in somewhat larger amounts than with pure Pu-239, to make up for its larger critical mass) would require attention only to the increased heat generation, for which there are simple remedies. With no other precautions, the weapon would have the same yield as an ordinary implosion weapon much of the time. So it could have a yield of 20 kilotons. But its minimum yield would be one or two kilotons if a spontaneous fission neutron injected itself at the worst possible time.

As stated on page 33 of the January 1994 "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium" a more sophisticated design (within the reach of any nuclear weapons establishment) would provide a weapon that did not suffer at all from the spontaneous fission problem of pre-initiation.

3. We are talking about any national program-- specifically including Iraq, Iran, or North Korea for making the early-design implosion weapon.

For the weapon that has a reliable yield, I certainly include every one of the five nuclear weapon states, and probably Israel, Pakistan, and India, and certainly Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland, if they decided to acquire nuclear weaponry.

In this context, one can refer to the publication "Drawing Back the Curtain of Secrecy" Restricted Data Declassification Decisions, 1946 to the Present, (RDD-4), January 1, 1998, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Declassification, "Approved for Public Release", http://www.doe.gov/html/osti/opennet/opennetl.html

"The fact of use in high explosive assembled (HEA) weapons of spherical shells of fissile materials, sealed pits; air and ring HE lenses; that multipoint detonation systems may be used in weapons, and a definition of pre-initiation-proof weapons (weapon, the yield of which is not sensitive to initiation of the nuclear reaction at a time earlier than the planned time). (72- 11)"

As for your last comment, the United States will indeed disclose (and has disclosed) the non-weapon grade plutonium that we have. And we do intend to burn excess weapon material as LWR MOX fuel. We turn them not into "less harmful isotopic composition plutonium" as you say, but rather into plutonium which is protected for decades by the intense radiation field of the irradiated fuel. In reality, the isotopic composition of this plutonium is somewhat less attractive than that of plutonium in spent fuel.

On page 2-3 of the July 1995 volume "Reactor-Related Options" of "Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium" we write specifically about the spent fuel standard.

"This means making the excess W-Pu roughly as inaccessible for weapons use as the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium in spent fuel from commercial nuclear-power reactors. The 'reactor-grade' plutonium found in commercial spent fuel, while it could be used to make nuclear bombs, poses much smaller risks than separated plutonium in this regard because of the mass, bulk, and intense radiation field of the spent fuel assemblies and because of the additional technical sophistication and resources required for chemical separation of the spent fuel plutonium from the accompanying fission products and uranium."

Ry, I hope that this position is clear, honest, and compelling. Please let me know if there is anything that is not clear or not convincing.

Richard l. Garwin

＊Mr. Garwin reguested to include at the end of this exchange the following "A more technical treatment 'Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can be Used to Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapon' by R.L. Garwin, is available at (http://www.fas.org/rig). Editor of Plutonium decided not to reject the request on the ground that half truth is still truth although it is not the entire truth. We hope that the entire purpose of this exercise in exchange about the more mature understanding of the issue may be not be biased.

Wine.., My Friend (III)

Champagne

Yuji Tsushima

Birth of Champagne

Human desire in general has no limits, and has served rightly or wrongly as a driving force in the creation of new things. Starting from the desire to eat delicious foods or drink good sake with someone, today's eating habits have been established through tremendous energy spent over hundreds of years. One example of this history of tremendous effort toward improvement can be found in the birth of champagne.

The Champagne district was already famous for wine production when Clovis founded the Frankish kingdom in the sixth century. Champagne is the northernmost location for wine production not only in France, but probably throughout the world, and it is hardly the best place to grow grapes. However, the soil in this district is high in calcium and its clay texture is similar to the Bourgogne in southern France. This means the soil is suitable for viticulture. In addition, the climate is safe from the scorching heat of summer with its mild Atlantic weather, despite a slight possibility of frost in springtime. Today three varieties of grapes are grown here: Pinot Noir, Pinot Meunier and Chardonnay, each of which occupies one third of the total 25,000 to 30,000 hectares of vineyards in the district.

The Mout, or must in English, of grapes produced in the northern district of Champagne begins its slow fermentation during the autumn winemaking activities. After the fermentation stops during the winter, the distinctive characteristic of secondary fermentation, known since ancient times, bubbles up again as the temperature rises. When wine was transported in casks, this fact was serious disadvantage. The difficulty in maintaining the quality of wine was bad enough; there was also the worry that the cask would burst in course of transportation. It may be an overstatement to say that an international technology transfer was needed to solve these problems of cask transport, but it should be pointed out that without the mass production of glass bottles, which started in England and popularized the use of bottles for selling drinks, there would be none of the sparkling wine now known as Champagne. Portugal's role in making the essential cork stopper should also not be forgotten.

It is widely accepted that the monk called Dom Perignon, (whom legend says was blind), devised the production method for sparkling wine whereby the carbon dioxide generated during secondary fermentation is sealed up inside the bottle in the wine. This is, however, a rather controversial tale, because it was in 1726, eleven years after the death of Dom Perignon, that the conservative French authorities finally officially permitted the sale of bottled wine. Yet it seems certain that this genius greatly contributed to the establishment of blending methods for champagne. At any rate, the details of the complicated and time-consuming production process for making the sparkling wine known as champagne is beyond our imagination. Let's take a look at the essence of the wine itself.

How Champagne Is Made

First of all, grapes are harvested entirely by hand in the Champagne district, and each bunch is examined painstakingly, one by one. The grapes are then transported with great care so as not to damage the skins of the fruit, and carefully pressed to release a certain amount of juice. This process is carried out with the greatest care to insure that the red color of such grapes as Pinot Noir does not blend into the pressed juice. As a rule, there are three presses of the grapes, and the total quantity of extracted juice is limited to 25.50 hectoliters from every 4 tons of fruit. About 2,000 pressing factories (pressurage) have been established in the district, and operate under license to insure strict conformity to these rules. Such care is taken over these procedures as a matter of course to maintain the international reputation.

One of the major characteristics of brewing champagne is the important process of blending (assemblage) the must toward the end of the pause in fermentation during the winter. In addition to the must produced that year, (casked must of different grades called la Cuvee are purchased by champagne brewers), the must from casks prepared in previous years is also used to create something appropriate to produce the characteristics of such brands as Moet et Chandon or Veuve Clicquot. If the quality of must is extremely good in a certain year, that must will be used exclusively for that fermentation, and will be sold as "vintage," at a higher price with a clear indication of the production year.

Because of this mixing process, the connection between the final champagne and the variety of raw wine grapes and the vineyard is severed, and champagne is transformed by the brewers from a simple agricultural product into a manufactured product with higher added value. White grapes (Chardonnay) and red grapes (Pinot, of course, excluding the red pigments from the skin as much as possible) are mixed together according to the formula of each brewer. It is said that three-fourths of the grapes used are Pinot, and one fourth Chardonnay, but there are some who value those champagnes made only with the latter as the "blancs de blancs," or "white of whites." The brewers are very meticulous and careful in maintaining their worldwide reputation, and it is unthinkable for them to use must from other places to make champagne.

Such a belief in purity yields unexpected results in the brewing stage called foaming (prise de mousse), which is the essence of champagne making. When bottling the carefully mixed must, seed for the foaming (Liqueur de Tirage) is added to each and every bottle. This seed is a mixture of yeast, older wine, and sugar. The yeast added here will in several months break down the sugar into a small portion of alcohol and a large portion of carbon dioxide, with the pressure inside the bottles reaching from 5 to 6 atmospheres. The question is how to remove the dregs (remains of the yeast cells) produced by this secondary fermentation from the highly pressurized contents of the bottle.

This is accomplished by a repeated process of turning the bottle slowly while vibrating it every day for a year, and gathering the dregs at the mouth of the up-side-down bottle. This process is called "Remuage." When it is finished, the next process, called "Degorgement," removes the sunken dregs from the pressurized bottle. The efficiency of this operation has been improved considerably by several devices including the freezing of the liquid, but in some factories, traditional manual operations are still used for both of the processes. We must admire the workers' skills, which have been fostered by tradition.

Champagne is handled with great caution, and aged gradually in a cool environment, usually in a cellar or cave that runs about 30 meters deep and as long as 200 kilometers underground in the Champagne district. The last production process proves clearly that Champagne is in large part a product of workmanship and commercial policy rather than a gift from the heaven. This process is Dosage, the process of supplying additives before shipping. This is done simultaneously with Degorgement, and makes up the lost wine removed from the bottle with the dregs, by adding a proper amount of supplementary liquid, or Liqueur d'expedition, which may contain old champagne, sweetener, and sometimes some cognac as well. The exact formulas are trade secrets, but an outline can be detected from the agreements between wine makers. When the additive is composed solely of wine, the result is called Ultra-Brut or Brut Sauvage; when the additive contains 1% liquor, Brut; and 2 to 5% liquor (the standard figure varies), Sec. These terms are displayed on the label to enable the customers to follow their preferences.

Before the bottles are finally shipped out, each bottle of perfected champagne will be aged for at least one year, and sometimes for more than five years, after all these meticulous steps which have been taken to eliminate the original taste of the yeast. Champagne is shipped at its prime, so there is little advantage for consumers to store it. In fact, there is a risk of deterioration if it is stored too long.

How to Enjoy Champagne

It used to be that champagne was something to enjoy during cheerful conversations after dinner as a kind of dessert wine. But today, it is more usually served as an aperitif or as a party beverage. In France, where the consumption of champagne far exceeds that of the rest of the world (most of 100 million plus bottles of champagne produced annually are consumed in France), it is said that champagne suits any occasion and any time of the day (toute la journee); before, during, or after a meal, and the proper choice of Brut, Sec, or Vintage will enhance the taste of either fish or meat.

Champagne is a symbol of fun and affluence. Champagne is a requisite for launching ceremonies. On the winners' platform or in a victory celebration, champagne is a necessity for the champagne shower. Nevertheless, unlike other wines, champagne unexpectedly lacks popularity not only in Japan but also worldwide. We all know that the main reason is that champagne is expensive. It is quite natural because the production process requires a lot of work and time, but still it is not easy for everyone to buy and take home. Also, because of commercialism, when a specialty which is not very familiar to many of us is put on sale, its already high price fetches higher price. Dom Perignon by Moet et Chandon, a specialty champagne made exclusively from what we call Tete de Cuvee, or the first press of the grapes, is sold at super high prices in the market, not to mention the "white of whites (blancs de blancs)" described above, and Vintage. It may not be fair to generalize but these expensive champagnes are usually targeted at those who are willing to pay believing high prices mean high quality. Therefore, in many cases, has been pointed out that the cost does not match the product. But the greatest problem is that it is impossible for amateurs to appreciate what is good about the so- called specialty wines.

I am not going to discuss the perfect temperature to drink champagne, (between 7℃ and 9℃), or type of glass, because these topics are covered in many other articles. It is traditionally said, try to remember two things: do not over-cool the bottle, and do not shake the bottle before serving. Although the rest should be left in the hands of the sommelier, I found one thing in the literature that drew my attention, a good number of statements to the effect that what we call a champagne glass, a shallow glass with wide mouth and a long stem, is not an ideal vessel for champagne. Rather a deep glass with steep sides is preferable because it can generate good foaming.

Champagne has been established as a specific category of wine. I cannot help but feel that it has been transformed through the work of human hands into something outside the realm of the fruit wines. But as you know, champagne is regarded as a fruit wine and is treated as such under Japanese tax law. It is possible to make sparkling wine outside the Champagne district. However, today's worldwide reputation has been established on the wisdom of the people in the Champagne district. They have introduced many new technologies based upon a solid footing in tradition and rooted in the local viticulture, instead of pursuing easy mass production. It provides a good lesson for the future of primary industries.

Special Wines and Local Originality

Fortifying is a way to add another human touch to wine. It is a way to process wine by adding brandy and sweetener during fermentation. Typical examples are the sherries of Spain and ports of Portugal. It is said that the commercial value of these wines was established by British merchants, who were shrewd businessmen. Vermouth is also a kind of fortified wine but it is classified as fruit wine under Japanese tax law because it contains additional alcohol and sugar, and is seasoned with herbs.

The British merchants started dealing in fortified wines mainly produced in Jerez in southwestern Spain, and the commercial value of sherry was established by the 17th century. Nowadays, there are many sherries manufactured in other countries which use the name, but originally sherry was the name for wine produced in Jerez. The characteristics of viticulture in this area are: to plow deeply to enable the vines to survive the dry summer, to sun-dry the fully ripened grapes of Palomino and Pedro Ximenez to increase their sugar content before pressing, and the solera system of blending new and old wines for fermentation before shipping. In fact, there are many distinctive procedures in sherry making. In addition, the dry fino type is made with Flor yeast, which produces a white film in the process of fermentation, and the sweet oloroso type is made without the help of the Flor yeast. The ultimate winner of the game is again the merchant, however. Sherry is destined to be blended before shipping in order to meet the tastes of the consumers, or in other words to bring in the largest possible profit.

This time, I tried to demonstrate the great effort and originality that our ancestors accumulated in creating special types of wines through human skill, using champagne and sherry as examples. We would like to pay our great respects to their efforts and show our gratitude from the bottom of our hearts when we appreciate these wines. Moreover, we should bear in mind that in order to maintain an unceasing reputation over a long history and through transactions across national borders requires the producers to accumulate expertise that cannot be imitated by anyone else. Those who engage in agriculture today are required to be ready to create products based on local traditions that cannot be copied by other people in other places. Any fabulous new food will need to survive the vicissitudes of time and adorn the culinary culture of the next generation.

Fruits, Vegetables and Energy Affluent in Joban Area

Reactor Building Paintings at Fukushima Daiichi NPS are very modern.

Fukushima is surrounded by mountains over 2,000 meters high, highlands, valleys and lakes. It is the gateway to Michinoku (of "the Road to Oku" fame) in Tohoku, and its climate is comparatively mild for the northern country. Since ancient times, Fukushima has consisted of three districts: the Aizu district located around the Aizu Basin in the west, the central Sendo ("mountain road") and Nakadori ("central road") areas which extend along the Abukuma River and the Abukuma Mountain Range running north and south and the Hamadori ("beach road") district and Kaido ("sea route") areas which face the Pacific Ocean. The ancient peoples of the prehistoric Jomon and Yayoi periods lived in the Hamadori district and gathered food from the sea and the river.

Nakadori was the center of the ancient Yamato Court administration over the Tohoku region, and many of the generals of the Minamoto and Taira clans traveled through the barrier stations of Shirakawa and Nakoso. Aizu holds a special place in Japanese history as the focus of the resistance to the new government of the Meiji era by the Alliance of Oshu Domains, and saw the end of the military samurai governments that had started one thousand years earlier when military rule over the Tohoku region began.

Futaba in the Hamadori - Iwaki district was a supply center for coal. The area was represented by the Joban Coal Field that included more than one hundred coal mines. The Joban Railway was established in 1897, before a majority of other domestic train lines, to transport one million tons of coal every year to the Sumida River in Tokyo. Tens of freight trains made the trip day and night. This coal powered the modernization of Japan, including the light of coal gas lamps. Also, a number of water power stations were built along Tadami River in the midst of heavy snow area that starts in Nikko Ozegahara, deep to the west of the Aizu Basin. These served as a supply center for electric power during the post-war reconstruction of Japan.

Pioneers in Nuclear Power Plants

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) conducted an investigation to evaluate the suitability of the Hamadori area under the encouragement On the top of the core of Unit No.5 at Daiichi and invitation of the administrations of Fukushima Prefecture and the Station. Ms. Amano (left) is a well-mannered Okuma and Futaba townships in 1961. Subsequently the Fukushima guide with thorough explanations. Institute of Investigation was established in Okuma in 1964. This marked the beginning of the construction of the first nuclear power station for TEPCO, and was at a time when the first surge of post-war reconstruction had finally subsided. The demand for an organization of the infrastructure to supply electric power to the Tokyo metropolitan area was a precursor of the miraculously furious economic growth period of Japan. A boiling water reactor (BWR) designed by General Electric of the U.S. was chosen for the power plant. The construction of the No. 1 Unit of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station started in September 1967, and with its targeted electrical output of 460MW, was to be one of the largest power stations in the world using this type of reactor.

The construction made good progress, and commercial operations started in March 1971, initiating the era of nuclear power generation in Japan. Soon other electric power companies started operation of nuclear power stations such as Tsuruga and Mihama. Since then, the construction continued with reactor Units No.2 through No. 5, with electrical output of 784MW, followed by Unit No.6 with an output of 1,100MW. When Unit No.6 started commercial operations in October 1979, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station became one of the largest suppliers of electricity with a total output of about 4,696MW.

As of March this year, the electricity generated to date amounts to about 590TWh (590,000GWh), the world's second- largest output, next only to that of Bruce Nuclear Power Station in Canada. This total volume of the output is more than twice TEPCO's present annual electricity output of 260TWh. In addition, Units No. 7 and No. 8, producing 1,380MW, are planned as additions to the north side of the power station. With these, the supply capacity of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station will be greatly increased. The social environment surrounding the nuclear power station has undergone even more significant changes with the passage of time from the post-war reconstruction, through the period of high economic growth, into the present period of steady growth. The construction of nuclear power stations is now based on the public acceptance, rather than request by the local government or assembly. As the management of the power station now moves into the second generation, and more information about the operations is shared with the local community.

Unit No. 1 was imported from the U.S. and it applied 50% indigenous technology. In order to build a light water reactor which has more than 90% indigenous technology to conform to domestic standards, various efforts have Ready to look into the reactor pool with containment gloves been made which reflect the acquisition of many and hat on and shoes changed. technologies and experiences in operation including troubles. The continuous, steady operations achieved in newer domestic nuclear power stations can be attributed to the hard work and efforts of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the pioneer. These attempts still continue to tackle new technical problems, which are bound to arise after 27 years of operations, and include the change of the core shroud; reduction, incineration and the storage of radioactive wastes from nuclear power station; as well as the storage of spent fuel in dry casks or in a pool on the premises.

The Central Control Room is more crowded than usual as Unit No. 6 is undergoing regular inspection. 6,000 to 7,000 people work at the station every day.

Electricity Produced in Fukushima Supports the Tokyo Metropolitan Area

More than 50% of the Futaba district, where the nuclear power station is located, is hilly and covered with forest. Before the war, the site of the nuclear power station was used as a training ground for battle planes known as the Red Dragons, and was later used as a salt farm after the war. The power station covers a huge area of about 300,000 square meters, spreading over the town lines to lie in both towns of Futaba and Okuma. The Kuroshio (Black Current) flows north through the Pacific Ocean and washes the coast of these towns, abundant in green forests. The layout of the power station utilizes the coast line with its exposed rock beds, and the topographical characteristics of the mild forest spreading inland to Nakadori. Generating facilities are built along the coast line, and the adjoining residential area in natural wooded area is maintained like a forest park. Wild squirrels, rabbits, and raccoon dogs run free among the pine trees, cherries, and azaleas.

The present population of Okuma township is about 11,000. It has gradually increased since 1960, when there were only 8,000 people, and fewer people work away from home now. 80 percent of 7,000 staff workers at Fukushima Daiichi Power Station are from the Futaba district and its adjacent area. Specialties of this region include fruits such as pear, peach and plum, as well as vegetables which are shipped to urban centers. In order to create new products from this area, a large-scale fish farm for flounder has been built on the south side of the power station, employing the warm waste water, and is operated by the Fukushima Sea-Farming Association and Okuma Fisheries Promotion Agency. In the fish nursery facilities, eggs of not only flounder, the specialty of the region, but also ayu, abalone, and sea urchin are hatched and the fry are fed until they are fully grown. The fry or adult fish are shipped to fishermen's cooperatives and fishery dealers in other locations. Fish and shellfish are not easily cultured because controlling the water temperatures and conditions is difficult, and millions of fry can be annihilated by mistakes at times. To get the best results, salt water freshly taken from the sea via the power station is used to keep the temperature of water in the breeding pools at about 20 degrees Celsius, as the water temperature from the power station is seven degrees higher than the ambient natural sea water.

The Joban region used to supply huge amounts of coal, and now it provides fruit, vegetables, and electricity to metropolitan areas, with the place of production proudly printed on the boxes of all fruit and vegetables. Electricity is also important in the support of people's lives and the economy of the metropolitan areas, but there is no way to label electricity to show its place of origin. Efforts to increase the speeds on the Joban rail lines, and improvement of the highways both enhance interactive, not one-way, associations between the metropolitan areas and this region, only 200 kilometers north of Tokyo. A sense of appreciation born in the hearts of both consumers and producers would in turn encourage an understanding of the efforts made to supply energy.

[Back to No.22 Contents] july 22 1998 Copyright (C) 1998 Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle [email protected] Flounder are grown with the warm sea water from the station. Soon after hatching, 15mm baby flounder swim with their bodies flat just as an adult fish. 1.1 million fish are grown each year to be release when they become 10 cm in length. Info Clip

Inauguration of the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Slated for October --Partial Amendment to the Atomic Energy Act and Laws Concerning the PNC --

Donen, the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC), is to be reorganized and restarted as the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development (tentatively named) on October 1, 1998 as a result of discussions in the Diet and in the Atomic Energy Commission over methods of development of fast breeder reactors and nuclear fuel cycle, and drastic reform of the PNC response as seen in the accident at the "Monju," the prototype fast breeder reactor (FBR), as well as in the fire and explosion at the Bituminization Facility of the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.

These accidents and scandals have aroused extensive discussions extending even to the dismissal of the PNC, and the very necessity of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, it has been concluded that the study of the practical use of nuclear fuel cycle is crucial for Japan, which has scarce resources. We strongly hope that the PNC will execute series of reforms and strive for research and development within the new agency in order to secure energy for the future of Japan and the world.

The following is an outline of these events concerning the PNC.

April 1997

- The "Monju" accident on December 8, 1995 was followed by the fire and explosion at the Tokai Bituminization Facility, and resulted in the establishment of the Study Committee on the Reform of the PNC which is under the direct control of the Science and Technology Agency (STA). The goals of the Committee are to conduct thorough third-party inspections to examine the institutional characteristics, organization and system of the PNC in order to accomplish drastic reform of the Corporation.

- The Study Committee on the Reform of the PNC chaired by Prof. Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, the former President of The University of Tokyo, reevaluated all operations of the PNC including its organization, management control, information communication, public relations, facility management, and the system of risk management, and it decided the policy for reform of the PNC.

August 1997

- A report of the Study Committee on the Reform of the PNC, "Basic Guideline for PNC Reform" was submitted, and the New Corporation Working Group lead by Prof. Atsuyuki Suzuki of The University of Tokyo was inaugurated under the STA to realize the transformation to a new corporation.

December 1997 - The Atomic Energy Commission's Advisory Committee (Chairman: Prof. Junichi Nishizawa, the former president of Tohoku University) on the FBR reported that the research and development of fast breeder reactors is one of the most promising choices of energy resource for the future.

- The "Draft Plan of the New Entity" was concluded by the Working Group for Corporation Operations. STA started to establish new corporation bill for reform of the PNC totally based on this concept.

February 1998

- On February 10, the proposed "Partial Amendment to Atomic Energy Basic Law and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation Law" was resoluted by the Cabinet.

・The PNC will be reformed to become the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development.

・The "Management Council" was established to maintain the transparency of the operational management.

・Activities of the new corporation emphasize those necessary for technically establishing the nuclear fuel cycle including the development of fast breeder reactors, reprocessing of spent fuel, treatment and disposal of high level radioactive wastes. Activities concerning advanced thermal reactor, uranium enrichment and uranium mining are not included.

April 1998

- The Amendment (finalized by the Cabinet on Feb.10) unanimously passed the House of Representatives with the support of both the ruling and all opposition parties except for the Communist Party on April 14.

- A supplementary resolution was adopted simultaneously to require information release, safety assurances, and the formation of a national agreement on nuclear fuel cycle policy.

May 1998

- The Amendment passed unanimously the House of Councilors by both the ruling and all opposition parties except for the Communist Party on May 13.

- A supplementary supporting resolution was also adopted.

With the passage of this amendment, the PNC will be transformed into a new organization based in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture, starting October 1, 1998, with the new objectives of establishing both fast breeder reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technology. In July, Yasumasa Togo, the former chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission, will be appointed President of the Board of Directors, and Yasuo Nakagami, Executive Director of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Vice President. Yasumasa Togo

Born: February 17, 1928, Oita Prefecture, Japan.

Graduated: March 1951, First Faculty of Engineering, The University of Tokyo.

Career: May 1968 - March 1988 Professor of Faculty of Engineering, The University of Tokyo.

June 1988 Commissioner of the Nuclear Safety Commission.

February 1993 - April 1998 Chairman of the Nuclear Safety Commission.

Yasuo Nakagami

Born: December 5, 1938, Tochigi Prefecture, Japan.

Graduated: March 1961, Faculty of Engineering, The University of Tokyo.

Career: June 1991 Director, Takasago Factory, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

June 1995 Executive Director, Assistant Director of Power Systems Headquarters.

For the Promotion of MOX Fuel Uses - 7th CNFC General Meeting Held -

On June 10, the 7th General Meeting of the CNFC was held at Kasumigaseki, Tokyo, and the Activity and Financial Reports for 1997, and the Program and Budget Plan for 1998 were approved. New executive members were also elected as the terms of office for the directors and auditors expired.

Program for 1998

The inauguration of the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development on October 1 as a result of organizational reform of the PNC, and the fact that a prior consent was given to the delayed planning, due to the PNC accidents, of MOX fuel uses at the Takahama Power Plant made CNFC decided to work for a more dynamic means of promoting the nuclear fuel cycle and the peaceful uses of plutonium. It also decided to provide access to information regarding the results of researches it conducted upon the issues of non-nuclear weapon policy in Asia, the treatment of plutonium from dismantled warheads, and the difference between reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium, as well as to evaluate how nuclear power contributes to the issue of the global environment.

After CNFC General Meeting, Mr. Yuji Tsushima, Acting Chairman, reports Diet discussions about economic policy.

Election of Directors and Auditors

As terms of office for executive members expired, new directors and auditors were elected. Mr. Tetsuo Aochi, director, left the office, and Messrs. Akinori Eto and Shu Watanabe, members of the House of Representatives, have assumed the position. The nuclear fuel cycle is gradually being established here and now is the time we must promote broader understanding. We would like to ask you for your cooperation and assistance with conducting CNFC activities.

Executive Editor

⇒ A joint U.S.-China communique of the 1998 China-American Summit held in Beijing was announced on June 27. The agreement includes mutual nuclear missile de-targeting for peace and stability in South Asia, and respect for the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. This means a few positive steps towards peace have been made away from the hair-trigger situation for three countries: the United States, China and Russia. Though the advancement is very small, we expect it will become a threshold in the reduction of nuclear weapons, not only by the U.S. and Russia, but by another three countries as well.

(Editorial Staff)