Plutonium Summer 1998 No.22
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Summer 1998 No.22 A Branch of the Chang Jiang River Going Across Shanghai Although Shanghai has achieved rapid economic development in the past, future growth will depend on Shanghai's ability to secure a stable supply of energy. The Chinese government has made plans to supply the coastal region of southeastern China, which has no reliable energy resources, with between 120 and 240 GW by the year 2050 by an expensive nuclear power generation program. It is estimated that, by 2050, the country's total power generation capacity will amount to 1,200 GW, of which 10-20% will be nuclear. Contents ● Opinion What to Do with Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan? ● Special Report Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy - A Study in Global Governance - Ryukichi Imai ● Pu-Series 18 On Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs Atsuyuki Suzuki ● Pluto 21 Rock Candy Confetti Shigeru Gotoh ● Letters Isotopic Composition of Plutonium - Importance of Discussions Should Be Recognized - ● Nourriture-5 Wine.., My Friend (III) Champagne Yuji Tsushima ● Views of Nuclear Power Stations Fruits, Vegetables and Energy Affluent in Joban Area ● Info-Clip Inauguration of the Organization of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Slated for October ● CNFC Information ● Postscript Plutonium Summer No.22 Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Juzen Bldg.,Room 801, 2-9-6, Nagata-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan TEL : 03-3591-2081 FAX : 03-3591-2088 Publisher Takashi Mukaibo Executive Editor Shigeru Gotoh Editorial Office Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Date of Issue: August 12, 1998 Sep. 21, 1998 Copyright (C) 1998 Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle [email protected] Opinion What to Do with Nuclear Weapons in India and Pakistan? India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and declared that they were members of the nuclear weapon countries. When I heard the news, the fact that they both had been engaged in nuclear development and had more than one nuclear weapon disappointed me and I could not help thinking that they were unable to see the trees for the forest. What both countries aimed at was not the same as that of the first test conducted in May 1974. Obviously, they wanted to demonstrate that they were armed with practical nuclear weapons and would develop nuclear technology for this purpose. The P5 and G8 countries issued an urgent joint communique announcing that they did not recognize India and Pakistan as nuclear powers. However, the truth is they both have been developing various nuclear weapons and possess them, and P5 could not take any effective counter measure to cope with this situation. I am not alone in thinking that it is now rather absurd for P5 to insist on keeping nuclear non-proliferation regime. Then What Should We Do? The Republic of South Africa said that it abolished all the seven nuclear warheads it secretly had owned. If this announcement was true, it would be the first example in the world, and could provide a good precedent for the India and Pakistan issue. The reason why South Africa abolished its nuclear weapons is that it assumed that its neighbor, Namibia, retreated from Angola and declared independence. Thus, interference by South Africa was no longer necessary. The incentive of South Africa to develop nuclear weapons was based on the fear that the Soviet Union was manipulating the situation behind Namibia and that it could bring in nuclear weapons at any time. The end of the Cold War between the U.S. and Russia also had a strong influence on the situation. The Kashmir issue lies on the verge of conflict between India and Pakistan, and it does not seem to be easy to settle. But what the whole world should do is to pay close attention to this issue, not to spare any effort for the settlement through cooperation with the UN, and try not to isolate these two countries from the rest of the world, but instead try harder to reinforce the connection with them. A specific step we should take first is to establish a hot line between India and Pakistan. Of course, I do not believe that such development of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped simply by solving the problem between these two countries. Unless nuclear arms reduction of among P5 is encouraged, and unless the threat of nuclear weapons of P5 is eliminated, someone will follow the example of India and Pakistan. Our greatest anxiety is that this may influence the Middle East. START-I was established to reduce the number of warheads in the U.S. and Russia to 6,000, and 3,000 to 3,500 by START- II, and 2,000 to 2,500 by START-III; however, the Russian Parliament has not yet ratified START-II. Even though they smoothly reached the START-III stage, the number of warheads is still large enough to fill up a nuclear submarine. What it does is to abolish all the ineffective nuclear missiles on the ground for the purpose of cutting military expense, and it does not seem to reduce the attacking ability of nuclear weapons of the U. S. and Russia. Besides, there is no way to persuade England, France, and China to join this policy by reducing arsenals to 2,000 warheads. As India pointed out, the problem here is that the nuclear powers do not show any specific timetable for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Even so, it does not mean that other countries are free to engage in nuclear development. Just as Samson tied up his own hands and feet, it is most unlikely that nuclear powers will show such a timetable. Prof. Imai of Kyorin University, a director of CNFC and a former ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, suggested in the previous issue of "Plutonium" (Spring 1998 No.21) that Japan should succeed the Canberra Commission and discuss specific procedures for abolishing nuclear weapons. I do not know if Prime Minister Hashimoto has read his thesis, but he has proposed to hold an international forum attended by specialists. Fruitful and substantial results are expected. Executive Editor [Back to No.22 Contents] july 22 1998 Copyright (C) 1998 Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle [email protected] Special Report Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Energy - A Study in Global Governance - Ryukichi Imai Former Ambassador, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Director, Council for Nuclear Fuel Cycle (CNFC) As I work on this paper, I happen to chair two separate study groups under different sponsorships, both working on the same general subject of "global governance". I have not tried to produce common definitions of the two words for both groups. The subjects are sufficiently new and broad. What follows is, therefore, my own understanding of the outputs from these studies. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power are "global" subjects in that they involve a significant portion of the globe, either in their capabilities to bring harm to people or to supply energy. They have been under various "regimes" at different times (for that purpose I divide the post-war half a century into seven separate periods), and its entirety seems to correspond to the overall concept of "governance" in that it consists of different international regimes at different times, yet seemingly accompanied by a set of consistent logic. In some languages, including Japanese, people sometimes distinguish "nuclear" and "atomic", as between military and peaceful uses of the same energy which is produced from either fission or fusion of nucleus of atoms. I have used these words interchangeably according to normal practices without implying such distinction. This note is attached to explain the title of this paper. Neither of the two groups mentioned above is responsible for the contents of the discussion. The Early Period of Atom as Big Science During the Second World War the United States have successfully accomplished its national scientific-technical project code named Manhattan District. Toward that end Washington spent 2 billion dollars which some say is equivalent of 25 billion 1995 dollars(*1) and ended up with three atomic explosive devices by the summer of 1945. One is of the gun-type consisting of two equally divided halves of some 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (in which U-235 was more than 90% compared to about 0.7% in natural uranium) placed at the ends of a gun barrel, so to speak. The two halves are joined within microseconds by high explosives, which become super-critical and produce something like 13,000 tons (13 kilotons) of energy equivalent in high explosive (TNT). The theoretical aspect of this design was straightforward and J. Robert Oppenheimer who was then leader of the Los Alamos National Laboratory did not think separate explosive experiment was necessary. The US airforce B-29 Enola Gay carried it to Hiroshima in August of that year. *1 : "Four Trillion Dollars and Counting" by the Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project Committee (Stephen I. Schwartz, editor) The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1995, estimates the total cost of nuclear armament (including weapons and infrastructures) to be 4 trillion US dollars The other type utilized new man-made element plutonium which was produced in nuclear reactors by having U- 238 (which is the majority of the natural uranium) atoms absorb one neutron each. Pu-239 is a fissile material similar to U-235 in that the chain reactions are possible. Pu-239 was easier to produce because as different chemical elements uranium and plutonium could be separated chemically. Isotopic separation of U-235 and U- 238 is a more difficult although we know today that the chemical separation involves far more intense radiation (due to fission products) than does uranium separation which is more physics-based (such as gas diffusion, centrifuge or magnetic).