"Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish." ~ Carlos Marighella A Comparative Study of German and Palestinian Revolutionary Terrorism by Hannah Mae Fransen Bachelor of Arts, Hons. History, University of Ottawa, 2008 A Report Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisor: David Charters, PhD, History Examining Board: Steven Turner, PhD, History (Chair) Sean Kennedy, PhD, History Marc Milner, PhD, History This report is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK August, 2009 ©Hannah Mae Fransen, 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your Tile Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-80675-3 Our file Notre r6f6rence ISBN: 978-0-494-80675-3 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduce, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. 1+1 Canada DEDICATION In memory of Sue Anne Fransen "Life always goes away. Love doesn 7." ~ Thomas Trofimuk 11 ABSTRACT Terrorism is one of the most basic forms of armed insurgency and one often employed by revolutionary organizations against democratic governments. This report examines the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency for two revolutionary organizations: the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Between 1968 and 1993, these two organizations used terrorism against the Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Israel, respectively, in an attempt to overthrow the democratic governments. In previous studies, the RAF has often been compared to other European fighting communist organizations; conversely, the PLO has often been examined on its own or as one phase of the Palestinian movement. This report compares the two organizations in order to examine how differences in ideology, constituency, strategy, actions, and propaganda combine to affect the outcome of revolutionary insurgencies. Instead of focusing on the actions of the state, as many of the existing studies do, this report examines how the RAF and the PLO doomed their insurgencies through their own strategies and actions. m ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Throughout the report writing process, I received invaluable support and guidance from mentors, family, and friends. Special thanks to: the History Department, the Gregg Centre, and the University of New Brunswick, for monetary support, exciting academic and social opportunities, and the chance to be a teaching assistant; Dr. David Charters, for chocolate, suggestions, guidance, and for following my strict schedule; Glenn Leonard; for an excellent critique and for helping me find my way in the academic sea; Oma and Baba, for phone calls, letters, mad money, and most importantly, loving encouragement; Jerry and Kathy, for the love, support, and trips home you have so willing bestowed upon me during this degree, the last one, and in all my endeavours; Christy, for movie nights, dance parties, seal slaughter stories, and being my sounding board; and Joel, for listening patiently and providing precious love and reassurance even though you often had no idea what I was talking about. IV Table of Contents DEDICATION ii ABSTRACT iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv Table of Contents v I. Introduction 1 II. Formation and Ideology Red Army Faction 21 Palestine Liberation Organization 30 III. The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Red Army Faction 39 IV. The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Palestine Liberation Organization 61 V. Epilogue: 1992/1993-2008 86 VI. Comparison and Analysis 90 Bibliography 99 Curriculum Vitae v 1 Chapter One Introduction Terrorism has been used as a method of insurgency for thousands of years. According to Ariel Merari, terrorism is the most basic form of insurgency and one of the strategies most often employed by insurgents.1 What is not clear, however, is whether or not terrorism is a consistently effective strategy of insurgency. If one considers two separate terrorism-based insurgencies, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 2 and the Red Army Faction (RAF), it is clear that although both employed terrorism, the results differed. Although neither group accomplished their respective goals (replacing Israel with a Palestinian state or bringing about a social revolution in Germany), the PLO came much closer to success than the RAF ever did. For example, the PLO was able to gain international recognition for its cause and the formation of the Palestinian Authority, while the RAF was unsuccessful beyond armed robberies and extortions. The PLO and the RAF employed similar tactics of armed struggle yet their insurgencies produced different outcomes. This report will show that both insurgent groups used terrorism to publicize their cause, finance their organization, free imprisoned members, and recruit new members. However, terrorism also tarnished their image, caused public acceptance of harsh counter-measures to ensure public safety, and, in the case of the PLO, complicated relationships with host Arab states and endangered the 1 Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," In The History of Terrorism: from Antiquity to al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand, 12-42, (California: University of California Press, 2007), 12 2 Although the Palestine Liberation Organization is an umbrella organization made up of numerous groups and factions, the nature and length of this study does not allow for an in-depth discussion of the constituent groups' ideologies or experiences. The PLO will be referred to as a singular entity except when opposition within the organization is important to the argument being made or to address the actions of a single group. 2 Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Aside from publicizing the insurgents' cause and securing the occasional tactical success, the direct benefits of terrorism were negligible for both the PLO and the RAF. The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Red Army Faction were chosen for this study because of the fundamental similarities between the insurgencies. Since the main object of this report is to consider the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency, the two groups were initially selected because armed struggle was their major active strategy for the greater part of their insurgency. Additional similarities allow the report to focus on the different strategies employed by two organizations and what impact these factors had on the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. Another similarity between the two groups is the time at which they emerged onto the world stage (between 1968 and 1970) and were in decline (by the early 1990's). This report's analysis will focus on the period between 1968 and 1993, when the two insurgencies were most active. Both groups were also influenced by 1960s radicalism and the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Paul Wilkinson's typology of political terrorism, the two groups also had similar revolutionary goals; they desired the overthrow of a state.3 Both target states were also governed by democratic structures. This is an important similarity, since when it comes to responding to terrorism democratic governments are constrained by a different set of rules than are authoritarian regimes. The power of democratically elected governing bodies comes from the people and thus to maintain its power, the government must maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its 3 Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (Hampshire: Macmillan Education Limited, 1986), 55- 57 3 population. In order to do so, the actions and reactions of the state must be seen as effective and/or 'acceptable,' or necessary to ensure safety and well-being. Absolute monarchies and dictatorships are not bound by these limits since they do not rely on popular election and thus counter-insurgency measures can be far