"Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish."

~ Carlos Marighella A Comparative Study of German and Palestinian Revolutionary Terrorism

by

Hannah Mae Fransen

Bachelor of Arts, Hons. History, University of Ottawa, 2008

A Report Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: David Charters, PhD, History

Examining Board: Steven Turner, PhD, History (Chair)

Sean Kennedy, PhD, History

Marc Milner, PhD, History

This report is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

August, 2009

©Hannah Mae Fransen, 2009 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

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1+1 Canada DEDICATION

In memory of Sue Anne Fransen

"Life always goes away. Love doesn 7."

~ Thomas Trofimuk

11 ABSTRACT

Terrorism is one of the most basic forms of armed insurgency and one often employed by revolutionary organizations against democratic governments. This report examines the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency for two revolutionary organizations: the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO). Between 1968 and 1993, these two organizations used terrorism against the

Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Israel, respectively, in an attempt to overthrow the democratic governments.

In previous studies, the RAF has often been compared to other European fighting communist organizations; conversely, the PLO has often been examined on its own or as one phase of the Palestinian movement. This report compares the two organizations in order to examine how differences in ideology, constituency, strategy, actions, and propaganda combine to affect the outcome of revolutionary insurgencies. Instead of focusing on the actions of the state, as many of the existing studies do, this report examines how the RAF and the PLO doomed their insurgencies through their own strategies and actions.

m ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the report writing process, I received invaluable support and guidance

from mentors, family, and friends. Special thanks to: the History Department, the Gregg

Centre, and the University of New Brunswick, for monetary support, exciting academic

and social opportunities, and the chance to be a teaching assistant; Dr. David Charters,

for chocolate, suggestions, guidance, and for following my strict schedule; Glenn

Leonard; for an excellent critique and for helping me find my way in the academic sea;

Oma and Baba, for phone calls, letters, mad money, and most importantly, loving

encouragement; Jerry and Kathy, for the love, support, and trips home you have so willing bestowed upon me during this degree, the last one, and in all my endeavours;

Christy, for movie nights, dance parties, seal slaughter stories, and being my sounding board; and Joel, for listening patiently and providing precious love and reassurance even though you often had no idea what I was talking about.

IV Table of Contents

DEDICATION ii

ABSTRACT iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv

Table of Contents v

I. Introduction 1

II. Formation and Ideology

Red Army Faction 21 Palestine Liberation Organization 30 III. The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Red Army Faction 39 IV. The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Palestine Liberation Organization 61 V. Epilogue: 1992/1993-2008 86 VI. Comparison and Analysis 90

Bibliography 99

Curriculum Vitae

v 1

Chapter One

Introduction

Terrorism has been used as a method of insurgency for thousands of years.

According to Ariel Merari, terrorism is the most basic form of insurgency and one of the

strategies most often employed by insurgents.1 What is not clear, however, is whether or not terrorism is a consistently effective strategy of insurgency. If one considers two separate terrorism-based insurgencies, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO) 2 and the Red Army Faction (RAF), it is clear that although both employed terrorism, the results differed. Although neither group accomplished their respective goals (replacing Israel with a Palestinian state or bringing about a social revolution in

Germany), the PLO came much closer to success than the RAF ever did. For example, the PLO was able to gain international recognition for its cause and the formation of the

Palestinian Authority, while the RAF was unsuccessful beyond armed robberies and extortions. The PLO and the RAF employed similar tactics of armed struggle yet their insurgencies produced different outcomes. This report will show that both insurgent groups used terrorism to publicize their cause, finance their organization, free imprisoned members, and recruit new members. However, terrorism also tarnished their image, caused public acceptance of harsh counter-measures to ensure public safety, and, in the case of the PLO, complicated relationships with host Arab states and endangered the

1 Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," In The History of Terrorism: from Antiquity to al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand, 12-42, (California: University of California Press, 2007), 12 2 Although the Palestine Liberation Organization is an umbrella organization made up of numerous groups and factions, the nature and length of this study does not allow for an in-depth discussion of the constituent groups' ideologies or experiences. The PLO will be referred to as a singular entity except when opposition within the organization is important to the argument being made or to address the actions of a single group. 2

Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Aside from publicizing the insurgents' cause and

securing the occasional tactical success, the direct benefits of terrorism were negligible

for both the PLO and the RAF.

The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Red Army Faction were chosen for

this study because of the fundamental similarities between the insurgencies. Since the

main object of this report is to consider the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of

insurgency, the two groups were initially selected because armed struggle was their major

active strategy for the greater part of their insurgency. Additional similarities allow the report to focus on the different strategies employed by two organizations and what impact these factors had on the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency. Another

similarity between the two groups is the time at which they emerged onto the world stage

(between 1968 and 1970) and were in decline (by the early 1990's). This report's analysis will focus on the period between 1968 and 1993, when the two insurgencies were most active.

Both groups were also influenced by 1960s radicalism and the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Paul Wilkinson's typology of political terrorism, the two groups also had similar revolutionary goals; they desired the overthrow of a state.3 Both target states were also governed by democratic structures. This is an important similarity, since when it comes to responding to terrorism democratic governments are constrained by a different set of rules than are authoritarian regimes.

The power of democratically elected governing bodies comes from the people and thus to maintain its power, the government must maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of its

3 Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (Hampshire: Macmillan Education Limited, 1986), 55- 57 3 population. In order to do so, the actions and reactions of the state must be seen as effective and/or 'acceptable,' or necessary to ensure safety and well-being. Absolute monarchies and dictatorships are not bound by these limits since they do not rely on popular election and thus counter-insurgency measures can be far more repressive and severe. Comparing insurgencies against democratic governments and authoritarian regimes is an entirely different topic that will not be addressed in this paper.

By examining the PLO and the RAF, which shared many features in common and used similar tactics, the study will attempt to draw some conclusions about the effectiveness of terrorism employed against democratic states. Similarly, this study will allow a greater understanding of their intriguing dissimilarities and the influence these differences had on the outcomes of the insurgencies. In addition to the conclusions regarding the individual insurgencies, the value of this study comes from the novel comparison of a European fighting communist organization (FCO) and a Middle Eastern national liberation movement. Comparing the strengths and weaknesses of these two insurgencies will provide further insight into the reasons why revolutionary terrorism succeeds and fails.4

In order to analyze the effectiveness of terrorism as strategy of insurgency, three types of literature must be analyzed: the theoretical literature on terrorism, the literature on the Red Army Faction, and the literature on the Palestine Liberation Organization. The analysis of these bodies of literature will help explain the choice of the PLO and the RAF as the main subjects of study and define the numerous terms and concepts employed in the report. This collection of primary and secondary sources will also help to

4Nicholas Berry. "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," Conflict Quarterly 3, no.l (Winter 87), 8 4 contextualize the struggles of the PLO and the RAF. The theoretical literature in particular will provide the tools to analyze the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy.

The theoretical literature can be divided into two loose categories: terrorism readers and single-issue books and articles. The readers are broad introductions of the subject, aimed at informing and explaining. The single-issue sources are intently focused on one aspect of the study of terrorism and do not provide the same breadth of explanation that the readers do. Thus, the single-issue sources require a basic understanding of terrorism prior to reading. Writing single-issue books and articles allows authors to delve more deeply into one aspect of the use of terrorism or counter- insurgency without being bogged down by surplus explanation.

After the emergence of international terrorism in 1968, there was a flurry of academic interest in terrorism as a new, intriguing field of armed struggle. The terrorism reader emerged as a way to provide basic education on the subject. This early literature was concerned with defining the subject of terrorism, and the word itself, in an attempt to understand the new international phenomenon. An excellent example of this definitional quest is Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman's Political Terrorism, published in 1988. The authors spend the first twenty-eight pages of Political Terrorism discussing problems raised by scholars in order to come up with a new 'consensus' definition. Seemingly, however, works on terrorism written after 1988 did not utilize Schmid and Jongman's

'consensus' definition; instead their writers chose or created a definition that fit the purposes of their study. Some authors have chosen to ignore the issue completely, assuming that the inducted already know its meaning. After an initial period of frenzied activity, the quest for the perfect definition died down. More recently, scholars such as Bruce Hoffman and David Charters have used a list of common characteristics to

delineate the common features of 'terrorism.' This report will use the list provided by

Bruce Hoffman in Inside Terrorism (2006) as a guideline for 'defining' terrorism.

According to Hoffman, terrorism is:

• ineluctably political in aims and motives; • violent— or, equally important, threatens violence; • designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; • conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; • and perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.5

Another subject widely addressed by the terrorism reader is that of terrorism typologies. Typologies help social scientists and historians categorize data in order to define and limit studies on terrorism. For example, in choosing the PLO and the RAF as objects of study, this report has been limited to analyzing two groups with revolutionary goals, which will allow the study to focus on the success and failure of groups within this category. By decreasing the number of major differences between the two groups studied, the report will be able to complete a more in-depth analysis of the insurgencies of the

PLO and the RAF.

A third and very popular topic addressed in the introductory reader is the challenge faced by democratic states battling terrorism. Both Grant Wardlaw's Political

Terrorism (1980) and Wilkinson's Terrorism in the Liberal State (1986) focus on this pressing issue. The impetus for these books was the threat posed by FCOs, such as the

5Bruce Hoffman. Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40 6

RAF in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy, and nationalist groups, such as the PLO in Israel, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and the Provisional Irish

Republican Army in Ireland.

A large portion of the literature on terrorism is didactic, intending to analyze and provide solutions or guidelines for dealing with the threat of terrorism. The literature focusing on the democratic response to terrorism most often fits in this category as scholars try to provide policy makers with the tools to understand and fight insurgencies more efficiently. Wardlaw's professed aim in Political Terrorism, for example, is to dissect important policy considerations in order to help liberal states combat terrorism and remain democratic.6 Discussions of appropriate and effective counter-insurgency tactics remain pertinent today, as democracies are still the target of widespread terrorism and will most likely remain so. Although they focus on democratic responses to terrorism, Wilkinson and Wardlaw's books are still intended for a somewhat uninitiated audience and therefore address the basic introductory subjects of the terrorism reader: definitions, typologies and the emergence of terrorism.

The democratic state's response to terrorism is also frequently the subject of single-issue articles. Where the terrorism reader sets out to provide a broad introduction to the subject of terrorism or democratic responses to terrorism, the single-issue literature addresses specific topics with more detail. The single-issue books and articles are often more argumentative than the broader texts, which seek to explain more than argue.

Examples of this literature include, Ronald Crelinsten's "Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Democracy: The Assessment of National Security Threats" (1989), Tom Parker's

6 Grant Wardlaw. Political Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, x "Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the

Terrorist Movements they Oppose" (2007), and Peter Chalk's "The Liberal Democratic

Response to Terrorism" (1995). Articles comparing the responses of different governments to a similar event or situation are also prevalent. For example, Menachem

Hofnung's "States of Emergency and Ethnic Conflict in Liberal Democracies: Great

Britain and Israel" (1994), and Gary Geipel's "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe

After 1970: Implications for Deterrence and Defeat of Violent Nonstate Actors" (2007).

By comparing what tactics have been employed in the past and their results, scholars and analysts hope to provide information that will help educate and equip terrorism analysts and policy makers with the tools to implement effective counter-insurgency campaigns.

In addition to studies of democratic governments' responses to terrorism, a multitude of other aspects are addressed in the single-issue literature. The relationship between terrorism and the media is one example. Often briefly addressed in terrorism readers, it is also the focus of articles and books such as Paul Wilkinson's "The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment" (1997), Alex Schmid's "Terrorism and the Media: The

Ethics of Publicity" (1989), and Brooke Barnett and Amy Reynolds Terrorism and the

Press (2009). The subject receives special attention from Susan Carruthers in The Media at War (2000). Carruthers challenges the accepted theory of 'symbiosis' - the idea that terrorism and the media have a complimentary relationship in which terrorism provides the news and the media publicizes the insurgency7 - stating that the media focus on violence often results in the political message being ignored. The public may miss the message and dismiss the violence as illegitimate and senseless. The exaggeration of this

7 Paul Wilkinson. "The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment," Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 52; Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 132 8

'senseless violence' that occurs in the media helps create a state of fear that may serve to justify harsh counter-measures in order to restore 'public safety.' Since the target and third party publics are exposed to terrorism through the media, discussions of the relationship between the media and terrorism are a frequent subject in the theoretical literature.

Another example of frequently discussed single-issue subjects is the success and decline of armed struggle movements. Martha Crenshaw's "How Terrorism Declines"

(1991) and Robert Dix's "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail" (1984) are two examples of this focus. Both of these studies will be of great interest to this report because Crenshaw and Dix's general analyses of why armed struggles succeed and decline will provide an excellent starting point for case studies on the RAF and PLO. Works on the use of terrorism as a strategy will also provide intriguing insight for this report. For example:

Nicholas Berry's "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism" (1987); Andrew Kydd and

Barbara Walter's "The Strategies of Terrorism" (2006), and; Peter Neumann and M.L.R.

Smith's The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails (2008).

Due to its largely didactic nature, a significant portion of the theoretical literature on terrorism focuses on trends and generalizations. The major influence in the theoretical literature comes from the social sciences; tracts are most often written by international relations theorists, policy analysts, and social scientists with the intent of educating and creating guidelines for governments concerned with combating terrorism. Although general studies are important, from a historical perspective there is more work to be done on individual insurgencies

Susan Carruthers. Media at War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, 190-192 9

The literature on the Red Army Faction is roughly split into two major groups: the

narrative accounts aimed at informing a general audience and the more analytical writing

aimed at scholars and government policy makers. The first group is characterized by

books such as Stefan Aust's The Baader-Meinhof Group (1985) and Jillian Becker's

Hitler's Children (1977) and the second group by pieces such as Jeremy Varon's

Bringing the War Home (2004), Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky's Europe's

Red Terrorists (1992), and numerous articles from journals such as Intelligence and

National Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Journal of Conflict Studies. The

more narrative accounts tend to focus on telling the stories of formation and decline of

the first wave of RAF terrorists, mainly the 1960s and 1970s. The analytical books and

articles focus on a wide range of issues, they are often more didactic in nature, and the

subject matter tends to be more directly influenced by contemporary world events and circumstances.

There is little debate in the narrative sources, since they present histories of the group with little analysis. The main debates in the analytical literature are: the effect of the fall of communism on the RAF, the 'cooperation' between the RAF and the German

Democratic Republic (GDR), and the 1992 ceasefire's potential for lasting success. These analytical pieces were inspired by global developments, mainly the collapse of the Soviet

Bloc and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the late 1940s, the world was divided into capitalist and communist camps and with the breakdown of this structure a re-evaluation of global politics took place. The literature written in the early

1990s reflects this re-evaluation, as authors sought to predict the effect that the fall of

European communism would have on the RAF. 10

Before the collapse of European communism, a debate raged over the question of whether the East German security services were supporting the RAF. When the Iron

Curtain fell and Communist Party branches and organizations crumbled information became available that proved there had been close cooperation. For example, after the collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) evidence proving the extent of cooperation between the RAF and the Ministry of State Security was found in the

Ministry of State Security archives and emerged during trials of former Stasi officers.

John Schmeidel utilized the secret documents and court materials to publish "My

Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany's Red Army

Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security" in 1993.9 The new information silenced the debate, reflecting the importance of availability of sources and the benefit of hindsight.

The fruitless debates over the future of the RAF and the 1992 ceasefire's potential for lasting success are products of the early publication dates of works such as Richard

Clutterbuck's Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe after 1992 (1990) and Hans Josef

Horchem's "The Decline of the Red Army Faction" (1991). Published mainly between

1991 and 1993, the articles analyze political climate and attempt to predict the future.

Authors writing after 1998, for example, would know that the RAF had disbanded and that the ceasefire had lasted.

Only two publications on the RAF have appeared in English after the early 1990s:

Garrett O'Boyle's "Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four

9 John Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany's Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security." Intelligence and National Security 8, no.4 (1993), 60-61& 67 11

Groups," published in 2002 and Jeremy Varon's Bringing the War Home, published in

2004. Bringing the War Home is the most complete work on the RAF as it is the only book that looks at the entire history of the group, from its origins to its disbandment.

Varon's book does not offer any shocking new conclusions but it confirms work done in the early 1990s based on newly available documents and is the most complete source available. However, a few gaps still remain in the account. For example, the period between 1992 and 1998 is discussed sparingly. This is disappointing since there is seemingly no literature in the English language historiography of the RAF that addresses this time period. Since they did not fully disband until 1998, the history of the RAF after the tentative ceasefire up until 1998 remains relevant. Although in some ways disappointing, Bringing the War Home is still the most comprehensive history of the

RAF.

Two unique sources deserve special mention; Michael Haynes' doctoral thesis

German Cultural Responses to the Red Army Faction (1988) and Joanne Wright's

Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968-1986

(1991). Haynes' work provides an interesting perspective on the cultural responses of the

German public to six artistic media representations of the RAF. In her book, Joanne

Wright looks at how the German public responded to the RAF's propaganda and whether they remained 'uncommitted,' became 'sympathetic,' or even 'active' audiences. The uncommitted audience condemned the RAF's violence and was uninterested in their motives, whereas the sympathetic audience was curious as to the RAF's motivations, may have felt they understood or agreed with them, or possibly disapproved of the government actions towards them. The sympathetic audience was the most varied of the 12 three and included supporters, in addition to sympathizers.10 In this report, the term

'sympathy' will be used to describe passive understanding, agreement, or compassion for the RAF's objectives or circumstances. The term 'support' will be used to describe active participation in the 'revolution' through any number of activities, such as demonstrations, disseminating propaganda, or providing shelter for the active RAF members. It must be stressed that both of these groups may not have been committed to the RAF's strategic objective but may only have felt compassion for the government's allegedly 'rough' treatment of RAF members. The active audience was comprised of those who were committed to the overthrow of the German state and were prepared to commit violence in order to achieve their objective. The value of both of Wright's and Haynes' works lies in their ability to shed light on the German people's reactions to the RAF or artistic representations of the RAF.

In addition to a lack of recent English-language publications on the RAF, there is also an imbalance of research on the different phases of the group, with an unjustified focus on the founding members to the detriment of the rest of the RAF's history. The infamy of the founding members of the RAF has led to an overwhelming interest in the first wave. For example, the film Der Baader Meinhof Komplex detailing the racy lives of the original leadership was released in Germany in 2008. Based on public interest, the initial leadership of the RAF has received more scholarly attention than the later periods, resulting in uneven coverage of the second and third waves. This uneven coverage does not reflect the severity of the insurgent challenge; the RAF remained dangerous well into the 1980s, striking American and NATO military bases in the FRG as well as

10 Joanne Wright. Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968-86. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 77 13 businessmen and diplomats.11 Other than a brief resurgence of interest in the early 1990s, as historians and analysts considered the implications of the collapse of the communist system in Europe, the coverage of the second and third waves of RAF leadership remains sparse.

In summary, the historiography of the RAF is patchy. While some areas, such as the initial period of 1968-1977 are fairly well covered, the later periods are less thoroughly addressed or ignored completely. The debates within the literature are fairly undeveloped and most of the disputes stem from either a lack of sources or the proximity of the publication date to the time being studied. Although there seems to be a wealth of literature in German, based on sources sited in the bibliographies, the English language literature is lacking. Considering the renown of the RAF, the historiography is sadly erratic.

Due to the longevity of the organization and its exaggerated influence in Middle

Eastern and global politics, the PLO has received a lot of scholarly attention. A large portion of this attention has focused on the politics of the organization. The social services and state-like activities of the PLO, for example, also receive some attention although decidedly less than the political workings of the PLO. The use of terrorism and armed struggle are also frequent topics of study, although they do not receive the same amount of attention as they do in the RAF literature. Where terrorism is the main focus of a large portion of the RAF literature, the PLO literature is more tempered, reflecting the more comprehensive struggle, the larger and more diverse organizational structure and the greater extent of non-violent political and social action. There is also interest in the

11 Henry Degenhardt. Revolutionary and Dissident Movements. (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1988), 130- 131 14 ongoing Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the creation of the Palestine Authority. As a result of the diverse foci of the literature on the PLO, the literature tends to be more descriptive and less argumentative than the RAF equivalent.

In the 1960s and 1970s, armed struggle was extraordinarily important to the

Palestinian insurgency. In the 1968 PLO Charter, armed struggle was identified as the

"overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase."12 It is difficult to discuss the internal and external politics of the PLO without an understanding of the organization's use of guerrilla warfare and terrorism and the impact these actions have had on its relations.

Armed struggle is broadly covered in the political analyses of Abdallah Frangi's The

PLO and Palestine (1983), Jillian Becker's The PLO (1984), Barry Rubin's Revolution until Victoiy (1989), and Helena Cobban's The Palestinian Liberation Organization

(1984). Palestinian terrorism has also engendered analytical studies similar to those centered on the RAF, many of which focus on the Israeli response to Palestinian terrorism. Two examples of this literature are Victor Vine and Barbara Salert's "Does a

Coercive Official Response Deter Terrorism? The Case of the PLO," (1996) and Noemi

Gal-Or's "Countering Terrorism in Israel," (1994). The analytical literature on the

German and Israeli responses will provide an interesting comparison of the different counter-insurgency methods employed by each government and their results.

As previously mentioned, the literature on the PLO focuses primarily on the political makeup and activities of the organization. The politics are often divided into three main divisions: internal or organizational politics, Middle Eastern politics, and international politics. Some sources may look at one of the three aspects in more detail,

12 "The Palestinian National Charter." Conflict Studies 7, no. 18 (1998), Article 9 15

for example The PLO: The Struggle Within (1988) by Alain Gresh or The International

Relations of the PLO (1989) edited by Augustus Norton and Martin Greenberg, but the

authors cannot avoid discussing all three political levels since they are inextricably

intertwined.

The internal politics of the PLO are complicated. Throughout its turbulent history, the PLO has been plagued with organizational problems, in part because of its pluralism.13 Composed of at least eight resistance groups, in addition to numerous student groups and unions, PLO diplomacy begins within its own organization. Gresh's The

PLO: The Struggle Within is an in-depth study of the conflicts within the PLO but it does not contain a detailed description of the positions of the different groups. Indeed, that is one of the subjects poorly covered by English-language publications. In the existing literature there is a focus on Fatah under Arafat's leadership to the detriment of the other groups. In Cobban's The Palestinian Liberation Organization, for example, the PLO and

Fatah dominate the first six chapters and the 'non-Fatah' groups are relegated to chapter seven. Rubin's Revolution until Victory and Becker's The PLO put similar emphasis on

Fatah. Although it makes sense that Fatah would be a major focus, since as Aaron Miller says in The PLO and the Politics of Survival (1983), "the history of the PLO is very much a story of Fatah's efforts to dominate and unify the resistance movement,"14 it remains important to have a firm understanding of the many groups that contribute to the policy decisions of the PLO.

13 Aaron David Miller. "The PLO and the Politics of Survival," The Washington Papers 99, volume XI, 1983, viii 14 Ibid., 43 16

Although the ideology and formation of the PLO constituent groups may not be the subject of regular discussion, their influence on the balance of power and policy decisions made by the PLO receives more attention. All 267 pages of Gresh's The PLO: the Struggle Within concentrate on the constant manoeuvring within the PLO. Even though Fatah was the largest group in the PLO, the other factions had a lot of power, perhaps more than they might otherwise since the PLO worked to create a diplomatic image and avoid fragmentation, which necessitated making concessions to the smaller factions. The capability of the smaller groups to maintain operational and ideological autonomy from the PLO put the organization in a number of dangerous situations, especially in regard to the factions' actions towards the PLO's host Arab states.15

Politics within the Arab world and their effect on the Palestinian insurgency is the subject of frequent study in books on the PLO. In The PLO and the Politics of Survival,

Miller questions how the PLO hopes to establish an independent state since the Arab states on which it depends are inclined to put their own national interests above those of the Palestinians. Whether they devote a section or chapter to Arab-Palestinian relations,

(Norton and Greenberg, and Cobban), or follow a chronological scheme (Frangi and

Becker), inter-Arab relations are impossible to ignore when discussing the PLO. The

1968 PLO Charter stated that the PLO would not interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states, but based on the differing ideologies of the factions and the inability of Fatah to control them, clashes were seemingly unavoidable. In Revolution Until Victory, Rubin explains that it was the actions of the smaller factions, and in particular the PFLP, that set

15 Barry Rubin. Revolution until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO. (Cambridge: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), 32 16 "The Palestinian National Charter," Article 27 17 the Jordanian Black September into motion in 1970.17 Being expelled from Jordan in

1970 and from Lebanon in 1982 were undoubtedly the most detrimental consequences of meddling in local affairs since the expulsions separated the PLO from their constituency by a substantial distance. Similarly, Middle Eastern conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq War or the First Gulf War also posed problems for the PLO. As the Arab states fell in behind

Iran or Iraq, the PLO's difficult position worsened, since they relied on the support, funding, and territory of the Arab states.

The example of the First Gulf War demonstrates how PLO relations within the

Middle East affected its international fortunes. By siding with Iraq against the US-led invasion of Kuwait, the PLO damaged their relationship with the United States. As a result of the decision to support Iraq, as Allon Groth points out in The PLO's Road to

Peace: Processes of Decision-Making (1995), the PLO was excluded from the Madrid

Peace Conference in favour of delegates from within the Occupied Territories.18 The

Israeli and American delegations soon discovered that the peace conference was not making headway because of the PLO's absence; the secret negotiations that took place in

Oslo the following year were far more successful thanks to the willingness of the new

Israeli President to deal with the PLO and the organization's participation in the talks.19

The international relations of the PLO are also a frequent topic of study. From early on, the PLO had an international outlook. Received at the UN in 1974 and granted observer status soon after, by the end of the 1970s the PLO had managed to establish formal diplomatic relations with eighty-six countries, which was more than the seventy-

17 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 35 l8Allon Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace: Processes of Decision-Making." Whitehall Papers 33, 1995, 24- 27 19 The Oslo Accords will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 18 two that had formally recognized Israel.20 Hopes for Israeli-Palestinian peace were also based on international cooperation and supervision, with the United States and the

USSR/Russia as the main mediators. In The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From

Oslo to al-Aqsa (2005), Nigel Parsons underlines the importance of international support; although many considered the PLO to be the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the organization was powerless to force itself upon negotiations. Due to its precarious position, the international relations of the PLO are very important as the abundant literature on the subject suggests.

In addition to the vast literature on the political relations of the PLO, the infrastructure of the organization, and the place of the PLO in the Palestinian national movement have received some study as well. An excellent example of the literature on the infrastructure of the PLO is Cheryl Rubenberg's The Palestinian Liberation

Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure (1983). Studies like Rubenberg's help to round out the literature on the PLO by providing details about health and education services, unions, students groups, economic infrastructure, and cultural education that the

PLO organized for Palestinians. Books such as Rubenberg's allow the reader to understand the complexity of the PLO behind the politics and armed struggle. She concludes that "the military activities of the PLO pale in magnitude, sophistication, and complexity in comparison with its civilian activities," yet the literature does not reflect this state of affairs, as Rubenberg's book is one of the few in-depth sources on the

'civilian' side of the PLO. Terrorism, not civilian infrastructure, was responsible for

20 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 47; Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 70 21 Cheryl Rubenberg. The Palestine Liberation Organization, its Institutional Infrastructure. Belmont, Mass: Institute of Arab Studies, 1983, 59 19

attracting media attention to the Palestinian cause and, partially as a result, it also

attracted the greatest academic interest.

Helga Baumgarten's "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-

2000," (2005) details another important yet often ignored subject. In her article,

Baumgarten describes and analyzes the ideologies and impact of the Movement of Arab

Nationalists, the PLO, and Hamas,22 as part of the evolution of the Palestinian nationalist movement. The PLO has received a lot of scholarly attention, as the copious number of books on the subject proves, yet Baumgarten's article is one of the few that places the organization within the context of the Palestinian movement.

The historiography of the PLO is more comprehensive than that of the RAF equivalent, although a number of underdeveloped areas remain. The literature is intensely focused on the internal and external politics of the organization, while the infrastructure and social services organized by the PLO have been neglected. The most recent period of

PLO history, from 1993 on, has also been insufficiently covered, as Hamas and the politics within the Occupied Territories have captured authors' attention. While there are some areas that do not receive enough attention, politics and armed struggle are frequent topics of study, which will be useful for this report.

While both the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Red Army Faction used similar methods of armed struggle, they achieved remarkably different outcomes. Their major differences are also reflected in the historiographies of the two groups. The

The radical, Islamic, Palestinian, nationalist group Hamas is an important player in the ongoing Palestinian insurgency. Hamas will only be mentioned briefly in this report; for more information see: Matthew Levitt. Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2006), and Jeroen Gunning. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 20 literature on the RAF is focused on the internal relationship of the group, their acts of terrorism and their political communiques. The literature on the PLO covers the same subjects in addition to covering the local and international politics of the PLO, its state­ like infrastructure, the peace process, and the creation of the Palestine Authority. The theoretical literature mainly focuses on the democratic state response to terrorism and creating theories on how insurgent groups expand, decline, and function in an attempt to provide didactic analyses. This report will explore the history behind the theoretical generalizations by comparing the PLO and the RAF using both the theoretical and subject literature.

The report is organized into five chapters. The first chapter includes an introduction to the report and a breakdown of the historiography of the PLO, the RAF, and the theoretical literature on terrorism. The second chapter presents a brief history of the organizations' roots and the development of their ideologies and strategies. The problems with their ideologies and strategies will be discussed in chapters three, four, and five. Specifically, chapter three addresses the Red Army Faction's experience with terrorism and chapter four is devoted to a similar analysis of the Palestine Liberation

Organization. A brief epilogue follows chapter four, providing a concise description of the German and Palestinian insurgencies between 1993 and 2006. Lastly, chapter five compares the two insurgencies' experiences with terrorism and the reasons for the failure of the Red Army Faction and the partial successes of the Palestine Liberation

Organization. 21

Chapter Two

Formation and Ideology

Red Army Faction

The RAF was a fighting communist organization whose strategic objective was to

destroy the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in order to institute a socialist state.

Unlike the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Red Army Faction was not an ethnic national liberation movement, although they considered themselves 'liberators' of

German society. In Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional

IRA, 1968-86, Joanne Wright calls the RAF a "forward-looking group" since they were not trying to recreate a previously existing Germany, but to create a new and 'better'

Germany. Wright identifies the revolutionary group's three historical origins as: the radical critique of West German society, the lack of parliamentary representation of the

German left, and the student protest movement.

The Federal Republic of Germany came into existence on May 23, 1949 when

Britain, France, and the United States merged their sections of conquered Germany. The new Germany was designed to be a democratic nation with a constitution, a parliament, and a decentralized federal governing system. The strong system of checks and balances was essential to preventing the possibility of another Weimar/Hitler experience.24 The

Allied powers carried out de-Nazification programs but many Germans who had held less

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 21, 68 24 William I. Hitchcock. The Struggle for Europe: the Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present. (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 30-35 22 senior posts under the Third Reich kept their positions. Although Germans were occasionally faced with reminders of their Nazi past, such as the "Auschwitz Trials," these public reflections did not often turn into private family discussions where parents shared their experiences with their children. The generation that matured in the 1960s encountered a society in which many former Nazis, including university professors, still held important positions. Students encountered the strict, authoritarian German university system, which had not liberalized despite the widespread democratization of

German society and politics, and were severely disappointed by the universities' top- down governance structure. The anti-establishment culture of the 1960s was amplified in

West Germany where the 'burden of Fascism,' as Peter Fritzsche describes the "residues of fascist attitudes... defensive attitudes about a past one has not come to terms with... and a pattern of perception that suspects fascism whenever democracy reveals its inadequacies," was particularly strong.26

In addition to its fascist past, Germany was also faced with a strong American presence. After the Second World War, the United States had tried to create West

Germany in its own political, economic, and social image. In many ways the American plan succeeded and the new Germany based its identity on "its striking prosperity... its staunch opposition to communism; and its adoption of Western-style democracy." The

US saw West Germany as the first line of defence against the communist threat and as such, they deployed a strong military presence and cultivated an alliance with West

25 "As of 1965, fully 60 percent of West German military officers had fought for the Nazis, and al least two-thirds of judges had served the Third Reich." Jeremy Varon. Bringing the War Home: the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies. (Berkley: University of California Press, 2004), 33 26 Peter Fritzsche. "Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the '68 Movement or 'Burden of Fascism'?" Terrorism and Political Violence 1, no. 4 (October 1989), 467 27 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 31 23

Germany. As a result of this relationship, Germany became a member of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955 and began to rearm itself.28 This alarmed

some Germans who saw the rearmament as a return to fascism, in addition to those who

despised the American influence and presence in West Germany. Critiques of West

German society from students, intellectuals, and those on the political left, consisted of

issues such as the American presence in Germany, Germany's rearmament and participation in NATO, West Germany's staunch anti-communist attitude, and the unaddressed burden of the fascist past.

In 1959, the Social Democrats (SPD)30 adopted the Godesberg Programme, which accepted the new socio-economic base of the Republic and Adenauer's foreign policy, in order to bring itself closer to the center of German politics.31 The SPD's

student organization, the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), found itself at odds with its more conservative parent organization and in 1961 the SPD excluded all members of the SDS from the party. This allowed the SDS to push for more radical programs and take a leading role in the extra-parliamentary opposition movement

(APO).32 In 1966, the SPD 'betrayed' the Left again by forming a coalition government with the Christian Democrats.33 The remainder of the Left felt under-represented in

Varon. Bringing the War Home, 6, 31 29 Konrad Jarausch. After Hitler: Recivilizing Germany, 1945-1995. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 128; Fritzsche. "Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy," 467; Varon. Bringing the War Home, 6 30 The German Communist Party was banned in 1956 for allegedly threatening the principles of the constitution leaving the SPD as the main left-leaning party in the Bundestag. Varon. Bringing the War Home, 31 31 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 24 32 The extra-parliamentary opposition movement rested on the belief that the existing parliamentary parties were unable to effect significant changes or to "defend the allegedly weakened constitution against the process of 'fascization.'" Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 24 33 Wolff-Dietrich Webler. "The Sixties and the Seventies: Aspects of Student Activism in West Germany," Higher Education 9, no.2 (March 1980), 155 parliament and was dismayed by the coalition's dominant 90% control of parliament.

The coalition fed the growing leftist extra-parliamentary opposition movement comprised of student and peace groups, certain trade unions, and sections of the intelligentsia.35 The

APO was against West German rearmament, the basing of nuclear weapons in Germany, and the passing of the "Emergency Laws," which would "permit the curtailment of democratic rights in times of crisis." To the APO, these actions imperilled West

German security and impaired its sovereignty.37

The German anti-authoritarian student movement developed alongside the APO in the spirit of the New Left. The student movement lasted from 1965 to 1969 and was based on a "fundamental critique of West German society, its international position amongst the countries of advanced capitalism, its internal social structures and, in particular, its media, universities and schools."38 The Vietnam War was also a major motivating factor in the movement as German students reacted to the disparity between

American teachings about democracy and their 'imperial' behaviour in Vietnam. The

United States had a "constitutive role" in forming the FRG and post-war German society;

West German youth were particularly concerned by American actions abroad because the mentor state's action recalled the 'genocide' in the recent German past and reflected poorly on the American-influenced FRG.39 The student movement was also concerned with the state of university education, student representation, and student housing, which

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 25 35 Rob Burns and Wilfried van der Will. Protest and Democracy in West Germany: Extra-Parliamentary Opposition and the Democratic Agenda. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 11 36 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 31 37 Ibid., 31 38 Burns and Van der Will. Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 99 39 Timothy Brown. "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study of Transnational History," American Historical Review 14, no.l (February 2009), 77 25

it protested regularly among the other highlighted issues. Protests increased in potency

and frequency in 1968, particularly after the police shooting of Benno Ohnesorg on June

2, 1968.40 After a brief period of intensity, including violent street battles with police, the

formerly unified movement slowly disintegrated into smaller single-issue groups.41 As

German universities granted the reforms that the students demanded, the majority of

student activists were placated and the protest movement gradually lost its momentum.42

In 1970, the SDS formally dissolved itself into a number of smaller groups as well;

sectarianism characterized the subsequent student movement. Similarly, the APO lost

steam in 1969 when the Christian Democrats/Social Democrats coalition dissolved.43

Even though the students had failed to rally the public or even the majority of the workers and had largely abandoned the protest movement, a small group of activists remained committed to change. They rejected protests and demonstrations, however, in favour of violence and terror.44 Andreas Baader and his girlfriend Gudrun Ensslin were among this group of disillusioned protesters. Along with two others, they set fire to department stores in Frankfurt on April 2, 1968 in "protest against indifference toward the [Vietnam] War" and "monopoly capitalism."45 The act brought together the eventual leadership of the first wave RAF: Baader and Ensslin; Horst Mahler (Baader's defence

It has recently come to light, through an examination of German Democratic Republic Ministry of Security Services documents, that Karl-Heinz Kurras, the police officer who 'accidentally' shot and killed Ohnesorg, was actually an East German secret agent. There is no evidence in his file that indicates the shooting was an assignment; Kurras' motivation for killing Benno Ohnesorg remains unclear. Helmut Miiller-Enbergs, and Cornelia Jabs. "Der 2. Juni 1967 und die Staatssicherheit," Der Spiegel, May 27 2009. http://www.bpb.de/themen/EIRZV5.html (accessed July 11, 2009). 41 Brown. "'1968' East and West," 83 42 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 228; Jillian Becker. Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1977), 15 43 Burns and Van der Will. Protest and Democracy in West Germany, 99, 115 44 Hitchcock. The Struggle for Europe, " 256-257 45 Tom Vague. Televisionaries: the Red Army Faction Story 1963-1993. (Edinburgh; San Francisco: AK Press, 1994), 11; Varon. Bringing the War Home, 42 26 lawyer); and journalist Ulrike Meinhof, who defended the act in her column in the radical magazine Konkret. On May 14, 1970, while serving time for the attack, Baader was freed by three women, one of whom was Meinhof.46 They went into hiding and began developing their ideology and tactics.

Although sometimes referred to as the Baader-Meinhof Group/Gang, the group formally named themselves the Red Army Faction, after the Japanese Red Army, a violent leftist organization whom Horst Mahler admired.47 The name was also provocative because it alluded to the British Royal Air Force (also RAF) that had bombed

Germany during World War Two and to the Soviet Red Army that was Germany's archenemy.48 While fine-tuning their ideology and strategy, the RAF carried out bank robberies in order to finance their struggle, as well as to pay for 'necessities,' such as military training at a Fatah training camp in Jordan. Between April 1971 and November

1972, the RAF released three publications written by Meinhof and Mahler detailing the group's ideology.49 The RAF also disseminated communiques after each attack, explaining their motives, objectives, and choice of target.50 Ideological motivations were very important to the RAF, since the basis of their revolutionary fervour came from the writings of communist theoreticians and philosophers.

The RAF's 'revolution' was based on a rejection of the "capitalist, imperialist, exploitative, fascist, and repressive" world order.51 The RAF considered the Federal

Republic of Germany, or more specifically "the domestic establishment and domestic

46 Hans Josef Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," Conflict Studies, 46 (1974), 1-2 47 Becker. Hitler's Children, 14 48 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 65 49 Hans Josef Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists,"6 50 Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations. (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 56 51 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 39 27

capitalism," its primary enemy.52 The United States was also identified as a major

ideological target, and Israel and NATO were likewise seen as exploitive and repressive

imperialist entities. The RAF's strategic objective was to overthrow the FRG, for the

aforementioned reasons, and replace it with a vaguely defined proletarian dictatorship.

The RAF's ideology was more destructive than constructive; the focus was on ridding the

world of'fascist' Germany and all other 'enemies,' and plans for the ensuing 'new

Germany' were of secondary importance, as they often are for revolutionary

movements.54 Geoffrey Pridham, professor of European Politics, aptly describes the

RAF's ideology as "largely negative, certainly Utopian and very much second hand."55

In Terrorist Propaganda, Wright identifies the major influences on the group's

'second hand' ideology. Members of the RAF were well versed in communist theory, as

an analysis of their ideology demonstrates. They were also adept at interpreting,

selecting, and combining ideological elements from other revolutionaries and philosophers in a way that portrayed the RAF's struggle as moral and just. This also meant ignoring theories or parts of theories that did not fit their vision. For example,

Marx and Engels provided the basic articulation of modern socialism; however the nineteenth century working class Marx and Engels had identified as the revolutionary vanguard had changed dramatically by the 1970s. The German 'working class' had become middle class bourgeoisie and was uninterested in revolution. Marx and Engels also stated that revolution cannot be created if the conditions are not ripe within a society, although the RAF did not believe this. The RAF considered themselves to be the

52 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 39 53 Ibid., 39 54 Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 55 55 Geoffrey Pridham, as quoted in Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 38 28

equivalent of Lenin's vanguard and admired Mao's 'voluntarism,' which called for the

adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese (local) conditions. From Guevara and the

example of Cuba, the RAF adopted the belief that guerrilla groups can help focus popular

discontent against the government and create mass uprising. Consistent with this theory

was the idea that revolution could be created even in unfavourable circumstances.

According to modern revolutionaries Mao and Guevara, however, guerrilla

warfare was best carried out in the country-side, a problem in urbanized Germany. The

RAF solved this problem by focusing on certain aspects of Brazilian guerrilla Carlos

Marighella's Urban Guerrilla Warfare. Marighella emphasized the importance of the

'urban guerrilla,' organized into small 'firing groups,' whose major tactics involve

assassinations and the use of bombs and propaganda to provoke a repressive state response. Marighella was also confident that these 'firing groups' could not be defeated, due to their small size, scattered nature and the support that they would get from the population, another idea adopted by the RAF. Ultimately, the RAF believed Marighella's theory that a repressive state response to the 'firing groups' would provoke a popular uprising.56 In these theories the RAF found inspiration, yet since there was no 'land hunger' or blatant government oppression, a new justification for the use of violence had to be found.

This new analysis was provided by philosophers Herbert Marcuse, Jean-Paul

Sartre, and Frantz Fanon. Marcuse believed that the proletariat had become too attached to capitalism and would no longer be the main thrust of revolution. The push would have

56 Carlos Marighella. "Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla," reprinted as an appendix to Robert Moss, "Urban Guerrilla Warfare," Adelphi Paper 79, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), 24, 36, 40 29 to come from the technical and professional classes and, in particular, the students. He argued that because students were not fully integrated into capitalist society they were best suited to recognize the situation, educate the people, and lead the revolution.

Marcuse philosophized that the only way to defeat globalised capitalism was for revolutionary forces in industrial societies and the Third World to ally themselves.57

Guevara had also expressed the view that the greatest contribution that Western radicals could make would be to bring the war for socialism home to their countries, or to "create

CO two, three, many Vietnams." In order to justify the violence that was part of their strategy, the RAF turned to Sartre. According to the French philosopher, man is inherently violent and therefore revolution without violence is meaningless. In addition, both Sartre and Fanon wrote that anti-colonial violence had a humanizing effect that was essential in human development. Thus, in a racist colonial context, violence against the colonizer restores the dignity of the colonized and destroys the repressive relationship.59

In the RAF's analysis, the United States, and Germany by extension, was the 'colonizer' and violence against them was justified by Sartre and Fanon's philosophies. When the

RAF added Marcuse's re-evaluation of liberal democracies, resulting in the importance of students and the need to bring the struggles of the Third World to industrial society, the framework of the RAF ideology was complete.

In summary, then, the RAF's strategic objective was to overthrow the West

German state in order to institute a 'dictatorship of the proletariat,' a vaguely defined socialist state. Their strategy was to provoke repressive state measures in order to

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 50 'Varon. Bringing the War Home, 1 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 51 'unmask the coercive and oppressive nature of the German state, at which point the

masses would rise up and revolt. In order to provoke the state, the RAF would use

terrorism or the revolutionaries' preferred idiom, 'urban guerrilla warfare.'60 Due to the

weakness of the broader Left, revolutionary violence was considered the only means

available to further the cause. Terrorism was also ideal because the RAF was too small to

launch true guerrilla actions, which were not suited to West Germany anyway.61 It also

allowed the RAF to choose their targets precisely, which was crucial since they were

selected in order to send specific ideological messages. For the RAF, a campaign of

terrorism was a just and acceptable strategy since "certain contexts require the necessary

and regrettable use of violence that results in death in order to achieve a situation that is

of great benefit to the majority."62

Palestine Liberation Organization

When the Ottoman Empire surrendered in 1918, Great Britain and France divided much of the former Empire between them, including the region of Palestine. From the beginning, the British mandate63 of Palestine was fraught with conflict. As early as 1920,

Palestinian Arabs carried out violent anti-Jewish riots in response to Zionist plans for the eventual creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and Britain's seeming acceptance of this

60 Garret O'Boyle. "Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups," Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no.2 (Summer 2002), 32 61 Hans Josef Horchem estimates the hardcore members in 1970 numbered about seventeen and throughout the insurgency, the number hovered between fifteen and twenty. Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," 4; Hans Josef Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no.2 (1991), 66 62 O'Boyle. "Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups," 34 63 After World War One, the mandate system of the League of Nations entrusted established countries with trusteeships of countries formerly part of vanquished empires. Great Britain was responsible for the Palestinian mandate. 31 outcome. Tensions continued to mount, and in 1936 Palestinian Arabs revolted in protest against Jewish immigration, land sales to Jews, and in an attempt to gain national independence for Palestine. The British finally quelled the Arab revolt in 1939, decimating the leadership of the Palestinian movement for years to come.64

Facing a severe economic crisis after World War Two and a persistent and costly

Jewish insurgency in Palestine, the British re-evaluated their stance towards the

Palestinian Mandate. After considering the financial burden of the mandate,65 as well as their recent decision to grant Indian independence, Great Britain put the question to the

United Nations. The UN voted in favour of the partition of Palestine into Jewish and

Arab states in November 1947. The British announced that they would no longer "be responsible for governing Palestine" and by May 15, 1948, the British had left.66

As the British prepared to leave, conflict flared between Jewish and Arab

Palestinians, since neither community was willing to accept the United Nations' proposed partition plan. On May 15, when the Zionist Provisional State Council declared Israel's independence Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon attacked the new country. The attacking forces were hampered by the conflicting agendas of their leaders, however, and the Israelis managed to expand their control to 78% of mandate Palestine. The Palestinian population was unable to muster a substantial fighting force of their own since the population was largely leader less during the 1947-1948 war. The war created

Yazid Yusuf Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State: the Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 2 65 The British government spent approximately £20,000,000 in Palestine between 1945 and 1948 on internal policing and compensation for damages caused by terrorist attacks alone. David Charters. The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945-194 7. (London: Macmillan, 1989), Appendix III, IV 66 Tom Segev. One Palestine, Complete. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 495 32 approximately 800,000 Palestinian refugees and was called al-nakba, the catastrophe, by

Arabs.67

Nationalist Palestinian opposition to Israel organized slowly after 1948, since the social, economic, and territorial basis for Palestinian nationalism was scattered

/TO throughout the Middle East and beyond. Fifteen years after al-nakba, the First Arab

Summit founded the Palestine Liberation Organization to aid in "organizing the

Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and their self-determination."69Ahmed Shuqairy, a veteran Palestinian diplomat, was put in charge of planning the organization and creating support for the Palestinian movement.

At the PLO's founding conference, the Palestinian National Charter and the Basic

Constitution were adopted.70 Although the PLO was primarily a political organization, it developed an institutional infrastructure with schools, hospitals, research centers, and social services to help Palestinians in exile and to solidify a common sense of identity.

This infrastructure would shift, crumble, and be revitalized as the leadership of the PLO was forced to relocate. The PLO's first five years of existence were full of modifying and restructuring as the organization was shaped by internal and external conflict.

The mid-to-late 1960s were a crucial time of ideological and organizational development within the Palestinian movement. The greatest influence was undoubtedly the June 1967 Six Day War, which drastically changed the Arab-Israeli relationship. Over six days, the Israeli Defence Forces defeated the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armies

Segev. One Palestine, Complete, 3-4 68 Ibid., 10 69 Helena Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 28-29 70 Ibid., 30 33

and captured the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, bringing more

Palestinians under Israeli control and creating an estimated 323,000 additional Palestinian

refugees.71 The swift Arab defeat and Israeli territorial gains forced the Palestinians to

rethink their strategy. The initial plan of inciting an Arab-Israeli war in the hopes of an

Arab victory had failed abysmally. The Six Day War proved that the Arab states were no

match for an Israel backed by 'Western Imperialism.' After the Six Day War, the

Palestinians realized that Israel would not be easily defeated by conventional Arab

armies, and tactics shifted towards unconventional combat, including guerrilla warfare,

like the Viet Cong were waging against the United States in Vietnam, and terrorism.72

One of the major proponents of armed struggle was Fatah, a Palestinian resistance

group formed in October 1959. Their main strategy was based on the execution of

guerrilla actions against Israel that were meant to gradually gain momentum and

eventually lead to a popular uprising.74 Fatah launched its first guerrilla attack against

Israel on January 1, 1965 and continued its hit and run attacks for the next two years.

After the 1967 war, Fatah was concerned that the Arab countries would accept peace in return for captured Palestinian land, which they would then incorporate into their own

states. In order to forestall this outcome, Fatah launched a two-pronged approach, focusing on military activities against Israel from the Occupied Territories and increasing its political activities with and within the Arab states. Although their attempt at organizing an armed popular uprising in the Occupied Territories failed, Fatah's efforts

71 Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 36 72 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 13, 15 73 Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 23 74 A. Yaniv. P.L. O. (Palestine Liberation Organization): A Profile. (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Study Group for Middle Eastern Affairs, August 1974), 18 34 there and elsewhere were admired by Palestinians and Arabs. In particular, the Arab propaganda that came out of the March 21, 1968 battle at Karameh, Jordan propelled fedayeen (commando)75 popularity to new heights. Pro-Palestinian propaganda boasted of victory, claiming that 300 Fatah guerrillas had held off an estimated 15,000 Israeli

soldiers.76 The truth of the matter was that Jordanian troops had fought with the fedayeen and that the Arabs had been firmly defeated by the Israelis. The importance of the

Palestinian performance at Karameh, however, was their decision to stand their ground and inflict damage upon their numerically and militarily superior opponents. Compared to the Arab defeat and humiliation at the previous year's Six Day War, the fedayeen

'victory' gave the Palestinian guerrillas enormous prestige and showed the comparative vitality of their insurgency to the feeble Arab effort.77

Soon after the PLO's creation in 1964, disputes and splits emerged among the

PLO leadership and, in particular, doubts about Shuqairy. Shuqairy's leadership of the

PLO was also being questioned by Arabs, Palestinians, and guerrilla organizations, including Fatah, who were concerned that the Arab states wanted to control the PLO for their own purposes. In late 1967, after many calls for his resignation, Shuqairy finally resigned. When the Fourth Palestinian National Council (PNC) convened in July 1968,

Palestinian commando groups led by Fatah received thirty-eight of one hundred seats.

Although thirty other seats were divided between the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP), Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), and the Popular Liberation Forces

(PLF), the Fatah-led coalition remained the largest block. At the Fifth PNC in February

' Hoffman. "Terrorism in History," 16 ' Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 33-37,42 'Bruce Hoffman. "Terrorism in History," Journal of Conflict Studies 27, no.2 (Winter 2007), 18-21 35

1969, Fatah used its numerical strength to impose its choice of Chairman, its own Yasir

Arafat. Arafat and Fatah's domination of the PLO lasted for many decades and shaped the face of the secular phase of the Palestinian movement.78

The 1967 Six Day War and the Fourth and Fifth PNCs changed the strategic focus of the Palestinian movement. Prior to the Six Day War, pan-Arab nationalism had been the dominant force in Palestinian politics; however, Pan-Arabism had been defeated along with the Arab armies. Fatah's Palestinian focus and record of armed opposition to

Israel helped reawaken Palestinian national identity. The new focus on Palestinian armed struggle against Israel was solidified in the 1968 Charter by the Fourth PNC. The

1964 PLO Charter was amended with seven new articles, including one which asserted

"armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase."80 The new articles also specified that this state must cover the entire territory of historic Palestine and therefore that no 'two-state solution' would be considered. In order to achieve this goal, the Charter highlighted the importance of maintaining unity within the movement until after Palestine was created, at which time all other details, such as the economic and political system of liberated Palestine, would be sorted out. The Charter also stressed the illegality of the 1947 partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel.81 With the acceptance of the 1968 Charter, the centrality of armed struggle as the main strategy of insurgency was solidified.

Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 31, 42- 44 79 Helga Baumgarten. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2000," Journal of Palestine Studies 34, (4) (Summer 2005), 33 80 Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 43; "The Palestinian National Charter," Article 9 81 "The Palestinian National Charter," Articles 2, 8, 10, 11, 12 36

Although the Charter stated the Palestinians' "firm resolution to continue their

armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of

[Palestine]" (author's emphasis),82 early PLO leaders were "elitists who had little interest

in mass organizing." Additionally, Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the

Diaspora were neither ready nor able to support a protracted guerrilla war.84 Even the

trained fighters were no match for the well trained, innovative, and determined Israeli

army, which was backed by a highly effective intelligence network. 5 To get Palestinian

forces up to the calibre of the IDF,

would take many years of preparation, years that the new, more militant fedayeen leaders believed they could ill afford to lose. Moreover, the Palestinians, along with many Arabs outside the resistance movement, felt a strong psychological need to redeem their wounded honor and dignity. In a military-psychological setting such as this, the renewed call for an active and immediate armed struggle using unconventional techniques became an increasingly attractive alternative strategy for many Arabs.86

Compared to conventional warfare and even guerrilla actions against Israel, the PLO leaders saw terrorism as "an easy, appropriate, and successful strategy."87 As early as the mid-1960s, the Palestinian fedayeen groups had succeeded in terrorizing Israelis and reaped emotional strength from these small victories. The material and human cost of terrorism is generally much lower than conventional or guerrilla warfare and since the terrorist groups are usually quite small and unpredictable, the operations have a greater

"The Palestinian National Charter," Article 9 83 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 26 84 Ibid., 26 85 During the Six Day War, the Israelis gained a wealth of material by capturing Jordanian files on the Palestinian movement. ShaulMishal. West Bank/East Bank: the Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), xiii; Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 26 86Bard O'Neill. "Towards a Typology of Political Terrorism: the Palestinian Resistance Movement," Journal of International Affairs 32, no.l (Spring/Summer 1978), 22 87 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 25 37

likelihood of succeeding. Although many referred to PLO actions as terrorism, the PLO

considered all Palestinian armed actions against Israel and Israelis as legitimate struggle

against an occupying nation. Similarly, the accusation of attacking Israeli 'civilians' was considered inconsequential because all Israelis were judged to be Zionist settlers, eligible for military service and ready to take up arms against the Palestinians, and thus justifiable targets. Some also saw terrorism as revenge for Palestinian suffering.88 After the Arab defeat of 1967 and the failed attempts at organizing mass uprisings inside the Occupied

Territories, the adoption of terrorism as a major strategy of insurgency made sense due to the position of both the target state and the Palestinian insurgents. The use of terrorism allowed the Palestinians to publicize their cause and harass the Israelis with minimal human and material resources.

The PLO's strategic objective was the complete destruction of Israel and the independence of Palestine, encompassing Israel and the Occupied Territories. Israel was particularly vulnerable to terrorism because of the small size of the Israeli population, the importance of immigration and tourism, Israeli preoccupation with the threat of conventional war from Arab border states, and the tremendous numerical asymmetry in the Arab-Israeli conflict.89 Thus, PLO leaders naively hoped that terrorism might kill or intimidate Israeli civilians enough to force Israel to surrender. Barring this, according to

Arafat, the use of terrorism was intended to

prevent immigration and encourage emigrations... to destroy tourism. To prevent immigrants becoming attached to the land. To weaken the Israeli economy and divert the greater part of it to security requirements. To create and maintain an atmosphere of strain and anxiety that [would]

88 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 25, 27, & 29 89 Noemi Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, ed. David Charters, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 145 force the Zionists to realize that it [was] impossible for them to live in Israel.90

By achieving these objectives, Israel would be significantly weakened and vulnerable to

"a quick blow by the regular armies at the right moment."91 The PLO's strategy in the late 1960s rested on armed struggle as the primary form of insurgency while political activities were considered a distant second priority. The shortcomings of this analysis of

Israeli society and the focus on armed struggle will be discussed in chapter five.

The RAF and the PLO were formed in the mid-to-late 1960s, with the goal of launching a revolution. Neither group was strong enough to fight a conventional war against their target state and thus irregular warfare became their main strategy of insurgency. Both groups believed that their actions were wholly justified and the only way to bring about a better state of affairs. One of the major differences between the two groups was that while the RAF targeted its own state from within, the PLO fought Israel largely from outside the country's limits. Ultimately, although they had different situations and motivations, both organizations sought the overthrow of their target state, not through the use of terrorism itself, but from a mass uprising of the German and

Palestinian people respectively. However, organizing and inspiring mass revolt was a painstakingly slow process, in contrast with the seeming ease and rapid rewards of terrorism. Neither the PLO nor the RAF possessed the patience necessary to endure the slow process of building a popular revolution when terrorism provided an alluring alternative.

Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 29 Ibid., 29 39

Chapter Three

The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Red Army Faction

Frustrated by the waning German student movement and desirous of radical change, the RAF turned to terrorism in hopes that their actions would provoke repressive state measures, therein 'unmasking' the true fascist nature of the German state. They believed that the masses would rise up against this repressive regime and the democratic structure would be overthrown.92 Throughout the group's existence, terrorism remained the main strategy of insurgency although propaganda played an important secondary role.

While terrorism was a constant tactic, the RAF's target changed over time. The first wave leadership, active from 1970 to 197793 saw the FRG and the United States as the main targets. Although the central leadership was imprisoned in 1972, they continued to plan the armed attacks, which were carried out by the new commando group. While their comrades remained in jail, the second wave commandos focused on freeing the imprisoned leadership, in addition to fighting capitalism and imperialism. With the suicide of Meinhof in 1976, and Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe in 1977, the commandos became the second wave leadership. The latter was active from 1977 to 198494 and adopted a new focus on the 'Military-Industrial-Complex' (MIC) and NATO in particular after 1981. Incarcerated in 1982, the second wave leadership, although still alive, lost the

O'Boyle. "Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups," 32 93 Although the first wave leadership was captured and imprisoned in 1972, they continued to lead the movement from jail until the suicides of the main members beheaded the group's leadership. 94 The second wave leadership was arrested by 1982, but they continued to lead the movement from jail as the first wave had before them. In 1984, however, the imprisoned second wave leadership's authority was challenged by the third wave commandos, who took over the direction of the movement. Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 66 40 leadership of the RAF to the third wave in 1984. Active from 1984 to 1993, the RAF's third wave leadership continued to focus their attention on NATO targets.95 In the mid-

1980s, they also tried to rally a 'European guerrilla front' with their French, Belgian, and

Italian counterparts,96 and at the end of the 1980s the third wave shifted their focus to

'United Europe.'97

Throughout their insurgency, bombings, robberies, and assassinations remained the

RAF's preferred tactics. After the botched Ponto and Schleyer kidnappings,98 however, they abandoned the strategy of extortion in favour of straight-forward assassinations.99

Throughout the insurgency RAF attacks had three main objectives; group survival and provisioning, advancing the revolution, and freeing imprisoned members. Money, identification papers, cars, and weapons were in constant demand since the group had no permanent source of income, needed fake identities in order to escape authorities, and arms to protect themselves and carry out future attacks. It was also important to attract new recruits and enlarge the sympathetic audience through terrorism and propaganda.

The RAF's propaganda targeted three audiences: the active, sympathetic, and uncommitted. The effectiveness of the use of terrorism for these three reasons, in addition to the reactions from the three audiences, will be discussed in this chapter.

Abraham Miller. "The Evolution of Terrorism," Conflict Quarterly 5, no.4 (Autumn 1985),5 96 Action Directe, Cellules Communistes Combattantes, and Brigate Rosse. 97 Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 69 98 Jiirgen Ponto, chairman of the board of Dresdner Bank, was to be kidnapped by the RAF in July 1977. When he resisted, the commandos shot him five times. Two months later, head of the German Industry Association Hanns-Martin Schleyer was kidnapped and held hostage. When the government refused to give in to RAF demands, they murdered Schleyer. Varon. Bringing the War Home, 324; Gary L. Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970: Implications for Deterrence and Defeat of Violent Nonstate Actors," Comparative Strategy 26, no. 5 (2007), 443 99 Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 65 41

The active members of the RAF were not 'weekend terrorists,' but wholly separated from society to reduce the risk of capture. The "elaborately conspiratorial lifestyle"100 that the active members led meant they could not have jobs through which to provide funds for the RAF. In order to fund their underground lifestyle and finance future acts of terrorism, the RAF became dependant on bank robberies and extortion. The beginning of each of the three waves was characterized by a period of robberies, as each new group needed to outfit themselves with the necessary money, weapons, and other provisions. In the spring of 1972, the RAF responded to a reproach that it was exclusively pursuing 'logistics' by stating that only with the "solution of logistics problems" could revolutionary actions be pursued.101 The RAF successfully terrorized numerous German banks; for example, on September 29, 1970 the group acquired DM 220,000 through the simultaneous robbing of three Berlin banks. By 1974, the RAF had extracted more than

DM 1.7 million by robbery and blackmail.102 By law, robbing a bank was considered a purely criminal act; however, the RAF attempted to justify their actions with weak statements such as, "financing a political organization is a political question" and robbing banks "is tactically right because it is a proletarian action."103 Whether the robberies were considered 'political' or criminal, terrorism was an extremely useful and effective tool in providing the RAF's 'logistics.'

Once the necessary materials had been acquired the RAF turned its efforts towards the terrorism that they hoped would result in a mass uprising of the German people. In the early stage, most of the damage was inflicted upon property through bombing and

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 141 101 Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," 2 102 Ibid., 2 103 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 144 42

arson and the targets were most often banks, police stations, U.S. military facilities, and administrative buildings. During this time, serious injuries and deaths were most often the result of shoot-outs between the 'pigs' and suspected terrorists.104 The RAF's first martyr was Petra Schelm, shot by police on July 15, 1971 while fleeing a police roadblock set up to capture RAF members.105 The first officer killed was Norbert Schmid in October of the same year.106 The violence of the RAF's first wave culminated in the 'May Offensive' of

1972 bombing campaign, which targeted US corps headquarters in Frankfurt, American

Army Headquarters in Europe, a German State Criminal Office, police headquarters in

Augsburg, and the Springer publishing house.107

The German security apparatus responded precisely as the RAF had hoped, calling the terrorists the 'real heirs of fascism' and using aggressive counter-insurgency measures, such as roadblocks, sweeping searches, and censorship laws. The size and the capabilities of the police and justice system were also greatly expanded in order to safeguard 'German democracy.'108 For example, between 1971 and 1981, the budget of the federal criminal police went from DM 54.8 million to DM 290 million and the number of people they employed rose from 1113 to 3536.109 Although the rise in federal police numbers may not seem substantial considering the size of the German population, it remains significant due to the devolved nature of German federalism. In the constitution, the Lander (states) were assigned the responsibility of public security, so the increase in federal manpower was an important reflection of the national character of the

104 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 208 105 Vague. Televisionaries, 3so6 106 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 208 107 Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," 3 108 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 14 109 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 174 43

insurgency.110 The police measures were effective; searches and roadblocks forced the

RAF deeper underground, which meant they had to expend more energy on survival and

evasion than on terrorism.111 By June 1972, the leading activists of the RAF's first wave were in custody.112 However, the counter-insurgency measures used by the government had been severe and aggressive and ultimately resulted in more violence; the tough response to the initial wave of violence re-enforced the RAF's conception of the German government as a fascist entity.113 In summary, although the first wave of active RAF members was imprisoned, they had achieved an important part of their strategy by provoking the state to show its 'repressive nature.'

With the imprisonment of the founding leadership, the remaining free commandos split their focus between advancing the revolution and freeing their incarcerated comrades. The FRG had shown itself willing to negotiate with terrorists in the early

1970s when Palestinian hijackings on Lufthansa flights had resulted in the release of prisoners and the payment of ransom money.114 The June 2nd Movement (J2M), a West

Berlin anarchist group who considered themselves more in touch with the working class, also successfully negotiated with the German government in 1975.115 They kidnapped

Peter Lorenz, the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union and the state agreed to release six prisoners, who were each given DM 20,000, for his return.116 Although it was

Arthur Gunlicks. The Lander and German Federalism. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 56 1'' Varon. Bringing the War Home, 254 112 Reiter and Klaus Weinhauer. "Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s," 379 113 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 14 114 Stephen Sobieck. "Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in Germany," in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, ed. David Charters, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 55 115 What was left of the June 2nd Movement after a series of arrests by German police joined the RAF in 1980. Varon. Bringing the War Home, 236-237, 301 116 Sobieck. "Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in Germany," 56 44 a J2M operation, at least three of the six prisoners freed were RAF members.117 The terrorists had monopolized the national television networks, which covered the kidnappers' statements and the release of the prisoners and the German media castigated the government for their humiliating failure.118 Emboldened by the J2M operation's success, the RAF took the Germany embassy staff in Stockholm hostage in April of the same year and demanded the release of twenty-six prisoners in German jails. After the embarrassing events of the Lorenz kidnapping, however, the German government decided to adopt a no-negotiations policy and refused the demands of the RAF. The

1977 Schleyer kidnapping and Lufthansa hijacking, which will be discussed in a below, also ended in RAF failure. So, too, did direct attacks on German jails housing RAF prisoners. Even if direct attacks had been successful, at most, only a few RAF members would have been freed since the insurgents were often confined in different jails in order to thwart mass rescue attempts.120 Although the 1975 June 2nd Movement operation was successful, terrorism proved an unsuccessful liberation tool for the RAF.

RAF terrorism and the subsequent government response had varying effects on the sympathetic, active, and uncommitted audiences, although they ultimately failed to produce a mass uprising. The RAF identified its main support base as the political left, as a review of their ideology would suggest. In particular, the RAF considered university students and those who had adopted commune life to be most amenable to their ideas.

Contrary to Marxist theory, the RAF identified the students as the revolutionary avant

117 Horst Mahler, Rolf Pohle, and Rolf Heissler. Degenhardt. Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 129- 130; Otto Billig. "The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades," Political Psychology 6, no.l (1985), 36 118 Sobieck. "Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in Germany,"56 119 Ibid., 56 120 The prisoners were kept separately until the new high security section of the Stammheim jail was built specifically for the RAF members. Billig. "The Lawyer Terrorist and His Comrades," 34 45 garde, stating, "It is not the organization of the industrial working class, but the revolutionary sections of the student body that are today the bearers of the contemporary conscience."121 The RAF correctly identified the New Left as its main base, although the extent of their commitment was not as great as the RAF would have liked. According to the RAF's strategy, the government's repressive response to RAF terrorism would provoke a strong response from the people, ultimately resulting in the overthrow of the state. Although the New Left and some left-leaning liberals did view the state's actions as overly severe and repressive, they were not ready or willing to lead a mass uprising; their criticism did not translate into support for the RAF's strategic objective. The police shooting of Petra Schelm, for example, triggered more sympathy for the RAF from the

Left than their concurrent terrorism ever did. The anti-authoritarian movement of the late

1960s and 1970s easily sympathized with the RAF's accusations that the security forces' actions were a manifestation of the Bonn government's fascist tendencies. In fact, Joanne

Wright identified police action between 1967 and 1972 as a significant factor in attracting people to the RAF, creating a larger sympathetic audience and attracting new members to the active audience.122 Although the FRG's physical repression of the first wave RAF did not provoke this group to rise against the government it did increase the New Left's sympathy for the RAF.

The sympathetic audience expanded and contracted based on the actions of the RAF and the FRG. In general, the RAF's terrorism decreased support for the group while the government's counter-insurgency measures often increased the group's support. For example, a 1971 study conducted soon after the shooting of Petra Schelm found that one

121 Horst Mahler, as quoted in Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 103-105 122 Ibid., 178-179 46 in twenty - of the 1000 West Germans surveyed - would shelter a member of the gang overnight. This same study found that one in four West Germans under thirty admitted to a 'certain sympathy' with the RAF. These surprisingly high numbers reflect an expansion of the sympathetic audience, particularly the younger generation, in light of the security force's actions. After the "May Offensive" bombing campaign in 1972, where six German and American targets were bombed and at least one person was killed and 38 people hurt, sympathy was very low.124 Unjustifiable violence on either side resulted in a loss of sympathy from the public for different reasons. The indiscriminate quality of the insurgents' violence created a climate of fear among the general German population who felt, particularly following unbridled RAF violence, that the German security forces could not adequately protect them.125 This fear for personal safety among those who did not support the RAF's ideological goals resulted in support for augmented security powers, in order to make society 'safer.' However, it was crucial that these counter- insurgency measures were both effective and acceptable. In other words, the measures must effectively stop the violence yet the deterrent must remain acceptable to a democratic society.12 Police were perceived "not just as representatives of political power but also as indicators of the quality of democracy in the political system"127 and thus 'severe' police actions, such as the shooting of Petra Schelm, might have been effective but were less acceptable. Measures that were seen as 'unacceptable' reaffirmed

Stefan Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon. (London: TheBodley Head, 1985), 154 124 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 179; Horchem. "West Germany's Red Army Anarchists," 3 125 Miller. "The Evolution of Terrorism," 6 126 Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970: Implications for Deterrence and Defeat of Violent Nonstate Actors," 439 127 Herbert Reiter and Klaus Weinhauer. "Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s: Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective," European Review of History 14, no. 3 (2007), 374 47 the RAF belief that the state was prone to fascism and increased public sympathy for the

RAF 'victims.' The RAF's sympathetic audience increased or decreased according to the perceived threat that each group posed to personal safety or the FRG's democratic principles.

One particularly successful RAF propaganda campaign focused on the prison conditions of the incarcerated RAF members. As soon as they were in custody, the RAF members began to complain about the treatment they received and the conditions of their imprisonment. They complained of 'isolation' torture, demanding that they be housed together in the same 'political' jail. Meinhof had the audacity to compare the prison conditions she experienced to those suffered by the Nazis' victims in Auschwitz. Their complaints were a propaganda ploy and, in reality, their conditions were more than adequate. For example, Meinhof was visited regularly by her ex-husband and twin daughters, the prisoners were permitted radios and record players, they received almost

1 OR any reading matter they wished, and their cells were also larger than average. In no way were their conditions comparable to the forced labour, starvation, torture, beatings, executions, mass murder, and discrimination suffered by the occupants of Auschwitz.

However, the RAF had correctly identified this tactic as one likely to attract a wider array of sympathizers. Those who could not understand or support their fundamental ideology could easily sympathize with a humanitarian issue, such as 'inhumane' prison conditions.129 Once again, it was not the actions of the RAF but the perceived cruelty of

128 Michael Burleigh. Blood and Rage: a Cultural History of Terrorism. (New York: Harper, 2009), 244- 245 129 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 111 48 the state, amplified by the group's propaganda, that triggered public sympathy for the

RAF mainly among the New Left.

In order to increase the pressure on the government and bring more attention to the cause, incarcerated RAF members also carried out organized hunger strikes. The hunger strikes were a powerful propaganda tool because if the striker was prepared to starve themselves to death, the state looked barbaric whether it allowed them to die or force fed them to keep them alive. During the hunger strikes, frequent demands included awarding the incarcerated RAF members prisoner of war status and the reassignment of RAF members to a common political prison. The group did not succeed in gaining the limited objectives of their hunger strikes, however, and lost two members, Holger Meins in 1974 and Sigurd Debus in 1981, in the struggle.130 Although ineffective against the government, the 'prison conditions' propaganda campaign gained the RAF sympathy and support mainly from the Left.

Just as the state's actions against the fugitives in the early 1970s had attracted sympathy and new recruits, propaganda lamenting prison conditions had the same effect in the mid-1970s. Some sympathizers felt strongly enough about the 'tortuous treatment' the prisoners received to start groups like Red Aid and the Committee Against Torture By

Isolation, which organized demonstrations, prepared press statements, and gathered books requested by the imprisoned insurgents.131 Many of the second wave RAF members got their start in these groups, moving from sympathizer to supporter to active insurgent as their conviction grew. Stephen Aust deftly explains the success of the

RAF's 'prison conditions' propaganda in attracting supporters and commandos:

130 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 116 131 Ibid., 117 49

Young people who had never met Baader and Ensslin in their lives.. .started along the path to illegality in a state of indignation at the real or imagined inhumanity of their conditions of imprisonment. At no time of the 'underground struggle' did the RAF have so magnetic a power of attraction 1 ^9

as they did when imprisoned.

This campaign was the RAF's most successful in terms of recruiting sympathizers, supporters, and new recruits.

In addition to repressive counter-insurgency measures and 'inhumane' prison conditions, the New Left was outraged by the elements of cultural repression, both from the state and private sector. The action of the government concerned the Left, who saw the "surveillance, censorship, confinement, condemnation, [and] exclusion" used by the state to curtail the actions of the RAF as a movement towards a more closed society.:

Of particular concern were censorship laws that prohibited Germans from producing, owning, and selling texts which encouraged or promoted violence against the Federal

Republic. The New Left detested these laws because they limited the freedom of expression and were carried into the private sector, where people began to pre-emptively censor themselves and others. For example, cultural productions that had no revolutionary content but were dedicated to RAF members or written by RAF members before their turn to revolution were censored due to concern over the possibility of public misperception of the producers support for terrorism. Productions with "'open'

Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 273 133 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 117 134 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 283 135 Film directors dedicated their film Moses und Aaron to Holger Meins, an RAF member recently dead from a hunger strike in 1975. The dedication was to a deceased friend and, in their opinion, one fo the best cameramen they had studied with. The dedication was taken out in spite of their good intentions due to concern over public misconception of the act. In the second circumstance, Ulrike Meinhof wrote a televised play called Bambule, which was scheduled to air in May 1970, was cancelled a few days before when Meinhof participated in the armed freeing of Andreas Baader. Although the play had no real connection to her criminal activities, the network decided not the broadcast the piece since its author was wanted by the 50

narrative structures, not providing a prescriptive direction or a clear moral norm," were

also distasteful since "many felt that cultural productions should be unambiguous in their

statements towards 'terrorism,' and to [sic] show 'positive' loyalty to the state."

Stories, articles, movies and plays about the RAF were also censored, which created a

climate of fear and self-censorship.137 Writers, publishers and artists were outraged and

denounced the actions as an assault on their freedom of expression.138 This cultural repression personally affected artists and those who worked on cultural productions and thus these people took common cause with the RAF against the increasing 'closure' of

society; it was not the RAF's actions but the government's reactive cultural 'repression' that generated sympathy for the insurgents.

The New Left was also concerned by the changes to the legislation in regards to the criminal justice system. The imprisoned first wave leadership had exploited the lax regulations regarding the communication of prisoners and defence attorneys, which had allowed the prisoners to organize and lead the group from jail, while the commandos outside carried out the attacks. They had been able to communicate with the commandos

1 ^Q outside thanks to the clandestine efforts of their lawyers. The prisoners also disrupted their own trials, refusing to cooperate and deliberately disrupting the proceedings.140 In order to stop their behaviour from preventing their conviction, the German government passed a legislative amendment, which allowed trials to take place without the attendance of the accused, in the event that the mental or physical injury resulting in their absence police. Michael Haynes. "German Cultural Responses to the Red Army Faction." (PhD diss., University of Glasgow, 1988), 32, 36-37 136 Ibid., 47 137 Ibid., 38 138 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 261 139 Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 442-443 140 Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 248-249 51 was self-inflicted.141 The German government also introduced the "Lex RAF," which forbade group trials and changed regulations regarding defence lawyers in an effort to curtail the abuses of the system perpetrated by the RAF and their lawyers.142 One of the most controversial changes was the Contact Ban introduced during the Schleyer kidnapping in 1977. The law forbade the imprisoned RAF members from coming into contact with anyone from outside the prison during RAF terrorist attacks, since the security forces believed the imprisoned leadership was passing on directives through its lawyers and visitors. These changes allowed the German justice system to run effectively, despite the efforts of the RAF to the contrary. As a result of these changes in legislation, numerous RAF members were convicted and many received long sentences.

There was some concern among liberals and the New Left as to the legislative changes however. The New Left, which had sprung out of the parliamentary opposition movement and was thus already concerned about the state of German democracy, was alarmed by what it saw as the increasing pervasiveness of the government. The state's critics charged that the FRG was beginning to resemble 1984\ 'Big Brother.' In response, the Bonn government claimed it was trying to protect German democracy in a way that the Weimar republic had been unable to protect itself from the rise of Nazism.144

Although the laws were harsh, "German authorities implemented these policy components without seriously compromising the rule of law or the standards of liberal

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 182 Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 443 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 182 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 283 52

democracy."145 Jeremy Varon states that the German government actually became more

open during the 1970s and 1980s;

Evidenced by the increasing acceptance of public protest; the flowering of progressive movements, such as environmentalism, feminism, and peace activism; the left's enjoyment, with the emergence of the Green Party, of unprecedented influence within the political establishment; and even the partial acceptance of low level violence.146

Although the government's actions seemed extreme to some, with the passing of time,

critics saw that the German government had not misused their power, but that the

changes had allowed for a stronger and more tolerant democracy.

A closer inspection of the sympathetic audiences' motivations reveals that much of the 'sympathy' stemmed from the feeling of having a common adversary: the German government. Many on the left, within Germany and elsewhere, were critical of the

"fascism, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation" that the RAF fought against, however, problems with the RAF's propaganda, and ultimately their 'revolution,' meant that the

RAF was more or less alone in their desire for a revolution. A closer inspection of the

RAF's propaganda exposes a number of major issues.147 To begin with, the communiques and manifestos were written in a convoluted language, making them difficult to understand unless the reader was familiar with Marxist rhetoric. The majority of those who were able to understand the language rejected the RAF's justification of revolution and violence. The German New Left realized that the ideology was incongruous with

Western parliamentary democracies, including Germany, and therefore that the RAF's justification of violence was also unacceptable. The RAF's claims that they were

Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 445 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 304 Becker. Hitler's Children, 12 53

'victims' of state repression were also dismissed; the RAF had provoked a 'repressive' response and therein created their own victimhood. In comparison with the genuine suffering of the Vietnamese or the Palestinians, this 'victimhood' was a sham. This negative analysis of the RAF's ideology extended to its adoption of urban guerrilla warfare, which was considered "unrealistic and inapplicable to the conditions in the

Federal Republic."148 The influential German student leader Rudi Dutschke rejected the

RAF's strategy "not on moral grounds, but because revolutionary constellations were inopportune." Thus, much of the German Left was unimpressed, unconvinced and uncommitted although some remained sympathetic, buying into the RAF's created

'victimhood.' For the large majority of the sympathetic audience, however, the

'sympathy' did not extend to support for the strategic objective of the RAF.

Since the sympathetic audience waxed and waned depending on the actions of the

German state and the RAF, the events of 1977 are particularly important. In the early-to- mid 1970s, state actions helped create a larger sympathetic audience for the RAF although the preponderance of this audience did not support the RAF's strategic objective nor rise up against the state as the RAF had hoped. As a result of their own actions, mainly the events of the 'German Autumn,' and the murder of Edward Pimental, the RAF lost the majority of their sympathetic audience.

As discussed earlier, the post-1972 RAF strategy included advancing the revolution in addition to seeking freedom for their comrades. Freeing the members was important for group morale and to assure recruits that the RAF did not give up on its members. 15°

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 106, 187 Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 246 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 149 54

The infamous 'German Autumn' was the culmination of the second wave's attempts to

free the original leadership. Three major events shocked Germany in 1977: the

kidnapping and murder of Daimler-Benz Chief Executive Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the

hijacking of Lufthansa 181,151 and the suicides of Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe. The

Schleyer kidnapping and the hijacking were both attempts to coerce the German

government into releasing imprisoned RAF members. However, the no-negotiations

policy adopted after the events of the Lorenz kidnapping, meant that no such negotiations

occurred.152 The new policy and new paramilitary GSG-9 unit created after the 1972

Munich Massacre were a resounding success; during the Lufthansa hijacking, all of the

hostages were safely rescued and three of the four terrorists were killed.153 Unfortunately,

the German government was unable to save Schleyer, who was killed after the

Mogadishu raid. Although Schleyer died, the government's strong stance against the

RAF was well received by the German public and world audiences, who were horrified

by the RAF's brutality.154

When Baader, Ensslin, Raspe, and Moller heard the news of the successful raid at

Mogadishu, they resolved to commit suicide yet make it seem like murder so as to perpetuate the myth of the fascist state even in death. On the morning of October 18,

151 The Boeing 737 was hijacked by four members of the RAF and PFLP on its way from Majorka to Frankfurt. The plane was eventually diverted to Mogadishu, Somalia where the GSG-9 unit raided the plane killing three hijackers and wounding the fourth. The PFLP demanded the release of imprisoned RAF leadership and two PFLP members imprisoned in Turkey, in return for the lives of the passengers and crew on the hijacked plane. The RAF had links with the PFLP, a similarly left-leaning Palestinian organization, through terrorist training camps run by Fatah and the PFLP. Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 68; Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 443-444; Varon. Bringing the War Home, 197-198; John Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany's Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security," Intelligence and National Security 8, no.4 (1993), 62-64 152 Sobieck. "Democratic Responses to International Terrorism in Germany," 56 153 Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 444 154 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 284 55

1977, Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were found dead in their cells by the morning guards;

Moller's wounds had not killed her. She claimed that the German secret service, in cahoots with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had done this to her and the other prisoners.15 The 'Stammheim myth' was spread by RAF supporters and some believed the myth for quite sometime, but ultimately it was discredited by RAF members Volker

Speitel and Hans-Joachim Dellwo in 1978, when they testified that the prisoners had committed suicide.156 The death of the first wave leadership and the disasters of the

'German Autumn' left the RAF disheartened. While the active audience remained committed, the German New Left, was already unimpressed by the RAF's problematic ideology. The unjustifiable violence of the 'German Autumn' only added to this sentiment. The New Left also recognized the German public's support of government counter-insurgency measures and saw the benefit in distancing themselves from the

RAF.157 A few New Leftists remained sympathetic, but on the whole the New Left - the only revolutionary base for the RAF - had abandoned the RAF.

Eight years later, the RAF destroyed its support base even further. In 1985, the RAF murdered American G.I. Edward Pimental in order to take his identification card. The card allowed the RAF access to the American Rhine-Main Air Base, where they placed bombs that killed two and injured twenty.158 The Pimental murder outraged the New Left, who denounced the RAF's actions as counter-productive and without moral justification.159 Pimental's life had been mercilessly thrown away for an access card; no

Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 256-257 Degenhardt. Revolutionary and Dissident Movements, 129 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 188 Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 66 Varon. Bringing the War Home, 303 56

revolutionary rhetoric could pass off his murder as 'justified' and the commando level of

the RAF acknowledged that the murder had been 'a mistake.' At the February 1986

Frankfurt Congress, members of the Left and even some RAF supporters attacked the

murder of Edward Pimental. With this act, the RAF severed its already tenuous link with

the New Left and was more or less bereft of sympathizers.160

Although the size of the RAF's sympathetic audience fluctuated, the large majority

of the German public belonged to the uncommitted audience throughout the insurgency.

This was due to the West German public's commitment to democracy, the prosperity of

German society, their abhorrence of communism, the German government's implementation of effective and largely acceptable counter-insurgency measures, and the democratization of German institutions. The student movement and subsequent RAF terrorism were anathema to the generations who had lived through the war and rebuilt

Germany. The older generations were frustrated by what they saw as insufficient appreciation for the democratic society they had worked so hard to create.161 Thanks to the economic miracle of the 1950s, German workers were better off than the average worker; in fact, Germany had the highest paid proletariat in the world.162 The RAF's complaint that the workers were too closely tied to the capitalist system to lead the revolution was correct. The workers did not want to lose what they had gained for a vague, new order and thus did not join the student movement of 1968. The RAF's ideology was also lost on the workers who had no interest in fighting the "wage slavery"

160 Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 66-67 161 Jarausch. After Hitler, 164 162 Miller. "The Evolution of Terrorism," 8 163 Jarausch. After Hitler, 180 57

and exploitation they did not experience.164 The audience typically most receptive to

mass rebellion against the state was, for the most part, uninterested.

West Germans were also among the staunchest anti-communists. This was due to

the founding influence of the United States, as well as, the FRG's role as a leading

Western European bulwark against communism. Many West Germans also had relatives

or friends in the GDR and had personal knowledge of the poor conditions in the

communist country; they understood what real repression and tyranny meant. West

Germans compared the FRG to the GDR and appreciated what they had. The RAF's use

of the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' was also distasteful to Germans who had lived under dictatorship and knew the realities of such government. The RAF's determination to turn the FRG into a socialist state was viewed by many West Germans as a threat to their safety and prosperity and the RAF's violence only augmented this sentiment.165

In addition to the ingrained distrust of communism, most of the West German public found the RAF propaganda baffling. Although fighting communist organizations such as the RAF were prolific, their inability to produce comprehensible propaganda meant that only the initiated could truly understand their intentions.166 The common German citizen was unable to follow the group's rhetoric and was uninterested in the new order that the

RAF proposed. The RAF's active members were largely unaware of this, however, since their underground lifestyle isolated them from the common public. Consequently, they

Miller. "The Evolution of Terrorism," 8 Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 177 Alexander and Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists 35 58 were unable to objectively analyze the German mood and thus did not make an apposite effort to garner mass support, although they recognized its importance.167

The uncommitted audience grew as changes to German institutions and behaviours helped to appease the majority of moderate protesters. For example, the liberalization of German universities appeased the student protesters in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1980, the peace seeking, anti-nuclear, left-leaning, and environmental movements were encouraged to join the parliamentary process with the creation of the

Green Party. By appeasing and including moderates in the political process, the Bonn government managed to decrease the RAF's sympathetic audience and diminish the possibility of mass revolution.169 By the mid-1970s, the counter-insurgency measures had also gained public support as the government deterrence policy produced results. By using effective and acceptable measures against the RAF, the security forces were able to ensure public safety in a manner acceptable to a democratic population.170 By 1977, the actions of the RAF and the FRG had ensured that the RAF's sympathetic audience was tiny in comparison to the vast majority of Germans, including the New Left, who were part of the uncommitted audience.

The RAF firmly believed that they were the revolutionary vanguard and that terrorism would lead to a mass uprising in response to government repression. In the early and mid 1970s, the post-war generation and particularly the New Left were sympathetic towards the RAF's objectives and experiences. Repressive government

Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 11 168 Jarausch. After Hitler, 178 169 Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism," International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006), 69 170 Geipel. "Urban Terrorists in Continental Europe After 1970," 445 59

counter-insurgency measures and skilful propaganda regarding 'inhumane' prison

conditions also sparked limited sympathy for the group among the greater population.

However, this support was only partial and often from humanitarian concern rather than

revolutionary fervour. The size of the RAF's sympathetic audience expanded and

constricted in accordance with the RAF and FRG's actions; the violence of the police or

prison system gaining more sympathy for the RAF than its own actions. With the

adoption of the no-negotiations policy and firmer criminal legislation, security forces and

the judicial system were able to develop an effective policy of deterrence. After the

violence of the 'German Autumn,' all but the most radical supporters abandoned the

RAF, including the New Left, who observed that the actions of the RAF did the Left

more harm than good. The RAF was left isolated; their tactics had failed and their

sympathy vanished.

Terrorism proved useful in ensuring the group's logistics, although many would

consider the theft and extortion used to finance the group akin to common criminal

actions. The RAF attempted to use terrorism to extort the release of imprisoned RAF

members in exchange for hostages; however, this tactic was useless after the Bonn

government adopted its no-negotiations policy in 1975. In regards to advancing the revolution, terrorism also failed. Although the group managed to maintain a cadre of

active insurgents, it was only about 20 people at any one time in comparison with the 50-

60 million West German citizens. The ability of the RAF to remain operational through two leadership changes demonstrated the small group's impressive resilience and ability to attract devoted recruits. However, the miniscule size of the group speaks to the inability of the RAF to mobilize West Germans against the Federal Republic or to turn 60

large numbers of their fleeting sympathizers into supporters. The RAF's active supporters

numbered in the dozens or hundreds at different points of the 23 year insurgency;

numbers never great enough to pose a serious threat to the FRG.171 RAF terrorism was

successful in attracting a small groups of devoted supporters and in provoking some

degree of the hoped-for repressive state reaction, yet it also alienated the public and

isolated the RAF from the moderate left and the majority of West Germans. Instead of rising up against the 'fascist' German state, the German people were happy to see that

state use their powers to rid the FRG of a violent threat. Aside from securing logistics and provoking a semi-repressive state response, terrorism was an inefficient strategy of insurgency and the RAF's 'revolution' was a failure.

171 Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction," 65-66; Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 180-181 61

Chapter Four

The Fruits of Terrorism and Insurgency: The Palestine Liberation

Organization

The 1967 Six Day War was a major milestone for the Palestinian movement. It demonstrated that the current conventional Arab armies were no match for Israeli forces and that it was time to take the struggle into their own hands. The fedayeen groups were already proponents of this attitude and in joining the PLO and electing Arafat their leader they changed the nature of the PLO dramatically. This new PLO adopted the 1968

Charter, which identified armed struggle as the primary tactic in the fight to gain

Palestinian independence. Since Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora were neither ready nor able to support a protracted guerrilla war, terrorism was adopted based on its disproportionate impact and use of minimal human and material resources.

The tactics the PLO employed were similar to those used by the RAF; however, the PLO also implemented programs to take care of its civilian population at the same time. In addition to the hostage situations, hijackings, and assassinations, the PLO organized vocational training, hospitals, and schools, among other services, to ensure the survival of the Palestinian people and foster a sense of Palestinian identity. The PLO also pursued international recognition of the Palestinian cause and their position as leaders of the

Palestinian people. By the nature of the conflict and the diplomatic strategy that the PLO pursued, they were able to make greater gains than the RAF ever did. They gained diplomatic recognition, observer status at the United Nations, and were considered the official representatives of the Palestinian people by a large number of countries and 62 organizations. Yet by the end of 1993, Israel remained the PLO's main obstacle; strong and resolute, the state had not been destroyed nor forced to make any devastating concessions. This chapter will analyze the positive and negative impacts of terrorism and diplomacy on the Palestinian insurgency.

In order to ensure the survival of the insurgency, the PLO had to ensure that their logistics and their people were taken care of and that new recruits joined the organization.

They had to acquire money, training, weapons, and safe havens for the fedayeen, but due to the support of the Arab states, the PLO was in a far different position than the RAF.

The Arab states provided logistical support and tolerated the PLO with varying degrees of enthusiasm, but on the whole, this allowed the PLO to meet its logistical needs on a greater scale with less 'criminal behaviour' than the RAF. Unlike the RAF, the PLO did not have to resort to robbery and extortion to fund their entire insurgency. The PLO also differed from the RAF in that they had a refugee population counting on them and a far greater number of eager recruits.

In the beginning, the PLO was almost entirely dependent on the donations of Arab states, which gave the contributors enormous power over the organization. However, as time went on, the PLO gained its own wealth, significantly lessening the ability of Arab rulers to influence the organization's actions by way of its finances. In addition to state sponsorship, legitimate funding came from a five percent tax on all Palestinians, philanthropic donations from wealthy Palestinians and Arab sympathizers, and investments. In spite of having these legitimate funds, elements of the PLO did occasionally resort to robbery and extortion. Although the use of terrorism for profit was not essential to the PLO's survival as it was for the RAF, it was a quick way to 63

supplement funds and embarrass Israel or its allies. For example, on February 22, 1972,

the PFLP hijacked a Lufthansa aircraft, demanding and receiving $5 million in return for

the aircraft crew and the plane. Another example is the Beirut bank robbery carried out

by Ali Hassan Salameh and a group of PLO militia. On January 20, 1976, they took

advantage of the Lebanese civil war to break into the British Bank of the Middle East and

steal between $50 and $100 million worth of cash, gold, and jewels.172 As the

organization created other sources of income and focused more on the creation of a

diplomatic image, terrorism for profit became less necessary and less profitable.

The second and third wave RAF had used terrorism to pressure the government in

hopes of securing the release of their imprisoned comrades. The constituent groups of the

PLO attempted the same feat. Due to the efforts of the Israeli intelligence community and

the Israeli Defence Force, fedayeen were captured often and thousands were held in

Israeli jails.173 In order to keep up morale in the organization and reassure members that though incarcerated they had not been forgotten, the PLO's constituent groups often employed terrorism in an attempt to bargain Israelis for Palestinians. Officially, Israel espoused a no-negotiations policy and vehemently encouraged other states to do the

same. For example, during the hostage situation at the Munich Olympics, Israel held firm on its no-negotiations policy and expected that West German authorities do everything in their power to secure the hostages without giving in to the terrorists' demands.17

However, the Israelis did not always abide by their own rules. The first negotiated prisoner release between the Israeli government and the PFLP-GC took place in 1979.

172 James Adams. The Financing of Terror: How the Groups that are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 94, 97-99, 117, 119 173 Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 163 174 Aaron J. Klein. Striking Back. (New York: Random House, 2005),55 The Israeli government exchanged seventy-six fedayeen for one Israeli soldier. In another and even more surprising negotiation in 1985, the Israelis exchanged 1, 150 prisoners for three Israeli soldiers. One explanation for the government's behaviour was their fear of public disapproval of the possibility of an 'unnecessary' loss of Israeli lives.175 Efraim

Inbar has suggested that the Israeli political leadership carried the mistaken belief "that

Israeli society [was] tired of the protracted conflict and [was] unwilling to pay the price

1 If* of continuous war" into the 1990s and beyond. Inbar suggests that the Israeli public was most concerned with success and was understanding of the possibility that success would incur casualties.177 The Palestinian victories in the late 1970s and 1980s made

Israel seem ridiculous and discounted the deterrent value of the no-negotiations policy, which was useless if not firmly upheld. In "The Strategies of Terrorism," Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter highlight the traditional doves versus hawks divide that has been the centre of Israeli politics for years. Dovish parties like the Israeli Labour party are seen as more likely to grant concessions due to their preference for peace, but the 1979 prisoner exchange was arranged with the hawkish Likud party.178 The Likud party's willingness to negotiate and give in to the terrorists' demands made the victory appear even greater, since the party has typically maintained a very hard-line attitude towards terrorism and concessions. A deterrence policy that is not strictly enforced leaves room for possible negotiations and success and is, therefore, ineffective. At times, the Israeli government was very firm in their rejection of negotiations, but at other times governments have not

Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 145, 151 176 Efraim Inbar. "Casualty intolerance." The Jerusalem Post, November 19, 2006, Opinion Section, Daily Edition. 177 Ibid., 178 Kydd and Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism," 62 65

only negotiated but conceded to the terrorists' demands, thus encouraging future violence.

In addition to supplementing finances and freeing prisoners, terrorism was also an

effective way to attract new recruits and force world audiences to take notice of the

Palestinians and their cause. In order to garner sympathy and support from wider world

audiences the PLO needed to make their cause known, and one of the major benefits of terrorism was its ability to attract media attention to the Palestinian cause. Hostage situations and assassinations received prime news coverage, particularly when they occurred outside of Israel and involved third party victims. The PLO discovered the benefits of 'propaganda by deed' when the PFLP hijacked an El Al plane on July 22,

1968.179 This was the first time that a plane had been hijacked for the value of its passengers, not the airplane itself, and the potential for destruction and loss of life forced the Israelis to communicate directly with their avowed enemy, which was contrary to their no-negotiations government policy. The insurgents gained a major victory by forcing the Israelis to recognize and communicate with them in addition to the international coverage the event received. The Palestinians found that the "first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and awakened the media and world opinion much more - and more effectively - than 20 years of pleading at the United

Nations."180 From this point on, the nature of terrorism changed dramatically. Insurgents travelled regularly from country to country and for the first time, innocent civilians from third party countries were attacked indiscriminately because of their power to attract

17 The term 'propaganda by deed' describes how violent acts of terrorism can be used to raise public awareness of an issue or cause. El Al was Israel's national airline. Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 63 66

attention to the event.181 International terrorism grabbed media attention and forced world

audiences to take notice of the Palestinian insurgents.

Another example of the ability of terrorism to attract media attention was the

Munich Massacre in 1972. On September 5, the Black September Organization, a covert

arm of Fatah, captured Israeli athletes and coaches in their Olympic housing. The

operation turned into a massacre when the German security forces bungled a rescue

attempt; nine Israelis and five Black Septembrists died in the ensuing firefight.182 Over

4000 journalists and 2000 television people were on hand in Munich to cover the

Olympics, so this bloody event was broadcast live to half a billion people around the world.183 The Munich Massacre was also important because it showed that even an

operational failure can still be a strategic success; the Black Septembrists did not get the desired prisoners released in exchange for their hostages, but they did gain important exposure for their cause. Although the violent act was condemned by uncommitted, world wide audiences, it piqued interest in the Palestinian situation and forced

1 84 international organizations and foreign countries to pay attention to the insurgency. By internationalizing terrorism, the PLO's fedayeen groups found an extremely effective method of publicizing the Palestinian cause.

Palestinian and Arab audiences were also affected by terrorism and the media exposure it received. Armed struggle gave the Palestinians 'heroic' figures to admire and an active outlet for their anger and feelings of dispossession. By joining the fedayeen groups and carrying out terrorism instead of wallowing in self pity, Palestinians were able

181 Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 64 182 Klein. Striking Back, 80 183 John Cooley. Green March, Black September. (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1973), p. 126 184 Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 69-70 67 to fight for their inalienable right to self-determination as recognized by UN resolution

2672. As fedayeen, Palestinians could feel like they were making a difference, supporting the insurgency, and helping to fight for 'their country.' Whether operationally successful or unsuccessful, violence attracted new recruits. After the battle of Karameh, for example, 5,000 new recruits applied to join Fatah whose 'heroic' performance had inspired Palestinians and Arabs alike.185 Similarly, even though the Munich Massacre was an operational failure, it motivated thousands of Palestinians to join the terrorist

1 Rfi organizations in the subsequent weeks. Unlike the RAF, which was only able to attract a small number of active members, the PLO's terrorism helped them attract thousands of recruits.

In addition to helping fund the PLO, free imprisoned members from jail, and attract new recruits, terrorism also influenced the PLO's relationships with the Palestinian community, the Middle Eastern Arab population, the Arab states, the Soviet Union, the

United States, and the world population. At times, terrorism gained the PLO sympathy, support, and admiration, but it disgusted others and complicated the PLO's relationships with friends and foes.

The humiliating defeat of the Six Day War exposed the failure of Arab nationalism and Arab leadership of the Palestinian struggle. In the vacuum, the fedayeen groups and subsequently the renewed PLO won the support of the Palestinian people. For example, Fatah's emphasis on a specific Palestinian identity rather than a common Arab one was widely admired among Palestinians. Similarly, Fatah's attacks against Israel and, in particular, the engagement at Karameh, raised their revolutionary credibility and

Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 42, 229 Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 70 68 gained them the respect and the devotion of the Palestinian people.187 Thus the

Palestinians supported, admired, and joined the PLO because it was seen as the best chance for Palestinian independence. This support continued for decades; in a 1986 study carried out in the Occupied Territories, 93.5 percent considered the PLO the representative of the Palestinian people and 78.6 percent picked Arafat as their preferred leader. The percentage of Arafat supporters was even higher in Palestinian refugee camps. More than 60 percent stated that armed struggle was the most effective way to solve the Palestinian problem but, interestingly, leaders associated with violence against innocent civilians received very low approval ratings. Similarly, leaders who rejected compromise or political means to achieve Palestinian objectives also received low ratings. These findings suggest that the PLO, while only receiving a 71.2 percent approval rating, had the support of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories because of their focus on armed struggle supplemented by diplomatic efforts.

Middle Eastern Arabs were also supportive of the PLO's adoption of terrorism.

Having been thrice beaten by Israel in the first nineteen years of the country's existence,

Arabs from the humiliated countries were all too happy to see Israel suffer at anyone's hands. The more extreme the act, the more prestige the terrorists gained in the eyes of the Arab people, who saw the humiliation of Israel as revenge and valued the heroic

1 80 actions of the fedayeen above the speeches of their leaders. In the words of Aaron

Miller, terrorism "gave the PLO legitimacy and credibility among the Palestinian and

Arab masses at a moment when their own leaders had failed to deliver on their promises

Baumgarten. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2000," 33-34 Khalidi. "The PLO as a Representative of the Palestinian People," 64-68 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 41 69 to regain Palestine."190 The Arab leaders were genuinely interested in helping the

Palestinians; however, the cause remained subordinate to the needs of their own states, and thus Palestinians and Arabs alike were often disappointed by Arab leaders' actions.191 It was time for the Palestinians to take control of the insurgency.

Since they did not have their own state, the Palestinians and the PLO had to rely on the hospitality of Arab states.192 In addition to the thousands of Palestinian refugees absorbed by the Arab states, the PLO relied on them to provide a base for the organization. Although the PLO pledged "not to interfere in the internal affairs of any

Arab state"193 in the 1968 Charter, they did get involved in local politics, due to the large size of both the Palestinian refugee populations and the fedayeen. Their meddling in local affairs angered and destabilized their host states and as a result the PLO headquarters was forced to change location twice in the first twenty years, moving from Jordan to Lebanon and then to Tunisia.194 The move from Lebanon to Tunisia was particularly devastating to the PLO. The fighting in Lebanon had decimated the PLO's fighting force and the relocation of PLO headquarters to Tunisia meant the organization was hundreds of miles from its constituency and target state. This separation made rebuilding and maintenance of the civilian infrastructure more challenging and the ease and frequency of cross-border raids into Israel was greatly diminished. The expulsions were unfortunate for the PLO,

Aaron David Miller. "The PLO and the Politics of Survival," The Washington Papers 99, volume XI, 1983, 89 191 Ibid., 16 192 See pages 117-154 in Daniel Byman. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, for an in-depth example of the Syrian experience with Palestinian insurgent groups. 193 "The Palestinian National Charter," 27 194 The PLO was expelled from Jordan by King Hussein's troops in September 1970, referred to as 'Black September.' In 1982, the PLO fled Lebanon after becoming involved in a protracted Lebanese civil war, which resulted in an Israeli invasion of the PLO stronghold in southern Lebanon. 70 but understandable; there was only so much that heads of state were willing to put up with before the PLO became more of a burden and threat than they could stand.195

The Arab states bordering Israel also had to be mindful of their relationship with

Israel and other allies. Although 'committed' to the Palestinian cause, Arab leaders focused on their country's priorities first and foremost just as the PLO had feared.

Allowing fedayeen to attack Israeli targets from one's country brought severe Israeli reprisals. For example, between 1967 and 1970, Israel attacked PLO bases in Jordan near the Israeli border in an effort to decrease attacks and forced King Hussein to kick out the

PLO. Similarly, in 1968, Israel destroyed thirteen planes at Beirut airport in retaliation for

PLO attacks on El Al airliners.196 The Israeli reprisals also endangered citizens of the host country and refugees since the PLO often deliberately put their centres in the midst of settlements and refugee camps.197 At times, the host country's citizens even suffered violence at the hands of the Palestinians themselves. For example, during the Lebanese civil war, Palestinians took revenge on the Lebanese who had discriminated against and ridiculed them by forcing them to resign important posts, seizing their land, crops, or goods, and wounding or killing them.198 Hosting the PLO - or its constituent groups - came with many risks, including the destabilizing effects of the PLO presence, clashes between fedayeen and the local army or inhabitants, and Israeli reprisals. Terrorism complicated the PLO's relationship with the Arab states, particularly those that hosted the organization.

Jillian Becker. The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization. (London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1984), 75 1 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?', 18,45 191 Yaniv. P.L.O., 28 198 Rubin. Revolution until Victory? 49 71

The Arab states only supported PLO terrorism when it did not endanger their

people, country, ambitions, or alliances. The Soviet Union, although wary of the

organization, saw the benefits of supporting terrorism against Israel. Beginning in 1967,

with Yuri Andropov's appointment to the KGB Chairmanship, the Soviet Union began

supporting international terrorism.199 It is unlikely that the USSR believed the PLO

would succeed in its goals but they gave the PLO arms and training, often indirectly

through Arab states, with the express hope that their actions would weaken Western

influence in the region and undermine Israel. Thus, similar to the Arab states, the

USSR had its own goals in mind when it supported the PLO. The Palestinians were still

on their own when it came to solid support for the Palestinian insurgency.

The PLO's relationship with the United States was also extremely complicated. The

capitalist superpower was Israel's closest ally and supporter in the Middle East. In 1975, the American government strengthened this relationship by promising Israel that it would not negotiate with any organization that did not recognize UN resolution 242.201 The PLO was insulted by the resolution, believing their situation to be more than just a 'refugee problem' and refusing to recognize Israel since, they countered, the entire state had been wrested from them by might.202 The US also considered the PLO a terrorist organization and refused to recognize it as the representative of the Palestinian people until the leadership accepted resolution 242. This antagonism complicated the PLO's international

Rami Ginat and Uri Bar-Noi. "Tacit Support for Terrorism: The Rapprochement between the USSR ad Palestinian Guerrilla Organization following the 1967 War," Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no.2 (April 2007), 273 200 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 39; Ginat and Bar-Noi. "Tacit Support for Terrorism," 270 201UN Resolution 242 called for a 'just settlement of the refugee problem' and specifies that Israel should return 'territories occupied' in exchange for peace. Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 236 202 Stewart Ross. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 103-104 72 manoeuvres, since the US had veto powers in the UN Security Council.203 However,

American support of Israel also constrained that country's actions against the

Palestinians. Israel had the "military means to commit genocide against the Palestinian people or to expel them to surrounding Arab countries" but would not attempt either because the US would not support a strategy designed to inflict mass casualties.204 Thus, the US position both protected and stifled the Palestinian insurgency, but ultimately upheld the status quo. Until the PLO was ready to truly renounce terrorism, the United

States would make no official moves to help the PLO reach an agreement with Israel.

Unofficially, however, the United States was interested in relations with the

'terrorist organization.' When Arafat signalled his interest in secret communication, the

Nixon government eagerly responded. Deputy Director of the CIA Vernon Walters met with Arafat's chief of intelligence and the main organizer of the Munich Massacre, Ali

Hassan Salameh. Arafat hoped for American recognition, even in secret, of the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian people, but was disappointed when the American government continued to insist that the PLO must first renounce the use of terrorism.

The covert relationship continued in spite of the PLO's failure to abandon terrorism;

Salameh passed intelligence to the CIA regarding Arab terrorist attacks in hopes that the

US would support the PLO or at least allow the organization to take part in any future peace talks. The covert US-PLO relations crumbled, however, as the Nixon government grew concerned that the unofficial communication might damage their relations with

Israel and Jordan; the United States could not afford to deal with an organization that

Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 230, 236 Kydd and Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism," 61 73 espoused violence and threatened its allies. In 1978, the CIA stood aside when the Israelis killed Salameh in retribution for the Munich Massacre.205

International terrorism reminded global audiences that Palestinians did not have a state and that they were not going to take Israel's conquest passively. Horrible conditions in the refugee camps, caused largely by the neglect of their host states, as well as Israeli retaliation that harmed innocent civilians, brought sympathy and support from world audiences drawn to the humanitarian aspect of the cause. Western audiences in particular sympathized with the Palestinians although they were less likely to condone terrorism as a method to rectify the situation. Terrorism played an important role in the

Palestinian insurgency by publicizing the cause and helping amass support from the

Palestinians, Arabs, the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc, China and some newly independent states. However, the violent killings of innocent civilians were reviled by the

Western states, which supported Israel's counter-insurgency and stalled pro-Palestinian

UN initiatives and Israeli-PLO negotiations. In summary, terrorism gained the sympathy and support of a large number of organizations, people, and states, but alienated a very important minority and polarized the conflict.

After the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the PLO realized that their current strategy, which focused primarily on armed struggle, was falling short of their desired objectives. Although they had desperately wanted an Arab-Israeli war, they had not been actively involved in the Yom Kippur War and were not consulted during the peace

205 Naftali, Timothy. Blind Spot. (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 74-77, 136 206 Many of the border states were unwilling to incorporate the large numbers of Palestinians into their own countries because of the disadvantages to their own people in politics and the economy. They preferred to leave the refugees in the makeshift camps, which attracted sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Some Palestinians also wanted to leave the camps in poor condition to emphasize their temporary nature and the refugees hope to return home. Ian Bickerton and Carla Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. (New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 105-108 74 process. They realized that without more of an international diplomatic presence, their organization might be pushed aside and possibly ignored completely if Israel managed to strike a deal with either Egypt or Jordan. At the 1974 PNC session, the Council decided to adopt a slightly different approach to the insurgency by continuing their focus on armed struggle but supplementing it with a much stronger diplomatic effort. This re- evaluation of strategy also included a subtle, but important, shift in stated objective. The

PNC detailed a new two-stage solution to the conflict; first, the creation of a Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and second, the newly acquired territory would then be used to liquidate Israel. The PLO did not deny the second phase, but by focusing initially on a 'two-state solution' they opened up the possibility of diplomatic relations. Although the PLO continued to seek the destruction of Israel, which it refused to recognize as a state, the new strategy allowed the PLO to enter the international arena as a diplomatic entity.207

Concerned that Jordan or Egypt might make peace with Israel in return for

'Palestinian' land, the PLO created this two-stage strategy. The subtle shift in program coupled with increased diplomatic efforts brought results for the PLO. At the October

1974 Arab Summit over Jordan's objection, the PLO was named the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people.208 One month later, the UN invited the PLO to participate in discussions on Palestine, allowing Arafat to appear before the General

Assembly. Although this was not the Palestinians' first experience with the UN, since

Fatah had been addressing their cause to the UN since 1965, it was the first time that the

PLO had been invited. Arafat addressed the General Assembly for 100 minutes, speaking

Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 45-46 75 of his 'dream' of a peaceful Palestine where Jews could coexist with Palestinians if they were willing to renounce Zionism. Arafat concluded the speech with the now infamous statement: "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."209 The General Assembly was impressed; resolution

3236, which reaffirmed the Palestinians right to self-determination and national independence, was passed after Arafat's speech and the UN invited the PLO to attend the

General Assembly as an observer.210 Resolution 3210 was also an important gain, since the PLO "derived its legal status and the right of participation from the assembly itself, rather than its being conditional only on recognition by the Arab League."211 Although the UN passed resolutions that were favourable to the Israelis, their recognition of

Palestinian rights and their support of the PLO, inviting Arafat to address the General

Assembly and granting the PLO observer status, were major diplomatic achievements for the Palestinian organization. The support of the UN can be attributed to the organization's changing membership. At its creation in 1945, the UN 'family' consisted of the states that had emerged victoriously from World War Two. By 1974, when the UN granted the PLO observer status, the 'family' had become a 'system,' having grown from fifty-one states to 138 in less than twenty years.212 A large number of the new members were new states themselves; having recently gained their own independence, the new members understood the PLO's nationalistic desires and supported them by passing favourable resolutions.

20 David Hirst. The Gun and the Olive Branch. (London; Boston: Faber and Faber Limited, 1984), 335 210 Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, 230 211 Abdul Zindani. Arab Politics in the United Nations. (Yemen: Sana'a University Publications, 1977), 213 212 Harrod, Jeffrey. The UN under Attack. (London: Gower, 1988), 2; United Nations, "Member States," http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (accessed June 15, 2009) In addition to their successes with the UN, the PLO worked to amass political

support from a number of diverse groups. Their efforts were rewarded; the PLO became a

full member of the Nonaligned Movement in 1975 and the Arab League in 1976.213 The

PLO also cultivated relations with Communist China and the USSR, ensuring the support

of the communist countries' satellites as well. There is debate within the literature as to

whether it was the PLO's diplomatic efforts or its terrorism that secured it a place in

world politics. While Augustus Norton states "it is diplomacy that has eked out a

prominent place for the PLO in world politics,"214 Bruce Hoffman suggests that terrorism

was responsible, saying it was "perhaps not entirely coincidental, then, that eighteen

months after Munich the PLO's leader, Yasir Arafat, was invited to address the UN

General Assembly."215 Aaron Miller agrees with Hoffman that the PLO's armed struggle has "enhanced the PLO's visibility" and "forced the Arab states and the international

community to take Palestinian grievances seriously." The PLO's early diplomatic campaign was so successful that they had established formal diplomatic relations with more countries than Israel (86 versus 72) by the end of the 1970s. Bruce Hoffman reaffirms his previous statement saying "it is doubtful whether the PLO could ever have achieved this success had it not resorted to international terrorism."217 It would appear that the PLO's diplomatic success was the result of its use of terrorism to publicize and gain sympathy for the Palestinian cause and the complimentary veneer of respectability and compromise that resulted from its diplomatic efforts.

213 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 47 214 Augustus Norton and Martin Greenberg, ed. The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 1 215 Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 70 216 Miller. "The PLO and the Politics of Survival," 88 217 Hoffman. Inside Terrorism, 70 77

One motivating factor behind the PLO's diplomatic efforts was its desire to be considered the sole representative body of the Palestinian people. They wanted to ensure that any agreements made with Israel or other nations regarding the future of Palestine resulted in the formation of a sovereign Palestinian state. The fact that many nations

'recognized' the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people did not stop negotiations from taking place between Israel and its border Arab states interested in peace and the return of land held between 1948 and 1967. Israel also tried to cultivate alternative Palestinian leadership from the Occupied Territories, although their attempts produced little of value.218 In order to expose the futility of these attempts at coming to a peace settlement without the PLO, the fedayeen groups employed the tactic of'spoiling.' By continuing to perpetuate violence while the Egyptians and Israelis negotiated peace settlements, for example, the PLO showed Israel that Arab countries or alternative Palestinian leadership were unable to control the fedayeen and thus a peace settlement without the participation of the PLO could not guarantee Israel the security it desired.219 The question of whether or not the PLO was able to control the fedayeen will be addressed in chapter five. Terrorism helped affirm the necessity of negotiating with the PLO in order to make an Arab-Israeli 'peace' truly peaceful.

Even though the PLO publicized their cause, gained observer status and diplomatic recognition, it still faced the original enemy: Israel. Instead of weakening Israeli morale as the PLO had hoped, Palestinian terrorism strengthened Israeli resolve and increased

1 Norton and Greenberg, ed. The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization. 4 219 Kydd and Barbara Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism," 72-73; Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State, 684 78

feelings of hostility towards Palestinians.220 Israel focused its efforts on coordinating the

counter-insurgency activities of the Israeli Defence Force and the Israeli intelligence

community to ensure the safety of Israel. For the most part they were successful; the

overwhelming majority of domestic and cross-border attacks were stopped.221 The fedayeen were careful to avoid the IDF in pitched battles if at all possible, since the army was well trained and could mobilize far greater numbers than the PLO could and thus hit and run terrorism was far more cost-effective. The strong Israeli security and military forces pushed the Palestinians to attack elsewhere, resulting in the spectacular international terrorism of the late 1960s and early 1970s.222 These international terrorist attacks attracted media attention, but the murders of Israeli citizens reduced Western support for the PLO and sympathy for the Palestinians. Successful Israeli anti-terrorist raids, such as those at the Entebbe airport in 1976, were cheered around the world.223 In order to combat Palestinian terrorism, Israel was forced to spend more time and resources on security and intelligence services. However, for all the Palestinian's efforts, terrorism alone was unable to undermine the fundamental security of the Israeli state.

Although unable to seriously threaten Israel's sovereignty, terrorism has forced the

Israeli government to take undesirable political and military actions. The country's limited experience with democracy was influenced by constant threat of Arab aggression, in addition to the Palestinian 'problem.' Compounding this situation was the fact that most leaders, up until the mid-1990s, had been military or insurgent leaders in Israel's

220 Miller. "The PLO and the Politics of Survival," 88 221 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 48; Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 163 222 Ibid., 163 223 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 54 224 Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 144 79

early years. Perhaps the best way to think of Israel is as a "mixed developed-deve loping

society" trying to create a democratic society from a patchwork of laws and traditions

with a diverse immigrant population. The legal status of the Occupied Territories also

created a problem for the young democracy, since both Palestinians and Israelis lived in

the Occupied Territories and the terrorism there was neither wholly domestic nor

international. The Occupied Territories were ruled by the military and were subject to

different laws than Israel proper. For example, two different legal systems were used -

local (Jordanian) law for Arab offenders and Israeli law for Israeli citizens - developing

an unequal and discriminatory system. Similarly, the Decree of Security Regulations225

empowered the security forces to apply a wide variety of repressive counter-measures against the populations of the Occupied Territories that would not be considered appropriate in Israel proper. Israeli counter-insurgency measures discriminated against

Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and hostility toward Israel grew, ensuring the

PLO new recruits.226

In addition to the use of discriminatory policies, the legitimacy of the practices of the Israeli General Security Service, Shabak, was called into question. The committee convened in 1987 to investigate Shabak found that the prime minister's "direct responsibility for the security office, as well as the internal control organ of Shabak, was not sufficient to guarantee effective supervision and to prevent abuses."227 The committee also found that Shabak used force, including torture, to extract confessions and

225 These emergency powers had originally been drafted by the British mandate government during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. The British called then 'emergency' measures in Palestine, but the Israelis call them 'domestic law' in the Occupied Territories. Menachem Hofhung. "States of Emergency and Ethnic Conflict in Liberal Democracies: Great Britain and Israel," Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 351; Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 150 226 Ibid., 150-151 227 Ibid., 153 80

information from suspected terrorists. They also provided false testimonies when the

confessors claimed they had only confessed under duress. Israeli citizens' civil rights did

not suffer from the uncontrolled security apparatus or the duality of legal systems that

were part of Israeli counter-insurgency methods, but the unfair treatment of Palestinians

reflected poorly on the country's commitment to democracy and freedom from

oppression. Additionally, the power abuses, violent and discriminatory practices, and

Israeli reprisals in the Occupied Territories, border states, and abroad did not stop

Palestinian terrorism. In fact, these measures generated opposition to Israeli security

998

forces actions and policies from within Israel and from the international community.

For example, while international terrorism in the early 1970s had tarnished the PLO's

reputation, Israeli aggression against the organization in southern Lebanon, gained them

international sympathy and support.229 The Israeli counter-insurgency strategy, while not

aggressive enough to result in the loss of American support, was at times seen as unacceptably indiscriminate and overly violent.

In addition to the negative effects on public perception, one of the main problems with the counter-insurgency strategy was that Israeli strategists viewed the Palestinian threat as solely military instead of recognizing the political aspect of the insurgency. The result was that Palestinian terrorism was seen as a smaller threat compared to the Arab armies. And ultimately, the Israelis failed to understand the significance of the

Palestinians' insurgency and their commitment to achieving their objective.230 Yet, just as

Israel had misunderstood the political threat of the insurgency, the PLO had

Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 148, 153 Miller. "The PLO and the Politics of Survival," 101 Gal-Or. "Countering Terrorism in Israel," 148 81

underestimated their opponent as well. Since they refused to accept that Israel had a right

to exist or that the population was devoted to the Jewish state, the PLO could not

understand the commitment of the Israeli people and the failure of terrorism to wreak

havoc on the structure of Israeli society.231 By pledging to destroy Israel in order to create

Palestine, the PLO had identified an unreachable goal and turned the conflict into an all

or nothing struggle fraught with misunderstandings and the perpetuation of a cycle of retaliatory violence.

After twenty years of armed struggle, the PLO had not made any territorial gains nor had they weakened Israeli commitment to the state. Although accorded less

importance, diplomacy had fared better, gaining the PLO observer status in the UN and diplomatic recognition from dozens of countries. The PLO's ability to analyze and respond to changing geo-political circumstances also played a vital role in their success.

For example, during the Intifada in the late 1980s, local leadership in the Occupied

Territories attempted to put forward a programme that would serve as a basis for negotiations with Israel.232 The Intifada also sparked the creation of the Islamic

Palestinian resistance organization Hamas, which would eventually challenge the PLO's leadership of the Palestinian people.233 In order to maintain their influence in the territories, Arafat pushed for acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338, in addition to the renunciation of terrorism at the nineteenth PNC in 1988.234 The PLO made this move in order to open up the possibility of negotiating with Israel and the United States and thus

231 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 41-42 232 The First Intifada (1987 - 1992) was a spontaneous Palestinian popular uprising that began in Gaza and spread to the West Bank. Ross. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 219-228; Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace," 20; For more information see Ruth Beitler. The Path to Mass Rebellion: an Analysis of Two Intifadas. (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004) 233 Baumgarten. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2000," 37-39 234 Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace," 20 82 maintain leadership of the Palestinian movement. The acceptance of resolution 242 was no small concession since it meant, in theory, that the PLO was renouncing its claim over all of Palestine and accepting a 'two-state solution' in opposition to the PLO Charter's original position.235 The PLO was unwilling to completely renounce terrorism, however, and the US severed relations with the organization in 1990 over their refusal to condemn an attack on Israeli citizens. This disruption of relations, compounded by the PLO's misguided backing of Iraq during the Gulf War, and the emergence of a rival Palestinian leadership in the Occupied Territories placed the PLO in a precarious position in 1991.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War, the US was the only remaining superpower in the Middle East and took advantage of the geo-political situation to push peace talks.237

The Madrid Conference in October 1991 made little progress since Israeli Prime Minister

Yitzhak Shamir refused to talk with the PLO, negotiating instead with a joint Palestinian-

Jordanian delegation. In June 1992, Yitzhak Rabin replaced Shamir as Prime Minister, paving the way for talks with the PLO, with whom he was willing to negotiate. Israeli and PLO representatives met for secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway and managed to come to an agreement due to Arafat's willingness to accept conditions the 'inside'

Palestinian delegation - made up of notable Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank who had no open relationship with the PLO - had previously rejected.238 On September

13, 1993 the PLO and Israel signed the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-

Go vernment Arrangements, which provided for the "withdrawal of Israeli forces and

235 Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace," 20 236 Beitler. The Path to Mass Rebellion, 134 237 Ibid., 134 238 Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace," 26-30; Tanya Reinhart. Roadmap to Nowhere: Israel/Palestine since 2003. (London; New York: Verso, 2006), 48 83

transfer of power to a PLO-appointed authority in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho -

symbolizing the West Bank's future inclusion in the process."239 By signing an

agreement with the PLO, the Israeli government officially recognized the PLO as the

representative of the Palestinian people and took a step towards allowing some form of

Palestinian autonomy.240

Between 1968 and 1988, the PLO and its constituent groups used terrorism

regularly as their main form of armed struggle against Israel. Initially, terrorism helped the PLO to gain credibility and establish their reputation in the Arab world. After the

shocking 1967 Arab defeat, even small PLO victories were cheered by Palestinians and

Arabs alike, who compared the daring, heroic actions of the PLO to the poor performance of their beaten, humiliated governments. Terrorism gave Palestinians an outlet for their frustration and gained eager recruits for the PLO. It was also a source of nationalistic pride for Palestinians; a cause to support and victories to cheer. At times, the only victory was the death of an Israeli, but other operations resulted in the release of large numbers of incarcerated Palestinians. Both victories were important since they showed the weakness of the Israeli state, which was unable to protect its citizens in the first case and in the second case, ignored their own deterrence policy therefore rendering it useless and encouraging future violence. Perhaps the greatest success the PLO achieved through the use of terrorism was publicity for their plight. By internationalizing terrorism, the PLO had accessed a greater audience than ever before. Millions of people worldwide were witness to the violence carried out by Palestinians against Israelis. Hijackings and high-

Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 198 240 Dennis J. Deeb. The Collapse of Middle East Peace: The Rise & Fall of the Oslo Peace Accords. (New York: IUniverse, 2003), 11 84

profile attacks, such as those at the Munich Olympics, publicized the cause more quickly

and dramatically than peaceful efforts would have been able. Terrorism helped to provide

the PLO and the Palestinian people with a sense of cohesion, purpose, and pride and

publicized the Palestinian cause in the international community.

Many of the PLO's greatest successes were diplomatic. For example, the PLO

gained membership in the Arab League and the Nonaligned Movement, in addition to

observer status at the UN. The UN General Assembly also passed resolution 2672

supporting the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. From the early 1970s

on, the PLO's diplomatic efforts produced big results. The PLO was recognized as the

'sole, legitimate representative' of the Palestinian people by the Arab League, as well as by the tens of countries that formally recognized the PLO as the Palestinian representative. Perhaps the greatest success of all was the signing of the Oslo Accords.

Israel finally recognized the PLO and made official concessions regarding the return of

Palestinian territory and sovereignty. Although terrorism publicized the Palestinian cause and reminded state leaders that Palestinians were not ready to fade into the background, without the bureaucracy, state-like structure, and diplomatic efforts of the PLO, these enormous successes would not have materialized.

Although terrorism helped the PLO to publicize their cause and gain the support of the Palestinian and Arab audiences, it also tarnished their image and complicated relationships with certain states and organizations. The United States, for example, refused to negotiate with the PLO due to their use of terrorism and refusal to recognize the state of Israel. The Arab states were also somewhat hostile towards the PLO's aggressive actions since they attracted Israeli reprisals that affected the Arab border states 85 and caused internal strife for the countries that hosted the PLO headquarters. Terrorism and the PLO's aggressive rhetoric also polarized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict further, encouraging increased Israeli violence and oppression of the Palestinian people, which in turn sparked new protest and violence. Perhaps the greatest failure of pursuing terrorism as their main strategy of insurgency was its inability to pose a serious threat to the state of

Israel. Israelis were committed to maintaining the Jewish state at all costs and terrorism alone was unable to convince them otherwise. Only with the PLO's renunciation of terrorism, intense pressure from the international community - including their American ally - and the election of an Israeli Prime Minister willing to compromise, was Israel finally persuaded to take steps towards allowing some form of Palestinian autonomy. The positions of the RAF and the PLO in 1993 could not have been more different. The PLO was conducting important negotiations with its enemy, which had recognized the organization's grievances by agreeing to negotiate with it, at the very time the RAF was dwindling into obscurity. A comparison of the two insurgencies will follow in chapter five. 86

Chapter Five

Epilogue: 1992/1993 - 2008

Red Army Faction

In addition to losing the vast majority of their sympathetic audience in the late

1970s and 1980s, the RAF began to lose its supporters and have trouble gaining new recruits. The collapse of European communism in 1989 was a huge blow to the FCO and finally convinced the third wave RAF members of the futility of their insurgency. The

East Germans' rejection of communism in favour of the democratic capitalist system of the Federal Republic of Germany and the reunification of East and West Germany in

1991 caused the RAF to reconsider their objective and their insurgency. The RAF's failure was clear; they had been unable to provoke a repressive government response or a popular uprising against the government. Their chances of success became even less likely with the reunification since the East Germans had taken part in a mass uprising against their own communist state and had rejected communism en masse. The RAF slowly came to the realization that their ideology and strategy were incompatible with the

Zeitgeist of reunified Germany.

949

With some trepidation, the Bonn government launched the Kinkel Initiative in late 1991, which allowed for the early release of imprisoned RAF members who were ill or had served long sentences. They hoped that this initiative would further erode the

241 Dennis A. Pluchinsky. "Germany's Red Army Faction: An Obituary," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 16, no.2 (1993), 144 242 Named after German Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel. Pluchinsky. "Germany's Red Army Faction," 139 87

RAF's support base.243 The RAF responded with a communique in February 1992 stating

that the issue of prisoner release was being addressed because of "all these [RAF]

struggles and initiatives for their collocation and their freedom."244 In a way, the RAF

had won a battle with Germany by securing the release of a few imprisoned members.

However, this small victory was in no way indicative of who had won the war. In April,

June, and August 1992, suffering from "ideological fatigue, strategic confusion, and

organizational isolation"245 the commando level of the RAF released communiques

announcing their intention to suspend the insurgency in Germany. Although the RAF

carried out one further operation in 1993, successfully detonating five bombs in a newly

built, empty prison, the group was 'running on the fumes of Marxism.'246 In 1997, former

RAF members held a reunion and on April 20, 1998, Reuters received a brief

communique from the group stating that "the urban guerrilla, in the form of the RAF, is now history,"247 officially disbanding the Red Army Faction.

Palestine Liberation Organization

The signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government

Arrangements at Washington inl993 raised Palestinian hopes, since they saw this agreement as a step towards the formation of an independent Palestine.248 On December

10, 1994, Israeli Prime Minster Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres,

243 Pluchinsky. "Germany's Red Army Faction," 139 244 Ibid., 139 245 Ibid., 136 246 Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 264-265; Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 48 2 7 Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 266 248 Deeb. The Collapse of Middle East Peace, 11 88 and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East.249 Also in 1994, the Palestinian National Authority

(PA) was inaugurated, to manage internal affairs in Gaza and Jericho and eventually in the West Bank as well.250 In 1996, Arafat won the election for the PA Presidency and

Fatah triumphed in the PA's Legislative Council.251 Although the PA was to be subordinate and accountable to the PLO, it slowly became autonomous from both Israel and the PLO, particularly after the local elections through which the Palestinians in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip gave the PA its legitimacy as a democratically elected body.

The PLO's leadership of the Palestinian movement had been in decline since the organization's expulsion from Lebanon and the rise of the PA occurred at the expense of the PLO, as people and supplies were increasingly focused on the Occupied

252

Territories.

The Oslo Accords had sparked many hopes, but their success was hampered by both Palestinian and Israeli failure to abide by the guidelines of the Accords. On the one hand, the Palestinians "failed to halt propaganda against Israel in the Palestinian media, did not confiscate illegal firearms from Palestinian police and militants, engaged in corrupt government practices, and did not demonstrate enough force in fighting terrorism from extremists."253 On the other hand, the Israelis refused to fully implement the self- rule provisions in the Oslo Accords and failed to stop the settlement program: between

249 Yitzhak Rabin, Yasir Arafat, and Shimon Peres. "Speeches Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize," in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, ed. Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 487; Deeb. The Collapse of Middle East Peace, 14 250 Bickerton and Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 179 251 Nigel Parsons. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. (London: Routledge, 2005), 46 252 Groth. "The PLO's Road to Peace," 82, 84 253 Deeb. The Collapse of Middle East Peace, 50 89

1993 and 2003, the number of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories doubled. 254 As the Oslo Accords and the PA foundered, Arafat and Fatah lost ground to Hamas, whose

social services had fostered the development of close relations with the local inhabitants.

The perception that Hamas had 'taken-over' the PLO's armed struggle against Israel also gave the younger organization popular appeal.255 With Arafat's death in 2004 and

Hamas's electoral victory over Fatah in the Palestinian Authority in January 2006,

Hamas's popularity eclipsed that of Fatah and of the PLO.256 Hamas also gained

Palestinian support from the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Israel hoped the action would ease international pressure and satisfy Israeli voters, but Hamas claimed, and many Palestinians believed, that the Israeli withdrawal was the result of Hamas's actions.257 In June 2007, Hamas used its paramilitary force, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam

Brigades, to take complete control over the Gaza Strip by "[exploiting] the near total

9SR collapse of rest of the Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza." This takeover split the

Palestinian movement within the Occupied Territories in two: resulting in a Hamas- controlled Gaza and a Fatah-dominated, Palestinian Authority-controlled West Bank.259

The Palestinian insurgency was not over but it had changed course and the PLO was no longer the dominant organization in Palestinian politics.

254 Deeb. The Collapse of Middle East Peace, 31, 50 255 Parsons. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority, 48; Baumgarten. "The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948-2000," Journal of Palestine Studies 34, (4) (Summer 2005), 38-42 256 Reinhart. Roadmap to Nowhere, 143-144 257 Ibid., 91; Bickerton and Klausner. A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 31A 258 Anthony Cordesman. "The Gaza War: A Strategic Analysis," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (accessed July 8, 2009), 5 259 Ibid., 6 90

Chapter Six

Comparison and Analysis

After over twenty years of insurgency, the RAF and the PLO were in decline and by 1992/1993, both organizations reached a turning point in their insurgency. The RAF and the PLO had originally chosen terrorism as a strategy of insurgency because of the military superiority of their target state, the propaganda value of the dramatic nature of violent actions, the comparatively minimal human and material costs, the rapid rewards of small-scale, covert actions, and because both organizations believed that a strategy of provocation or attrition, respectively, would result in victory. The two organizations used terrorism to varying degrees of success to ensure logistics, to free imprisoned comrades, to publicize their cause, and to attract new recruits. Their actions resulted in the target state's development of counter-insurgency measures and counter-terrorism units and changes to the target state's legislation in attempt to combat the groups' violence.

However, by 1993, the two insurgencies had taken remarkably different paths; the RAF was on its last legs while the PLO seemed to be finally turning diplomatic success into substantive negotiations. This chapter will compare the effectiveness of terrorism as a strategy of insurgency for the RAF and the PLO in regards to: ensuring logistics; freeing imprisoned members; affecting sympathy, support and recruitment; and ultimately, affecting the target state and the attainment of the strategic objective.

The RAF and the PLO successfully used terrorism to fund and equip their operatives. Both groups used bank robberies and extortions to ensure logistics for their insurgencies. Although often successful, the use of terrorism for nefarious activities, such 91

as robbery or extortion, sullied the image of the insurgents, reducing them to the level of

common criminals. The RAF used terrorism in this manner throughout their insurgency,

but when the Bonn government learned to treat the insurgency with "conventional law

enforcement tactics" the state was able to "maintain a posture of moral legitimacy during

its struggle with the RAF,"260 and thus denied the organization the repressive government

response and the negative public reaction they hoped for. Although the PLO and its

constituent groups did employ terrorism in this manner, they also developed their own

assets and were able to rely mainly on investments, donations, and taxes to fund their

insurgency. This allowed the organization to distance itself from the 'criminal' image

such terrorism evoked, which became increasingly significant as the PLO attempted to

create a more diplomatic image. By the end of the 1970s, the PLO had largely ceased to use terrorism for profit.

Terrorism was also a successful tool for recruiting new members and new

supporters. For Palestinians, terrorism was an active outlet for anger and frustration; the

emotional victory achieved by humiliating Israeli was important for the defeated Arabs

and inspired thousands to join the PLO or its constituent groups. Similarly, RAF terrorism inspired the bourgeois German youth who romanticized the Viet Cong and Che

Guevara. The RAF acquired far fewer recruits than the PLO, only managing to attract a few dozen in comparison to the PLO's thousands. Nonetheless, terrorism was successful in inspiring Palestinians and Germans to join the insurgencies of the RAF and the PLO.

Both groups also used terrorism when attempting to free imprisoned members, usually by creating hostage situations in the hopes of obtaining a prisoner exchange. The

260 Tom Parker. "Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the Terrorist Movements they Oppose," Terrorism & Political Violence 19, no. 2 (2007), 72 92 outcome of these operations was largely determined by the target state, since the government decided whether or not to bargain with the terrorists based on an evaluation of the hostage situation, the message a bargain would send to the insurgents, the public reaction to the death of the hostages/the freeing of prisoners, and the ability of their counter-terrorism unit to effect a successful rescue. The PLO had greater success in this than the RAF, but they also had a far greater number offedayeen in Israeli jails. Although prisoner exchange operations often failed due to government refusal to negotiate or the efforts of the target state's security forces, even unsuccessful operations were important for improving morale within the insurgency and obtaining publicity for the movement.

Perhaps most importantly, the sensational nature of terrorism guaranteed media attention for the RAF and the PLO. The RAF's actions received a lot of coverage in

Germany, in addition to some interest in NATO countries, but since most RAF operations were carried out within Germany, it remained a localized issue. By involving citizens from third party countries and executing operations outside of Israel, the PLO's actions were of greater significance to world audiences, who subsequently consumed more media about the insurgents and their actions. Spectacular hijackings and high-profile operations, such as those at the Munich Olympics, guaranteed the PLO widespread media coverage.

The Palestinian insurgency was also intimately connected to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the instability in the Middle East, giving it more international interest than the German insurgency. Although journalists and broadcasters often focused on the seemingly senseless violence and brutality of the acts, publicity was nonetheless important because it piqued hitherto untapped interest in the insurgency. Terrorism, and in particular the 93

PLO's international terrorism, was successful in publicizing the PLO and the RAF's

insurgencies.

Susan Carruthers argued that the media often focused on the sensational violence

of terrorism, sidelining the insurgents' message. Without a message, or for those who did not agree with the message, the violence of terrorism seemed senseless and the insurgents could thus be dismissed, their violence abhorred, and a government response supported.261 When the Israeli or German government responded with counter-insurgency measures that were both effective and acceptable, they retained public support by maintaining order and ensuring the continuation of a healthy, secure democracy. On the other hand, counter-insurgency measures that seemed weak or ineffective, such as prisoner exchanges, decreased the German or Israeli public's support for their government. While ineffective measures did not increase sympathy for the insurgents,

'unacceptable' counter-insurgency measures did. It was the media coverage of the Israeli and German government's reactions that gained more sympathy and support for the insurgencies among the sympathetic or uncommitted audiences. For example, the use of excessive force, such as the German police killing of Petra Schelm or retaliatory Israeli air strikes that harmed innocent Palestinians, increased sympathy for the insurgents. The

Bonn government learned this lesson fairly quickly and was able to efficiently combat the

RAF using methods 'acceptable' to the large majority of the German people and international community. The Israeli government did not take the same steps to improve its counter-insurgency policy and, through its actions, Israel enlarged the PLO's sympathetic audience. While terrorism was applauded by the insurgents' supporters, the

1 Carruthers. The Media at War, 191 sympathetic audience was more likely to increase in response to 'unacceptable' government counter-insurgency measures.

In order to be successful, the insurgents needed to at least maintain this sympathy, if not turn it into support. However, terrorism alone was rarely capable of doing this; general sympathy did not easily translate into support for the insurgents' strategic objectives. A prime example of this is the sympathy the RAF gained in response to their

'prison conditions' campaigns; sympathy for the group increased, but only a very small minority of these sympathizers supported the RAF's strategic objective. The PLO fared better at maintaining sympathy and increasing support thanks to their diplomatic endeavours and the genuine victimization of the Palestinians. While many people might have found it hard to support a terrorist organization, it was much easier to sympathize with Palestinians still living in refugee camps or the PLO leadership that portrayed itself as independent of the Palestinian terrorists.

One of the main reasons that both insurgencies failed to obtain their strategic objective was because their strategies were constructed on inadequate and naive analyses of the target state and/or their audiences. The main flaw in the RAF analysis was the belief that the German public would rise up against the Bonn government according to

Marighella's provocation model; they failed to understand that the German public had no

969 interest in revolution, particularly a communist one. The RAF was initially successful in provoking a 'repressive' response from the security forces; however, the Bonn government managed to adapt its policies in order to make its counter-insurgency measures more effective and 'acceptable,' thereby refusing to provide a necessary

Kydd and Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism," 69 95

element in the RAF's plan. Since the German public was not inclined to sympathize with the RAF and, aside from a few blunders, the response of the Bonn government was both

effective and 'acceptable,' the RAF's terrorism only antagonized the population and

increased support for government counter-insurgency measures. In summary, RAF terrorism was an effective tactic for securing logistics, gaining recruits, and publicizing the insurgency, but it alienated the public instead of provoking a sympathetic mass uprising. Shocked by the collapse of European communism, the RAF members finally understood the futility of their struggle and abandoned their insurgency.

The PLO's strategy suffered as the result of a similar mistake; the PLO profoundly misunderstood the Israeli commitment to Israel. In the face of the Arab conventional armies' defeat, the PLO believed that it could "sap the IDF's strength, undermine national morale, and erode popular support and trust of Israel's military and political leaders," eventually forcing the country to surrender under the weight of a war of attrition.263 Since the PLO leaders did not believe that Israel had the right to exist, they underestimated the devotion of those who fervently did believe in the Jewish state. The

PLO had thought that anti-Israeli terrorism would "prevent Israel's consolidation and bring about its disintegration and dissolution, paving 'the way for a quick blow by the regular [Arab] armies at the right moment.'"264 However, Israeli society did not disintegrate, even in the face of a mass Palestinian uprising like the First Intifada, and the

Arab states made peace with Israel, more or less accepting the post-1967 status quo in exchange for greater regional stability. By questioning the right of Israel to exist and

263 O'Neill. "Towards a Typology of Political Terrorism," 16; Victor Vine and Barbara Salert. "Does a Coercive Official Response Deter Terrorism? The Case of the PLO," Terrorism and Political Violence 8, no.l (Spring 1996), 27 264 Rubin. Revolution until Victory?, 29 96 underestimating Israeli fidelity to that state, the PLO mistakenly believed that local and

international terrorism would weaken Israel sufficiently to allow the PLO to reclaim the

land they believed was rightfully theirs.

Despite their flawed conception of Israeli society, the PLO used terrorism to gain

sympathy and support from Palestinian and Arab audiences, recruit insurgents, ensure

logistics, and publicize the Palestinian insurgency. However, as time passed it became

clear that the narrow focus on 'armed struggle' was limiting the PLO. One of the major

factors that contributed to the partial success of the Palestinian insurgency was the

leadership's ability to analyze the geopolitical situation and adapt their strategy. Although the PLO leadership did not always make wise choices - supporting Iraq against the US during the First Gulf War, for example - over the decades, they made a number of changes that resulted in their greatest diplomatic successes. These changes included the adoption of the two-stage plan in 1974, which improved the PLO's diplomatic image; the renunciation of terrorism and the acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 in 1988, which showed the PLO's willingness to communicate with Israel; as well as the signing of the

Oslo Accords, where the PLO agreed to terms that the Palestinian leadership in the

Occupied Territories had refused. By pursuing a program of diplomacy, in addition to their armed struggle against Israel, the PLO created important links with dozens of countries and organizations, which augmented their sympathetic audience and gave the insurgency greater international legitimacy.

While the Federal Republic of Germany managed to isolate the left-wing radicals and maintain the support of its population, the mystique of the RAF lives on today; the

German public remains fascinated by the RAF, and the first wave leadership in particular, 97

as the popularity of the 2008 film Der Baader Meinhof Komplex indicates. In Blood and

Rage, Michael Burleigh states that the "RAF has become just another marketing

brand,"265 pointing to the German public's acceptance and even embracement of the

radical insurgency of their past.

Unfortunately, the Palestinian insurgency has not yet become history: serious

issues remain between the Israelis and Palestinians. While the RAF's 'victimhood' was

the group's own creation and thus fairly easily resolved, millions of Palestinians continue

to live in horrible conditions in refugee camps and in the Occupied Territories, particularly in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Peace talks and agreements have brought

little relief to the population and many of the Palestinian goals/demands have not been met. Support for the radical, Islamic group Hamas has grown as the PLO's peace initiatives have failed and, particularly, during the Second Intifada?66 The cycle of violence continues and intensifies as retaliatory Israeli counter-insurgency measures alienate and radicalize the moderate Palestinian population, who then support the continuation of Palestinian violence.267 The recent conflict in the Gaza Strip is particularly indicative of the continued antagonism between the two sides. In response to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Israel launched an economic and political war on Hamas and Gaza, depriving the region of a large part of its power, water, and economy. Hamas stepped up arms smuggling and began firing rockets at Israeli territory in response. In December 2008, the Israelis invaded the Gaza Strip in Operation Cast

Lead in an attempt to stop the rocket attacks and show their refusal to accept hostility on

Burleigh. Blood and Rage, 266 Cordesman. "The Gaza War: A Strategic Analysis," 5 Berry. "Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism," 12-13 98

Israeli borders. Despite Israeli military superiority in the conflict, the operation "did not succeed in deterring Hamas from new rocket strikes on Israel or [make] definitive changes in the political and military situation in Gaza."268 However, the invasion did

960 increase instability in the region and ultimately weaken Israel's security. The last 40 years of Palestinian insurgency have proved that Israel cannot be defeated by terrorism alone, yet it is unlikely that the tit for tat exchange will cease in the near future.

In conclusion, the RAF and the PLO successfully employed terrorism to publicize the insurgents' cause, ensure logistics, attract sympathy and support from predisposed populations, and recruit new members for the organizations. However, it was detrimental to the RAF and PLO's insurgencies because it often hurt the perceived legitimacy of the insurgent organization, alienated even the sympathetic audience, and increased support for government counter-insurgency measures. This report concludes that terrorism was an ineffective strategy of insurgency for the Red Army Faction and the Palestinian

Liberation Organization.

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Candidate's full name: Hannah Mae Fransen

Universities attended (with dates and degrees obtained): University of Ottawa, Bachelor of Arts, Hons. History, 2008