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1 Plato on the Good Andre Pinero Submitted to the Department Of Plato on the Good Andre Pinero Submitted to the Department of Philosophy Spring 2020 1 For both philosophers and human beings more generally, the concept of goodness is one of paramount importance. The idea of goodness is considered to be fundamental to ethics, without any conception of it, we would be lost and unable to tell right action from wrong. This is generally where the importance of goodness stops in philosophy. We usually assume, particularly in the modern world, that the sphere of the good is one coterminous with judgment of human action, and that to expand our conception of goodness to our metaphysical or epistemological inquires is not only confused but ultimately somehow fallacious. In other words, if inquiry into the Good can lead to any knowledge at all, it will only be in the ethical sphere. Such assumptions are not shared by one of the most important figures in our philosophical lineage, Plato. To be sure, Plato is quick to accept that the Good is an ethical concept, one that allows us to judge human agents and actions. However, not only did Plato believe that goodness and our desire for it structured human action, but he also upheld that goodness was fundamental to knowledge and even reality, a claim that rings bizarre to modern ears. As Matthew Evans puts it in his paper on Plato’s Euthyphro, Plato puts “normative facts” at the “foundation” (Evans, 2012, p. 2) of his metaphysical system, rather than having his normative views be based on his metaphysics (as might seem far more intuitive to a modern mind). Even more strikingly, Plato believed all things are good in the same way. Goodness is for Plato univocal. As Peter Geach put it (when arguing against the univocal nature of goodness) “all things called good must satisfy some one condition” (Geach, 1956, p. 35). Though for Geach this view is “hopelessly ambiguous” (Geach, 1956, p. 35), Plato is adamant that even when we are talking 2 about things of wildly different sorts (from a human being to a plant to a celestial body), the quality that makes them good must be at base the same. As we shall see, not only does Plato believe that this one quality is what makes a thing a good instance of its kind, but he also upholds that this quality is present in all things to some degree in so far as they exist. Indeed, the Good is for Plato not merely a fundamental idea, but the centerpiece of his entire philosophical system (in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology). Ethically speaking, without knowing the Good we will be unable to understand what is “fine and good” (Republic, 505b2-3) in human affairs at all. With regard to epistemology, Plato claims that our knowledge is made possible by the Good, as it gives “the power to know to the knower” (Republic, 508e2). Lastly, objects of knowledge, the forms or ideas, owe their “existence and being” (Republic, 509b7-8) to the Good, and thus for Plato the very order of reality would not exist without this univocal goodness. It is in Book VI of the Republic that Plato explores this vital idea. Though discussion of the Good originates in an ethical and political context concerning the rulers of Socrates’ ideal city, Plato soon changes the scope of the discussion by placing goodness at the heart of his metaphysics and epistemology. Interestingly, Plato does not explore this idea in the same way as other objects of knowledge. Instead of providing us with even a working definition of Goodness that one could use to judge and apply to objects in the world, Plato relies upon an analogy in order to impart to his reader a general sense of the place of the Good in his system. 3 I hope to show that though Plato provides us no definition of goodness here, one does exist. For Plato, goodness is unity or oneness. Put simply, this means both that the idea of unity (as synonymous with goodness) is the most fundamental in the Platonic universe, and that individual things in that universe (both ideas and material objects) exist insofar as they are unified. I argue that this conception of goodness makes sense both in the context of Plato’s analogy and helps flesh out his picture of ideas and particular objects. In sketching out this position, I attempt to show how both material things and ideal forms participate in the form of the Good and how goodness thus explains the reality of both of these categories of things. Additionally, I will discuss how forms participate in the Good more directly than particular objects, and thus are both better and more real. After introducing my interpretation of goodness as unity, I will then evaluate and ultimately reject an alternate interpretation of the Good. This reading deemphasizes the definitional content and seeks instead to center our understanding of it in on its role in Plato’s metaphysics; claiming either that reaching a definition is unimportant or in some sense impossible. In other words, what matters is that the Good is the ground of reality, not what the content of the Good is. Though there is good reason to think this view is wrong, by exploring it and admitting its strengths in bringing our attention to crucial nature of the role of the Good we will arrive at a better understanding of both Plato’s conception of the Good and why he chose not to directly present it in the Republic. At issue here is whether unity as goodness is the ultimate aim of Plato’s thought in this regard, or whether we are better off minimizing the importance of a 4 definition in favor of the role the Good plays in Plato’s system as the fundamental explanatory principle of reality. We will reject the view that the role of the Good ought to be emphasized over its content, and conclude that the manner in which Plato explores the role of the Good is actually important to and buttresses our view of unity as the Good. In doing so, we will show that the relations explored in the analogy of the sun serve to help us understand the Good as we have formulated it. Essentially, one cannot have knowledge of the Good as unity without understanding that and how the Good allows for the reality of forms. Introducing the Good and the Analogy of the Sun Discussion of the idea of the Good in Plato’s Republic takes place in Book VI. This book is largely dedicated to Plato’s conception of philosophers, who are designated as the rulers of the ideal, perfectly just city discussed in the Republic. Plato here discusses the nature of philosophers, claiming that they must be “genuine lover(s) of learning” (Republic, 485d3), love the pleasures of the soul over those of the body (485d10-12) and not fear death (486a12) or be unjust (486b8). Aside from these character traits of those who will be selected as philosophers there is the matter of what sort of things these prospective leaders must learn in order to rule. Prospective philosophers must be trained in a variety of subjects, including physical exercise, in order to be up to the task of leading the city and being true philosophers who can serve that end. This education has as its goal knowledge of the Good, which is called the “greatest and most appropriate subject” 5 (Republic, 504d2) and the “cause” (504d6) of the virtues discussed in Book IV of the dialogue. From its very first mention we can see why knowledge of the Good would be so useful for philosophers, as Socrates calls it “the greatest thing to learn about” (Republic, 505a2) and mentions that other things become “useful and beneficial” (505a3) in light of it. Indeed, knowledge of all but the Good is deemed lacking and incomplete for a philosopher, since without knowledge of goodness we can know “nothing fine or good” (Republic, 505b2-3). This is seemingly quite natural, since for Plato the philosophers will also be guardians, or the political leaders of the city. It makes sense that these leaders would have to be well learned with regard to human goodness, as they would have to determine what is good for the citizens of their city. So far then, we could safely assume that Plato is referencing a good that is much more familiar to us, one that pertains to human beings and affairs. The Good’s supreme importance notwithstanding, the discussion initially seems to go on along the usual Platonic lines. In this vein, Socrates brings up two popular definitions for goodness: pleasure and knowledge. Socrates quickly shoots both of these possible definitions down.1 With this preliminary, eliminative round complete, it would seem natural for Socrates to pursue a more constructive path and direct his interlocutors toward some working definition of goodness. Plato has already done just that with justice in Book IV of the same dialogue (Republic, 443c8- 1 Pleasure, the candidate of “the masses” (Republic, 505b5), is shown to be clearly dissimilar to the Good, since pleasures can be bad, and something cannot both be good and bad. Knowledge, the candidate of the “refined” (Republic, 505b6), fares little better. The proponents of this view cannot say what sort of knowledge the Good would constitute, outside of claiming it is knowledge of the Good, which clearly still leaves us in the dark as to the Good’s actual content. 6 444a1), and though he is clear that this definition is not complete, he is still very open to providing one.
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