This Isn't Your Mom's Tupperware Party

THIS ISN’T YOUR MOM’S TUPPERWARE PARTY: HOW EMILY’S LIST CHANGED THE AMERICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

JAMIE PAMELIA PIMLOTT

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2007

For Pamie: tee hee, llama, emu, snort!

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In no way would this dissertation have been completed without the support and love of a great

number of people. First I’d like to thank my chair, Lawrence C. Dodd. Without his support and belief

in me from Day One I would not have continued with my studies. I will always cherish the time spent

with him talking about scholarship, politics, and life. Little did I know that having him as an advisor

would be such a wonderful intellectual experience. I only hope that one day I will be able to offer the

same kind of support and intellectual stimulation to my own students. I would also like to thank Leslie

Anderson, who pulled me aside one day in after class in 2002 and said, “Why aren’t you in the Ph.D.

program?” Dan Smith’s support and advice became critical early on in my search of the dissertation

topic—I first began researching EMILY’s List in his Campaign Finance course. He also provided a

wonderful sounding board as I struggled to find a job in D.C. and work through the juggernaut of

campaign finance legislation. During a discussion over a topic for an Independent study course, Lynn

Leverty, one of my first graduate school teachers (during Grad School Part I) said to me, “This topic is

dissertation material!” From those first few courses—the Field Seminar and APD—and throughout this

project Beth Rosenson provided an excellent blend of criticism and encouragement. I knew that if I

convinced her I stood on solid ground.

Peggy Conway, who I took a class with as an undergraduate eons ago, agreed to come out of

retirement and serve on my committee. She offered me wonderful feedback, actually sending me hard

copies of chapters that I could go through and see her comments. She also introduced me to two wonderful female scholars, Karen O’Connor and Sarah Brewer, who took me under their wing during my time in Washington, D.C. Lastly, but certainly not least I’d like to thank Kendal Broad, who offered wonderful comments and encouragement as I struggled with the how EMILY’s List used identity politics and how the organization evolved not into a women’s PAC but a movement. Any error herein is my own.

I would also like to acknowledge the love and support of Dana K. Bagwell (DKB). Never did I imagine I would find as wonderful a man—he is my best friend, my intellectual equal (if not superior), my soulmate, and the love of my life. He has been there to celebrate with me and to wipe my tears. He tirelessly read drafts of this dissertation on the way to work—missing work one day to help me make a deadline. He kept me caffeinated and fed on those long nights, every once and a while saying things like

“get to work!” He loves me—I am a very lucky woman.

Lastly I would like to acknowledge my parents and my daughter. My parents taught me to never give up, regardless of the barriers I faced (and there were many). I would like to think that this is a testament to those teachings. Without my Dad engaging me in political debates and being a news junkie from the time I can remember, I doubt I would have found my calling. Mom—words cannot express the debts I owe you. Over a decade ago, I said you were the ‘Wind Beneath My Wings’—thanks for teaching me how to fly. Finally, to my daughter Pamelia, my Pamie—I cannot imagine my life without you in it. Being your mom is the most precious gift—you are an amazing girl. I came to this topic by happenstance, but I would like to think that I pursued it because in it I see a vision of the type of world I want you to live in.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... 6

LIST OF TABLES...... 8

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 10

ABSTRACT...... 11

INTRODUCTION ...... 13

Understanding EMILY’S List—the Thesis...... 15 Second-Wave Feminism and Electoral Politics—The Roots of EMILY’S List ...... 17 The Emergence and Evolution of EMILY’S List...... 18 Members and their Organizational Roles ...... 18 Candidates and the Organization...... 19 Summary...... 20

LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 21

Women as Tokens...... 22 Women as Candidates...... 24 Women and Legislatures ...... 29 Women Need Money...... 33 Women Have Powerful Tools ...... 34

THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND IDENTITY POLITICS...... 37

A Brief History ...... 38 The ERA ...... 42 Women Activists and EMILY’s List...... 44

EMILY’S LIST—THE ORGANIZATION...... 46

Why a PAC? ...... 46 Women’s PACs ...... 51 EMILY Grows and Matures ...... 55 EMILY’s List: New Frontiers ...... 64 EMILY’s List Reaches Out ...... 77

EMILY’S LIST—THE MEMBERS...... 93

Where Do EMILY’S List Members Belong?...... 95 Data and Method...... 99

Hypotheses...... 101 Basic Demographics ...... 102 Sex ...... 102 Occupation...... 103 Where Do Donors Live?...... 106 Sex, State of Residence, and Occupation ...... 108 Sex and Money ...... 110 Types of ELISTERs...... 112 New Donors...... 113 New versus Repeat Donors ...... 114 ‘Other’ Donations...... 118 Conclusion ...... 121

THE CHOSEN FEW—EMILY’s LIST ENDORSEMENTS 2000–2004 ...... 132

EMILY’s List Endorsement ...... 132 Candidates and Bundled ELIST Money...... 133 The Changing Distribution of EMILY’s List Funds ...... 136 Primary Candidates...... 137 Tools in EMILY’s List’s Toolbox...... 138 EMILY’s List in the States...... 140 Modeling EMILY’s List Support ...... 142 Data and Method ...... 143 Who Does EMILY’s List Endorse? ...... 145 Who Gets More Dough?...... 147 Conclusion ...... 148

CONCLUSION...... 160

It Is All About Women, Stupid! ...... 164 EMILY’s List: The PAC ...... 166 ELIST: The Interest Group...... 167 ELIST: The Movement...... 169 ELIST: The Campaign Organization...... 170 ELIST: The Party Adjunct...... 171

CODING GUIDE FOR NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS ...... 173

Researching the List...... 174

Organizational Data...... 174 Members ...... 175 Candidates...... 176

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 178

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 188

LIST OF TABLES

Table page

Table 4-1. Contributions to and from the National Parties, 1980–2004...... 86

Table 4-2. Independent Spending by EMILY’s List, 1986–2004 ...... 86

Table 4-3. EMILY's List Electoral Activities, 1986–2004...... 88

Table 4-4. Bundling by Select PACs, 2000–2004 ...... 88

Table 4-5. EMILY’s List WOMEN VOTE! Activities ...... 90

Table 4-6. Non-federal Expenditures by Select Women’s PACs, 1980–2004...... 90

Table 4-7. Select Disbursements from EMILY’s List 527, 2002...... 91

Table 5-1. Sex of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 ...... 123

Table 5-2. Occupation of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004...... 123

Table 5-4. Donors ($200 and above) from States where EMILY’s List Endorsed a Candidate .125

Table 5-5. Donors ($200 and above) from States with Competitive Races involving an EMILY’s List Candidate, 2004 ...... 125

Table 5-6. Distribution of States by Sex...... 126

State of Residence...... 126

% Female Donors...... 126

% Male Donors ...... 126

Table 5-7. States with Competitive ELIST Races by Sex and Percentage of Amount, 2004 .....126

Table 5-8. Distribution of Occupation and Amount of Donation by Sex...... 127

Table 5-9. Contribution Amounts for EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004...... 127

Table 5-10. EMILY’s List Donor Pool by Sex and Contribution Amount, 2004 ...... 127

Table 5-11. Type of EMILY’s List Donor ($200 and above) by Sex, 2004...... 128

Table 5-12. Occupation by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004...... 128

Table 5-13. State of Residence by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004...... 129

Table 5-14. Contribution Amount by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004...... 129

Table 5-15. Giving Patterns of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 or more), 2004...... 129

Table 5-16. Contribution Range by Donor Type, 2004...... 129

Table 5-17. Number and Gender Breakdown of ELISTERs ‘Other’ Donations ($200 and above), 2004...... 130

Table 5-18. Sex of ELISTER by Donor Type, 2004 ...... 130

Table 6-1. Bundled Money from EMILY’s List to Candidates, 2000–2004...... 151

Table 6-2. Number of Federal Candidates EMILY’s List Supported (bundled and other), 2000–2004 ...... 151

Table 6-4. EMILY’s List Contributions to Candidates in the Primary (not bundled), 2000–2004152

Table 6-5. Average ELIST Contribution to Candidate by Type and Seat Status, 2000–2004 ...153

Table 6-6. Logit of all Female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004 ...... 157

Table 6-7. Pooled Logistic Regression of all female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004...... 158

Table 6-8. Linear Regression of all female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004 ...... 159

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

4-1 Total Number of PACs, 1978–2004 ...... 82

4-2 Connected versus Non-Connected PAC Receipts, 1978–2004 ...... 82

4-3 Receipts to PACs by Sector, 1978–2004 ...... 83

4-4 Percentage of Receipts to Candidates by PAC Sector, 1978–2004...... 84

4-5 Average Candidate Contributions from Women’s PACs by PAC Type ...... 84

4-6 Receipts of Select Women’s PACs, 1980–1994...... 85

4-7 Percentage of Receipts of Women’s PACs to Candidates, 1980–1994...... 85

4-8 Hard and Soft Money Receipts, EMILY’s List, 1986–2004 ...... 87

4-9 Timeline of EMILY’s List Activities, 1985–2004 ...... 89

4-10 Sex of Trainees in Participation 2000 and Campaign Corps ...... 90

4-11 EMILY’s List Membership, 1984–2004...... 91

4-11 Flowchart of EMILY’s List Activity ...... 92

6-1 State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2000 ...... 154

6-2 State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2002 ...... 155

6-3 State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2004 ...... 156

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THIS ISN’T YOUR MOM’S TUPPERWARE PARTY: HOW EMILY’S LIST CHANGD THE AMERICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

Jamie Pamelia Pimlott

May 2007

Chair: Lawrence C. Dodd Major: Political Science

Formed in 1985 as a political action committee (PAC) to provide select female candidates “seed” money to run for federal office, today EMILY’s List is much more than a

PAC. Over the past twenty-three years, a political entrepreneur, Ellen Malcolm, a cadre of liberal feminists activists and thousands of liberal feminist women and men have transformed

EMILY’s List into a women’s influence organization.

This study examines the growth and transformation of EMILY’s List from its inception in 1985 through the 2004 election cycle. Using secondary sources, I argue that the impetus for

EMILY’s List is firmly rooted in the goals and activities of the liberal feminist women’s movement of the 1970s. The successes and failures of this movement set the stage for the creation of EMILY’s List. Using qualitative and quantitative data, I then trace the organization’s evolution from its early days as a PAC to its transformation into a multi-pronged influence organization which acts like a PAC, but also acts like an interest group, a movement, a party adjunct, and a campaign organization. Here the study engages and questions how well the current theories of PAC influence and interest group action fit with the current political environment.

Understanding EMILY’s List as an influence organization instead of a PAC makes it much easier to understand why so many women and men from all over the country are drawn to the organization. Instead of understanding EMILY’s List as an elite PAC, data in Chapter 5 show that EMILY’s List serves a national membership of feminist women and men who give large sums of money to the organization in order to support its mission. That mission—electing pro-choice Democratic women to US Congress (and increasingly to state governments) is the last piece of this puzzle. It is here where EMILY’s List’s impact can be measured and evaluated.

The examination herein of the EMILY’s List organization, its members, the candidates, and the relationship between these components and the U.S. Congress make it clear that

EMILY’s List is much more than a woman’s PAC. It is a women’s influence organization that works as a conduit, fostering organization among women at the mass and elite level and supporting women candidates and making them competitive, all the while providing a new model for political organizations.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Formed in 1985 as a political action committee (PAC) to provide select female candidates

“seed” money to run for federal office, today EMILY’s List is much more than a PAC. Rather it

has morphed into a women’s influence organization whose impact is felt in the voting booth, in

state and local governments, in the US Congress, and perhaps even the White House in 2008. In

fact, there are few political theaters where ELIST has not become a player; however, this reality

was far from pre-ordained.

In 1985 it was cast as a pseudo Tupperware Party; but instead of a group of apolitical

housewives trading meatloaf recipes, this was a group of politically savvy women writing checks

and sharing rolodexes.1 By 1988 the organization became a serious player among PACs, bundling over $650,000 to their list of recommended female candidates.2 In its many attempts during the late 1990s to persuade legislators not to pass more restrictive campaign finance law and its willingness in 2004 and 2005 to engage the FEC in a legal battle over regulation of 527 activities, the organization functioned as an interest group, proving itself very adept at the “inside game” of lobbying.3 Furthermore in the past ten years EMILY’s List became powerful in many other areas: as a driving force in Democratic politics, a socializing agent for pro-choice

Democratic women at the mass level, a mentoring organization for Republican women, and a model that many different types of groups/entities/etc. have tried to replicate.

1 Political consultant Jeri Rasmussen described EMILY’S List as “the ultimate Tupperware party, with the grand prize being the U.S. Senate seat,” (Burrell 1994: 124).

2 “Bundling.” The Center for Responsive Politics. http://www.opensecrets.org/pubs/law_bagtricks/loop5.asp

3 “Bipartisan Freshmen Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform to Convene First Hearing.” Press Release. April 24, 1997. http://www.house.gov/tauscher/press/4-24-97.htm; “Court Denies Emily’s List Attempt to Enjoin FEC Allocation Rules,” March 4, 2005. Campaign Legal Center Weekly Report. http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press-1557.html

Yet for the most part scholars and journalists, while acknowledging the tremendous success

of EMILY’s List in raising money from contributors, underestimate the scope and importance of

the organization. While paying lip service to its ability to bring in money from thousands of

contributors, scholars tend to dismiss the organization as women’s PAC, albeit the most

successful one. To some degree this characterization is accurate: EMILY’s List is the premier

women’s PAC on the political scene, but this is not what has led reporters and pundits to refer to

Ellen Malcolm, founder and President of EMILY’s List as the “queenmaker” of the Democratic

Party (Spake 1988). 4 Rather it is the additional things that EMILY’s List does in combination with being a women’s PAC and particularly its ability to adapt to the changing political environment that makes it so important.

The goal of this project is to put to rest the idea that EMILY’s List is simply a women’s

PAC and replace it with a full understanding of the organization as a multi-pronged women’s influence organization. While EMILY’s list is a PAC, it is also an interest group, a party adjunct, a campaign organization, and a movement. I argue that none of these categories alone can capture and explain the organization’s leadership, its structure, its activity, or its members.

That is, while the organization is a PAC, its PAC status is not determinative of its influence.

Each of these concepts helps explain part of EMILY’s List influence, but one alone cannot provide us with a full picture of the organization’s impact. It is the interaction between these various layers that defines the organization, its activity, its members, and the candidates it supports.

4 In terms of receipts and expenditures there can be little doubt that EMILY’S List is the premier women’s PAC, which is the standard I am using. In terms of financially endorsing the most female candidates or lobbying success it could be argued that other organizations such as the Women’s Campaign Fund, the National Organization of Women (NOWPAC) or Planned Parenthood are the most successful. For a discussion of the types of women’s PACs and their relative successes see: (Barakso 2005, 95-96; Burrell 1998; Burrell 1994, Chapter 6; Cook, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Conway et al. 2005, 95; Day and Hadley 2005, Chapter 2; Francia 2001)

An examination of the organization, its members, the candidates, and the relationship

between these components and the U.S. Congress will make it clear that EMILY’s List is much

more than a woman’s PAC. Rather it is a women’s influence organization that works as a

conduit, fostering organization among women at the mass and elite level, supporting women

candidates and making them competitive, and fostering a community among successful

candidates that serves to magnify their political clout once in office. As it does so, EMILY’s List

is using identity politics to push past the current boundaries of interest group politics to

transform the political landscape of American politics.

Understanding EMILY’S List—the Thesis

In 2003–2004 The Center for Responsive Politics placed EMILY’s List third in a list of

PACs with the top receipts for the cycle: it garnered over $34 million from more than 10,000

contributors.5 The organization came in as number four on the list of top spenders in the election cycle.6 The president and founder of EMILY’s List, Ellen Malcolm, is one of the top

Democratic strategists in the country.7 Yet EMILY’s List is largely dismissed in the scholarly world as a “women’s PAC.” Those who have written about the organization acknowledge that it has been an important force in making women competitive in the early stages of congressional campaigns, but they do not fully appreciate the impact that the organization has on American politics as a whole (Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1993; Burrell 1994).

5 www.opensecrets.org. While EMILY’S List came in third for receipts and expenditures, it is important to note that the organization is not listed in the top fifty PACs according to the Center for Responsive Politics. This discrepancy is due to the way in which EMILY’S List receives its money, primarily in the form of bundled checks. Therefore, while the organization receives “credit” so to speak with the FEC and with the candidates to whom the money goes, it is a different type of “credit” than typically associated with PACs.

6 www.opensecrets.org

7 Bai, Matt. 2005. “Machine Politics” New York Times Magazine. 15, August, p. 11-12

Another reason for the underestimation of the organization is its characterization as an

ideological PAC that is only interested in supporting women who will protect Roe v. Wade

(1973). For instance in their comparison of EMILY’S List, WISH List and Susan B. Anthony

List, Day and Hadley argue, “it is the abortion issue more than partisanship that divides them,”

(Day and Hadley 2005, 21). According to interviews they conducted with high-level staff

members from the organization, “their [organizational leaders] primary criterion for choosing to

support candidates, apart from their partisanship, is that the candidates support the Roe v. Wade

decision,” (Day and Hadley 2005, 22).8 Thus the organization has two strikes against it; it focuses on women and it has limited appeal vis-à-vis its pro-choice position. However, this project will show that those who view pro-choice beliefs as a litmus test for the organization, the membership, and the candidates they endorse, are missing something central to understanding and assessing the power of EMILY’S List.

In fact EMILY’s List privileges gender and progressive ideals more than it privileges abortion policy. That is not to say that abortion is not critical to the organization; in 2003, for instance, EMILY’s list withdrew its support of Mary Landrieu, a Democratic Senator from

Louisiana because she supported an amended ban on partial-birth abortions.9 Yet EMILY’s List

played a critical role in Betty Castor’s campaign for the Senate in Florida even though Castor

publicly supported the referendum on the Florida ballot requiring parental notification.

Furthermore, while EMILY’s List does emphasize their pro-choice position, it puts much more

8 For more discussion of the organization’s goals vis-à-vis abortion and the role it plays in candidate selection and member donations see: Barakso 2005, 134; Burrell 1994, 121-126; Francia 2001, 8).

9 Franke-Guta, Garance. 2003. “EMILY’S List Hissed.” The American Prospect 13 (17): 12-3.

emphasis on its desire to bring together women at the mass and elite level in a common identity-

driven purpose—to put pro-choice Democratic women into elected office.10

The emergence of that purpose is a response to three factors: critical challenges to women’s rights in the 1970s and early 1980s, opportunities created by campaign finance reform, and gifted leadership at the elite level. The subsequent success of the organization in evolving over time and continuously pulling individuals into politics, all the while remaining true to the identity concerns, has led it to becoming a force of institutional change, not only in electoral politics, but in the U.S. Congress as well. It is a force that now needs to be recognized and better understood, guided by the understanding of the role identity politics plays in fostering women’s unity in the contemporary era.11

Second-Wave Feminism and Electoral Politics—The Roots of EMILY’S List

After a brief review of the pertinent literature I discuss how the women’s movement set the

stage for the formation of EMILY’s List. During the 1970s women were faced with a series of

challenges that forced them to take a stand on issues heretofore deemed personal and private; the

personal became political.12 Issues such as abortion, education, employment, marriage and children divided women from men AND divided women from women. These issues even divided organizations (Barakso 2005); however, by the mid 1970s the liberal feminist women’s

10 While electing pro-choice Democratic women is the main goal of the organization, the ways in which it pursues this goal have evolved and the language and messages the organization utilizes has changed. For example in recent years, the organization has used anti-Republican themes and has focused on the role women play in winning and retaining control of Congress. Yet even then, when the organization’s strategy or focus has shifted due to the political environment, it continues to frame its message through the lens of identity politics. The organization’s shifting strategy is discussed more in Chapter 4.

11 The theoretical framework that provides a basis for this idea of evolution and change relies on the work of Larry Dodd. See: Dodd, Larry. 1994. “Political Learning and Political Change” in The Dynamics of American Politics, ed. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillison. (Boulder: Westview Press) and “Re-Envisioning Congress” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th edition, ed. Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. (CQ Press: 2005).

12 The first known citation for this phrase is Carol Hanisch’s essay, “The Personal is Political." In Feminist Revolution, March 1969 (204-205).

movement reached critical mass and became strong enough to maximize on the political

opportunities available (Costain 1992). One of these political opportunities was the ability of

groups to form political action committees (PACs). The arrival of PACs on the political stage

was serendipitous for women, although it would not be until EMILY’s List that women would

take full advantage of this new organizational form.

The Emergence and Evolution of EMILY’S List

Created in 1985, the mission of Emily’s List (Early Money Is Like Yeast: it helps the

dough rise) seems straightforward—to increase the number of pro-choice Democratic women in

federal office. For a number of years, EMILY’s List made it to the FEC’s list of Top 50 PACs in

receipts. Furthermore, of the 81 women serving in the 109th (67 in the House, 14 in the Senate),

52 are Democrats, all of whom have been endorsed by EMILY’S List.13

In Chapter 3, I provide a basic history of the organization, focusing on how the List came

into being, its structure, strategies, setbacks and successes. From all accounts, Ellen Malcolm is

the foundation of the organization; to this day, she has the final say so in all organizational

decisions. It may be that Malcolm’s position at the helm of EMILY’s List for over twenty years

is the secret to its success. Under her leadership the organization has been agile and dynamic,

expanding into new arenas of influence, while remaining firmly rooted to its mission and history.

Members and their Organizational Roles

According to Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action (1965), an organization is

nothing without its members. In Chapter 4, I explore the relationship between the members and

the organization. EMILY’s List membership grew exponentially from 1986 through 2004 and

the vast majority of their membership is female—yet the conventional wisdom is that women do

13 Data from the Center for Women and Politics at Rutgers University. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/cong.pdf#page=2 and from EMILY’S List. www.emilyslist.org

not contribute to politics often and especially do not give large amounts.14 How does EMILY’s

List accomplish this feat and who are these ELISTERs? Barakso (2005) characterized EMILY’S

List as an organization attuned to the needs of the “political elite,” however, as detailed in

Chapter 3, since 1992 the organization began to focus much more on grassroots activism. How

successful has EMILY’S List been in its effort to grow the grassroots? Are some of the members

of EMILY’s List “new” or are the organization’s coffers lined with the money of loyal

members? Is EMILY’s List just a ‘Beltway’ phenomenon or a social club for a few elite women

or is the organization in fact a broad-based entity that attracts a variety of types of individuals for

a variety of reasons? The answers to these and other questions are the focus of Chapter 4.

Candidates and the Organization

In Chapter 5, I explore the relationship between candidates and the organization. As

mentioned previously, EMILY’s List supported all but a few of the women who have made it

into U.S. Congress since 1986. However, a focus on these women may not accurately reflect

EMILY’s List success rate. According to the organization’s literature, candidates endorsed by

EMILY’s List have four things in common: they are female pro-choice Democrats who are

viable candidates. Yet how does the organization assess viability? Does candidate status matter

to EMILY’s List endorsement? How does the organization’s bundling efforts fit into candidate

endorsement? Does the organization bundle money to candidates that they do not otherwise

help? And perhaps most importantly, what impact does an EMILY’s List endorsement have on

election outcomes? How many endorsed candidates lose at the primary stage? How many win

the general election?

14 Michael Malbin, “Thinking About Reform” In Life After Reform: When the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Meets Politics, ed. Michael Malbin. Rowman & Littlefield: 2003.

Summary

There can be little doubt that EMILY’s List has undergone a series of organizational transformations in the past twenty years. Understanding how it evolved from a donor network of less than twenty women to a multi-pronged women’s influence organization with over 100,000 members and millions of dollars annually is an important endeavor. The organization’s success is intimately linked to the political success of women and their power in the U.S. Congress and its evolution allows us to test and expand several important theories about interest groups.

The conventional wisdom concerning interest group formation has at its core an elite group of political savvy individuals. That is certainly the case in EMILY’S List. But here is where the similarities end. While other organizations begin as a small group and then encourage grassroots mobilizing which serves as the foundation of a more formal interest group organization that may or may not become involved in electoral politics vis-à-vis a PAC,

EMILY’S List has retained its status as a formal PAC while behind the scenes working as an interest group, a party adjunct, a campaign organization and a movement. Thus this study of

EMILY’S List will break apart the current model of interest group activity, leading us to a new, more modern understanding of women, power and organized interests in American politics.

Furthermore, it will quiet the voices that cast the organization as a women’s PAC or a plaything of a few elite women. As we shall see, EMILY’s List is a vibrant, dynamic, broad-based organization with agile leadership and an identity-driven vision that is changing the face of

American politics.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter I assess the current scholarship on female candidates running for elective

office at the state and national level and their impact on legislative and institutional change.

Within that literature, I highlight the amount of attention that scholars of women and politics

have given EMILY’s List, a political action committee formed in 1984 with the express goal of

electing more pro-choice Democratic women.

Since the mid-1990s EMILY’s List has played a significant role in congressional

campaigns. Some scholars (Biersack et al. 1993; Francia 2001) have noted the impact of

EMILY’s List on congressional elections, though none have cast the organization as a ‘major player.’ One explanation for this lack of recognition is the organization is perceived as having a very specific purpose and constituency which is not as widespread as other PACs, e.g., those associated with labor or corporate interests. Rather, EMILY’s List is characterized as an ideological PAC and within that broad category it is further characterized as a PAC that focuses on “women’s issues.” 1 Because of this categorization, many scholars dismiss the organization’s

activities as narrowly focused and relatively inconsequential to the “big picture.” However, as

discussed in later chapters, these dismissals are inaccurate. Although EMILY’s List started as a

narrowly focused project, in the past twenty years it has expanded its influence far beyond the

confines of its PAC structure.

Another blow to the organization’s chance for recognition by scholars is the outdated

criteria that many use in evaluating PAC strength. The study of PACs began in the late 1970s

1 The number of active PACs comes from the Annual PAC Summary Press release published by the FEC. The FEC only categorizes PACS into five categories: Corporate, Labor, Non-connected, Trade, Corporate without stock, and Cooperative. The Center for Responsive Politics and the Campaign Finance Institute categorize non-connected PACs as ideological PACs and the former organization breaks apart ideological PACs into 13 sub-categories, one of which is “women’s issues.” See: http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.asp?txt=Q01&cycle=2006

(Alexander 1983; Jacobson 1980; Malbin 1980; Sabato 1984; Sorauf 1984), and many scholars

today are still applying the same theories and formula to assess current PAC influence even

though the political environment and campaign finance law has changed significantly. For

example, campaign finance scholars typically measure an organization’s influence according to

the amount of money it gives to candidates, not receipts or ‘other’ activities of the organization.2

Because EMILY’s List only gives an average of 5 percent of its receipts to candidates in hard money contributions,3 scholars tend to dismiss it as a ‘small-time player’ in congressional elections. This tendency is fostered by the fact that direct contributions by PACs to candidates

seem to have become less important to congressional candidates in recent years; of the $11.9

million spent in the during the 2004 congressional races (House and Senate), only $3 million, or

25 percent, came from PACs.4

Women as Tokens

When the Equal Rights Amendment failed to be ratified by the requisite number of states in 1982, groups such as the National Organization of Women begged women to run for political office. They argued that if women had been a greater force within political institutions at the time the amendment would have passed (Barakso 2005). Only thirty-four women held state- level elected office in 1982; they comprised 10.5 percent of all elected state-level offices.5

Women made up an even smaller percentage of officeholders at the national level. Twenty-three women served in the 97th Congress (1981–1983), twenty-one in the House and two in the Senate.

2 There are a few exceptions to this, the most notable of which is the work of Steve Weissman and Kara Ryan, “Nonprofit Interest Groups’ Election Activities and Federal Campaign Finance Policy: A Working Paper.” July 2006. The Campaign Finance Institute. http://www.cfinst.org/studies/pdf/NonprofitsWorkingPaper.pdf

3 Contributions to candidates for 2000-2004 were divided by total receipts for the organization. The results were then averaged. Data obtained from Political Moneyline: http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi- win/x_pacpg.exe?DoFn=C0019343396

4 Data from the Center for Responsive Politics. “The Price of Admission” in the section entitled “The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle.” http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.asp?txt=Q01&cycle=2006 5 Data from the Center of American Woman and Politics. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/cong.pdf

All together they comprised four percent of the membership in Congress at that time. Although

NOW’s ‘call to arms’ may have been responsible for an increase in the mobilization of mass

level women, women started to push open the doors of government in the preceding decade.

Data from the Center for American Woman and Politics shows that while women had been

members of U.S. Congress consistently since 1925,6 only in 1969 did the number of women in the House and Senate begin to consistently rise.

Many of the early studies examining women in political office emphasize description over analysis (Chamberlin 1973). One explanation for the relative lack of analysis given to women candidates prior to the mid-1970s is that many viewed these women as “token” members; forty- one women who served in Congress prior to 1970 came into office because of a death of a family member, typically their husband.7 They did not receive appointments to powerful committees, and

oftentimes they did not run for re-election. Furthermore, scholars argue that the reason these women ran for office is much different than those given by female candidates in the later half of the twentieth century. For instance, in Congressional Women, Gertzog argues that beginning in the

1970s, an increasing number of women running for public office were “strategic politicians- experienced, highly motivated, career public servants who carefully calculate the persona and political benefits of running for higher office, assess the probability of their winning, and determine the personal and political costs of defeat before deciding …” (Gertzog 1995, 4).

Gertzog’s argument echoes that of Susan Tolchin (1974) who asserts that women in the 1970s were, “…shedding the delicacy and aloofness that had precluded them from acting as decision makers and accepting instead a gloves-off approach to the culture and the trade-offs of the political

6 Jeanette Rankin was the first woman elected to U.S. Congress in 1917; she lost her bid for re-election in 1919. No woman served in Congress again until 1921, when four women took office.

7 Kirkpatrick 1974; Diamond 1977; and Githens and Prestage 1977 are the exceptions here. Data from the Center of American Women and Politics. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/widows.pdf

marketplace” (Tolchin 1974, 27). Women were able to do this because movement politics had

taught them about power—its sources and its limits—and political reforms such as the passage of the ERA in Congress, the creation of a Woman’s Caucus, and the greater inclusion of women in the party structure brought women into mainstream American politics. Once they got there, they refused to leave or take a back seat to men.

The introduction of a different ‘type’ of female legislator in late 1970s corresponds to a larger societal change, most notably an increased number of women obtaining graduate and professional degrees. As women began entering fields like history, political science, and sociology, an increasing number of them turned their attention to understanding the role and place of women within each of the disciplines. Thus it is in the mid-to-late 1970s that scholars, particularly female scholars, began asking questions about women’s political participation and using the tools of their disciplines to find the answers.8

Women as Candidates

The first systematic study of female politicians was Jeane Kirkpatrick’s Political Woman

(1974). Kirkpatrick questions why so few women became involved in “high politics.” She provides two hypotheses: either men impose the belief that women are incapable and/or not

suited for politics or women prefer not to be involved (Kirkpatrick 1974, 9). Based on data from

in-depth interviews with forty-six female legislators,9 Kirkpatrick draws comparisons between the social characteristics, recruitment, and campaign experiences of these forty-six women with a similar group of male legislators. She finds that both the female and the male legislators could

8 Some of the earliest literature on women and politics addresses women as voters and participants at the mass level. See Klein 1984; Mueller 1988; Sapiro 1983. This literature largely fits outside the scope of this paper, as I am more concerned with the attention scholars have paid to female candidates and female politicians.

9 All of the women selected had served more than one term and were considered effective, committed legislators by a panel of representatives from the American Association of University Women, the Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, and the League of Women Voters (Kirkpatrick 1974, 22).

be termed conventional in terms of values, lifestyle, and personality. Where they differ,

however, are on areas associated with traditional sex roles such as education level, career, age at

the time of first campaign, and age of children (Kirkpatrick 1974, 55).

The differences between male and female legislators grow larger when Kirkpatrick

extends her analysis into recruitment and campaign activity. Here women fall into two

categories: Ready Recruits and Office Seekers. One of the items that differentiate these women

is their career choice. Kirkpatrick finds that female lawyers were more likely to actively seek a

legislative position whereas women without career experience tended to wait until someone

asked them to run (Kirkpatrick 1974, 80).

These findings are strengthened by the work of several authors in Portrait of Marginality

(1977). Githens and Prestage argue that the power and influence of female politicians is

circumscribed by the tension which exists between their achieved status as a member of the

political elite and their ascribed status as a woman. Putting this theory to the empirical test,

Marcia Lee examines why so few women achieve public office by way of surveying over 400

political participants in New York State. She finds that only certain types of women consider

political life in the first place: upper middle class educated women were more apt to participate;

however, income and education could not be used to predict men’s participation rates (Lee 1977,

124). Furthermore Lee found that the existence of children at home, fear of sex discrimination,

and perceptions of women’s proper role all served to limit women’s participation.

Susan Carroll (1994) also tests the impact of socialization in her work, but then goes far beyond socialization to examine the other factors that limit women’s participation. Using data from a survey of all female primary candidates at the state and national level during the 1976 election cycle, Carroll finds that the very structure of American politics inhibits women’s participation. She argues that while socialization factors are relevant, the realities of recruitment,

single-member districts, and incumbency close women off from political careers. In the second edition of the book, published in 1994, Carroll includes an analysis of the strides that women made during the 1992 election. She points to the greater number of open seats, the anti- incumbent political atmosphere, and the emphasis on domestic affairs as examples of changing the political opportunity structure. Because of these changes, women made significant gains in

1992. Carroll’s findings have been echoed by other scholars who view the 1992 election as proof that that voters will vote for women and that they can run competent political campaigns, but that their victories are somewhat contingent on externalities.

Witt, Paget, and Matthews (1994) point to another set of external factors that also have an enormous impact on the effectiveness of women’s campaigns. Relying on interviews with female politicians and their staff, the authors evaluate female candidates on the “four cornerstones”: credibility, money, mobilization, and the media. They find that credibility can be an issue for some female candidates, particularly those who have never held political office. Yet overall, women have a slight advantage with voters insofar as they are seen as more “trustworthy” than their male counterparts. Unfortunately, this trustworthiness does not easily translate into contributions, which is one of the major problems for female candidates.

The final component of Witt, Prestage, and Matthews’s analysis addresses the impact of the media on female candidates. Kim Fridkin Kahn presents a similar, but more complex argument in her book, The Political Consequences of Being a Woman (1996). Kahn examines the impact of gender stereotypes on style of presentation, the substance, and the use of certain personality traits in campaigns and the role of these same factors on the decision-making of voters. She tests the impact of these stereotypes through two well-designed experiments, supplemented by a thorough content analysis of newspaper coverage and campaign

advertisements from twenty-three senatorial and twenty-one gubernatorial campaigns involving female candidates from 1983–1988.

Kahn argues that stereotypes act as a lens through which the media and thus the voters view a candidate. Thus to measure the impact of stereotypes on a woman’s political campaign one must understand how the stereotypes affect the questions the media acts, the voter’s perception of the candidate’s competence in dealing with salient issues, and finally the candidate’s campaign strategy. It is this last item, the role of stereotypes in candidate strategy that Kahn sees as the most pressing. One of the reasons that these stereotypes are at play in politics is that female candidates “buy into” them.

The overall message of Kahn’s book is a depressing. The women’s movement has spent the last thirty-plus years fighting to dismantle these stereotypes and make them less salient and from

Kahn’s analysis one would conclude they have failed. However, according to Kahn, some of the fault lies with the women who are running for political office, as she finds them buying into and perpetuating these stereotypes.

Kahn’s book is a valuable contribution to the literature on women’s experience in political campaigns. Its value and its downfall is that she examines women running for U.S.

Senate and governor, two areas where women have not had a great deal of success in winning their races, perhaps for the reasons that Kahn points out. However, one must consider the applicability of Kahn’s findings for women running for other positions, particularly those running for the U. S. House of Representatives.

Barbara Burrell makes this exact argument in A Woman’s Place is in the House (1994).

Unlike Kahn who focuses on senatorial and gubernatorial candidacies, Burrell states that congressional elections are where the action occurs. Using various types of data (election returns, FEC records, and interviews with candidates and activists) Burrell argues that one must

understand the outcomes of female candidacies between 1968 and 1992 as the result of a

dynamic and multi-dimensional process (Burrell 1994, 10). The items that she finds as critical

for female candidates—party and organizational support, financial contributions, a well-trained

campaign staff—should not come as a surprise.

What is especially valuable about Burrell’s analysis, beyond the fact that she presents a

historical overview of women running for the U.S. House, is that she compares the experiences

of women running for office to that of men. Informed by Carroll and Burrell’s work, in Gender

Dynamics in Congressional Elections (1997) Richard Pivens Fox provides an in-depth analysis of women and men’s experience running for the House in California during 1992 and 1994.

During those two years, over 61 races and 104 elections occurred. Thirty-four elections involved women; 22 involved only women (Fox 1997, 5). For all the elections involving women, Fox examines six areas of possible differences: motives, campaign organization, strategic objectives, campaign styles, voter targeting, and male voter response. Through interviews with campaign managers and campaign staff, supplemented by campaign literature such as direct mail, press releases, and newspaper coverage, Fox finds that women express less ambition and have smaller and less professional campaign organizations (Fox 1997, 28). More important, however, are the differences he finds in issue priorities and campaign style. These differences, according to Fox, are explained by three factors. First, the choices that women make about their campaigns are influenced by traditional gender role stereotypes. Second, women perceive a need to focus on credentials. Third, female and male candidates have somewhat different issue agendas, influenced in part by their personal convictions (Fox 1997, 97–99). Thus Fox’s analysis shows that even in a state like California, which has the largest delegation of women serving in

Congress, female candidates are still affected, and in some ways hampered, by their status as women.

Women and Legislatures

The tension between achieved and ascribed status first noted by Githens and Prestage in

Portrait of Marginality (1977) is a tension that not only impacts women’s entrance into politics, but also impacts the experience of women who make it into office. “Women are assimilated into the political elite to a limited extent only, and even then sexual stereotyping and role assignment limit their power and influence” (Githens and Prestage 1977, 175). Other contributors to

Portrait of Marginality provide further evidence. In their analysis of female party leaders,

Costantini and Craik (1977) argue that men are much more politicized than women and women experience a greater degree of social pressure than men do in terms of political participation.

Due to these differences, male and female legislators do not achieve leadership or think about leadership and power in the same way. In their survey of party leaders in California the authors find, “the career styles and motivational differences between the men and women politicians studied are likely to contribute to male dominance of major public and party offices” (Costantini and Craik 1977, 238–239).

One of the major areas of study for scholars interested in women’s impact on political institutions are state legislatures. In part this focus is due to numbers—there are more women serving at this level of government at any one time than anywhere else. While there are a host of articles by scholars examining state legislatures (Nechemias 1987; Reingold 1992; Sanbonmatsu

2002; Welch et al. 1985), the three seminal books on the subject are Diamond’s Sex Roles in the

State House (1977), Thomas’ How Women Legislate (1994) and Rosenthal’s, When Women

Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures (1998).

Diamond’s goal in this work is ambitious. Based on her hypothesis that sex differences in state legislatures is directly proportional to the amount of competition in the state she argues that women do best in those states where there is a minimal amount of competition for seats. It is

here, according to Diamond, that women are more likely to meet the criteria for office. It is also

in these areas, according to Elazar’s measure of political traditionalism (Elazar 1972), that

women generally find conditions that are more favorable. In the states where there is a greater level of competition, Diamond finds that there is substantial difference in the behavior of male and female legislators. Based on this finding, Diamond creates a four-role typology of female legislators: Housewife-Benchwarmer, Traditional Civil Worker, Women’s Rights Advocate, and

Passive Women Rights Advocate (Diamond 1977, 170-171).

Diamond’s findings are important, but they are also limited in that she focuses her analysis on four New England legislatures: Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont.

Diamond recognizes this limitation, stating repeatedly that the trends she finds may not be applicable for other states. Subsequent scholars have added to Diamond’s analysis. Sue Thomas extends many of Diamond’s findings in her work How Women Legislate (1994). Thomas administered a mail survey to all the female legislators and a sample of male legislators in twelve states across the nation. Building on the work of Diamond and others, Thomas asked questions related to three important themes: backgrounds, attitudes, and experiences. She finds that the female legislators in the 1980s (when the survey was administered) differ significantly from their counterparts in the 1970s along all three lines. The female legislators of the 1980s came from more professional backgrounds and had more education and job-related experiences. In the realm of attitudes about women’s abilities and women’s roles, there were also differences between the two cohorts. While both groups saw women facing obstacles to political success, the women of the 1980s saw those obstacles as surmountable (Thomas 1994, 83). But perhaps the most important difference that Thomas highlights is the different experiences of the women in these two cohorts. The women of the 1980s, in part because of these different backgrounds and

attitudes, and in part because of their greater numbers, were bringing about institutional and

political change.

Yet how much change these women brought is left somewhat open for debate, a point

that Thomas acknowledges. In terms of policy change she argues that the existence of women in

legislatures has changed the type of issues that legislators examine. Thomas claims, “The

limited evidence available suggests that female officeholders apply their singular point of view

to the range of issues,” yet she provides no quantitative data to support this claim (Thomas 1994,

141). What issues were women particularly active? She sadly acknowledges that women

legislators are not introducing or guiding more legislation dealing with women, children, and/or

families but simultaneously claims that women are making strides. Thus Thomas’ study is an

important one, but it leaves one searching for evidence.

It is here that Cindy Rosenthal’s work When Women Lead (1998) saves the day.

Rosenthal examines female chairs of state legislative committees; she argues that female

legislators are changing the face of leadership—from a command style to an “integrative style

[that] emphasizes collaboration and consensus…” (Rosenthal 1998, 4). These themes are present,

but obscure in Thomas’ work; however, Rosenthal marshals data from surveys, focus groups,

and fieldwork to bring the impact of women in legislative bodies to the fore. From Rosenthal’s

work we see that women are strategic. When there are few women in the legislative body they

tend to assimilate to current norms and work within the system; however, as their numbers

increase they tend to move away from the command style to assume a more integrative approach.

Taking these theories to the next level, scholars such as Gertzog (1995), and Swers

(2001) examine the impact of women in national political institutions. Gertzog approaches the

topic through an analysis of one specific part of Congress—the Congressional Women’s Caucus.

After looking at the types and conditions under which women obtained congressional office,

Gertzog concludes that the opportunity for women to come together and work on shared

concerns is indicative of larger changes among women, namely gender consciousness and

feminism. These attitudinal and/or ideological changes brought with them a host of concerns—

about pay equity, child care, domestic violence, and education, that were shared among women

regardless of party.

What Gertzog does not discuss in his book and can not foresee is the election of

conservative/antifeminist women into Congress which affects the ability of the Caucus to bring

about substantive changes. By the early to mid 1990s these ideological tensions are added to by

the decision of the new Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich to cut the funding and staff of this

and other caucuses. The effect of these changes meant that the Women’s Caucus became more

of a meeting ground rather than an instrument of policy proposals. This is not to say, however,

that the regular meetings of female legislators have become worthless, as a number of

congresswomen have mentioned that keeping lines of communication open is valuable in and of

itself.10

Whereas Gertzog points to the different types of women elected into Congress and the potential for them to work together to change public policy and perhaps the institution, sixteen years later Swers (2001) evaluates how well women are doing in making that difference.

Interestingly she focuses on the very time (the 103rd and 104th Congresses) that the funding for the Women’s Caucus was cut. However, Swers’ focuses on policy outcomes, specifically the fate of “women’s issues” in the policymaking process.

10 Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) discussed the lack of a Women’s Caucus in the Senate as exists in the House, however, she mentioned that the women of the Senate meet for a monthly dinner meeting, setting aside partisanship for the night in order to exchange ideas, experiences, etc. Interview held in 709 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. during PLEN’s “Women and Congress” session. March 13, 2005. This practice is also mentioned in Marie C. Wilson’s Closing the Leadership Gap (2004).

Women Need Money

One of Swers’ critically important findings is that as the number of women in Congress increases, the likelihood of them having an impact also increases. But for women to have this impact they have to be present. While women continue to run for political office, there remains a gender gap in service: as of 2005 women only comprised 15.4 percent of the membership in the

House of Representatives and only 14 percent of the membership in the Senate.11 One reason given for the continued dearth of women in these legislative bodies is the high rate of incumbency. Scholars studying female candidates have found that women tend do as well as men in open-seat races (Burrell 1994; Carroll 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Schlozman and Uhlaner 1986). However, the number of open-seat races has consistently dwindled in the last twenty-years. In fact, one of the reasons given for the large influx of women in the 1992 congressional elections, dubbed the “Year of the Woman” by scholars and pundits, is an abnormally high number of open-seat races due to resignations and retirements (Carroll 1994;

Cook, Thomas and Wilcox 1994).

In examining why women were more likely to achieve office via open-seat elections than as challengers, scholars quickly discovered that one of the obstacles to women winning was money. The amount of money that incumbent legislators raised during the 2004 election cycle averaged at $1.1 million for House members and $8.6 million for Senate incumbents. According to data from the Center for Responsive Politics, most of these funds come from individual contributions (over 60 percent in most cases), but the rest typically come from the contributions

11 “Women in Elective Office: 2005” Fact Sheet. Center for American Women and Politics. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/elective.pdf

of political action committees (PACs) associated with business, labor, ideological, or “other”

groups.12

A challenger typically receives far less money from PACs and interest groups than do

incumbents. The roots of this discrepancy lay in the access strategy used by PACs (Magee

2002). Using this strategy, interest groups and other organizations give money to legislators in

order to gain access to him/her in the hopes that access will lead to influence. While scholars

have not been able to prove influence, that is, they have not been able to find a direct correlation

between interest group money and roll-call votes, they have found that the access organizations

gain through such monies goes beyond influencing one particular vote to influencing committee

outcomes, the wording of legislation, etc. (Magee 2002; Smith 1995). Clearly pursuing the

access strategy can have many benefits for interest groups and organizations. But for groups to

maximize on these contributions, it is necessary that the candidate be in office. Hence donating

to the incumbent rather than the challenger is more in these groups’ interest, and since there are

fewer women in office than men, the men get the majority of these PAC funds.

Women Have Powerful Tools

However, there have been changes in the PAC world in recent years in terms of the ways

in which PACs attempt to influence the political agenda. Sabato (1984) notes that some PACs

supplement or replace the access strategy with an electoral strategy, in which PAC money and

other types of support to candidates who agree with the organization on some ideological issue

(Conway 1991; Sabato 1984, 72–84). PACs that use strategy often support a higher percentage

of challengers or open-seat candidates than PACs using strictly an access strategy.

12 Data from the Center for Responsive Politics, Washington, D.C. www.opensecrets.org. The percentage of PAC contributions to candidates has steadily increased over time, from 21 percent in 1978 to 34 percent in 1986 to approximately 40% in 2004 (Grenzke 1989)

Women’s PACs are more likely pursue an electoral strategy over an access strategy. In

fact, the first women’s PACs were created as women’s groups realized that to make an impact on

policy they needed women to be in positions of power and the “typical” paths to fundraising

were largely closed to women. In the early days, these organizations were severely limited in

terms of how much money they raised and hence how much money they were able to give

candidates. Thus, they were largely symbolic in nature and consequently, few scholars have paid serious attention to the organizations. Other than brief mentions in books and articles pertaining to female candidates, the only work focused specifically on women’s PACs is that of Day and

Hadley (2001a, 2001b, 2005) who focus on donors to three women’s PACs in the 1996 election cycle and Frederickson (2004) whose unpublished dissertation examines the giving patterns of women’s PACs.

It is not hard to see then, why EMILY’s List has flown under the radar of most scholars.

Yet the consequences of the organization’s low visibility is problematic for the scholarship pertaining to female candidates. Scholars are either missing the influence of the organization or they are mis-specifing its influence by focusing on its bundling activities when they should be focused on evaluating the organization’s total amount of influence in the electoral arena. In fact we are missing a crucial element in the story of female candidates. If it is true that support from

EMILY’s List can virtually ‘make or break’ a female pro-choice Democratic candidate then we must know why the organization’s impact is so seismic. Furthermore as numerous other interest groups have used EMILY’s List as an organizational model in recent years (Koenenn 1992), the impact of the organization can be felt across party lines.

To begin this process, Chapter 3 re-frames the discussion of EMILY’s List by connecting the organization to the women’s movement. Without understanding the accomplishments and failures of the liberal feminist women’s movement one cannot understand the organization’s

purpose or its evolution, nor can one grasp the important role that EMILY’s List members play in sustaining and rejuvenating the organization.

CHAPTER 3 THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT AND IDENTITY POLITICS

Female candidates have faced two types of barriers in their quest for political office.

Historically society has cast politics as a male domain; the only ‘acceptable’ way for women to

enter politics was through the death of a family member (Kincaid 1978). Those women who

entered on their own faced dismissive male opponents and negative media coverage (Kahn 1996;

Witt et al. 1994). If they overcame these barriers, they hit a second set of obstacles associated

with their status as challengers. Challenger candidates wage an uphill battle in congressional

campaigns. They do not have the benefits of name recognition or the benefits of office

(franking, easier access to PAC funds, etc.). Scholars have shown that to overcome these

barriers, all challengers, but especially female candidates, need copious amounts of money

(Biersack et al. 1993; Burrell 1994).

Ellen Malcolm, heiress to the IBM fortune and long-time political activist, witnessed female candidate’s desperate need for money first hand while working on Harriet Woods’ 1982

U.S. Senate campaign. Woods lost by a slim margin (49 percent to 51 percent), and by most accounts lost the race because she ran out of money in the final days of the election (Woods

2001). However, Woods’ campaign was not Malcolm’s first experience with politics. She

worked for Common Cause in the mid-1970s (about the time that FECA passed) and served as

Media Coordinator in Jimmy Carter’s administration. After witnessing Woods’ loss, Malcolm

marshaled her considerable resources (money, time, and political connections) to transform the

political world one woman at a time. She believed that if women were given enough “early”

money to make them competitive with their male counterparts through the primary season (the

average total cost of a House or Senate race in 1984 was $241,000 and $2.3 million respectively)

they could ultimately wrest the seat from their male competitor’s grasp.1 In the early 1980s,

Malcolm’s friend Lael Stegall advised that a PAC would give her the tools to accomplish this goal (Spake 1988).

Malcolm’s entrance into the PAC world came at a particular time—a time ripe for women’s organizing. By the early 1980s the women’s movement encouraged women to run for office as an “end run”; if male legislators could not be counted on to push for pro-woman legislation then women would become part of the institution and do it themselves. But it was not only the idea of pro-woman legislation that drove women into public life; it was also the belief that women brought a distinctive voice to politics, a voice that needed to be heard for our

Republic to be truly representative. The existence of these beliefs is firmly rooted in the liberal feminist concerns articulated by feminist activists in the late 1960s and 1970s (Lorber 2005).

However, before discussing liberal feminism and its role in the formation and sustainability of

EMILY’s List, it is important to understand the crucible in which EMILY’s List formed.

A Brief History

The work of Jo Freeman (1975) and Sara Evans (1979) stand as the authoritative accounts of the liberal feminist women’s movement. Evans’ work documents the ‘beginning’ of the movement. She points to women’s experience in the civil rights movement, arguing that the experiences of women involved in the ‘rights’ movement gave them the tools to press for their rights. Female activists began organizing ‘consciousness raising’ groups to share their experiences. These groups gave women a language, a shared set of symbols, and a “space” in which to think about change (Evans 1980). Whereas Evans’ account documents the creation and growth of one thread of the feminist women’s movement, Jo Freeman documents the emergence of the women’s “liberation” movement that was younger and ‘more radical’ than the former. In

1 Vital Statistics on Congress, 2001-2002. Ornstein, Norma, Thomas Mann and Michael Malbin, eds. Washington, DC: The AEI Press. (87-93).

fact, if you ask ten people about the goals of the liberal feminist women's movement, chances are you will get ten different correct answers. Some say that the movement focused on obtaining social and economic equality for women; others see it as a movement concerned with change in specific policy arenas—reproductive rights, education, employment, etc. However, these goals were not mutually exclusive; rather they were mutually reinforcing—progress in one often meant progress in another.

But the existence of these ‘common goals’ does not mean that a consensus existed among women regarding the methods to achieve these goals. Many within the women’s movement remained dubious of the traditional approach—lobbying members of Congress, voting, etc.

According to Freeman ‘woodwork’ feminists and those in the “older” women’s organizations

(such as NOW) were much more comfortable with lobbying and traditional politics than they were with ideas and actions of the ‘radical’ women’s liberation movement. The latter felt that the only way to affect change was to upend the current institutional arrangements and power structures; hence their activities often involved consciousness-raising and education of the public in an attempt to change societal norms (Freeman 1975). The former group recognized that institutional change needed to occur, but felt that the best way to accomplish it was persuasion and piecemeal change.

Malcolm created EMILY’s List to reflect both of these threads. She firmly believed in

‘traditional’ politics insofar as the organization’s mission was to get women into public office, not begin a parallel institution or upend the current institutional structure. In some ways she followed an even more traditional route than NOW. As Barakso notes NOW tried to accomplish its mission while following an anti-hierarchical model with state and local chapters having a good deal of power in determining the organization’s action plan and mission. Malcolm took a traditional (male) entitiy—the PAC—with its strict hierarchical structure and made it into

something new—a women’s influence organization. In part this organizational decision helps

explain why ELIST exceeded NOW/PAC in its electoral activities by the late 1980s. While

NOW’s anti-hierarchical structure could and should be viewed as one of the organization’s

strengths and innovations, it became an albatross as the organization tried to react to the national

political environment. While it is true that all politics are local and the personal is political, it is

also true that those movements and organizations with a unified message and set of priorities

tend to be more successful (Costain 1992; Mansbridge 1986). So Malcolm broke with the

movement in terms of EMILY’s List structure but remained firmly committed to liberal feminist

concerns which she communicated to potential members through her use of identity politics.2

According to Button, Rienzo, and Wald (1997) there are three characteristics that

indicate a group or movement is using the politics of identity. First, identity politics creates

“new lines of political cleavage … based on ‘race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality’ rather than

the traditional group divisions [such as religion or class].” Second, identity politics is used in the

pursuit of broad goals that go beyond securing economic resources to “ensuring that they are

accorded a full measure of equality and respect…the underlying concern (is) with attaining a

place at the table.” Third, groups motivated by identity politics tend to “embrace a wide array of

political tactics” (5–6).

2 The usefulness of the term identity politics is a matter of some debate among scholars. Bernstein (2005) finds there are at least three different theoretical perspectives: neo-Marxist, new social movement, and post- modernist/constructionist (49-58). The neo-Marxist approach to identity politics does not see the women’s movement as identity politics because it is not based on alleviating class inequality—rather neo-Marxists understand identity politics “in social, cultural, or psychological terms” (ibid. 49). Post-constructionists argue that it is ridiculous to think that the women’s movement was able to use identity politics effectively because women (and other groups) have multiple identities, all of which are socially constructed; “identity politics hardens rather than redefines differences in status identities that are the basis for inequality” (ibid. 56). While the neo-Marxist and post- modernist approach to identity politics do offer something to our understanding of the women’s movement’s use of identity politics, most notably the latter, helps us understand the claims of non-representation by black and Latino feminists, the new social movement approach to identity politics is the most useful for the purposes of this paper. Although some within that approach do not consider identity politics as important to the women’s movement because of the movement’s “radical and inclusive tendencies” more generally the approach recognizes identity politics as a legitimate political activity (Bernstein 2005, 55).

The use of identity politics by the women’s movement is legendary. Some claim that of

all the movements that used or attempted to use identity politics to achieve their goals, the

women’s movement has been the most successful (Ryan 2001). At the same time, it is important

to note that an understanding of the role of identity politics vis-à-vis the liberal feminist

movement requires a recognition of the strategic, social, political, and cultural elements that go

into deploying such a tool (Bernstein 2005, 67–68).

Furthermore, noting the utility of identity politics is not to say that the movement’s use of

identity politics was without problem.3 Identity politics united early members of the second- wave feminist movement because they possessed a shared language and set of experiences, fostered in part through consciousness-raising and buttressed by their shared demographic characteristics.4 This is not to say that members possessed a unified understanding of their identity or how to use it. Just as the liberal feminist movement had multiple organizational threads, it also included multiple concepts of identity, even in the early days. One thread used an identity based on difference (women are different and bring a ‘distinctive set of values’) to support their ‘social justice claims’ while the other used an identity based on equality to push their claims for restributive policies, though they sought to use existing resources and institutions to bring about change (Benhabib 1994; Fraser 1996). In 1986, Malcolm would argue that

Congress needed more women and women needed to provide the resources and support to get themselves and fellow women into positions of power—clearly a liberal feminist position.5 But

3 Some scholars argue that the only way a movement can use identity politics effectively is by being exclusive. Bernstein notes that Touraine (1998) makes this claim.

4 Furthermore, those who criticize identity politics do so because it has become somewhat of a ‘garbage can’ term; scholars use the term without defining it (Bernstein 2004). 5 Fraser notes that these two ‘orientations’ are often seen as conflicting, as one necessitates economic change and the other requires social or cultural change (Fraser 1996, 7). This is a “false antithesis” arguing for a “bivalent conception of justice [which] encompasses both distribution and recognition … the notion of parity of participation” (ibid. 30). This approach requires formal legal equality, “encompasses all (adult) partners to interaction … [and]

in the 1970s Malcolm and other political activists had not yet grasped the magnitude of institutional and political change needed for any real measure of women’s equality to be obtained. The battle over the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, however, made that crystal clear.

The ERA

Scholars looking back on the liberal feminist women’s movement have almost unanimously cast the battle over the Equal Rights Amendment as the turning point in the movement. Prior to this point the movement benefited from a confluence of factors—plentiful resources, political opportunity, increasingly skilled leadership, and relatively weak opposition

(Costain 1992). It is no surprise then that the ERA passed Congress almost unanimously in 1972 with virtually no opposition. Many considered it a fait accompli; supporters were not prepared for the level of opposition they encountered in the states. Mansbridge (1986) provides three explanations for the failure of the ERA: the necessity of a volunteers to push for passage, the lack of organization of said volunteers, and the lack of research to refute the opponents’ claims

(118). This last failing was the most hurtful as individuals and groups opposing the ERA (STOP

ERA, Eagle Forum, and other New Right organizations) quickly organized and began to

“circulate blatant lies” (Boles 1979). In fact, opponents were so organized and the women’s movement so broadsided by the emergence of opposition after passage by Congress that within a year the ratification process stalled and “the ERA’s proponents had lost control of the ratification process” (Mansbridge 1984, 13). Ultimately the amendment expired nine years later with only five additional states having ratified it, three short of the necessary thirty-eight.

Both Freeman and Boles’ work went to press before the amendment expired and both authors end their books with thoughts about the meaning of the ERA and the consequences of presupposes the equal moral worth of human beings” (ibid. 31-32). The result: “ seeking out transformative approaches to redistribution and deconstructive approaches to recognition” (ibid. 67).

possible outcomes. Freeman states, “the ERA could also have an adverse effect on the

movement by deflecting its energies from more important concerns . . . if ratification efforts drag

on and on . . . the ERA will turn out to be a losing proposition . . . [and] failure to ratify [may]

convince legislators that the movement has no political clout” (Freeman 1975, 240).

Freeman appears almost prophetic. With the failure of the ERA came the implosion of

the women’s movement and concomitantly, a decline in the movement’s influence on the

political agenda and the fate of women in politics became tenuous. As Costain (1992) notes one

of the key factors that helped the movement achieve its goals in the late 1960s and 1970s was the

fluidity of electoral coalitions. Those coalitions began to solidify in the late 1970s, so despite the

‘emergence’ of a gender gap in the 1980 election and the [misplaced] celebration that women

were finally voting as a bloc, the liberal feminist women’s movement lost much of its power in

the subsequent decade.6

The failure of the ERA and the ascension of Reagan to the presidency left “groups within

the women’s movement in a state of disarray” on two fronts (Costain 1992, 120). Internally the

two threads of the movement argued amongst themselves over future strategy, finances, and

leadership (Barakso 2005, 90–92) and externally the movement’s very public failure precipitated

its loss of influence in national politics. Bashevkin (1994) documents the decline in the

movement’s influence, noting that the number of pro-woman pieces of legislation and court decisions continually declined throughout the Reagan administration. During the 1970s, 72.7

percent of judicial and legislative outcomes were favorable to the women’s movement as

compared to 50 percent during Reagan’s administration, reaching a nadir of 14.3 percent during

George H. Bush’s presidency (Bashevkin 1994, 681–685). In interviews with movement

6 Reagan came out against the ERA during the 1980 presidential campaign, causing some to state that his anti-ERA stance cost him votes with women (Bashevkin 1994, 679). Subsequent research, however, indicated that the gender gap in the 1980 election had little to do with the ERA (Mansbridge 1985).

activists, Bashevkin found that “respondents consistently portrayed the Reagan and Bush administrations as opposed to women’s movement interests. They spoke of an adversarial environment, of feeling distant from the White House because their opinions were not usually taken into account on either policy making or presidential appointments” (688). More generally, activists saw the period of 1980–1992 as one that brought “racism and social division . . . fear of the new right … and policy rollback(s)” (692). However, good things came out of this proverbial fall from grace: “Feminist groups altered their focus and tried to build on changes in public consciousness that were beyond the control of presidential administrations” which brought “more momentum and more public support…[awareness] of the obvious enemy … and a financial and mobilization bonanza for many women’s organizations …” (Bashevkin 1994, 692; see also Taylor 1989).

Women Activists and EMILY’s List

Due to both the successes and failures of the liberal feminist women’s movement, by the mid-1980s an increasing number of women possessed the money to wage a battle against gender inequality. Enter Ellen Malcolm and friends, who had experience in both traditional politics and the liberal feminist women’s movement. Malcolm believed that if pro-choice Democratic women acquired political power it would change American political institutions and the structure of political power; she also believed the election of this type of female candidate would affect public policy. Thus Malcolm crafted EMILY’s List to appeal to liberal feminist women’s concerns about the “visible sources of gender discrimination, such as gendered job markets and inequitable wage scales, and with getting women into positions of authority in the professions, government, and cultural institutions” (Lorber 2005, 41). Without this use of liberal feminist identity politics and its broad appeal within the population of angry liberal feminist women in the

early 1980s, EMILY’s List would not have become a legitimate voice for women’s electoral

activity.

While other women’s PACs bickered over which candidates to support or had problems

acquiring funds, from the beginning Malcolm and her fellow strategists seemed to understand

how to balance receipts and expenditures to maximize the organization’s efforts.7 They understood that while critical, money was not the entire story. EMILY’s List succeed where others failed because by the mid-1990s it evolved into a women’s influence organization which offered female candidates and members the total package: a wide range of benefits to members

(both purposive and solidary), an extensive support network of campaign professionals and donors (for candidates), a legislative agenda (via its supported candidates) that included reproductive rights, pay equity, and child care, and most importantly, it was successful in getting women elected.

Malcolm created an organization built around feminist theory, feminist donors, and feminist candidates. It became an organization where female money mattered and female voices were heard. Over the last twenty years those voices have grown stronger and more diverse as the organization has expanded far beyond its PAC beginnings into an influence organization built by women, controlled by women, and in pursuit of influence for women. Chapter 4 traces the evolution of the organization and highlights the way that Malcolm’s agile leadership guided the organization into a political powerhouse.

7 NOW-PAC supported all feminist candidates—even men—(Barakso 2005) and WCF (Women’s Campaign Fund), while only supporting women, historically only provides endorsed candidates with direct contributions (www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_pacpg.exe?DoFn=C0001502406). The ‘founding mothers’ of the organization were Malcolm and twenty-five women, though there are no references to their names in any coverage of the organization. However, a few names of early supporters such as the wife of Senator Jeff Bingham and Jan Mondale have been mentioned (Spake 1988).

CHAPTER 4 EMILY’S LIST—THE ORGANIZATION

The goal of this chapter is two-fold. First, I place EMILY’s List in the larger political

world. Why did Stegall advise Malcolm that a PAC would be the best way to make an impact?

What tools did PACs offer? Second, I provide a basic history of the organization, focusing on

how the List came into being, its structure and strategies. In many ways the organization was

borne of frustration, funds, and fraternization, yet Malcolm is clearly the cornerstone of

EMILY’s List.1 Encouraged by friends to combine her political connections and her considerable fortune to make a difference, by 1986 Malcolm began to market EMILY’S List much like women marketed Tupperware. In the second half of this chapter I examine how

Malcolm used the framework and legal tools associated with a PAC to her advantage, adapting them along the way to transform the organization into a women’s influence organization and, more generally, a major player in the world of money politics. By 2004 every aspect of the organization’s structure and strategy had evolved—only the importance of identity politics and the role of Malcolm as leader remained unchanged.

Why a PAC?

Political action committees or PACs came into existence in the early 1900s and were most often associated with labor or business interests (Sabato 1992; Souraf 1988). While some scholars noted their existence with concern, often citing Madison’s warnings regarding the

divisiveness of factions or discussing them in reference to corruption or graft (Schattschneider

1960), for the most part these groups were not a major concern because of the strength of the

parties. By the mid sixties, however, party strength declined and interest groups blossomed, fed

in part by the institutionalization of social movements (Ornstein and Elder 1978). One of the key

1 Spake, Amanda. 1988. “Women can be power brokers, too: How Ellen Malcolm learned to influence elections and love it.” The Washington Post 5 June, p. W32.

things many of these groups did was to lobby the government in order to have their positions

considered. The effectiveness of interest groups lobbying efforts varied—the women’s

movement and civil rights movement enjoyed moderate success at lobbying while the gay rights

movement and the disability movement enjoyed less success. In many ways, what the group

could offer politicians determined the success of the movement. For instance, groups such as the

women’s movement or civil rights movement offered government officials a much-needed

constituency (Costain 1992, 14), other organizations such as business interests, unions, etc., stepped up their use of money as a tool of influence and a means of access. As Souraf (1992) notes, money had been in the system since the 19th century, however, up until the mid 1960s, the

parties controlled the purse strings and candidates campaigns. As campaigns became candidate-

centered and campaign consultants became a separate entity, “the burden of raising campaign

money passed from party to candidate and the fat cats became as important to candidates as they

had been for the parties” (Souraf 1992, 3). As the cost of campaigning skyrocketed (from $200

million in 1964 to $425 million in 1972), some pushed for legislation limiting campaign costs via

passage of FECA in 1971.2 Yet FECA did not stop Nixon from extorting upwards of $30 million dollars from corporate executives (Sabato 1988, 5). In response to this, and to the Watergate scandal writ large, Congress passed a series of amendments to FECA in 1974 to stem the tide of money involved in campaigns and elections. These amendments largely focused on limiting the contributions of wealthy individuals or “fat cats” who most considered the major problem of the system (Souraf 1992, 9).3 As a result, the 1974 amendments “…ignored or overlooked the two

2 Most notably the Democrats, driven by the ability of the GOP to raise more money according to Souraf (1992).

3 One of the main goals of FECA in 1971 was toestablish establish a public financing system and to place limits on the amount of money candidates could spend in elections. Those limits were struck down by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). http://www.campaignfinancesite.org/court/buckley1.html

emerging developments that would push reform off course…”: candidate spending and PACs

(Souraf 1992, 11-12).

FECA provided a legal framework for interest groups to push their money into the

political arena. Though not mentioned explicitly in FECA, the law established clear rules for

political action committees that sought to influence elections through financial contributions.

PACs cannot give contributions (direct and in-kind) of more than $5,000 a year to a candidate or

his/her committee, no more than $15,000 a year to the national parties and no more than $5,000 a

year to any other PAC.4 In addition to these monies, PACs were able to do an unlimited amount

of independent expenditures for or against candidates as long as this spending is “not made in

concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate’s

authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.”5

Sabato asserts that the 1974 amendments to FECA “guaranteed a place for PACs because

their limit [to candidates] was five times that of an individual donor… [making them] the natural

and legitimate vehicle for financial participation in campaigns by a wide array of American

interest groups” (9–10). In the years after 1974, large numbers of interest groups took advantage

of this political opportunity; the number of PACs grew exponentially in the next decade.

Motivated to form PACs by the larger contribution limitations, the chance for greater participation by members, or even at the ‘encouragement’ of elected officials, the number of registered PACs grew from 1,949 in 1979 to 4,596 in 1986 (Figure 4-1).6

4 http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf

5 http://www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf

6 According to Sabato, there are at least five reasons to start a PAC. First, as mentioned above, PACs have more leeway to give money than individuals, though the amount they are practicably able to give depends heavily on whether the PAC has a “parent” organization that foots the PAC’s administrative costs. Second, government has a greater impact on some groups than others. Third, groups will have more influence if members are active in politics—giving money gives members a material stake in elections. Fourth, the creation of a PAC can be the result of external pressure from elected officials. Finally, it may simply be a public relations ploy (Sabato 1988, 29-31).

Thomas (1978) argues that all PACs are the same on one key variable: “They represent

an effort through the accumulation of economic power to influence the outcome of elections, to

establish favorable relations with elected officials, or to do both” (Thomas 1978, 82). The FEC,

however, categorizes PACs three different ways. First, they distinguish them from candidate or

party committees. Second, PACs are categorized according to whether or not they have a parent

organization. Third, PACs are classified into one of five sectors: Corporate, Labor,

Trade/Membership/Heath, Non-connected, Cooperative, or Corporation without stock.7

Although Souraf is generally dismissive of attempts to categorize PACs in general ways, he finds that FEC categorization of PACs: “…which began as categories growing out of regulatory imperatives have, surprisingly, become useful analytical categories, because from their legal and

structural differences the various kinds of PACs have developed important organizational and

behavioral differences” (Souraf 1992, 102).

The vast majority of PACs are connected organizations, i.e., they have a ‘parent’

organization that absorbs the administrative costs of the PAC. All corporate, labor, and

trade/membership organizations are considered connected and their PACs are considered

separate segregated funds (SSF) by the FEC.8 There are costs and benefits to each FEC

classification. According to the FEC, an SSF or connected organization may solicit only a

restricted class of persons associated with the connected organization. The public cannot be

solicited for donations.9 Yet this does not keep these PACs from acquiring donations. As

7 The FEC summary files include a column named SIG. According to the codebook for the summary file, “This indicates the organization with which the committee has reported being connected. In most cases, these sponsoring organizations cannot use treasury funds to directly make political contributions. The law does, however, permit them to pay the overhead costs of these committees.” ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/pacsum92.txt

8 It is important to note that some PACs which are considered “ideological” or single-issue PACs are in fact SSFs of trade/membership/associations according to the FEC. For example, the NRA-Victory Fund, National Women’s Organization PAC, Women’s Campaign Fund, and National Women’s Political Caucus are all SSFs.

9 http://www.fec.gov/pdf/colagui.pdf

Figure 4-2 illustrates, connected PACs bring in much more than non-connected PACs.

Disaggregating connected PACs into FEC sectors we see that connected PACs still have higher

receipts than non-connected PACs in all but a few years (Figure 4-3).

Not only do these organizations tend to have higher gross receipts, but they are often in a better

spot to engage in electoral activities because they do not have the burden of massive overhead

costs. Figure 4-4 shows the percent of PAC receipts that went to candidates from 1978–2004.

Connected PACS give a much greater percentage of their receipts to candidates than non-

connected PACs. This tends to make them more influential in politics, if defining influence in

terms of access to candidates or elected officials. However, even as early as 1992, EMILY’s List

appeared to be an exception to this rule. Souraf presents the organization as a member of a new

class of ideological non-connected PACs

that go beyond the stereotypical PAC. EMILY’s List, for example, is registered as a PAC and makes contributions in the usual ways, but in its pursuit of its feminist agenda it is also a donor network in which membership requires dues of $100 per election and a pledge to contribute at least $100 to at least two candidates endorsed by EMILY’s List. It is an organizational form that suits especially the autonomous, politicized contribution, and it may well be a PAC variant with a future. (Souraf 1992,111)

What set Malcolm on the path to PAC powerhouse? While it is true that a PAC allowed

her and her friends to make a larger contribution to candidates than they could make as

individuals, Malcolm knew that to really make a difference would require much more than

people writing a check. Female candidates really needed a support network that included trained

political consultants and savvy campaign staff, not to mention the need for candidate recruitment

and training. Malcolm was not the only one with this knowledge, nor was she the only one who

sought to increase the number of women into elected office. There were at least three other

PACs, National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), Women’s Campaign Fund (WCF), and

National Organization for Women PAC (NOW/PAC) active in the system. Why would Malcolm form EMILY’s List instead of working with the existing organizations?

Women’s PACs

As mentioned earlier, the literature on women’s PACs is sparse, though in recent years scholars have tried to rectify this situation. In Women’s PACs: Abortion and Elections (2005)

Day and Hadley briefly discuss the history of women’s PACs, noting “virtually every account of women’s gains in electoral politics during the 1990s credits women’s PACs with much of this success” (6). They briefly mention that women’s PACs began in the 1970s and “expanded tremendously after the mid-1980s,” but do not discuss how these PACs fit into the larger campaign finance tapestry (Day and Hadley 2005, 7). Fredrickson (2004) attempts to close this gaping hole in the literature by examining the impacts, motivations, and impact of women’s

PACs from 1998–2002. She explains scholars’ inattention to women’s PACs as due to the fact that women’s PAC have a different motivation than traditional PACs, i.e., women’s PACs seek descriptive representation whereas traditional PACs seek substantive representation (39).10

While Fredrickson recognizes and emphasizes that women’s PACs are different from traditional

PACs, and states emphatically that this difference needs to be fully appreciated by scholars, she misses some critical points vis-à-vis the place of women’s PACs in the campaign finance system.

First, she fails to historicize women’s PACs. According to Fredrickson, NOW created

NOW/PAC in 1983, WCF formed in 1974 as the first women’s PAC and NWPC, formed in

1971, also began a PAC. However, FEC records indicate that NOW/PAC existed at least as far back as 1980 and NWPC formed at least 3 years before WCF, though NWPC envisioned their

10 Fredrickson recognizes that women’s PACs were not created in a vacuum; some do seek substantive representation. Thus she classifies women’s PACS into three categories: Fem PACs who focus on descriptive representation, Policy PACs which focus on substantive representation, and Unity PACs make decisions based on both types of representation, i.e., they support only certain types of women candidates (46-48).

mission as more broad than that of WCF, which focused exclusively on electoral activities. 11

Yet Fredrickson does not make these distinctions. Finally, Fredrickson states that the FEC

categorizes women’s PACs as non-connected organizations. While this mistake is common,

insofar as most tend to categorize PACs in the same way that they categorize interest groups, an examination of FEC records shows that the three women’s PACs noted above are in fact connected organizations with SSFs.12 This does not negate Fredrickson’s findings vis-à-vis the

importance of women’s PACs to female candidates, however, this specificity is critical to our

ability to fit women’s PACs into the larger system of campaign finance.

As Figure 4-5 illustrates, women’s PACs which operate as SSFs are able to use a greater

percentage of their PAC monies in efforts to get candidates elected. In fact in most years the

average contribution from connected women’s PACs was twice as large as the average from non-

connected women’s PACs.

Even though women’s PACs, especially those that operate as SSFs, are comparable to

non-women’s PACs in terms of candidate contributions, campaign finance scholars and

journalists tend to dismiss these organizations as small-time players in moneyed politics. But

others (Burrell 1994; Day and Hadley 2005; Francia 2001; Fredrickson 2004; Witt et al 1995)

argue that women’s PACs are a critical resource for female candidates.

An endorsement from a woman’s PAC significantly and positives increases the overall PAC contributions and the overall campaign contributions of congressional candidates … [and] campaign contributions from women’s PACs and endorsements from women’s PACs do have some impact on the percentage of the two-party vote received during the general election. (Fredrickson 2004, 177)

11 Barakso discusses NOW’s electoral activities and the discussion of a PAC date back to the mid 1970s (Barakso 2005: 64).

12 Ornstein and Elder (1978) argue that groups can to categorized according to its goals, membership, resources, and activities (26). Of the 60 women’s PACs that Fredrickson examines (p32), twelve of them are considered trade/membership groups by the FEC.

Why are members of the academy generally dismissive of these organizations? One possible reason is the method that traditional campaign finance scholars use to measure PAC influence. “Evaluations of PACs usually proceed … from the misimpression that a PAC is a

PAC and that they are all one kind of political animal … the trick is to find both the great similarities and the main axes of difference beneath all of the diversity” (Sabato 1992, 107). If we look at the three main women’s PACs in the period from 1980–1994 we see that these organizations were ‘small time’ players in the PAC universe even though the legal structure of campaign finance worked to their benefit.

Figure 4-6 and Figure 4-7 show the receipts and candidate contributions for NWPC,

WCF, NOW/PAC and EMILY’s List from 1980-1994. We see stark differences among women’s

PACs on these measures, even before EMILY’s List emerged in 1984. National Women’s

Political Caucus acquired the least receipts during this period; Women’s Campaign Fund consistently received the greatest amount of contributions until 1992, when EMILY’s List took in twice as much as WCF. In terms of the percent of receipts given to candidates, Figure 4-7 is surprising. From 1980 to 1990, NWPC and WCF spent less than 40 percent of their receipts on candidate contributions. Ironically NOW/PAC, which according to Barakso (2005) was torn asunder over whether or not to create a PAC, and then made a series of controversial decisions about which candidates to support, was the one women’s PAC to take full advantage of their status as a SSF to make the most out of their influence during this period.

Why weren’t NWPC, WCF, and NOW/PAC able to maximize their potential? First, the power of these organizations is tied to the ability and willingness of members or potential members to give monetary contributions. Those most likely to give to these organizations, women, have historically had less disposable income and are less likely to donate money than their male counterparts (Capeck 1998; Francia et al 2001). Women were more likely than men to

give to these organizations because the goal(s) of women’s PACs are different than the goals of most ‘traditional’ PACs insofar as women’s PACs tend to pursue descriptive representation to a greater or lesser degree (Fredrickson 2004, 50). Furthermore, for these organizations to give money to candidates and increase their power in the eyes of scholars and journalists, they needed a pool of suitable female candidates to support. According to data from the Center for American

Women and Politics, between 1970 and 1984 an average of 50 women ran for U.S. Congress each cycle.13 Furthermore, between 1974 and 1984, no more than 23 women served in Congress at any time.14 For NOW/PAC, which was more interested in substantive representation than in electing female candidates, the dearth of women in power led them to support male candidates:

“NOW regularly endorsed male Democratic candidates who supported many of NOW’s positions …” (105). In many ways NOW/PAC’s history exemplifies the problems of women’s

PACs in this period. Proponents of the PAC faced substantial opposition within the organization to the very idea of creating a PAC. Barakso notes, “members felt that the ERA and the mainstream political activities the campaign entailed threatened to undermine NOW’s commitment to grassroots mobilizing … [and] eroded NOW’s position as an outsider in the system and its commitment to representing the vanguard of feminist activism…” (64). But by the mid-1980s, while there were still some holdouts, liberal feminist women largely united behind the goal of supporting female candidates, recognizing that working ‘outside’ the system was not the most effective way to pursue their goals. Echols (1989) argues that not until radical feminism

‘dissipated’ did liberal feminism become “the uncontested voice of feminism, thus allowing it to define the political agenda of the women’s movement for the public-at-large” (11). But NWPC,

13 http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/CanHistory/can_histsum.pdf

14 http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/CanHistory/canwincong_histsum.pdf

WCF, and NOW/PAC were not able to take full advantage of this opportunity, weighed down by

their history and organizational structure.

Given these realities, it is not surprising that Malcolm felt free to enter the PAC world.

But that does not explain why EMILY’s List, a non-connected PAC, came in and within three

election cycles surpassed NWPC, WCF and NOW/PAC.

EMILY Grows and Matures

As the story goes, Malcolm and twenty-five friends started ELIST in her basement,

which seems like an unlikely place for an IBM heiress and her politico friends to ‘begin’

anything.15 In fact, ELIST’s origin story reads like the opening credits of “That 70s Show”, but

instead of singing “In the Street” Malcolm and her friends are singing “I Will Survive.”16

In the early days and even years of the organization, it is likely that Malcolm’s basement served as the organization’s headquarters. Overhead costs for non-connected PACs tend to gobble up large portions of receipts, so it makes perfect sense that Malcolm would seek to minimize these costs at the start. But there is another reason for EMILY’s List’s ‘birth’ story to be set in a basement—it builds upon the tradition of grassroots action of the civil rights and

liberal feminist women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This is the audience that Malcolm

is speaking to, especially in these early years, as these are the women and men with the money

and the motive to give. She spoke at residential house parties where she explained the concept of

supporting women in their quest for public office.17 She also had her friends “working the

circuit”; according to Spake the wife of Senator Jeff Bingham hosted a party for senators’ wives

15 http://www.emilyslist.org/about/where-from.html

16 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0165598/combined

17 Other groups and even the Republican and Democratic parties are now using this strategy in their registration and GOTV efforts. See: (http://www.commonwealthclub.org/features/reform/houseparty/; http://www.utdemocrats.org/ht/display/EventDetails/i/692172 ; http://www.fairvote.org/novoselic/).

and Jan Mondale participated by sending 200 letters (Spake 1988). As word spread among the female political elite, interest in the organization and its goals grew.

How did Malcolm differentiate EMILY’s List from the other women’s PACs? First,

Malcolm pursued both descriptive and substantive representation vis-à-vis EMILY’s List, i.e., only female pro-choice, pro-ERA Democratic candidates would get ELIST support. The other major women’s PACs either focused on descriptive representation, supporting all female candidates regardless of party or issue position or, they focused on substantive representation going so far as to support male candidates over female candidates if the male candidate’s position on key issues was closer to the organization’s preferred policy (Fredrickson 2004, 17).

Furthermore, Malcolm took a page out of the labor PAC book and focused her attention on

Democratic women. In the early years of the liberal feminist women’s movement, many feminist activists followed a bipartisan approach, believing that it provided them with the best chances for success (Costain 1992; Barakso 2005). NWPC, WCF, and NOW/PAC followed in that tradition.

“NOW’s leaders repeatedly stressed the nonpartisan nature of NOW’s involvement at board meetings and national conventions” (Barakso 2005, 67). Woods notes that when encouraged to seek the presidency at NWPC she hesitated, in part because “NWPC is multipartisan and that meant I’d not only have to give up my institute at the university but also all partisan Democratic activities” (Woods 2001, 136).

Malcolm, however, saw the Democratic Party as the most receptive to female candidates

(Day and Hadley 2005, 7). Seizing political opportunity, she hitched her wagon to the

Democratic caravan. Not only did Malcolm set EMILY’s List up as a party-adjunct vis-à-vis candidate recruitment and support (discussed more below), but also in 1992 EMILY’s List began giving money to the Democratic Party (Table 4-1).

PACs giving money to the parties is not new—in fact it was seen as a way for individuals

and groups to insure influence dating back to the 19th century. Souraf points to the significant

amount of money labor gave to the Democratic Party in 1988 as part of the explanation for

labor’s access (Souraf 1992, 110). Beginning in the 1990s though, the parties came to rely on

PACs for more than simply a check. In addition to hard money donations, PACs began to give

the parties unregulated soft money donations that the party could use for ‘party building’ which often took the form of GOTV efforts or issue advocacy (Dwyre and Kolodny 2003).18 According to data from the Center for Responsible Politics, EMILY’s List provided the national Democratic

Party with over $385,000 in soft money between 1998 and 2002.19 Of the select women’s PACs examined (NWPC, WCF, and NOW/PAC), the only one to provide the parties with any soft money during this period was the National Women’s Political Caucus, which gave the

Democrats $1,050 in 2002.20

Furthermore, EMILY’s List engaged in its own issue advocacy during this time period.

According to the Annenberg Public Policy Center, “Nine groups and the two major parties

accounted for 90% of the spending on television issue ads in the top 75 media markets after

Super Tuesday.”21 EMILY’s List was one of these groups, spending $3.4 million on issue ads in

2002. Here again we see Malcolm ‘learning’ from other organizations, incorporating their

strategies, and seeing if it fits her goals. According to Biersack and Viray (2005), issue advocacy

became a popular tool in the mid-1990s because it could be paid for with soft money. For

18 Soft money is money given to the organization that is not from individuals, i.e., money given to the organization from party committees, from candidates, or from other PACs. Soft money is most often discussed in the context of the national parties in part because one of the main goals of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) was to limit soft money (Bauer 2004).

19 http://opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp1.asp?txtName=EMILY%27s+List

20http://opensecrets.org/softmoney/softcomp2.asp?txtName=National+Women%27s+Political+Caucus&txtUltOrg= y&txtSort=name&txtCycle=2002

21 http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/ISSUEADS/reports_previous.htm

connected organizations, this meant that money could come from the parent organization’s

treasury to fund these activities. The only catch was that issue ads could not expressly advocate

the election or defeat of a candidate. They could, however, talk about a candidate’s record and

the issues and encourage voters to contact a candidate.

Acquiring information on the issue advocacy of organizations is a huge undertaking, thus

reports done by the Annenberg Public Policy Center serve as the most accessible and reliable

source for this information.22 While EMILY’s List does appear on the Center’s report covering the 1999–2000 election, the organization does not show up on the Center’s reports for 1996 or the 2002 report.23 This does not mean that the organization did not engage in these activities in these or other years, just that if they did, the amount spent on these activities was miniscule.

For EMILY’s List, issue advocacy may not have been practical for at least three reasons.

First, ELIST had much more hard money than soft money (Figure 4-8); as a non-connected PAC

they did not have a parent organization’s treasury to raid for additional soft money funds.

Second, it is possible that a decision was made within the organization to prioritize GOTV and

solidify connections between the organization and the Democratic national and state party

organizations rather than spend money on issue advertising, especially given that the

organization had been spending hard money on independent expenditures since 1988

(Table 4-2). Independent expenditures are considered more effective because they allow the

organization to expressly advocate the defeat or election of a candidate.24 Although hard money

22 http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/

23 ibid. and http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/ISSUEADS/reports_execsummary.htm

24 Even though BCRA prohibited PACs and individuals from giving soft money contributions to the national parties, PACs and individuals could still give soft money to state party organizations. This is why after 2002 the Women Vote! joint fundraising committees were sponsored by EMILY’s List and various state Democratic Party organizations rather than the DSCC or the DCCC as had been the case in previous years. Regarding the question of which is better, issue ads or independent expenditures, although independent expenditures may be more effective

must be used to pay for these expenditures, the organization’s decision to use independent expenditures over issue advocacy may have been a strategic one insofar as they would be using donor dollars to expressly support EMILY’s List candidates.

The second way in which Malcolm differentiated EMILY’s List from other women’s

PACs is her decision to package EMILY’s List as a donor network. There were multiple payoffs from this decision. First, to some degree this took the pressure off Malcolm in terms of expectations for the organization. Malcolm and her advisors had to come up with a slate of recommended candidates, and Malcolm traveled the country to increase the membership rolls and get donations. However, because the emphasis was on the organization’s function as a donor network, if recommended candidates lost, one explanation could be that donors did not give enough—or they did not have enough to give! On the other hand being a donor network gave donors the feeling of control to donors. This would be especially important in the early days of the organization before its ‘track record’ had been established. More important, would be selling membership in EMILY’s list as an investment—an investment in a candidate, and investment in an organization, and an investment in a future where women had an equal voice on the floor of the U.S. Congress. Why would this have been a relatively easy sell for Malcolm?

Because in these early years Malcolm focused her membership drives on affluent ‘connected’ politically active women who knew something about politics. She did not have to convince them of the importance of political activity nor the importance of her mission. Her intention was not to start a social movement—though in the end she created the organizational equivalent in terms of membership, innovation, and accomplishments.

they can also be problematic for groups if the position they take is controversial or if a group comes out in support of a candidate and such an endorsement activates issues previously latent.

By the mid 1990s EMILY’s List “raised bundling to an art form” (Day and Hadley 2005,

6). In typical Malcolm fashion, she observed something that others were doing, and adjusted it to

meet her needs. As Souraf (1992) notes, bundlers or brokers played a role in moneyed politics

since at least the 19th century. These individuals served as the conduit between the party and the

‘fat cats’ who provided the party with funds.

The brokers of today are the descendants of the fat cats, the old party treasurers, the campaign managers, and the finance committees and their chairpeople who raised the money in the old days. And just as then, they bring a third set of interest to the contributor-candidate exchanges. (Souraf 1992, 129)

When the party’s influence declined in the mid-twentieth century, the influence of brokers increased, as these individuals knew how to help candidates raise the funds necessary to buy precious television time and the services of political consultants.

Malcolm’s decision to bundle was not revolutionary. The decision by PACs to bundle money seems like a no-brainer—it is simply one more way that a PAC can gain influence with a candidate. However, the decision to bundle is not one to take lightly as donors could send checks to candidates not endorsed by the organization and the organization must transmit the money to the candidate. The chance for this type of embarrassment is one that keeps many

PACs from bundling (Sabato 1988, 64). However, Sabato notes that bundling can bring real benefits to an organization in terms of influence with candidates and contact with donors. For these and other reasons, organizations such as Council for a Livable World have used bundling since the 1960s (Thomas 1978, 84–86).

PACs that bundle are often those who seek substantive representation. While EMILY’s

List is concerned with substantive representation insofar as all endorsed candidates have to be pro-choice and pro-ERA, however, they do not have any specific policy goals insofar as they do

not employ lobbyists.25 Still, the whole argument about wanting more pro-choice, pro-ERA

women in office is based on the belief that these women will behavior differently than their male

counterparts, so there is a substantive element to EMILY’s List activity. The substantive link,

however, is not one that EMILY’s List uses after the legislator is in office—by all accounts,

EMILY’s LIST does not go to a candidate and say, “we supported you so you need to vote this way on this issue.”26

Why then would Malcolm sell the organization as a bundling powerhouse? According to

Souraf (1992), bundling often does more for the bundler than for the recipient or the donor.

The variety of cases, the configuration of interests, the enhancement of political goals—the possibilities are virtually endless in the universe of brokered contributions. By all informal accounts and alarms, the role of the broker grows with each passing electoral cycle … The brokers’ interests are those of the contributor writ large, and their many brokerings make themselves into an influential elite that some have called the new fat cats of American campaign finance. (125–126)

Souraf views this as a negative outcome, but what choice did Malcolm have if she wanted to accomplish her goal of getting women elected? As pointed out in Chapter 5, while she does pull money in from already active members, she also pulls in new members, specifically new female members, who have been sorely underrepresented in the circle of political decision makers. Moreover, there is evidence that female contributors are different from their male counterparts and insofar as EMILY’s List works as a stepping-stone to other contributions,

Malcolm could in fact be changing the face of American politics.

25 “PAC for women expects no monetary payback.” 1992. The Houston Chronicle, 20 December, p. A4.

26 The closest EMILY’s List has come to this is after the vote on the Partial Birth Abortion Ban. Two congresswomen, Representative Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) and Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) voted for the ban. Malcolm publicly lambasted them and stated that the organization would not support them ever again. While one would imagine that this would have little impact, as both Lincoln and Landrieu were incumbents and ELIST is on record for supporting open-seat and challengers, the organization does support incumbent candidates, especially those in competitive races. Franke-Guta (2003). See Chapter 6 for more discussion.

Bundling made Malcolm into the broker for female Democratic pro-choice candidates.

She became “the queen of the hat-passers”—the “democratic queenmaker”—and a power broker

within the Democratic Party. It is this power that helped her propel ELIST into the top tier of

moneyed politics. She was able to offer the Democrats money when they needed it.27 Malcolm also helped the Democratic Party recruit viable female candidates; in fact she vetted them. The party knew that if Malcolm was willing to throw her support behind a candidate then they should step up. Historically speaking, the parties have not been given high marks for its recruitment efforts vis-à-vis women; however, in recent years scholars have found that the parties are doing a better job recruiting and funding candidates, and some point to the efforts of EMILY’s List in helping the Democratic Party in this endeavor (Burrell 1994; Day and Hadley 2005;

Sanbonmatsu 2004).

In fact, EMILY’s List began to provide this vetting service to more than just the party—it

began to function as a “lead” PAC, signaling to other PACs that a candidate was worthy of

support. Thomas mentions that the AFL-CIO’s PAC, COPE, as well as BIPAC also functions in

this manner. “If BIPAC contributes to a candidate, its action may well trigger, or at least

encourage, contributions to the same candidate from other business PACs. Similarly a candidate

who receives support from COPE is virtually assured to some level of funding from other labor

PACs” (Biersack and Viray 2005, 54; Herrnson 2005, 32; Thomas 1978, 33).

Finally, Malcolm helped the Democrats turn out the vote, not only by giving ELIST

donors a stake in the election, possibly increasing their likelihood of voting, but also by engaging

in GOTV efforts. In 2004, EMILY’s List sent more than 500 volunteers to travel to Florida the

week before the election to canvass neighborhoods, “knocking on 506,000 doors to bring home a

27 Souraf (1992) notes that PACs were godsends to the Democrats because they have historically been at a monetary disadvantage.

victory for progressive values.”28 They also engaged in GOTV efforts in South Carolina, placing

“171,000 computerized calls … to provide them [Democratic voters] with precinct information.”29 I will discuss these activities in more detail later; for now, it is important to note

that the activities would foster bonds between the organization and the Democratic Party (both

national and state-level organizations). While these activities would likely benefit EMILY’s

List’s recommended candidates in the targeted areas, because of the nature of GOTV the benefits

from these activities would likely accrue to all Democratic candidates and could significantly

affect election outcomes (Biersack and Viray 2005, 70; Semiatin and Rozell 2005, 76).30 In this, as in other endeavors, Malcolm adapted the successful strategies of other PACs, especially labor, for her own uses.31

Was all of this the result of Malcolm’s decision to market ELIST as a donor network?

No. Bundling in and of itself would not have transformed ELIST into a premier PAC. Through bundling Malcolm was able to build up her influence and the organization’s importance. In bundling money to candidates, the party and others see that Malcolm can deliver the goods, i.e. money.

Just how much bundling did Malcolm accomplish? In terms of bundled money as a percentage of receipts, the high-water mark for the organization came in 1990 when it received

28 See: http://www.emilyslist.org/gallery/FLGOTV, http://www.emilyslist.org/team_emily/wcaarchive/folakeoguntebi.html and http://www.emilyslist.org/team_emily/wcaarchive/pepecervantes.html.

29 Schafer, Susanne. 2004. “Voters may have gotten incorrect information.” Associated Press Wire, 1 November; Russakoff, Dale. 2004. “Democracy-to-Go: Contested States are Magnets to Droves of Mobile Activists.” The Washington Post, 24 October.

30 Beirsack and Viray find that the NRA, COPE, and the NAACP have “focused much of their electoral efforts on voter mobilization and communications targeting their large membership” since the late 1990s (Biersack and Viray 2005, 70).

31 Semiatan and Rozell (2005) point out, from 1996 to 2000 PAC get-out-the-vote (GOTV) strategies changed from a focus on television advertising to television ads supplemented by registration drives, phone banks, and direct mail (80).

20 percent of its receipts in the form of bundled contributions. However, as the amount of ELIST receipts increased (Figure 4-8), the percent of bundled receipts necessarily goes down. Thus, an examination of the raw amount of money earmarked by ELIST across years is a better window into EMILY’s List bundling program

(Table 4-3).

In fact, EMILY’s List has consistently increased its bundling activity across time. In fact, the money that EMILY’s List bundles to candidates far outpace the amount of money the organization gives to candidates in direct or in-kind contributions. Furthermore, analysis from the Campaign Finance Institute shows that EMILY’s List remains the top bundler among PACs

(Table 4-4).

After comparing ELIST’s bundling activity to its total receipts and to other PACs that advertise their bundling operations, it appears that EMILY’s List bundling activity only appears to have decreased because the organization now does so much more than bundling that this activity seems minor.

EMILY’s List: New Frontiers

How did Malcolm make this happen and why would Malcolm want to take EMILY’s List beyond bundling, especially since by bundling she is giving female candidates more of what they need than she could do simply through PAC activity? It may be that Malcolm did not want to do this but that members gave her more and more checks directly to the organization and she needed to do something with the money—she could only give candidates $5,000 an year. However, as we will see in Chapter 6, EMILY’s List very rarely reaches the maximum contribution they can give a candidate. A better explanation for EMILY’s List’s expansion is that Malcolm knew that candidates needed money, but she also knew they needed a politically savvy, well-funded support network. To provide candidates with this Malcolm had to make it into a more traditional

PAC and she needed donors to invest in the organization, not just in individual candidates. How

did she do this?

Malcolm was helped along by the organization’s success in the 1986 and 1990 elections

where 10 of 25 recommended candidates made it into the U.S. Congress and all cited EMILY’s

List as giving them critical amounts of support.32 When the 1991 Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings hit the airwaves, the backlash among women flooded the candidate pool and the coffers of women’s PACs, especially EMILY’s List . 33 This shift in the political landscape provided

Malcolm with a new political opportunity—potential members. In response, Malcolm shifted her

focus from the “autonomous, politicized contributor” to the angry mass of women outraged at

the sight of a committee comprised of white male senators who summarily dismissed Hill’s

claim of sexual harassment (Kim 1998; Palley 1993; Souraf 1992, 111). Women could not help

asking themselves—would Thomas have made it to the Court if there had been a woman on that

committee?

Looking at the organization’s activities over the past twenty years (Figure 4-9), it is

evident that the 1992 election cycle was a watershed. Within the next two cycles, the

organization transformed itself into a full service interest group, beginning four new projects,

reaching out to new members, becoming deeply connected to the Democratic Party, and creating

formal and informal networks with other PACs and their leaders.

In 1992 EMILY’s List made a concerted effort to support female pro-choice women of

color running for office. That year they provided just over $80,000 to Carol Moseley Braun who

32 http://www.emilyslist.org/about/where-from.html; Nita Lowey, who received $40,000 from EMILY’s List in 1992, stated, “They’ve been extremely helpful for me….They get people to contribute, and all you have to do is say thank you.” See: “PAC for women expects no monetary payback” 1992. The Houston Chronicle, 20 Dec, p. A4. Also see Schwawrtz, Maralee and Kenneth Cooper. 1992. “Female Candidates Got Major Boost from Contributors.” The Washington Post, 8, November.

33 For a discussion of the 1992 election and EMILY’s List see: Delli Carpini and Fuchs 1993; Jaquette 1997; Palley 1993; Caroll 1999; Kim 1998.

became the first African American woman to serve in the U.S. Senate.34 According to the

organization’s press release, EMILY’s List has endorsed “every one of the 11 African-American

women who serve in the U.S. House of Representatives … and every one of the six Latina

Democratic women serving in the U. S. House.”35 In fact, according to organization accounts,

“one-third of the women EMILY’s List has helped to elect to the House and Senate have been

women of color.”36 However, such claims must be kept in perspective. As Chapter 6 illustrates,

EMILY’s List endorsement is not easily obtained, so while the organization does give support to

the women of color that meet its criteria, there is no indication (through the media or through the

organization literature) that the organization does anything different or extra to reach out to

women of color.

In the case of Gwen Moore, whom the organization holds up as the premier example of

their ‘women of color’ program, the organization provided Moore with funds less than thirty

days before the primary, when they provided her with $5,003 in in-kind donations.37 The organization also bundled money to her before the primary, however, 86 percent of the bundled funds came to Moore after she won the primary.38 Even though the support came late, Moore gives EMILY’s List credit for helping her to win her election. Records from the Federal Election

Commission indicate Moore raised $534,926 in donations and had $167,092 in cash on hand

34 http://www.opensecrets.org/1994os/osdata/moslecar.pdf

35 http://www.emilyslist.org/newsroom/presskit/woc.html 36 ibid.

37 The first donation from EMILY’s List to Moore occurred on August 13, 2004, ten days after the primary. http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/com_supopp/2003_C00193433

38 For primary dates see: http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/2004pdates.pdf. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, EMILY’s List (organization, members, or PAC staff) provided Moore with $87,303 in the 2004 election: http://www.opensecrets.org/races/contrib.asp?ID=WI04&cycle=2004&special=N.

going into the primary.39 At that point EMILY’s List gave Moore a direct contribution of $5,000

and bundled $9,750 to her from ELIST donors. An examination of the pre-primary report filed

with the Wisconsin in August of 2004, EMILY’s List reported raising $3,000 year to date, all of

which was then transferred to the “Women’s Choice” committee.40 By October, the organization

reported raising an additional $9,000 all of which went to twelve women running for state level

office.41 Yet given the kudos that Moore gives EMILY’s List and the fact that the organization

claims to have spent $685,000 in Wisconsin, though only $100,000 of that was in contributions

to candidates, it seems clear that that the organization is doing something that can not be

measured by using the traditional measures of PAC activity.42

One of those things, training a cadre of campaigners, began in earnest in 1993. As

mentioned before, Malcolm knew that for women to win, they needed a support network, and

professional consultants comprise a critical component of that network. As Brewer (2005) notes,

women comprise a relatively small proportion of political consultants for a whole host of reasons including family demands, business climate, sexist clients, and early career decisions such as their lack of campaign experience (154–158). She argues it is critically important to have more

women as consultants and staff because “women might lend a fresh approach … they maybe

more collaborative … [and] women campaign managers might be better at advising men how to present themselves to women voters.”43

39 http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/

40 http://elections.state.wi.us/financereport_pac_all.asp 41 ftp://doaftp04.doa.state.wi.us/electionsboard/2004/EmilyList-PREF04.xls

42 Conniff, Ruth. 2005. “Spreading the Dough.” The Nation. October 31: 16. By ‘traditional measures of PAC activity’ I mean the evaluation of PACs according to how much they give to candidates (direct or in-kind) or spend on independent expenditures. These figures do not capture the the organization’s GOTV efforts nor do they capture the other things the organization does like candidate training and consultant/staff training.

“One of the few—as in perhaps a half-dozen-prominent female media consultants in the

country,” Dawn Laguens recently gave EMILY’s List credit for helping more women enter the

consultant field: “…more women are working their way into the pipeline, cutting their teeth on

the kind of lower-profile races that will eventually qualify them for the big leagues. Having

groups like EMILY’s List, which seek out and train promising women for campaign work,

doesn’t hurt either.”44 Between1993 and 2005 the organization claims to have trained “nearly

1,000 women and men” through their campaign staff/consultant training program.45

In 2001 the organization supplemented these efforts with a new program, Campaign

Corps, which focused on training college students to work as support staff, “…in targeted progressive Democratic campaigns for the three months leading up to Election Day.”46 While the organization literature implies that EMILY’s List created Campaign Corps from whole cloth47, Campaign Corps dates back to the 1988 election cycle under the name Participation

2000.48 I conducted an exhaustive Lexis-Nexis and ProQuest search using EMILY’s List as both a subject and a title search term. I separated the articles (n=600) into seven categories according to the type and degree of mention.49 For the purposes of this analysis, three categories

are of particular interest: substantive articles, organizational news, and organizational

reference/affiliated member. Within these articles there were only two mentions of Campaign

43 Kornacki, Steve. 2006. “Men are from mars, Women are from …. Mars?: Gender roles in 21st century campaigns.” Campaigns and Elections, 28 (1): 41.

44 Kornacki, Steve. 2006. “Men are from mars, Women are from …. Mars?: Gender roles in 21st century campaigns.” Campaigns and Elections, 28 (1): 40-42.

45 http://www.emilyslist.org/do/jobs/index.html

46 http://www.emilyslist.org/do/campaign-corps.html

47 http://www.emilyslist.org/about/where-from.html

48 http://www.campaigncorps.org/about/

49 See Appendix A for the complete coding guide

Corps or its predecessor Participation 2000. Neither article provided substantive information

about the program; in fact Campaign Corps did not receive any more than passing mention.

A broader search was slightly more successful. A ProQuest search with the terms

Campaign Corps or Participation 2000 as subject keyword or title keyword retrieved three (3)

relevant articles, one of which provided the background of Campaign Corps predecessor,

Participation 2000. Ohio governor Richard Celeste formed Participation 2000 in 1988 in order to

provide select progressive candidates with college-aged volunteers.50 No mention of EMILY's

List appeared in any of these articles, however, FEC records indicate that the two committees were at least informally linked in the 2000 and 2002 election cycle; EMILY’s List provided

Participation 2000 with $5000 during each cycle.51

With little to no media coverage of Campaign Corps, how can EMILY’s List make the

claim that Campaign Corps has changed the face of American politics? If we look at the types of

college students that EMILY’s List takes credit for training we see that EMILY’s List has stayed

true to its mission of empowering women. Since 1988 the program has trained at least 180 young

women and 116 young men to work on campaigns.

Since EMILY’s List “adopted” Participation 2000 it has put a unique EMILY’s List stamp

on the program.52 Examining Figure 4-10 we see that since EMILY’s List took exclusive control

of the organization the proportion of women trained in the program significantly increased.53 It

50 Schwartz, Maralee, Maraniss, David. 1990. “Gov. Celeste's People Power PAC.” The Washington Post, 23 Sep., p. A8

51 http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/com_rcvd/1999_C00221887 and http://query.nictusa.com/cgi- bin/com_rcvd/2001_C00221887

52 http://www.emilyslist.org/happening/20years20050315.html

53 Using the yearly class photos available on the organization’s website to code the sex of the trainees provides preliminary evidence of EMILY’s List’s mark on American politics. Of the seventeen classes held since 1988, fourteen photos were available accounting for 70 percent of the trainees (n=296). Photos for the 2002 and 2004 are missing.

has also changed strategy vis-à-vis the pairing of students and candidates. Whereas during

Celeste’s tenure students were given (as in-kind donations) to select progressive candidates

regardless of gender, EMILY’s List program sends trainees exclusively to female candidates

endorsed by the organization.

The decision to ‘adopt’ Participation 2000 and revamp it to meet her needs is another prime example of Malcolm’s use of organizational learning to further her political goals. Here again Malcolm incorporated a pre-existing program and adapted it for her ends, in this case providing viable female pro-choice Democratic candidates trained campaign staff.

EMILY’s List candidates also benefited from another EMILY’s List project that began in the mid-1990s, the Women’s Monitor. According to organizational press releases, the Monitor,

has focused on a range of topics and key voter targets to build a comprehensive data file on the political views and voting behaviors of American women. In addition to survey research and focus groups, the Women’s Monitor helped pioneer other innovative techniques including micro-targeting, voter modeling and techniques to dispel myths about women voters and candidates.54

The organization claims “EMILY’s List candidates and Democrats at large have come to depend

upon the reliable, objective information in the Monitor.”55 EMILY’s List disbursement records

indicate that between 2002 and 2004, EMILY’s List devoted over $700,000 to polling, which

does not include the money spent on “in-kind” polling done for specific candidates.56

An additional connection between EMILY’s List and the Democratic Party is the Women

Vote! project, which began in 1994 as part of the organization’s state level GOTV efforts.

Table 4-5 shows what the organization claims to have accomplished through these activities.

54 http://www.emilyslist.org/newsroom/monitor/

55 http://www.emilyslist.org/newsroom/monitor/monitor_fact_sheet.html

56 www.fecinfo.com

According to FEC records, Women Vote! (also known as America Women Vote! or some

derivative) are a series of joint fundraising committees between EMILY’s List and one of the

national Democratic Party’s Congressional Committees (DCCC and DSCC) or various state-

level Democratic Party organizations, depending on the election year. The 2004 election cycle

provides a good window into EMILY’s List activities vis-à-vis Women Vote! as the organization

had three separate committees. AMERICA WOMEN VOTE! was a joint fundraising committee

between EMILY’s List and the DCCC; 57 America Women Vote! 2002 was a joint fundraising

committee between EMILY’s List and various state Democratic Party committees; 58 and South

Dakota Women Vote! was a third joint fundraising committee between EMILY’s List and a state part organization, South Dakota, where Stephanie Herseth was engaged in a highly contested

House race. 59

It is impossible to track the money because the committee’s disbursements are simply

transfers from the joint fundraising committee to the various affiliated committees. Once the

money enters the organization’s coffers it becomes incorporated in the amorphous pool of soft

money the organization can use for GOTV efforts. One way to assess the amount of resources

the organization devotes to state-level activities is by examining their non-federal expenditures,

which are funded at least in part, through soft money. Because these activities occur at the state

level and pertain to state-level elections, they do not have to be itemized in FEC records, making

it necessary to glean the details of the organization’s state-level activity from organizational

accounts. However, because receipts to the federal PAC fund these activities, the FEC requires

the organization to report the gross amount spent on non-federal activities. The organization can

57 http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/?C00397919

58 http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/?C00377994

59 http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/?C00397000; http://www.emilyslist.org/happening/insider-news/20040603.html

also claim part of its other activities, like GOTV efforts that have the potential to help both state and federal candidates, as non-federal expenditures.60 FEC records documenting EMILY’s List’s non-federal expenditures from 1984–2004 show that EMILY’s List’s state-level work ‘took off’ in 1994 and, like the organization’s receipts and membership numbers, state level activities have consistently increased. It is interesting to note that of the select women’s PACs examined here, only Women’s Campaign Fund uses its PAC to fund non-federal activities.61

At this point it should be clear that while EMILY’s List’s federal activity has garnered it the most attention, Malcolm and others have always recognized the importance of having a ‘farm team’ of women in the states and have devoted the resources to making that a realty. EMILY’s

List support for state-level candidates, most notably female pro-choice Democratic women running for governor, dates back to the 1990 election cycle and the organization’s GOTV efforts, have focused on getting women voters to the polls.62

In 2001, the organization became further engaged in state-level elections, creating the

Political Opportunity Program (POP). Its mission: “to recruit, train, and support pro-choice

60 Nonconnected committees that have established separate federal and non-federal accounts under 11 CFR 102.5 (a)(1)(i), or that make federal and non-federal disbursements from a single account under 11 CFR 102.5(a)(1)(ii), shall allocate their federal and non-federal expenses in the following way: their administrative expenses, costs of generic voter drives, and costs of public communications that refer to any political party, with at least 50 percent Federal funds, as defined in 11 CFR 300.2(g). (1) If federal and non-federal funds are collected by one committee through a joint activity, that committee shall allocate its direct costs of fundraising, as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, according to the funds received method. Under this method, the committee shall allocate its fundraising costs based on the ratio of funds received into its federal account to its total receipts from each fundraising program or event. This ratio shall be estimated prior to each such program or event based upon the committee's reasonable prediction of its federal and non-federal revenue from that program or event, and shall be noted in the committee's report for the period in which the first disbursement for such program or event occurred, submitted pursuant to 11 CFR 104.5. See: http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061500/edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2006/janqtr/11cfr106.6.htm

61 This is not to say that these other organizations do not participate at the state and local level, however both the NWPC and NOW/PAC are part of organizations with state and local chapters that can fund these activities separate from the federal PAC (Barakso 2005; Woods 2001).

62 Organization press releases referring to helping eight women attain the office of governor. See: http://www.emilyslist.org/candidates/women-helped.html

Democratic women running for state legislative, constitutional and key local offices.”63 A 2004

press release claims that through this program they have trained over 3,100 women. During the

2004 election, “POP made 225 contributions, supporting 140 winning candidates in competitive

races for constitutional, state legislative, and key local offices in 28 states.”64 A Lexis-Nexis search of regional newspapers from January 2003 to January 2005 resulted in two articles discussing the Political Opportunity Program. One highlights Cristina Uribe, a regional director

of the POP program who earlier served as a regional political director for the AFL-CIO.65 The other offers a substantive look at the program, highlighting the experiences of several POP trainees and the type of materials they receive via the training.

At a recent training session in Miami, Coyne-McCoy [a regional director of POP] guided about 30 women in a hotel conference room through the fundamentals of raising money: how to form an organized plan and target groups of donors such as friends, voters who share your beliefs, people who hate your opponent and community powerbrokers. Participants received a thick training manual that covers every aspect of running a professional campaign, down to minute details such as a 15-page spread sheet with Florida press contacts, sample door-knocking guides and estimated costs for direct mail pieces—to the cent.66

In providing these services, EMILY’s List provides potential candidate critical

information that helps them become viable candidates and increases the chances that party

organizations and PACs will support them in the future. For instance, EMILY’s List requires

that a candidate be ‘viable’ before the organization will recommend her; a source who has gone

through this process stated that a critical component to the organization’s perception of candidate

viability is how much money the candidate has been able to raise during the first quarter of the

63 ibid.

64 http://www.emilyslist.org/do/pop/information.html 65 Richman, Josh. 2004. “Bay Area woman grooms candidates.” The Daily Review, 24 March.

66Thomas, Ken. 2004. “EMILY’s List program trains women to run for office” Associated Press State & Local Wire, 25 May.

cycle.67 When NPR asked prominent Democratic fundraiser Terry McAuliffe the secrets of

viability he replied, “… cash on hand.”68 Thus by offering this type of training EMILY’s List is increasing the chances that these women will be able to meet those benchmarks and become viable candidates.

Unfortunately there is no way to fully evaluate just how much the organization spends on these trainings, how many women are trained, how many actually run for office, how many win,

etc., except to rely on the organization’s accounts. Even though these activities are funded with

money from the federal PAC, these activities are considered non-federal expenditures that are

not itemized. An alternative route to this information is through state-level campaign finance

records in states where trainings are held, but acquiring such information is time and labor

intensive and beyond the scope of this project.

Similarly opaque are the activities of EMILY’s List’s 527 organization. 69 Referred to as

“stealth PACs” by some, 527s are political organizations that collect donations and make expenditures in an effort to “influencing or attempting to influence the selection, nomination, election or appointment of an individual to a federal, state, or local public office or office in a political organization.”70 While 527s who conduct “electioneering activities” are required to file

with the FEC and the IRS, the majority of 527s report only to the IRS.71

67 Interview with member of House of Representatives. Requested anonymity. October 30, 2005.

68 http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7292720&sc=emaf 69 527 refers to the section of the Internal Revenue Service Code which governs the organization’s behavior. http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=96350,00.html

70 http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/article/0,,id=96350,00.html

71 According to the FEC, “Unincorporated, unregistered "527" organizations may also make electioneering communications, subject to the disclosure requirements and the prohibition against corporate and labor funds.” See: http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/electioneering.shtml#527s. Further, the FEC states that “Persons who make electioneering communications that aggregate more than $10,000 in the calendar year must file the "24 Hour Notice of Disbursements/Obligations for Electioneering Communications" (FEC Form 9) [PDF] with the Commission

Having a 527 provides two benefits. First, individuals can give unlimited amounts of money to 527 committees. Second, 527 funds can be used in ways that PAC funds cannot.

EMILY’S List is not the only PAC to have created a 527, but the ability to do so is of fundamental importance to the organization. The importance that EMILY’S List places on its

527 is evidenced by a recent case filed by EMILY’s List against the FEC in reaction to the

Commission’s recent ruling that limits the types of funds 527s can use.72

In 2000 Malcolm decided to take advantage of this new campaign finance innovation by forming a 527 organization. Because EMILY’s List does not use the 527 to pay for electioneering it only files reports with the IRS. 73 According to IRS reports, in 2002 the

organization reported receipts of just over $4 million; in 2004 EMILY’s List’s 527 received

more than $7.7 million in receipts.74 In that cycle the Center for Responsive Politics listed

EMILY’s List’s 527 as number 17 on the Top 50 527s.75

An examination of the 527’s disbursements in 2002 indicates that just under 25 percent of the organization’s spending went to overhead costs.76 Included in these costs are $183,098 in

salaries for Malcolm and two staffers. Malcolm and the two staffers also received a salary from

within 24 hours of the disclosure date. 11 CFR 104.20(b). FEC Form 9 must be received by the Commission by 11:59 p.m. on the day following the disclosure date.” 72 http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_E.shtml

73 Organizations or individuals doing electioneering have to report to the FEC (fn 131). EMILY’s List did not appear in an examination of these records. It

74 http://forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/generatePDF.action?formId='521391360-990POL- 01'&formType=P90

75 http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=C&cycle=2004&format=

76 http://forms.irs.gov/politicalOrgsSearch/search/generatePDF.action?formId='521391360-990POL- 01'&formType=P90. The 2004 records for EMILY’s List’s 527 records are not available via the IRS website listed above. Consequently this analysis examines only 2002 activities. One would imagine that the 2004 disbursements were larger though there is no reason to believe they were distributed differently across categories.

the PAC during the 2002 election cycle.77 In this, EMILY’s List’s 527 appears to function like a

‘parent’ organization of a connected PAC without the limitations of that legal relationship.

Yet more important to the role the 527 plays in Malcolm’s strategy is the way in which the 527 facilitates the organization’s GOTV efforts; 36 percent of receipts to the 527 during 2002

went toward phone banks, polling, media and mailings (Table 4-7). According to Weissman and

Hassan (2006), until recently the Federal Election Commission “refused to subject 527s to

contributions restrictions so long as their stirring campaign ads and voter mobilization programs

steered clear of formal candidates endorsements” (79).

While EMILY’S List is not the only PAC to have created a 527, the ability to do so is of

fundamental importance to the organization.78 In fact, the formation of the 527 could very well

be a key element in the organization’s decision not to conduct the same amount of issue

advocacy in 2002 (via the PAC) that it engaged in during 2000. As stated above, the 527 can

conduct unlimited issue ads. Instead of the organization turning away from issue advocacy after

the 2000 election, it appears that the organization found a better way to engage in that activity—

through its 527. Malcolm’s decision to form the 527 may be the best example yet of Malcolm’s

propensity to experiment with new ideas and strategies, especially if they have been shown by

others to be effective means. It is important to note that rarely does Malcolm simply copy what

others are doing—rather she adapts strategies to fit her own ends and to compensate for

problems that others encounter. In this way, Malcolm’s decision-making is a product of double

loop learning (Argyris 1996; Dodd 1994).

77 http://www.fecinfo.com/cgi-win/x_disb5.exe?DoFn=2002C0019343330Salaries~H4*0

78 http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527cmtes.asp?level=C&cycle=2006

EMILY’s List Reaches Out

Malcolm’s most recent experiment moves beyond asking members to simply write

checks and attend luncheons—through TEAM EMILY, Malcolm pushes EMILY’s List members

to become involved. TEAM EMILY’s mission is “recruiting a new generation of activists [and]

building an online grassroots community.”79 Members can log on to the website and look for

jobs, receive information about events, read “The Insider” (EMILY’s List’s monthly newsletter),

contribute money, receive updates about John Roberts’ nomination to the supreme court, of

Bush’s strategy in Iraq, etc. While the organization had been doing outreach since its inception—in fact that is how Malcolm recruited members in the organization’s early years in small informal parties across the country—in TEAM EMILY we once again see Malcolm using a strategy others had profited from, internet technology, to her advantage. Through TEAM

EMILY the organization attempts to create a dialogue with members through online chats, opinion polls, event listings, as well as provide a more general resource for members to obtain information about the activities of endorsed candidates.80

In many ways, TEAM EMILY represents the last piece of the puzzle in Malcolm’s quest

to become “the largest PAC.” Souraf cast labor PACs as the most influential and successful in

the late 1980s because they had higher average assets, were largely unipartisan, gave larger sums

to candidates than other PACs, and gave a higher percentage of candidate contributions to non-

incumbents than other PACs (Souraf 1992,107–109). 81

79 http://www.emilyslist.org/team_emily/FAQ.html; http://www.emilyslist.org/about/where-from.html

80 Sanchez, Julian. 2004. “Politicizing the Web.” Reason 36 (7): 13; Taylor, Catharine P. 2004. “Campaign aides” MediaWeek 14 (42): 18-20; Walsh, Mark. 2004. “Using the Web the way Dean Did.” Business Week 3897, 14.

81This has changed somewhat since GOP takeover in 1994, but the vast majority of contributions from Labor PACs still go to Democratic candidates. The greatest percent of Labor PAC donations to Republicans occurred in 2004 and 2006 when Republican candidates received 13 percent (in each cycle) of Labor PAC contributions to candidates. See: http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.asp?txt=P01&cycle=2004

It is in the nonlabor PACs that the weaknesses of PACs as electoral organizations are most apparent. Unlike labor PACs, they do not mobilize large numbers of voters, for they have not become reference groups or symbols for their donors (that is, their ‘members’). The donors’ affiliation with the nonlabor PAC is often tenuous and passive, often secondary to other political affiliations or loyalties; political activity via the PAC is for many of them a not very intense or demanding form of political activity. (Souraf 1992, 110)

By 2005 EMILY’s List became a reference group for both candidates and donors, just as labor had been in the late 1970s. The benefits that Thomas accrued to Labor PAC are even more present in EMILY’s List activity. “Labor PACs have always raised their campaign funds from large numbers of people, not only because their membership is large but also because their individual members are not wealthy” (Thomas 1978, 32). Although EMILY’s List membership is not as large as labor, data in Chapter 5 will show that Malcolm has added a considerable number of nontraditional voices to the donor pool.

Malcolm’s innovation and political learning has paid off handsomely for the organization. As Figure 4-11 illustrates, between 1990 and 2004 EMILY’s List enjoyed a constant increase in members causing the organization’s total receipts to skyrocket.

EMILY’s List constant success is not typical in the PAC world, especially for non- connected PACs. Scholars find that PAC membership and receipts—and therefore PAC influence—waxes and wanes according to changes in the political environment such as majority control of Congress and the legal structure as well as changes within organizations such as changes in leadership or the relevance of the interest to members and/or the public (Green and

Bigelow 2005; Malbin 2007; Patterson and Singer 2002). How has ELIST escaped this cycle?

They have escaped because of Malcolm’s propensity for double-loop learning and because as the organization boasts of success, its cache increases. People want to be a member because not only

do they believe in the purposive goals of the organization, but also because membership brings

solidary benefits that increase as the organization becomes more successful and powerful.

How do individuals come to perceive the organization as successful? First, and perhaps

the most critical element to EMILY’s List’s perception of success is the existence of candidates

as patrons like Barbara Mikulski, Nita Lowey, and Gwen Moore. Walker (1991) finds that

patrons provide organizations considerable legitimacy. As these (and other women) give

Malcolm and the organization credit for their electoral victories, they link the organization’s

success to the success of its endorsed candidates.

Second, the organization’s press coverage is overwhelmingly positive and this positive

press is bolstered by the organization’s aggressive strategy of contacting members.82 In the last two months, from January 2007 to March 2007, EMILY’s List sent fourteen emails, five of which mentioned Bush, Cheney, or the Republican Party in the subject line, one referring to

Speaker Pelosi and one entitled “First woman president” which touted their endorsement of

Senator Hillary Clinton for president in 2008. All included requests for money and most touted the impact of the organization or its endorsed candidates. For example, on January 31st an email

entitled, “More the same from Bush” stated:

The failed Bush agenda hurting Americans. The only remedy is to bring new progressive leadership to Washington. That’s why, every single day, EMILY’s List is working hard to elect even more pro-choice Democratic women to office— women who will protect our rights and defend our values for years to come, no matter who is in the White House.

It went on to list the goals of EMILY’s List in the upcoming election cycle, including recruiting

new candidates, “defending our pro-choice women leaders from outrageous Republican attacks,”

supporting incumbents, training activists, and planning the “largest get-out-the-vote operation

82 An examination of articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, The Hill, and Roll Call from 1986-2004 show a consistent pattern of positive coverage.

ever in what will be the most important presidential election of our lifetime.” These emails,

which are sent in conjunction with direct mail pieces (at a rate of approximately 1 piece of mail

per week), keep donors connected to the organization and informs them of the organization’s

connection to and perspective on current events

The third way in which the organization fosters the perception of success is through its

events. The organization holds quarterly meetings of its “Majority Council” and, at a minimum,

holds a yearly luncheon that all members can attend (for a fee) which serve as both a purposive and a solidary benefit of membership.83 The speakers often include EMILY’s List candidates who have made it into Congress or state governments or current candidates seeking office.84

These women serve as proof of the organization’s success, and as such help solidify the purposive goals of the organization and its members. Furthermore, these events serve as networking opportunities where members meet like-minded individuals. Friendships can form; professional opportunities can develop.

Critical to EMILY’s List success is the connection between the organization and its members, a connection that has at its foundation a belief that women are a critical part of the political system and need to be more involved and better represented. To accomplish this,

Malcolm created EMILY’s List, and through her ability to adapt to a shifting political

83 Donors who give $1,000 or more a year are members of the “Majority Council.” According to the organization the benefits of Majority Council membership include: “ A EMILY's List Majority Council Team Member will be assigned to act as your personal political advisor; Receive private copies of EMILY's List research and political updates, including confidential monthly political memos from Ellen Malcolm, president of EMILY's List; [and] Meet candidates, elected officials, and other Majority Council members at Majority Council events in Washington, D.C., and around the country.” https://secure1.emilyslist.org/Donation/index.cfm?event=initiativeSL_showDetail&supportlevelID=3. “Friends” of EMILY’s List give a $20 or more monthly contribution to the organization and receive “all the benefits of regular EMILY's List membership, plus special insider briefing memos, personal copies of research and political alert emails from the Friends of EMILY's List liaison in Washington.” https://secure1.emilyslist.org/Donation/index.cfm?event=initiativeSL_showDetail&supportlevelID=2

84 Speakers at the 2005 Annual Luncheon on October 30, 2005 included Jennifer Granholm (Governor of Michigan), Representative Gwen Moore (WI-4) and Senator Barbara Mikulski (MD). Speakers at the 2007 Annual Luncheon on March 6, 2007 included Senator Clare McCaskill (MO), Senator Amy Klobuchar (MN), Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (NY), and Speaker Nancy Pelosi (CA-8).

environment and her ability to learn from the strategies of others she overcame the problems others faced to transform a donor network of twenty-five women into a full-service political organization.

But service to whom? There is little doubt that Malcolm helped create one of the most dynamic political organizations in existence—a feat even more amazing considering where the organization began. Reflecting her role in the organization, this chapter documents on how the organization’s leadership and structure facilitated its rise to power. From this one may have the impression that EMILY’s List is a Beltway behemoth, with a very small donor base and limited appeal outside of Malcolm’s well-connected circle. Is that the case? Or is EMILY’s List in fact a national, broad-based membership organization that appeals to both sexes and attracts members from a wide array of occupations and regions? Could it be that EMILY’s List has achieved what it set out to do in 1986—become a leading PAC and an important vibrant grassroots organization whose impact goes far beyond Election Day?

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Figure 4-1. Total Number of PACs, 1978–2004

$700,000,000

$600,000,000

$500,000,000

$400,000,000

$300,000,000

$200,000,000

$100,000,000

$0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 connected nonconnected Source: Data acquired from records of the Federal Election Commission

Figure 4-2. Connected versus Non-connected PAC Receipts, 1978–2004

$350,000,000

$300,000,000

$250,000,000

$200,000,000

$150,000,000

$100,000,000

$50,000,000

$0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Corporate Labor Non Connected Trade/Membership/Health Cooperative Corporation without St Source: Data acquired from the records of the Federal Election Commission Figure 4-3. Receipts to PACs by Sector, 1978–2004

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Corporate Labor Trade Non-Connected Cooperative Corporate w/o stock

Source: Data acquired from the records of the Federal Election Commission Figure 4-4. Percentage of Receipts to Candidates by PAC Sector, 1978–2004

$200,000

$180,000

$160,000

$140,000

$120,000

$100,000

$80,000

$60,000

$40,000

$20,000

$0 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Average from NonConnected Average from Connected Source: Records acquired from data of the Federal Election Commission

Figure 4-5. Average Candidate Contributions from Women’s PACs by PAC type, 1980–2004

$8,000,000

$7,000,000

$6,000,000

$5,000,000

$4,000,000

$3,000,000

$2,000,000

$1,000,000

$0 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

WCF NOW/PAC ELIST NWPC

Source: Data acquired from Political Moneyline

Figure 4-6. Receipts of Select Women’s PACs, 1980–1994

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 WCF NOW/PAC ELIST NWPC Source: Data acquired from Political Moneyline Figure 4-7. Percentage of Women’s PAC Receipts to Candidates, 1980–19941

1 NOW PAC was able to give more than 100 percent of their receipts to candidates in 1980 because they had $10,492 in Cash On Hand (COH) at the beginning of the cycle (www.fec.gov).

Table 4-1. Contributions to and from the National Parties, 1980–2004

Contributions from Party Contributions to Party Other Other EMILY's Women's EMILY's Women's List PACs LABOR List PACs LABOR 1980 $– $– $– $– $– $– 1982 $– $– $– $– $– $– 1984 $– $– $– $– $– $23,157,332 1986 $– $– $– $– $– $– 1988 $– $– $– $– $– $31,402,208 1990 $5,500 $– $620,746 $– $– $34,114,777 1992 $50 $– $– $73,930 $1,500 $5,758,741 1994 $3,600 $– $– $72,000 $– $4,295,912 1996 $71,732 $– $500 $228,750 $– $6,504,704 1998 $4,000 $– $22,950 $230,300 $– $4,870,708 2000 $60,000 $– $2,000 $123,490 $– $6,870,395 2002 $135,835 $– $12,000 $178,176 $500 $5,364,214 2004 $36,199 $– $15,500 $112,500 $– $6,574,973 Source: Data acquired form records of the Federal Election Commission

Table 4-2. Independent Spending by EMILY’s List, 1986–2004

EMILY’s List Independent Year Spending 1986 $– 1988 $1,500 1990 $19,861 1992 $– 1994 $– 1996 $– 1998 $122,211 2000 $21,478 2002 $– 2004 $837,982 Source: Data acquired from records of the Federal Election Commission

$40,000,000

$35,000,000

$30,000,000

$25,000,000

$20,000,000

$15,000,000

$10,000,000

$5,000,000

$0 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Hard Money Soft Money

Source: Data acquired from records of the Federal Election Commission Note: Calculated by subtracting the total individual contributions from the total receipts reported to the FEC. Figure 4-8. Hard and Soft Money Receipts, EMILY’s List, 1986–2004

Table 4-3. EMILY's List Electoral Activities, 1986–2004 Org to Bundled Candidates 1986 $0 $14,807 1988 $64,015 $67,984 1990 $198,575 $71,013 1992 $886,493 $365,318 1994 $822,015 $227,689 1996 $1,375,840 $217,518 1998 $1,734,556 $233,721 2000 $2,591,030 $221,746 2002 $2,237,595 $202,940 2004 $4,246,690 $125,535 Source: Data acquired from records from the Federal Election Commission

Table 4-4. Bundling by Select PACs, 2000–2004

Amounts Reported by Orgs as Earmarked Contributions*

Organization 2000 2002 2004 Club for Growth Advocacy $1,319,810 $2,181,420 $5,305,788 MoveOn.org $437,400 $162,521 $932,116 New Democrat Network $1,131,786 $998,069 0 NRA 0 $4,950 0 EMILY's List $2,591,030 $2,237,595 $4,246,690 Source: Campaign Finance Institute

1985 Malcolm and 25 friends form ELIST 1986 1987 Independent spending and bundled 1988 money begin 1989 Received money from Party 1990 1991 Receipts exceed those of NWPC, WCF and NOW/PAC

Gave money to the Party; 1992 nonfederal expenditures begin 1993 Trains Consultants 1994 Women Vote! projects begin 1995 1996 Women Vote! in 31 states 1997 1998 Women Vote! in 26 states 1999 2000 527

POP Program 2001 Campaign Corps 2002 2003 Figure 4-9. Timeline of EMILY’s List Activities, 1985–2004

0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* 2003 2004* 2005

women men Source: Data acquired from EMILY’s List press releases/photo gallery. Figure 4-10. Sex of Trainees in Participation 2000 and Campaign Corps

Table 4-5. EMILY’s List WOMEN VOTE! Activities # of Target Year Individuals Mail Phone States 1994 902,575 — — 1 1996 2,700,000 7,500,000 500,000 31 1998 3,400,000 8,000,000 2,000,000 26 2000 8,000,000 10,281,120 2,000,000 7 2002 — 6,630,906 1,989,562 2 2004 954,890 3,411,520 1,423,641 4 Source: Data acquired from EMILY's List

Table 4-6. Non-federal Expenditures by Select Women’s PACs, 1980–2004 Year EMILY's List WCF NWPC NOW 1980 $— $— $— $— 1982 $— $— $— $— 1984 $— $— $— $— 1986 $— $— $— $— 1988 $— $— $— $— 1990 $— $— $— $— 1992 $284,201 $236,389 $— $— 1994 $— $— $— $— 1996 $1,166,466 $321,822 $— $— 1998 $3,572,349 $307,973 $— $— 2000 $6,719,801 $146,366 $— $— 2002 $5,561,400 $314,494 $— $— 2004 $8,123,514 $306,827 $— $—

Table 4-7. Select Disbursements from EMILY’s List 527, 2002 Political Disbursements Consultants $208,740 Candidate Contributions $272,370 Committee Contributions $1,071,879 Other Committees $2,500 Mail $531,410 Media $712,378 Phonebank $187,747 Polling $82,869 Total Political Spending $3,069,893 Total Receipts $4,006,195 Spending at % of Receipts 76.6% Source: Internal Revenue Service Form 990

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Source: Data acquired from EMILY’s List press release. Figure 4-11. EMILY’s List Membership, 1984–2004

Figure 4-12. Flowchart of EMILY’s List Activity

CHAPTER 5 EMILY’S LIST—THE MEMBERS

Malbin (2003) suggests that money and politics are caught up in a push-pull relationship. Money is either pushed into the system by persons or groups seeking access and influence, or it is pulled into the system by candidates, parties, and PACs, who want all the legitimacy that money can buy. For single-issue or ideological groups to be effective this push-pull relationship must occur synergistically; while pulling in money from contributors they must simultaneously find ways to push their money into the political arena. More specifically, they have to make sure their money matters. To a large degree the ability to matter is heavily dependent on how much money they have to disburse. If a group can give money to politicians and parties it makes them take notice.

Similarly, if the group can point to several thousand members who are organized and will mobilize for or against an individual or policy, a pragmatic candidate or legislator will pay attention.

EMILY’s List possesses both of these things—money and members. When it began in 1985 the organization consisted of a small group of elite women meeting in

Ellen Malcolm’s basement; today the organization boasts of more than 100,000 members.

Its position as the premier bundling organization is its “claim to fame” among those interested in campaign finance and its role in giving pro-choice female Democratic candidates “early” money has been noted and emphasized by women and politics scholars. Yet one of the most important aspects of EMILY’s List—its donors—has received very little attention from scholars, even though these men and women

contributed upwards of $25 million dollars to the PAC during the 2003–2004 election

cycle.1

There are three reasons that EMILY’s List donors (ELISTERS) have been off the

radar of scholars. First, EMILY’s List is primarily known as a PAC.2 The majority of the literature on PACs focuses on the organization strategy and leadership of these organizations, not the donors, as the latter are perceived largely tangential to the organization’s success. Second, EMILY’s List is cast as a women’s PAC, organizations that are typically cast as influencing the competitiveness of female candidates (Burrell

1994; Francia 2001) but having limited influence in the larger political arena. Third, the conventional wisdom is that women are small-time players in the world of moneyed politics; the gender gap in contributing to political campaigns is longstanding and well- documented (Burns et al. 2001; Francia et al. 2003; Green et al. 1999). Given that

EMILY’s List is cast as an ideological PAC and the (correct) assumption that EMILY’s

List donors are primarily women, who as a group have historically given fewer campaign contributions in smaller amounts to a smaller number of candidates and committees than men, scholars’ inattention to EMILY’s List donors up to this point is understandable.

Finally, most consider EMILY’s List an elite organization with elite clientele who are

‘hooked’ into politics.

1 Total receipts for EMILY’s List in 2003-2004 came to 34.1 million. According to FEC reports, $25.8 million came from individual contributions; $17.1 million of this came in the form of contributions of $200 or more. $13.4 million of these were direct contributions to the organization; $4.3 million were bundled to candidates. These donations are not included in this analysis except where explicitly mentioned. The remaining money came to the organization from other committees including national and state Democratic Party organizations, other political action committees, and candidates. The focus of this chapter is the $13.5 million dollars contributed by ‘large’ donors over the course of the 2003-2004 election cycle.

2 This designation is simply a legal one now as EMILY’s List is a multi-faceted/multi-function interest group with a PAC, a 527, and a non-federal account, each of which funds a different set of programs/activities.

Using data from the Federal Election Commission, I show that female donors to

EMILY’s List in 2003–2004 are anything but anecdotal to the world of moneyed politics.

Not only did these donors, 85 percent of whom are women, give upwards of $13 million

to EMILY’s List and its recommended candidates, but 18 percent of these donors gave an

additional $6 million dollars to other PACs, candidates, and parties.

After providing a brief descriptive analysis of EMILY’s List donors based on the

information available in FEC records, I examine what EMILY’s List is doing to reverse

the gender gap in political contributions, transforming women into powerful political

donors in the same way Malcolm transformed the organization from a donor network into

a women’s influence organization. The second goal of the chapter is to determine if

EMILY’s List is pulling new donors, particularly women, into the political system and

the impact that has on the political landscape. In the process of meeting these goals, I

examine EMILY’s List donors as political actors. What does it mean to be an ELISTER?

Are these donors consistent in their donation patterns? Do ELISTERs donate to

candidates and committees beyond those associated or affiliated with EMILY’s List? If

so, are these donations consistent? Once EMILY’s List pulls a donor into the system,

does this increase the likelihood of that person contributing to other candidates, PACs, or

parties in future elections?

Where Do EMILY’S List Members Belong?

The study of EMILY’s List and the larger study of political contributors at large are rooted in the literature on campaign finance and its impact on political institutions, candidates, and the electorate. However, because EMILY’s List’s mission is driven by identity politics, which stresses the need for women to use their political power at all levels of government and society, the story of the organization’s members is also

connected to liberal and socialist theorists articulation of inequality and the steps needed

to reverse those differences.3

The impact of campaign finance legislation on individuals has not been a major

point of scholarly inquiry until recently. The conventional wisdom was that political

donors were an elite group who gave money to gain influence. A few scholars, most

notably Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) touched on the importance of political

donations to overall levels of participation in their larger analysis of political equality.

They suggested that those who donated to political campaigns were more likely to vote

and volunteer, more likely to persuade others, and generally exhibited higher levels of

political efficacy.4

Following in this tradition, Francia et al. (2003), published an exhaustive analysis of congressional donors, finding that those most likely to donate to congressional candidates are white, wealthy men with high levels of education (Francia et al. 33). Yet even within this rather elite category, important differences exist. For example, the authors assert that most donors can be classified as either an occasional donor or a habitual donor. Occasional donors come into and out of the donor pool; they are often pulled in by personal appeals and more often than not they participate in local or state politics much more frequently than federal politics. They tend to limit their contributions to a few candidates and/or races and often give smaller aggregate amounts. Occasional donors often fall into the ‘ideologue’ category, i.e., ideological rather than material

3 Lorber (2005) provides a quick summary of these feminisms on pages 26-27 and 63-64.

4 In fact, those concerned about low turnout rates have suggested that tax credits for political contributions (whether sent to a public financing system or to general candidates/parties/PACs) may increase Election Day turnout because individuals will then have a ‘stake’ in the election outcome. Discussed in-depth in John M. de Figueiredo and Elizabeth Garrett in “Paying for Politics” Working Paper No. 34, Center of the Study of Law and Politics, f.n.18).

concerns motivate them to give. These occasional ideologues are best contrasted to

habitual intimates—individuals who often give to multiple candidates or committees in

larger amounts and are more likely to be motivated by friendship and/or social ties

(Francia et al. 2003, 53).

EMILY’s List donors are often characterized as habitual intimates insofar as the

organization is known as Malcolm’s ‘baby’ and the role of her friends in the

organization’s formation and continuation is oft repeated. And while the organization

boasts of 100,000 members, the number of dues paying members is considerably smaller

and the number of active participants even smaller. If that were not the case then

EMILY’s List would boast of higher receipts from individuals.5 It is it is unsurprising then that the organization is cast as one with elite membership and limited appeal outside of the ‘Beltway.’ This belief is further buttressed by our understanding of women’s participation in campaign finance.

What do we know about female political donors? Not a lot. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argued that women are most disadvantaged in political activity when such activity involves resources such as money. If women were as “well endowed” as men there would be less of a gender gap in campaign finance. Capek (1998) made a similar claim in a Women as Philanthropy report. She argued that that if age, income, number of dependants, “age” of money, pension status, and health were held constant very few differences between male and female donors could be found (Capek 1998).

5 If EMILY’s List had 100,000 dues paying members (dues being $100 a year to the organization and two $100 bundled checks to candidates), in the 2004 cycle it would have brought in $40 million ($20 million in contributions to the organization and $20 million in bundled contributions). Instead, the organization brought in just under $25 million from individuals and just over $4 million in bundled checks. Clearly EMILY’s List suffers from the ‘free rider’ problem, however, this is facilitated by the organization by the high quality of information on its website. There is little incentive for individuals to actually pay dues when emails and mailings are sent after signing up for the organization’s email list.

Green et al. (1999) argued that female donors bring “a distinctive voice to campaign

finance.” In their comparison of male and female donors they found that female donors

are more Democratic, more likely to hold liberal positions, and more motivated by policy

concerns than male donors. Furthermore, they found that female and male donors give to

a ‘different mix of candidates’ with women actually giving to a greater number of

candidates but in smaller amounts (Green et al. 1999).

Using the same data as Green et al., Francia et al. (2003) found little to no change

in the percentage of women participating from 1978 to 1996—in both years women

comprised roughly 17 percent of congressional donors. They did find some evidence

indicating an increase in female donor activity—female donations to Senate candidates

increased in 1996, which they suggest could be part of a larger trend—but generally the

Francia et al. study is a very conservative estimate of women’s participation in this key

political activity.6

Our specific knowledge of EMILY’s List donors is limited to a study done by

Day and Hadley. In their examination of the policy interests and ideological agenda of donors to women’s PACs during the mid-1990s, Day and Hadley found that donors, who are overwhelmingly female in the case of EMILY’s List, have a predictable ideological orientation. According to surveys of a small section of donors, ELISTERs take consistently liberal policy positions on a wide range of issues, the most important issues being abortion (Day and Hadley 2002). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, since Day

6 The authors do not indicate that they considered the slate of candidates running for Senate versus those running for House in 1996 to see if perhaps the electoral context had anything to do with increased female monies to Senate candidates.

and Hadley’s survey, the organization has transformed itself and along the way

diversified its message.7

Studies of female political donors are rare. Although some recent studies of political donors have taken note of female contributors, scholars seem ready to accept the belief that female donors are not numerous enough, powerful enough, or perhaps different enough to deserve attention. The proceeding analysis shows that this belief may well be misplaced. Furthermore, these data show that EMILY’s List efforts to bring in new donors and transform itself from an elite donor network to a mass-based influence organization have been successful.

Data and Method

The bulk of these data come from records of the Federal Election Commission

(FEC). Political organizations and candidates are required to provide the FEC with basic

demographic information for all donors who give $200 or more each year.8 Donations

from individuals who give less than $200 an election are reported as lump sums as “un-

itemized contributions.” Bundled or earmarked contributions are reported as such on the

organization’s reports; these contributions have to be itemized although there are

different standards of disclosure depending on the amount of the contribution.9

After obtaining these data for 2003–2004 donors, I separated bundled

contributions ($4.3 million) from those given directly to the organization ($13.5 million).

7At the 2007 EMILY’s List annual luncheon, Malcolm mentioned the need to secure women’s reproductive rights, but only after she called for an end to the Iraq War, drew attention to the need for equal pay, and highlighted the work that female members of Congress were doing on important issues like healthcare and children’s welfare. “Women in Power.” EMILY’s List Annual Luncheon held at the Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC March 6, 2007.

8 These data are from the detailed individual contributor file available for download at www.fec.gov.

9 http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nongui.pdf

While EMILY’s List is perhaps most famous for its bundling power, as noted in Chapter

4, the organization’s power and influence in other areas of campaign finance far exceeds

its bundling efforts. Thus in this chapter I set aside bundled contributions.

Next I created a dataset that only showed the number of discrete individuals

giving to EMILY’s List. In some cases one individual gave upwards of fifteen separate

donations over the course of the election cycle. Because each donation is entered

separately, the FEC data must be refined. One must be careful, however, when

aggregating contributions insofar as there could be multiple John Smiths donating to the

organization. In those cases involving multiple donations I only aggregated those

individuals where the name, city, state, and zip corresponded. After obtaining a clean

dataset of large donors to EMILY’s List for this election cycle, 10 I preformed a basic

descriptive analysis in order to make some broad comparisons between EMILY’s List

donors and the larger pool of congressional donors.

To achieve the second goal of this paper, assessing the ability of EMILY’s List to

pull new donors into the system, I compared a the dataset of discrete individual donors to

EMILY’s List in 2003–2004 to a similarly obtained dataset for each election cycle dating

back to the organization’s inception. Using ACCESS I created queries to test how many

of the 2003–2004 donors to EMILY’s List gave to the organization in prior years. Those

who were repeat givers were so noted in the dataset.11 The results of these queries are discussed below.

10 These data only capture donors who gave $200 or more to EMILY’s List during the 2003-2004 election cycle. CF scholars typically refer to these donors as “large” or “big” donors as opposed to donor who give less than $200, who are typically referred to as “small” donors.

11 The FEC detailed files includes a file of all individual contributions made to political committees. Within the individual contributor file there are several types of information such as the FEC filer number

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The third goal of the paper is to access the contribution patterns of ELISTERs beyond

their contributions to EMILY’s List. A third and final set of ACCESS queries were run to

match ELISTERS to their “other” donations; those given to EMILY’s List and those given to

candidates and/or committees through EMILY’s List (bundled contributions) were excluded.

The results of this query, which provides the committee number (assigned by the FEC) and

the amount of contribution, were then matched to the FEC committee file to obtain the name

of the organization and/or candidate. I separated these “other” contributions into categories:

contributions to presidential candidates, contributions to parties (local, state, and national),

contributions to congressional candidates, and contributions to PACs. Applying the typology

of PACs used by Center for Responsive Politics,12 I classified ELISTERs’ PAC donations into six categories: (1) Women’s PACs (other than EMILY’s List), (2)

Industry/Business/Professional PACs, (3) Democratic/Liberal PACs, (4)

Republican/Conservative PACs, (5) Ideological PACs and (6) Unknown. The results of this analysis are discussed below in aggregate form.

Hypotheses

Research indicates political donors comprise a very small percentage of the total population. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, only .52 percent of the U.S. adult population gave $200 or more in the 2004 election; less than one-third of these donors are women.13 Yet, female donors make up the cornerstone of EMILY’s List

(the recipient of the donation), the type of donation (bundled, direct, refund), the contributor’s name, address (city, state, zip), and occupation, the amount given, and the date of the contribution. If the contribution is a bundled contribution the FEC filer number of the final recipient is listed in the “Other FEC file” column.

12 www.opensecrets.org 13 http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/DonorDemographics.asp?Cycle=2004&filter=A and http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/DonorDemographics.asp?Cycle=2004&filter=F

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providing the organizations with over $11 million dollars during the 2004 election cycle.

How can this be? How can women be relatively minor players in moneyed politics but

be such major players vis-à-vis EMILY’s List.

The questions in this chapter center on how well 2004 EMILY’s List donors fit

with of our general knowledge about political donors. Of particular interest is the role

that female donors play in funding one of the top PACs, a PAC that many consider an

elitist organization dominated by a few key women. From this belief, one might imagine

that EMILY’s List has a relatively small homogenous donor base. To test whether or not

that impression is correct, I examine data from the pool of members who gave $200 or

more to the organization during the 2004 election cycle. After discussing the limited

demographic information available for these donors (sex, state of residence, and

occupation), I examine their contribution patterns in their entirety, assessing if they gave

to the organization in previous election cycles and where else (if anywhere) ELISTERS

gave political donations in 2004.

Basic Demographics

Sex

Given the purpose and ideological perspective of the organization, it is

unsurprising that women comprise 84 percent of donors to EMILY’s List in 2003–2004

(Table 5-1). These findings reinforce the work of Day and Hadley regarding the sexual

While this may be the case now, many scholars argue that the political system would benefit more with a more diverse donor pool. First, candidates would need to listen to different types of people and less reliant on ‘special interests’. Second research indicates that those who donate money are more likely to participate in other ways. For these very reasons some states have instituted tax credits or rebates for state-level candidates and other states have passed implemented a ‘clean money’ system that provides public funding for state-level candidates. There is a study underway at the Campaign Finance Institute examining the behavior and political attitudes of donors in these states compared to donors in other states using data from the National Institute of Money and State Politics (NIMSP) http://www.followthemoney.org/index.phtml.

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composition of the organization in the mid 1990s.14 However, given the organization’s

use of identity politics and identity-driven mission some may find the percentage of men

giving substantial donations to EMILY’s List surprising even though scholars have

documented the participation of men in earlier women’s organizations not to mention

their participation in the first- and second-wave feminist movement. The similarities and

differences among female and male ELISTERs are discussed in detail later in the chapter.

Occupation

In some analyses of political donors, occupation is used an explanatory variable.

For example, Verba et al. (2001) found that occupation had a significant impact on

whether or not an individual participated in various types of political behavior because of

the skills associated with certain jobs, not to mention the money and social networks.

Francia et al. (2003) found that business executives (48 percent) supplied congressional

candidates with the majority of their individual donations, followed by attorneys (17

percent), and those in the medical (13 percent) and education (11 percent) professions

(Francia et al. 2003, 28).15

Among 2004 EMILY’s List donors, the three largest occupational categories are

retired, none, and business.16 The existence of retired persons in the donor pool fits with

14 Because I am interested in the entire universe of ELISTERs, especially female donors, I used the entire universe of donors as my sample size instead of extracting an equal sample of male and female donors. While this is perfectly acceptable given my goals, any discussion or comparison of female and male donors must be must be viewed with circumspection. If nothing else this study should highlight the need for a greater understanding of male ELISTERs and intrigue scholars who are interested in comparing male and female political donors.

15 A small proportion of their sample chose retired, other, or none as their occupation (6 percent) even though 40 percent of donors in their sample are over the age of sixty. The ability of Francia et al. to discuss donor occupation is largely a function of their methodology—a survey of a sample of donors—versus solely relying on FEC data as is the case in this project.

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what we know about the relationship between age and political behavior. The majority of

‘retired’ persons fall into an age cohort that 1) already participates in politics at a higher

rate and thus will be more numerous and 2) often have more disposable income than

those in younger cohorts. It is understandable, then, that 18 percent of ELIST donors

report their occupation as ‘retired’ and donations from these individuals comprise 23

percent of the total amount of money EMILY’s List received from individuals giving

$200 or above.

The single largest occupational category is “none” (Table 5-2). Common sense

tells us that these people have to have some source of income otherwise they would be

unable to give over $200 to an organization. Some argue that the “none” occupational

category should be understood as an attempt by the donors to ‘hide’ their occupation as

part of a bundling scheme or an attempt to circumvent limitations imposed first by FECA

and more recently by BCRA. I question this, instead suggesting that these donors could

simply want to protect their occupation in the name of personal privacy rather than

‘nefarious’ scheming. These could also be independently wealthy individuals who are

not employed in traditional ways. For example in the FEC online database Malcolm’s

occupation is listed as “none” on some records and as “EMILY’s List” on others. The

higher percentage of male donors in the “none” category lends support for this

hypothesis. Given the general distribution of wealth in the United States we know that

men are much more likely to be independently wealthy and as EMILY’s List becomes

increasingly legitimate, these male tycoons are drawn to the organization for strategic

16 The donor occupation in the FEC records comes from the records of the PAC. When making a contribution to EMILY’s List via their website using a credit card it requests you fill out certain information such as name, address, occupation. These data go to the FEC via the organization’s monthly reports. However, if a donor leaves occupation blank OR simply sends EMILY’s List a check there is no way to determine their exact occupation unless listed on the check.

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purposes.17 Furthermore, donors in the “none” category actually give less than their percentage of the whole would suggest; they comprise 29 percent of all donors but only give 16 percent of all receipts $200 and above. The existence of a large percentage of men in this category helps explain this disjuncture, as male ELISTERs tend to give smaller amounts to the organization.

Echoing previous studies of congressional donors, individuals who work in the business world provide EMILY’s List with a large percentage (23 percent) of their

receipts from individuals, although they only comprise 17 percent of all donors. 18 This difference suggests that these donors are giving larger contributions than those in other categories. The other two largest occupational categories for ELISTERs are education (7 percent) and law (6 percent). These findings are in line with Day and Hadley’s study in which EMILY’s List donors were more likely to be teachers than donors to WISH List or

Susan B. Anthony List (2005, 34). The increased presence of lawyers in the 2004 donor pool could be due to an increase in the number of women in that profession, however, it could simply be part of the larger diversification of EMILY’s List’s donor pool.

Certainly, the presence of homemakers, medical professionals, and engineers support that interpretation. It is especially noteworthy, if unsurprising, that almost 30 percent of

ELISTERs employed as Engineers are male. These gender differences will be explored

in a later section.

17http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=12&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mrrc.isr.umich.edu%2Fpu blications%2Fpublications_download.cfm%3Fpid%3D387&ei=5Oz0RYzQJpfMgwSEwbHmAQ&usg=__ 34i6IPKjlAG37Paxlh3leS37ky0=&sig2=VpHyrfKGNnn41n2MXKSnXQ

18 Similarly problematic is the frequency with which donors chose the self-employed category, but because self-employed individuals are by definition business owners, I combined that occupation with those whose occupation fell within the traditional ‘business’ category making it the third largest category (17 percent). See Appendix D for the explanation of the categories and the complete data breakdown.

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Where Do Donors Live?

Further evidence of that EMILY’s List appealed to a wide range of individuals in

2004 is found by examining the residential patterns of EMILY’s List donors.19

These data provide important insights into the diversity present in EMILY’s List membership in 2004. Those who believe EMILY’s List has limited geographic appeal are wrong; donors to EMILY’s List in 2004 came from all over the country.20 Furthermore, these data are a conservative estimate of EMILY’s List reach; it is quite possible that a significant percentage of smaller donors (those who give aggregate contributions of less than $200) live in some of the 35 “other” states, but data on these donors cannot be obtained from FEC records.

Only 36 percent of 2004 EMILY’s List donors come from some of the most populous states, states with the highest percentage of female legislators serving in U.S.

Congress and, in the case of California and Florida, where the organization supported the greatest number of candidates.21 Donations to the organization could also result from the

existence of a competitive election; Malbin and Gais (1998) found that political donations

increase as the competitiveness of the election increases. Therefore in looking at the

19 49.7 percent of those employed in legal profession in 2005 are women compared to 47 percent in 2000. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau: http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm=y&- geo_id=01000US&-qr_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U_QTP27&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&- redoLog=false and http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&- qr_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_S2401&-ds_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_&-redoLog=false

20 Those states with less than 2% of all donors are omitted. No donors came from Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. See Appendix D for complete data.

21 California has 19 women serving in the House and 2 in the Senate; New York has 6 female members in the House and one in the Senate, and Florida has five female members of Congress. http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/Officeholders/cong-current.html Although EMILY’s List appeal appears to be stronger in these states, without further research it is impossible to determine whether this is due to EMILY’s List activity (supporting candidates, direct mail, television ads, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts), a ‘friendly’ political environment for female candidates, or whether it is simply an artifact of a higher population density and a higher per capita income.

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residential patterns of donors we expect to see that a higher proportion of EMILY’s List

donors in 2004 come from states where EMILY’s List supported a candidate and/or where

there was a competitive race. Furthermore, we expect higher aggregated amount of

contributions to come from these locations.

These data support my hypotheses; 48 percent of donations came from states where

EMILY’s List supported a candidate in 2004. Donors from these areas provided the

organization with 52.5 percent of its donations ($200 and above) from individuals. If we

add the monies from donors from states where EMILY’s List did not support a candidate,

but where there was at least one competitive race in 2004, the percentage of receipts

increases slightly to 49 percent and the percent of donations given by individuals in

competitive or EMILY’s List supported states increases slightly to 52.6 percent.22 If we

look at the question of competitiveness and its relationship to EMILY’s List donations

more conservatively—that is if we just look at donors from states where EMILY’s List

candidates were engaged in a competitive election—we see a different picture. Very few

candidates EMILY’s List supported were embroiled in competitive races in 2004 (8 out of

35 in 2004) and only 8.7 percent of receipts (approximately $1.1 million) came from

donors in those states.

These data leave little doubt that EMILY’s List has a national donor base and is a

broad-based movement. Not only is this an important piece in the puzzle vis-à-vis the

organization’s true place in American politics, but it is also important because the

organization is well-placed to pull donors, especially women, into the political system. 23

22 Louisiana is the only state where EMILY’s List did not have a candidate in a race but there was at least one race in the state which was competitive. Competitive races are those the Cook Political Report listed as either a “tossup” or a lean Democratic or lean Republican race in May of 2004.

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Further, insofar as female political donors are considered different than their male

counterparts, though they comprise a small percentage of the donor pool, the organization’s

ability to pull female donors into the political system is critically important.

Sex, State of Residence, and Occupation

Is there is a gender gap in the 2004 EMILY’s List donor pool? A quick look back

at Table 5-1 shows a significant and large gender gap; EMILY’s List has 6 times more

female donors giving $200 or more in 2004 than male donors. This should come as no

real surprise to those familiar with the history and goals of the organization, yet this large percentage of female donors is especially noteworthy because women are thought to be minor players in moneyed politics. Furthermore, the fact that men do give substantial amounts to the organization is also noteworthy and is a sign that Malcolm’s efforts to make EMILY’s List a full fledged influence organization with a broad mission and broad-based membership have been successful.

Because this study includes the entire universe of donors I can examine whether basic socio-demographic differences exist between female and male ELISTERs and within each category. If we compare female ELISTERs to their male counterparts, we see a few differences in terms of occupation or state of residence, although it is possible that the ambiguous categories obscure any differences.24 Examining differences among women and among men we see that there is a similar distribution of men and women. In those cases where there are differences, those differences amount to 1 percent or less.

23 Analysis needs to be done to determine whether this has changed among ELISTERs across time. As EMILY’s List evolved (Chapter 4), has its support come from different areas? Answers to these questions require a longitudinal analysis of ELISTERs using Federal Election Commission records.

24 Women are more likely to be captured by the categories listed than men (only 13.9 percent of women were categorized as “other” occupation as opposed to 22.5 percent of men), however, this could be a result of the coding mechanism rather than the actual occupation category.

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It is surprising that the distribution of men is so close to the distribution of women across states. While this may be the result of a concerted effort by EMILY’s List to recruit male donors (though there is no indication of that in any of the organization’s materials) it is more likely the case that men see the organization as increasingly legitimate and are using EMILY’s List as an new outlet for influence.

Further evidence of this type of behavior is apparent in an examination of the distribution among women and among men in states where EMILY’s List supported a candidate and in those states where an ELIST candidate ran in a competitive race. For example, a much higher proportion of female ELISTERs live in Minnesota than the proportion of male ELISTERS; however, the proportion of male ELISTERs in Nebraska,

Pennsylvania and South Dakota exceed the proportion of female ELISTERS. It is also in these three states where men give much larger proportions of the total contribution to

EMILY’s List. Furthermore, in Nebraska and South Dakota male ELISTERS give a larger proportion of ELIST receipts (27.8 percent and 40.3 percent respectively) than represented in the ELIST donor pool (22.7 percent of ELISTERs in Nebraska are men and 28.6 percent of South Dakota ELISTERs are men).

The same phenomenon is at work in the distribution of occupations of men and women though there are a few interesting trends to flesh out. First, a greater proportion of female ELISTERs fall into the education profession, are homemakers, or list community or political organizations as their occupation. Given women generally make up a greater proportion of these occupations this finding is unsurprising, yet these are not the type of occupational categories one expects to see in an elite Beltway organization.

Rather it speaks to the organization’s diverse appeal to women. Second, the proportion

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of women in the business category is much larger than the proportion of male ELISTERs,

likely a reflection of businesswomen, having faced their own share of glass ceilings,

recognizing the need to come together to ensure women an equal voice in public life and

a place of power within the political sphere.

Turning briefly to the distribution of occupations among male ELISTERs, a large

proportion fall into the business category, unsurprising given their general dominance of that occupation. More striking, however, is the large proportion of male ELISTERs claiming no occupation or ‘retired’ (over 56 percent). Although large proportions of women also fall into these categories (45 percent), the distribution of women across occupation is less skewed. It could be the case that these larger proportions are a reflection of a higher percentage of independently wealthy male ELISTERs looking for an additional outlet for their funds, as opposed to a pool of professionally employed women motivated to donate because of their own experiences.

Sex and Money

More differences appear when we examine the amount of money that individuals give to the organization by sex and donor category. Current research characterizes female donors as largely ‘occasional’ donors pulled in by personal appeals and motivated by ideological concerns (Francia et al. 2003). The general belief is that women are minor players in moneyed politics, giving less money in smaller amounts to fewer candidates then their male counterparts. Yet an examination of 2004 EMILY’S List donors refute these generalizations. In fact, the magnitude of the financial donations from female donors is staggering given the conventional wisdom.

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Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), an individual can give up to

$5,000 per year ($10,000 per cycle) to political action committees.25 With few studies of

PAC donors, I will be using analyses of congressional donors as proxy for PAC donor behavior. The vast majority of congressional donors (84 percent) give contributions of less than $500, but a sizable minority of donors, 29 percent, give contributions of $1,000 and above (Francia et al. 2001, 23). Do the 2004 EMILY’s List donors fit this typology?

How many are ‘major’ donors, giving $1,000 or more and of these, how many come close to the maximum donation amount of $10,000?

Fifty-nine percent of ELISTERS gave between $200 and $500 totaling almost $2.2 million in direct contributions. Thirty-seven percent are ‘major’ donors to the organization, giving contributions of $501 and $5,000. Donations from this group comprised more than half ($7.9 million) of the total amount received by EMILY’s List from individuals. Those giving over $5,000 comprise 3.6 percent of EMILY’s List donors, just slightly more than present in the congressional donor pool according to

Francia et al. These donors account for 43 percent ($5.8 million) of all direct donations

($200 and above). Very few of these donors (n=145 or 1 percent) give close to the maximum donation of $10,000 to the organization.

Given 84 percent of EMILY’s List donors are women it seems rational to assume then that the bulk of the organization’s funds came from women.26 All told, women

supplied the organization with over $11.7 million dollars, 87 percent of its total contributions from individuals giving $200 or more. While we typically think of female

25 http://www.fec.gov/press/bkgnd/bcra_overview.shtml

26 Again this is not capturing people who give $200 or less. It is entirely possible that men dominate the donor list at this lower level. There is no way to ascertain this using the FEC data files.

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donors as giving smaller amounts, in the case of EMILY’s List women dominate all

ranges, nowhere is it more pronounced than the top donation ranges. Ninety-four percent

of donations between $9,001 and $10,000 and 91 percent of donations of $10,001 and

above came from female donors.

Although women dominate the donor pool, there are interesting differences

among female and male donors. A greater proportion of male donors (64.8 percent) gave

between $200 and $500 as opposed to female donors (58.1 percent), who were just

slightly more equally distributed across donation levels than male ELISTERs. There are

multiple explanations for these findings. First, this suggests either less of an ability to

give money by men or that men derive less purposive benefits from the organization’s

membership. It appears that male donors find the organization appealing because of its

increasing legitimacy and use an ELIST donation as another strategic investment,

whereas female donors, seeking descriptive representation in addition to the other

benefits of membership, give larger amounts of money to the organization. Second, the large proportion of female ELISTERs giving at smaller donation levels suggests that the organization is not an elite PAC but an organization that draws in all types of donors both big and small, a point that would be further strengthened by an examination of un- itemized contributions.

Types of ELISTERs

According to Francia et al. (2003), very few donors to congressional candidates are ‘perpetual’ donors, giving to the same candidate repeatedly. Although no one has applied this typology to PAC donations, one would imagine that PAC donors are perpetual givers because the benefits they seek (both purpose and solidary) stem from their monetary contributions. Analyses of FEC records for EMILY’s List indicate that

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such a belief may be misguided. Only 27 donors (less than 1 percent of all ELISTERs)

are loyalists, giving to the organization in at least five of the eight election cycles since

EMILY’s List’s inception. This figure increases only slightly to 5 percent if the definition of ‘loyalist’ is relaxed to giving $200 to EMILY’s List in at least three election

cycles. However, if we limit our analysis to the last two election cycles (2002 and 2004),

31 percent (n=3,571) of ELISTERs are loyalists, giving $200 or more to the organization

in both cycles. These data suggest that instead of relying on loyal donors, donations from

new ELISTERs line the coffers of EMILY’s List coffers. 27 This is a critically important

finding, as it (1) points to the dynamic and broadening nature of the organization’s

membership and (2) the ability of EMILY’s List to provide the services discussed in

Chapter 4 depended heavily on receipts from new donors. Who are these new donors,

how do they differ from repeat donors and what brought them into the political system?

New Donors

Federal Election Commission records show that EMILY’s List is bringing new individuals into the donor pool. Sixty-seven percent (n=8,345) of donors to EMILY’s

List in 2004 were first-time givers to the organization (Table 5-11).28 The large percentage of new ELISTERS in 2003–2004 could be the result of an expanding donor pool. In Election after Reform, Malbin discusses the large number of new donors (78.8 percent) in the 2004 presidential donor pool, noting that this conflicts with prior

27 It is possible that 2002 election cycle was the beginning of EMILY’s List pulling in new donors as a result of changes in strategy, and the payoff for them came in 2004.

28 FEC records indicate that these individuals have not given more than $200 to the organization since 1990. It is possible that some of these individuals gave less than $200 to the organization in prior years in which cases they would not show up in the FEC files. But even if this is the case, these data suggest that something, be it the changing strategy of the organization or the external political environment, led these individuals to give $200 or more to the organization in 2004

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research.29 The same type of phenomena occurred with EMILY’s List in 2004. It may be

the case that the stakes in 2004 (highly contested presidential race, partisan polarization

in the electorate and in Congress) made previous small donors to EMILY’s List feel it

was necessary to increase the amount of their contribution, leading to their classification

as ‘new’ ELISTERs in these data. Whether “new” ELISTERs continue to give larger

amounts to EMILY’s List requires further empirical testing—taking the data analyses

backward and forward in time. A clearer picture of ELISTERS can also be gleaned from

an analysis of donor contributions to ‘other’ political committees (PACs, parties, or

candidates). Before examining these ‘other’ contributions, it is important to further

investigate differences between new and repeat ELISTERs in 2004.30

New versus Repeat Donors

A greater percentage of male 2004 donors (72 percent) are “new” to EMILY’s

List versus only 66 percent of female 2004 ELISTERs. There could be many reasons for this: women ideologically disposed to EMILY’s List may already be donors, thus decreasing the possible donor pool of new female donors. A second possibility could be that the goals and ideological position of the organization is becoming more appealing to men; certainly ‘feminist men’ are ripe for donating to EMILY’s List (Conover 1988;

Cook and Wilcox 1991; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999).

29 Malbin’s analysis only compares the 2000 and 2004 donor pool where this study goes back to the 1990 election cycle in search of EMILY’s List’s 2004 donors.

30 It is important to note that there may have been a different composition of donors with a smaller percentage of new ELISTERs in earlier cycles. It is also possible that a good percentage of these ‘new’ ELISTERs will become repeat ELISTERs in future cycles. A longitudinal analysis of EMILY’s List donor would answer some of these questions, however, that is beyond the scope of this project. It would also be interesting to see how many of these ‘new’ ELISTERs are ‘brand new’ to giving political donations.30 If that were the case, EMILY’s List would not be the cause of an increased number of brand-new donors, but rather the beneficiary of changes brought about by other factors.

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Third, male donors in 2003–2004 may have perceived EMILY’s List as an

increasingly legitimate outlet for their money due to Malcolm’s connection with America

Coming Together and the Democratic National Committee, or the degree to which the

organization became involved in more “mainstream” political activities, like spending

six-thousand dollars in independent expenditures in opposition to the re-election of

George H.W. Bush.31 Without tracing donor patterns over time, it is impossible to

accurately determine the source of this difference, however, these data suggest that

female and male ELISTERs have been attracted to the organization at different times and

at different rates. Further research is needed to fully flesh out these and other gender differences mentioned in previous sections.

In terms of occupation, there are significant differences between New and Repeat

ELISTERs. A greater percentage of Repeat ELISTERS (41.2 percent) self-report as

retired versus only 16 percent of New ELISTERs. It is possible that Repeat ELISTERs

are older than New ELISTERs and hence they are more likely to be retired; it could also be the case that a greater percentage of Repeat ELISTERs are independently wealthy. We also see a gap between Repeat and New ELISTERs who chose “none” as their occupation, but this difference is in the opposite direction. Among New ELISTERs,

“none” is the most frequently chosen occupational category (37 percent). Fewer Repeat

EListers categorize their occupation as “none” (13.4 percent), though it does remain one of the largest occupational categories.

New ELISTERs appear to live in slightly different places compared to Repeat

ELISTERs. Looking just at the states with the largest percentage of all ELISTERs, we

31 www.fec.gov. Independent expenditures are listed under “Committees or Candidates Supported or Opposed.”

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see that there is a greater percentage of New ELISTERs (18 percent versus 15 percent)

that reside in one of the 35 “other” states and a slightly smaller percentage of New

ELISTERs versus Repeat ELISTERs in the states with the largest overall percentage of

donors (CA and NY). This is further evidence suggesting that the organization has

successfully broadened its appeal whether through direct targeting efforts or increased

legitimacy due to its connections with other political entities.

New donors tended to give in smaller amounts ($500 or less), comprising over

eighty percent of the donations received at this level. As the aggregate amount of

donations increase, the number of new donors giving decreases; 40 percent of donors

giving over $1000 were new donors to EMILY’s List. Clearly in 2004 EMILY’s List

relied on repeat donors to provide ‘major’ donations and thus the majority of the

individual contributions even though these repeat donors made up less than 50 percent of

their donor pool. Seventy-five percent of major donors (giving $5,000 or more) are repeat

givers versus only 19 percent of those giving $500 or less.

It is possible that the first time an individual donates it is in a smaller amount, but

future donations bring higher amounts as the donor develops trust and a ‘stake’ in the

success of the organization.32 A comparison of the donation patterns of repeat donors in

2004 compared to earlier cycles could answer this. More than 45 percent of major donors

(giving over $5,000) gave somewhere else during the election cycle compared to only 23 percent of donors giving $500 or less. This difference could be a function of the major donors being asked more frequently or having a higher income level, yet other studies have found that large majorities of donors have incomes over $80,000 (Day and Hadley

32 In an interview the Development Director of EMILY’s List attributed the organization’s success in fundraising to “…clear goals, a sense of community, and value-driven excitement…” quoted in Capeck. (1998).

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2005, 34; Francia et al. 2001, 30). The idea that small donors are significantly less

affluent than large donors has not been shown, yet with the entrance of new donors into

the donor pool it is entirely possible this may be the case.

Expecting EMILY’s List donors to give consistently across cycles may be

expecting too much. While the majority of congressional donors are habitual (Francia

2001, 22), PAC donors may have different motives than congressional donors. Scholars

assert that donors to congressional or even presidential candidates give because they want

to affect the outcome of the election(s) and/or they want to ‘purchase’ access to the

candidate. While these motives are also a factor for PAC donors, it is important to

remember that some PACs, especially ideological PACs, are affiliates of interest groups

whose members participate because of the various types of benefits they receive—

material, purposive, and solidary (Moe 1980; Olson 1965; Walker 1991). EMILY’s List,

however, does not have an affiliated interest group—its PAC is the interest group. It is

from the PAC that donors receive benefits. Purposive benefits flow from the

organization’s success in electing pro-choice Democratic women to state and federal

office. Solidary benefits stem from the meetings the organizations hold all over the

country where members meet and network with likeminded men and women.33

If members are receiving these valuable benefits from their contributions to the

PAC, why don’t they give consistently? There are two possible answers. First, it is

possible that the lack of repeat giving is due to free riders, though since the organization’s

success depends on how much money they receive, this is doubtful. The second

33 It is even possible that ELISTERs receive some type of material benefits insofar as the election of more women to office is thought to positively impact the legislative agenda in terms of women’s lives. Furthermore, material benefits could be tied to the solidary benefits members receive vis-à-vis professional networks.

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possibility is that donors from earlier years began giving to the organization strictly for

purposive reasons and as the organization professionalized and diversified the donors

perceived it as increasingly risk-averse in terms of supporting female pro-choice

Democratic candidates. This will be discussed more in the next chapter: however, if this

is true it would follow that donors with this perception who only sought purposive

benefits would not be as loyal in their support whereas those who receive purposive and

solidary benefits may be driven to give more consistently. A third possibility is that

EMILY’s List is a ‘starter’ organization insofar as individuals, especially women, may

start off giving contributions to EMILY’s List and then, because they are asked by others

for monies or they become more comfortable with giving they start to give monies they

would have previously given to EMILY’s List to other candidates or committees. 34

Determining which of these possibilities is correct is beyond the scope of this

project as it would require a longitudinal analysis of the FEC records of ELISTERS

supplemented by a survey of these donors, however, an examination of where 2004

ELISTERs gave besides EMILY’s List will show if this is even an issue. It is possible

that ELISTERs give nowhere else but the organization and its recommended candidates.

‘Other’ Donations

A donation to EMILY’s List should not be thought of as the proverbial ‘end’ of

the line for political donors; nowhere in the literature has anyone claimed that those

giving to PACs give only to PACs, though there are claims that once an individual gives

to one entity the likelihood of that person giving to another entity increases. Furthermore,

34 Furthermore, it is important to note that these figures exclude those who only bundle to the organization. It is possible that since the organization began as a donor network those who are longstanding members may only give in this manner. This chapter does not address these donors; future research should address this gap.

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the reputation and history of the organization push donors toward other donations, though this is typically thought of to occur through the bundling via the organization.

Eighty-two percent of ELISTERs who gave contributions of $200 or more to the organization gave only to EMILY’s List; only 18 percent gave a non-bundled contribution to another organization (candidate, PAC, party) that year. Unsurprisingly,

‘other’ donors are more likely be ‘major’ contributors a fact which is likely related to their higher incomes and the increased frequency of being asked to give (Table 5-16).

These ‘other’ contributions from ELISTERs amount to more than $5.5 million dollars. If we look at these donations by donor type Repeat ELISTERs appear generally more active in politics than New ELISTERs; repeat donors to the organization were 2.5 times more likely give a donation to another political entity than New ELISTERs.35

These ‘other’ contributions from ELISTERs amount to more than $5.5 million dollars. If we look at these donations by donor type Repeat ELISTERs appear generally more active in politics than New ELISTERs. It is possible that New ELISTERs are newer to moneyed politics and thus not asked by multiple persons or entities for a donation in

2004. It is also possible that New ELISTERs gave donations of less than $200 to other groups not be picked up in the FEC records. Examining these other donations by donor sex provides further insight into the gender difference in campaign finance. Male

ELISTERs are 1.6 times more likely to give to another committee than female ELISTERs

(Table 5-18). Female ELISTERs gave more money in ‘other’ donations but this is likely a function of the greater number of women in the EMILY’s List donor pool.

These monies went to an interesting assortment of candidates and committees

(Table 5-19). The Democratic Party committees ($3.7 million) and the Kerry-Edwards

35 http://www.hutchon.net/ConfidOR.htm

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presidential campaign ($1.2 million) also received hefty sums from EMILY’s List donors. However, along with these ‘typical’ recipients are some real surprises, like the

$65,712 given to the Republican Party committees and the $33,454 given to the Bush-

Cheney presidential campaign.

Scholars expect this type of donor behavior from donors to corporate PACs and other non-ideological political committees for strategic reasons; it is less expected among donors to ideological groups. These donations would be less surprising if they came exclusively from ‘new’ ELISTERS. Had that been the case one could suggest that these donors could be new to politics and unaware that EMILY’s List and these committees are at odds. Yet the majority of donations to Bush and the Republican PACs came from donors who had given to EMILY’s List in prior years. Only thirty-nine percent of these donations came from new donors whereas sixty-two percent came from repeat

ELISTERs. Donations to the National Republican Party show a different trend, with over half the monies coming from new and brand new donors to EMILY’s List. More analysis must be done to explain these confounding findings, as prior research indicated that

EMILY’s List donors were ideologically consistent and doggedly liberal. Although this is a very small set of all EMILY’s List donors (only 18 percent of ELISTERs gave somewhere else, and only 10 percent of those gave to entities affiliated with the GOP or conservative ideology), it deserves further examination.

It is possible that the higher percentage of Repeat ELISTERs giving across party and across the ideological divide is simply an artifact of the donor’s higher level of political activity overall. Research has shown that once an individual gives political contribution the likelihood of giving another donation to the same or different group

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increases exponentially—perhaps this is the reason that a higher percentage of repeat

ELISTERs give ‘other’ contributions. It may also be the case that Repeat ELISTERs are more connected in their communities and generally more politically active which would increase the likelihood of them being asked by friends or coworkers for a donation contrary to their party affiliation or ideological disposition. Furthermore it is entirely possible that the donation to EMILY’s List is the peculiarity in their donation patterns— as one discussant noted, “I know a woman who is a die-hard Republican and Bush supporter but donates to EMILY’s List because all of her friends do and it is ‘the thing’ to do in her community for social connections.”36

Conclusion

The data and analysis in this chapter focuses only on donors to EMILY’s List in

2003–2004 and as such is only a limited, but important, window into the behavior of donors in that cycle. Scholars assumed that analyses looking strictly at congressional and presidential donors captured the majority of campaign donors—it is clear from this study that that assumption is faulty. Looking strictly at donors to EMILY’s List in 2004, we see that studies that limit their gaze to congressional or presidential donors potentially miss a non-trivial number of ELISTERS—12,397 to be exact—the vast majority of whom (86 percent) are female. This matters because if candidates knew that women were a larger part of the donor pool it could affect their behavior and the competitiveness of elections more generally. Some states have implemented donor incentive programs in an effort to diversify the donor pool for these very reasons. And while EMILY’s List has finally obtained clout among candidates and in the larger political environment,

36 Comment made during a presentation of these data at the APSA Convention in Philadelphia, PA, August 2006.

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individual donors deserve their fair share of the credit for the organization’s position.

These women and men are power brokers, albeit non-traditional ones, and without their

contributions the organization would not have the money to pursue its goals.37

One goal in this chapter is to provide a fresh way of looking at the organization

described in Chapter 4. Scholars examining the role of organizations tend to focus on

leadership and structure. While these are obviously critical elements—without

Malcolm’s leadership and vision it is doubtful that the organization could have evolved

into the multi-faced influence organization it is today—it is the members that provide a

critical link between the organization and the outside world. Without members EMILY’s

List could be viewed as a plaything of a rich female politico; yet given the broad base of

the organization, in terms of sex, location, occupation, and donation ranges, one must

recognize the organization as a growing, dynamic force to be reckoned with.

It is this view of the organization—as reckoning force—that guides the next

chapter. There I explore the impact of the organization on congressional elections. It is

in this arena that the organization’s adaptation and evolution is clear. An empirical

investigation of the strategies that EMILY’s uses and examining how those strategies are

affected by the political environment will solidify EMILY’s List position as an adept

political organization comfortable with using whatever tools necessary to achieve its

goals and meet the needs of its members.

37 As discussed in Chapter 4, the organization has clout with the Democratic Party (insofar as the national party looks to the organization to vet female candidates and the state parties partner with the organization to raise funds for GOTV) and with candidates, both potential (insofar as they would like to be an ELIST endorsed candidate) and current (insofar as the organization has helped create a network of support for women—consultants, staffers, etc.,—and the majority of Democratic women elected have received ELIST endorsement at some point in their career, if not multiple times.

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Table 5-1. Sex of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 Sex Percent Number Female 84.0% 10,416 Male 14.1% 1,753 Missing 1.8% 228 Total 100.0% 12,397

Table 5-2. Occupation of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 % of % of % of % of All Total Female Male Occupation Amt. Given Donors Amount Donors Donors Business $3,084,624 17% 23% 88% 11% Community/Political $334,005 2% 2% 96% 3% Consultant $268,815 2% 2% 84% 15% Education $854,087 7% 6% 87% 11% Engineer $111,329 1% 1% 68% 29% Executive $473,534 3% 4% 89% 10% Financial $371,401 2% 3% 85% 15% Government $222,041 2% 2% 86% 12% Home $472,268 3% 4% 99% 1% Law $1,024,562 6% 8% 86% 14% Medical $406,872 4% 3% 84% 12% None $2,188,254 29% 16% 79% 18% Other $566,785 4% 4% 85% 15% Retired $3,098,982 18% 23% 83% 16%

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Table 5-3. State of Residence of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 % Female % Male State of Residence % All Donors Donors CA 19.7 83.6% 14.4% CO 2.0 83.1% 14.5% CT 2.2 82.0% 16.1% DC 3.7 85.5% 12.5% FL 5.2 83.9% 13.6% IL 4.1 87.0% 12.6% MA 8.1 86.0% 12.3% MD 4.1 85.3% 14.1% MI 2.5 81.9% 14.5% NJ 2.8 84.7% 13.6% NY 11.4 85.4% 13.8% OH 1.9 80.6% 16.8% PA 3.4 80.3% 17.5% TX 4.7 85.2% 13.7% VA 4.2 70.1% 9.6% WA 3.2 80.2% 17.3% 35 OTHER 16.8 87.6% 15.5% Total 100

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Table 5-4. Donors ($200 and above) from States where EMILY’s List Endorsed a Candidate % of % of Amt. Amt. from % of all Female from % of Male % of Amt. State Donors in State Donors donors Female donors from Male AR $34,160 0.3% 72.70% 89.20% 27.30% 10.80% CA $2,829,019 19.7% 85.30% 87.30% 14.70% 11.90% CT $277,273 2.2% 83.60% 83.10% 16.40% 13.90% FL $1,099,441 3.7% 86.00% 84.60% 14.00% 13.10% GA $148,068 0.3% 89.90% 92.80% 10.10% 7.10% IL $539,051 4.1% 87.40% 8.90% 12.60% 10.70% IN $55,835 0.5% 74.60% 71.90% 25.40% 25.70% LA $20,395 0.3% 87.50% 87.5% 12.50% 12.5% MD $485,917 4.1% 85.90% 86.90% 14.10% 12.90% MN $127,726 1.2% 89.70% 87.40% 10.30% 9.70% MO $121,853 1.1% 89.80% 90.00% 10.20% 8.90% NC $159,380 1.5% 84.40% 86.80% 15.60% 13.00% NE $17,695 0.2% 77.30% 72.20% 22.70% 27.80% OK $20,305 0.3% 87.90% 84.20% 12.10% 13.50% OR $141,980 1.3% 82.90% 84.90% 17.10% 13.00% PA $447,917 3.4% 82.10% 80.50% 17.90% 16.20% SC $37,459 0.4% 86.00% 92.90% 14.00% 6.40% SD $2,975 0.1% 71.40% 59.70% 28.60% 40.30% WA $419,405 3.2% 82.30% 82.20% 17.70% 16.10% WI $108,936 1.0% 84.00% 82.50% 16.00% 16.10% Total 7,094,790 48.9%

Table 5-5. Donors ($200 and above) from States with Competitive Races involving an EMILY’s List Candidate, 2004

Amt. from % All % Female % Male State donors Donors Donors CT $277,273 2.15% 83.60% 16.40% MN $127,726 1.20% 89.70% 10.30% NC $159,380 1.47% 84.40% 15.60% NE $17,695 0.18% 77.30% 22.70% PA $447,917 3.22% 82.10% 17.90% SC $37,459 0.41% 86.00% 14.00% SD $2,975 0.06% 71.40% 28.60% Total $1,070,425 8.68%

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Table 5-6. Distribution of States by Sex State of Residence % Female Donors % Male Donors CA 19.60% 20.10% CO 2.00% 2.10% CT 2.10% 2.50% DC 3.70% 3.30% FL 5.20% 5.00% IL 4.20% 3.70% MA 8.30% 7.10% MD 4.10% 4.10% MI 2.40% 2.60% NJ 2.80% 2.70% NY 11.60% 11.10% OH 1.80% 2.20% PA 3.20% 4.20% TX 4.80% 4.60% VA 3.50% 2.90% WA 3.00% 3.90% 35 OTHER 17.50% 18.30%

Table 5-7. States with Competitive ELIST Races by Sex and Percentage of Amount, 2004 % Female % Amt. by Female % Male % Amt. by Male from state donors in state from state donors in state CT 24.40% 83.10% 24.90% 13.90% MN 14.50% 87.40% 8.70% 9.70% NC 16.80% 86.80% 16.20% 13.00% NE 1.90% 72.20% 2.90% 27.80% PA 37.20% 80.50% 42.20% 16.20% SC 4.80% 92.90% 4.00% 6.40% SD 0.60% 59.70% 1.20% 40.30%

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Table 5-8. Distribution of Occupation and Amount of Donation by Sex % Female Donors % Amt. given by % Male Donors % Amt. given Occupation in Occupation Female Donors in Occupation by Male Donors Business 17.50% 23.8% 13.30% 17.6% Consult 2.00% 2.8% 2.20% 0.2% Education 7.30% 1.9% 5.50% 2.5% Engineer 0.90% 6.3% 2.30% 5.8% Executive 3.00% 0.7% 1.90% 1.9% Financial 2.20% 3.7% 2.30% 1.9% Government 2.00% 2.6% 1.70% 4.0% Home 3.70% 1.7% 0.20% 1.2% Law 6.50% 4.0% 6.10% 0.1% Medical 3.70% 7.7% 3.10% 7.3% None 27.50% 2.7% 36.20% 4.3% Other 3.90% 15.6% 3.90% 19.6% Community/ Political 1.90% 4.0% 0.40% 5.6% Retired 18.00% 22.3% 20.90% 27.9%

Table 5-9. Contribution Amounts for EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 Amount of Contribution % All Total Amount % Female % Male $200–$500 59.3% $2,157,704 82% 15% $501–$1,000 17.1% $1,850,104 85% 14% $1,001–$2,000 10.6% $2,117,260 88% 11% $2,001–$3,000 4.9% $1,555,621 90% 9% $3,001–$5,000 4.5% $2,338,114 85% 14% $5,001–$9,000 2.4% $1,951,281 87% 12% $9,001–$10,000 0.9% $1,124,500 94% 5% $10,001 and above 0.3% $381,472 91% 9% Total 100.0% $13,476,056

Table 5-10. EMILY’s List Donor Pool by Sex and Contribution Amount, 2004 Amount of % Female Donors % Male donors Contribution giving at this level giving at this level $200–$500 58.1% 64.6% $501–$1,000 17.3% 16.6% $1,001–$2,000 11.1% 8.6% $2,001–$3,000 5.2% 3.3% $3,001–$5,000 4.6% 4.5% $5,001–$9,000 2.5% 2.0% $9,001–$10,000 1.0% 0.3% $10,001 and above 0.3% 0.2%

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Table 5-11. Type of EMILY’s List Donor ($200 and above) by Sex, 2004 % Female % Male % of Female % of Male ELISTERs ELISTERs Repeat 86.5% 12.2% 43.6% 28.1% ‘New’ 82.8% 15.1% 66.4% 71.9%

Table 5-12. Occupation by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004 % Repeat Donors % New Donors % % of New employed in employed in Occupation Repeat Donors occupation Occupation Business 42.6% 57.4% 21.8% 14.3% Community 49.5% 50.5% 2.5% 1.2% Consult 39.7% 60.3% 2.4% 1.8% Education 33.8% 66.2% 7.3% 7.0% Engineer 35.3% 64.7% 1.2% 1.1% Executive 44.2% 55.8% 3.8% 2.3% Financial 40.3% 59.7% 2.7% 2.0% Government 35.9% 64.1% 2.2% 1.9% Home 38.4% 57.4% 3.7% 2.9% Law 36.3% 63.7% 7.0% 6.0% Medical 38.0% 62.0% 4.3% 3.4% None 15.0% 85.0% 13.4% 36.9% Other 39.7% 60.3% 4.7% 3.4% Retired 23.0% 77.0% 41.2% 15.9%

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Table 5-13. State of Residence by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004 State of % of Repeat % of New in Residence % Repeat % New in State State CA 36.5% 63.5% 22.0% 18.6% CO 27.3% 72.7% 1.7% 2.2% CT 33.7% 66.3% 2.2% 2.1% DC 42.6% 57.4% 4.8% 3.1% FL 31.6% 68.4% 5.0% 5.3% IL 30.9% 69.1% 3.9% 4.2% MA 22.9% 77.1% 5.7% 9.3% MD 31.7% 68.3% 3.9% 4.1% MI 31.0% 69.0% 2.4% 2.6% NJ 39.0% 61.0% 3.3% 2.5% NY 38.5% 61.5% 13.4% 10.4% OH 31.9% 68.1% 1.8% 1.9% PA 32.2% 67.8% 3.3% 3.4% TX 37.9% 62.1% 5.5% 4.4% VA 23.6% 76.4% 3.0% 4.8% WA 28.7% 71.3% 2.8% 3.4% 35 OTHER 29.6% 70.4% 15.2% 17.5%

Table 5-14. Contribution Amount by Type of Donor ($200 and above), 2004 % from Amount % from Amount Repeat from Repeat New from New Up to $500 19.4% $489,807 80.6% $1,667,897 Between $501 and $1,000 37.6% $695,347 62.4% $1,157,680 Between $1,001 and $5,000 59.3% $3,726,032 40.7% $2,284,963 Between $5,001and $2,526,151 $549,630 $10,000 81.3% 18.7% $10,001 or more 87.5% $329,548 12.5% $51,924 Total $7,755,240 $5,722,319

Table 5-15. Giving Patterns of EMILY’s List Donors ($200 or more), 2004 Loyalists ‘Other’ 82.20% 17.80%

Table 5-16. Contribution Range by Donor Type, 2004 % Loyalists % 'Other' Up to $500 77% 23% Between $501 and $1,000 80% 20% Between $1,001 and $5,000 73% 27% Between $5,001 and $10,000 57% 43% $10,001 or more 28% 72%

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Table 5-17. Number and Gender Breakdown of ELISTERs ‘Other’ Donations ($200 and above), 2004 % of All Amt of % of Repeat Amt. of % of New Total Amt. of giving ‘other’ from giving ‘other’ giving ‘Other’ ‘Other’ Repeat ‘Other’ from New ‘Other’ Female $3,737,902 16.2% 2,299,285 29.2% 1,438,617 11.4% Male $1,457,207 26.7% 820,354 38.3% 636,853 22.1% Missing $331,150 4% 301,740 50% 29,410 12.8% Total $5,526,529 17.8% 3,421,379 50.3% 2,104,880 49.6%

Table 5-18. Sex of ELISTER by Donor Type, 2004 % Female % Male Loyalists 83.80% 73.30% ‘Other' 16.20% 26.70%

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Table 5-19. Recipients of ‘Other’ Donations by EMILY’s List Donors ($200 and above), 2004 Amt. from Repeat Amt. from New Total Amount ELISTERs ELISTERs Kerry $1,193,975 $696,860 $497,115 Dean $44,229 $36,344 $7,885 Edwards $12,292 $8,542 $3,750 Other Dem Presidential $27,150 $18,900 $8,250 Candidates Nader $500 $0 $500 Bush $33,454 $21,304 $12,150

DNC $2,771,167 $1,595,132 $1,176,035 DCCC $175,173 $162,950 $12,223 DSCC $59,050 $41,325 $17,725 DEM-State/Local $65,960 $55,656 $10,304

RNC $14,363 $5,326 $9,037 NRCC $38,650 $33,400 $5,250 NRSC $210 $10 $200 GOP-State/Local $12,489 $300 $12,189

Congressional Candidates $862,927 $581,273 $285,654

Women's PACs $6,350 $4,100 $2,250 DEM/Liberal $141,833 $118,130 $23,703 GOP/Conservative $1,750.00 $1,750 Industry, Business or Prof. $31,279 $85,834 $15,627 Unknown $33,458 $26,450 $7,008

Total Other $5,526,259 $4,143,922 $2,336,651

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CHAPTER 6 THE CHOSEN FEW—EMILY’S LIST ENDORSEMENTS 2000–2004

The purpose, persistence, and power of EMILY’s List centers on the interaction

between three dimensions: the organization, the contributors, and endorsed candidates.

Malcolm formed EMILY’s List to help female pro-choice Democratic women achieve

power. In the process of empowering female candidates she created a powerful

organization

In this paper, I focus on the candidates the organization endorses over a three year

period, arguing that the success of endorsed candidates is an indication of EMILY’s

List’s power. EMILY’s List endorsed all but 5 of the Democratic women serving in the

110th Congress, many of whom credit the organization for helping them make it into those hallowed halls, it is hard to cast the organization as a minor player. But how many female candidates does EMILY’s List help? Has the organization stayed true to its roots vis-à-vis supporting female pro-choice Democratic candidates others deem ‘risks’ or has

EMILY’s List become risk averse and static. After providing a descriptive analysis of

EMILY’s List endorsement process and basic statistics about the number and types of candidates the organization has endorsed in recent years, I perform a series of regressions to assess what factors predict EMILY’s List support.

EMILY’s List Endorsement

Early in the organization’s history, decisions regarding candidate endorsement were made by the founding members, many of whom personally knew the candidates endorsed. As the organization grew and money became available to support multiple candidates from all over the country, the selection process became more sophisticated.

According to organizational literature, a candidate is endorsed after,

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she has demonstrated that she is a viable, pro-choice Democratic woman … with a reasonable chance of winning base[ed] on our interactions with candidates and campaigns and on the expertise of and information gathered and analyzed by the EMILY’s List political staff. … Candidates must be prepared to illustrate, credibly and specifically, how they can win—and demonstrate that they are taking those steps … Candidates are also asked to fill out a short choice questionnaire to show their commitment to protecting the tenets of Roe v. Wade.

Providing the candidate clears all these hurdles, she receives the endorsement of

EMILY’s List and all the corresponding benefits: mention in member newsletters and on

the website, a political tracker and a finance tracker.1 She may receive direct and in-kind contributions ($5,000 per election, $10,000 per cycle), unlimited independent expenditures, direct mailings, etc. However, the only ‘promise’ that the organization publicly makes to the candidate is that once recommended,

a profile about the candidate and her race is sent to our members, who then decide whether to contribute to her campaign. There are generally a number of candidates included in a single candidate mailing. There is no regular schedule for mailings. Some candidates are included in more than one mailing. There is no standard amount of money that a candidate raises from a mailing as our members always choose which candidates to support.

From this one would get the impression that donors and bundled contributions are driving

EMILY’s List success.

Candidates and Bundled ELIST Money

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the total amount of money the organization bundles to candidates far exceed the amount it gives to candidates as direct or in-kind donations

(refer back to Table 4-3). In that chapter, I put aside bundled funds because although they are, at least in part, the result of the organization’s encouragement, ultimately it is not the

1 Organizational literature references political and finance trackers. Political trackers are there to help every female Democratic pro-choice candidate. If a candidate makes it into the ‘endorsed’ category then the organization also assigns a finance tracker to the campaign to handle fundraising, including writing a fundraising plan, hiring staff, training the candidate and staff regarding effective fundraising strategies, etc.

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organization but the individual who decides which candidates receive bundled money, in

what amount, and when. Receiving bundled funds from EMILY’s List is an elite honor;

only 25 of the 116 female Democratic women running for Congress in 2000 received a

bundled contribution of over $200 from an ELIST member (Table 6-1). Furthermore,

from 2000 to 2004 the number of candidates receiving ELIST bundled funds decreased

from 25 to 19 and the types of candidates receiving bundled funds shifted slightly,

although the amount of bundled money continued to increase.

The funding of incumbents increased from 4 in 2000 to 5 in 2002 and remained

there in 2004, though incumbents share of bundled receipts ($200 or more) increased

from 6.9 percent in 2000 to 41 percent in 2004. The number of challengers receiving

bundled money decreased slightly, from 10 in 2000 to 6 in 2004 and their share of

bundled receipts declined from 47.4 percent in 2000 to 11 percent in 2004. The number of open seat candidates receiving bundled money from EMILY’s List also declined slightly, from 11 in 2000 to 8 in 2004, however, their share of bundled receipts remained relatively steady.

It is important to note that these declines are in the sheer number of candidates obtaining bundled contributions of $200 or more and does not mean that the organization shifted away from supporting challengers and toward incumbents in the period. Data speaking to that issue is provided in a later section. The data above, however, are suggestive insofar as bundled money comes from EMILY’s List donors. Is the increase in the percentage of bundled money to incumbents reflective of member preferences?

Perhaps members have a ‘favorite’ female candidate who they support regardless of seat

status. Alternatively, it could be reflective of members taking cues from the organization.

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For example, in early March 2007, EMILY’s List announced the first round of ‘endorsed’

congressional candidates for the 2008 election cycle: Kirsten Gillibrand (NY-20),

Gabrielle Giffords (AZ-8), Carol Shea-Porter (NH-1). All of these women are

incumbents in extremely competitive districts.

Examining the races where a candidate received bundled funds from EMILY’s List during the period it is clear that competition plays a factor either in EMILY’s List’s decision to recommend the candidates or in members’ decisions about which candidates to send bundled money. On average, forty-eight percent of the races in which EMILY’s

List provided a candidate with bundled money occurred in competitive districts where

Gore or Kerry received between 45 and 55 percent of the vote. More House candidates receive ELIST bundled money than Senate candidates. EMILY’s List bundled to more candidates from bigger states like California and Florida, followed by Illinois, Minnesota,

New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Five of these states provide EMILY’s List with 35.2 percent of its membership (refer back to Table 5-3).

Through its bundling program EMILY’s List provides candidates with a significant

amount of money, and it has a good track record for bundling to winners: an average of

62 percent of the candidates who received bundled money from EMILY’s List between

2000 and 2004 won in the general election.2 However, EMILY’s List’s bundling behavior

is only part of what it does for candidates. In particular, we can look at the amount of

overall spending that combines bundling and organizational funding to get a clearer sense

2 Bundled amounts only refer to contributions of $200 or more because availability of data. The Democratic percent of the district comes from the vote tally for the Democratic presidential candidate in that district in the last election according to the Almanac of American Politics. CQ Press and Roll Call rate congressional races on a 7 point scale from safe Democratic to safe Republican.

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of the ways in which EMILY’s List is distributing its support, in terms of funds, across

women.

The Changing Distribution of EMILY’s List Funds

Data from the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP) indicate that

between 2000 and 2004 the number of Democratic women running for federal office

steadily increased. Yet organizational reports filed with the Federal Election

Commission during this period indicate that the number of federal candidates receiving support from EMILY’s List declined (Table 6-2).3

Fewer female Democratic candidates received EMILY’s List support in 2004

compared to 2000 or 2002. Examining EMILY’s List endorsement by seat status and

chamber (Table 6-3) it is clear that the decline is taking place in the House, not the

Senate. In the House, the decline occurs at all three levels, although there is some

variation. Here the number of incumbent candidates supported declines from 11 in 2000

to 9 in 2002 and 2 in 2004. The number of challengers supported declines from 12 in

2000 to 6 in 2002 and 5 in 2000 as the number of open seat candidates supported declines

from 12 in 2000 to 4 in 2004. Again it is important to note that these declines are in sheer

numbers.

In the House then there is a reduction in the number of candidates EMILY’s List

supported between 2000 and 2004 and a steady amount of support for female Democratic

Senate candidates. I will return to the types of candidates EMILY’s List supports in a

moment, but given EMILY’s List’s reputation for giving ‘early’ money, let us first look

at the organization’s behavior in primary campaigns.

3 In this estimate, I collapse bundled and organizational funds and thus the number here differs from the number in Table 6-1. Endorsement is defined here as a hard money contribution, in-kind contribution, independent expenditure, or bundled money.

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Primary Candidates

Although not officially stated, it is a popular belief that EMILY’S List has a policy of not getting involved in primaries where two or more female pro-choice Democratic women are running against each other. Data on EMILY’s List endorsement of candidates engaged in woman-to-woman races in a Democratic primary confirm this belief.

EMILY’s List did not endorse a single woman in any of the thirty-one primary races involving two female Democratic women between 2000 and 2004, though after the primary they became involved in several of these campaigns (3 in 2000 and 5 in 2002).

It is logical that a strategic organization seeking to maximize its success and influence would shy away from primaries with two or more female Democratic candidates given the organization’s mission. In some sense they do not care which woman wins. In other primary situations, however, where there is only one female

Democratic woman running we expect to see a higher amount of EMILY’s List activity, especially given that the organization is known for giving ‘early’ money.

Table 6-4 shows the number of candidates EMILY’s List supported through direct

or in-kind contributions from the organization before the primary. These data fly in the

face of previous scholarly discussions of ELIST that emphasize the organization’s role in

giving candidates early money, i.e., money before the primary, and vetting candidates for the Democratic Party (Biersack et al. 1993).4 While the organization did give ‘early’ money to a few candidates, the number dwindled in 2002 and 2004. Furthermore, the

Party endorsed the candidate first in 50 of 66 races in which both entities gave the candidate money. Two scenarios are possible: ELIST fully embraced the model of a

4 A large caveat here is that ‘early’ money could be coming from the organization in the form of bundled contributions from members to the candidate, not money from the organization itself.

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traditional PAC in recent years or after two decades of ELIST tutelage, the Democratic

Party realizes it needs to give female Democratic candidates monetary support. It seems

more probable that the latter is the case given that EMILY’s List endorsed 17 candidates

during the period that did not receive any support from the Party.

Perhaps instead of ELIST getting more risk averse the Democratic Party has learned and adjusted their support for candidates so that they are more aware of the contours of the candidate pool. Or perhaps the decrease in the number of primary candidates EMILY’s List supported reflects a better pool of female Democratic candidates that do not need ELIST help as much to be taken seriously. Looking at the primary outcomes for candidates the latter seems possible; 79 percent of female

Democratic candidates won their primary without ELIST support. However, if we examine just those running as challengers and open-seat candidates the percentage of primary winners not endorsed by ELIST lowers to an average of 54 percent, a stark contrast to 75 percent of ELIST challengers or open-seat candidates who become primary winners. Given that success, what would lead the organization to decrease the number of challengers and open-seat candidates it endorsed? Is EMILY’s List becoming more of a traditional PAC in terms of its candidate behavior?

Tools in EMILY’s List’s Toolbox

The increasing number of female Democratic incumbents and a decrease in the number of challengers supported by the organization over the period suggests that it may well be on that path; however, an examination of the types and amount of support each kind of candidate receives paints a different story.

Although the sheer number of challengers supported by the organization decreased from 2000 to 2004 and the number of incumbents increased, data from

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Table 6-5 suggests that the organization is still firmly committed to support challenger

and open-seat candidates, albeit fewer of them. Whereas in 2000 challengers and open

seat candidates received an average of $4,605 and $3,856 respectively from the

organization in direct contributions, in 2004 the average direct contribution increased to

an average of $5,713 and $4,980 to fewer candidates. And while the organization is

using its resources to support incumbents—it spent $15,118 in in-kind contributions to

one incumbent in 2004—that candidate, Stephanie Herseth, faced an extremely

competitive election.

Incumbents like Herseth can face extremely competitive elections that necessitate

large amounts of money and EMILY’s List is a logical place to go for support. Still

research suggests that EMILY’s List money would not be as necessary to incumbent

candidates as it would to challenger or open-seat candidates because incumbents have

access to “traditional” sources of funds (Burrell 1998; Fredrickson 2004). On the other

hand, if we think of EMILY’s List mission and strategy as one in flux (due to Malcolm’s

willingness to learn and adapt), one can imagine other explanations.

First, organizational leaders want the candidates, especially incumbents, to have a

connection to the organization; elected candidates serve as patrons helping the organization retain relevance. Second, as the organization reacts to the political environment, i.e., the Democratic push to acquire majority control in the House and/or

Senate, incumbent seats become every bit as important as a challenger or open seat races.

It may be the case that support from EMILY’s List may help incumbents ward off challengers and to encourage other organizations to support the candidate.

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Third, it is possible that while more female Democratic women are running for office, fewer of these women are quality candidates. Unfortunately, very little data on female candidates who have not made it into federal office exists. While it would be possible to see how many of these candidates had served in a state legislature or held state office before, acquiring these data is beyond the scope of this project, but certainly should be on the agenda for future research. We do know, however, from research on candidates that a quality candidate is one with “attractiveness and political skill” which includes attributes such as education, prior legislative experience, personal appearance, etc. (Krasno 1988, 920). Is seems improbable, however, that the quality of female candidates running for office has declined in recent years considering all the work that

EMILY’s List and others have been doing at the state level to build a pipeline of women ready to run.

EMILY’s List in the States

In 1992 EMILY’s List expanded, starting a series of new projects aimed at transforming itself into a full service organization for candidates. In the early years of the twenty-first century the organization entered another stage of rejuvenation and expansion through its adoption of Campaign Corps, the creation of the POP program, and the formation of its 527. All of these changes are the result of Malcolm’s recognition of a need or an opportunity. When female Democratic pro-choice candidates needed trained

staff, Malcolm offered candidate and staff training. When the organization needed

another way to diversify and maximize its impact, Malcolm formed the 527. When the

number of female Democratic women in state legislatures dropped in 2000, EMILY’s

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List created the Political Opportunity Program (POP).5 Through POP the organization made a concentrated effort to broaden its support network and build up the number of women running for office across states.

Yet data from the FEC records indicate that between 2000 and 2004, as the number of candidates EMILY’s List supported declined, the organization in fact diversified where it supported candidates (Figures 6-1, Figure 6-2, and Figure 6-3). In

2000 the organization supported (through bundled and other contributions) congressional candidates in 22 states. In 2002, that number increased to 25 states, but declined again in

2004 to 20 states. Obviously, external factors that also affect EMILY’s List decision- making regarding endorsement, particularly the number of female Democratic candidates running in any one state in a cycle, but it is critically important to note that EMILY’s List is not just supporting candidates in the Northeast or the Beltway, or even just in

California. Rather it is supporting female Democratic candidates all over the country mimicking its diverse membership.

Unfortunately, further exploration of EMILY’s List activity on the state level requires data that is difficult to obtain. But the important point is that appears to be a decline in the sheer number of candidates the organization could in fact be simply a strategic redeployment of resources toward state level work.

Finally, it may be the case that EMILY’s List has outsourced itself, shifting from providing most of its endorsed candidates not with seed money, but rather providing them with the ‘cache’ of being an EMILY’s List candidate. In this case, it would be the organization’s position as a reference group that matters to viable candidates and not the

5 http://www.emilyslist.org/do/pop/index.html

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money. There is some anecdotal evidence to support this argument. In an interview

about the organization’s role in her election one congresswoman stated that in order to

obtain an EMILY’s List endorsement, the organization told her she had to raise $250,000

before they would give her (bundled or direct) a penny. She said, “At that point—the point that I raised that much money and had won the primary—I didn’t need EMILY’s

List’s help.”6 The organization did end up endorsing her and bundling money to her, but she did not see that money as critical to her election given her real hurdle occurred in the primary.

It seems likely that there are a variety of factors at work which affects EMILY’s

List endorsement rates. Without more information about each individual candidate (such as age, education, previous political experience, race, current occupation, income, etc.) it is impossible to create a fully specified model to explain the factors that predict EMILY’s

List endorsement. We can, however, attempt to further our understanding of the organization’s endorsement activity via an election or district-centered approach.

Although any findings made will not be definitive, these empirical tests are a significant step forward in understanding a critical component of an organization’s decision-making process—an organization that is changing the composition and character of US Congress.

Modeling EMILY’s List Support

As I turn to develop explanatory models that account for the ways in which

EMILY’s List supports candidates for the U. S. Congress, I concentrate on two concerns.

The first is to determine the factors that explain why EMILY’s List chose to endorse

women Democratic candidates for the Congress—across primary and general elections

races—by contributing at least a minimal amount of money (whether bundled, unbundled

6 Interview with female member of Congress. October 31, 2005. Requested anonymity.

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or both) to their campaign. Which Democratic women attract support from EMILY’s

List? The second concern is to determine the factors that explain why EMILY’s List chose to contribute large amounts of money (whether bundled, unbundled or both) to some Democratic women in primary and/or general election campaigns, versus giving them little or no money. Which Democratic women attract extensive financial support from EMILY’s List? In addressing these questions I focus on the congressional elections analyzed thus far in this chapter: 2000, 2002, and 2004.

Data and Method

These data come from a variety of sources. The list of candidates came from the

Center on American Women and Politics (CAWP) and the Center for Responsive

Politics. Data on the district or state including presidential vote patterns (percent who supported the Democratic candidate in each election) and the final election results (vote percentage) come from several volumes of the Almanac of American Politics. Ratings of competitiveness came from ratings from CQ Politics. Data pertaining to the total amount raised by candidates, first and second quarter funds and all the data pertaining to

EMILY’s List activity on behalf of candidates came from records of the Federal Election

Commission.

In analyzing this data, I use logistic analysis to ascertain why EMILY’s List supports some women but not others, since the dependent variable (to support or not support) is categorical in nature. I use OLS regression analysis to ascertain why the organization distributes large sums of PAC money to some women and less amounts or none to others.

In both sets of analyses, I focus on five dependent variables. As noted earlier, there is considerable belief among analysts that EMILY’s List supports only ‘serious’ women

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candidates who have raised some considerable amount of money and thereby

demonstrated a base-level viability to their campaign. To capture this issue I look at the amount of money women candidates reported having available in the first quarter of the election year. A second dependent variable is the incumbent or non-incumbent status of women, designed to see whether EMILY’s List is concentrating only on those running for reelection, who may be patrons and also may help protect the existing group of women in the Congress, or whether they are looking to non-incumbents who could help build the base of women in Congress. Alternately it could use a mixed strategy, supporting both incumbents and nonincumbents with no apparent preference.

A third dependent variable is the competitiveness of the race, which seeks to determine if ELIST is focused on helping women win in close races, as an aggressive and concentrated way to solidify and increase women’s presence in Congress, or is perhaps supporting women in noncompetitive races. To gauge competitiveness I use two different measures. First, I utilize the competitive ratings of congressional races by CQ Politics; second, I look at the what percent of the vote the Democratic presidential candidate received in the last election with those drawing 55 percent or less considered to be in a more competitive or less safe district for Democrats.

Finally, I look at whether or not ELIST is more concerned with supporting candidates in the House, the Senate, or a mixture of the two. In the effort to use its money to increase women in Congress, support for House candidates makes sense, since it costs less for candidates to have a chance to win in House races. On the other hand, adding

Democratic women to the Senate in some ways is more desirable, since the supermajoritarian 60-vote nature of Senate policy-making gives women more potential

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leverage there. In addition, adding women to the Senate through the use of EMILY List contributions aids the sense of visibility and power of EMILY’s List more than does helping to win House seats.

With these data and concerns, let us now turn to determine the factors that shape

EMILY’s List decisions to support women, looking first at why it decides to endorse women by giving them at least some minimal financial support.

Who Does EMILY’s List Endorse?

For each cycle, I perform a logistic regression on data from the universe of female

Democratic candidates running in that year. The variables and the ways in which I set them up for the logistic analysis are as follows:

Dependent variable: EMILY’s List monetary support for the candidate, either bundled or another type (1=ELIST support, 0=no ELIST support)

Independent variables: • Dummy variable for seat status (Incumbent = 1, other=0) • First quarter funds (in dollars): (1=0–$64; 2=$65–$5,320 3=$5,321–$35,249; 4=$35,250–$74,914; 5=$74,915–$194,123; 6=$194,124 and above)

• Roll Call rating for the race (1=tossup or lean Democrat or lean Republican; 0=all others)

• Democratic Vote for President in Presidential Election (percentage) • Dummy variable for chamber (1=House, 0=Senate)

Table 6-6 presents the results for a logit analysis determining the factors that best explain why ELIST endorses some women Democratic candidates and not others.

The positive significant relationship between first quarter receipts and EMILY’s

List support in 2000 indicates that candidates with higher amounts of money had a greater likelihood of receiving support from the organization. It is also noteworthy that

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no other variable in the model is significant.7 In 2002, first quarter receipts are again

significant. In 2004, however, two variables are significant: first quarter receipts and

chamber. This suggest that in 2004, female Democratic candidates with higher first

quarter receipts and those running in Senate races were more likely to receive some type

of EMILY’s List support.8

Here we see EMILY’s List following a mixed strategy. In 2000 and 2002 it appears as if female Democratic women who showed the organization they could raise money were likely to get an endorsement from the organization. In 2004, however, chamber and the ability to raise money again take center stage, reinforcing several possible explanations posed earlier for EMILY’s List endorsement behavior. First, 2004 illustrates EMILY’s List’s participation in the power game insofar as they supported a few highly visible women. Second, scholars have pointed to the crushing defeat the

Democrats suffered in 2002 (Dodd and Oppenheimer 2005). In response, the Democrats looked at the 2004 congressional elections not as an opportunity to gain seats but as a situation where they needed to hold on to the seats they had, particularly in the Senate where obtaining a clear 60 vote majority would mean complete Republican dominance.

In this way, the significance of the chamber in the above model reinforces EMILY’s

List’s recognition of the larger political game being played: while its goal is to get women elected, it is also to protect the progress they have made.

7 p is greater than .147 for all the other predictors.

8 I ran a pooled regression (Table 6-7) using the same dependent and independent variables, first using 2000 as a reference category. The results were similar to that of the regular logistic regression presented in Table 6-6. I also ran the pooled logistic regression with 2002 as a reference category (to see if ELIST followed a different endorsement strategy during midterm elections); the results were similar.

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Who Gets More Dough?

EMILY’s List decision to support or not support a female Democratic

congressional candidate is only part of the story. The other part is how much support the

organization provides candidates. It is possible that one set of considerations dominates

the decision to endorse women candidates, possibly following a mixed and idiosyncratic

set of decision rules, while another set of considerations dominate the decision to give

some Democratic women large amounts of money and other women little or no money.

To determine whether the organization approaches its decisions about how much money

to give candidates in a different manner from its decision to endorse candidates, I have

performed a series of linear regressions on the level of EMILY’s List contributions to all

female Democratic congressional candidates between 2000 and 2004. The variables in

these regression analyses are listed below:

Dependent variable: Total amount of EMILY’s List funding (in dollars).

Independent variables: • Dummy variable for seat status (1=Incumbent, 0=other) • First quarter funds (in dollars): (1=0–$64; 2=$65–$5,320 3=$5,321– $35,249; 4=$35,250–$74,914; 5=$74,915–$194,123; 6=$194,124 and above)

• Roll call Rating (1=tossup or lean Democratic or lean Republican; 0=other) • Democratic Vote for President in Presidential Election (percentage) • Dummy variable for chamber (1=House, 0=Senate)

The results presented in Table 6-8 provide considerable insight into how the organization spread its resources among Democratic candidates for Congress during the years under study. In all three years there is a significant relationship between the amount of first quarter receipts women had on hand and the amount of money ELIST gave them: the more money women had, and thus assumedly the more serious their

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campaign was, the more money ELIST gave (within federal limits). Likewise, in all three years, the competitiveness of races played a significant role in understanding ELIST contributions: the more competitive the race, the more money the organization gave women candidates. In 2002, nonincumbents received significantly more support from the organization than incumbents; however, in 2000 and 2004 the organization used a mixed- strategy of supporting both types of candidates. Finally, as with the findings on endorsements, chamber mattered only in 2004, when ELIST showed some preference for extensive funding of Senate women candidates.

Conclusion

Together with other data presented throughout this chapter, these results demonstrate the Malcolm has crafted EMILY’s List into a distinctive PAC. As women have gained legitimacy as candidates for Congress, and as the number of women in

Congress has increased substantially, the organization appears to be moving away from general support for women candidates and towards strategies that would increase the actual number of women Democrats in Congress. While it continues to endorse a number of women and give some funds to these women irrespective of their competitiveness or incumbency status, it is increasingly using the bulk of its funds in a more focused and concentrated manner, focusing on a small number of women in competitive races, particularly in the Senate. In so doing, EMILY’s List appears to be focused on trying to make a critical difference in a few races in order to both increase the number of women in Congress and help increase the margin of Democratic seats in the House and particularly in the Senate.

In sum, EMILY’s List appears to have responded in some dramatic ways to changes in its environment and in its own effectiveness over the past decade or so. When

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few women were in Congress and the real issue was building a broad base of women candidates to compete for office, EMILY’s List endorsed a large number of women, spread its money widely and did so with aggressively to push women as a group forward.

But as women have increasingly gained seats in Congress, and as incumbent women have many sources to draw on for campaign funds, the organization has changed its strategy.

In part, as discussed earlier, the organization is focusing on supporting candidates in state and local level races. But it has also changed the nature of its congressional strategy.

Particularly in light of the close margins between Democrats and Republicans in

Congress, and the particular value of additional women in the Senate, EMILY’s List has focused on trying to distribute major funds to a small number of women in competitive races where victory could both increase the number of women on the Hill and affect congressional control.

In the process, EMILY’s List has evolved in ways quite different from traditional

PACS in a way that highlights the fact that, while being a PAC, it is much more than a

PAC. It is a women’s influence organization seeking to increase women’s actual influence on the Hill by increasing the number of Democratic women elected to Congress and increasing the chance that such women will have access to power by being members of the majority party. Whereas traditional PACs tend to increasingly focus on giving to safe incumbents, as a way to gain access to patrons, ELIST has increasingly focused its attention and resources in a way that will position women as a group to have access to power in Congress.

Today, to receive EMILY’s List support a woman must be Democratic, pro- choice, and serious about running. But to receive extensive funds these women must

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generally be nonincumbents in competitive races whose election can make a real difference in the power of women on Capitol Hill. This strategy is a reasonable and realistic one precisely because EMILY’s List and other women’s organizations proved so successful in the 1980s and 1990s in fostering women Democratic candidates for

Congress and aiding them in winning seats, so that Democratic women would increasingly be attain power in Congress. This focused strategy is a testament to

Malcolm’s capacity to learn, change, and take EMILY’s List with her. While the data are still out, the Democrat’s success in the 2006 elections, and particularly the election of a female Democratic Speaker, may in fact be the ultimate proof of the effectiveness of the strategy Malcolm and ELIST embraced in the early to mid-2000s as they continued to push for expanded women’s influence on the Hill. Longitudinal analysis going back to

1986 and forward to 2006 is a next step in this research project.

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Table 6-1. Bundled Money from EMILY’s List to Candidates, 2000–2004 2000 2002 2004

# Supported $ Given $ Supported $ Given # Supported $ Given Incumbent 4 $167,655 5 $792,640 5 $1,728,219 Challenger 10 $1,133,950 8 $366,274 6 $463,675 Open Seat 11 $1,090,250 11 $994,920 8 $2,053,646 Total 25 $2,391,855 24 $2,153,834 19 $4,245,940

Table 6-2. Number of Federal Candidates EMILY’s List Supported (bundled and other), 2000–2004 2000 2002 2004 No 78 95 118 Yes 38 29 19 Total 116 124 137

Table 6-3. EMILY’s List Endorsements by Chamber and Seat Status, 2000–2004 2000 I C O Total US. REP 11 12 12 35 US. SEN 0 3 0 3 Total 11 15 12 38

2002 I C O US. REP 9 6 9 24 US. SEN 1 3 1 5 Total 10 9 10 29

2004 I C O Total US. REP 2 5 5 12 US. SEN 3 1 3 7 Total 3 6 6 19

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Table 6-4. EMILY’s List Contributions to Candidates in the Primary (not bundled), 2000–2004 Total ELIST Total Number Supported in of Fem Dems % ELIST Year Seat Status Primary in Primary Supported I C O 2000 1 8 10 19 116 16.4% 2002 8 4 7 19 124 15.3% 2004 3 2 4 9 137 6.6%

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Table 6-5. Average ELIST Contribution to Candidate by Type and Seat Status, 2000–20041 Average Bundled Contribution ($200 or more) to Candidates, 2000–2004 Avg. Open Average All Avg. Incumbent Avg. Challenger Seat $99,661 $55,885 $113,395 $99,113 2000 (n=24) (n=3) (n=10) (n=11) $93,645 $158,528 $52,325 $90,447 2002 (n=23) (n=5) (n=7) (n=11) $223,450 $345,644 $77,279 $256,706 2004 (n=19) (n=5) (n=6) (n=8)

Average In-Kind Contribution to Candidates, 2000–2004 Avg. All Avg. Incumbent Avg. Challenger Avg. Open $5,019 $– $4,127 $5,588 2000 (n=18) (n=0) (n=7) (n=11) $3,357 $3,706 $2,194 $3,607 2002 (n=15) (n=5) (n=3) (n=7) $5,974 $15,118 $4,014 $5,312 2004 (n=9) (n=1) (n=3) (n=5)

Average Direct Contribution to Candidates, 2000–2004 Avg. All Avg. Incumbent Avg. Challenger Avg. Open $4,457 $4,636 $4,605 $3,856 2000 (n=33) (n=11) (n=15) (n=7) $6,364 $4,786 $7,014 $7,230 2002 (n=22) (n=7) (n=9) (n=6) $5,270 $5,069 $5,713 $4,980 2004 (n=11) (n=3) (n=4) (n=4)

Average Independent Expenditure to Candidates, 2000–2004* Avg. Open $13,776 2000 (n=2) 2002 $- $107,665 2004 (n=2) *Emily’s List only conducted independent spending for open seat candidates.

1 It is important to note that not every candidate will receive each type of support. Thus the numbers in these tables do not aggregate to the totals in the prior tables.

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T J V A IA IL H N RI X AK AR C C GA KS LA ME MN MT N N OH OR SD T VA WA WV

Figures 6-1. State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2000

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J R A IA IL A N H V H R RI A AK A C CT GA KS L ME M MT N N N O O SD TX V WA WV

Candidates Running ELIST Supported

Figures 6-2. State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2002

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K R A A IA IL A N NJ H R RI D X A V A A C CT G KS L ME M MT NH NV O O S T VA W W Figures 6-3. State and Number of Female Democratic Candidates for Federal Office, 2004

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Table 6-6. Logit of all Female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004 2000 2002 2004 Incumbent .267 -.322 -.618 .593 (.545) .630 First Quarter .753*** .353** .710*** .180 (.149) .177 Roll Call Score 1.353 .536 -2.826

.933 (.694) 1.558 Democratic Vote for President .014 .001 .000 .021 (.020) .018 Chamber .469 -.053 -1.586*** .991 (.7) .747

N 116 124 137 ***p=.000; **p<.01; *p<.05

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Table 6-7. Pooled Logistic Regression of all female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004 Incumbent -.761** -.761** (.342) (.342) First Quarter .547*** .547*** (.077) (.077) Roll Call Score 0.199 0.199 (.478) (.478) Democratic Vote for President .007 .007 (.011) (.011) Chamber -.752 -.752 (.423) 2000 Election -.331 (.308) 2002 Election .331 (.308) 2004 Election -.207 -.548 (.305) (.298)

***p=.000; **p<.01; *p<.05

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Table 6-8. Linear Regression of all female Democratic Candidates for U.S. Congress, 2000–2004 2000 2002 2004 Incumbent -.081 -.263*** -.001 (10721) (8865) (22402.7) First Quarter .343*** .848*** .418*** (.013) (.026) (.008) Roll Call Score .387 *** .147** .176** (15366.3) (12078) (39281.1) Democratic Vote for President .027 .109 .018 (377.7) (327.2) (705) Chamber -.140 .057 -.327*** (16105) (12263.2) (30404.7) N 116 124 137 Adjusted R Square .44 .73 .39 Note: Coefficients are standardized ***p=.000; **p<.01; *p<.05

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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

On January 20, 2007, EMILY’s List announced its endorsement of Senator

Hillary Rodham Clinton for President of the United States. Just two months prior the

organization rejoiced as the Democrats took control of Congress and the Democratic

caucus elected the first female Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi. In the Senate,

Senator Barbara Boxer became chair of the Environment and Public Works Committee;

Senator Dianne Feinstein became chair of the Rules and Administration Committee; and

four (4) Democratic women became chair of House committees.1 One of the top

Democratic women, Rosa DeLauro (CT-3), served as the first Executive Director of

EMILY’s List. All of these women, with the exception of Pelosi, have received some

type of support from EMILY’s List.2

Yet even though its impact is apparent, little systematic research has been done on

the organization. The goal of this project is to understand the organization’s many facets

and impacts by examining its roots in the women’s movement, its place within the world

of campaign finance, its relationship with the Democratic Party, its impact on the

mobilization and participation of the mass public, and its efforts to get women into office.

In exploring EMILY’s List in these ways, I made a series of important findings.

One of the earliest questions asked in this project was to what extent is EMILY’s

List simply a very successful women’s PAC, and to what extent is it something more? In

1 www.senate.gov and www.house.gov. Juanita Millender McDonald chairs the House Administration committee; Louise Slaughter chairs the Rules Committee; Nydia Velasquez chairs the House Small Business Committee; and Stephanie Tubbs Jones chairs the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct.

2 As discussed in Chapter 6, while all of these women may have received some level of support/endorsement from EMILY’s List; that is not to say that the organization played an equally important role in all of the campaigns.

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comparing the organization to other women’s PACs, it quickly became apparent that

EMILY’s List is much different than NOW/PAC, NWPC or WCF. While there are similarities between EMILY’s List and the other women’s PACs, by 1992 its influence and impact quickly superseded the others. Little is gained by looking at the organization as a women’s PAC in 1992 and beyond; much more can be learned by comparing its structure, behavior, and influence to more traditional PACs like those of labor interests.

As detailed in Chapter 4, Malcolm learned much from watching labor and other

PACs navigate the waters of the PAC world and negotiate the political and legal juggernaut that is campaign finance. Perhaps the most important thing she learned was the importance of making EMILY’s List into a reference group for its members. Souraf claims that labor’s ability to become a symbol and a shortcut for its members helps explain its longevity and power (1992). However, EMILY’s List’s successes cannot be understood solely as the result of Malcolm’s political learning and adaptation. Evidence provided in Chapter 3 and 4 illustrates that Malcolm used a certain type of identity politics to connect the organization to the women’s movement. In the early years of the organization, the successes and failures of the liberal feminist women’s movement helped fuel donor passions—in 1992 the embers Malcolm fanned burst into flame (helped along by serendipitous events like the retirement of several incumbents and redistricting) and remained burning brightly since.

Critical to the organization’s post 1992 successes is its expansion into new arenas like consultant training, issue advocacy, get-out-the-vote efforts. In fact, the organization bifurcated in 1992. On one hand it has ramped up its efforts to recruit candidates, putting increasingly more money into state-level projects, trainings for

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candidates and staff, etc. On the other hand, the organization reached out in new ways in an effort to expand its membership through issue ads, direct mail, Internet newsletters, an online community and phone banks. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, these efforts paid off handsomely for the organization, boosting the membership from 23,000 in 1992 to

100,000 in 2004.

But not all members are the same nor do they all receive the same benefits. Using records of the Federal Election Commission I examine how many of these ‘members’ are free riders. Of the 100,000 members, only 11 percent give the organization donations of

$200 or more per year, yet this small number provided 40 percent of the organization’s receipts in 2004. Further analysis of these individuals indicated that the organization continues to grow—the majority of these $200+ donors had never given this amount to the organization before and all but a small percentage of these donors gave exclusively to

ELIST during the 2004 election cycle. The latter points to EMILY’s List’s role as a reference group for donors and/or its ability to pull new (largely female) participants into the donor pool. Furthermore, we see that the new donors to EMILY’s List tend to come from slightly different states than repeat donors, a testimony to EMILY’s List’s efforts to expand their impact and membership as it grew from a donor network of 25 to a full- service political organization.

How has EMILY’s List been able to consistently grow when others have wavered? Part of the answer is that Malcolm continues to use identity driven appeals to keep donors cognizant of the need for women in political office and focused on the accomplishments of the women that have made it. Furthermore, the organization adheres to a strict hierarchical structure. While there are divisions within the organization

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(different branches, regional directors of POP, etc) Malcolm has the final word on all

decisions. As discussed in Chapter 4, this allows EMILY’s List much more freedom and

opportunity to adapt to changing political environments while others are constrained by

their organizational structure.

The other part of the explanation regarding EMILY’s List’s unstoppable rise to

power is the candidates it supports. Chapter 6 outlined the choices EMILY’s List made

via candidate endorsement in 2000–2004. While EMILY’s List endorsed candidates do

win their elections at a higher rate than those not endorsed by the organization, it is

difficult to assess how much this is due to ELIST activity and how much is self-selection.

Without accurate measures of how much the organization is spending on GOTV efforts

and direct mail in each district and state it is impossible to fully assess its impact on the

election outcomes. In terms of EMILY’s List’s state-level program it is clear that the

organization is spending huge amounts of receipts to recruit and train women at the

lower-levels.3 In 2004 the organization spent over $8 million in the states; one quarter of

all receipts for that cycle. While not all of these funds are spent on candidates, an

undisclosed portion goes towards get-out-the-vote efforts and direct mail, there is every

indication that the organization realizes the necessity of supporting women at lower

levels and allocates significant resources for that endeavor.

The models included in Chapter 6 suggest that even as EMILY’s List has become

more professional and evolved into a women’s influence organization, it remains true to

its original mission of helping pro-choice Democratic women achieve higher office.

However, over the course of twenty years the organization has become more strategic

3 Although we know that EMILY’s List is spending significant amounts of money in the states, these efforts are hard to assess due to the tremendous effort needed to cull data from all the states due to differing disclosure thresholds and data access policies.

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about which pro-choice Democratic women receive support. Unlike organizations such as the Women’s Campaign Fund, which gives a blanket sum to any candidate it endorses,

ELIST allocates money to its candidates depending on a variety of factors; serious female

Democratic candidates running in competitive districts are the most likely recipients of

ELIST support.

It Is All About Women, Stupid!

Is EMILY’s List a women’s PAC? Yes, insofar as it is a PAC created by a woman to support women candidates. As an organization whose mission and message centers around a feminist identity that simultaneously argues for women to have a more equal role in both the public and private sphere and for women to bring their unique perspective to offer society and political life, all the while recognizing the multiplicity of women’s experiences—then it is clearly a women’s PAC. Yet classifying it in such a way places it in a category of other women’s PACs that are not as adaptive, expansive, or strategic as EMILY’s List. While its legal status is that of a PAC, the organization does not fit within the traditional PAC mold either, as it is not a ‘front’ for a few hundred extremely wealthy patrons and founding mothers. In terms of its membership, it resembles a social movement—professional women and men supporting an organization helping women reach their potential. And while the organization’s history and internal administration keep it firmly connected to its PAC roots, the organization clearly wants to be a reference group for members that is constantly adapting and expanding in order for it to maximize on opportunities, the largest opportunity being the electoral arena. It is for these new opportunities (both in terms of campaign finance but also in terms of number of women seeking office) that the organization has placed more emphasis on state level activity in recent years. It is also opportunity that keeps the organization connected to

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congressional races and, as we saw in 2006, the organization has the resources available

to run a strong state and federal program supporting female Democratic pro-choice

candidates.

Thus, EMILY’s List is not just a PAC, an interest group, a movement, a party

adjunct, or a campaign organization—it is all of these things. It is in fact a new type of

organization—a women’s influence organization—comprised of parts from all of these

different types of entities.

The few scholarly works that exist on EMILY’s List cast the organization as a

women’s PAC and using that lens, examine the impact of the organization on making

female candidates competitive or examine the policy implications of ELIST activity.

ELIST has routinely been mentioned by scholars (Burrell 1994; Conway 1991; Witt et al

1994) as playing an integral role in providing pro-choice female candidates with early

money, but ELIST has never played a central role in any of these analyses. Rather

anecdotal evidence of ELIST activity has been marshaled to explicate the barriers female

candidates face and the ways in which those barriers have been reduced in recent

decades. Day and Hadley took their analyses further, arguing that ELIST’s importance

lay in its support of pro-choice female Democratic candidates.

While important, both Day and Hadley’s analyses and other scholarly mentions of

ELIST are missing critical portions of ELIST’s story: the organization is much more than

a PAC. Without understanding ELIST as a women’s influence organization with multiple prongs we cannot hope to understand how what started as a donor network of 25 women evolved into an organization with nationwide membership of 100,000 members.

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EMILY’s List: The PAC

Given its beginning as a women’s PAC, it is not surprising that many still view it

through that lens. However, we miss a great deal by limiting our perspective in this way.

For example, scholars tend to assess the influence of PACs according to how much

money they give to candidates as historically PACs have been viewed as vehicles

organizations use to buy access to candidates. EMILY’s List, however, does not give a

large percentage of their receipts or disbursements to candidates because 1) they are a

non-connected PAC and as such all of their overhead expenses must be paid out of

receipts; 2) bundled money; 3) ELIST does other things which are not typically included

in scholar’s assessments of PAC power. Hence, it is not surprising that PAC scholars

tend to dismiss the organization even though the FEC classifies them as one of the top

PACs.

In many ways EMILY’s List resembles an interest group more than a traditional

PAC. PACs are considered extremely elite entities; donors may write checks but

providing money is their sole interaction with the PAC. In contrast, interest groups are

membership organizations. Leaders typically serve at the pleasure of members;

membership numbers rise and fall depending on the saliency of the issues and other

socio-political factors. Most interest groups are not primarily political organizations, i.e.,

they do not engage in electoral politics.4 Instead, interest groups are organizations with a variety of resources at their disposal and use a variety of strategies to obtain their goals.

4 The vast majority of interest groups are non-profits [501(c)(3)s or (c) 4s) whose primary mission is education or 501 (c)(5)s or 501 (c)(6)s, labor unions and trade associations . If these organizations do engage in political activity, they do so by creating a connected PAC [known as a separate segregated fund (SSF)]. Connected PACs are discussed more in Chapter 3.

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interest groups also use a variety of incentives to keep members engaged, because it is

only insofar as they are ‘representing’ members that an interest group has influence.

ELIST: The Interest Group

In many ways viewing ELIST as an interest group rather than a PAC makes more

sense. As we shall see in Chapter 3, EMILY’s List has a variety of resources—time,

money, members, a talented leader and sophisticated support staff, patrons, etc. It has

also put those varied resources to work, starting at least five new projects in the last

fifteen years. It is the leading voice in encouraging more women to enter politics.5 Its membership has increased from 25 in 1985 to 100,000 in 2005 in part because it offers members a variety of incentives to join. Purposive incentives come from the support the

organization gives to female pro-choice Democratic candidates. Solidary incentives are

obtained through the various meetings and luncheons held by the organization. Material

incentives are missing, though one could argue that by giving to the organization and

networking at luncheons and meetings material benefits could accrue.

Why isn’t ELIST understood as an interest group? The National Rifle

Association (NRA) does all of the above—it also has a PAC (the NRA Victory Fund).

Why then do we understand ELIST as a PAC, not an interest group, but understand NRA

as an interest group and a PAC?

The one thing that interest groups such as the NRA do that EMILY’s List does

not is lobby. Lobbying is a critical component of interest group activity. It is through

lobbying that interest groups provide legislators with information about issues and the

position of group members (and presumably at least a portion of the legislator’s

5 Even though EMILY’s List focus is to get more pro-choice female Democratic women into positions of political power, the founder and president of ELIST, Ellen Malcolm, provided Republican pro-choice women a good deal of help when they began WISH List in 1993.

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constituents) on the issue. In some cases interest groups help legislators draft parts of

legislation or submit amicus curiae briefs to the Court on cases pertaining to their issue

interests. However, EMILY’s List does not engage in these activities. The closest thing

the organization has come to lobbying is Malcolm’s testimony in 1992 in front of the

Committee on House Administration regarding proposals to reform campaign finance.6

They do educate their members about relevant occurrences. When John Roberts and

Samuel Alito were nominated by George W. Bush as Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court

EMILY’s List came out against both nominations, posting information on their website and sending out emails to their members. But this is very different than employing lobbyists to represent them and their members on Capitol Hill—rather this fits better with

ELIST’s status as movement organization (discussed below).

EMILY’s List also differs from interest groups in the strict control leaders maintain over the organization’s activities. Most presidents and officers of interest groups serve at the pleasure of members or a Board of Directors; this is especially true of interest groups that began as social movements. In these cases, the interest group represents the institutionalization of the movement and the interest group often retains the movement’s structure. For example, Barakso (2005) notes that the National Organization of Women

(NOW) holds regular elections for presiding officers. The same holds true for the

National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC) and many other interest groups, though the frequency of their elections and competition for the position differs, dictated in part by the organization’s charter. Scholars have linked these changes in group leadership to changes in group strategy (Barakso 2005; Woods 2001). EMILY’s List, however, has

6 Hearing of Committee on House Administration. May 23, 1991. CIS-No: 92-H421-4.

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been able to evolve and adapt even though one woman has lead the organization for the last twenty-two years. I argue in Chapter 3 that Malcolm’s steady hand at the helm of

EMILY’s List has in fact facilitated the organization’s rise to the top instead of stifling its evolution. This is rare—to have a leader of an entrenched organization who is willing to take risks, putting valuable resources (time, money, personnel) into new projects and new candidates while continuing to meet the needs and goals of the organization’s early members.

ELIST: The Movement

Thus far, I have discussed how ELIST is a PAC, but it is more than a PAC and it is an interest group, but different from other interest groups. ELIST is also a movement, although it is not typically recognized as such. It began as a small group of liberal feminist women, angry at the barriers female candidates faced, who used liberal feminist identity politics to generate interest and support from women and men all over the nation.

Its message, its techniques, its candidates, and its membership are all part of the larger liberal feminist movement of the 1970s. In the early 1990s we see the organization reacting to the debates within the larger movement regarding the different experiences of women of color—in response to that ELIST began to incorporate social feminist concerns, emphasizing the need to reach out to female pro-choice Democratic candidates of different ethnicities and reach out to more women at the mass-level. It is at this point that the organization added its Women Vote! projects through which they focused on mobilizing women across the country to vote. ELIST was so intent on reaching out to a broad base of women and men that Malcolm put aside her pure partisan position and mentored Glenda Greenwald in her quest to for a Republican pro-choice version of

ELIST-The Wish List.

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ELIST’s resolve to only support Democratic candidates has closed the

organization off from certain avenues of influence. For example, ELIST cannot

participate in the Council of Women’s Organization because of the organization’s

partisan position. Thus, EMILY’s List has no ‘say’ in crafting the mission or goals of the

larger current-day feminist women’s movement. However, this ‘limitation’ keeps the

organization from becoming embroiled in struggles with other feminist women’s

organizations and it keeps EMILY’s List from being castigated for being a ‘traditional’

organization, i.e., focused on the concerns and experiences of middle-class white women

even though the organization’s mission is firmly rooted in these traditional liberal feminist ideals. Instead EMILY’s List can remained focused on getting women into public office and these other organizations focus on making sure the women, once there, represent the movement’s interest.

ELIST: The Campaign Organization

The fourth component of ELIST’s amalgam is its function as a campaign organization. In some ways, this is what EMILY’s List is best at—providing female pro- choice candidates with a full-service support network. Although EMILY’s List did not start this way, by the 2000s EMILY’s List provided candidates with personal training, campaign staff, polling, direct mail, advertising (general issue ads and express advocacy) and phone banks in addition to the direct (hard money) contributions provided to

candidates it endorses. These are resources and services that most candidates could not

otherwise afford, especially those candidates at the state and local level. Here EMILY’s

List has helped hundreds of hundreds of female Democratic pro-choice women become

members of state government and in some cases the entrance of these women have

helped the Democrats win or retain control of the state legislature.

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ELIST: The Party Adjunct

Unlike other PACs, interest groups and women’s organizations, EMILY’S List

has always focused its attention on the Democratic Party. While others took a bipartisan

approach, seeking access and support from legislators on both sides of the aisle or giving

money to all female candidates regardless of political party, Malcolm believed that the best chance for women lay with the Democratic Party.7 To make ELIST a power-player

Malcolm cultivated a relationship with the Party; by 1992, her status as a Democratic insider solidified. Malcolm’s rationale for becoming a Democratic Party adjunct is clear, but why would the Party find this appealing? First, by the early 1990s EMILY’s List was a premier bundler and Malcolm became known as someone who could deliver the money.

Democrats needed money to beat the GOP and Malcolm had access to donors and tools of the PAC at her disposal. Second, the Party knew it needed women voters and as ELIST evolved into a reference group, it potentially had the ability to deliver money and votes.

Furthermore, insofar as other women’s organizations were bipartisan EMILY’s List

became more valuable to the Democrats. Not only did Malcolm begin to evaluate female

candidates for the Democratic Party, but EMILY’s List also began transferring money to

the national and state Democratic Party organizations, increasingly engaging in get-out-

the-vote (GOTV) efforts, and generally doing things for the Party that needed to be done.

In classifying EMILY’s List as a PAC scholars have missed recognizing the new type

organizational form—a women’s influence organization—crafted by Malcolm. While

legally a PAC, ELIST is in fact a composite of a PAC, an interest group, a movement, a

7 I wonder how much of this is due to her Democratic connections with the Carter administration, how much was her observance of the position and treatment of women in the parties, how much was position- driven-with the New Right staking claim to the GOP in the early 1980s, Reagan coming out against the ERA, etc.

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party adjunct, and a campaign organization. All of these components are critical and relevant to understanding the breath of ELIST activity and its impact and none of them alone are determinative of that activity or impact. Hence ELIST cannot be understood by focusing on the organization’s PAC activity or its activities supporting the Democratic

Party, but must be understood using multiple lenses, that of a PAC, an interest group, a movement, a campaign organization, and a party adjunct. Only then can we appreciate the story of EMILY’s List as a story of strategic decision-making, persistence, and power. And only then can we understand how a powerful entrepreneur and like-minded liberal feminist women crafted a new type of political organization—a women’s influence organization—with the power to help elect the first female President of the

United States.

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APPENDIX A CODING GUIDE FOR NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS

1. Paper: 1=The Hill; 2=Roll Call; 3=NYT; 4=Wash Post; 5=LA Times; 6=other 2. If ‘other’ paper, list name here 3. Title 4. Date (mm.dd.yyyy) 5. Type of mention: 0=endorsement; 1=substantive; 2=organization news; quote by organization=3; organization as comparative example=4; reference to ELIST=5; miscellaneous=6 6. If endorse, candidate name? 7. If endorsement, does it mention pro-choice/abortion? Y=1; N=0 8. If endorsement does it mention how much money the organization gave candidate? Y=1; N=0 9. If Yes to 7 then amount ($000,000) 10. If substantive, is just ELIST mentioned? Y=1; N=0 11. If substantive, article topic (according to title/first paragraph): 1=campaign finance; 2=electing women; 3=org. news; 4=abortion 12. Is the article positive (1), negative (0), or neutral (2) 13. If organization news, what activity/section mentioned? 14. If example, what organization mentioned?

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APPENDIX B RESEARCHING THE LIST

This project uses a multi-method approach, utilizing quantitative FEC data sets,

qualitative analyses of web sites and newspaper articles driven by theories pertaining to PAC behavior, interest group activity and identity politics vis-à-vis movement organizations.

Organizational Data

The organizational part of this study serves as a backbone of the analysis. To study the evolution of the organization, its changing strategy, and the changing socio-political context since its founding in 1985, I relied on both qualitative and quantitative data. First, since very

little research had been done on EMILY’s List, I began this project with an exhaustive

newspaper search for information on Ellen Malcolm, EMILY’s List, Campaign Corps, Women

Vote! and the Political Opportunity Program My search began with articles published in three

major U.S. papers: the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.1 Even more important perhaps, given the organization’s history as an “elite” organization is an examination and analysis of sources commonly read by the political elite such as Roll Call and

The Hill. These papers are two of the most important sources for day-to-day occurrences in

Congress as well as in-depth coverage of congressional elections.

These qualitative data were supplemented by records of the Federal Election Commission

(FEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As a political action committee EMILY’S List must report financial activity to the Federal Election Commission on at monthly basis.2 At year’s end the FEC files a yearly summary report which lists the organization’s receipts, expenditures, transfers to and from the committee to and from other entities (such as candidates,

1 The Los Angeles Times will be used because a smaller “national” EMILY’s List office exists in San Francisco, but the circulation of the Los Angeles Times circulation is greater than that of the San Francisco Chronicle; in addition California hosts the largest delegation of pro-choice Democratic women in Congress. 2 http://images.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/?C00193433.

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the party committees, or other PACs), and the gross amount of non-federal expenditures. Data

on specific types of expenditures, e.g., which candidates received what kind of support, how

much the organization spent on phone banks or polling, direct mail costs, etc., were obtained

through a combination of electronic filings available as .pdf files and detail files available in

database format.

These data are critical to tracing changes in the organization and assessing how the

organization used its resources to begin new projects and continue existing ones. FEC data also provided similar information on the three select women’s PACs (Women’s Campaign Fund, the

National Women’s Political Caucus, and NOW/PAC) as well as information on labor PAC activity and the support/recruitment the Democratic Party provided female candidates. Since

2000, when EMILY’s List formed a 527, they filed yearly reports with the IRS. These 527 files are not as comprehensive because the IRS requires a different level of disclosure, however, these files did provide information on receipts, expenditures, and transfers.

Members

The types of messages members are receiving about EMILY’s List, whether sent by the organization or uncovered in the newspapers, will be important in formulating hypotheses regarding the motivations of the organization’s members. The bulk of the data regarding contributors, however, came from records provided by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

The organization’s monthly report lists all contributions to the organization during that period including the name, city, state, zip, occupation, date and the amount of the contribution. Also available is whether the contribution was earmarked for a specific candidate or general contribution to the organization.

Since one part of the member analysis was to see if donors in 2004 had ever given to the organization before, I obtained FEC detail records for every election cycle from 1986–2004.

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After excising ELIST’s donors in each year and placing them in separate database tables. I then

had to create an aggregate file for each year, collapsing donations from the same individual into

one single donation. With this process complete moved forward with the analysis discussed in

Chapter 5, looking at ELIST’s 2004 donors by sex, occupation, and donation amount. To

categorize ELIST donors as New or Repeat I used Access to link the yearly tables. I then linked

the 2004 ELIST donor file to the full detail file for 2004 in order to see the other contributions

2004 ELISTERs.

Candidates

Data on the candidates endorsed by EMILY’S List came from a variety of sources. First,

the list of female primary and general election candidates for the 2000–2004 election cycle is

based on data from the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers. To determine

which candidates ELIST endorsed I used the data from the FEC (mentioned above) and double-

checked it against the list of candidates EMILY’s List provides. Furthermore many of the

articles obtained through the newspaper searches (mention above) included information about

EMILY’s List candidates.

Armed with a complete list of candidates I then culled data from a variety of sources. The

FEC records of EMILY’s List and the Democratic Party provided information about what kinds

of monetary support (if any) a candidate received. The Center for Responsive Politics provided

data about on how much money the candidate received overall as well as the breakdown of those

funds. CRP also provided information regarding vote totals for the general election; primary

election outcomes were available on the CAWP lists. Three editions of the Almanac of American

Politics (2002, 2004, and 2006 editions) provided information about the district including

Democratic vote for President. Data on the competitiveness of districts in each cycle came from

Roll Call. These data were critical in the modeling section included in Chapter 6. Lastly, two

176

female candidates endorsed by EMILY’s List agreed to interviews and provided a fuller picture

of what it meant to be an EMILY’s List candidate, why that would be desirable, and what types

of support the organization provided. These interviews helped flesh out themes and ideas in both

Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.

Without the intersection of these different types of data, this dissertation would not have taken its current form. Along the way I could have made it into a more quantitatively driven project, focusing on the available data on donors and candidates, however if I had so we would still be ignorant of the new organizational form Malcolm created via EMILY’s List—the women’s influence organization. Instead I came to this project with a theory about how a PAC behaves and a question over why EMILY’s List seemed to be such a powerful organization

(when measured by receipts) but had a very small part in any study of campaign finance and interest group activity. That puzzle has been solved—it is because EMILY’s List is a PAC, but it is something much more than a PAC. It is its position as a women’s influence organization that needs to be recognized as a powerful player in politics.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jamie Pamelia Pimlott graduated Central Florida Community College in August of 1995

with an Associate of Art degree. She went on to receive a Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude,

in history from the University of Florida in December of 2001. Returning immediately to

school, Jamie received a M.A. in American history with a minor in Latin American history and a

minor in political science from the University of Florida in May of 2001. After working briefly

at the Center for Jewish Studies and the University Police Department—Community Services

Division, Jamie returned to school to pursue her Doctorate in political science. While attending

school, she taught history and political science at both Central Florida Community College and

Santa Fe Community College. During her last few semesters of graduate school, she also taught

her own courses in Political Behavior and Congress at the University of Florida.

Jamie currently lives and works in the Washington, D.C. area with her significant other, daughter, and pets. In April of 2007, she accepted a full-time position as a Research Analyst at the Campaign Finance Institute. There she will be working on a state-level donor project and various projects pertaining to the 2008 presidential race. In the fall of 2007, Jamie will be teaching a graduate/undergraduate course on Women and Public Policy at American University.

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