The Whole Duty of Man Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics
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Hugo Grotius's Modern Translation of Aristotle
Digital Commons @ Assumption University Political Science Department Faculty Works Political Science Department 2016 Natural Rights and History: Hugo Grotius's Modern Translation of Aristotle Jeremy Seth Geddert Assumption College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/political-science-faculty Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Political Theory Commons Recommended Citation Geddert, Jeremy Seth. "Natural Rights and History: Hugo Grotius's Modern Translation of Aristotle." Concepts of Nature: Ancient and Modern. Edited by R. J. Snell and Steven F. McGuire. Lexington Books, 2016. Pages 71-90. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital Commons @ Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Natural Rights and History: Hugo Grotius's Modern Translation of Aristotle Jeremy Seth Geddert Cicero writes in de Finibus that "nature never forgets its own primary prop erties." This leads him to inquire, "then how comes it that human nature alone abandons man?"1 If Hugo Grotius were alive today, he might wonder the same thing. Grotius's language of nature remains surprisingly enduring in contemporary discourse. Yet most students of political thought seem to have forgotten the man. This inattention is a notable change from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, during which one contemporary described Gro tius as "the greatest universal scholar since Aristotle."2 Grotius's fame began in 1598, when King Henry IV of France pronounced the fifteen-year-old prodigy as "the miracle of Holland." By his early twenties he became the Pensionary of Rotterdam, and by his early thirties he penned major works of history, literature, political philosophy, and theology. -
The Rights of War and Peace Book I
the rights of war and peace book i natural law and enlightenment classics Knud Haakonssen General Editor Hugo Grotius uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu ii ii ii iinatural law and iienlightenment classics ii ii ii ii ii iiThe Rights of ii iiWar and Peace ii iibook i ii ii iiHugo Grotius ii ii ii iiEdited and with an Introduction by iiRichard Tuck ii iiFrom the edition by Jean Barbeyrac ii ii iiMajor Legal and Political Works of Hugo Grotius ii ii ii ii ii ii iiliberty fund ii iiIndianapolis ii uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word “freedom” (amagi), or “liberty.” It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 b.c. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash. ᭧ 2005 Liberty Fund, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 09 08 07 06 05 c 54321 09 08 07 06 05 p 54321 Frontispiece: Portrait of Hugo de Groot by Michiel van Mierevelt, 1608; oil on panel; collection of Historical Museum Rotterdam, on loan from the Van der Mandele Stichting. Reproduced by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Grotius, Hugo, 1583–1645. [De jure belli ac pacis libri tres. English] The rights of war and peace/Hugo Grotius; edited and with an introduction by Richard Tuck. p. cm.—(Natural law and enlightenment classics) “Major legal and political works of Hugo Grotius”—T.p., v. -
181 Chapter VII a World of Many
181 Chapter VII A World of Many: Giving up the Belief in the Possibility of Universal Rule (1648/59 – 1714) A Description of the “State” of the Holy Roman Empire Slightly less than twenty years after the treaties of Munster and Osnabrück, the jurist and historian Samuel von Pufendorf (1632 – 1694) clad his description of the Holy Roman Empire into a fictitious travel report. He took the role of a Veronese citizen named Severinus de Monzambano, explaining to his alleged brother the oddities of the form of government of the Empire. The choice of Veronese identity had not been random, as the city of Verona the lay on Venetian territory and, from the fourteenth century, Venice had no longer been considered part of the Empire,1 from the turn towards the sixteenth century even as the foe of the Emperor. Pufendorf explained the form of government of the Empire in historical terms, described the processes by which the centre of rule had shifted from the Italian Peninsula to areas north of the Alps and, at the very beginning of his report, made it clear that the Empire was known by the wrong official name. Instead of “Holy Roman Empire”, it should, Pufendorf insisted, be called the “new state of the Germans”, because it had nothing to do with the ancient empire of the Romans. It was a grave mistake, he wrote, to believe that this ancient empire of the Romans had continued to be in existence. Quite on the contrary, the empire, whose capital the city of Rome had once been, had been destroyed. -
Inventing Westphalia
Inventing Westphalia Nicholas Pingitore Senior Thesis Spring, 2020 Advisors: Ethan Shagan and Raphael Murillo Pingitore 1 Introduction The Westphalian Moment, if there ever was one, may quite well have occurred more than 100 years after the signing of the now famous Peace, and in Geneva no less. Writing around 1756, Jean-Jacques Rousseau declared in his treatise, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe that “the Treaty of Westphalia will perhaps forever remain the foundation of our international system.”1 Prevailing social science lore would find no fault with Rousseau’s logic. Examples abound from the last 70 years of various political theories, international histories, university conferences, even modern military alliances, referencing Westphalia.2 Invariably, there are some differences in how these thinkers frame the importance of Westphalia, but the general mold is familiar enough to any sophomore undergraduate enrolled in a course on international relations.3 It goes as follows: The Thirty Years’ War lasted from 1618-1648. This three-decade-long catastrophe was perhaps Europe’s first modern continental war. While the majority of the conflict took place in central Europe, it drew upon every “great power” resulting in an estimated five to eight million deaths. Modern estimates would suggest that such a toll resulted in a 15–20 percent decline in Europe’s population.4 By 1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Translated by C.E. Vaughan, A Lasting Peace Through The Federation of Europe and The State of War, London: Constable and Company Limited, 1917, p. 55. 2 Javier, Solana. “Securing Peace in Europe.” Speech presented at the Symposium on the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, Münster, Germany, November 12, 1998. -
Creation and Authority
Andrew Franklin-Hall Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2012): 255-280 Pre-publication Draft Creation and Authority: The Natural Law Foundations of Locke’s Account of Parental Authority1 Abstract: Despite its prominence in recent work on the ethics of the family, Locke’s child-centered account of parental authority has not received the historically informed analysis which other aspects of his philosophy has received. In this paper, I discuss the relation of Locke’s view to the seventeenth-century debate on paternal power and highlight the fundamental importance of the theological concept of creation to his natural law theory and, in particular, to his account of parental authority. This permits us to correct a common misinterpretation of Locke: that he struggles in vain to avoid the conclusion that parents own their children because they made them. I argue that once the natural law foundations of his position are better understood, Locke’s entire discussion of parental authority turns out to be both more consistent and, in some ways, less modern than has often been assumed. This, in turn, raises question as to what aspects of Locke’s view will have to be altered if we reject his theological assumptions. 1 Abbreviations: DC = Hobbes, De Cive; ECHU = Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding; ELN = Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature; Lev. = Hobbes, Leviathan; LNN = Pufendorf, Of the Laws of Nature and Nations (De Jure Naturae et Gentium); RWP = Grotius, Of the Rights of War and Peace (De jure belli ac pacis); ST = Aquinas, Summa Theologica; STCE = Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education; WDM = Pufendorf, The Whole Duty of Man (De Officio Hominis et Civis); 2T = Locke, Two Treatises of Government. -
Natural Law Vs. Positive Law
Natural Law vs. Positive Law: Natural law or the law of nature (Latin: lex naturalis) has been described as a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore has validity everywhere.[1] As classically used, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature and deduce binding rules of moral behavior. The phrase natural law is opposed to the positive law (meaning "man-made law", not "good law"; cf. posit) of a given political community, society, or nation-state, and thus can function as a standard by which to criticize that law.[2] In natural law jurisprudence, on the other hand, the content of positive law cannot be known without some reference to the natural law (or something like it). Used in this way, natural law can be invoked to criticize decisions about the statutes, but less so to criticize the law itself. Some use natural law synonymously with natural justice or natural right (Latin ius naturale), although most contemporary political and legal theorists separate the two. Although natural law is often conflated with common law, the two are distinct in that natural law is a view that certain rights or values are inherent in or universally cognizable by virtue of human reason or human nature, while common law is the legal tradition whereby certain rights or values are legally cognizable by virtue of judicial recognition or articulation.[3] Natural law theories have, however, exercised a profound influence on the development of English common law,[4] and have featured greatly in the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suárez, Richard Hooker, Thomas Hobbes, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, and Emmerich de Vattel. -
Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation Laurence Claus University of San Diego School of Law, [email protected]
University of San Diego Digital USD University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Law Faculty Scholarship Theory Research Paper Series September 2004 Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation Laurence Claus University of San Diego School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons Digital USD Citation Claus, Laurence, "Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation" (2004). University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series. 11. http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claus: Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series September 2004 Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation Laurence Claus Published by Digital USD, 2004 1 University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 11 [2004] MONTESQUIEU’S MISTAKES AND THE TRUE MEANING OF SEPARATION 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (forthcoming) Laurence Claus1 “The political liberty of the subject,” said Montesquieu, “is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of another.”2 The liberty of which Montesquieu spoke is directly promoted by apportioning power among political actors in a way that minimizes opportunities for those actors to determine conclusively the reach of their own powers. -
Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime Canuel, Mark
Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime Canuel, Mark Published by Johns Hopkins University Press Canuel, Mark. Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. Project MUSE. doi:10.1353/book.15129. https://muse.jhu.edu/. For additional information about this book https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15129 [ Access provided at 29 Sep 2021 18:58 GMT with no institutional affiliation ] This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Justice, Dissent, and the Sublime This page intentionally left blank Justice, Dissent, M and the Sublime N Mark Canuel The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore © 2012 The Johns Hopkins University Press All rights reserved. Published 2012 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The Johns Hopkins University Press 2715 North Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363 www.press.jhu.edu Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Canuel, Mark. Justice, dissent, and the sublime / Mark Canuel. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4214-0587-2 (hdbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-4214-0609-1 (electronic) — ISBN 1-4214-0587-3 (hdbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 1-4214- 0609-8 (electronic) 1. Aesthetics in literature. 2. English literature—18th century— History and criticism. 3. English literature—19th century—History and criticism. 4. Justice in literature. 5. Sublime, The, in literature. 6. Romanticism—Great Britain. I. Title. PR448.A37C35 2012 820.9Ј007—dc23 2011047314 A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Special discounts are available for bulk purchases of this book. -
How Do We Understand International Law and Peace?
Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Political Science Theses Department of Political Science Summer 8-7-2018 How Do We Understand International Law and Peace? Rebecca Sims Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses Recommended Citation Sims, Rebecca, "How Do We Understand International Law and Peace?." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2018. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/72 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACE? by REBECCA L. SIMS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF HENRY CAREY, PHD ABSTRACT This review essay provides a comprehensive roadmap of the international law of peace, which has not been so presented in the International Law-International Relations literature before. In Part 1 we review peace law as such, that is, where it is simply and directly mandated in international law. In the second of the two parts, we depict international law that does not mandate peace, but requires behavior that indirectly results in peace. In both parts the three sources of international law, treaty, custom or principles are identified, along with soft law, which is incipient, but non-binding. Laws of peace per se include all the United Nations Charter provisions (treaty and customary) related to peace and peaceful conditions, jus ad bellum (custom) and the law against aggression (treaty), the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States (custom and principle) and the Human Right to Peace (custom, soft law). -
Leibniz As Legal Scholar
LEIBNIZ AS LEGAL SCHOLAR Matthias Armgardt* 1. Introduction1 These days, Leibniz is very famous for his contributions to philosophy, especially in the fi eld of metaphysics, and to mathematics, especially for the invention of calculus and the binary numeral system. However, attention has seldom been drawn to the fact that Leibniz was also, particularly at the beginning of his career, a legal scholar. Even legal historians have been reluctant to translate and analyse his complex works on the law. Luig was one of the fi rst legal historians to consider these texts, but did so from a dogmatic point of view only.2 When I wrote my book3 about Leibniz’ Doctrina conditionum4 in the 1990s, no translation was available. Nowadays, French translations of some of his legal texts by the philosopher Boucher are available,5 as well as English translations by the philosopher Dascal6 and by Sartor and Artosi.7 In addition, some of his texts on natural 1 I wish to thank my friend Laurens for his encouragement to return to Leibniz after a break of more than ten years. I had the opportunity to present part of this paper at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in January 2013. 2 Recently, Luig made a methodological contribution as well: Klaus Luig, Leibniz’s concept of jus naturale and lex naturalis – defi ned “with geometric certainty”, in: Daston/Stolleis (eds.), Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe, Ashgate 2009, pp. 183ff. 3 Matthias Armgardt, Das rechtslogische System der “Doctrina conditionum” von G. W. Leibniz, Diss. Köln, Marburg 2001 (referred to as Armgardt, DC). -
The Church Fathers Assessed Nature, Bible and Morality in Jean Barbeyrac Joris Van Eijnatten
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by DSpace at VU The Church Fathers Assessed Nature, Bible and Morality in Jean Barbeyrac Joris van Eijnatten In the eighteenth century, natural law thinkers tended to tread the narrow path between affirming Revelation at the cost of Reason on the one hand, and asserting Reason at the cost of Revelation on the other. When all has been said and done, to which body of divine writ will we have truly pledged our allegiance? Do we recognize Revelation or Reason, the Book of Books or the Book of Nature? Few eighteenth-century writers on natural law would have denied that both Scripture and Nature were books writ large by God for all mankind. Most were content to acknowledge truths derived by reason from nature without expressly denying the truths of faith contained in the Bible. Problems arose when truths of reason appeared to contradict truths of faith. In such cases, natural law thinkers—such as the Huguenot Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744)—usually contended that what appeared to be truths of faith to previous generations were actually untruths. Consequently, truths of faith had to be subject to reinterpretation, and the guardians of religious truths would do well to devote some time to the study of natural law. Such contentions unavoidably brought men like Barbeyrac into conflict with clergymen as the keepers of the faith. Not surprisingly, eighteenth-century natural law thinkers often reveal a pronounced anticlerical streak. Because of his life-long devotion to natural law and moral philosophy, a moderate, Protestant anticlericalism also became second nature to Barbeyrac. -
A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2015 A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment Robert Hoffman University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Hoffman, Robert, "A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment" (2015). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1063. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1063 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1063 For more information, please contact [email protected]. A New Reading of Kant's Theory of Punishment Abstract There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the aditionaltr interpretation of Immanuel Kantâ??s writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that throughout his published writings on practical philosophy â?? and in particular in his Metaphysics of Morals â?? he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only be justified as a direct response to an individualâ??s act of wrongdoing, his status as one of the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kantâ??s explicit support for retributivism directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of punishment. In particular, I highlight Kantâ??s division