Five years of the Caribbean Netherlands

Working of the new administrative structure

summary

Oberon Nauta, Ph.D.

1.1 Introduction

The islands of Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius have been part of the Netherlands' constitutional structure since 10 October 2010. The islands' new status is regulated in the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (in Dutch: Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden). The islands have the status of public entities (in Dutch: openbaar lichaam) in the sense of article 134 of the Dutch Constitution. This provides for a special form of decentralised administration within the Netherlands which is comparable to municipalities.

The final agreement of the mini-conference about the future constitutional position of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba of October 2006 in The Hague states that five years after the moment when the three islands acquire a constitutional position within the Netherlands' constitutional structure, the effect of the new constitutional structure will be jointly evaluated by the Netherlands and the three islands together. Agreement was reached on 19 June 2014 with the Commissioners for Constitutional Affairs for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba about the instruction for this evaluation, and agreements were made about how to deal with the findings of the study. The previously published explanation by the Council of State concerning the evaluation of the constitutional structure of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba was reflected in the evaluation instruction.1

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations established an evaluation committee on 22 September 2014. In agreement with the public entities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba the membership of this committee is as follows:  J.W.E. Spies, LL.M. chair  Prof. A.H.A. Soons  G.A.E. Thodé, LL.M.  Prof. L.F.M. Verhey  F.H.H. Weekers, LL.M.

The committee's goal is to examine three areas for evaluation. These relate to the effect of the legislation, the working of the new administrative structure and the consequences of the transition to the new constitutional situation for the population of the islands.

This is the summary of the study into the working of the new administrative structure. The aim of this study was to establish how the administrative organisation, the democratic representation of the population and the formal supervision of the Caribbean Netherlands are functioning. It was carried out by DSP group in collaboration with Bruno Steiner Advies and Curconsult Curaçao and supervised by a committee made up of the following people:

Note 1 appendix to Kamerstukken II, 2013–2014, 33 750-IV, no. 27

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 G.A.E. Thodé, LL.M. (member of the evaluation committee) - chair  F. Goedgedrag, LL.M. – Associate member of the Council of State and inter alia former governor of Curaçao  M.A.P. van Haersma Buma, LL.M. – Chairman of the Financial Relations Council (Raad voor de Financiële Verhoudingen) and inter alia dyke warden and former mayor  Prof. A.H.A. Soons (member of the evaluation committee) – deputy chair  Prof. L.F.M. Verhey (member of the evaluation committee)

1.2 Explanation of methodology

1.2.1 Questions at issue

The study answered the following five evaluation questions:

Main question 1: Which qualitative and quantitative criteria for good/sound administration can be applied?

Main question 2: To what extent is the administration of the public entities appropriate, sound and effective?

Main question 3: How have the powers and tasks been dealt with across the various administrative bodies?

Main question 4: To what extent do the inhabitants of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba feel (democratically) represented in the relationship with the European part of the Netherlands and (through the Netherlands) in the relationship with the countries of Sint Maarten, Curaçao and Aruba?

Main question 5: How have the financial relationships and the expenditure by the islands and central government developed?

1.2.2 Research approach

The study divided into three phases.

Phase 1: preparation During the first phase extensive desk research was carried out on previous (partial) evaluations, policy memoranda/circulars, laws and regulations and other official State publications. Scientific literature on small scale communities, insularism and political culture was also consulted.

In addition, the Perception Study 2015 was carried out under the supervision of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP). This study was a repeat of a previous perception study, supplemented with a number of new topics. The perception study consisted of a telephone survey amongst a representative random sample of a total of 750 inhabitants on the three islands.

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10 of the 53 survey questions related to this study into the new administrative structure. These questions were new and were provided by DSP group. The survey was conducted in April 2015.

Phase 2: assessment of the working of the organisation of the public administration As part of the study, fieldwork was carried out in the second phase on all three islands and an analysis took place of registration data from the Kingdom Representative and the Board of Financial Supervision for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (in Dutch: College financieel toezicht Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba). During the fieldwork interviews were conducted with over 100 respondents. The interviews were semi-structured.

For the purpose of the study various open events were also organised on all three islands at which anyone could raise issues which they felt were important for the evaluation. The open events were organised jointly with the SCP. The researchers attended these open events on Saba. On the other islands only the SCP attended the events. Afterwards the researchers from SCP provided DSP group with the information from the open events which could be important for the evaluation of the new administrative structure of the Caribbean Netherlands.

The Caribbean Netherlands evaluation committee operated a website during the period of the evaluation. Visitors could post messages on this website or email messages to the commission using a response form. These messages were included in the research as secondary written sources.

Phase 3: completion Following completion of the fieldwork in the Caribbean Netherlands, further interviews were conducted in the European Netherlands with the Caribbean coordinators of most departments, a former Kingdom Representative, the (former) Kingdom Representative's civil service support and various roles within the Kingdom Relations directorate. The information collected was then analysed, and an initial draft final report was produced. The supervision committee commented on this first draft. Based on these comments a second draft was prepared, which again was subjected to comments from the supervision committee and the evaluation committee. This final report has been produced on the basis of these comments.

1.3 Scope and limitations of the study

This study has number of limitations. Firstly it should be pointed out that the study constitutes a snapshot. Although nearly five years had passed at the time of the fieldwork since the islands were given the status of public entities, the study also clearly shows that there is a lot of development still taking place.

Secondly it should be noted that the public entities' provision of primary information is relatively limited. Various types of statistical basic data which are available as standard in the European Netherlands were not available on the islands, as a result of which there was a relatively high dependence on verbal information from the interviews.

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Finally it should be noted that the study particularly focuses on areas which are open to improvement. The researchers did not consciously apply this focus, but this was a result of the fact that many respondents used the study to identify areas for attention. It may be that as a result of this the positive developments have remained somewhat overlooked.

1.4 Research findings

1.4.1 To what extent is the administration of the public entities appropriate, sound and effective? How have the powers and tasks been dealt with across the various administrative bodies?

In answering this question a distinction is made between the new administrative structure at local level and the new structure in the sense of the relationship between the public entity and central government.

New administrative structure: local The islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba became part of the Dutch constitutional structure as public entities in the sense of article 134 of the Constitution on 10 October 2010. Their administrative structure and the relationship with central government was regulated in the Wet openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba (Public Entities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba Act - WolBES) and the Wet financiën openbare lichamen Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba (Finances of Public Entities Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba Act - FinBES). The fundamental assumption underlying these laws was that the islands would be able to implement local autonomy in an adequate way. Because the Council of State had indicated in its explanation of 2006 about the future status of the islands that the Gemeentewet ( Municipalities Act) provides a tried and tested model for this, WolBES was structured in imitation of this act.

By following the Gemeentewet, the act deviated on a number of important elements from the administrative system as laid down up until 10 October 2010 in the Eilandenregeling Nederlandse Antillen (Netherlands Antilles Islands Regulations - ERNA). One of the most notable differences relates to the introduction of political dualism. In imitation of the Gemeentewet, WolBES separates the executive council from the island council so that commissioners may no longer simultaneously be a member of the island council (section 40 ff. WolBES). The island council is therefore now deemed to supervise the executive council and provide it with frameworks more than in the past. A number of powers which could also be exercised in the past have been provided with a statutory basis for this task, and the number of rights has been expanded. Hence the island council has been able to exercise the right of amendment (section 151 WolBES) and the right of initiative (section 150 WolBES) since 10 October 2010. The administrative system also has an court of auditors function (section 95 ff WolBES) and an ombudsman function (section 106 ff. WolBES).

However, not all the provisions of the Gemeentewet have been transferred to WolBES. Lawmakers felt that the small area and population of the islands together with the great distance from the European part of the Netherlands meant that allocation to an existing or new province offered no

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added value. Administrative experiences over the previous decades also gave lawmakers grounds for applying extra safeguards for good governance to the islands' administrative system. The administrative structure of the Caribbean Netherlands can be summarised as follows: at local level regulatory power is exercised by the island council (e.g. section 152 WolBES). Day-to-day administration is in the hands of the executive council (section 168 WolBES), and independent supervision of compliance with the law lies with the courts. Supervision of the day-to-day administration takes place within both a horizontal and vertical chain. Insofar as it involves supervision of the administration, the horizontal chain consists of the island council, court of auditors and ombudsman.

The study shows that the horizontal supervision chain is not functioning effectively within the new administrative structure. Hence it is clear with regard to the functioning of the island council that certain problems which already existed at the time of the Netherlands Antilles have not been significantly alleviated with the introduction of WolBES. One of these is finding suitable candidates for the island council. Just as in the European Netherlands, council members in the Caribbean Netherlands may not be employed by the public entity where they form part of the island administration (section 14 WolBES). The average prospective municipal councillor in the European Netherlands suffers little problem with this provision, because he can simply find employment outside the boundaries of the municipality. However the islands are surrounded by sea, which makes commuting practically impossible. Potentially suitable candidates therefore do not stand for election. This problem is reinforced by one of the provisions of WolBES which deviates from the Gemeentewet in prohibiting various commercial relationships between council members and the public entity (section 16 WolBES).

Alongside the lack of suitable candidates, the effectiveness with which the island council supervises the executive council is further eroded by the fact that the number of council members is relatively small compared to the European Netherlands. However the number of administrative portfolios is greater, which means that the average number of issues per council member is higher than in a municipality. The part-time remuneration means that the council members generally have a (full- time) job alongside their council work, and therefore have insufficient time to really explore issues in depth. Budgets are often approved without significant discussion, and little or no use is made of the right of initiative or the right of amendment.

The horizontal supervision is further weakened by the absence of an operational court of auditors. Although all three island councils have adopted the island council ordinance to establish a shared court of auditors as required by WolBES, so far the required council members have not yet been appointed by all three islands.

However, it is debatable whether the supervision of the executive council by the island council would increase if the council members were better equipped and the court of auditors was functioning. It appears to be customary on all islands for the commissioners to liaise with the members of the coalition parties on the island council as part of a caucus. This state of affairs means that the island council members - contrary to the provisions of section 28 WolBES - certainly do not always vote independently, and the opposition is largely disempowered.

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The ombudsman function - which is provided by the National Ombudsman at the islands' request - requires the least attention within the horizontal supervision chain. So far the handling of complaints has run smoothly, and the number of applications is steadily increasing.

The weakness of the horizontal supervision means that the vertical supervision gains in relative importance. The study shows that the vertical supervision chain deviates from the municipal model in various areas. Not only does it include participants who are not present in the European Netherlands, but it can also be stated in a general sense that it is designed to be more intensive and preventative than for municipal councils. As a result of the fact that the provincial administrative layer is absent, the administrative device of the Kingdom Representative has been created as the administrative link between central government and the public entity (section 187 WolBES). With the aim of safeguarding good governance, lawmakers have provided the Kingdom Representative with special powers. Hence a number of island ordinances required by law will only take effect after he has approved them (section 14 fifth paragraph, section 35 fourth paragraph, section 105 second paragraph and section 123). Decisions by the island council concerning the appointment, promotion and dismissal of civil servants and boards of state companies and state foundations also require the approval of the Kingdom Representative (section 126 paragraph 2, section 135 and section 168 paragraph 3 WolBES). The Kingdom Representative can also submit decisions by the island council which he believes should be considered for suspension and annulment by the Crown to the minister responsible (section 219 WolBES ff.). Decisions by municipal councils in the European Netherlands can, incidentally, also be annulled by the Crown, albeit in that case the province will in principle make the submission.

The island governor plays a facilitating role within the vertical supervision. That means that he also ensures that the decisions of the island council are in line with the law and public interest, and should he suspect a conflict with one or both principles, he can submit a decision for annulment through the Kingdom Representative (article 223 WolBES).

The study shows that the vertical administrative supervision is unable to fill the gaps created by the weak horizontal chain. This is due to a number of factors. In the first place the Kingdom Representative's information position is not safeguarded. This means that - contrary to section 24 paragraph 6 and section 72 paragraph 3 WolBES and the Regeling elektronische bekendmaking en beschikbaarstelling regelgeving decentrale overheden (Regulation on electronic publication and provision of regulations by decentralised authorities) - the island administrations do not consistently publish all the decisions they have made. This applies both to the island council ordinances and the decisions of the executive council. Section 221 WolBES stipulates that if this prescribed publication does not take place, the island governor will send the decisions to the Kingdom Representative within two days. The study shows that in practice this is not done systematically either, despite the fact that the Kingdom Representative has formally demanded it.

Secondly WolBES only stipulates a conflict with the law and a conflict with public interest as legal grounds for annulment. In practice these terms provide the Kingdom Representative with only limited means to work with, as was identified during the study. Although he and later the Cabinet have provided further clarification of the scope of both assessment criteria in supplementary

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memoranda, in practice it is often far from clear whether a decision can be annulled or not. The exercise of this extensive power also requires that the Kingdom Representative is supported in this by the minister in The Hague. However, in the rare cases when the Kingdom Representative has submitted a decision for annulment during the period examined, this support was not provided.

The lack of such support also relates to the lack of clear process agreements between the Kingdom Representative and the department in The Hague about the approach to be adopted with regard to submissions for annulment. WolBES stipulates that the decision to submit must be made within two days of publication of the decision. In order to avoid embarrassment for the Kingdom Representative, there should first be substantive agreement on the desirability and feasibility of such a submission at policy level in The Hague prior to a formal submission. However, two days is not a lot of time, and the current lack of clear working agreements between The Hague and the Kingdom Representative about the method of liaising means that there is no guarantee that both parties can make proper substantive preparations for any submission. This situation further raises the threshold for the already tricky tool of submission for annulment.

The Kingdom Representative's special power with regard to appointments, promotions and dismissals also appears to be fairly ineffective in practice. Although the Kingdom Representative assesses the personnel dossiers for completeness and correct application of the prescribed rules in all prescribed cases, it can thereby not be ruled out that better qualified people have been sidelined by the executive council at an early stage. Political appointments, in the sense that the job is given not to the best-qualified candidate but to a politically favoured individual, are therefore not ruled out. Temporary appointments are also regularly made on the basis of commission contracts. This form of (temporary) appointment is not assessed by the Kingdom Representative. The dominant perception is therefore that there is political favouritism involved in many appointments.

The position of the island governor is a fourth factor which impedes the effectiveness of the vertical supervision. The study shows that the island governor suffered a significant conflict between on the one hand safeguarding the working relationships within the executive council and on the other side checking the lawfulness and compliance with the public interest of decisions by the island council. This conflict means that he does not take on a proactive supervising role. The civil service support for the island governor on the islands is also limited or not organised in an independent way, so that he lacks knowledge and (legal) expertise in performing his supervisory tasks.

The vertical financial supervision is set out in FinBES. That supervision deviates from the financial supervision as applied to municipal councils on two crucial aspects. Firstly, the supervision is preventative (section 19 first paragraph FinBES). That means that the minister must approve the budget in advance before it becomes legally valid. This also applies to amendments to the budget (section 21 FinBES). (In municipalities in the Netherlands the vertical financial supervision is repressive, which means that supervision takes place retrospectively.) Secondly, supervision is exercised by an administrative body which is unknown amongst municipalities: the Board of Financial Supervision for Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (section 2 FinBES). This board advises the islands and the Minister of the interior and Kingdom Relations about the financial policy, and supervises the day-to-day administration by the executive council (section 4 FinBES).

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The study shows that this form of financial supervision is largely effective. In other words, the islands' financial discipline improved considerably during the period examined, and there is greater insight into the islands' financial situation.

The vertical financial supervision of the private corporate entities in which the public entities have holdings but which are not included in the public sector is not effective. The reason for this is that FinBES only covers the public sector. Section 1 paragraph 1 at h FinBES defines the public sector. The definition used - adopted from the United Nations' System of National Accounts - means that the public entities can enter into a risky holdings in corporate entities for which they are not accountable to the Board of Financial Supervision. During the study various parties pointed to the fact that the public entities actually adopt liabilities and run risks in various corporate entities outside the public sector, but it was not possible to establish precisely how great these risks are. To a lesser degree this problem also applies to the public entities' private shareholdings which are part of the public sector, incidentally. In practice the Board of Financial Supervision finds it particularly difficult to obtain the annual reports and accounts and other financial documentation for these organisations, even though these organisations are required by law to provide such documents.

The law currently does not provide for differentiation by island. This means that in principle every island undergoes the same supervision and must submit the same documents for this. The administrative burden that this involves - particularly for the implementation reports required by law (section 22 FinBES) - raises questions about proportionality for Saba, which has been demonstrably complying with the statutory requirements for a considerable length of time.

New administrative structure: relationship between central government and public entity Under section 136 the public entities run their own administration (autonomy), but as with the municipalities central government can demand regulation and control (joint governance) of the public entity (136 WolBES second paragraph). The islands have thereby lost their constitutionally assured autonomy to which they were entitled as an Island Region under ERNA. However, the tasks of the public entities differ from the municipal administration. The reason for this was that it was agreed at the time of transition that the islands would, in principle, perform the same tasks as in the era of the Netherlands Antilles.

This study has shown that the practical implementation of the islands' tasks often fails to match the level of implementation in the European Netherlands. The reason for this lies particularly in the fact that the civil service's capacity and quality is inferior to that in the European Netherlands, and that there was insufficient experience of various tasks required by law. In other words, although various statutory provisions applied during the Antilles period, supervision of compliance with the statutory obligations was less strict.

Support from The Hague has been found to be both necessary and frequently required, particularly in the area of producing legislation and technically complex (enforcement) tasks. Initially this took place unilaterally from the European Netherlands without systematic consultation with the islands. Nowadays this is increasingly taking place on the basis of an interactive liaison process with the public entities, so that local knowledge and information is utilised and the feasibility can be assessed.

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However the local employment market remains a major area for attention, since the supply of highly trained specialised persons is insufficient to fill all the general and specialist roles within the public administration and within the National Office for the Caribbean Netherlands (In Dutch: RCN) . Deployment from the outside therefore remains a structural necessity. The terms of employment which the islands can offer are unfavourable compared to the terms of employment in the European Netherlands. And insofar as staff can be recruited from the European Netherlands or elsewhere, they often stay for a short length of time, as a result of which accrued knowledge leaves the islands again relatively quickly.

RCN is the executive agency for most central government tasks. The study shows that the inhabitants of the islands rate RCN relatively highly. However it was mentioned in the interviews that the execution of tasks and provision of services does not always have sufficient sensibility for the local conditions, and an excessively Netherlands-based perspective is sometimes adopted.

Just as in the European Netherlands, every minister is also responsible for his specific policy area in the Caribbean Netherlands. Because Dutch policy does not automatically apply to the islands, the minister often produces laws and regulations and policy specifically aimed at the islands. Whilst the departments in The Hague generally have a lot of knowledge about the situation in the Netherlands, knowledge about the islands is often deficient. For that reason every ministry has stationed a liaison/department head on Bonaire. They maintain contact with the department coordinators in The Hague who have been specifically appointed to manage the Caribbean dossier from The Hague. The coordinators are also the point of contact for the policy workers who need to carry out activities on the public entities. The Kingdom Representative is charged with the task of ensuring coherence in central government policy, both locally and in The Hague.

The study shows that the aforementioned method for liaison between The Hague and the islands offers no guarantee that sufficient account is taken of local interests, and that there is equally no guarantee that laws and The Hague's policy can be implemented effectively in the Caribbean Netherlands. The ministries also work primarily independently of one another, as a result of which there is little integration of policy. The Kingdom Representative is unable to effectively break through this compartmentalisation, because he has few formal powers to force the parties to act together on overlapping dossiers. In practice departments therefore often execute the ministerial responsibility adequately, but at the same time that execution does not serve the public interest of the islands well.

Findings in perspective The above shows that the execution of public administration in the Caribbean Netherlands has various areas for attention. However, one cannot conclude on the basis of this that the islands are underperforming. The question one has to ask is: "what might have been expected of the islands in view of the unusual circumstances in which they find themselves?" A brief comparison with municipalities in the European Netherlands and a few surrounding British Overseas Territories shows that administrative entities of a comparable scale and/or isolated location often face similar challenges. Hence the recruitment pool for administrators and civil servants on the nearby British islands is equally problematic. The overlap between social and professional roles amongst administrators is also not unique to the Caribbean Netherlands. This also occurs in small

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municipalities in the European Netherlands, and it lends a far more personal nature to politics. However, the Caribbean Netherlands differs from the European Netherlands in one significant regard: the poverty. This means that the inhabitants of the islands are more dependent on the authorities. This dependence increases the pressure on administrators to abuse their powers in exchange for electoral support.

It can also be concluded on the basis of the study that a lot of what is expected or legally demanded of the islands are matters of which the European Netherlands have often already had decades of experience. New tasks or tasks where a much higher level of execution is required than was customary in the past take time to become habitual and for expertise to be accrued, and five years is quite a short period in that regard.

Finally it should be noted that various administrative challenges faced by the islands also arise in the European Netherlands. Hence political dualism in municipalities is often not implemented in such a way that the council independently supervises the municipal executive: there too, decision- making is often discussed in advance with the coalition caucuses to the exclusion of the opposition. This does not just happen at municipal level, but also in the House of Representatives. Small municipalities are also frequently confronted in the same way with the 'diseconomies of scale' in performing their tasks. However, the isolated location of the Caribbean islands makes it impossible to utilise tools which are on offer in the European Netherlands, including in the context of the Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen (Communal Arrangements Act). This means that in practice the islands face various tasks alone, where in the European Netherlands collaboration is sought for the same tasks. These are all circumstances which place the aforementioned areas for attention in some sort of perspective.

1.4.2 To what extent do the inhabitants of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba feel (democratically) represented in the relationship with the European part of the Netherlands and (through the Netherlands) in the relationship with the countries of Sint Maarten, Curaçao and Aruba?

The study shows that the inhabitants of the three islands do not feel strongly represented in the relationship with the European part of the Netherlands. On the one hand they point to the fact that the current electoral system means that the islands are unable to capture a single seat in the House of Representatives, whilst on the other hand there also appears to be little interest in the politics of The Hague. This is in contrast to the interest in the local island council elections.

The public entities also sometimes feel there is an indifferent attitude amongst Dutch administrators and politicians. This attitude is partly attributed to the fact that the public entities are not a significant factor for the Dutch public, as a result of which ministers can afford to pay little attention to the islands. The European Netherlands' concern for the interests of the three islands in the Kingdom is also not always perceived positively. On the one hand this is because the integration into the Netherlands' constitutional structure means that compliance with (existing) laws and regulations is now monitored more strictly, which is felt to increase the cost of living, amongst other things. On the other hand this is because in the execution of ministerial responsibilities there is nog enough attention paid to the local consequences of particular policy choices or legislation. The current

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situation is thereby felt to be worse than in the period prior to 10 October 2010. At that time the islands not only chose their own representatives in the Parliament, but the government of the Netherlands Antilles also had an administration office on each island which administrators and citizens could address directly.

At the same time the study shows that the options for informal liaison with The Hague are many times greater than for the average municipal council. Various ministers and administrators regularly visit the islands, and representatives of the island councils are received in The Hague at a high level. There is also some direct liaison between the public entities' civil servants and their counterparts in The Hague.

1.4.3 How have the financial relationships and the expenditure by the islands and central government developed?

The study shows that the ratio of central government spending to decentralised spending is around 80/20. Half the decentralised spending is funded from the free distribution from the BES fund. If the financial ratio between central government and the Caribbean Netherlands is compared to that in the European Netherlands, one sees that there is more central control in the Caribbean than in Europe. That is to say that the public entities have the power of disposal over a relatively smaller proportion of the total amount spent on the islands.

Over the period 2010 - 2015 total expenditure rose by an annual average of 22%. Within this total, central government expenditure increased most significantly, so that its share of the total rose from 71% to 79%. If one looks at the composition of central government expenditure by policy domains, the expenditure on healthcare makes up the largest proportion: around one third in 2015. Healthcare expenditure also grew most rapidly in 2010 - 2015, by an average of 45% per year. The average annual increase was also high in other policy areas. Only the expenditure on social affairs and employment showed a relatively low growth.

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Taxes are also levied on the islands. Central government taxes were around nine times as high as the islands' own levies and taxes in 2014. Nonetheless central government spends more on balance on the island than is levied in central government taxes. The ratio was 2.7. So for every euro that central government raises on the island, 2.70 euro 'comes back'.

The relatively centralised relationship between central government and the public entity is also reflected in the investments relating to standard island tasks and their funding. In view of the prohibition on interest-bearing loans and their meagre reserves, the islands are dependent on interest-free loans and "free contributions" from the departments. Funding through interest-free loans helps to ensure both a more integrated assessment of income and expenditure on investments and greater scope for decentralised policy. However the difference is only limited, since the agreement to provide an interest-free loan ultimately lies with the department concerned. All this boils down to a relatively limited financial autonomy on the part of the public entities in the Caribbean.

In the Caribbean the limited financial autonomy is seen as patronising. From the European perspective this guidance is perceived as being desirable for two reasons. Firstly, the lack of financial discipline which was found to exist prior to 2010. Secondly, the reduced administrative strength compared to Dutch municipalities, as a result of which certain tasks are 'too big' for the islands. How such issues are assessed is therefore primarily a political and administrative consideration, and not a scientific matter.

1.5 Individual aspects of islands

Although the study of the new administrative structure particularly exposed points of similarity between the three islands, the study also identified differences. The most important of these can be summarised as follows:

1.5.1 Bonaire

Out of the three islands, political dualism seems to be most successful on Bonaire. That is due not least to the relatively large island council and the wider range of island council candidates. Yet is also acknowledged on Bonaire that the island council does not have sufficient time and quality to closely supervise the executive council. It is also said that the island council does not receive all the documents from the executive council that should be shared with it. The lack of a court of auditors is generally perceived as a shortcoming on Bonaire.

The study shows that the executive council and the civil service on Bonaire are insufficiently synchronised. Various parties highlighted the fact that commissioners frequently fail to inform their civil servants about decisions made or to be made, as a result of which misunderstandings were said to arise. At the same time mention was also made of the fact that commissioners sometimes get involved in individual cases at a (low) official level, thereby bypassing the formal lines of communication where necessary. It was also reported in the study that there is room for

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improvement in the working relationship between the executive council and the civil servants. The large number of changes of directors and heads of department is said to reinforce this conclusion.

Various parties also pointed to the relatively large number of political advisers. These confidants of the commissioners are said to play an important role in developing policy. Because the civil service is insufficiently involved in many policy developments and the political advisers leave at the same time as the commissioners, a change of council is said to cause a break in continuity. Various parties also pointed out that the political advisers are generally not appointed in a normal way, but using a commission contract. This contract means that their appointments are not formally tied to approval from the Kingdom Representative.

If one looks at the division of tasks between central government and the public entity and the liaison between the two, one notices that out of the three islands the public entity Bonaire liaises most intensively with the liaisons and heads of department. This is also logical, in view of the fact that they are based at RCN in Kralendijk.

The study shows that Bonaire occupies the middle position in terms of the satisfaction of the population. Inhabitants of the island give their administration a rating of 5.2, whilst they give the Dutch government a 4.7. But the inhabitants of this island believe most strongly out of the three islands that they can exercise influence both over their own administration and that in The Hague (and they also rate their opportunities for influence more highly than the average Dutch citizen does).

With regard to the financial relationships the study shows the following. In 2014 the relative share of the healthcare expenditure on Bonaire was significantly higher than on St. Eustatius and Saba; to a lesser extent this also applies to expenditure in the field of education and social affairs. The general overview showed that the ratio between central government expenditure and central government taxes is 2.7 for the Caribbean Netherlands. However, at 2.1 that ratio is lower for Bonaire. For St. Eustatius and Saba that ratio is higher, at 4.5 and 6.2 respectively.

1.5.2 Saba

Political dualism is not widely embraced on Saba. Initial attempts were made to emphatically establish a division between the island council and the executive council, but none of the parties appreciated the estrangement between the two that resulted from this. The view is also widely held within the island administration that it is not appropriate for an island council member with only a fraction of the number of votes that a commissioner has received to oppose the commissioner in question too strongly. The researchers got a picture of relatively harmonious collaboration between the island council including the opposition and the executive council.

Unlike Bonaire and Sint Eustatius the lack of a court of auditors is not viewed as a major shortcoming, and the staffing of the court of auditors from Saba therefore has a low priority.

Language was found to pose a tricky barrier for the exercise of the supervisory role by the Saban island council. As elsewhere, Dutch is the official administration language and a great deal of

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legislation and policy documents are therefore not available in English. The language skills of the island council members mean that one cannot expect that these documents will always be understood equally well.

In the past island council meetings on Saba often took place behind closed doors. This is no longer the case, and according to some council members the executive council and island council would benefit from meeting behind closed doors from time to time so that liaison between the executive council and the island council is facilitated. Out of the three islands, it is on Saba that the strongest arguments are made for differentiation of the financial supervision. Various respondents point out that the annual accounts have already been approved for three successive years, and the quarterly reports are therefore excessive.

The perception study 2015 shows that out of the population of the three islands, Sabans rate their administration most highly. This relates to their own administration, the government in the Netherlands and the functioning of democracy in general. This picture is also echoed in the interviews with the administrators: although they mention that formal influence has greatly diminished since 10 October 2010, good lobbying in The Hague can also achieve a great deal. It is notable that a majority of the inhabitants of Saba, just like those of Sint Eustatius, believe that they cannot exercise any influence over their own administration.

If one looks at the financial relationships, it is notable that compared to Bonaire relatively more is spent on public safety, infrastructure and the environment and economic affairs on Saba. Saba's free distribution is comparatively much higher than that of the other islands in order to offset 'diseconomies of scale'. Saba also has comparatively more of its own funds than the other two islands. The general overview showed that the ratio between central government expenditure and central government taxes is 2.7 for the Caribbean Netherlands. However, for Saba this figure is 6.2. In other words, for every dollar raised in taxes 6.20 dollars come back.

1.5.3 Sint Eustatius

Out of the three islands, Sint Eustatius is characterised by the greatest political instability. Over the period 2011 - 2015 the public entity had no less than five changes in the executive council. The administrative instability is partly attributable to the heterogeneous politics: out of the three islands, Sint Eustatius has the most political parties. Coalitions can often only be formed with support from small parties which, as a result of the basis of 75% of the electoral quotient, often represent an even smaller minority of voters than the number of seats would suggest.

Political dualism does not appear to have established a firm footing on Sint Eustatius. That means that decision-making by the executive council is prepared within the caucuses and the opposition is thereby hardly involved. It is also pointed out that the island governor is frequently absent from the island council meetings, as a result of which the opposition cannot be informed through him either.

Based on the interviews the researchers have gained a picture that the relationship between the executive council and the civil service on Sint Eustatius is disrupted, and this is resulting in

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insufficient synchronisation between the two. The relationship between the executive council and (the head of) finance in particular gave rise to concern more than once during the period examined.

Out of the three islands, the population of Sint Eustatius is the least satisfied. This relates both to their own local administration and the government in the European Netherlands. Compared to Bonaire and Saba the turnout at elections is also low, whilst the number of indications that votes are bought during elections on the island were high. A majority of Statians - like the Sabans - also feel that they can exercise no influence over what the local administration and the government in the Netherlands do. During the study the interviewed administrators also expressed the least positive views about the Netherlands and The Hague's treatment of their island.

In terms of the financial relationships Sint Eustatius occupies a comparable position to Saba. Unlike Bonaire, where the share of the healthcare expenditure was significantly higher than on Sint Eustatius, the share of expenditure on public safety, infrastructure and the environment and economic affairs on St. Eustatius was higher than on Bonaire. The general overview showed that the ratio between central government expenditure and central government taxes is 2.7 for the Caribbean Netherlands. The ratio for Sint Eustatius was 4.5.

1.6 Conclusion

The study shows that the new administrative structure has not been able to eliminate most of the administrative challenges which existed prior to 10 October 2010. In addition, new challenges have arisen. This final paragraph sets out a number of personal observations from the researchers arising from these challenges. These observations are separate from the answers to the questions at issue.

As described above, the horizontal supervision chain is still weak on the islands, despite the introduction of political dualism. And in practice the vertical supervision, which with the introduction of the Kingdom Representative is considerably stricter on paper than in the European Netherlands, cannot compensate for the weakness in the horizontal chain. Whether the suggestions of alleged irregularities raised in the interviews have actually been perpetrated by the administrators has not been examined within this evaluation. However, it is clear that the way in which the new administrative structure functions offers a relatively wide scope for administrators to abuse their powers. This raises the question of whether the system of checks and balances in the new administrative structure is adequately tailored to the specific context within which the public administration in the Caribbean Netherlands operates.

Completely new issues have also arisen since 10 October 2010. One of the most significant may be that of the promotion of the interests of the islands' population. The study shows that the islands are not properly able to effectively highlight their needs and preferences in The Hague. On the one hand this is due to the small size and limited quality of their civil service, which prevents them from giving an appropriate response to the overwhelming stream of information and questions from The Hague. On the other hand the current allocation of tasks and responsibilities between central government and the public entity does not help the effective promotion of the islands' interests. For

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obvious reasons issues relating to the European Netherlands take up the vast majority of the attention of Dutch ministers and administrators. However, because the islands are not an important issue in the Dutch parliament either, ministers generally have little focus on the Caribbean Netherlands. This means that The Hague sometimes performs poorly on central government tasks on the island without the responsible minister being held to account for this. 'Emergency cord' procedures such as citizens' initiatives or a consultative referendum are not a means for the islands to demand political attention either, since their population numbers make the use of both democratic tools unachievable.

The risks of poor treatment are increased because the departments generally work independently of one another. From the islands' perspective this is lamentable because many ministries' policy areas overlap and therefore require an integrated approach. In the new administrative structure the Kingdom Representative has primary responsibility as the person to break through this compartmentalisation. However, his ability to create coherence in central government policy is limited because he has no enforcement powers. Central government policy has therefore often seemed lacking in coherence and even capricious in recent years. This is a situation which requires attention, given the fact that the islands enjoy less (financial) autonomy than municipal councils and partly as a result of this are more dependent on central government. This not only raises the question whether the means by which the islands can indicate their needs are furnished with sufficient safeguards, but also whether central government coordination should not be embedded more firmly.

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18 SUMMARY | Working of the new administrative structure Caribbean Netherlands | DSP group