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Perception and in phonological processing: the case of the

ARTICLE in · APRIL 1994 Impact Factor: 3.63 · DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)90032-9

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José Morais Regine Kolinsky Université Libre de Bruxelles Université Libre de Bruxelles

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Available from: Regine Kolinsky Retrieved on: 15 July 2015 Cognition, 50 (1994) 287-297 OOlO-0277/94/$07.00 0 1994 - Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Perception and awareness in phonological processing: the case of the phoneme

JosC Morais*, RCgine Kolinsky Laboratoire de Psychologie exptrimentale, Universitt Libre de Bruxelles, Av. Ad. Buy1 117, B-l 050 Bruxelles, Belgium

Abstract

The necessity of a “levels-of-processing” approach in the study of mental repre- sentations is illustrated by the work on the psychological reality of the phoneme. On the basis of both experimental studies of human behavior and functional imaging data, it is argued that there are unconscious representations of in addition to conscious ones. These two sets of mental representations are func- tionally distinct: the former intervene in perception and (presumably) production; the latter are developed in the context of alphabetic literacy for both and writing purposes. Moreover, among phonological units and properties, phonemes may be the only ones to present a neural dissociation at the macro-anatomic level. Finally, it is argued that even if the representations used in and those used in assembling and in conscious operations are distinct, they may entertain dependency relations.

Cognitive is concerned with what information is represented mentally and how it is represented. In these twenty years or so of Cognition’s life the issue of where, that is, at what levels of processing, particular types of information are represented has become increasingly compelling. This issue is crucial both to track the mental itinerary of information and to draw a correct

*Corresponding author. Fax 32 2 6502209, e-mail [email protected] The authors’ work discussed in the present paper was supported by the Human Frontier Science Program (project entitled Processing consequences of contrasting ) as well as the Belgian Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS) - Loterie Nationale (convention nos. 8.4527.90 and 8.4505.93) and the Belgian Minis&e de I’Education de la Communaute francaise (“Action de Recherche concertee” entitled Le traitement du langage darts diffkrentes modalitts: approches comparatives). The second author is Research Associate of the Belgian FNRS. Special thanks are due to all our collaborators, and in particular to Mireille Cluytens.

SSDI OOlO-0277(93)00601-3 picture of mental structure. However, the “where” question may be even more difficult to answer than the “what” and “how” ones. In spite of the tremendous development of the functional imaging technology. we arc still unable to follow on a computer screen the multiple recodings of information accomplished in the brain. Thus. the experimental study of human behavior remains up to now the most powerful approach to the mind’s microstructure. Sadly, we all know that what we register are intentional responses given under the request of the experimenter, so that the evidence arising from an experiment may be difficult to attribute to a particular stage of processing. No reader of Cognition doubts that he or she can represent phonemes mentally. Characters coming out of press or from the writer’s hand are costumed phonemes, or at least may be described as such. But at how many processing level(s) and how deeply do phonemes live in our minds‘? We take the phoneme issue as a good illustration both of the necessity of pursuing a “levels-of- processing” inquiry in the study of mental representations and of the misunder- standings and pitfalls this difficult study may be confronted with. In the seventh volume of this journal, our group demonstrated (at least we believe so) that the notion that speech can be represented as a sequence of phonemes does not arise as a natural consequence of cognitive maturation and informal linguistic cxpcrience (Morais, Cary, Alegria, & Bertelson, 1979). This claim was based on the discovery that illiterate adults are unable to manipulate phonemes intentionally, as evidenced by their inability to delctc “p” from “purse” or add “p” to “urso”. In a subsequent volume of this journal, under the guest editorship of Paul Bertelson. it was reported that Chinese non-alphabetic readers share with illiterates the lack of phonemic awareness (Read, Zhang, Nie, 81 Ding, 1986) and that the metaphonological failure of illiterates seems to be restricted to the phoneme. since they can both manipulate and ap- preciate rhyme (Morais. Bertelson. Cary. & Alegria, 1986). Later on, we observed that illiterates can compare short utterances for phonological length (Kolinsky, Cary, & Morais, 1987), which again suggests that conscious access to global phonological properties of speech utterances does not depend on literacy. We were happy that Cognition’s reviewers had understood the interest of our 1979 paper. As a matter of fact, we had submitted a former version of it to another journal, which rejected it on the basis of the comments of one reviewer who could not believe in our results given that, as Peter Eimas and others had shown (e.g., Eimas, Siqueland, Jusczyk, & Vigorito, 1971), American babies can perceive “phonemic” distinctions, like between “ba”, “da” and “ga”, fairly well. We are not complaining about reviewers- almost every paper of the present authors has greatly improved following reviewers’ criticisms - sincerely, we are almost grateful to the anonymous reviewer and presumably distinguished scholar who confounded perception and awareness. It was probably his or her reviewing that led us both to write: “the fact that illiterates are not aware of the phonetic .I. Morais, R. Kolinsky I Cognition 50 (1994) 2X7-297 289 structure of speech does not imply, of course, that they do not use segmenting routines at this level when they listen to speech” (Morais et al., 1979, p. 330), and to conclude the paper stressing the need “to distinguish between the prevalence of such or such a unit in segmenting routines at an unconscious level and the ease of access to the same units at a conscious, metalinguistic level” (p. 331). In the following years, we progressively realized that, as far as our own work was concerned, the battle to distinguish between perceptual and postperceptual representations had just begun. The work with illiterates and with non-alphabetic readers has contributed to nourish, if not to raise, the suspicion that the phoneme could be, after all, and despite our familiarity with it, a simple product of knowing an alphabet. Warren (1983) rightly called one’s to the danger of introspection in this domain: “Our exposure to alphabetic writing since early childhood may encourage U S t o accept the analysis of speech into a sequence of sounds as simply the recognition of a fact of nature” (p. 287). However, he has erroneously taken observations from the conscious awareness level as evidence of perceptual reality or non- reality. In the same paper, he listed the “experimental evidence that phonemes are not perceptual units” (our italics). In this list, the fact that “illiterate adults cannot segment phonetically” (p. 289) appears at the top. Some linguists have reached the same conclusion as far as the role of phonemes in the formal description of is concerned. Kaye (1989), for instance, announces “the death of the phoneme” (head of a section, p. 149), in the context of an attempt to demonstrate that “a phonology based on non-linear, multileveled representations is incompatible with the notion of a phoneme” (pp. 153-154). Is the phoneme dead? Did it ever exist otherwise than in the conscious of alphabetically literate minds ? Are phonemes the make-up of letters rather than letters the make-up of phonemes? Like Orfeo, we have to face the that constantly assault the visitors of perception. One may use perceptual illusions to fight against experimenters’ illusions. Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) have convincingly argued for “the centrality, in perceptual psychology, of experiments which turn on the creation of perceptual illusions” (p. 161). Besides its ability to demonstrate the direction of causality between two correlated states, the production of an implies that the perceiver has no full conscious control of the informational content of the illusion. Thus, information that is not consciously represented may, if it is represented at an unconscious perceptual level, influence the misperception. By looking at the informational content of the illusion, and having enough reasons to believe that part of this information cannot come from conscious representations, one is allowed to locate the representation of that part of the information at the unconscious perceptual system. Following the logic of illusory conjunctions (cf. Treisman & Schmidt, 1982), we took advantage of the technique to elicit illusions which 290 J. Morais, R. Kolinsky I C’ognition 50 (I 094) X7-297 should result from the erroneous combination of parts of information presented to one ear with parts of information presented to the opposite ear (see Kolinsky, 1992, and Kolinsky, Morais. & Cluytens. in press, for detailed description of the methodology). If speech attributes can be wrongly combined, they must have been separately registered as independent units at some earlier stage of process- ing. In our situation. since the subject is asked either to detect a word target previously specified or to identify the word presented in one particular ear, his or her attention is not called upon any word constituent. This experimental situation can thus be used for testing of illiterate as well as literate people. Recent data that we have obtained on Portuguese-speaking literate subjects (either European or Brazilian) indicate that the initial of CVCV utterances is the attribute that “migrates” the most. compared to migrations of and either voicing or of the initial consonant (Kolinsky & Morais, 1993). Subsequent testing of Portuguese-speaking illiterate subjects, again from both Portugal and Brazil, yielded the same pattern of results (Morais, Kolinsky, & Paiva, unpublished). This means that, at least for Por- tuguese, have psychological reality at the perceptual level of process- ing, and that the role of consonants in speech perception can be demonstrated in a population that is unable to represent them consciously. Phonemes are not a mere product of alphabetic literacy, at least-we insist-in Portuguese native speakers. The very same populations which allowed us to show that conscious representations of phonemes are prompted by the learning of alphabetic literacy provide also a clear suggestion that unconscious perceptual representations of phonemes can develop prior to the onset of literacy. Portuguese and Brazilian subjects possess unconscious representations of phonemes without disposing of conscious ones. The reverse picture can also be found. Testing French native speakers on French material. we found low rates of initial consonant migration (Kolinsky, 1992; Kolinsky et al., in press). At the particular stage of processing tapped by the attribute migration phenomenon French-speaking listeners do not seem to represent consonants (the possibility that consonants are represented at other perceptual stages cannot be excluded), at least they do not do so as much as Portuguese-speaking listeners, but, given that they were university students, we may be confident that they possess conscious representations of phonemes. This double dissociation supports the idea that conscious and unconscious representations of phonemes form two func- tionally distinct sets of mental representations. However, distinctiveness does not mean necessarily independence. Two functionally distinct systems may interact with each other. Thus, it is important to address both issues. Phonological processing intervenes in different functions. It intervenes in perceiving and producing speech. in reading and writing, and in the different forms of metaphonological behavior. .I. Morais, R. Kolinsky I Cognition 50 (1994) 287-297 291

The perception and production of speech require distinct systems. Indeed, production can be affected by a lesion in Broca’s area while leaving recognition of auditory intact, and the reverse may be true for a lesion in Wernicke’s area. Thus, separate representations are needed for input and output processing. As far as the independence issue is concerned, very little interference was observed on reading aloud words by having to monitor at the same time for a target word in a list of auditorily presented words (Shallice, McLeod, & Lewis, 1985). Both Shallice et al.‘s finding and the fact that auditory word input does not activate the area specifically activated by word repetition and word reading aloud as shown by positron emission tomographic (PET) imagery (Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1989) suggest that processing in the input system might be quite independent from processing in the output system. The two input functions, that is, the recognition of written and spoken words, also use distinct phonological systems. Moreover, written word pronunciation does not activate the Wernicke’s area that is activated during word repetition (Howard et al., 1992). Since behavioral studies have provided evidence of automatic activation of phonological representations of word constituents, includ- ing phonemes, during orthographic processing (Ferrand & Grainger, 1992; Perfetti & Bell, 1991; Perfetti, Bell, & Delaney, 19&S), these phonological representations would be distinct and to a large extent independent from those involved in spoken word recognition. However, let us note that the automatic phonological activation during skilled word reading has probably very little in common, except from a developmental point of view, with the intentional assignment of phonological values to letters and groups of letters that is mostly used in the reading of illegal sequences or of long and phonologically complex pseudowords. We have argued above that conscious representations of phonemes are distinct from the unconscious representations of phonemes used in spoken word recogni- tion, and we might consider now whether or not they are distinct, too, from the representations of phonemes which are intentionally activated in reading. Is phonological dyslexia, which is characterized above all by a highly selective impairment in reading pseudowords and nonwords, concomitant with a severe deficiency in manipulating phonemes consciously? Based on the ability to perform phonemic manipulations displayed by a patient diagnosed as phonological dyslexic, Bisiacchi, Cipolotti, and Denes (1989) suggested that the representa- tions involved in pseudoword reading and in phonemic manipulations are independent in skilled readers. However, the data are not convincing. As a matter of fact, the patient’s impairment in pseudoword reading was slight, she knew the phonemic values of all the letters of the alphabet, and she could read and write a very high number of meaningless syllables (cf. discussion in Morais, 1993). More recently, Patterson and Marcel (1992) suggested that the nonword reading deficit “may be just one symptom of a more general disruption to phonological processing” (p. 259). They presented the results of six phonological dyslexics. all displaying a severe deficit in nonword reading, on both the intentional segmentation and assembling of phonemes. An interesting dissociation was observed between these two tasks, since all subjects were exceedingly poor at assembling three phonemes, but two of them could delete the initial consonant of a short utterance on about 80%~ of the trials. The nonword reading deficit of these patients might be due mainly to deficiency in assembling. At least for the two patients who could delete initial phonemes, there might be no deficiency in accessing phonology from orthography: unfortunately, the authors do not give any indication on the patients’ knowledge of grapheme-phoneme corre- spondences. In collaboration with Philippe Mousty. the first author has tested three phonological dyslexics (more exactly. two of them were deep dyslexics). and one surface dyslexic on different metaphonological tests (see Morais, 1903). The surface dyslexic (J.S.). who displayed no effect of lcxicality in either reading or writing, but a large effect of regularity. was only slightly impaired in his conscious phonemic abilities (in reading, too, there were a number of single consonant confusions, suggesting a slight impairment in his grapho-phonological conversion procedure, besides his impairment in the addressed procedure). All the three phonological dyslexics (V.D., P.R. and R.V.) were extremely poor at nonword reading, and no one of them displayed a regularity effect. Intcrcstingly, all wcrc also extremely poor at the phonemic tests, performing around chance level: two of them performed much better on rhyming judgement and on tests requiring a conscious analysis of utterances into syllables than on the phonemic tests. Thus, when the reading deficit spares the mechanism of phonological assembling. phonemic awareness is still present; but in those cases where phonological assembling is dramatically damaged phonemic awareness is not observed, the patients behaving in the metaphonological tests like illiterate people. Rc-education of the assembling procedure re-installs phonemic awareness. P.S.. the deep dyslexic whose re-education was described by de Partz (1986) and who, immediately before re-education, was unable to associate letters with phonemes. attained a very high level of performance on both pseudoword reading and phonemic analysis when WC tested him a few years later. The assembling procedure in reading (which. we repeat, may not be the only mechanism involving phonological representations in word reading) seems thus to depend on the same phoneme representations that are evoked for the purpose of intentional, conscious manipulations of phonemes. More recently, we could test J.S.. V.D.. P.R. and one further phonological dyslexic (S.A.) on the speech dichotic test we have designed for the induction of attribute migration errors (unpublished data). Their results were compared with those of control subjects of the same age and educational level. We wanted to J. Morais, R. Kc&sky I Cognirion -50 (1994) 287-297 293 know if people phonologically impaired both in conscious phonemic analysis and in phonological assembling in reading would show the same pattern of attribute migration in as normal listeners. The results were very clear. J.S., the surface dyslexic, obtained an overall correct detection score as poor as the phonological dyslexics, but he was the only patient who showed the normal pattern of migrations for French, that is, a high rate of migrations for syllable, followed by moderate rates for first and voicing of the initial consonant, and a low rate for initial consonant. All the phonological dyslexics failed to obtain migrations for syllables, and their migra- tion rates for initial consonant were even lower than those obtained by the normals. It should be noted that, with the exception of J.S., who was good at repeating both words and nonwords, all the other patients displayed good word repetition but relatively low nonword repetition. Among the phonological dyslexics, V.D. and P.R. had been diagnosed as Broca’s aphasics, but S.A. as Wernicke’s, thus precluding a clear association to one type of . What are we allowed to infer from these correlational data? The distinctiveness of conscious and unconscious representations of phonemes cannot be questioned, given that it was clearly supported by the dissociation observed in illiterate people. Thus. there are two ways to interpret the impairments observed in our phonological patients. One interpretation is that the cerebral damage they had undergone was wide enough to affect two relatively localized systems of repre- sentation, that is, the representations used in speech perception and those used in assembling and in conscious operations. The alternative is to conceive that these two systems of representation, though distinct, entertain dependency relations with each other. We do not dispose of neuro-anatomical data about our patients which would be sufficiently precise to try to match the areas damaged with types of deficit. However, it may be useful to inspect the literature to evaluate how distant the areas supporting conscious and unconscious phonological representations could be from each other if they are not coincident. Recently, Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, and Gjedde (1992) reported that phonetic decoding is accomplished in part of Broca’s area near the junction with the premotor cortex. The evidence comes from an increase of activation, measured with PET, in that area in a task requiring to decide whether two syllables ended or not with the same consonant, in comparison with passive listening of the same speech material. Yet, the task used involves much more than phonetic decoding. It is a rather sophisticated metaphonological task, which illiterates would be unable to perform. Thus, the true implication of Zatorre et al.‘s finding is that a part of Broca’s area is involved in conscious phonemic analysis. Phonetic decoding is obligatorily and automatically triggered whenever people hear speech stimuli. Thus, it occurs even under passive listening. Activation of temporal parietal structures posterior to the sylvian fissure occurs during passive 294 J. Morais, R. Kolinsky i Cognition SO (lYY4) 287-297

listening, whereas frontal activation anterior to this fissure occurs for articulation, as shown by other neural imaging studies (cf. Petersen et al., 1989). As Petersen et al. comment. “the activation of the left temporoparietal focus during passive auditory word presentation, but not for auditory clicks or tones, makes this area a good candidate for phonological of words” (p. 163). Since, on the other hand. the neural circuits that subserve articulation appear to host phonemic awareness processes in people who know an alphabet, it seems that conscious and unconscious representations of phonemes rely on different-though, as could be expected, relatively close - brain areas. It would be interesting to assess whether or not activation of an additional area is obtained with a discrimination task, that is, which requires the subject to decide whether two speech stimuli are the same or different, in comparison with the passive listening situation. The discrimination task implies an intentional judge- ment (in this sense, it is metaphonological), but it requires only the global matching of two conscious percepts (in this last sense, it involves recognition, and it may therefore be much closer to perception). Our expectation, however, is that activation elicited by the speech discrimination would be similar to that observed in passive listening. This prediction is based on the fact that, as reported by Petersen et al. (1989), a rhyming task, thus a metaphonological but non-analytical task. using visual input implicated the temporoparietal cortex. Worth noting also is a case of word deafness in a patient with a left temporoparietal infarct, involving most of the superior temporal gyrus, and with a subsequent right hemisphere infarct involving again the superior temporal gyrus (Praamstra, Hagoort, Maassen, & Crul, 1991). The second stroke caused a specific deficit in an auditory lexical decision task, suggesting that auditory processes dependent on the previously intact right hemisphere have for some time compensated for the left hemisphere damage. Comparison of discrimination and identification functions for and consonants suggests that there was a phonetic deficit, presumably prior to the second stroke. Interestingly, despite the auditory and phonetic impairment, the patient was able, even after the second stroke, to perform a (in some sense) metaphonological task requiring him to judge whether two disyllabic words began (ended) or not with the same syllable. Very precise phonetic decoding was probably not necessary in this syllable- matching task, so that the task may have been accomplished on the basis of the residual auditory and/or phonetic capacities. The task is formally similar to the one used by Zatorrc et al. (1992). but it concerns syllables rather than phonemes. We predict that it would not yield the anterior activation that Zatorre et al. found. The neuro-anatomical and neuropsychological data available up to now do not indicate a consistent dissociation between phonological and metaphonological representations as unitary ensembles. Among phonological units and properties, phonemes may be the only ones to present such a dissociation. The conscious J. Morais, R. Kolinsky I Cognition 50 (1994) 287-297 295 representations of phonemes appear to be selectively dissociated, on a neural basis, from the processes of phonetic decoding. Our results with illiterates using the migration phenomenon on the one hand, and the conscious phonemic manipulation tasks on the other hand, are consistent with the neural data. What functional dependency relations might the conscious and unconscious representations of phonemes entertain with each other? From unconscious to conscious representations, the dependency relation may be trivial. In in which perceptual processing at the phonemic level may be crucial for the quality of the global conscious speech percept, the activation of unconscious representa- tions ultimately constrains the elaboration of conscious representations. The reverse dependency relation is theoretically more interesting. As we discuss elsewhere (Morais & Kolinsky, in press), the acquisition of phonemic awareness may elicit supplementary and perhaps more efficient procedures to cope with spoken words. We found evidence for a (sometimes useful) strategy of listening based on attention to the phonemic structure of words in the dichotic listening situation, and even when the stimuli are simply presented against a noise background (Castro, 1992; Castro & Morais, in preparation; Morais, Castro, Scliar-Cabral, Kolinsky, & Content, 1987). Other indications that attentional focusing on phonemes may lead to improved word recognition include Nusbaum, Walley, Carrell, and Ressler’s (1982) observation that listeners may avoid the illusion of phoneme restoration by focusing attention on the critical phoneme. However, the stage of processing at which these influences occur remains an open question. Remember that orthographic representations may also influence rhyming judgements on spoken words (Seidenberg & Tanenhaus, 1979), detec- tion of phonemes (Taft & Hambly, 1985) as well as the occurrence of phonologi- cal fusions in dichotic listening (see Morais, Castro, & Kolinsky, 1991). However, written word input does not seem to activate the areas devoted to the perceptual processing of spoken words. The effects of strategies based on conscious phonemic representations, as well as orthographic effects, may take place between perception and recognition-a land that remains unexplored and that is perhaps unexplorable with our present techniques. To conclude, in spite of attempted murder, the phoneme is still alive. It seems that it is not a mere convention. It would have a perceptual as well as a postperceptual reality, and therefore it deserves further and more systematic exploration.

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