CONCLUSION

FATHER OF THE MODERN AGE

Patrick J. Speelman

When the ink dried on the final treaty and the last soldiers returned to their garrisons, breathed a sigh of relief. The Seven Years’ War was over. But how did it finally end? What did the war accomplish? And to what purpose did it serve? How was it understood? Historians have poured both energy and effort into understanding the war’s origins—the Diplomatic Revolution, Anglo-French rivalries in North America, unset- tled business in Germany—that the peace itself is either overshadowed or compartmentalized within the ‘’ idea.1 But there was no Congress like Westphalia, Utrecht or even Aix-La-Chapelle. Only the Austrian leader Kaunitz (and no doubt the bedeviled Saxons) desired such a diplomatic framework to end the conflict. If the war itself is a difficult thing to demarcate and define, then the peace really defies classification.2 The Treaty of Paris was but one of four (technically five) major peace treaties that ‘wound down’ the conflict and abated its fury.3 They were all separate and unilateral, but yet interconnected at the same time. This sug- gests an aberration. If one includes the end of the Anglo-Cherokee strug- gle with the Treaty of Long-Island-on-the-Holston (1761) and the Treaty of

1 The Anglocentric nature of the literature generally sees the Treaty of Paris as the end of the war (with an exclamation point) and over-emphasizes the Anglo-French conflict at the expense of understanding the drawn-out nature and inter-connectedness of the peace- making of 1762–63. See, Zenab Esmat Rashad, The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951), Barry M. Gough, British Mercantile Interests in the Making of the Peace of Paris, 1763: Trade, War and Empire (Lewistown, NY: Edward Mellen Press, 1992), and Fred Anderson, “The Peace of Paris, 1763,” chap. 3 in The Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath of War, eds. Williamson Murray and James Lacey (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 2 For an overview of peace-making styles and classifications see Heinz Durckhardt, “Peace Treaties from Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era,” chap. 3 in Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 45–58. 3 They include: St. Petersburg, Hamburg, Paris and Hubertusburg (with signing separate agreements with Austria and ). The complete texts are found in volume 42 (1760–64) of The Consolidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1969). 520 patrick j. speelman

Charlestowne (1762), any attempt to fit it into the diplomatic progress of peace-making between Westphalia (1648), via Vienna (1815), and ulti- mately to Versailles (1919) is even more discomforting and discontinuous.

A Piecemeal Peace

First the war’s end must be understood within the context of the ‘Dip­ lomatic Revolution of 1762’ that saw Russia’s leaving the coalition against Prussia (and briefly joining its former enemy) and making peace unilater- ally. This act, triggered by the Czarina Elizabeth’s death in January 1762 and the accession of the Pro-Prussian Duke Karl Peter Ulrich of Holstein- Gottorp to the throne as Czar Peter III, led to the Treaty of St. Petersburg (5 March 1762). In it Russia renounced its treaty with Austria and agreed to vacate Prussian territory. Peter went further and in secret articles agreed to Prussia’s provisioning of Russian troops not withdrawn in a timely manner (to be used for his much-desired war with Denmark) and began details on a Russo-Prussian military alliance. The unpopularity of his Prussian and Danish policies and his inability to consolidate his throne led to his ouster in July 1762, the seizure of power by his wife, who became Czarina Catherine II, and the revocation of the military alliance with Prussia. More importantly Catherine decided against recommencing war against Prussia, and therefore ratified the Petersburg agreement. Without Russia, Austria’s war to recover Silesia stood at the crossroads.4 More difficulties had mounted in the mean time. The change of course in Russia and the impending peace between it and Prussia compelled the Swedish Diet to come to terms with Frederick. It was financially and mor- ally bankrupted by the war. Stockholm had decided on peace in December 1761. By May 1762 and fearful of what a Russo-Prussian alliance might bring, the country of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII approached Frederick through his sister, Sweden’s own Queen Louise Ulrike.5 Although Frederick would later write that he had forgotten he was even at war with Sweden, he no doubt was happy to acquire a status quo antebellum peace with the Treaty of Hamburg (22 May 1762). Two weeks later the

4 The best overall narrative and summary of the peace-making events in Europe of 1762 is Franz A.J. Szabo, The Seven Years’ War in Europe (Harlow: Pearson, 2008), especially chap. 7. Much of the following narrative is derived from this important book. 5 Frederick II, “History of the Seven Years War, Part II,” in Posthumous Works of Frederic II, King of Prussia, trans. Thomas Holcroft (London: G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1789), 3: 263.