Gale Primary Sources Start at the source.

British Foreign Policy During the Seven Years’ War (1749-63)

Matt J. Schumann

Eastern Michigan University

Various source media, State Papers Online

EMPOWER™ RESEARCH Both before and during the Seven Years' War (1756-63), allies against France. During and after the peace British foreign policy primarily reflected a strategic negotiations, he sought to contain French ambitions. By rivalry with France. The two powers confronted each 1752, his initiatives had apparently won success other during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740- overseas and brought much of Europe into alignment 48), but British leaders extended the contest into with British aims, but his achievement was illusory: its peacetime. British diplomatic activity made France collapse triggered the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756, appear weaker around the globe and isolated in Europe and ultimately the Seven Years' War. by 1752, but crucial missteps soon undermined both The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ended the War of the the peace and Britain's international standing. By 1756, Austrian Succession in 1748,[1] but conflated European a dramatic reversal of alliances caused contemporaries and colonial issues, and neglected new realities in to proclaim a diplomatic revolution. With allies limited Northern and Eastern Europe. Parisian wits mocked it to Prussia, Hanover and a few smaller German states, with a new phrase: bête comme la paix. Particularly British policy also shifted from extensive alliance “stupid” from their perspective was Louis XV's consent diplomacy to limiting their own commitments. to exile his popular ally and guest, the Jacobite Prince Ministers sold the public on “winning America in Charles Edward Stuart. British agents eagerly tracked Germany,” but Anglo-Spanish and Anglo-Prussian the prince's whereabouts, and pursued rumours that relations suffered as Britain triumphed in the Atlantic the neutral island of Tobago had been deeded to French World. By 1763, the Treaty of Paris formalized the general Maurice de Saxe.[2] Meanwhile, the London largest territorial transfer of the early modern era— Gazette advertised the new settlement at Halifax, which mostly at French expense—while that of Hubertusburg would soon tilt the ethnic and military balance in Nova marked the start of Britain's era of “splendid isolation”. Scotia in favour of British immigrants.[3] Newcastle and I. his allies, in short, pursued peace on British terms.

From 1713 to 1744, the Anglo-French rivalry lay That pursuit even exceeded the written scope of the dormant, yet Robert Walpole's fall and the War of the treaty. Anglo-Prussian ties briefly warmed with Henry Austrian Succession combined to reawaken it. Thomas Legge's mission in 1748,[4] but the disgrace of French Pelham-Holles, 1st Duke of Newcastle emerged from envoy Count Jean Armand de l'Estocq heralded an even Walpole's shadow as Britain's leading foreign policy greater triumph for Britain's position in St. voice by the mid-1740s, as British and French forces Petersburg.[5] A Russo-Prussian-Swedish war scare came increasingly into contact. His antigallican streak known as the Northern Crisis invited possibilities for mirrored the British public's, following George II's British intervention, yet Newcastle instructed envoys victory against the French at Dettingen (1743), British Robert Keith and John Carmichael, 3rd Earl Hyndford, to colonists' conquest of Louisbourg, and Hanoverian dampen his allies' enthusiasm for war.[6] The crisis triumph over the last major Jacobite Rebellion (both abated with Britain's limited accession to the Austro- 1745-46). During wartime, Newcastle sought Russian alliance in October 1750, but Newcastle continuously to focus his Austrian, Dutch and Sardinian observed of French subsidy treaties in the Baltic:

“France has now wisely found out, that a little money kept vigilant against French settlements in West Africa well applied in peace may save millions in war, (and) and the Caribbean.[13] enable them to continue a peace, or begin a new war… Deadlock in Europe and fluidity overseas undermined whenever her interest, or her ambition, shall incline

[7] the apparent British triumph. Keith could not seal the her to it.” Imperial Election, Anglo-Dutch talks stalled on troops He sought to answer this threat with his own scheme in in the Austrian Netherlands, and new French forts Germany. He took an idea from Charles Hanbury panicked Anglo-American colonists.[14] Instructions of 28 Williams, his envoy in Saxony, to build a league of August 1753 called for a vigorous colonial defense, but German princes around the election of Austria's all efforts failed in 1754 while Newcastle's position Archduke Joseph as King of the Romans, or heir- weakened at home.[15] British hopes rose in March 1755, apparent as Holy Roman Emperor. Votes from Austria as Austrian State Chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz (Bohemia) and George II's Electorate of Hanover would requested direct Anglo-Russian talks. Williams took up be automatic, and with Anglo-Dutch funds and backing the task in April, and concluded a treaty in September from Austrian and Russian troops, Newcastle for £100,000 in peacetime subsidies, £500,000 for anticipated a coalition featuring Bavaria, Cologne and wartime.[16] Yet Frederick II of Prussia sought to end Saxony.[8] Needing only Trier and Mainz for a super- Anglo-Prussian tensions, and concluded a convention majority, he foresaw a pliant Prussia and a quiet, of neutrality at Westminster, signed 16 January isolated France. By 1753, Franco-Prussian strains were 1756.[17] Both sides believed they had allayed their evident even in London, yet Newcastle failed to address partners' concerns; in fact, they had laid the broader concerns about British meddling in German groundwork for a reversal of European alliances.[18] politics, and fears of Prussian aggression ultimately The Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 is often remarked for ended serious thought about an early Imperial

[9] the sudden emergence of new coalitions, particularly election. the Austro-French alliance. The two powers announced The Election Plan was, however, only the centerpiece of the First Treaty of Versailles in June, stunning a larger effort. Commodore Augustus Keppel renewed contemporaries with the news, in effect, of British and treaties with the Barbary States in 1751, while British Prussian isolation.[19] Newcastle proposed one last ambassador to Spain Benjamin Keene capitalized on scheme: a vast counter-coalition. Joseph Yorke the friendly attitude of Spain's King Ferdinand VI.[10] A answered from The Hague that Britain had more to gain treaty in October 1750 greatly reduced tensions over from watching, waiting, and building an alliance with the Asiento[11] and Gibraltar, and British diplomats aided Prussia.[20] Spanish reconciliation with Sardinia and Austria, sealed

[12] The Anglo-Prussian alliance was not yet secure, but by the 1752 Treaty of Aranjuez. British ascendancy in was quickly becoming so. In May, Frederick welcomed India also seemed assured after victory at Arcot, British the British envoy Andrew Mitchell and the opportunity settlers and traders advanced in several regions of for closer ties. As the Treaty of Versailles became North America, and British mariners and commissaries

known, he anticipated Yorke's insights about reducing Henry highlighted imminent threats to the American British commitments, and he took British advice to colonies.[28] Prussian triumphs at Rossbach and Leuthen clarify Austrian intentions before starting his own war.[21] arguably saved the entire war effort late in 1757, and British and Prussian envoys worked together in Vienna spurred serious reconsideration of Britain's role in the as early as February, and Frederick advised the British German theatre.[29] in May of a new French envoy in St. Petersburg.[22] By Foremost among Britain's commitments was the August, Walter Titley received orders to work with Prussian alliance itself, undergirding Pitt's vision of Johann August von Haessler, his Prussian counterpart “winning America in Germany.” Joseph Yorke and the in Copenhagen, and to use the three states' shared Prussian Baron Heinrich Dodo von Knyphausen joined official Protestantism as a pretext for closer

[23] talks for an official treaty, signed 11 April 1758, ties. Finally, commenting on Frederick's invasion of featuring a wartime subsidy of £670,000 per Saxony in September, Northern Secretary Robert [30] th year. Meanwhile, British leaders nullified Hanover's d'Arcy, 4 Earl Holdernesse, accurately represented neutrality and remobilized “His Britannic Majesty's Britain's new diplomatic position: “There is nothing left

[24] Army in Germany,” with all but 5,000 electoral troops for us but to wish success to our ally.” funded from British coffers. Frederick offered some II. cavalry and a new commander for the army—Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick—and British soldiers entered Entering the Seven Years' War, British alliances were the theatre through Emden in Prussian more informal than official, resting heavily on Prussia [31] Ostfriesland. British ministers kept a regular and a treaty with Hesse-Cassel signed in 1755.[25] The correspondence with Prince Ferdinand throughout his war effort stalled until 1757, enabling Prussia and campaigns, and Anglo-Prussian relations arguably Hanover to emerge as key partners; yet despite the peaked with a marriage proposal for Frederick's collapse of Newcastle's ministry, the focus on France nephew, the future King Frederick Wilhelm II, in remained. Pitt's addition to the ministry added new [32] November 1759. Behind the lines, British diplomats energy to the war effort, and a major turn in British played vital roles in espionage and secret missions, policy away from Europe and toward the Atlantic World. alongside their public functions. James Hollford monitored the war from Genoa, and Onslow Burrish The war's expansion brought numerous reverses by sent early reports from southern Germany; amid failing 1756. German mercenaries came to protect England Anglo-Austrian relations, Robert Keith forwarded from invasion; the navy failed at Minorca; British copies of the Vienna Gazette; George Cressener colonists felt threatened from Calcutta to the forwarded intelligence and intercepted mail from Carolinas.[26] The government collapsed at year's end, Cologne and later Maastricht; Dutch agents under the forcing Frederick to wait six months before the Pitt- names of Marteville and Wilkinson offered information Newcastle ministry took office.[27] The king had lost at from Sweden.[33] James Porter welcomed the Prussian Kolín by then; blunders in western Germany ended in a agents Albert Friedrich de Varenne and Karl Adolf von convention of neutrality; atrocities at Fort William

Rexin in Constantinople; Samuel von Cocceji worked Austrians took Schweidnitz; yet at the start of 1762, the with several British envoys in Italy; James Murray death of Czarina Elizabeth and Spain's entry into the helped Frederick to commission privateers in war suddenly reversed the trend. Despite the best Venice.[34] Diplomatic intercepts from London fill another efforts of John Stuart, 4th Earl Bute, who took over 28 volumes of the State Papers.[35] And while diplomatic leadership from Pitt and Newcastle in 1761-62, orders in Northern Europe trumpeted the “Protestant Frederick denounced all attempts to renegotiate the Cause,” British diplomats in the south briefly sought British tie, set his diplomats to sabotage the new military aid from Sardinia, and worked more broadly to ministry, and closed ranks with St. Petersburg.[40] The unite Catholic Spain, Naples, Sardinia and even Venice war finally ended with two separate treaties, early in in their opposition to France and Austria.[36] 1763. That of Paris was remarkable for the scale of French territorial concessions; that of Hubertusburg More generally, however, British agents sought to limit mandated among its Prussian, Saxon and Austrian the war. Frederick appeared at several points to signatories a rarity in eighteenth century diplomacy—a release his British allies for their war on France, and [41] return to the status quo ante bellum. Britain ended the British ministers and envoys duly broke common Seven Years' War in “splendid isolation”: lacking strong cause. Despite welcoming Prussian agents, Porter diplomatic ties all across Europe, and eminently remained skeptical of Ottoman intervention; despite the triumphant over a defeated but vengeful France. Russo-Prussian war, British agents favored trade with St. Petersburg over Prussian requests for ships in the Baltic.[37] Pitt's revitalization of Britain's war effort ENDNOTES galvanized privateers, yet he worked both diplomatically and within the Admiralty to contain their [1] Preliminary articles, 19/30 April 1748, TNA SP 108/104; Final Treaty with secret article, 7/18 October 1748, SP 108/110-11. Spanish excesses, not least against Spain.[38] Despite what Accession to preliminaries and final treaty, 17/28 June and 9/20 October 1748, SP 108/508, 510. Newcastle dubbed a “glorious reinforcement” in 1760,

[2] with British troops in Germany reaching a total of Entries for 25 October and 27 November 1748, "Chronological Series of Events in the Prosecution of the Present War from Signing th 22,000, the overall effort increasingly focused on naval the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle on the 7 of October 1748," William L. Clements Library (WLCL), Charles Townshend MSS 296.6.1. See also and colonial operations.[39] British planners likely could Bedford's initial instructions to Yorke, 2/13 February 1748/9, TNA SP 78/232/2; same to same, 16/27 February and 2/13 March 1748/9, SP not have anticipated the effects of their triumphs 78/232/16, 38-39. overseas, but damage to French finances by 1760 had [3] London Gazette, nos. 8829-8839; see also TNA CO 5/6 visible consequences for the fighting in Central Europe. [4] TNA SP 90/64

British victories also affected peace negotiations, [5] TNA SP 91/47.

beyond the desire of the young King George III to end [6] Yorke to Bedford, 25 February / 8 March 1749, TNA SP 78/232/37. the war. Already in 1759, there was no question of See also TNA SP 80/181-84; SP 91/49-51.

Britain being senior partner in the alliance, while Prussia struggled to survive. That struggle nearly ended in 1761 as Russian troops seized Kolberg and the

[7] Newcastle to Hardwicke, 25 August 1749 (OS), British Library (BL) [22] Keith to Holdernesse, 11 February 1756, and Holdernesse to Keith, Add. MSS 35410, f.127. See also TNA SP 108/187, SP 108/435-437. 23 March 1756, TNA SP 80/197; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 27 May 1756, SP 90/65. [8] TNA SP 80/184-91; 81/98-102; SP 81/127; SP 88/71-74. See also SP 108/188-90, SP 108/268; D.B. Horn, "The Origins of the Proposed [23] Keith to Holdernesse, 11 February 1756, and Holdernesse to Keith, Election of a King of the Romans, 1748-50," English Historical Review, 23 March 1756, TNA SP 80/197; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 27 May 1756, 42:167 (1927), 361-70. SP 90/65.

[9] Pelham to Newcastle, 28 July 1753, BL Add. MSS 32732/1, ff.373-74; [24] Holdernesse to Newcastle, 4 September 1756, BL Add MSS 32867, TNA SP 80/185-89; SP 81/158, part B f.231. See also Holdernesse to Mitchell, 8 and 17 September 1756, TNA SP 90/66. [10] WLCL Townshend MSS, 297.1. See also TNA SP 71/9-10, 24, 29; SP 94/135-42. [25] Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Hesse-Cassel, 18 June 1755, TNA SP 108/269. [11] The right granted by Spain to Britain in 1713 to supply slaves and goods to Spanish colonies. [26] TNA SP 87/27/1-45; ADM 7/946; CO 5/7.

[12] Anglo-Spanish treaty of 24 September / 5 October 1750, TNA [27] TNA SP 90/68-69. See also J.C.D. Clark, Dynamics of Change: the 108/513. For British diplomats in talks for Aranjuez, see TNA SP Crisis of the 1750s and English Party Systems (Cambridge, 1982). 80/188-90; SP 92/59-60; SP 94/139-41. [28] TNA SP 87/27/46-68; for the colonies, see I.K. Steele, Betrayals: Fort [13] TNA SP 78/234-39; WLCL Mildmay MSS, vols.2, 3, 5. William Henry and the "Massacre" (Oxford, 1990).

[14] TNA SP 80/193-97, SP 84/461-69; e.g. Holdernesse to Keith, public [29] Correspondence on both battles appears in TNA SP 90/70. and secret letters of 7 January 1755, SP 80/195. [30] For some of the earliest discussion of terms, see Mitchell to [15] Holdernesse to Governors in America, 28 August 1753, TNA CO 5/6, Holdernesse, 24 October 1757, most secret, TNA SP 90/70. For ff.92-93; Holdernesse to Dinwiddie, 28 August 1753, CO 5/211. negotiations and the treaty itself, see the correspondence between Holdernesse and Yorke, SP 90/71; Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Alliance, [16] Keith to Holdernesse, 4 March 1755, separate, TNA SP 80/195; 11 April 1758, SP 108/422. Holdernesse to Dickens, 11 April 1755, Holdernesse to Williams, 11 April 1755, public, very secret, and separate and secret letters, SP [31] For Prince Ferdinand, see Holdernesse to Amherst, 29 November 91/60. Williams to Holdernesse, 27 September and 2 October 1755, 1757 and Amherst to Holdernesse, 24 November 1757, TNA SP SP 91/61; Convention of St. Petersburg, 19/30 September 1755, SP 87/27/69-70; direct correspondence with Prince Ferdinand starts in 108/438. SP 87/33. For Emden, see De Laval to Wallace, 23 March 1758, SP 84/480; Prince Ferdinand to Münchhausen, 12 April 1758, SP 87/33/8. [17] Geheime Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz (GStAPK) Rep.96.32H, K; BL Add. MSS 32856-62; Convention of Westminster, 16 [32] TNA SP 87/33-40, 46-47; Frederick to Knyphausen, 9 November January 1756, TNA SP 108/421. 1759, Knyphausen to Frederick, 27 November 1759, GStAPK Rep.96.32B, ff.329, 350. [18] Announcement and foreign reaction appears in Holdernesse to Keith, 20 January 1756, and Keith to Holdernesse, 4 February 1756, [33] TNA SP 79/21-22; SP 80/198; SP 81/106; SP 81/128-37; SP 95/102- TNA SP 80/197; Corry to Holdernesse, 21 February 1756, and 03. Williams to Holdernesse, 17 February 1756, SP 91/62; Bristol to Fox, 7 February 1756, SP 92/64; Gray to Fox, 9 March 1756, SP 93/14; [34] Frederick II to Varenne, 27 June 1756, TNA SP 97/39; Frederick II to Porter to Fox, 2 April 1756, SP 97/39. Porter, 23 February 1758, SP 97/40; Extract of Secret Instructions for Cocceji, given 14 March 1759 at Breslau, given at London, 4 April [19] Upon first news of the treaty, the cabinet ordered a copy sent to 1759, SP 90/73; Wood to Mackenzie, 20 April 1759, and Knyphausen to Berlin. Holdernesse to Mitchell, 8 June 1756, TNA SP 90/65. See also Pitt to Mackenzie to Cocceji, 20 April 1759, SP 92/67; privateering Bristol to Fox, 17 April and 9 June 1756, SP 92/64; Porter to Fox, 16 commission attached to Murray to Pitt, 19 March 1760, SP 99/68. June 1756, SP 97/39. [35] TNA SP 107/64-91. [20] Newcastle to Yorke, 11 June 1756, very private, BL Add. MSS 32865, ff.257-66; Newcastle to Hardwicke (Yorke's father), 12 June [36] TNA SP 75/101-11; 84/476-95; SP 92:64-69; SP 93:14-19; SP 1756, ibid., ff.277-78; Yorke to Newcastle, 18 June 1756, very 94:153-161, SP 99:66-68. private, ibid., ff.341-44.

[37] Mitchell to Holdernesse, 9 December 1756, TNA SP 90/67; Yorke to [21] Mitchell to Holdernesse, 14 May 1756, very secret, and 7 June 1756, Holdernesse, 26 April 1758, separate, SP 90/71. More generally, see secret, TNA SP 90/65; Holdernesse to Mitchell, 9 July, 13 July, 6 SP 90/65-69; SP 91/61-67; SP 97/39-41. August 1756, ibid.; Mitchell to Holdernesse, 12, 17 and 20 August 1756, SP 90/66.

[38] Letter from Valletta to Madrid, 23 December 1756, concerning Corbett, J.S., England in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Combined the Sark privateer, TNA SP 94/154; Keene to Pitt, 6 and 17 March Strategy (London, 1907). 1757, and Holdernesse to Keene, 19 April 1757, most secret and separate letters, all concerning the Antigallican, ibid. See also the Danley M. and Speelman, P., eds., The Seven Years' War: Global letter of marque for the Antigallican, 2 July 1756, TNA HCA 26/5, f.96. Views (Leiden, 2012).

Dann, U., Hanover and Great Britain 1740-1760 (Leicester, 1991). [39] Newcastle to Yorke, 20 May 1760, BL Add. MSS 32906, ff. 158-59; TNA CO 5/6-7; ADM 1/89. Doran, P., Andrew Mitchell and Anglo-Prussian Diplomatic Relations during the Seven Years War(New York, 1986). [40] TNA SP 90/77-82; GStAPK Rep.96.33A-G; K.W. Schweizer, England, Dorn, W.L., "Frederick the Great and Lord Bute," Journal of Modern Prussia and the Seven Years War: Studies in Alliance Policies and History, 1:4 (1929), 529-560. Diplomacy (Lewiston, 1989). Dull, J., The French Navy and the Seven Years' War (Lincoln, 2005). [41] TNA SP 78/251-56; SP 108/119-24; Z. Rashed, The Peace of Paris, Eldon, C.W., England's Subsidy Policy Towards the Continent During the 1763 (Liverpool, 1951). Seven Years' War(Philadelphia, 1938).

Grant, W.L. "Canada Versus Guadeloupe, An Episode of the Seven Years' War,", American Historical Review, 17:4 (1912), 735-43.

Grenier, J., The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710- 1760 (Norman, 2008). BIBLIOGRAPHY Harding, N., Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 (Woodbridge, 2007). Anderson, F., Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of British North America, 1754-66(London, 2000). Harding, R., Sea Power and Naval Warfare 1650-1830 (London, 1999).

Baugh, D., "Great Britain's 'Blue Water' Policy, 1689- Horn, D.B., "The Origins of the Proposed Election of a King of the 1815," International History Review, 10:1 (1988), 33-58. Romans, 1748-50," English Historical Review, 42:167 (1927), 361-70.

Baugh, D., The Global Seven Years War, 1754-63: Britain and France in a Horn, D.B., "The Cabinet Controversy on Subsidy Treaties in Time of Great Power Contest (New York, 2011). Peace, 1749-50," English Historical Review, 45:179 (1930), 463-66.

Black, J., Natural and Necessary Enemies: Britain and France in the Horn, D.B., Sir Charles Hanbury Williams and European Diplomacy Eighteenth Century (London, 1986). (1747-58) (London, 1930).

Black, J., "Essay and Reflection: on the 'Old System' and the Houlding, J.A., Fit for Service: the Training of the British Army, 1715- 'Diplomatic Revolution' of the Eighteenth Century," International 1795 (Oxford, 1981). History Review, 12:2 (1990), 301-23. Lodge, R., "The Continental Policy of Great Britain, 1740- Black, J., America or Europe? British Foreign Policy, 1739- 1760," History. 16 (1932), 298-304. 1763 (London, 1998). Lodge, R., “Sir Benjamin Keene K.B.: A Study of Anglo-Spanish Black, J., A System of Ambition? British Foreign Policy, 1660- Relations in the Earlier Part of the Eighteenth Century,” Transactions 1793 (Stroud, 2000). of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., 15 (1932), 16-25.

Brecher, F., Losing a Continent: France's North American Policy, 1753- Mapp, P.W., The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713- 1763 (London, 1998). 1763 (Chapel Hill, 2011).

Brewer, J., "The Misfortunes of Lord Bute: A Case Study in Eighteenth McLynn, F., France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981). Century Political Argument and Public Opinion," Historical Journal, 16 McLynn, F., 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the (1973), 3-43. World (London, 2004). Brewer, J., The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State Middleton, R.N., "Pitt, Anson and the Admiralty, 1756-1761," History, 1688-1783 (New York, 1989). 65 (1970), 189-98. Browning, R., The Duke of Newcastle (New Haven, 1975). Middleton, R.N., The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and Carter, A.C., The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years the Conduct of the Seven Years' War, 1757-1762 (Cambridge, 1985). War (London, 1971). Middleton, R.N., "British Naval Strategy, 1755-1762: the Western Clark, J.C.D., Dynamics of Change: the Crisis of the 1750s and English Squadron," Mariner's Mirror, 75:4 (1989), 349-67. Party Systems (Cambridge, 1982). Nester, W.R., The First Global War: Britain, France and the Fate of North Clayton, T.R., "The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and the America, 1756-1765(London, 2000). American Origins of the Seven Years' War," The Historical Journal, Nester, W.R., The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New 24:3 (1981), 571-603. France (Norman, 2014).

Pares, R. "American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-1763," English Historical Review, 51:203 (1936), 429-65.

Pritchard, J.A., Louis XV's Navy, 1748-1762 (Kingston, 1987).

Peters, M., Pitt and Popularity (London, 1980).

Rashed, Z., The Peace of Paris, 1763 (Liverpool, 1951).

Savory, R., His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years' War (Oxford, 1966).

Schumann, M., “Anglo-Prussian Diplomacy and the Baltic Squadron, 1756-58,” Forum Navale, 59 (2003), 66-80.

Schumann, M. and Schweizer, K.W., The Seven Years' War: A Transatlantic History (London, 2008).

Schweizer, K.W., "Britain, Prussia, Russia and the Galitzin Letter: A Reassessment," Historical Journal, 26:3 (1983), 531-56.

Schweizer, K.W., England, Prussia and the Seven Years War: Studies in Alliance Policies and Diplomacy (Lewiston, 1989).

Schweizer, K.W., Frederick the Great, William Pitt and Lord Bute: the Anglo-Prussian Alliance, 1756-1763 (New York, 1991).

Scott, H.M., The Emergence of the Eastern Powers, 1756- 1775 (Cambridge, 2001).

Scott, H.M., The Birth of a Great Power System, 1740-1815 (New York, 2006).

Simms, B., Three Victories and a Defeat: the Rise and Fall of the First British Empire (London, 2007).

Spencer, F., "The Anglo-Prussian Breach of 1762: an Historical Revision," History, 41 (1956), 100-12.

Starkey, D., British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, 1990).

Steele, I.K., Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre" (Oxford, 1990).

Szabo, F., The Seven Years War in Europe (New York, 2007).

CITATION

Schumann, Matt J.: “British Foreign Policy During the Seven Years’ War (1749- 63).” State Papers Online, Eighteenth Century 1714-1782 (Part IV), Cengage Learning (EMEA) Ltd, 2018

© Cengage Learning 2018

@GaleEMEA