Promoting Natural Resource Conflict Management in an Illiberal Setting: Experiences from Central Darfur, Sudan

Home , Near East Foundation, Robert Fisk

World Development 109 (2018) 163–171

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World Development

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Promoting natural resource conﬂict management in an illiberal setting: Experiences from Central Darfur, Sudan

A. Peter Castro

Department of Anthropology, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244, United States article info abstract

Article history: My main goal is to draw attention to ongoing conflict and insecurity in Darfur region of Sudan, still one of Accepted 25 April 2018 the world’s largest humanitarian situation. Darfur once commanded global attention but has receded into the shadows of a world suffering from compassion fatigue. This study was prompted by three distinct yet related concerns. The first is the growing interest in environmental performance within illiberal regimes. I contend that understanding the situation in authoritarian and heavily conflict-ridden societies such as Darfur region in Sudan requires a combined holistic and historical framework for understanding the complex interplay of political economy and cultural ecology affecting local use and management of natural resources. The second concern is a desire to reflect on the possibilities and challenges of peacebuilding and recovery Darfur, drawing on my experience there with two projects carried out by the Near East Foundation that sought to promote early recovery in Central Darfur through environmental peacebuilding. Its preparation was prompted by three distinct yet related concerns. The third concern is to address some of the links between peacebuilding and natural resource interventions. I argue that even in extremely illiberal settings such as Darfur that it is still possible to carry out activities that widen the scope for action by local populations. This finding was most evident regarding the project’s conflict management training, which local people ended up applying in a range of situations, and which helped spawn a peace movement among youths. Nevertheless, project participants noted that this training and action, while helpful at the community level, could not address ‘‘bigger problems outside.” Renewed national and international peace efforts are needed. Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction and cultural ecology affecting environmental performance (Sonnenfeld and Taylor, 2018). This type of framework is especially The preparation of this study was initially prompted by two dis- important for understanding the situation in authoritarian and tinct yet related issues. The first concerns the growing interest in heavily conflict-ridden societies such as Sudan, which will be the environmental performance of illiberal regimes (Wurster, examined in this paper. 2013; Zhu, Zhang, & Mol, 2015). Sonnenfeld and Taylor (2018, p. The second issue prompting this paper concerned my desire to 516) define ‘illiberalism’ as ‘‘those settings, regimes, and move- reflect on the possibilities of peacebuilding and recovery in the ments that do not prioritize or protect the rights, perspectives, troubled western Sudanese region of Darfur, still the setting of and interests of individuals and minorities.” After years of plati- one of the world’s biggest humanitarian operations since the out- tudes about ‘good governance’ that often seemed divorced from break of large-scale violence in 2003. It once commanded global reality (Grindle, 2010), the challenge of sustainable development attention, with commentators and activists routinely portraying is now being examined within the context of a range of regimes, it as the world’s first climate change-driven war or as an eternal including authoritarian states. With few exceptions, such as struggle between African and Arab (Faris, 2007; also see Sower’s (2007) study of Egyptian nature reserves, there has been Mamdani, 2009). Lately Darfur has faded from the view of a public little attention to how autocratic African governments foster or prone to compassion fatigue (Moeller, 1999). Disappointment with undermine environmental goals, especially within development the peace processes, which yielded two significant agreements and contexts. One theme that has generally emerged from this nascent yet no widely accepted or effective resolution, had also lessened literature is the need for a combined holistic and historical frame- interest. Meanwhile, Darfur’s ‘‘generalized insecurity” remains work for understanding the complex interplay of political economy such that de Waal (2015, p. 58), a long-time observer, compared to the region’s to a Hobbesian description of ‘‘warre.” He contends

E-mail address: [email protected] that this situation is the outcome of a cynical political marketplace https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.04.017 0305-750X/Ó 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 164 A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 rather than the inevitable outcome of social primordialism or envi- Ettenger, 1994; Castro, 1995a, 1995b). In this paper I will argue ronmental change. that even in extremely illiberal settings such as Darfur that it is still Sudan is one of the world’s most illiberal countries. Freedom possible to carry out activities that widen the scope for action by House’s (2018) global survey of political rights and civil liberties local populations. Observations of the NEF projects obviously serve consistently ranks it among ‘‘the worst of the worst” in terms of as the basis for this claim. As will be discussed, the design of the the 50 leading nation-states and territories designated as ‘‘Not NEF project offered an ambitious attempt at what Cleaver (2012) Free.” Journalist Robert Fisk (2005, p. 11), reflecting on Sudan’s calls institutional bricolage, introducing principles drawn from brutal civil wars, once observed that, ‘‘This was not, therefore, a Ostrom’s (1990) Mainstream Institutionalism to revitalize local country known for its justice or civil rights or liberties.” Yet he also resource institutions. NEF’s efforts drew on its long experience in pointed out that ‘‘nothing in Sudan was what it seemed” (Fisk, Mali (Benjamin 2004), serving as a trans-Sahelian exchange. The 2005, p. 10). For example, characterizations of Sudan as a fragile NEF projects also served as conventional platform for the delivery state (see Fund for Peace, 2016) misses the durability of its hege- of services and materials to its clientele. Unfortunately, severe monic Khartoum-based elite whose political role dates back to security restrictions, reflective of both Sudan’s illiberalism and colonial days, when the country was run by one of history’s most Darfur’s insecurity, made it impossible to assess either NEF’s insti- illiberal regimes, the British Empire (Collins, 2008). The current tutional innovation or its overall effectiveness in project manage- head of government, President Omar al-Bashir, has stayed in power ment as one would normally do so (for example, see Dyer et al., since 1989, despite serious internal challenges and the Interna- 2014). My limited data suggest that NEF’s overall performance tional Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment for alleged war crimes in was positive, a significant outcome in its setting. Yet, this is not Darfur. Jones, Soares de Oliveira, and Verhoeven (2013, p. 6) place where I wish to aim my focus. Instead, my main concern is with Bashir among other contemporary African ‘‘illiberal state builders” a particular project activity: its conflict management training, a in Angola, Ethiopia, and Rwanda, regimes in which protracted vio- bricolage combining external and local practices, and with what lence ‘‘plays a central and ongoing role” in their system of project participants did with it. They reported using the skills in governance. both resource- and non-resource settings, and it also helped spawn My professional involvement with Darfur started in 2009, when a peace movement in Central Darfur with over 500 reported partic- the African Programme of the United Nations’ University for Peace ipants. I now appreciate, thanks to the nudge by the reviewers, that (UPEACE) invited me to participate in a conference on the role of my Darfur study, despite its limitations, might be able to address environmental change in the Sudanese conflict (Leroy, 2009). This some aspects of environmental peacebuilding, particularly regard- invitation reflected my work, especially with the United Nations ing conflict resolution training. In dealing with these concerns, it is Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), on natural resource con- important not to lose sight of a major point: Darfur and the strug- flict management in Africa and elsewhere (for example, see Castro, gles of its people are largely forgotten. Their urgent concerns must 1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1995a; Castro and Ettenger, 1997; Castro and be placed back into the global limelight. Finally, the views expressed Nielsen, 2001, 2003; Castro and Engel, 2007). Consulting with FAO here are entirely my own, rather than reflecting those of NEF or any allowed me to move from being solely a conflict analyst (usually as other organization. I alone take responsibility for the paper’s project evaluator or academic researcher) to someone engaged in contents. conflict training, both in devising materials and directly facilitat- ing. Many of the UPEACE conference attendees were Darfurians, including Yassir Hassan Satti from Zalingei University. Our mutual 2. The setting interest in climate change and its relationship to conflict led us to work together on a study in the Zalingei area of Central Darfur, Darfur covers an area as large as France. It is part of the exten- with Satti collecting field data while I focused on historical mate- sive Sudanic transitional zone running along the southern edge of rial from outside Sudan (Satti and Castro, 2012). As it turned out, the Sahara. The region encompasses desert in its north, Sahelian the Near East Foundation (NEF), one of the world’s oldest human- savanna and woodland to its south, and, in the center, the Jebel itarian organizations, had just established a collaborative arrange- Marra massif (3000 m), where orographic rains support permanent ment with my university and was starting two internationally- springs and seasonal streams (wadis). O’Fahey (2008, p. 5) calls it funded projects in the Zalingei area. NEF asked me to be serve as ‘‘a harsh environment, hot, dry and dusty away from the moun- a consultant on its projects, dealing with both training and evalu- tains... water is always and everywhere a scarce commodity.” ation, traveling there in August–September 2012 and March–April The rains mainly fall from June to September but vary widely 2014. The projects promoted early recovery, a supposed transi- within and across years. Darfur is drought-prone yet wetter- tional phase from humanitarian to development assistance (see than-normal streaks occasionally occur. The region is undergoing Bailey, Pavanello, Elhawary, & O’Callaghan, 2009) in the wake of long-term shifts in weather patterns though their nature and the 2011 Doha Peace Agreement. Subsequent political events in extent are not fully understood (Satti and Castro, 2012). Desertifi- Darfur, Sudan, and globally revealed this transition to be only a cation, whether due to climate change or human-induced land chimera. misuse, is a constant fear (UN, 2010). The two main traditional A third issue which this study addresses, albeit in a limited livelihood strategies, sedentary farming and transhumant pastoral- manner and, frankly, at the insistence of reviewers, is the link ism, rely on a deep knowledge of the area’s precarious environ- between peacebuilding and natural resource interventions ment. In the not too distant past Darfur was self-sufficient in (Bruch, Muffett, & Nichols, 2016; Young and Goldman, 2015). My food staples and Sudan’s largest supplier of livestock (Morton, seeming reluctance to comment on environmental peacebuilding 1996). The 2003 war greatly impacts lives and livelihoods, with is not because I do not regard it as a vital field. On the contrary, large-scale terror, destruction, and dislocation. It also altered Dar- my first African research was in Kirinyaga County, Kenya, which fur’s cultural landscape, with rapid, massive urbanization, experienced the Mau Mau War in the 1950s, with its brutal coun- increased pressure on water supplies, and widespread deforesta- terinsurgency (Anderson, 2005; Elkins, 2005). As part of that study tion among the lasting changes (Buchanan-Smith & Bromwich, I documented the massive social engineering, including land con- 2016; Young & Jacobson, 2013). solidation and privatization, villagization, and commercial agricul- The region was long the site of indigenous states, the last of ture, that the British used in trying to shape a distinct post-conflict which, the Dar Fur Sultanate, ruled from the mid-1600s until the landscape favorable to their interests in Kirinyaga (Castro and early 20th century (O’Fahey, 2008). Dar Fur means the domain A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 165

(dar) of the Fur, the largest ethnic group and founders of the sacral A politicized and polarized ethnicity now dominated discourse, kingdom that became an Islamic sultanate. Despite its name and fusing tribalism and racism. Local, national, and international pro- origins, the sultanate evolved into a multi-ethnic polity, incorpo- cesses combined to fuel the shift from communal coexistence to rating leaders from the area’s numerous cultural and economic mutual hostility. El-Battahani (2009, p. 47) identified ‘‘power- groups. The region always contained a mixture of Sudanic, Arab, hungry, urban-based ’elite’ groups” within each tribe as key actors and other peoples, and, as noted by O’Fahey (2006, p. 24),‘‘... no in driving ethnic consciousness. Political reforms – replacement of part of Darfur was ever ethnically homogeneous.” Population the native administration with councils in the 1970s and regional- movements into the region were encouraged by the sultanate to ism in the 1980s – created arenas where elites used ethnic appeals build up its tax base. In general, cultural identities were porous, for recruitment. Darfur became engulfed by protracted war permeable, and dynamic as people intermingled or shifted affilia- between Libya and Chad (Burr & Collins, 2006). Weak governance tion, and groups merged or subdivided. Local identity labels often in Darfur allowed their forces to roam freely in the region. Both focused on non-ethnic attributes such locality, religion, or whether countries dispensed patronage and arms to attract local support- the people on the sultanate’s margins were enslavable (de Waal, ers. Libya’s Qaddafi also promoted a pan-Arab supremacist creed 2005). Peaceful coexistence once characterized relations among that attracted some Darfurians. National politics also mattered. groups within the region (El-Battahani, 2009). Polarized ’Arab’ The Sudanese national government increasingly sought through and ’African’ identities would not emerge until late in the 20th cen- policy to define the country in as an Arab-Islamic state. Southern tury. It should be noted that some basic aspects of Darfurian soci- Sudanese resisted with arms this attempt at ethno-religious hege- ety are imprecisely known, including its current population size, mony, increasingly defining themselves as ’Africans’ in the process demographic history, and the number of people killed during the (Collins, 2008). As their civil war heated up during the 1980s, 2003 war and its aftermath (Leroy, 2009; Mamdani, 2009; southern insurgents tried to rally support in the country’s other O’Fahey, 2008). subaltern peripheries. Their efforts were often rebuffed but the notion of ’African’ identity resonated with some non-Arab Darfuri- ans (Hassan, 2009). As identities hardened, land disputes escalated 3. Crisis: Background into large armed conflicts between ethnic militias. This situation culminated in a series of fights in the late 1980s between Fur forces Darfur’s 2003 crisis has long roots in the region’s history, and Darfurian Arabs, including newly organized Janjawid militias. including its relationship to the rest of Sudan and to neighboring Qaddafi-allied Chadian Arabs contributed to the defeat of the Fur nation. In 1800 the Dar Fur Sultanate was a major power within in the so-called War of the Tribes. Thousands died, and thousands the central Sudanic lands (O’Fahey, 2008). The next century proved more were dislocated, their lands occupied by the victors. National a time of declining fortunes, with Turko-Egyptian forces and the dissatisfaction with the central government’s slowness in quelling Mahdist Revolution sweeping through by the late 1800s. In 1898 the fighting contributed to its downfall in June 1989. With Omar the sultanate started its last gasp of independence. That same year Hassan al Bashir now in power, conflicts continued periodically Britain, in nominal partnership with Egypt, incorporated Sudan until they merged into the wider 2003 war. into its empire. The Khartoum region served as its political, eco- Politicized ethnicity overlapped with declining relations nomic, and even cultural core, as the British regarded its Arabs to between farmers and pastoralists (Abdul Jalil, 2014; Flint & de be superior to the colony’s other peoples (Collins, 2008). British Waal, 2008). In the past these groups generally shared comple- forces invaded Darfur in 1916. Annexed as Sudan’s westernmost mentary relations, manifested in livestock corridors, post-harvest province, Darfur was treated a remote, unrewarding periphery, pasture sharing, and trade. The native administration helped unworthy of investment for public services or infrastructure smooth over tensions. But in an era of weak governance, abundant (Daly, 2010). The colonial regime prioritized keeping order, arrang- weapons, and extreme ethnic ideology, armed aggression offered ing political and land administration along tribal lines. This subtly an expedient way of achieving goals. Land claims were now pur- but significantly altered the patterns of authority and tenure exer- sued by violence. Ethnic cleansing was often a consequence of cised by the sultanate, placing emphasis on ethnic allegiances the drive for land rather than a motivator of it (Daly, 2010). Other (Mamdani, 2009). The new ’native administration’ proved highly forces shaped this troubled context: rapid population growth, herd effective in maintaining order. expansion, declining land productivity, and drought (Flint & de After four decades of colonial rule Darfur had the dubious dis- Waal, 2008; UN, 2010). Whatever the cause, pastoralists often dis- tinction of having ‘‘the worst schools, hospitals and basic infras- pensed with customary negotiations before entering new areas. tructure of anywhere in Sudan” (de Waal, 2015, 53). They asserted their right under Sudan’s 1970 land nationalization, Independence in 1956 failed to alter its peripheral status. Darfur or they simply used intimidation. Farmers also took provocative mattered little in national politics, receiving paltry funding for actions, closing seasonal corridors or otherwise denying herders development, generating widespread resentment (Collins, 2008; access to resources. Rising acts of banditry fueled inter-group Hassan and Ray, 2009). Decentralization was eventually used as a tensions. means to address discontent, but Khartoum’s unwillingness to President Bashir’s aggressive promotion of the Arabization devolve authority and resources only increased tensions. In fact, agenda troubled the country’s non-Arab population, including in by the early 1980s the national government of Jaafar Nimeiri, an Darfur. The central government’s decision to divide Darfur’s gover- autocrat in power since 1969, faced financial collapse due corrup- nance into three state units was seen by Fur, Masalit, and other tion and mismanagement. Darfur’s famine in 1984–85 confirmed non-Arab leaders as a gerrymandering exercise to reduce their the region’s marginality (de Waal, 1997, 2005). Anger about it political influence (Daly, 2010). The newly appointed state gover- helped depose Nimeiri in 1985 but Darfur’s governance crisis deep- nors further fueled ethnic-based unrest by their actions and inac- ened. Some chiefs convened inter-tribal conferences to reduce ten- tion. Insecurity increased as political and criminal violence sions but the central government often proved unsupportive (Flint merged. The Darfur Liberation Front, an anti-government group, & de Waal, 2008). By the 1990s effective public administration was launched attacks in 2002. Flint and de Waal (2008, p. 116) contend largely limited to Darfur’s main towns, while its ‘‘out of control” that Khartoum’s response was ‘‘half-hearted and incoherent” as it countryside spawned conflicts over land and political ascendancy weighed whether these opponents posed a significant security (O’Fahey, 2008, p. 302; also see Morton, 1996; de Waal, 2005; challenge. Before long, the situation was out of control, and the Hassan & Ray, 2009). government ended up accused of genocide. 166 A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171

4. The 2003 war and elusive peace camp-based IDPs, another 600,000 Darfurians identified as vulner- able, 140,000 South Sudanese refugees, 195,500 returnees, and Darfurian rebels publicly announced their opposition to the several thousand refugees from Chad and the Central African national government for its neglect of the region in February Republic (UNOCHA, 2017). Although some people have returned 2003, launching a war that created a massive and protracted to their homes in Darfur, new displacements occurred to violence, humanitarian crises. What set apart the Darfur War from the Overall, living standards are low. In 2012, the Darfur Regional region’s previous conflicts was the scope and magnitude of death, Authority, an entity created by the 2006 peace agreement, found destruction, and dislocation, especially regarding the civilian pop- that two-thirds of its residents fell below the national poverty line, ulation. As with many things regarding the region, exact numbers and it had some of the worst human development indicators in regarding this disaster are imprecisely known (Mamdani, 2009). Africa (DJAM, 2012). De Waal (2015, p. 57) estimated that from 2003 to early 2005, Darfur continues to be one of the world’s largest humanitarian the time of the most intense fighting: ‘‘...the army and militia operations. It has been filled with challenges. Warfare, banditry, killed perhaps 30,000 civilians, caused a famine that killed several and the region’s limited infrastructure pose significant security hundred thousand more, and displaced millions.” Starvation was and logistical problems for aid workers. From 2003 to mid-2013, not simply the outcome of chaos. As is typical in counterinsurgen- 47 of them were killed, 139 injured, and 71 abducted in Darfur cies (Castro & Ettenger, 1994), hunger and terror, including mass (UNOCHA, 2013). Sudanese officials hampered relief efforts with rapes, were major components of the conflict. The government bureaucratic demands: ‘‘Aid workers needed visas to enter Sudan, aimed for ‘‘a war of total destruction” but failed to defeat the rebels travel permits to Darfur, daily travel permits to leave the state cap- (Flint & de Waal, 2008). It all came at a very high cost. Ali (2013) itals, and fuel permits to travel” (Flint & de Waal, 2008, p. 145). The estimated that the direct economic costs for Sudan from the Darfur government tightly controlled access by non-governmental organi- War exceeded $30 billion by 2009. This amount included $10 bil- zations to the region. This was demonstrated in March 2009, when lion in military-related expense, as well as billions more for the the Sudanese government expelled 13 international NGOs from foregone lifetime earning of the dead, the lost productivity of the Darfur and revoked the licenses of three local NGOs. It was IDPs, and ruined infrastructure. Ali acknowledged that this valua- responding to the issuing of a warrant by the ICC for President tion fails to convey the full human costs. Even with the new oil Bashir, who was accused of war crimes in Darfur. These 16 NGOs wealth that Sudan started earning at that time, it could not afford had provided nearly 40 percent of the 16,000 aid workers then in this ruinous conflict. He calculated that the government’s cost of the region (Pantuliano, Jaspars, & Ray, 2009). Expulsion of NGOs acceding to initial rebel demands in 2003 would have been around has continued, adding to the uncertainties of operating in the $60 million (Ali, 2013, p. 517). region. A large international presence remains in Darfur, albeit Externally-brokered peace agreements between the Sudanese with few foreign nationals. According to the UN, 60 international government and rebel groups took place at Abuja, Nigeria, in organizations had more than 5000 staff members in Sudan during 2006, and at Doha, Qatar, in 2011. The African Union and United August 2015, with 96.7 percent of their staff recorded as Sudanese Nations posted peacekeepers (UNAMID) to the region. These efforts citizens (UNOCHA, 2015). Numerous Sudanese and Darfurian civil all proved highly problematic (Flint & de Waal, 2008; Hovil & society organizations also provide humanitarian and development Bueno, 2016; Ismail & LaRocco, 2012). The lack of widespread Dar- assistance (Murphy & Tubiana, 2010). furian participation in reaching both agreements undermined their Reconciliation and recovery have been major goals of Darfur’s legitimacy. Slow and incomplete implementation of their terms peace processes. Besides pledges for humanitarian aid, each agree- confirmed the peace process’ troubled status. Policy restrictions ment has been accompanied by promises from donor agencies to and insufficient resources limited UNAMID’s mission and impact. support longer-term peacebuilding and economic development in Meanwhile, armed conflict continued, including clashes between the region. After the 2006 peace agreement, several European rebel and government forces, inter-communal confrontations, inci- countries and the United States set up the Darfur Community dents of brigandage, and even fights within the ranks of the rebels Peace and Stability Fund (DCPSF), with the UN Development Pro- and ethnic militias. According to de Waal (2015, p. 53), Darfur’s gramme (UNDP) serving as manager. It offered communities aid violence had become ‘‘more widespread and intractable” but also in forging trust, strengthening institutions, and building up liveli- ‘‘less extreme” if measured in terms of fatalities, which averaged hood assets as prerequisites for sustained development. The DCPSF less than 2000 civilian and combatant deaths from 2005–2011. financed relatively small-scale projects by NGOs, selected by com- These deaths varied widely in terms of ethnicity and locality, petitive proposals, dealing with conflict resolution, reconciliation, reflecting the dynamism of conflict. Recently discovered gold fields livelihoods, and restoring public service, emphasizing inclusion of of North Darfur, for example, emerged as a conflict hot spot women, youths, and marginalized groups. It disbursed more than (Bartlett, 2016). No neat division existed between war and peace; $60 million for projects by 2015 (DCPSF, 2015). An evaluation car- instead, instability prevailed. The ability to inflict violence, includ- ried out in 2012 on behalf of British foreign aid, a trust fund donor, ing criminal acts such as robbery, rape, and kidnapping, was a bar- found that the DCPSF projects were largely effective in attaining gaining chip in national and regional political marketplaces, where their goals, despite security problems and other constraints identity or regional issues matter less as a motive than pursuit of (Coffey Inc., 2012). The DCPSF funded NEF’s Resources, Economic international and national patronage offered through nominal Security and Peace Project to be examined here. peace processes (de Waal, 2015). The Doha peace process offered the possibility of international The ongoing impact of war and instability is readily evident in donors providing large-scale funding for moving from relief to the region’s still massive population of internally displaced people development in Darfur. A multi-agency task force devised a (IDP) and refugees. The UN reported more than 2.1 million IDPs in detailed strategy for the ’evolution’ of assistance, with contribu- Darfur and 316,000 Darfurian refugees in Chad as of October 2017 tions from Sudanese officials, the Darfur Regional Authority, the (UNOCHA, 2017). More than 1.6 million IDPs lived in 60 camps, University of Khartoum, the African Union, several UN organiza- usually situated next to towns, with the Sudanese government tions, and American and other bilateral aid agencies (DJAM, often exercising little control over their internal affairs. Other IDPs 2012). De Waal (2015, p. 63) characterized it as ‘‘a blueprint for a mainly settled in urban areas. According to the UN, as of October technocratic governance of Darfur.” This ambitious plan called 2017, three million people required humanitarian assistance: the for investment of $7.2 billion over six year in the region: $5 billion A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 167 for reconstruction, $1.4 billion for economic recovery, and $845 resource management. The Resources, Livelihoods, and Security million for governance, justice, and reconciliation. The Sudanese in Darfur Project (RLS), funded by USAID (budget: $2.6 million), government pledged $2.6 billion towards this effort, with interna- ran from October 2012 to March 2015. It aimed to enhance local tional donors expected to furnish the rest. A major donor confer- livelihoods, food security, and resilience with the goal of support- ence in April 2013 only raised an additional $1 billion, half of it ing peaceful and participatory economic recovery. The projects donated by the Qatari hosts. The European Union offered $35 mil- took place in 25 communities spanning nine clusters and seven lion. USAID offered no new pledge, despite having participated in administrative localities within Central and West Darfur States. formulating the strategy (Kushkush, 2013). This refusal departed This area took in Zalingei and Nertiti towns, IDP camps, rural set- from USAID’s pledge in 2011 to support early recovery activities tlements, and pastoralist groups. In most of the clusters Fur farm- in addition to Darfur relief operations, where it constituted the sin- ers comprised the largest group, though Mornei’s population was gle largest provider of aid (Miller, 2011). More than $20 million largely Masalit. Other ethnic groups, including seasonal pastoral- was set aside for it by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance ists, also lived in the clusters. The Fur and Masalit themselves were (USAID/OFDA, 2012). Early recovery always assumed improved not ethnic monoliths but had localized divisions. Some of the clus- security. By late 2012, however, the Americans complained about ters fell within the Jebel Marra Project zone, one of the region’s few increased violence and problems of access faced by humanitarian large-scale development interventions launched after indepen- personnel in the region (Timberlake, 2012). Spiking IDP figures dence (Morton, 1996). Extension agents from it were integrated exposed Darfur’s rising violence: 80,000 in 2011; 114,000 in into NEF activities. Although each project had its own distinct 2012; 380,000 in 2013; 430,000 in 2014; 246,000 in 2015; and objectives and activities, they strongly complemented one another. 158,600 in 2016 (UNOCHA, 2017). As troubles increased, USAID RESP established NEF’s modus operandi for participatory capacity halted support for early recovery. NEF’s Resources, Livelihoods, building, inclusive community mobilizing, and delivery of material and Security in Darfur Project, which is also covered here, was to project participant for livelihood and income-generation one of USAID’s early recovery initiatives. As they had done in the activities. past (Morton, 1996), people in Darfur tried to take advantage of The RESP Project unfolded slowly as the staff navigated Darfur’s these opportunities while they lasted. extensive and complex security apparatus. Getting permission for project events and staff travel outside Zalingei town (the project’s headquarters) proved time-consuming. Armed conflicts and insta- 5. The Darfur projects bility also affected activities. A dispute between the Misseirya and Salamat tribes turned violent during 2013, for example, impacting The Near East Foundation (NEF) is a US-based NGO founded in several sites. There were occasional fears that Zalingei town, Cen- 1915 in response to the Armenian genocide within the Ottoman tral Darfur’s capital and the site of the project’s headquarters, Empire. Since then NEF has conducted humanitarian and develop- would be attacked, halting work. Armed robberies also occurred ment activities in the Middle East and Africa. Dedicated to inclu- in the area. The region’s very poor road infrastructure added sive sustainable development, its projects focus on capacity another layer of challenge. Heavy rains, when they came, added building, community organizing, institution strengthening, and to the transport woes, and in 2012 also sparked a large outbreak livelihood support, especially through locally appropriate eco- of yellow fever. In general, the skill, diplomacy, courage, creative- nomic initiatives and collaborative natural resource management ness, and persistence of the NEF project team and their partners (NEF, 2015). NEF has operated continuously in Sudan since 1978, in navigating Darfur’s troubled setting deserves to be highlighted. and had projects in Darfur during the late 1980s and 1990s. Its Whether these helped foster a sense of ’local ownership,’ however, in-country staff consisted entirely of Sudanese nationals. In formu- is a question to be addressed later. lating its Darfur projects, NEF planners drew on its extensive experience in the Malian Sahel, particularly with promoting 5.1. Community mobilization community-based land management institutions (Benjamin, 2004). A NEF Malian staff member even worked briefly with his The NEF interventions involved an ambitious attempt to recast Sudanese counterparts on the project’s mobilization strategy. local institutions so that they could serve an inclusive and partici- National partners for the projects were Hand in Hand Organiza- patory means for revitalizing local natural resource management tion for Peace and Development (HIH) and the Sudanese Organiza- and for delivering other project materials and services. In design tion for Humanitarian Aid (SOHA). These NGOs shared with NEF a they followed the principles of Mainstream Institutionalism delin- strong commitment to inclusive and participatory approaches to eated by Ostrom (1990) and others, including formalizing institu- relief and development work. HIH started operating in Darfur in tional arrangements, delineating clear jurisdiction boundaries, 2009, with several faculty members from Zalingei University, one and transparency. Exactly how the new institutions would mesh of three colleges located in the region, among its members. Its local with existing ones, the process of bricolage (Cleaver, 2012), was activities included organizing women’s groups for training and a feat of engineering left to the actual implementation, a common income-generation activities. SOHA was established in 2006, occurrence (Cleaver & de Koning, 2015). Specifically, the NEF pro- engaging in a number of peacebuilding, health, and rural develop- jects set up supra-village associations (SVAs), multistakeholder ment activities. Both partners supplied the project’s field agents, institutions for mobilizing project activities and providing a plat- who were based within participating communities. The agents form for dialogue on reconciliation and mutual problem-solving. often came from these areas. Having field agents stay within pro- NEF-Mali staff devised the model in the 1990s to pursue opportu- ject sites was uncommon in Darfur’s humanitarian interventions. nities for community resource management opened by decentral- The structure of the NEF-partner relationship and the composition ization. Each of the nine clusters had a SVA executive committee, of its members fostered the project’s framing in terms of tradi- unpaid volunteers, usually with 50 members. NEF’s strategy for tional nafeer ideas and practices – the local custom of communities recruitment promoted inclusiveness while also taking into account working together in response to village needs. existing leadership, institutions, norms, and customs. Both formal The Resources, Economic Security and Peace Project (RESP) and informal leaders were engaged, including tribal and religious operated from January 2012 to April 2014, supported by the DCPSF authorities, school teachers or other educated persons (both male (budget: $1 million). As per DCPSF’s mandate, it focused on foster- and female), and community members already engaged in promoting local reconciliation, peacebuilding, and collaborative natural ing reconciliation and development efforts. Members were drawn 168 A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 from each area’s main social groups, with at least 10 percent of the rather than supplanting them with new ones. The trainings raised executive committee drawn from IDPs or smaller ethnic groups. awareness and offered encouragement for reconciliation and For example, an interviewee from Abate reported that its SVA’s peaceful solutions. conflict resolution committee was composed of members from Participants at the first TOT workshop included staff from the nine of its largest groups, with all 13 tribes from the area engaged two partner organizations; officials current and past from min- when serious matters arose. Women comprised between one-third istries dealing with agriculture, education, housing, planning, and to one-eighth of the SVA executive committee memberships, while forestry; faculty from the University of Zalingei; and representa- nearly 30 percent of their member were classified as youths. tives from civil society organizations, including the Women’s Although information was incomplete, the committees clearly Union. Nearly one-third (13 of 43) of the trainees were women. had higher representation among the more prominent, prosperous, The NEF staff ultimately trained more than 1300 people, half of and educated residents, as well as among those who were males, them women, at workshops organized in the project areas. Among more senior, settled (in contrast to being IDPs), and from larger their trainees were farmers, herders, IDPs, members of local NGOs, ethnic groups. Was this just another example, as Cleaver (2012) and officials from line ministries. Officials from the administration, puts it, of ‘‘new arrangements, old inequalities?” Without a doubt humanitarian affairs, and the military also attended workshops. A the SVAs reflected much continuity with existing local leadership second TOT workshop was held in March 2014, which I also lead, and power patterns. Yet, Morton (1996, p. 54), based on his long attended by approximately 70 people, including UN and UNAMID experience in Darfur, noted ‘‘the absurdity” of projects trying ‘‘to representatives. The project also spread conflict resolution infor- bypass the rural middle classes,” given their roles as ‘‘mediators mation through a radio program and public events. of state services.” At the same time the project’s involved smaller The impact of this training became quickly apparent. A few ethnic groups, women, and youths, ensuring some wider social weeks after the August TOT workshop an omda (a local administra- representation. tor) who attended reported using its techniques to support media- Interviews revealed that the executive committees varied in tion of a potentially dangerous dispute between local farmers and their procedures. Some SVAs were highly formal, holding regularly herders involving livestock corridors, crop damage, and forest scheduled meetings with minutes taken, while others operated encroachment. More than 300 camels trampled through fields almost on an ad hoc basis. Thus, there was not a singular sort of and woodland. The military intervened, taking away the animals. bricolage that occurred but much variation within NEF’s standard- Both farmers and pastoralist were on the verge of violence. The ized design. The SVA executive committee recruited and oversaw omda organized a reconciliation committee composed of the repre- specialized committees which deal with reconciliation/conflict res- sentatives from the disputing parties as well as neighboring groups olution, agriculture, livestock, forestry, and, in some places, spe- who would be likely affected by fighting. They resolved their dis- cialized themes such as youths or beekeeping. With some pute, agreeing on compensation and reestablishing livestock pas- exceptions, particularly reconciliation/conflict resolution, these sage. The community experienced no further incidents during the committees mainly engaged in project activities, providing or rest of the growing season. Similar conflicts were reported in the selecting trainees, carrying out training (for those who attended project areas over access to land, water, and woodland between training of trainer workshops), distributing and using inputs, and and among farmers and herders, with similar responses aimed at helping to monitor their impacts. The specialized committees usu- multistakeholder engagement and peaceful resolution. More than ally consisted of 15 members, sometimes more. Project procedures 240 cases were recorded where project participants used their stressed social inclusiveness, especially concerning tribal or ethnic training to address conflicts. This number probably underreported affiliation, a value often appreciated within local communities. A the actual incidence of interventions. SVA representative from Mukjar cluster, for example, proudly sta- Community members recognized that conflict management ted: ‘‘We have a conflict management committee. All tribes are a skills were applicable in many settings, ranging from inter- part, even locally. There are about five or six different tribes there.” communal hostilities to domestic violence. An omda from Zalingei Other committee members reported similar experiences. The con- reported putting his training to use when two people from differ- tributions and limitations of the SVA committee will become ent ethnic groups were found dead outside one of the IDP camps. clearer when seen in the context of the projects’ activities. Their families believed they had been murdered, and they took 18 IDPs hostage, threatening to kill them. He quickly formed a rec- 5.2. Reconciliation and conflict resolution onciliation committee consisting of the disputants, tribal authorities, and local administrators. The omda reported that the NEF’s SVA institutional strategy required attention to negotia- emphasis on conflict analysis proved important, as he identified tion, mediation, and conflict response skills. In addition, project tensions between the two ethnic groups. A peaceful resolution planners and staff appreciated that that the projects themselves was eventually reached, with compensation paid and the hostages needed to be conflict-sensitive, as their own activities could create released, some of them having been held for over a month. The disputes or intensify existing ones. The projects benefited from the Mornei SVA helped resolve a state of conflict between the Missiriya presence of the Peace Studies Center at the University of Zalingei, and Gemir tribes that had lasted for 14 years. One of the Mornei where some of the staff had been trained. NEF was fortunate that omdas involved in the project also intervened in a domestic vio- the Zalingei locality commissioner during RESP’s start-up was the lence case. He organized a meeting composed of their respective former Center director Yassir Hassan Satti. He officially opened family members, sheikhs, and other local informal leaders. They the training of trainers (TOT) workshop in August 2012, its first reconciled, and the husband agreed to pay compensation to his major event. I served as a lead trainer, which featured segments wife. In Abata the SVA conflict committee organized a meeting of on conflict analysis, gender analysis, mediation, negotiation, multi- all the local tribes after a trader had been violently robbed and stakeholder dialogue, collaborative natural resource management, almost kidnapped. An interviewee reported that the perpetrators reconciliation, and related topics. The involvement of the Center had fled, ‘‘Their footsteps vanished in the countryside.” However, trainees and the workshop participants ensured that training drew they used the event as a means of addressing crime in general, on customary practices such as judiya (local mediation sessions), resulting in a reduction in robberies and break-ins. Another inci- ajaweed (mediators, usually elders, religious leaders, or other local dent was reported by an interviewee from Nertiti’s SVA illustrated dignitaries), and rakoba (an agreement or settlement). The project the complexities arising from the combination of warfare and staff emphasized building on or strengthening existing practices, instability: A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 169

The Arabs attacked a convoy. The military were able to retrieve Village committee, relevant government departments, the locality the goods and fuel. The government rewarded those who commissioner, and security people.” Women usually composed retrieved things, giving them a vehicle. A military person drove about one-fourth of the participants who prepared the agreements. it, saying it was now my car. A man recognized that the car was Despite being signed, the elaborate, ambitious CLUMPs were very his – it had been stolen months earlier. He said that his owner- limited in their impacts due to insecurity within and across com- ship could be proved, because there were three things about munities. Indeed, it was difficult to ascertain the extent to which (within) the car that he could describe. He proved correct. The they were operative at all in some areas. But they clearly mattered, original owner was asked when he lost it – in 2013. The rebels at least to some extent, in some places. According to one account, a had taken it. But the car’s new owner did not want to give it up. local leader known to be armed used this reputation to enforce his The SVA conflict resolution committee sat with the native cluster’s convention, preventing encroachment by a neighboring administration to decide the fate of the vehicle. The two tribes group. Reduce tree cutting was attributed to the agreements, along of which the new and original owners belong sat down. We with the operation of forestry committees. realized that if we did not find a solution, the trouble might RESP and RLS supported activities to replenish local natural escalate. The new owner of the car wanted a reward, and since resources, including tree nurseries, rangeland reseeding and tem- the car had sustained damage, the owner wanted payment. So porary land enclosures to protect grazing grounds (reportedly both sides got paid. The car went back north to the owner. If much appreciated by pastoralists), extension services (including someone find it, the item has to go back, for dignity, it needs integrated pest management), and even rehabilitation of a dam to be returned to the owner.’ near Nertiti. The projects funded training and materials for group and individual income-generation enterprises. As part of RESP, par- This and other accounts also underscore how SVA members ticipants processed food oils, produced cheese, kept bees, grew worked in conjunction with local administrators (with their mem- vegetables, and made bricks. RLS focused on creating or strength- bership often overlapping), police, and others to address conflicts. ening existing small-scale enterprises, with project staff helping The SVA committees also engaged with the Peaceful Coexistence project participants with market assessments, skill-building, and Committees set up earlier in Central Darfur by the Native Admin- mentoring. More than 2700 people received business training, of istration with support from UNAMID’s Civil Affairs Unit. Several which over 900 obtained support for their activities through RLS. participants reported that an advantage of SVA reconciliation and The project also trained 25 para-vets (two of them women), help- peacebuilding efforts was that disputes often could be handled ing to restore this public service. To promote increased agricultural peacefully within communities, without formally calling in exter- production, RLS also distributed at low cost or freely (to destitute nal parties. households) implements, seeds, and other inputs. The project proved influential in the rise of a non-partisan Data collected by the project showed that these activities gen- peace-seeking group, Youth of the Tribes of Darfur. It started with erally raised incomes and increased food access for participants, a handful of individuals from different backgrounds who wanted to sometimes substantially though certainly not always. Because of foster reconciliation and peacebuilding. They grew into an informal the short time-span of the projects and the inability to evaluate movement with more than 500 members, both women and men, the project by standard means, their long-term impact, cost- from 36 ethnic or tribal groups. Some of its members received con- effectiveness, and sustainability could not be determined. flict management training from the project. The group’s leaders Nonetheless, people were generally very enthusiastic about them. relished their informal status, feeling that registration as a civil I was told by a small shopkeeper from Zalingei, who participated society organization would compromise their autonomy and in the RLS Project, ‘‘The training was very useful for doing business, non-sectarian character. Members go into markets, public meeting giving me new ideas and new information on how I can operate places, and pastoralist settlements to raise consciousness about more profitably by finding new products and sources of supply.” peace and reconciliation. A woman organizer stated that she made Overall, the projects tried to reach a wide spectrum of people, seek- a special effort to reach other women, as they have been the ones ing to overcome barriers based on gender, age, ethnicity, liveli- most harm by conflict. They also target youths as well, since much hood, residence status (including IDPs), economic status, and of ‘‘bad behavior” that occurs such as armed robberies, burglaries, other variables. Despite these efforts, however, Darfur region con- and drug abuse, disproportionately involves them. Several mem- tinues mired in instability and outbreaks of violence. bers have supported mediation efforts, such as Missiriya-Salamat hostilities that have caused widespread insecurity. Their leaders participated in the 2014 TOT workshop in Zalingei. They provided 6. Conclusion dramatic testimony, describing where their efforts led to reopened local markets and reduced inter-communal tensions. Darfur in western Sudan offers one of the world’s most illiberal settings. As described in the paper’s first part, the transformation of 5.3. Natural resource management and livelihood support the Dar Fur Sultanate from a powerful core to a remote, impover- ished periphery was a long-time coming. Rooted in social processes Both projects promoted peacebuilding and recovery by seeking already underway before the 20th century, it political and eco- to revive or strengthen local economies, natural resource manage- nomic marginalization was accelerated and deepened by colonial ment institutions, and food production systems. NEF introduced and post-colonial rule. In recent decades geopolitical intrigues another innovation from its Malian experience: collaborative land involving neighboring countries and state-driven institutional use management planning (CLUMP). Like the SVAs, the CLUMP changes altered identities and inter-group relations in Darfur’s drew heavily from Mainstream Institutionalism’s view of ’crafting’ multiethnic society, further unraveling its social fabric. The fight- formalized, rules-based, transparent, and voluntary institutions ing in 2003 combined a center-periphery struggle against the (see Benjamin, 2004; Ostrom, 1990). Each CLUMP is based on a Sudanese state with a civil war. The region’s troubles seem intract- convention, an agreement reached by local stakeholders, project able when viewed through the lens of its historical political staff, and authorities, designating natural resource practices and economy. responsibilities at the cluster administrative level. All nine clusters The second part of this paper, focusing on two internationally- adopted conventions. The process was described by a SVA repre- funded projects operated by the Near East Foundation and its sentative from Nertiti: ‘‘Our meeting brought together the Supra- national partners, provides another window for examining the 170 A.P. Castro / World Development 109 (2018) 163–171 potential for change in Darfur. The projects, focusing on commu- WD28), and by the Resources, Livelihoods and Security in Darfur nity mobilization, natural resource management, and economic Project, sponsored by the United States Agency for International recovery as means of peacebuilding. The severe security situation Development (AID-ODSA-G12-00205). in the region, including in the Zalingei area, limited the quality of data that could be collected about the implementation and impacts References of the projects. Nevertheless, available information, especially accounts of conflict resolution and other activities carried out by Abdul-Jalil, M. A. (2014). Nomad-sedentary relations in the context of dynamic land project participants suggest that much can be accomplish, even rights in Darfur: From complementarity to conflict. In J. Gertel, R. Rottenburg, & in illiberal settings, if people are given sufficient opportunity for S. Calkins (Eds.), Disrupting territories: Land, commodification & conflict in Sudan creativity and action. NEF’s projects generally supported Darfuri- (pp. 102–120). Woodbridge: Currey. Ali, H. E. (2013). Estimate of the economic cost of armed conflict: A case study from ans in their efforts to handle conflicts and tensions peacefully. Darfur. Defence and Peace Economics, 24(6), 503–519. https://doi.org/10.1080/ The limits of what can accomplished through such project in terms 10242694.2012.723154. of peacebuilding, especially beyond the community level. A repre- Anderson, D. (2005). Histories of the hanged: The dirty war in Kenya and the end of empire. New York: Norton. sentative from Abata’s SVA succinctly expressed this conclusion: Bailey, S., Pavanello, S., Elhawary, S., & O’Callaghan, S. (2009). Early recovery: An ‘‘In the field of conflict resolution, previously, there were lots of overview of policy debates and operational challenges. Humanitarian Policy Group problems. After the training, we are now able to resolve our local Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute. Bartlett, A. (2016). Conflict extractivism in Darfur’s gold mines. Peace Review, 28(1), problems – the small, inside ones. The bigger problems outside, 46–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2016.1130378. we cannot yet handle.” For Darfur to achieve recovery requires Benjamin, C. (2004). Livelihoods and institutional development in the Malian Sahel: A breakthroughs in national and international peace efforts. De political economy of decentralized natural resource management [Unpublished dissertation]. University of Michigan. Waal’s (2015) recent analysis of the ‘‘real politics” of the Horn of Bromwich, B. (2015). 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Nichols (Eds.), Governance, natural resources, and post-conflict peacebuilding. London: Earthscan. observed, much positive potential exists in seeking to combine Burr, J. M., & Collins, R. O. (2006). Darfur: The long road to disaster. Wiener: ‘‘political resolution of conflict” with ‘‘new forms of environmental Princeton. governance.” The efforts such as those by the Youths of the Tribe of Castro, A. P. (1988). Southern Mount Kenya and colonial forest conflicts (pp. 33–55). Durham: Duke University Press. 266–271. Darfur also reveal the aspiration and capacity of the region’s resi- Castro, A. P. (1991a). The southern Mount Kenya forest since independence: A social dents to work towards their own solutions. analysis of resource competition. World Development, 19, 1695–1704. Castro, A. P. (1991b). Njukiine forest: Transformation of a common property resource. Forest and Conservation History, 35, 160–168. Conflict of interest Castro, A. P. (1995a). Facing Kirinyaga: A social history of forest commons in southern Mount Kenya. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Castro, A. P. (1995b). Coffee, tea, or bureaucracy? Two commodity case studies from None. Kirinyaga, Kenya, 1951 to 1983. Research in Economic Anthropology, 16, 349–395. Castro, A. P., & Engel, A. (Eds.). (2007). Negotiation and mediation techniques for Acknowledgements natural resource management: Case studies and lessons learned. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. I am grateful to the Near East Foundation (NEF) for inviting me to Castro, A. P., & Ettenger, K. (1994). Counterinsurgency and socioeconomic change: The Mau Mau War in Kirinyaga, Kenya. Research in Economic Anthropology, 15, participate in its projects in Darfur, Sudan, during 2012 and 2014. 63–101. At its Syracuse headquarters I especially wish to thank Charlie Ben- Castro, A. P., & Ettenger, K. (1997). Indigenous knowledge and conflict management: jamin, Simona Ceci, Ann Sutherland, John Ashby, and Paul Worden. Exploring local perspectives and mechanisms for dealing with community forestry disputes. In Volume 1: Compilation of discussion papers made to the From NEF-Sudan and the project staff in Zalingei I acknowledge the electronic conference on ‘Addressing natural resource conflicts through community excellent assistance of Musa Gismalla, Omaya Gismalla Mohamed, forestry’ (pp. 141–164). Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Mohamed Adam Dahia Abdul Salam Gumaa Abdalaziz, Amin El Nations. Zubeir Gubartalla, Galal Eldin Yassin Saef Eldin, Izaldien Babiker, Castro, A. P., & Nielsen, E. (2001). Indigenous people and co-management: Implications for conflict management. Environmental Science and Policy, 4, and many others too numerous to list here. I am very grateful to 229–239. Ikhlas Eissa Mohamed who as a consultant to NEF worked with Castro, A. P., & Nielsen, Erik (Eds.). (2003). Natural resource conflict management case me in evaluating its projects and carrying out the training of train- studies: An analysis of power, participation and protected areas. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. ing workshop in 2014. Yassir Hassan Satti, who was Commissioner Cleaver, F. (2012). Development through bricolage: Rethinking institutions for natural of Zalingei Locality in 2012, deserves warm thanks for his support. I resource management. London: Routledge. wish to express my deep gratitude to Syracuse University, which Cleaver, F., & de Koning, J. (2015). Furthering critical institutionalism. International Journal of the Commons, 9, 1–18. has a special collaborative agreement with NEF, for allowing me Collins, R. O. (2008). A history of modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge University time to participate in the Darfur projects. Thank you, too, to David Press. 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