DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - november 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Transatlantic relations Russia |Ukraine |NATO |European Union |United States | on issues of mutual concern. contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating conference todiscussways bywhich Russia andtheWest can Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome organized aninternational at theB backdrop, the Center on theUnited States and Europe (CUSE) in relations cannotberuled out. Against thisdisturbing over Ukraine aresostrong that theriskof abreakdown on issues such asIran’s nuclear programme. Clearly, tensions not collapsed altogether, with thetwo still able tocoordinate the sametime,cooperation betweenRussia andtheWest has instrument of defence from andcontainment of Russia. At to go backtoits historical roots andre-calibrate itself asan and policymakers pondering whether theAlliance needs NA deteriorated that talk of anewColdWar hasbecome routine. of Ukraine,West-Russia relations have sodramatically In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimeaanddestabilization Abstract by Riccardo Alcaro Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Western-Russian TO’s role inEurope isagaininthespotlight, with experts rookings Institution inWashington andtheIstituto keywords DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 2 and Europe (CU Europe and theCenter the S on United with cooperation in (IAI) Internazionali Affari Istituto the by 2014 Rome October on in 20 organized and Crisis” Ukraine Light of in the Relations Western-Russian * T took placeinRome on 20October2014astheseventh edition of theIAI-launched di SanPaolo, theFriedrich EbertStiftung(Rome Office) and Unicredit Bank.It International Development, NA The event wasgenerously supported byItaly’s Ministryof Foreign Affairs and 1. Theconference tensions, managecompetition, andkeep cooperating on issues of mutual concern. international conference todiscussways bywhich Russia andtheWest cancontain in Washington andtheIstituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome organized an the Center on theUnited States andEurope (CUSE)at theB a breakdown inrelations cannotberuled out. Against thisdisturbingbackdrop, nuclear programme. Clearly, tensions over Ukrainearesostrong that theriskof collapsed altogether, with thetwo still able tocoordinate on issues such asIran’s of Russia. At thesametime,cooperation betweenRussia andtheWest hasnot roots andre-calibrate itself asaninstrument of defence from andcontainment policymakers pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical become routine. NA Russia relations have sodramatically deteriorated that talk of anewColdWar has In light of Russia’s annexation of Crimeaanddestabilization of Ukraine,West- Introduction by Riccardo Alcaro* Report of theT in Light of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Western-Russian Relations Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? . Internazionali (IAI). S and Institution, Brookings Report of the seventh edition of the T of the edition seventh of the Report Riccardo Alcaro is Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United Fellow Center S on at the Visiting the is Alcaro Riccardo ransatlantic Security S rookings Institution. Brookings SE) at the TO’s role inEurope isagaininthespotlight, with expertsand ransatlantic Security S enior Fellow in the T Fellow the in enior ymposium series. ransatlantic S ransatlantic TO’s Public Diplomacy Division, theCompagnia ransatlantic Programme at the Istituto Affari Affari Istituto at the Programme ransatlantic ecurity S ecurity ymposium entitled “A Peace?ymposium Cold tates and Europe (CU Europe and tates ymposium 2014 rookings Institution E) at the SE) at the tates tates DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 3 also –andcrucially –bythedetermination tomake surethat political regimesin for control andinfluence aredriven not only by foreign policy proximity, but is of theessence inthisregard.Some participants contended that Russia’s goals global player, andexerting control or influence over Russia’s neighbourhood participants agreedthat Putin’s overall objective istorestore Russia’s status asa Russia slidinginto domestic instability andinternational irrelevance. Almost all institutionally-based afterhisreturn tothepresidencyin2012–isabrake against also seemsconvinced that hisrule –which becameeven more personal rather than policies. Putin is,of course,personally concerned about staying inpower, but he matter enormously inthedefinition of the Russian national interest andtheensuing Russian political system,theworldviews andleadership style of President Putin With power andinfluence concentrated in andemanating from the very top of the are structurally incompetition, especially intheformer Soviet space. the Kremlin that Russian andWestern interests may overlap occasionally but they legacies of theSoviet (andT personal background in the shaped by aculture of pragmatism that often verges on sheercynicism. Putin’s and Russian national interests become rooted inpersonal andvested interests and and economic businessthat arefundamentally different from Western practices, according towhich Putin andhisinnercircle engageinmethodsof doing political domestic concerns enjoy total consensus. Amore nuanced assessment emerged, did thenotion Putin that intervened President inUkraineout Vladimir of purely dismissed asthesole motivation behindRussia’s Ukrainepolicies, but neither Purely geopolitical interests were generally (though bynomeansunanimously) reflect geopolitical interests or are rooted in considerations of domestic expedience. The debate initially focused on the extent to which Russia’s policies in Ukraine 2. Russia’s interests andPutin’s power context. and position inthewiderinternational NA in EasternEurope (notably Ukraine), leadership, West-Russia competition namely thenature of Russia’s their ideasabout four maintopics, and frank.Participants exchanged The debate waswell-informed, lively Georgia, Turkey andRussia took part. Bulgaria), theUS,Ukraine,Armenia, Germany, theUK,Italy, Poland and number of EUmemberstates (France, tanks andotherinstitutions from a Over forty senior expertsfrom think Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? TO’s role andRussia’s worldviews sarist) era, have contributed tosolidifyingthe idea in Soviet intelligence services, as well as the political Nathalie T occi (left), Ettore Greco(centre), Riccardo Alcaro (right) DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 4 Ukraine, which proved significantly more efficient thanthe conventional military this is the sophisticated intelligence and military approach Moscow followed in a grave political crisis inUkraineandfor takingaction inCrimea.Attesting to concluded that Putin andhisteamcertainly preparedfor thecontingency of followed anddidnotprecedeRussia’s invasion of Crimea.But participants also Russia’s interests. Several expertsalso argued that thechoice toannexthepeninsula decision to invade wastaken only afterthesituation inKyiv wasdeemed toimperil years inadvance –infact,therewasconsensus among participants that the strategic mind.TheKremlin might nothave planned to invade andannexCrimea opinion andreinininternal dissent, hispolicies also attest toahighly flexible opposition forces that present different views) asa rhetorical device towinpublic Russian-speakers) against ‘Them’ (the West, the fascists in Ukraine, and domestic While Putin’s narrative follows abinary, polarizingpattern of ‘Us’ (Russians and them. youth –sharethebasic patriotic tenetsandnow expectthepresident toactupon the religious right aswell asblue collar workers andlargesections of theRussian domestic constituencies –theintelligence services, themilitary, thebureaucracy, deliberately emphasized hasacquiredthepotential tospuraction of its own. Key legitimacy. As such, theyargued, theRussia-West civilizational clashthat Putin has background into aninstrument toinvigorate support for hispersonal power and of Putin’s clique, others emphasized that Putin hasnow turnedthisideational West andclaimedthat it ismore of asmokescreen concealing thevested interests importance of theideational divide that Putin hasdeclaredbetweenRussia andthe economic pressurefrom theWest. While several participants downgraded the as a conservative-minded proud nation that is ready to withstand political and not). In doing sohehaspresented himselfasthedefender of Russia’s identity has discriminated against them or (irrespective of whether Ukraine Russians and Russian-speakers has protected the rights of ethnic terms: Putin hasdeclaredthat he and especially inidentity-related of geopolitical interests but also been framed not only interms Russia’s intervention there – has events inUkraine–andjustify narrative usedbyPutin todescribe For thisreason, it wasargued, the 3. Putin’s Russia vs.theWest democracy’ or ‘patriotic’ plebiscitary autocracy. a viable alternative (andhencealegitimate challenge) toPutin’s modelof ‘managed Russia’s neighbouring states are(or will) notbeperceived bytheRussian public as Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Nathalie T occi (left), Ettore Greco (right) DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 5 at least more independent on theinternational stage. these areall basic components of Putin’s efforts tomake Russia more influential or stage inways that might notalways promote Russian interests. Ideally, Putin wants Moscow today could also encouragePutin andRussia toplay hardball on theglobal than choice. Yet thesuspicious, competitive andzero-sum mindsetprevailing in power – investing inawider international portfolio isamatter of necessity rather one participant asatransregional (i.e.Eurasian) power with elements of aglobal Western-Russian tensions. Besides,for a country such asRussia –definedby relations with non-Western countries asbeingoverly determinedbythecurrent choice for any country andthereisno reason toseeRussia’s attempt toimprove its Several participants remarked that diversification of foreign relations isasensible notably with theotherBRICS countries andparticularly China. West over Ukraineasafurther spurtodiversify Russia’s international relations, Western influence internally, Putin was also saidtoseetheconfrontation with the dependent on the Russian state and government. While pursuinginsulation from cut off theirindependent businessandotherties with Europe andbecome more are actually servingPutin’s purposetohave Russian economic elites reduce or sanctions imposed bytheUSandEUinretaliation for Russia’s Ukrainepolicies and competition. In theseterms,some participants argued that theeconomic the West that isbasedon power anddefinedbyamix of pragmatic bargaining integration into Euro-Atlantic frameworks infavour of akindof interaction with as astainon thecountry’s history. Putin hassetasideeven theconcept of partial Boris Yeltsin inthe1990s.Thisisnow seennotonly asastrategic mistake but also rejection of Russia’s initial co-authorship of Europe’s post-ColdWar order under public opinion. Putin haspresidedover agradual but eventually comprehensive special meaning for Putin andhisteamalso resonating broadly inRussian The issue of Russia’s foreign policy independencewashighlighted asbearinga 4. Russia’s placeintheworld Riccardo Alcaro (left), Fiona Hill (right) Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? confusing adversaries; keeping the recourse topractices aimedat Continuous contingency planning; human costs). and cameat proportionally high significant military shortcomings armed forces, but which also laid bare because of the sheer magnitude of its August 2008(which Russia won intervention againstGeorgia in adapt tochangedcircumstances; at hand;willingness andcapacity to option of plausible deniability always DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 6 US influence inEUdecision-making on dealing with Russia. With Germany more only brought EUmemberstates andtheUScloser on Russia; it hasalso increased security concerns now rings more hollow thanbefore. TheUkrainecrisishas not the credibility of hisrepeated claimthat theWest hasneglected Russia’s legitimate was able toplay ‘divide andrule’ politics intheEUandbetweenEurope andtheUS, relations totheone Russia hadworked towards for years. While inthepastPutin contended that theUkrainecrisiswashaving thecontrary effect on US-European to side with the USand push for sanctions proved theRussians wrong. It was also cultural andpolitical relationship with Russia. Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision willing to spoil its 25-years long investment in building up a multi-layered trade, Moscow, sotheargument went, counted on thefactthat Germany would notbe For astart,participants argued that Russia badly miscalculated Germany’s reaction. Ukrainian soil, thepicture changedsignificantly. Kyiv aspartof a1994political arrangement toremove nuclear weapons from and demonstrated utter contempt for thesecurity assurancesMoscow hadgiven international borders inCrimeaandfuelled acivil warinsouth-eastern Ukraine, or theEUinresponse tothe2008Georgia war.But afterRussia forcibly changed sanctions asaviable option. Indeed, no sanctions wereimposed byeither theUS France andItaly tocontemplate any kindof deepor comprehensive economic interests but also bythe desiretokeep Europe stable, of countries such asGermany, reluctance, motivated bytrade was sonotably because of thestrong contentious topic inEurope. This on Russia would have beena imposing andmaintaining sanctions Before theannexation of Crimea, to regional dynamics. have infactimparted abipolar turn bipolar Europe. His actions inUkraine is clearly reflected inhis vision of a Putin’s vision of amultipolar world 5. Abipolar Europe scenario. in a relationship increasingly dominated by confrontation over Ukraine. also acknowledged that Chinanow hastheupper handbecause of theWest-Russia an historic competitor toChina in engaged inahedging strategy vis-à-visChina–for instancebyproviding Vietnam, curtail hisroom for manoeuvre. Several participants pointed out that Russia isstill BRICS countries too). But long-term confrontation with theWest, it wasargued, will Russia toplay amultiple balancing actbetweentheWest andChina(andtheother Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? The prospect of Moscow becoming a junior partner Southeast Asia, with military assistance. Yet they Beijing was highlighted as a plausible Isabel Facon (left), Alexey Gromyko (center), Gulnur Aybet (right) DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 7 Orysia Lutsevych (right) Piotr Kościński (left), Christopher Chivvis (center), in theconference. military postures.It wasfrom thisperspective that NA confrontation below thethresholdof anopen conflict underpinnedbyadversarial sanctions arealso away toraisethecostsof Russia’s action while keeping the sharing of responsibility for themanagement of Europe’s neighbourhood. Critically, The EU’s authority toimpose wide-rangingsanctions allows for greater transatlantic have EU-wide measuresimposed. Americans tofindanagreement with theGermans(anda few others)in order to controversial move such astheimposition of sanctions. All it took wasfor the Washington found it relatively easytoorganize consensus intheEUover ahighly in agreement with theUSapproach on responding toRussia’s takeover of Crimea, Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? counter-measures tohybrid warfare. Besides,some participants saidthat the feeling, however, that theAlliance should thinkmore and fasterabout developing ability to deploy troops to face emergencies along its borders. non-permanent military posturein Poland andtheBaltic states andincreasingits approach. NA recalled that theAlliance’s summit inNewport, Wales, opted for areactive-adaptive Overall, therewerefew calls for NA and Latvia. arming groups of rebelsamong Russian minorities incountries such asEstonia of agents provocateurs, tolimited border breachestoorganizing, financingand solidarity among NA eastern Ukraine)andotherprovocations aimedat testingand potentially eroding the forms of ‘hybrid’ warfare (akin to what Russia has been resorting to in south- in thepast.Theriskisnotsomuch aconventional military invasion. It israther was evolving into adifferent kind of threat to NA conventional match for NA Russia, for all the improvements madeafterthe2008Georgia war, isstill notareal is nocompetition whatsoever for thecontrol of Europe asawhole). And militarily TO hastaken stepsto reassure its most exposedallies by raisingits TO memberstates. TO. However, several participants contended that Russia TO toadopt anaggressive military posture.It was S uch measuresmay rangefrom the use Russia’s borders (meaning that there has shiftedfrom central Europe to for power. Geographically, thefocus order rather than aglobal contest problem istheoutline of Europe’s during Soviet times. Strategically, the considerably less acute thanit was Western-Russian competition is of several reasons. Ideologically, Cold War isoff themark because It wasargued that talk of anew 6. NA TO thantheSoviet Union posed TO andRussia TO’s role wasmostly debated There was a general DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 8 political andeconomic reforms, securing Western assistance andmanagingthe membership (at least inthenearfuture) andweremore focused on carryingout Petro Poroshenko andArsenij Yatseniuk, hadnoexpectations concerning NA to fight. Participants agreedthough that Ukraine’s President andPrimeMinister, about theprospect of furtherRussian incursions into theirterritory, but also ready in theDonbas region. Theyareopposed tothefederalization of thestate, fatalistic also saidtobeinnomoodfor makingconcessions totheRussian-backed rebels in Ukraine’s history amajority isinfavour of NA Russia, pro-EU forces are dominating the political process, and for the first time An overwhelming majority of Ukrainianshave now become estrangedfrom with hisplanfor aEurasian Union including Ukraine. as heconsidered the prospect of Kyiv’s closer ties with the EU to be incompatible Russia, at least initially. Participants agreedthat Putin saw thingsquite differently, Russia. Euro-Maidan –concluded one participant –waspro-EU rather thananti- rule of law, all thingsthat Ukrainians tend toassociate with theEUrather than said tobeindireneedof effective institutions, political accountability andstrong mind of mostEuro-Maidan protesters (barringafew ultra-nationalists). Ukrainewas of Crimeaandsupport for therebels,ascutting ties with Moscow was notinthe Some argued that thiswasalmost entirely theconsequence of Russia’s annexation Several participants contended that Ukrainehasnever beenfartherfrom Russia. 7. Ukraine’s grimoutlook intractable, wasof coursethefuture of Ukraine. Russia andtheWest areat loggerheads. Themostcritical one, but also themost should intheory go beyond selective cooperation andencompass issues on which of theYalta agreement or theHelsinki process. It wasalso argued that engagement acceptance of Russia’s vision of abipolar Europe enshrinedinsome newversion evidence of this).It wasunderlinedthat selective cooperation bynomeansimplies (and Russia’s continuous cooperative behaviour on Iran’s nuclear issue provides and should therefore be possible now was possible during theColdWar toward Russia. Selective cooperation effort with apolicy of engagement a reneweddeterrenceanddefence the notion that NA In general, therewasnoobjection to both) tosupport largerdeployments. might prove unwilling or unable (or Alliance, assome memberstates could become anirritant within the forces closer toRussia’s borders military redeployment of NA Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? TO should balance TO B rian Whitmore (left), Ivan Krastev(center), TO membership. Ukrainianswere Samuel Charap (right) TO DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI 9 without Russia having togive up any of its gains. is convinced that theWest will blinkfirst on Ukraineandseekan accommodation supply toUkraine)wasamatter of necessity, notchoice. Another argued that Putin striking an agreement with the Kremlin (starting with a deal securing Russian gas space wasconsidered anentirely plausible scenario. Oneparticipant insistedthat the status quo with Donbas asyet anotherfrozen conflict inthe former Soviet into Euro-Atlantic frameworks. Thenotion that Putin might beseton maintaining but it iscapable of destabilizing it andthus severely hampering Kyiv’s integration upper hand in south-eastern Ukraine. Russia might not be able to control Ukraine, stance of Ukraine’s political establishment andpublic opinion, Russia still hasthe less agreement among participants. Some argued that, inspite of thelargely pro-EU Conflict management intheDonbas emergedasthe one issue on which therewas how toreactRussia’s expectedopposition tothemove. problematic country asUkraine.And inany case,theEUwould have tofigure out the EUwould hardly bedoing itself any favours byincorporating such alargeand This proposition didnotmeetwith much support, asotherparticipants hinted that membership thepolitical andeconomic reform process will hardly besustainable. Some participants argued that without theprospect, however distant, of EU a source of corruption and no friends of reform, still wield considerable influence). multilateralism isentirely state-determined andinterest-driven. shaped bypower politics andinterstate competition andconflict, andin which outline islikelier tobemore in linewith thewiderworld order, which isstrongly a continuous focus on dialogue andprocess. Europe’s nascent political-security sovereignty, multilevel governance, rule of law-based multilateral interactions and put anend(toPutin’s delight) toaEuropean post-ColdWar order basedon pooled in the Donbas; it has seriously damaged West-Russia relations; and has perhaps resulted inthefirstlandgrab Europe since1945andanunprovoked civil war The conference ended inableak mood.The Ukraine crisis, it was remarked, has Conclusions Conference participants Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? carry out political and economic The ability of thegovernment to the International Monetary Fund. financial support from the West and certain collapse without prompt recalled that the economy faces on fighting a war with Russia and Ukraine could notafford to keep Some participants cautioned that crisis intheDonbas. oligarchs, generally considered tobe some (notleast because Ukraine’s reforms wasalso questioned by 10 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Debate Discussants Paper-giver Chair West-Russia Relations and theEmerging Global Order First Session Q&A Respondents Keynote speaker Chair Views Understanding Russia’s Leadership: President Putin’s Power Base and World Welcome AddressandConferenceIntroduction Rome, 20October2014,Hotel Ponte S Conference Programme Introductory Session Politik (S Margarete Klein,Senior Associate, StiftungWissenschaft und stratégique (FR Isabel Facon, Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pourlarecherche Alexey Gromyko,Director, Institute of Europe, Moscow International Peace, Washington Thomas DeWaal, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for James Sherr,Associate Fellow, Chatham House, London Council, Moscow Andrei Kortunov,Director General, Russian International Affairs (CUSE), B Fiona Hill, Director, Center on theUnited States andEurope Rome Nathalie Tocci,Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), (CUSE), B Rome andVisiting Fellow, Center on theUnited States andEurope Riccardo Alcaro, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Introduction Ettore Greco,Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Welcome Address WP), Berlin rookings Institution, Washington rookings Institution, Washington S), Paris isto 11 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Final Remarks Debate Discussants Paper-giver Chair West-Russia Strategic Competition in Europe and the South Caucasus Third Session Debate Discussants Paper-giver Chair NATO and Russia: Enemies Again? Second Session (CUSE), B Rome and Visiting Fellow, Center on theUnited States andEurope Riccardo Alcaro, Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Studies (IISS),Washington Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD), London Oksana Antonenko,Senior Political Counsellor, European Bankfor (IAI), Rome Nona Mikhelidze,Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali Relations (ECFR),London Ivan Krastev,BoardMember, European Council on Foreign Prague Brian Whitmore, Senior Editor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Robert Pszczel, Director, NA Orysia Lutsevych, Research Fellow, Chatham House, London Office Mikhail Troitskiy, Deputy Director, MacArthur Foundation, Russia Christopher Chivvis, Senior PoliticalScientist, RAND, Arlington Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM),Warsaw Piotr Kościński,Director of EasternandSouth-Eastern Europe rookings Institution, Washington TO Information Office in Moscow 12 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI List of Participants Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Ivan Krastev Piotr Kościński Andrei Kortunov Margarete Klein Fiona Hill Ruth Hanau Santini Alexey Gromyko Ettore Greco Isabel Facon Thomas Eymond-Laritaz Thomas DeWaal Giovanna DeMaio Christopher Chivvis Samuel Charap Claudio Catalano Vincenzo Camporini Gulnur Aybet Antonio Armellini Oksana Antonenko Riccardo Alcaro (ECFR), London Board Member, European Council on Foreign Relations (PISM), Warsaw Programme, Polish Institute of International Affairs Director of EasternandSouth-Eastern Europe Moscow Director General, Russian International Affairs Council, (S Senior Associate, StiftungWissenschaft undPolitik B Director, Center on theUnited States andEurope (CUSE), University, Naples Assistant Professor of Political Science, L’Orientale Director, Institute of Europe, Moscow Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome stratégique (FR Senior Research Fellow, Fondation pourlarecherche Senior Director, APCOWorldwide, London Peace, Washington Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International PhD candidate, L’Orientale University, Naples Senior Political Scientist, RAND, Arlington (IISS), Washington Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies Research Department, Finmeccanica S Vice President, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome University Istanbul Head Department of International Relations, Özyeğin Ambassador Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD), London Senior Political Counsellor, European Bankfor Europe (CUSE),B and Visiting Fellow, Center on theUnited States and Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome rookings Institution, Washington WP), Berlin S), Paris rookings Institution, Washington pA, Rome 13 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? Gayane Novikova Nona Mikhelidze Cesare Merlini Alessandro Marrone Jeffrey Mankoff Orysia Lutsevych Brian Whitmore Cory Welt Mikhail Troitskiy Nathalie Tocci Paola Tessari Oleksandr Sushko Constanze Stelzenmüller Stefano Silvestri James Sherr Nicolò Sartori Ferdinando Salleo Jana Puglierin Robert Pszczel Riccardo Perissich Director, S Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome (IAI), Rome President, Boardof T Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Senior Fellow, Security andDefence Programme, Istituto International Studies (CSI),Washington Deputy Director andFellow, Center of Strategic and Research Fellow, Chatham House, London Senior Editor, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague Washington Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University, Associate Director, Institute for European, Russian and Deputy Director, MacArthur Foundation, Russia Office Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Research Fellow, Security andDefence Programme, Cooperation, Kiev Research Director, Institute for Euro-Atlantic the United States (GMFUS),Berlin Director, T Internazionali (IAI),Rome Scientific Advisor, Former President, Istituto Affari Associate Fellow, Chatham House, London Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome Senior Fellow, Security andDefence Programme, Istituto Ambassador Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), Berlin Program Officer, Future Forum, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Director, NA and Italy, Rome Executive Vice President, Council for theUnited States pectrum, Center for Strategic Analysis, Yerevan ransatlantic T TO Information Office in Moscow rustees, Istituto Affari Internazionali rends, GermanMarshall Fund of 14 DOCUMENTI IAI 14 | 11 - November 2014 ISSN 2280-6164 © 2014 IAI Latest DocumentiIAI Western-Russian Relations inLight of theUkraineCrisis A ColdPeace? www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo B and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIand Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational S and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain that end,it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. T economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurther Founded byAltiero S Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 14 |04 14 |05 14 |06 14 |07 14 |08 14 |09 14 |10 14 |11 14 |03 06 3224360 06 3224363 Security. Summary Report OSCE, theGlobal Mediterranean, and theFuture of Cooperative Istituto Affari Internazionali, Towards “Helsinki +40”:The Summit: Prospectsfor International Security Giulia Formichetti and Paola T Union Valeria T Symposium 2014 Light of theUkraine Crisis.Report of theTransatlantic Security Riccardo Alcaro, ACold Peace? Western-Russian Relations in Loukas T dibattito parlamentare epubblico trail 2009eil 2014 Quanto conta il Parlamento europeo perl’Italia? Un’analisi del Eleonora Poli eLorenzo Vai; Nicoletta Pirozzi (acuradi), Economic Trendsand Recovery Prospects Domenico Lombardi andSamantha St. Amand, Global edizione 2014 raccomandazioni del Rapporto sulla politica esteraitaliana Istituto Affari Internazionali, Scegliere percontare. Sintesi e and Challenges of the2014Italian EUPresidency Emiliano Alessandri, Nicole Koenig andMarco S runetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy ermini, TheTime hasCome for aEuropean Energy soukalis, Exit strategy dallo stato confusionale europeo pinelli in1965,does research inthefields of foreign policy, political essari, After theNATO Wales iddi, Priorities pectator), anonline webzine o