Texas National Security Review

Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153

2012

1998 2021

UNDER THE MAGNIFYING GLASS 1991 2005

1977 1969 1984

1958 UNDER THE MAGNIFYING40BC GLASS 1962 1944 100AD 340BC 1951 Volume 4 • Issue 2 Spring 2021 200BC 500BC VOLUME 4 ISSUE 2 SPRING 2021

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • WINTER 2020

MASTHEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS

Staff: The Foundation

Publisher: Executive Editor: Associate Editors: 03 Revise! Ryan Evans Doyle Hodges, PhD Galen Jackson, PhD Francis J. Gavin Van Jackson, PhD Editor-in-Chief: Managing Editor: Stephen Tankel, PhD William Inboden, PhD Megan G. Oprea, PhD

The Scholar

09 From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications Editorial Board: of Military Exceptionalism Susan Bryant, Brett Swaney, Heidi Urben Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: 25 The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD War Order Undone Samuel Helfont Richard Betts, PhD Stacie E. Goddard, PhD Vipin Narang, PhD Tami Davis Biddle, PhD Jim Golby, PhD Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, PhD 49 The Future of Sino-U.S. Proxy War Philip Bobbitt, JD, PhD James Goldgeier, PhD Suzanne Nielsen, PhD Dominic Tierney Hal Brands, PhD Sheena Greitens, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD 75 Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations Miguel Centeno, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD Kori Schake, PhD Jim Golby, Hugh Liebert Robert Chesney, JD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Kiron Skinner, PhD Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Sarah Snyder, PhD Annika Culver, PhD Nina Kollars, PhD Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD Ashley Deeks, JD Sarah Kreps, PhD Kristina Spohr, PhD Peter D. Feaver, PhD Melvyn P. Leffler, PhD Keren Yarhi-Milo, PhD Rosemary Foot, PhD, FBA Adrian Lewis, PhD Amy Zegart, PhD Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD Margaret MacMillan, CC, PhD Shannon French, PhD Rose McDermott, PhD The Strategist

99 America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 Lindsey Ford, Zack Cooper 117 U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned Paul Lettow Policy and Strategy Advisory Board:

Chair: Adm. William McRaven, Ret.

Hon. Brad Carson Paul Lettow, JD, PhD Hon. Kristen Silverberg, JD Hon. Derek Chollet Hon. Michael Lumpkin Michael Singh, MBA The Roundtable Feature Amb. Ryan Crocker Hon. William J. Lynn, JD Adm. James G. Stavridis, Ret., PhD Hon. Eric Edelman, PhD Dan Runde Hon. Christine E. Wormuth 157 Competitive, Competent, Conservative: Internationalism After Trump Hon. John Hamre, PhD David Shedd Michael Singh

Designed by Cast From Clay, printed by Linemark The Foundation Revise!

In his introductory essay for Volume 4, Issue 2, the chair of our editorial board, Frank Gavin, emphasizes the importance of taking a second look at history and challenging our assumptions about the past.

cholarship is not only about discovery vicissitudes of domestic politics as by any coher- of the new. It is also about challenging ent long-term plan. As late as 1979, few would have the old, or rather, what we think we al- assessed that the United States was ahead in the ready know. This can be difficult, even competition with the Soviet Union, to say nothing controversial,S and never more so than when the of being poised to ultimately prevail, and as late subject being reexamined and revised is our own as 1986, fewer still would have predicted the great history. It is easy to forget that history is not sim- rivalry would soon be over forever. The United REVISE! ply a recounting of what has happened, but also States did not appear to be especially hegemonic the way we decide to remember, recount, and in the early years of the post-Cold War era: U.S. make sense of the past. economic prospects seemed uncertain and Ameri- We often hold stylized narratives of the past can grand strategy stumbled, appearing ineffectual in our heads that we believe to be unassailable. against such noted great-power political foes as the Ask an intelligent observer to outline the story of Somali rebels, Rwandan Hutus, Haiti, and Serbia. America’s engagement with the world after 1945, Historical revisionism — the kind that dares us and he or she might offer a clear, bifurcated story: to challenge and interrogate strongly held assump- There was the Cold War and the post-Cold War tions about the past — helps push against our nat- era. The Cold War would likely be identified as an ural, if somewhat unhelpful, tendency toward ret- uninterrupted geopolitical and ideological conflict rospective or outcome bias: Since we know how a between the Soviet Union and the United States story like the Cold War ended, we can’t help but that began soon after World War II was over and construct a neat narrative of inevitability. Revision- ended with the revolutions in Eastern Europe in ism also allows us to complicate our understand- 1989. The analyst might suggest that the United ing of chronology and periodization. The conven- States prevailed by relentlessly pursuing the dec- tional narrative of postwar international relations ades-long strategy of containment, articulated by and U.S. grand strategy focuses on Europe and the George Kennan in his 1946 “Long Telegram.” With U.S.-Soviet competition. The reality of world poli- the collapse of the Berlin Wall and eventually tics after 1945 was far messier, and a variety of forc- FRANCIS J. GAVIN the Soviet Union itself, the United States rapid- es — such as decolonization and the emergence of ly switched, like the film The Wizard of Oz, from new nations; regional rivalries and conflict; Euro- black and white to color and to something com- pean integration and eventual union; the rise of pletely different: America’s hegemonic, unipolar political Islam; and globalization and the financial, moment and the rise of liberal internationalism. telecommunications, and rights revolutions — Upon closer examination, this seamless portray- shaped global affairs as much, if not at times more, al obscures as much as it reveals. Kennan’s version than the Cold War superpower rivalry. of political and economic containment was aban- The problem with a simplistic Cold War/post-Cold doned as a failure in the early 1950s, replaced by War narrative is exposed in Samuel Helfont’s fas- a more muscular military posture that he spent cinating reexamination of the 1991 Gulf War. The the rest of his career disparaging. Two especially conventional wisdom sees the war as a military tri- intense periods of confrontation when global war umph for the United States that exorcised the de- was a distinct possibility — 1949 to 1953 and 1958 mons of the Vietnam War and helped establish the to 1962 — were interposed between longer periods practice of collective security while reinvigorating of simmering competition and occasional détente global institutions for an American-led liberal inter- and even cooperation. Even as ensuing adminis- national order. This picture, however, was clouded trations worked to craft comprehensive and effec- by a post-conflict sanctions regime that impover- tive national security strategies, as Paul Lettow’s ished the Iraqi people without unseating Saddam article in this issue ably chronicles, America’s pol- Hussein’s brutal Baathist regime, harming America’s icies shifted while defense budgets rose and fell global image while splintering the wartime coalition. and rose again, in a rhythm driven as much by the The Gulf War was only the start of greater difficulties

3 4 The Foundation Revise! in a region that has been the cause of much grief for regional dynamics in East Asia that were much ding acknowledgement to seeing an old problem the United States ever since. different than those in Europe. Korea was divided, in a different way to a fierce desire to contact the Re-thinking the Gulf War also complicates the Vietnam a disaster, integrative alliances like NATO authors and argue with them. That is the desired issue of periodization, or how we mark and define and the European Union elusive, and China, after outcome for any good journal. Challenging and re- historical eras. For many, the Gulf War was the first 1972, an ally of convenience. As Adam Tooze re- vising history — and the assumptions and myths major event of the post-Cold War world. Another minds us, “The simple fact is that the US did not behind that history — is rarely comfortable, espe- way to look at the conflict, however, was as an out- prevail in the Cold War in Asia.”1 As the Communist cially as the past provokes strong feelings for many growth and culmination of political dynamics that Party’s ruthless massacre of protestors in Tianan- people. I have long thought that an underappreci- had been brewing in the region for years. The two men Square revealed, Beijing did not share Ameri- ated but important measure of a nation’s under- key dates here are 1967 and 1979. Up through the ca’s view of history and world order. The Commu- lying social and civic health is its ability to toler- mid-1960s, the Middle East was not a grand stra- nist Party leadership was obsessed, then and now, ate, and even encourage, historical revisionism. It tegic priority for the United States, trailing well with avoiding what it saw as the Soviet Union’s is easy to forget how hard — and how rare — it behind Europe, East Asia, and even Latin America grave mistakes in the Cold War competition with is to create an intellectual, political, and socio-cul- in importance. Britain was the major Western pres- the United States. Looking at today’s rivalry with tural environment that encourages a willingness ence in the region. The 1967 Six-Day War changed China, Tooze suggests, to challenge any conviction, no matter how widely all of that. The Soviet Union appeared to seek great- shared or deeply held. The results are often messy er influence in the Middle East, providing weapons The mistake in thinking that we are in a ‘new and contentious and unpopular. It is well worth the and egging on client states Egypt and Syria, while Cold War’ is in thinking of it as new. In put- price, however. Historical revisionism — to ruth- financial and monetary burdens forced Britain to ting a full stop after 1989 we prematurely de- lessly examine and wrestle with our most treas- drastically reduce its footprint. Stuck in an un- clare a Western victory. From Beijing’s point ured beliefs and assumptions — is a critical path to winnable war in Southeast Asia, the United States of view, there was no end of history, but a humility, understanding, and wisdom. could do little on its own to counter the Soviet continuity — not unbroken, needless to say, gambit. While Israel easily prevailed in the conflict, and requiring constant reinterpretation, as Francis J. Gavin is the chair of the editorial America’s concern for Soviet regional influence any live political tradition does, but a conti- board of the Texas National Security Review. He drove it to establish deeper strategic ties with Isra- nuity nevertheless. is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and el, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. Within a decade, Ameri- the inaugural director of the Henry A. Kissinger ca’s efforts to reverse Soviet influence in the region In other words, not only did the Cold War play out Center for Global Affairs at SAIS-Johns Hopkins had been largely successful but at a steep cost: The differently in East Asia than in Europe, the history, University. His writings include Gold, Dollars, and Middle East had been elevated as a grand strategic meaning, and lessons from the conflict are under- Power: The Politics of International Monetary Rela- priority while the United States had tied itself clos- stood much differently in Beijing than they are in tions, 1958-1971 (University of North Carolina Press, er to arguably problematic regimes and even more Washington D.C. China, no doubt, has the lessons 2004) and Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy problematic, complex regional dynamics. This left from the history of the Soviet-U.S. Cold War rival- in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell University Press, America exposed during the 1979 Islamic Revolu- ry in mind as it reflects upon the utility of proxy 2012) and Covid-19 and World Order (Johns Hopkins tion in Iran that not only transformed Iran but also wars as a tool of great-power political competition. University Press, 2020) co-edited with Hal Brands. the larger politics in the region. In this viewing, Dominic Tierney’s analysis of the future of Sino-U.S. His latest book is Nuclear Weapons and American the Gulf War was not the clean, resounding start proxy war provides an excellent way to assess such Grand Strategy (Brookings Institution Press, 2020). of a new era, but the messy interlude of a complex conflicts, should they emerge as he expects. American commitment whose relation to the Cold Historical revisionism can be applied not only to War was uncertain. events, but to institutions and practices. Since 9/11, Lindsey Ford and Zack Cooper similarly force us as Susan Bryant, Brett Swaney, and Heidi Urben to re-think periodization and stylized histories in remind us, the military has been held in especially their excellent analysis of what 1969 can teach us high esteem within American society. But as their today. The Nixon administration, which was reeling fascinating survey reveals, such exceptionalism can from the Vietnam War, facing powerful domestic come at a cost: The long-held and cherished notion calls for retrenchment, and hoping to reset Amer- of the non-ideological citizen-soldier gives way to a ican grand strategy in a more sustainable fashion, more politicized and perhaps isolated servicemem- declared that its allies in East Asia had to do more ber. Jim Golby and Hugh Liebert suggest that les- to provide for their own security. Ford and Cooper sons from ancient history — particularly the classic reveal the varying paths different countries in the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius — may pro- region took in response to this mandate, ranging vide a better understanding and guide to the impor- from moving closer to the United States to accom- tant norms of civilian control of the military. modating threatening powers in the region. My guess is that, like me, you will come away Nixon’s Guam doctrine reflected Cold War and from this issue with a mix of reactions, from nod-

1 Adam Tooze, “Whose Century?” London Review of Books 42, no. 15, July 30, 2020, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n15/adam-tooze/ whose-century.

5 6 7 The Scholar 8

The Scholar

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of scholars. Our aim is for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and policy desks from Washington to Tokyo, and to be cited as the foundational research and analysis on world affairs.

7 8 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism

For nearly 40 years, the American public has placed FROM CITIZEN SOLDIER extraordinary trust and confidence in the military, celebrating heroism and service in diverse venues ranging from religious services to theme parks to sporting events. Survey after TO SECULAR SAINT: survey has shown that Americans revere their military, at least superficially. How members of the military feel about THE SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS their own service, sacrifices, and relationship to the rest of society has been an open question. To help explore these questions, we surveyed more than 1,200 midgrade to senior OF MILITARY EXCEPTIONALISM military officers and West Point cadets between 2017 and 2020 regarding their political views, their sacrifices, and their pride in service. In addition to confirming past research indicating SUSAN BRYANT that servicemembers are increasingly isolated and have a BRETT SWANEY growing sense of exceptionalism, our results also indicate that the attitudes of military elites who are in the minority in terms HEIDI URBEN of race, gender, and political views vary considerably at times from their majority peers, raising questions about the degree of inclusivity within the ranks today.

he 2020 Gallup Poll measuring the 1980.2 That is a rather remarkable run considering American public’s confidence in insti- that, for nearly two decades, America has been in- tutions reported what many in the mil- volved in protracted wars where victory has been itary already know — that Americans fleeting and difficult to define. Moreover, less than haveT an enduring trust in the armed forces.1 In fact, 0.5 percent of the U.S. population currently serves 72 percent of those surveyed indicated they have in the armed forces.3 “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the Since the 9/11 attacks, there has been a profu- military. This trend goes back decades: The mili- sion of literature exploring this extraordinary lev- tary has either been the top-ranked institution or el of support for the military, both in terms of its has tied for the top in every year of the poll since implications for U.S. governmental decision-making 1986 and is the only major institution that inspires and how the “non-serving” public views and inter- higher levels of confidence today than it did in acts with those who have chosen to join the armed

1 Megan Brennan, “Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges,” Gallup, Aug. 12, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/317135/ amid-pandemic-confidence-key-institutions-surges.aspx. 2 Brennan, “Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Surges.” See also, James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” The Atlantic (January/February 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/. 3 “Demographics of the U.S. Military,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/article/demographics-us-military.

9 10 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism

forces.4 However, remarkably little scholarship has risen a professional “warrior caste” largely living preferring the current arrangement for different their book, Warriors and Citizens. This hesitancy examined how military personnel perceive their separately from a society that does not share in reasons. Even if this were not true, the practical to answer questions on military matters is like- own service as well as society at large and what the the burden of military service.9 The result is that impediments associated with going back to the cit- ly rooted in respondents’ unfamiliarity with the implications of these views are for civil-military re- today’s servicemembers are less well known and izen-soldier system appear insurmountable.11 The armed forces.14 Compounding this cloistering ef- lations, the country’s conception of citizenship and their individual sacrifices seem to mean less to shift from a drafted armed forces to an all-volun- fect, recent studies show that those who choose to service, and the ideal of the citizen-soldier. Through the public. And yet, they are more superficially teer force has had a number of consequences, es- join the military are more likely to come from fami- surveying over 1,200 military elites at different stag- revered than America’s citizen-soldiers were.10 pecially in the 20 years of war that have followed lies with a history of multi-generational service, an es in their careers, this article aims to do just that: But what have been the effects of this shift to a the attack of September 11. Specifically, it has led indication that we are seeing the emergence of an to explore how military officers today view not only warrior caste model, both on the public and on the to increased isolation for U.S. servicemembers, to American “warrior caste.”15 Additionally, military their own service and sacrifice but the American “warriors” themselves? This article, and our sur- military members shouldering the brunt of the bur- recruiting is disproportionately reliant upon re- public who, by all accounts, trusts them unfailingly.5 vey, were undertaken to improve our understand- den of war, and to a feeling among society — and cruits from rural areas, the South, and areas that As of this writing, the United States is 19 years ing of how America’s servicemembers view their the military — that those who serve are somehow host large military installations, with the Northeast into the current wars — wars that have been own service and sacrifice. Specifically, our study exceptional or set apart — that they are, in a sense, underrepresented, giving this caste phenomenon entirely fought by volunteers who represent examines some of the consequences associated secular saints. Our survey was designed to explore a rural and regional flavor.16 Taken together, these less than 1 percent of the overall population. Al- with the All-Volunteer Force after nearly 20 years these consequences of the All-Volunteer Force, factors tend to both separate and isolate military though expensive, the All-Volunteer Force, which of prolonged war, and our survey was designed to which we discuss below. communities from civilian ones, to the detriment will turn 50 in 2023, remains preferable to those elicit military elite opinion on some aspects of each of civil-military relations.17 who serve as well as to those who don’t.6 This of these consequences. The section that follows is Increased Isolation preference is a relatively recent development. not intended to be an exhaustive review of these Unequal Burden-Sharing The last time a Gallup poll found a majority of consequences but instead focuses on three themes One consequence of moving to an all-volunteer Americans in favor of a draft was 1981.7 For most related to shifting to the All-Volunteer Force: in- force is that those who serve in the military are A second consequence of the All-Volunteer Force of U.S. history, the idealized, and even mytholo- creased isolation, unequal burden-sharing, and increasingly segregated from the rest of society. is that the burden of being at war for nearly 19 years gized, model of military service has been the cit- sentiments of exceptionalism. Today, less than 0.5 percent of the population has has fallen disproportionately upon a small segment izen-soldier. Whether embodied by the “minute- served in the current wars. This lack of shared ex- of the American population. Charles Moskos coined man” or the spirit of the “Greatest Generation,” perience between most Americans and those serv- the term “patriotism lite” to explain the broader the American preference has traditionally been Isolation, Unequal Burden-Sharing, ing has led to the increased isolation of America’s public’s response to this uneven burden-sharing.18 for the ordinary citizen who takes up arms when and the Specter of Exceptionalism armed forces, a topic that continues to dominate It involves giving vocal public support to the troops called upon rather than the professional warri- discussions about the civil-military gap.12 Amy as a substitute for making broader sacrifice in a or.8 After nearly two decades of persistent con- Fighting and winning the nation’s wars has Schafer has pointed out that, for those under 30, time of war. This is most commonly manifested in flict, that citizen-soldier ideal has become nos- become the purview of a small cadre of highly there has been a sharp decline in familiarity with what some have branded as the “thank-you-for- talgic to the point of quaintness. In its place has trained professionals, with both sides of the divide the military as measured by knowing someone in your-service” phenomenon.19 What has emerged uniform.13 Kori Schake and Jim Mattis note the is a new bargain between servicemembers and ci- high number of individuals who responded “Don’t vilians, one in which military service is no longer 4 From October 1991 through June 2001, on average, 65 percent of Americans reported a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the military. Since June 2002, the average confidence level in the military has been 75 percent. See Brennan, “Amid Pandemic, Confidence in Key U.S. Institutions Know” or “No Opinion” in response to questions a component of one’s civic responsibility. These Surges.” For other recent examinations of public confidence in the military, see Jim Golby and Peter Feaver, “Thank You For Your Lip Service? Social about the military in their 2013 YouGov survey for observations are supported by a 2015 Harvard Pressure to Support the Troops,” War on the Rocks, Aug. 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/thank-you-for-your-lip-service-social-pressure- to-support-the-troops/; David T. Burbach, “Partisan Dimensions of Confidence in the U.S. Military, 1973–2016,” Armed Forces & Society 45, no. 2 (April 2019): 211–33, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X17747205; Jim Golby and Peter Feaver, “The Determinants of Public Confidence in the Military,” Paper 11 Beyond the seeming impossibility of getting legislation to reinstitute a draft through Congress, a draft would also be impossible to operate Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, Aug. 29, 2019; and Heidi Urben and Jim Golby, “A Matter without lowering the current enlistment standards. Today, more than two-thirds of service-age Americans (ages 17 to 24) are unfit for military ser- of Trust: Five Pitfalls that Could Squander the American Public’s Confidence in the Military,” in Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations: The vice. Even more troubling, the underlying problems (education, criminality, and obesity) preventing military service in the majority are growing worse Military, Society, Politics, and Modern War, ed. Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks, and Daniel Mauer (New York: Oxford Press, 2020), 135–46. rather than getting better. A draft would mean that standards for enlistment would have to be lowered, with all of the concomitant implications for readiness and training. Thus, there is a logic and a preference for the professional military to continue as it is currently conceived, even though 5 We follow the definition of military elites first used in Peter Feaver and Richard Kohn’s Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) survey, the implications have not been fully examined by the citizenry. Miriam Jordan, “Recruits’ Ineligibility Tests the Military,” Wall Street Journal, June 27, also referred to as “up and coming military officers.” The TISS sample also included U.S. Military Academy cadets and war college students. See 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/recruits-ineligibility-tests-the-military-1403909945. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 6–7. Additional survey demographics from our survey can be found in Appendix A and the survey instrument is included in Appendix B. Both 12 Mark Thompson, “The Other 1%,” Time, Nov. 21, 2011, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2099152,00.html; and Hugh are available in the online version of this article at https://tnsr.org/2021/02/from-citizen-soldier-to-secular-saint-the-societal-implications-of-mili- Liebert and Jim Golby, “Midlife Crisis? The All-Volunteer Force at 40,” Armed Forces and Society 43, no. 1 (January 2017): 115–38, https://doi. tary-exceptionalism/. org/10.1177/0095327X16641430. 6 Amy Schafer, “Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,” Center for a New American Security, May 8, 13 Schafer, Generations of War. 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations-of-war; and Steven M. Kosiak, “Is the U.S. Military Getting Smaller and Older? And 14 Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, eds., Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2016), 289–90. How Much Should We Care?” Center for a New American Security, March 14, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/is-the-u-s-military- getting-smaller-and-older. 15 Schafer, Generations of War. See also Schake and Mattis, Warriors & Citizens; Charlsy Panzino, “‘Warrior Caste’: Is a Public Disconnect Hurting Military Recruiting Efforts?” Military Times, Jan. 18, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/01/19/warrior-caste-is-a-public-discon- 7 Jeffrey M. Jones, “Vast Majority of Americans Opposed to Reinstituting Military Draft,” Gallup News Service, Sept. 7, 2007, https://news. nect-hurting-military-recruiting-efforts/; and Susan Bryant and Brett Swaney, “Deconstructing the ‘Warrior Caste:’ The Beliefs and Backgrounds of Senior gallup.com/poll/28642/vast-majority-americans-opposed-reinstituting-military-draft.aspx. Military Elites,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, July 5, 2017, https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1428887/deconstructing-the-war- 8 Ricardo A. Herrera, For Liberty and the Republic: The American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861 (New York: New York University Press, 2017), rior-caste-the-beliefs-and-backgrounds-of-senior-military/. viii–x; and Phil Klay, “The Citizen-Soldier: Moral Risk and the Modern Military,” The Brookings Institute, May 24, 2016, http://csweb.brookings.edu/ 16 In 2018, South Carolina, Florida, Hawaii, Georgia, and Alabama were the top five recruiting states, after controlling for population size. See content/research/essays/2016/the-citizen-soldier.html. Council on Foreign Relations, “Demographics of the U.S. Military”; and Rosa Brooks, “Civil-Military Paradoxes,” in Warriors and Citizens, 33–39. 9 Eliot A. Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen Soldier,” Parameters 31, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 23, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol31/ 17 Liebert and Golby, “Midlife Crisis?” iss2/5/. 18 Charles Moskos, “Feel that Draft?” Chicago Tribune, June 8, 2005, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2005-06-08-0506080018- 10 This idea that one can be revered but that an individual life means less because the person volunteered came to a head in 2017 with President story.html. Donald Trump’s alleged remarks that a Green Beret who had died in Niger “knew what he had signed up for.” See Mark Landler and Yamiche Alcin- dor, “Trump’s Condolence Call to Widow Ignites an Imbroglio,” New York Times, Oct. 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/us/politics/ 19 Matt Richtel, “Please Don’t Thank Me for My Service,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/22/sunday-review/ trump-widow-johnson-call.html. please-dont-thank-me-for-my-service.html.

11 12 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism

Institute of Politics poll that found that while many showcasing the Army’s values of loyalty, duty, re- youths supported sending ground troops back into spect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and per- Iraq to fight the Islamic State, very few would con- sonal courage. He was struck by the fact that the sider serving in the military themselves.20 display introduced the list by saying that these val- James Fallows, writing in the Atlantic in 2015, ues “distinguish American soldiers from American pointedly called out a public attitude of reverence society.”25 It was peculiar, he thought, to suggest toward, but disengagement from, the military and that these attributes were not valued by Ameri- highlighted the unequal burden placed on so few. cans in general, or that somehow these attributes At the time, he wrote that America had been at war were unique to the military. It has become normal for over a decade but as a public it had not.21 It is for politicians and Americans to honor soldiers for not only about the unequal burden of service, how- their sacrifice, heroism, and patriotism and to imply ever, as Schake and Mattis rightly point out. It is that military members are more virtuous than other also about the burden of grief. The public is largely Americans.26 In a 2018 YouGov poll, for example, 50 unaffected by the casualties of war, and there are percent of Americans stated that all members of the few public rituals that pull the military and society military are heroes, regardless of their experience.27 together in times of great pain.22 What historically Trust and confidence in the military is expressed was a common experience of loss and sacrifice is in a tendency to elevate the soldier to the status now an isolating, perhaps even alienating, experi- of a national icon or even a secular saint.28 Today’s ence for military servicemembers. This may con- volunteer servicemember occupies the peculiar tribute to a feeling among servicemembers that position of a secular saint in contemporary socie- efforts to demonstrate appreciation by the public ty, fulfilling Samuel Huntington’s observation that are hollow tokenism and only further sequester the the choice to join the military is in “pursuit of a military from society.23 higher calling in service to society.”29 The Catholic conception of sainthood is a seemingly strange, but Sentiments of Exceptionalism ultimately appropriate, analogy for the position the military holds in contemporary American society.30 A third consequence of the All-Volunteer Force Rather than ordinary, saints are, by definition, ex- is a sense of superiority or exceptionalism with- traordinary. Sainthood is also associated with the in the ranks. In his acceptance speech after being idea of submission to and, if necessary, martyrdom awarded West Point’s Thayer Award in 2011, former in the service of, God. The saint is in no way sin- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cautioned young less, but rather is set apart from society and is the cadets about the “growing disconnect between mil- “conqueror … who conquers him/herself.”31 Simi- itary and society, not by average Americans, but on larly, the servicemember-cum-secular saint is dif- the uniformed side of the equation.”24 In his speech, ferent and apart from the average citizen. These Gates recalled a hallway display in the Pentagon soldier-saints have all sworn an oath to “support

20 “Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes Toward Politics and Public Service, 28th Edition,” Harvard University Institute of Politics, Fall 2015, https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/pictures/151208_Harvard_IOP_Fall_2015_Topline.pdf. 21 Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military.” Rosa Brooks has also described this phenomenon as “enthusiasm and ignorance.” Brooks, “Civil-Military Paradoxes,” 22. 22 Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, “A Great Divergence?” in Warriors & Citizens, 9. 23 Schake and Mattis, “A Great Divergence?” 24 Robert M. Gates, “Thayer Award Remarks,” Speech at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, Oct. 6, 2011, https://www.westpointaog. org/page.aspx?pid=4843. 25 Gates, “Thayer Award Remarks.” 26 Ronald R. Krebs, Robert Ralston, and Aaron Rapport, “Americans’ Blind Faith in the Military Is Dangerous,” Foreign Policy, Dec. 3, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/americans-blind-faith-in-the-military-is-dangerous-civilian-oversight-deference-mcraven-trump/. 27 John Vandiver, “Half of Americans Surveyed Say All Servicemembers Are Heroes,” Stars and Stripes, Sept. 27, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/ news/half-of-americans-surveyed-say-all-servicemembers-are-heroes-1.549349. Of note, when the same question was asked in Germany and the United Kingdom, only 15 percent of Germans and 32 percent of Britons responded that all those serving in their armed forces should be described as heroes. See also Matthew Smith, “Are the Troops Heroes? Americans, Britons and Germans Feel Very Differently,” YouGov, Sept. 26, 2018, https:// today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/09/25/are-troops-heroes-americans-britons-and-germans-fe. 28 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23. 29 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 8. 30 Rosa Brooks has also noted the elevation of military service into the realm of the “sacred.” See Rosa Brooks, “Serving in the Military Doesn’t Make You Special,” Los Angeles Times, Aug. 10, 2016, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-brooks-military-sacred-20160810-snap-story.html. 31 Peter Kreeft, “What Is a Saint?” Catholic Education Resource Center, accessed Jan. 12, 2021, https://www.catholiceducation.org/en/culture/ catholic-contributions/what-is-a-saint.html.

13 14 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism and defend” the U.S. Constitution, with their lives to advise senior civilian leaders wisely or readily if necessary, and be obedient even if it conflicts subject themselves to civilian accountability.36 with their personal judgment or physical safety. With such high levels of trust — even deference — being given to a segment of society that is in- Methodology and Findings creasingly isolated, chronically unrepresentative, and shouldering the burdens of America’s protract- Given the public’s high levels of trust and con- ed conflicts, many civil-military relations observers fidence in the military, the acute burden borne by have warned about the implications for the mili- an isolated segment of society during America’s tary. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) David Barno suggests that iso- recent wars, and concerns about a growing sense lation in the face of an adoring nation risks foster- of exceptionalism within the ranks, we decided to ing a “closed culture of superiority and aloofness” explore these themes as part of a broader survey within the military.32 There is a fine line between we conducted of military elites. We conducted a feeling a sense of isolation and a more pernicious voluntary, online survey in seven waves from De- strain of elitism. Scholars have pointed out that cember 2017 through March 2020. Our partici- this isolation combined with military members’ pants were 1,218 military officers enrolled in the frequently higher levels of education or technical various colleges within the National Defense Uni- training and physical fitness can contribute to the versity and the Army War College and cadets at idea that the military is not only separate from so- the U.S. Military Academy.37 To gain insight into ciety but is perhaps a superior class.33 generational differences among the respondents, This isn’t the first time that these dynamics have we surveyed those just beginning their careers as been the subject of concern. In their watershed sur- officers and those who are approaching the ranks vey of military elites nearly two decades ago, Peter of senior officers. The survey sample by no means Feaver and Richard Kohn found that 77 percent of reflects the military at large, let alone the entire of- military leaders agreed with the notion that civilian ficer corps, nor is it meant to. Rather it is meant society would be made better off by adopting more to be representative of military elites — those “up of the military’s values and customs.34 In the run- and comers” likely to be tapped for advancement up to the invasion of Iraq, a 2003 Military Times through promotion and selection for exclusive mil- poll also revealed that two thirds of its active duty itary schooling.38 While we only focus on a handful subscribers thought military members had high- of questions from the survey in this article, the full er moral standards than the nation they served. survey instrument can be found in Appendix B.39 More than 60 percent called the country’s moral We asked these officers and cadets a series of standards only “fair” or “poor.”35 Immense public questions aimed at exploring how they view their trust, even veneration, for the military feeds this service in the armed forces and how they feel the sense of superiority. As Kohn observed, caution, American public views that service, specifical- skepticism, and even a bit of mistrust is healthy for ly looking at the three themes discussed in the the relationship between senior military and civil- previous section. We asked participants the de- ian elites. However, military officers who feel con- gree to which they agreed or disagreed with the tempt for their elected or appointed leaders — or statement that the American public understands even the voters who put them there — are unlikely the sacrifices that members of the military make,

32 Thomas E. Ricks, “Dave Barno’s Top 10 Tasks for General Dempsey, the New Army Chief of Staff,” Foreign Policy, Jan. 21, 2011, https://foreign- policy.com/2011/01/21/dave-barnos-top-10-tasks-for-general-dempsey-the-new-army-chief-of-staff/. 33 Schafer, Generations of War. and found that only 27 percent of respondents firm that servicemembers are feeling increasingly 34 Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, 55. agreed or strongly agreed. However, a majority of isolated from society in that they feel that no-one 35 Gordon Trowbridge, “2003 Military Times Poll — We Asked. You Answered,” Marine Corps Times, Dec. 29, 2003, http://webarchive.loc.gov/ respondents agreed that the American public is can quite understand what members of the mil- all/20040111094402/http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-2513919.php. generally grateful for these sacrifices (see Table itary have gone through during wartime except 36 Richard H. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Naval War College Review 55, no. 3 (Summer 1). These findings reinforce what many observers, others who have worn the uniform. 2002): 35, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss3/2/. including Fallows and Rosa Brooks, have suggest- Notably, mid-to-senior grade officers (71 per- 37 Most military officers that we surveyed were senior officers (O5s and O6s) attending senior service college at the National War College ed about how the American public views its armed cent) are more likely to think that the public is and Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy in the National Defense University at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. However, the sample from the National Defense University also included a small subsample of forces after nearly 18 years of war — with rever- grateful for their service than West Point cadets midgrade officers attending the Joint Forces Staff College, specifically the Joint and Combined Warfighting School. While the subsample within the ence but disengagement.40 They also help con- (55 percent), while slightly more combat veterans National Defense University included officers from each of the military services, this survey’s sample is predominantly an Army sample. Cadets at the U.S. Military Academy who we surveyed were drawn from the core course on American politics — a class typically taken by sophomores. 38 Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, 6–7. 39 The survey instrument is included in Appendix B, which can be found in the online version of this article, https://tnsr.org/2021/02/from-citi- zen-soldier-to-secular-saint-the-societal-implications-of-military-exceptionalism/. 40 Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military”; and Brooks, “Civil-Military Paradoxes.”

15 16 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism

exceptionalism, we asked if respondents agreed harbored similar sentiments — that the only peo- (69 percent) think the public is grateful compared emonies at sporting events, servicemembers who with the notion that those who have not served ple who were fair game to question them were to those who have not been in combat (57 percent).41 fought the post-9/11 wars have been the benefi- in the military generally should not question or those who have served in uniform themselves. It is likely that military officers who have made ciaries of Americans’ gratitude. criticize the military. This question was prompt- Fewer than a quarter of respondents agreed with the sacrifice inherent in deploying to combat We also wanted to examine to what extent mil- ed, in part, by White House Press Secretary Sarah the statement that those who have not served in zones tend to think the public does indeed ac- itary elites have not only begun to believe their Huckabee Sanders declaring to a reporter in Oc- uniform should not question or criticize the mili- knowledge and appreciate such sacrifices, because own press and take the public’s praise for them for tober 2017 that it would be “highly inappropriate” tary, although nearly three times more West Point they have experienced the public’s gratitude first granted, but whether they think they are, in fact, to question or debate a four-star general, referenc- cadets (30 percent) agreed than their more senior hand. From the proliferation of care packages for superior to the society that they have pledged to ing then-White House Chief of Staff Gen. (Ret.) military officer counterparts (11 percent). Similar- deployed troops, to elaborate welcome home cer- defend. To probe for these sentiments of military John Kelly.42 We wanted to know if military elites ly, those who have not deployed were also more

41 It should follow that the subsamples of West Point cadets and those who have not deployed in combat should generally mirror one another, just as mid-to-senior grade officers and combat deployment veterans are strongly correlated. Of the 597 West Point cadets who completed the 42 Josh Wagner, “White House Press Secretary: It’s ‘Highly Inappropriate’ to Question a 4-Star Marine General,” Washington Post, Oct. 20, 2017, survey, six were prior service veterans with combat deployment experience. Of the sample of 621 mid-to-senior grade officers, 545 were combat https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/20/white-house-press-secretary-its-highly-inappropriate-to-question-a-4-star- deployment veterans. marine-general/?utm_term=.1194fb976635.

17 18 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism

on this survey question largely correlates with the we found a divergence based on key identity varia- higher level of support among West Point cadets bles such as political ideology, party affiliation, and in general (30 percent) and male West Point cadets gender (see Table 3). For example, 82 percent of (28 percent). Approximately 23 percent of female liberals felt that the military should reflect socie- mid-to-senior grade officers agreed with this state- ty, compared to just 61 percent of conservatives, ment, compared to just 10 percent of male mid-to- with a similar split observed along party lines — 79 senior grade officers. percent of Democrats compared to 64 percent of Another way to investigate whether military Republicans. Likewise, 78 percent of women think servicemembers see themselves as exceptional is that the military should reflect society, compared to ask whether or not officers find the culture of to 65 percent of men. the military to be superior to the rest of society. These findings further indicate that identity is an Roughly a quarter of those surveyed agreed with important factor for military elites when they reflect this sentiment, but with some striking differenc- upon their service. Servicemembers who are under- es among subgroups. Senior officers were slightly represented in the military think that the military more likely than West Point cadets to indicate that should look more like society, whereas those who they thought military culture was superior, but the are in the majority in the military feel less strongly difference was small. There were, however, more about achieving that goal. This is more than just a notable differences in responses based on ideolo- theoretical debate. The findings carry real implica- gy, party identification, race, and gender. Conserv- tions about elites’ support for various policies to- atives and Republicans were nearly twice as likely day, such as promotion board procedures, gender to agree that the military is superior to civilian so- integration into combat roles, efforts to increase the ciety as liberals and Democrats, and whites were number of African American officers in combat arms twice as likely as African Americans to hold this branches in the Army, or the debate on transgender view. Men were also slightly more likely than wom- individuals serving in the military.44 en to agree that military culture was better than Lastly, we asked respondents about their pride civilian society. Thus, it would appear that military in service and the likelihood that they would en- elites’ political views and identity matter in how courage young people close to them to join the they conceptualize military service and society. It military today. At first blush, the findings appear should not be surprising that the experiences of encouraging, with a strong majority of respond- minority elites vary considerably from those who ents reporting both pride in service and a will- are in the majority, and that those different expe- ingness to encourage others to join the military riences might influence minority views of the mil- (see Table 4). When comparing responses among itary and society at large. Elites who self identify subgroups, however, differences begin to emerge. as liberals, Democrats, or African Americans — all Almost all of the midgrade to senior officers sur- of whom are minorities in the officer corps — may veyed (97 percent) reported higher levels of pride not find military culture to be as idyllic as con- in service compared to cadets who were just start- servatives, Republicans, men, or whites do.43 It is ing their careers (85 percent). Combat veterans unclear whether this is also true for women, given displayed higher levels of pride than those who that they were more likely than men to agree that have not deployed. Mid-to-senior grade officers military members should not be questioned by ci- and those who had deployed were also more like- vilians, but less likely to agree that military culture ly to encourage others to join (80 percent) than is superior to civilian society. those who have just joined themselves and those When we asked respondents the normative ques- who have not deployed (67 percent). Responses apt to agree than combat veterans. This point is the military’s subordination to civilian authority. tion of whether or not the military should reflect did not vary by gender, with men and women re- instructive: Those with the least amount of time Of note, while a slightly larger percentage of con- society, we found higher support for this among porting similar levels of pride in service and will- and experience in the profession are more apt to servatives and Republicans agreed that those who mid-to-senior grade officers (71 percent) than ingness to encourage young people to join the mil- think that those serving should be immune from have not served should not criticize the military among West Point cadets (63 percent). However, itary. However, when the results are broken down questioning and criticism from outsiders. This than liberals and Democrats, the differences were could suggest that the longer one is exposed to not statistically significant. One surprising finding 43 In our survey, 20 percent of respondents identified as a Democrat and 18 percent identified as a liberal. Blacks or African Americans consti- the professional norms associated with being a in Table 2 is also worth noting. Approximately 32 tuted eight percent of our survey sample, and women made up 18 percent of our sample. military officer, the more likely one is to support percent of female respondents agreed with the 44 On June 18, 2020, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper announced the establishment of a new Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion in the Military, oversight or criticism of the institution. In many statement that those who have not served in uni- aimed at eliminating racial bias and increasing diversity within the ranks, especially in the officer corps. Additionally, on June 26, 2020, the U.S. Army announced that it will no longer include official photographs or any information that identifies a soldier’s race, ethnicity, or gender in promotion selection ways, this finding is encouraging. We should want form should not question members of the military, boards. Both moves came in response to Black Lives Matter protests in the aftermath of the George Floyd killing and the concomitant reactions in the U.S. military elites to reject the idea that they should compared to just 18 percent of men. In our sample, military about systemic bias and racism. Dan Lamothe, “Pentagon Chief Announces New Steps to Improve Fairness for Service Members of Color,” Wash- ington Post, June 18, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/06/18/pentagon-chief-announces-new-steps-improve-fairness-ser- be immune from outside questioning. To do oth- 65 percent of female respondents were West Point vice-members-color/; and Nancy A. Youssef, “To Combat Racial Bias, Army Is Dropping Photos from Some Soldier Records,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, erwise would be counter to the very principle of cadets. The higher level of support among women 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/to-combat-racial-bias-army-is-dropping-photos-from-some-soldier-records-11593102600.

19 20 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism based on political views, partisanship, and race, Department of Defense report found that a third questions about the degree of inclusivity — or even recommendations. First, the services should aim the findings tell a different story. of African American servicemembers indicated outright discrimination or harassment — with- to study not only who serves in the military and Liberals and Democrats were slightly less likely that they had experienced racial discrimination or in the ranks. To be fair, it is unclear how widely why, but who does not serve and why. The answer to report pride in their service and a willingness harassment during a 12-month period. Similarly, a such attitudes toward taking pride in service and to this question should help focus recruitment ef- to encourage others to serve compared to con- 2020 Reuters study found that uniformed members being willing to recommend that others join are forts, as well as retention efforts, to ensure a mil- servatives and Republicans. More starkly, white of the military rarely file formal Equal Opportuni- held across the military. Our survey sample only itary — especially an officer corps — that better servicemembers were significantly more likely ty complaints for racial discrimination, suggesting included officers and cadets, who account for only reflects society. Such efforts would also comple- to report pride in service and encourage others they do not trust the system. a narrow slice of the armed forces. We do not know ment and enable the military to better act upon the to join the military than African American ser- if the more numerous enlisted ranks hold similar findings of the National Commission on Military, vicemembers. In fact, only 56 percent of African views and if their views vary by ideology, party, National, and Public Service, which recommended American respondents surveyed indicated they Conclusion race, and gender. Future research involving a large- strengthening and expanding education pathways would recommend that a young person close to scale, random sample could shed more light on the for military service, expanding opportunities for them join the military today. No other measured This study has highlighted some of the less vis- extent to which a divide exists between majority subgroup reported such a low likelihood to rec- ible implications of the All-Volunteer Force. Our and minority groups in the military. Such a study ommend service. Even more noteworthy, only 38 findings show that while most military elites in should be commissioned now. percent of African American West Point cadets in- uniform today feel the American public appreci- Regardless, these findings should give dicated they would encourage someone close to ates their service, they also think that the public senior military leaders and their civilian them to join the military, compared to 77 percent fails to understand the sacrifices members of the superiors pause. Part of the allure of the of African American midgrade and senior officers. military make. Perhaps this is an understanda- citizen-soldier of the past was that service More than half of African American cadets sur- ble byproduct of unequal burden-sharing during seemed to trump politics. People from di- veyed (52 percent) were neutral on the matter. nearly two decades of war. Additionally, only 43 verse backgrounds found common Ten percent indicated they would not recommend percent of military elites disagreed that military ground through shared sacrifice, or that a young person join the military, compared to culture is generally superior to the rest of Amer- what Cohen termed “the idea of mili- 5 percent of white cadets who would not. ican society, raising not only concerns of discon- tary service as the great leveler.”47 To- While admittedly a small subsample, it is alarm- nectedness among the officer corps but also a ten- day, however, both uniformed and non-uniformed youth to explore service, and strengthening mili- ing that so few African American cadets who are dency toward feelings of exceptionalism. leaders should come to terms with a worrisome tary recruiting and marketing.49 just beginning their military careers indicated that Much of the civil-military relations scholarship side effect in the professionalized fighting force Military recruiting is a tough business. Given the they would likely encourage other young people over the past two decades has centered on the — that servicemembers’ ideology and politics may already small slice of young Americans who meet to join the military, especially since 62 percent of civil-military gap — the divide between those who shape their conception of service. the necessary standards for service, an obvious African American cadets reported that a member serve and the rest of society. Our findings certainly This is not the first time that scholars have un- tendency can exist to “fish where the fish are.” And of their immediate family served in the military, reinforce the notion that such a gap continues to covered evidence of differing attitudes and expe- while military service as a family business rightly indicating some degree of familiarity with military exist. However, our study also found evidence of riences among political minorities in the military. offers much to be proud of, it, too, adds to military service. African American cadets are a minority at a troubling new gap — one among military elites Previous research has found that a higher percent- elites’ sense of isolation from the society that they West Point and historically have been underrep- themselves. After nearly two decades of fighting age of Army officers who described themselves are sworn to defend. Making a serious effort to ex- resented there, although recent years have noted wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, our survey as Democrats reported feeling uncomfortable ex- pand recruitment, especially of elites, outside the higher minority enrollment levels.45 Regardless, data shows that military elites’ feelings of superi- pressing their political views with their co-work- military’s traditional bastions of support may help their hesitancy to recommend that other young ority over the rest of society are more prevalent ers compared to officers who identified as Repub- to increase the officer corps’ representativeness people join is striking, particularly given that more among conservatives, Republicans, whites, and licans. Likewise, a greater proportion of Democrats and reduce its isolation and the tendency of service- senior African American officers were more apt to men (at least in certain measures) than among lib- indicated that other officers had encouraged them members to have a sense of exceptionalism.50 The encourage young people to join. Clearly, more re- erals, Democrats, women, and African Americans. to vote a particular way than Republican officers.48 military has a greater ability to affect retention than search is required, as these findings raise questions And, while military elites in general tend to display What makes our findings in this study notable, recruitment. Given the concerns raised here regard- about the degree of inclusivity within the ranks to- high levels of pride in service, it is not uniformly however, is that these differences between major- ing minority groups, the services should pay greater day and why minority elites tend to view their ex- so, with liberals, Democrats, and African Ameri- ity and minority opinions on normative aspects care and attention to why such minorities choose to perience in the military less positively than their cans reporting lower levels of pride and being less related to the military profession stretch beyond leave the military. majority elite peers seem to.46 Two recent reports inclined to encourage young people to join the mil- party affiliation into ideology, race, and gender and Second, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that document the extent of racial discrimination itary today. This may be due to the fact that the may impact how elites conceptualize their service should lead the services in a major effort to bet- within the ranks further underscore the need for experiences of these minority military elites may and view the rest of American society. ter incorporate the study of civil-military relations more research and attention to the matter. A 2017 vary considerably from their majority peers, raising Given these findings, we offer two modest and the norm of non-partisanship into professional

45 Of the 1,190 cadets who reported in to West Point’s class of 2023 in the summer of 2019, 180 (15 percent) were African American. Jenni Fink, “West Point’s Newest Class Has More Minority Cadets than Last Year,” Newsweek, July 1, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/west-point-class- 47 Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen Soldier.” 2023-minority-cadets-1446958. 48 Heidi A. Urben, “Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves? Levels of Political Activism of Active Duty Army Officers,” Armed Forces and Society 40, 46 David Barno and Nora Bensahel articulate the challenge facing the U.S. military well. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Reflections on the no. 3 (July 2014): 580, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12467774. Curse of Racism in the U.S. Military,” War on the Rocks, June 30, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/reflections-on-the-curse-of-racism- 49 Inspired to Serve: The Final Report of the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, National Commission on Military, in-the-u-s-military/; Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: Long-Withheld Pentagon Survey Shows Widespread Racial Discrimination, Harassment,” Reuters, Jan. National, and Public Service, (March 2020), 33–40, https://www.inspire2serve.gov/sites/default/files/final-report/Final%20Report.pdf. 14, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-civilrights-exclusive/exclusive-long-withheld-pentagon-survey-shows-widespread-ra- cial-discrimination-harassment-idUSKBN29J1N1; and Phil Stewart, M.B. Pell, and Joshua Schneyer, “U.S. Troops Battling Racism Report High Barrier 50 We are by no means the first to make such an argument. As an example, see Kathy Roth-Douquet, “America’s Elite Needs to Get Back in to Justice,” Reuters, Sept. 15, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-military-civilrights/. Uniform,” Foreign Policy, Sept. 25, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/military-service-warrior-caste-united-states/.

21 22 The Scholar From Citizen Soldier to Secular Saint: The Societal Implications of Military Exceptionalism military education, which is sorely needed. Leaders and subordination to civilian authority.55 While This article reflects the personal views of the au- should also reinforce why selfless service is such Washington’s nine-page speech was a measured, thors. It does not represent the views of the U.S. a critical component of professionalism, especially dispassionate response to a growing frenzy within Army, National Defense University, or Department within the officer corps. Each branch of the mili- the officer corps, it was his seemingly offhand com- of Defense. tary has a rich tradition of inculcating the concept ment that truly disarmed the crowd: “Gentlemen, of servant leadership, but it is largely taught with you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for, I Acknowledgements: The authors wish to thank an eye toward being a servant leader with regard to have grown not only gray, but almost blind in the Dr. Peter D. Feaver, the panelists at the 2019 In- one’s own subordinates.51 Fostering a similar focus service of my country.”56 In the ultimate gesture of ter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Socie- on the values of humility and selfless service to- humility, Washington reminded his fellow officers ty, and the anonymous Texas National Security Re- ward the country and its citizens may help to com- of the greater cause they served. After nearly two view reviewers for their helpful feedback on earlier bat the growing sense of superiority among those decades of war, and as the elite of the U.S. military versions of this manuscript. We also are grateful to who serve today. find themselves more isolated, more burdened, the National Defense University, U.S. Military Acad- For many serving in the military, King Leonidas less representative of society, but more revered emy, and U.S. Army War College, especially Col. Su- and the vastly outnumbered Spartans at the Battle than ever before, senior military leaders would be zanne Nielsen and Lt. Col. Heidi Demarest, and Dr. of Thermopylae, popularized in the film 300, offer well advised to turn to the country’s original secu- Marybeth Ulrich for facilitating this survey research. an idealized vision of military service. Released just lar saint for inspiration. as the surge in Iraq was commencing in 2007, the Image: Department of Defense, Patrick Kelley film, as described in a Los Angeles Times review, Dr. Susan Bryant is the executive director of “celebrate[s] a warrior cult that prizes physical Strategic Education International as well as a re- fitness, discipline, and bravery. The numbers are tired U.S. Army colonel, an adjunct associate pro- small, but the hearts are stout. The cult is part of fessor at Georgetown University, a visiting lecturer the society it protects but yet is separate, even at John Hopkins University’s School of Advanced alienated from it.”52 The story of the Spartans at International Studies, and a visiting research fellow Thermopylae is not only favored by the rank and at National Defense University’s Institute for Na- file — both the former chief of staff of the Army tional Strategic Studies. and former commandant of the Marine Corps had Steven Pressfield’s novel on the same topic, Gates Mr. Brett Swaney is an assistant research fel- of Fire, on their official reading lists.53 While the low at the Institute for National Strategic Studies story of bravery and unbreakable solidarity in the at National Defense University. His research focus- face of overwhelming odds is a natural choice to es on civil-military relations and NATO/Europe. He inspire young servicemembers, it also carries with holds an M.A. in global security studies from Johns it the undeniable theme of a warrior caste separate Hopkins University. from, if not superior to, the rest of society.54 We suggest that another historical figure of my- Dr. Heidi Urben is an adjunct associate profes- thologized proportions, but one arguably more sor at Georgetown University, non-resident senior accessible to U.S. audiences, be given the same associate at the Center for Strategic and Inter- amount of attention and admiration from senior national Studies, adjunct scholar at West Point’s military leaders and the officer corps today — Modern War Institute, a visiting research fellow at George Washington. The first commander in chief’s National Defense University’s Institute for National Newburgh Address to a group of several hundred Strategic Studies, and a retired U.S. Army colonel. Continental Army officers who were ready to mu- She is currently writing a book on partisanship and tiny over a lack of pay in 1783 not only thwarted a political activity in the armed forces. possible coup but encapsulates servant leadership

51 Tom Kolditz, “Why the Military Produces Great Leaders,” Harvard Business Review, Feb. 6, 2009, https://hbr.org/2009/02/why-the-mili- tary-produces-grea. 52 Tony Perry and Robert W. Welkos, “The Few, the Proud Among Fans of ‘300,’” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2007, https://www.latimes.com/ archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-14-et-spartans14-story.html. 53 “The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, accessed Jan. 12, 2021, https://history.army. mil/html/books/105/105-1-1/index.html; and “Revision of the Commandant’s Professional Reading List,” U.S. Marine Corps, March 4, 2019, https:// www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/1773787/revision-of-the-commandants-professional-reading-list/. 54 Jim Gourley, “Welcome to Spartanburg!: The Dangers of this Growing American Military Obsession,” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2014, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/22/welcome-to-spartanburg-the-dangers-of-this-growing-american-military-obsession/. 55 George Washington, “Newburgh Address: George Washington to Officers of the Army, March 15, 1783,” Mount Vernon (website), accessed Jan. 12, 2021, https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-sources-2/article/newburgh-address-george-washington-to-officers-of-the-army- march-15-1783/. 56 Washington, “Newburgh Address.” See also Richard H. Kohn, “The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d’Etat,” William and Mary Quarterly 27, no. 2 (April 1970): 187–220, https://doi.org/10.2307/1918650.

23 24 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone

The Gulf War is often remembered as a “good war,” a high- THE GULF WAR’S AFTERLIFE: tech conflict that quickly and cleanly achieved its objectives. Yet, new archival evidence sheds light on the extended fallout from the war and challenges this neat narrative. The Gulf War DILEMMAS, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, left policymakers with a dilemma that plagued successive U.S. administrations. The war helped create an acute humanitarian AND THE POST-COLD WAR crisis in Iraq, and the United States struggled to find a way to contain a still recalcitrant Saddam Hussein while alleviating the suffering of innocent Iraqis. The failure of American leaders ORDER UNDONE to resolve this dilemma, despite several chances to do so, allowed Saddam’s regime to drive a wedge into the heart of the American-led, post-Cold War order. While in the short term the SAMUEL HELFONT war seemed like a triumph, over the years its afterlife caused irreparable harm to American interests.

n June 1991, nearly 5 million onlookers en- American politics. Both the Clinton and Obama ad- thusiastically welcomed American troops ministrations admired the way President George returning home from the Gulf War as they H. W. Bush handled the conflict.5 Despite some marched in a ticker-tape parade through handwringing about Saddam Hussein remaining in NewI York City’s “Canyon of Heroes.”1 This image power and the fact that there was no World War of the Gulf War as a triumph has proved endur- II-style surrender, the conflict is still remembered ing. As two historians of the war wrote a decade as a “good war” or, as one Marine Corps general later, the Gulf War was “one of the most success- described it, a “beautiful thing.”6 Unsurprisingly, it ful campaigns in American military history.”2 For has had an outsize impact on the way Americans many Americans, the war exorcised the demons think war should be conducted.7 of Vietnam.3 Others have contrasted the success Yet, just a few miles north of the June 1991 tick- of the 1991 Gulf War with the failure of the 2003 er-tape parade, the difficulties American diplomats Iraq War.4 Such praise has transcended domestic were facing at the United Nations offered a quite

1 Susan Baer, “Desert Storm Takes N.Y. 5 Million Attend Ticker-Tape Parade,” Baltimore Sun, June 11, 1991, https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/ bs-xpm-1991-06-11-1991162064-story.html. 2 Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), xiii. 3 E.J. Dionne Jr., “Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome,” Washington Post, March 4, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/poli- tics/1991/03/04/kicking-the-vietnam-syndrome/b6180288-4b9e-4d5f-b303-befa2275524d/. 4 Richard N. Haass, “The Gulf War: Its Place in History,” in Into the Desert: Reflections on the Gulf War, ed. Jeffrey A. Engel (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 57–83; and Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York: Mariner Books, 2014). 5 Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 11; and Jeffery Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doc- trine/471525/. 6 Kirk Spitzer, “25 Years Later, Desert Storm Remains the Last Good War,” USA Today, Feb. 27, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opin- ion/2016/02/27/column-25-years-later-desert-storm-remains-last-good-war/81033112/. 7 Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Long Shadow of the Gulf War,” War on the Rocks, Feb. 24, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/the- long-shadow-of-the-gulf-war/.

25 26 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone different image of the war’s place in history. The establish a more sustainable policy on Iraq. Both of sources almost immediately reveals a disparity be- for all countries in the world, and for [the United Gulf War had caused much more damage to Iraqi these opportunities offered a way out of the dilem- tween the destruction they describe in Iraq during Nations] as a whole, than the many regional con- infrastructure than American officials had antic- ma that America faced in the wake of the Gulf War the 1990s and the American narratives of a clean flicts with which we have tried to grapple over re- ipated or acknowledged. As a result, the conflict and seizing them would have led to more favorable and precise war in 1991.13 As the second half of this cent decades.”14 The conflict, he argued, “marked a contributed to an acute humanitarian crisis that outcomes for U.S. interests and for the post-Cold article demonstrates, this disparity facilitated Ira- clear, firm and effective determination of the world developed during and after the war. Moreover, the War system. qi attempts to drive a wedge between the United community not to allow the law of the jungle to Iraqi regime was carrying out atrocities against its Bush had sold the Gulf War as a way to forge the States and its international partners. Saddam’s overcome the rule of law.”15 The American ambas- own people and failing to abide by the Gulf War’s post-Cold War international system into a “new regime spent considerable time and effort high- sador called the war’s ceasefire agreement “unique ceasefire agreement that permitted U.N. inspectors world order” that would unite the globe in a liber- lighting, in cinematic detail, the suffering that the and historic,” claiming that “it fulfils the hope of full access to its weapons sites. In response, the al, American-led system rooted in the rule of law.8 Iraqi people experienced because of the Gulf War mankind.”16 In a sign of the times, the Soviet Un- United States insisted on keeping economic sanc- This was a laudable goal. Yet, the fallout from that and international sanctions, juxtaposing it against ion’s ambassador agreed, arguing that the conflict tions on Iraq in place to coerce the Iraqi regime war ultimately undermined any hopes for such a American narratives about the war and its after- demonstrated “the soundness of the new thinking, into full compliance. However, these sanctions fur- system. New archival material from the Iraqi Baath math to devastating effect. the new system of international relations.”17 ther deepened the emerging humanitarian crisis in Party’s archives and the Clinton Library demon- This article first describes the policy dilemma These sentiments stemmed from the way that Iraq, punishing civilians for the crimes of a regime strates how humanitarian issues in Iraq poisoned that the United States faced following the Gulf the Bush administration sold the war. Shortly af- that they had little ability to influence. Through- American foreign relations and became a weapon War. It then discusses the opportunities that the ter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, out the following decade, the inability of the United for Iraq and other states to undermine American United States missed to deal with that dilemma. Bush began promoting a war to liberate Kuwait by States to find a way out of this dilemma plagued leadership of the international system. The result- Finally, the article shows how these missed oppor- connecting it to visions of a liberal and more hu- American diplomacy and diminished the country’s ing frustration and ill will propelled the United tunities weakened the post-Cold War international mane post-Cold War order.18 On Sept. 11, 1990, he international standing. States into the 2003 Iraq War, which only further system and ultimately contributed to the American made his case for war in a widely publicized ad- This outcome was not inevitable. Following the undermined its international standing. decision to invade Iraq in 2003. dress to Congress. He linked the Gulf crisis with war, at least two opportunities arose for finding a Most critical analyses of the Gulf War fail to con- the end of the Cold War, explaining that the “crisis formula to hold Baghdad accountable while also sider the aftermath of the war.9 When they do, they in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. As new often debate whether the United States won the America’s Post-Gulf War Dilemma rare opportunity to move toward an historic pe- archival material makes clear, the American fail- Gulf War but lost the peace.10 However, that debate riod of cooperation.”19 He stated explicitly that a ure to seize either of these opportunities caused artificially separates the war from its political fall- The months following the end of the Gulf War “new world order” was one of the objectives of the lasting, and probably irreparable, damage to U.S. out, including the 2003 Iraq War. In fact, most de- presented the international community with com- coming Gulf conflict and he argued that the crisis interests and to the post-Cold War order that the bates about Iraq that occurred in 2003 — including peting images of triumph and despair: triumph for would birth “a new era — freer from the threat of United States wanted to build. The first opportu- debates about regime change — had their origins the United States and the United Nations, despair terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more nity emerged from a plan in the summer of 1991 to in the dilemma that the Gulf War created for U.S. for Iraq and its civilian population. This Janus- secure in the quest for peace.” This was no ordi- separate the humanitarian situation in Iraq from policy. This article explicitly links these events, of- faced outcome created a dilemma. How could the nary foreign policy venture. As Bush explained, “A the United Nations’ attempt to eliminate illicit fering a corrective to historical narratives of the international community preserve the gains it had hundred generations have searched for this elusive Iraqi weapons programs. The second opportunity Iraq wars. made during the Gulf War in solidifying a post- path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across arose following Bill Clinton’s election in 1992. Ira- These insights stem from new research with Ira- Cold War system based on the rule of law, while the span of human endeavor.” Yet, the conflict in qi records show that once Clinton replaced Bush, qi, American, and U.N. records.11 The Iraqi archives also addressing the acute humanitarian crisis that the Persian Gulf would finally put within reach a Baghdad was prepared to adjust its approach to the are particularly interesting and have generated a had engulfed millions of Iraqi civilians? “world in which nations recognize the shared re- United States and the international community. As wealth of new literature over the past decade.12 sponsibility for freedom and justice. A world where a result, the United States had a clear chance to However, immersing oneself in Iraqi and Arabic Triumph the strong respect the rights of the weak.”20 This almost utopian rhetoric about a new world 8 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” Speech, Washington, DC, Sept. 11, 1990, available at the Miller Center, Uni- The triumphal feelings that emerged at the end order tapped into the broader zeitgeist at the end versity of Virginia, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-1990-address-joint-session-congress. of the conflict surpassed what one might expect of the Cold War. A year earlier, in 1989, the polit- 9 For example, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, from a limited regional war. As the British ambas- ical scientist Francis Fukuyama famously declared Brown and Company, 1995); Marvin Pokrant, Desert Storm at Sea: What the Navy Really Did (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999); Marolda and Schneller, Shield and Sword; James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa sador to the United Nations argued, the war was the “end of history” on the pages of the Nation- Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1994); and Daryl G. Press, “The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare,” International Security “of far greater and of far more positive significance al Interest. For Fukuyama, the coming victory of 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 5–44, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092121. 10 Though he takes a different position than this article, Joshua Rovner provides a good overview of this debate in Joshua Rovner, “Delusion of De- 13 For an example of the narratives that emerge from Iraqi records, see Khoury, Iraq in Wartime, 35–47. feat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998,” Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 4 (2014): 482–507, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.891074. 14 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” UNSC Records, S/PV. 2981, April 3, 1991, 111, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.2981. 11 In addition to some primary documents from the George H. W. Bush administration, archival records used in this article include the Ba‘th Regional Command Collection, housed at the Hoover Archives and Library, Stanford University (hereafter cited as BRCC); the Conflict Records Re- 15 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 112; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” in The United Nations and search Center, formerly housed at the National Defense University, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as CRRC); the Clinton Library Archives, housed the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, ed. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The United Nations Blue Books Series, vol. IX, Department of Public Information, at the William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum, Little Rock, AR and online at the Clinton Digital Library, https://clinton.presidentialli- United Nations, New York, 1996, 33–34. braries.us (hereafter cited as Clinton Library); and the National Security Archive at George Washington University, Washington, DC and online at 16 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 82. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/ (hereafter cited as the National Security Archive). The United Nations records can be found in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2020 (hereafter cited as UNSC Records). 17 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 99. 12 For example, see Dina Rizk Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 18 Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), Kevin M. Woods, David D. Palkki, and Mark E. Stout, eds., The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978–2001 (New York: Cam- 396; and George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage, 1999), 317–18. bridge University Press, 2011); Joseph Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University 19 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” Speech, Washington, DC, Sept. 11, 1990, available at the Miller Center, Press, 2012); Aaron Faust, The Ba’thification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Totalitarianism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015); Samuel Helfont, University of Virginia, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-1990-address-joint-session-congress. Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Lisa Blaydes, State of Repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). 20 George H. W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.”

27 28 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone liberal democracy in the Cold War represented the enforcing these resolutions represented a new ap- the air campaign would have been equally success- befallen the country.”34 The team argued that the end state in the long evolution of political ideology.21 proach to international relations. He insisted that ful in expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait had it re- war “wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the Bush himself had made a similar, though less philo- “enforcement” of Security Council resolutions was stricted its targets to the Iraqi military and com- economic infrastructure of what had been, until sophical, argument about the triumph of liberal de- “qualitatively different from the way of war” be- mand-and-control systems.31 January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mech- mocracy in his 1989 inaugural address.22 Such think- cause it emphasized “diplomatic efforts to arrive at The war damage was compounded by Saddam’s anized society.” In May, a team of medical and le- ing mixed and coalesced with other ideas about the a peaceful solution” and strove “to minimize unde- crackdown on mass uprisings across the country gal experts from Harvard University visited Iraq evolution of international politics and warfare dur- served suffering.”27 As such, while linking the Gulf following Iraq’s defeat. The regime deployed its and completed a peer-reviewed study. They came ing the late 1980s and early 1990s. A string of prom- crisis to idealist dreams of a new world order was elite Republican Guard to Shia-dominated south- to largely the same conclusions as the U.N. team, inent intellectuals claimed that liberal democracy useful in rallying support, it also set high and per- ern Iraq, where it laid waste to several towns and estimating that “at least 170,000 Iraqi children un- had prevailed and that the connected phenomena of haps unrealistic expectations about the amount of damaged important religious shrines. In some cit- der five years of age are likely to die from epidemic war and authoritarianism were becoming obsolete.23 damage and suffering the war would cause in Iraq. diseases unless the situation in Iraq These “millenarian expectations,” as one prominent On the tactical and operational level, the Gulf War changes dramatically for the better.”35 historian has termed them, allowed Bush to argue achieved remarkable successes. The American-led As these reports showed, 9,000 homes that a new world order could replace the might- coalition quickly expelled the Iraqi military from were destroyed and over 70,000 peo- makes-right calculations of previous ages.24 Kuwait in January and February of 1991. The world ple were left homeless in the after- The world order Bush promised was not exactly seemed to have come together to enforce a new math of the war. Coalition bombing new. A liberal order rooted in collective security had global system and the conflict’s ceasefire sparked damaged or destroyed 17 of Iraq’s 20 existed in theory since the advent of the United Na- the triumphalist, internationalist rhetoric high- power plants. Eleven of them were tions after the world wars. However, the Cold War lighted above.28 Soon after the war ended, however, deemed unrepairable. These power had blocked its full implementation. The warming the sense of triumph was quickly overshadowed by plants were needed to maintain es- relations between Moscow and Washington in the the dilemmas that the war produced. sential infrastructure like water treat- late 1980s meant a new order could be based on co- ies, bodies literally piled up in the streets.32 The ment facilities. Without them Iraqis struggled to operation rather than conflict at the United Nations, Despair regime’s counterattack in northern Iraq led over find clean water. Overall, these and similar reports making a rules-based system possible. As Bush de- a million Kurds to flee their homes for makeshift agreed with the findings of Ahtisaari’s team, that clared, it would create a world “where the rule of The pre-war promise “to minimize undeserved camps along the Turkish and Iranian borders. The “most means of modern life support have been de- law supplants the rule of the jungle.”25 suffering” did not match the reality on the ground regime had used chemical weapons against the stroyed or rendered tenuous.”36 Bush is often described as a foreign policy real- for Iraqis.29 The Gulf War was clearly less destruc- Kurds in a genocidal campaign known as al-Anfal The destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and the ist rather than an idealist.26 It is difficult to know tive than other 20th-century conflicts, such as the in the late 1980s, and many Kurds feared Saddam suffering of Iraqi civilians that resulted from the whether he was influenced by liberal ideas behind world wars or the wars in Korea and Vietnam. Nev- was planning another round of atrocities.33 Thus, war and its aftermath contrasted with the idealis- a new world order and, if so, to what extent, or ertheless, in addition to targeting the Iraqi military the war not only damaged Iraq directly with bombs tic narratives about a clean and precise war that whether he adopted such rhetoric simply to sell directly in and around Kuwait, the U.S. Air Force but also led to several rounds of unrest and harsh American officials had presented during the con- the war at home and abroad. Either way, his rhet- pushed a strategic bombing campaign that was de- repression from the Iraqi government that further flict. In April 1991, the New York Times reported oric clearly raised expectations that American signed to win the war by incapacitating the Iraqi worsened the humanitarian situation. that the reality on the ground in Iraq “seemed to actions would emulate the ideals that Bush had state and its critical infrastructure.30 This strategic The extent of the damage that the war and its be at odds with allied military officials’ insistence expressed. The United States gained enthusiastic bombing deep inside Iraq contributed significantly aftermath caused became clear when several in- that the damage in Iraq was largely confined to international support for the war, leading to an un- to the humanitarian crisis after the war and com- dependent survey teams visited Iraq in the spring military sites and transportation links.”37 In June precedented string of binding United Nations Se- plicated America’s post-war diplomacy. Academic and summer of 1991. A U.N. team led by Under-Sec- 1991, the Washington Post reported, “The strategic curity Council resolutions. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, assessments of the war have argued that strategic retary-General Martti Ahtisaari claimed “nothing bombing of Iraq, described in wartime briefings as the U.N. secretary-general at the time, argued that bombing in Iraq was largely ineffective and that that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for a campaign against Baghdad’s offensive military ca- the particular form of devastation which has now pabilities, now appears to have been broader in its

21 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184. 22 George H. W. Bush, “Inaugural Address,” Speech, Washington, DC, Jan. 20, 1989, available at the Miller Center, University of Virginia, https:// 31 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 211–53; Press, “The Myth of millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/january-20-1989-inaugural-address; and Engel, When the World Seemed New, 73. Air Power.” 23 See, for example, John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); John Keegan, A 32 For an overview of these events and the myths that surround them, see Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity History of Warfare (New York: Robert F. Knopf, 1993), 48–49; and John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 2 (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 13, 65–84, 117–32; Khoury, Iraq in Wartime, 135–36; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge (Spring, 1991): 103–4, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-03-01/toward-post-cold-war-world. It should be noted that Gaddis’ analysis University Press, 2002), 264–71; and Helfont, Compulsion in Religion, 121–24. does not suppose that these ideas will succeed, or even that they should. 33 Scott Peterson, “Kurds Say Iraq’s Attacks Serve as a Warning,” Christian Science Monitor, May 13, 2002, https://www.csmonitor. 24 Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), xi. com/2002/0513/p08s01-wome.html. 25 Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.” 34 “Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-Crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management,” in The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 26 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, “George H. W. Bush: Conservative Realist as President,” Orbis 62, no. 1 (2018): 56–75, https://doi. 1990-1996, ed. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, March 20, 1991, 187. org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.11.001. 35 “Harvard Study Team Report: Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War,” Harvey Study Team, Harvard University, May 1991, BRCC, 2749_0000, 27 “Security Council resolution calling for strict compliance with the sanctions against Iraq and confirming that these sanctions apply to all 0311–88. Quote found on page 312. means of transport, including aircraft,” UNSC Records, S/RES/670, Sept. 25, 1990, https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/670%20(1990); and Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” 21-23. 36 Paul Lewis, “After the War; U.N. Survey Calls Iraq’s War Damage Near-Apocalyptic,” New York Times, March 22, 1991, https://www.nytimes. com/1991/03/22/world/after-the-war-un-survey-calls-iraq-s-war-damage-near-apocalyptic.html; and Barton Gellman, “Allied Air War Struck Broadly 28 For an operational history of the war, see Gordon and Trainor, The General’s War. in Iraq,” Washington Post, June 23, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/06/23/allied-air-war-struck-broadly-in-iraq/ 29 See “Security Council resolution calling for strict compliance with the sanctions against Iraq,” 174–75; and Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” 21–23. e469877b-b1c1-44a9-bfe7-084da4e38e41/. 30 Alexander S. Cochran et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1: Planning (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 155. 37 Lewis, “After the War.”

29 30 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone purposes and selection of targets.”38 During the ceasefire discussions at the Security Iraqi sovereignty pushed a majority at the Security medicine, water, electricity, etc.) to estimate their This situation was exacerbated by the fact that Council, the French representative cited the U.N. Council — led by China, India, Yemen, and Cuba — needs. Even the most minimal, short-term effort American planners had allowed for some excessive survey team’s report and argued, “The necessary to press for easing the sanctions.48 This divergence to supply the necessary humanitarian aid required damage to Iraqi infrastructure because they as- goal of the restoration of lasting peace in the Gulf began a long process that eventually ended with tens of billions of dollars. These “massive financial sumed that following Iraq’s capitulation or regime should not involve measures that are unnecessari- the shattering of the Security Council’s post-Cold requirements” were “of a scale far beyond what is, change, the United States would quickly move in ly punitive or vindictive against the Iraqi people. It War unity. or is likely to be, available under any United Na- to rebuild the country.39 However, because the war would be unjust if they were held responsible for tions-sponsored programme.”53 After all, the Unit- ended so quickly, a war termination strategy was the actions of their leader.”43 ed Nations’ appeal to donors for humanitarian as- never completed, let alone coordinated with plans By June 1991, the Security Council was split. The Missed Opportunities sistance for Iraq, Kuwait, and the border areas with and operations. Thus, the ceasefire did not set the United States and the United Kingdom demanded Iran and Turkey had only raised $210 million.54 conditions for rebuilding to occur.40 that Saddam be removed from power. While the To avoid a standoff at the Security Council over The only state capable of financing Iraqi recon- official U.S. objectives in the Gulf War, as outlined Iraq in the summer of 1991, member states needed struction was Iraq. Its oil resources had the po- Dilemma: Balancing Enforcement in National Security Directive 54,44 did not include to find a formula that would address the humani- tential to fund reconstruction, but U.N. sanctions and Humanitarianism regime change, the war raised expectations that tarian situation in Iraq while preventing the regime prevented Baghdad from selling its oil or import- Saddam’s days as leader of Iraq were numbered. from skirting binding resolutions and rearming. By ing the materials it needed to rebuild the coun- Addressing the humanitarian crisis in Iraq was Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney later ad- mid-summer, the secretary-general presented the try. Sadruddin’s report highlighted that existing complicated by the need to enforce Iraq’s compli- mitted that the U.S. military had Saddam in its outlines of just such an approach to the Security resolutions permitted exceptions to prohibitions ance with the war’s ceasefire agreement. The Iraqi crosshairs from the first day of the conflict.45 Bush Council. Unfortunately, the United States failed to on Iraqi exports and imports to ensure the Iraqi government agreed to give up its weapons of mass himself claimed to have “miscalculated” in his as- seize the opportunity. government had “adequate financial resources” destruction and the programs it had used to pro- sumption “that Saddam could not survive a humil- to procure “essential civilian needs.” The excep- duce them. Yet, because coalition troops had left iating defeat.” He lamented that Saddam remained American Overreach tions could clearly include oil exports and the im- Iraq at the end of the war, economic sanctions were in power following the war and later stated that the port of critical goods for reconstruction. However, the United Nations’ only real means of leverage United States “could have done more” to weaken The United Nations secretary-general appointed such exceptions required approval by the Security against the Iraqi regime. By mid-June, it became his regime.46 In retrospect, it seems clear that the the senior U.N. statesman, Prince Sadruddin Aga Council’s Sanctions Committee.55 clear that Iraq was attempting to limit the actions Bush administration felt uneasy about using the Khan, to be his executive delegate for the human- To guarantee that Baghdad used oil revenue to and effectiveness of U.N. weapons inspectors. The American military to march on Baghdad and over- itarian crisis in Iraq. In July, Sadruddin returned address the country’s humanitarian crisis rather Iraqi regime committed several clear violations of throw Saddam. However, Bush and his advisers from Iraq with a detailed report on the scale of the than for other, illicit purposes like rearming, the the ceasefire agreement, and the regime continued wanted regime change and assumed it would take problem as well as recommendations for address- report argued, existing monitoring mechanisms the brutal crackdown on its own population.41 place through either a precision strike or internal ing it within existing Security Council resolutions. could easily be expanded “to provide adequate in- Sanctions were a problematic tool for enforcing Iraqi actions. These sentiments carried over to the The “impact of the sanctions,” he argued, “had formation on the destination and use of the goods compliance because they hurt the Iraqi population post-war period, with Washington wanting to solve been, and remains, very substantial on the econo- in question.” All money would flow through banks at least as much as they hurt the regime. Once it the compliance-versus-humanitarianism dilemma my and living conditions of [Iraq’s] civilian popula- in the United States and, as the report detailed, became clear how much damage the war and its af- by removing Saddam from power.47 tion.”49 At that time, Iraq was only able to generate “commercial transactions relating to the export of termath had caused, some states and U.N. officials Other states at the Security Council were uncom- 25 percent of the electrical power it had prior to oil and the import of the above-mentioned goods began to call for easing sanctions on humanitari- fortable with this approach. The United Nations the war.50 Iraqis lacked access to clean water, raw and services” would be “sufficiently transparent an grounds even if Iraq did not fully comply with had never approved regime change in Iraq and sewage was flowing in the streets of some cities, at the international level to allow adequate con- the U.N. dictates. The United Nations’ own survey the U.S. government’s demand for it seemed like a and outbreaks of typhoid and cholera had already trols with respect to their shipment and entry into team recommended an immediate end to the em- heavy-handed shift toward unilateralism. Concerns occurred.51 Additionally, sanctions had led to food Iraq.”56 Before leaving Iraq, Sadruddin received Ira- bargo on Iraq to prevent “imminent catastrophe.”42 over the humanitarian situation and violations of shortages and threatened to “cause massive star- qi assurances that the country would acquiesce to vation throughout the country.”52 this plan and its monitoring mechanisms.57 The biggest impediment to addressing the human- This proposal was designed to meet the needs 38 Gellman, “Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq.” itarian crisis in Iraq was financial. The report sur- of the Iraqi people while maintaining the securi- 39 Cochran et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1, 94. veyed critical sectors of Iraqi society (agriculture, ty architecture to prevent Iraq from rearming in 40 For a discussion of alternative plans, see Thomas G. Mahnken, “A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War,” in The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered, eds. Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar (New York: Routledge, 2003), 121–48. 48 “Provisional Record of the 2995th Meeting, U.N. Security Council;” “Provisional Record of the 3004th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” UNSC 41 “Provisional Record of the 2995th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” UNSC Records, S/PV.2995, June 26, 1991, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.2995. Records, S/PV 3004, Aug. 15, 1991, https://undocs.org/en/S/PV.3004; and Litvak, “Iraq (Al-Jumhuriyya al- ‘Iraqiyya),” 440–41. 42 Lewis, “After the War.” 49 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991 on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq Prepared by Mission Led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, Execu- 43 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 93. tive Delegate of the Secretary General,” United Nations, July 15, 1991, 11, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/162775?ln=en. 44 George H. W. Bush, National Security Directive 54, The White House, Jan. 15, 1991, George H. W Bush Presidential Library and Museum, 50 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 13. https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd54.pdf. 51 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 12. 45 “Oral History: Richard Cheney,” PBS Frontline, January 1996, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/cheney/1.html. For 52 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 13. analysis, see Donald Stoker, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 195–96. 53 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 15. 46 James Gerstenzang, “Bush Airs Thoughts on End of Gulf War,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 15, 1996, https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm- 54 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 15. 1996-01-15-mn-24868-story.html; and Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 487. For analysis of unclear objectives in the war, see Stoker, Why 55 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 16. America Loses Wars, 195–96. 56 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 17. 47 Meir Litvak, “Iraq (Al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Iraqiyya),” in Middle East Contemporary Survey XV: 1991, ed. Ami Ayalon (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), 440–41. 57 “Report to the Secretary-General Dated 15 July 1991,” 16.

31 32 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone violation of Security Council resolutions. It also left ran into a major problem. The resolution assumed Iraqi Outreach direct contacts with Clinton and widespread po- weapons inspections and more targeted sanctions that Saddam cared more about the Iraqi people than litical influence in the United States.68 The Iraqis against the regime in place. In practice, the pro- he did about his own power. That assumption proved The failure of the oil-for-food program in 1991 also tried to contact Clinton through Oscar Wyatt, posal separated humanitarian issues from inter- incorrect and he rejected the program even in the and early 1992 left Iraq and the United States blam- who was the founder of the Houston-based petro- national security. The report received enthusiastic face of a humanitarian catastrophe. Despite consid- ing each other for the plight of the Iraqi people. leum and energy firm, Coastal Corporation. Wyatt support from a majority of the Security Council erable efforts by senior U.N. officials, including Secre- This standoff continued until November 1992, worked with the Iraqi-American, Samir Vincent, members. In early August, India lauded its “useful tary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who took office when Bush lost the presidential election to Bill who was later arrested on charges of corruption suggestions,” claiming they made “evident that the at the end of 1991, Saddam continued to reject the Clinton. Saddam and other high-ranking Iraqis in- related to the oil-for-food program and of operat- humanitarian objectives we aim at can be achieved resolution as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.62 terpreted the American election as a referendum ing as an illegal agent of the Iraqi regime.69 Iraqi with simple and yet effective arrangements for With Saddam’s refusal to cooperate, the Bush ad- on Bush’s approach to Iraq.64 In closed-door meet- Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz provided Wyatt observation and regular reporting.”58 China made ministration blamed him rather than the sanctions ings following Clinton’s election, Saddam and his and Vincent a letter to deliver to Clinton on behalf clear that it strongly backed the report’s “sound for the humanitarian situation. Technically, Bush senior advisers mused that the Clinton administra- of the regime that, the Iraqis hoped, would help es- recommendations.”59 was right. Saddam could have significantly alleviat- tion offered new opportunities. In one discussion, tablish a better relationship. As an Iraqi official told The United States was less enthusiastic. Wash- ed his people’s suffering by cooperating. Yet, riding Saddam stated, “I believe that during [Clinton’s] Saddam, “Samir and Oscar are very optimistic.”70 ington was not happy that Saddam had survived high off what they perceived as the success of the reign, a change will occur,” and internal Iraqi docu- These outreach efforts were not simply an at- the war, and it still viewed him as the primary Gulf War, American policymakers failed to compre- ments reveal that Baghdad saw Clinton’s victory as tempt to change American policy. The Iraqis un- impediment to a cooperative, post-Gulf War Iraq. hend the political power of Iraqi suffering or the a chance to “turn a new page.”65 derstood that they, too, needed to adopt a new While the Bush administration could not muster damage it could cause to U.S. interests down the The Iraqi regime briefly altered its tone and at- approach and to carry out internal reforms. As enough support at the United Nations to demand road. By contrast, Saddam knew the suffering of tempted to open a dialogue with Washington. As stated in a report by the Baath Party’s bureau that Saddam’s removal, it did not want to allow him to the Iraqi people was an important political weapon a regime report stated in November 1992, the Ira- was responsible for foreign relations, Iraq and the reconsolidate his power. By giving Baghdad the for his regime. In many ways, he benefited from qi press needed, “at least for the time being,” to United States shared interests in “balancing Iran power to sell its oil and provide services for the his people’s anguish and, as more recent research “not write negative headlines” about the American strategically” and in relation to oil. These interests Iraqi population, this report’s recommendations has demonstrated, his regime manipulated inter- president-elect.66 The regime sent cables to every could form the basis of a new relationship during provided Saddam the means to resolidify his rule. national surveys to show that Iraqis were suffering Iraqi mission around the world instructing its rep- the Clinton administration. However, it added, Iraq Thus, Washington led a minority effort at the Se- even more than they were.63 In essence, the United resentatives to take advantage of the changes in must “keep up with modern times.” The report curity Council to block the implementation of the States found itself playing a game of chicken with Washington. In addition to holding “solidarity ac- discussed the need to address human rights vio- report’s recommendations.60 the fate of Iraq’s civilian population. A liberal coun- tivities with the people of Iraq,” they were to meet lations in the country and even to introduce some The United States backed a separate plan in which try like the United States could not win that type with American, British, and French ambassadors democratic reforms.71 This was not the first or last the United Nations would manage the sale of Iraqi of struggle against a regime that cared little for its to convince them that sanctions on Iraq violated time that the Iraqi regime spoke about the need for oil and use the proceeds to deliver food and essen- own people’s anguish. international law and human rights. They were to democratization, and one should read such docu- tial supplies to Iraqis. Like Sadruddin’s proposal, In hindsight, Washington overreached in reject- emphasize that these states could make 1993 a year ments with a healthy dose of skepticism.72 Saddam this “oil-for-food” arrangement provided human- ing Sadruddin’s proposal. The U.S. government ap- of peace. To the extent possible, the missions were ruled a brutal, tyrannical regime. It was not on the itarian relief to the Iraqi population while limiting peared callous to the Iraqi people’s suffering and to send similar messages to Clinton, members of cusp of becoming a liberal democracy. Indeed, the Saddam’s ability to divert money to illicit programs. to be acting in an increasingly unilateral manner the U.S. Congress, the U.S. secretary of state, and report’s authors clarified that they had “intense However, it cut the regime in Baghdad out of the at the Security Council. The proposal was far from other senior American officials.67 reservations” about most forms of democracy and equation. States that had backed Sadruddin’s pro- perfect and Saddam could have attempted to ma- In another instance, Baghdad reached out to that Western-style democracy was neither good posal also backed this plan, though several of them nipulate it to skirt restrictions on his regime. Yet, a Clinton through the Council of Lebanese American nor viable for Iraq. voiced reservations about American unilateralism in unified international community would have been Organizations, which the Iraqi regime believed had Nevertheless, the report stated, “it is not blocking what they perceived to be a better formula. well-equipped to deal with his intransigence. As China, India, and several smaller states worried that this article demonstrates below, the unresolved 64 Kevin M. Woods and Mark E. Stout, “Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert Storm,’” Journal of Strategic Studies, 33, the American-backed program would not provide humanitarian situation in Iraq helped break up the no. 1 (2010): 25–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402391003603433. enough humanitarian aid and that it excessively en- cooperative international order that the Gulf War 65 “Saddam and Senior Advisers Discuss Clinton’s Desire for Talks with Iraq and Impediments to Improved Relations, January 13, 1993,” in The -Cable], Cable from the Secretary General of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Region] “برقية جفرية“ ;Saddam Tapes, 44–45 61 croached on Iraqi sovereignty. had forged and made U.S. efforts to contain Iraq al Command of Iraq/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 033-4-2, Nov. 23, 1992, 766. The American-backed oil-for-food program easily more difficult. 66 For example, see “No Subject,” Memo from Member of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Secretary General of the passed a Security Council vote, but it immediately Branch Command, BRCC, 2721_0000, Nov. 25, 1992, 307. Tariq Aziz made a similar recommendation in a meeting with Saddam. See “Saddam and Top-Level Ba’ath Officials Discuss the Causes and Consequences of Clinton’s Election Victory and Potential for Improved Relations, circa November 4th, 1992,” in The Saddam Tapes, 41. Cable], Cable from the Secretary General of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Regional Command of] ”برقية جفرية“ Provisional Record of the 3004th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 98. 67“ 58 Iraq/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 033-4-2, Dec. 19, 1992, 717. 59 “Provisional Record of the 3004th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 81. Cable], Cable from the Secretary General of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Regional Command of] ”برقية جفرية“ 68 60 See David M. Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Iraq/Office of the Secretariat of the Region,” BRCC, 2721_0000, Nov. 25, 1992, 130. 2006), 114-6; Litvak, “Iraq (Al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Iraqiyya),” 440–41; and “Provisional Record of the 3004th Meeting, U.N. Security Council.” 69 “Q&A: Oil-for-Food Scandal,” BBC, Sept. 7, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4232629.stm. 61 “Provisional Record of the 3004th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 56, 81–82, 98, 101. 70 “Saddam and His Advisers Discuss the Decline of the United States and the Possibility of Rapprochement with the Incoming Clinton Adminis- 62 See for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Document 77. Letter to Jose Luis Jesus, President of the Security Council,” July 15, 1992, in The tration, circa January 14, 1993,” in The Saddam Tapes, 47–50. Papers of United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, vol. 1, ed. Charles Hill, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 173–76; and Recommendations], Memo from the Secretary General of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Regional] ”مقترحات“ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Document 88. Letter to Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister, Republic of Iraq,” Aug. 4, 1992, in The Papers of United Nations 71 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, vol. 1, 193–94. Command of Iraq/Office of the Secretary General of the Region,” BRCC, 3187_0001, Feb. 10, 1993, 484–87. 63 See Tim Dyson, “New Evidence on Child Mortality in Iraq,” Economic and Political Weekly 44, no. 2 (2009): 56–59, https://www.jstor.org/ 72 Ofra Bengio, “Iraq (Jumhuriyyat al-‘Iraq),” Middle East Contemporary Survey XIX: 1995, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Boulder CO: Westview stable/40278386. Press, 1997), 221–22.

33 34 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone

hidden from the [regime’s] leadership that the Iraqi behavior and, with it, American policy. CLINTON’S APPROACH global orientation is marching toward the realiza- The Clinton administration either missed the tion of democratic practices.” Thus, the report sug- signals that Iraq was sending, or it ignored them. gested the Iraqi parliament discuss the formation From the very beginning, the new administration of committees representing all slices of society and in Washington indicated that it intended to con- KILLED ANY CHANCE then arrange “free elections” for these committees tinue its predecessor’s approach to foreign policy in which all Iraqis could participate. The report issues such as Iraq.77 Internally, the administration argued that, in the immediate wake of the Gulf was divided about how much attention to give Iraq, FOR REFORM IN BAGHDAD War, the regime could not take these steps with- but as a former National Security Council staffer out giving the impression that it was succumbing claimed, “there was a consensus … that Saddam to internal and international pressures. Such an was evil.”78 Baghdad seemed to confirm that view OR FOR FINDING impression would have empowered the regime’s when it provoked a military confrontation with the adversaries. However, that time had passed. While outgoing Bush administration in January 1993 and the report recommended that the regime proceed then attempted to assassinate the former presi- with “extreme caution,” it made clear that calls for dent in April 1993. Unsurprisingly, Washington was A NEW ARRANGEMENT democratic reforms would “resonate globally.” In not interested in the Iraqi regime’s outreach. taking such actions, the regime could cooperate Baghdad’s interpretation of Clinton’s election with “concerned global organizations” at the Unit- was almost certainly flawed. The election was not THAT COULD ADDRESS ed Nations and in the United States to improve a referendum on Bush’s policy toward Iraq. Never- Iraq’s international status.73 theless, that misperception opened at least some This report was not without critics in the regime, opportunity for reform in Baghdad and for a reset THE ONGOING especially because it suggested that Baath Party in its relationship with Washington. Instead of ex- members could lose some of their privileged sta- ploring this opportunity, the Clinton administra- tus to non-Baathists.74 There were also limits to tion adopted an unworkable policy that it inherited Saddam’s appeasement of Clinton. “Actually, it is from its predecessor. Clinton’s National Security HUMANITARIAN CRISIS Clinton,” he told his advisers, “who is supposed to Council backed the oil-for-food resolution that the be willing to carefully handle the relationship with Bush administration had sponsored in August 1991 us in a way where we don’t get upset with him.”75 and argued that “Iraq refuses to comply with these IN IRAQ. The existence of this and similar reports on Iraqi resolutions … because the regime would prefer the reforms should not be taken as evidence that Iraq Iraqi people to suffer.”79 Publicly, the Clinton ad- was on the brink of making an about-face. Yet, the ministration introduced a policy of dual contain- report indicates a discussion that was occurring ment aimed at both Iraq and Iran, but by 1994, the behind closed doors within the regime, and some CIA began running an operation codenamed “DB of its suggestions were later implemented.76 In ret- Achilles,” which attempted to overthrow Saddam rospect, the report made clear that powerful voic- in a coup.80 In 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine es in Baghdad believed the Clinton administration Albright stated, “We do not agree with the nations presented new possibilities and that senior Iraqis who argue that if Iraq complies with its obligations were considering difficult measures to seize that concerning weapons of mass destruction, sanc- opportunity. Had the Clinton administration ex- tions should be lifted.”81 In 1998, Clinton signed the plored this opening, as difficult as that would have Iraq Liberation Act, which had passed unanimous- been, it would have had the opportunity to alter ly in the Senate and that made regime change the

.Recommendations], BRCC, 3187_0001, Feb. 10, 1993, 484–87] ”مقترحات“ 73 Recommendations], Memo from the Director General of the Office of the Secretariat of the Region to the Branch Command of the] ”مقترحات“ 74 Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region, BRCC, 3187_0001, Feb. 18, 1993, 473. 75 “Saddam and Top-Level Ba’ath Officials Discuss the Causes and Consequences of Clinton’s Election Victory,” 44. 76 Bengio, “Iraq (Jumhuriyyat al-‘Iraq),” 221. 77 Christopher, In the Stream of History, 11, 28. 78 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 56. 79 “Points to Be Made on Iraq,” Oct. 11, 1994, Clinton - Iraq/Haiti Insert 10/13/94 for National Association of Broadcasters, Clinton Library, 13, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9074. 80 David Ignatius, “The CIA and the Coup that Wasn’t,” Washington Post, May 16, 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opin- ions/2003/05/16/the-cia-and-the-coup-that-wasnt/0abfb8fa-61e9-4159-a885-89b8c476b188/. 81 Marc Trachtenberg, “History Teaches,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 7, no. 2 (September 2012): endnote 16,32, https://www.yalejournal. org/publications/history-teaches-by-marc-trachtenberg; and David M. Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council, 1980–2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 121.

35 36 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone official policy of the U.S. government.82 Saddam. Unlike most other Arab dictators, he did narrative of a weak and helpless Iraq being bullied states, such as those that had seats in the United Clinton’s approach killed any chance for reform not rise through the ranks of the army or come to by a neo-imperialist superpower was much more Nations Security Council or had important geostra- in Baghdad or for finding a new arrangement that power in a military coup. His position stemmed effective than a narrative of a strong Iraq standing tegic positions in the Middle East. The operations could address the ongoing humanitarian crisis in from his involvement in a populist political party up to the United States.90 then combined that political pressure with manip- Iraq. As Saddam told his advisers on multiple oc- — the Baath — and he viewed his power through This realization formed the core of Iraq’s politi- ulation of more traditional economic and geopolit- casions, “We can have sanctions with inspectors the prism of mass politics. The unresolved human- cal strategy to break up the U.S.-led coalition that ical interests.93 or sanctions without inspectors; which do you itarian crisis in Iraq and his obstinance in the face was enforcing sanctions and inspections following It is difficult, and maybe impossible, to disentan- want?”83 Considering the Iraqi regime’s actions of overwhelming Western power provided him the the war. After the ceasefire, Iraq began linking “the gle the effects of Iraqi influence operations from over the previous few years, resetting the relation- opportunity to seize the mantle of leadership in a new world order and the disaster of the Iraqi chil- other factors that drove international politics in ship with Saddam would not have been easy and bottom-up, global opposition to American hegemo- dren.” The Baath Party used the war to highlight the 1990s. Disapproval of American overreach and the outlines of the potential arrangement remain ny in the post-Cold War era. the contradictions in the emerging international the natural attenuation of international political murky because the window of opportunity closed During the war, Iraqis and those sympathetic to system. Because of the coalition’s “interest in hu- will to maintain sanctions would likely have oc- before it could be developed fully. Yet, in hindsight, their suffering began to point out the contrast be- man rights,” a Baathist pamphlet argued, “thou- curred without any of Iraq’s actions. Moreover, the Iraq’s outreach early in the Clinton administration tween the idealist rhetoric of the new world order sands of Iraqi children face death, deformity and most successful Iraqi efforts reinforced these oth- offered a chance to avoid the damage to American and the reality that they confronted. As one Iraqi vagrancy.” It claimed that the “unjust sanctions er, independent forces. Thus, where the effects of foreign relations that ensued. intellectual recorded in her diary after 20 days of imposed on Iraq resulted in the death of 14,232 one of these other forces ends and the effects on bombing, “Bush says, we make war to have peace. Iraqi children during the first months [after the Iraqi influence operations begin is difficult to un- Such nonsense. What a destructive peace this is. A war], due to contamination, malnutrition and acute ravel. Nevertheless, the Iraqi archives reveal vast, Effects of Iraq’s Unresolved Crisis on new world order? I call it disorder.”86 Then, a few shortages of vaccines and medicines.”91 The Iraqi previously unknown efforts to manipulate domes- World Order days later, she wrote simply, “Killing is the new regime also made claims about the United States tic politics in key states around the world. As inter- world order.”87 targeting hospitals and schools that were exagger- nal Iraqi documents show, Iraqi Baathists working The Bush administration’s push for an ultimately Saddam first realized the political power of ated or simply untrue, but there was enough truth in dozens of countries spied for Baghdad, ginned unworkable policy in the face of viable alternatives this rhetoric when the United States bombed the in its propaganda to be taken seriously by global up favorable media coverage, and reached out both and the Clinton administration’s decision to continue al-Amiriyah bunker during the height of the Gulf audiences. Baghdad paid close attention to the overtly and covertly to “all people, organizations, that policy left an acute humanitarian crisis simmer- War’s strategic bombing campaign. The Ameri- studies conducted by the United Nations and Har- unions, associations, political parties and anyone ing in Iraq. This unresolved crisis provided Baghdad can military mistakenly thought the location was vard University that highlighted how the Gulf War else who has political, popular, union, and profes- with a powerful political tool it could use against the a military command center. It was actually an air and sanctions destroyed the Iraqi economy and the sional influence.”94 They also tried to intimidate United States. Over the course of the following dec- raid shelter, and the bombing killed hundreds of state’s essential functions. Iraqi Baathists then dis- and silence anyone who stood in their way.95 ade, the suffering of the Iraqi people helped push Iraqi civilians. As news of the bombing emerged, tributed the results of these studies widely, includ- Iraqi Baathists often worked internationally with states such as France and Russia out of the Ameri- condemnation from around the globe forced the ing to key sectors in the international community. people and groups that had little in common with can-led system. America’s standing fell considerably, United States to end its strategic bombing in Bagh- As internal Baath Party records show, they did so the regime in Baghdad except for the fact that they and the post-Cold War order began to fray. dad.88 In that sense, al-Amiriyah did more to cur- through both open channels as well as in covert opposed sanctions on Iraq. Therefore, Baathists In most ways, the aftermath of the Gulf War was tail coalition military operations than any Iraqi an- operations, which were designed to disguise the re- regularly used proxy organizations and disassoci- disastrous for Iraq. The Iraqi military, economy, and ti-aircraft system. This event, more than anything gime’s role in spreading the information.92 ated with the Iraqi embassy “to provide cover for society were almost completely incapacitated. Wide- else, taught Saddam the power of weakness. Early At the end of 1991, Saddam convened a com- their [Baath] Party activities.”96 In doing so, they spread uprisings threatened Saddam’s regime in the in the crisis, Saddam told his advisers that Iraq mittee consisting of senior regime officials from could avoid divisive political questions about the months after the war. Moreover, the Baathists began needed to appear powerful to attract support.89 the Foreign Ministry, the Baath Party, the Iraqi regime and instead argue that they were merely hemorrhaging senior officials. Iraq’s ambassador to Consequently, as one American journalist working Intelligence Service, the Health Ministry, and the concerned about the well-being of their families the United States had defected to Canada during the in Iraq at the time observed, the Iraqi regime ini- Ministry of Culture and Information to execute a and friends who were suffering in Iraq. Baathists war,84 and several other Iraqi ambassadors and even tially tried to hide civilian casualties in an attempt strategy designed to break the international alli- courted people on both the left and the right: ac- the head of Iraqi military intelligence followed suit to project strength. By contrast, after the bombing ance against Iraq. This was done primarily through ademics, student organizations, militant Islamists, in the years following the war.85 of al-Amiriyah, the regime went to great pains to influence operations, which they termed taharruk pacifists, liberal activists, and conservative isola- However, there were some silver linings for highlight Iraqi casualties. Saddam realized that the (movement). These operations emphasized moral tionists. They found allies in the media and even and humanitarian arguments like those discussed among some mainstream politicians. Then they 82 Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998, Public Law 105–338, Oct. 31, 1998, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-105publ338/pdf/PLAW- above to create bottom-up political pressure in key attempted to bring these incongruent groups 105publ338.pdf. 83 Trachtenberg, “History Teaches,” endnote 16, 32; and Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, September 90 Author interview with Jon Alpert by phone, April 19, 2017. 2004, vol. 1, 61. .The New World Order and the Disaster of the Iraqi Children], BRCC, 2749_0000, 1991, 656–67] ”النظام الدولي الجديد و كارثة اطفال العراق“ 91 I was Iraq’s Ambassador in Washington: My story with Saddam]كنت سفيرا للعراق في واشنطن: حكايتي مع صدام في غزو الكويت ,Muhammad al Mashat 84 92 See various files in, BRCC, 2749_0000, 1991. during the invasion of Kuwait] (Beirut: The Iraqi Institute for Research and Publishing, 2008). -Associations and People], Memo from the Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, to the Regional Command/Office of the Secre] ”جمعيات وشخصيات“ 93 The Fleeing of the Ambassador from Tunis to London], Memo from the Secretary General of the] ”هروب السفير من تونس الى لندن“ ,For example, see 85 tariat of the Region, BRCC, 3203_0003, Dec. 22, 1991, 355–56. Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Regional Command/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC 039-4-1, Aug. 15, 1993, ,Cable], BRCC, 033-4-2, Nov. 23, 1992, 766. For an overview of the Iraqi Baath Party’s structure outside Iraq, see Samuel Helfont] ”برقية جفرية“ Wreckage of the Eastern Gate] (Kuwait: Al Qabas, 1997). 94] ”طام البوابة “الشرقية ,and Wafiq al -Samarra’i ;19–318 “Authoritarianism Beyond Borders: The Iraqi Ba’th Party as a Transnational Actor,” Middle East Journal 72, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 229–45, https://doi- 86 Nuha al Radi, Baghdad Diaries: A Woman’s Chronicle of War and Exile (New York: Vintage, 2003), 29. org/10.3751/72.2.13. 87 al Radi, Baghdad Diaries, 31. 95 Kevin M. Woods et al., Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents Vol. 1, Iraqi Perspectives Project, Institute for 88 Gordan and Trainor, The General’s War, 326. Defense Analysis, 2007. .Proceedings of the Meeting of the General Secretariat Group], BRCC, 026-5-5, Feb. 15, 1989, 207] ”محضر اجتماع هيأع مكتب االمانة العامة“ Saddam Appraises American and International Reactions to the Invasion of Kuwait,” Aug. 7, 1990, in The Saddam Tapes, 176. 96“ 89

37 38 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone together into a loosely organized, yet potent, polit- The supposedly independent proxy groups ical force designed to achieve Iraq’s strategic goals through which the Baathists worked revealed how throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.97 different governments viewed Iraq. In 1994, one Ira- The Baathists used these influence operations qi proxy group, representing itself as a humanitari- to push proponents of the post-Cold War order to an and cultural organization, presented Clinton with reconsider their support for the American-led sys- details on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq and asked tem. The fallout was most evident in France and him to lift sanctions. Clinton responded curtly. He Russia, both of which supported the United States argued that Saddam was being investigated for var- in the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath, but ious crimes against humanity, “including genocide,” then used their positions on the Security Council to and that sanctions on his regime needed to remain resist American policies on Iraq later in the 1990s. in place. The Clinton administration recognized that The Arab states that supported the Gulf War went Iraqis were suffering, but it blamed Saddam for re- through a similar transition. As such, Iraqi influence jecting the oil-for-food formula.100 When the same operations drove a wedge into the international sys- Iraqi proxy group reached out to French President tem to the detriment of American interests. François Mitterrand, he responded that the informa- tion it provided on the humanitarian crisis in Iraq France had a great impact on him. While Mitterrand did not commit to a change of French policy, Iraqi officials Senior Iraqi officials understood that different in Baghdad took note of his “positive response,” states required different approaches. In December which was generally indicative of the broader sym- 1991, Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, argued in an pathy for Iraqis in France.101 internal memo that the political situation and pub- By 1994, American diplomats stated clearly that lic sentiment in the United States precluded any the French were moving away from the United States chance of successfully influencing the U.S. govern- on Iraq.102 French policy on Iraq then began to shift ment. However, he mused, “perhaps the conditions more dramatically with the election of President for influencing [France] are more favorable.”98 Jacques Chirac in 1995. Chirac felt the American ap- These observations proved prescient. France was proach was not working. While the U.S. government much more sympathetic to the suffering of the Ira- wanted to compel Saddam through sanctions and qi people. Also, while France supported the Gulf air strikes, Chirac recognized that the American pol- program that gave him more control and, as later not see that as a viable option or one that was sup- War and sanctions, it avoided presenting its Iraq icy was unworkable. He told Clinton, “I’m afraid we investigations have shown, Baghdad manipulated ported by a U.N. resolution. Instead, it wanted to policies as a harbinger of a new world order. In are working here with an unarmed gun.” By this, he this program to funnel money to international ac- give Saddam a path out of international isolation the United Nations Security Council discussions meant that for Saddam, the “best way to regain con- tors with influence at the U.N. Security Council. and sanctions.105 In essence, Paris continued to fa- following the Gulf War, France’s representative fo- trol of the people is to pretend to be a martyr.” Thus, French officials were a major target of that effort. vor the policies that the United States had reject- cused on instituting a ceasefire and “re-establishing the more Chirac and Clinton punished Saddam, the Some of them accepted significant enticements de- ed in the summer of 1991. American inflexibility regional security.”99 This focus on regional security stronger he became.103 signed to buy their influence or reward political po- on this issue inflamed opposition in France to U.S. differed significantly from the American attempt to As a conservative and a Gaullist, Chirac wanted sitions that were favorable to Iraq, which may have policy toward Iraq on humanitarian grounds and link the conflict to grandiose ideas of world order to protect France’s traditional diplomatic power affected French policy.104 it made it politically possible for Paris to diverge and a new international system. Following the war, against rising American hegemony. Therefore, he However, the unresolved humanitarian crisis in from Washington. France’s approach toward Iraq remained much pushed back against U.S. policies almost by instinct. Iraq — amplified by Iraqi influence operations — In 1996, the French government began to pull more flexible and Aziz saw that France provided Moreover, in 1996, Saddam finally agreed to a mod- provided Chirac with political options he otherwise out of the coalition enforcing the no-fly zones over real opportunities. ified version of the United Nations’ oil-for-food would have lacked. Because the French govern- Iraq.106 Over the next few years, it grew increasingly ment was much more sympathetic to Iraqi suffer- hostile to the U.S. strategy in Iraq and the sanc- ing under the U.N. sanctions, it was more open to tions regime itself. Although France continued to 97 The Baath Party archives contain thousands of pages on the party’s influence operations in the 1990s and early 2000s. In addition to sources -Recommendation], Memo from the Director of the Office of the Secretariat of decoupling sanctions from weapons inspections. support arms control in Iraq and remained official] ”مقترح“ :cited above and below, see the following for a small sampling -Work Plan], Memo from the Secretary General of the Central As the conflict continued through the 1990s, the ly supportive of the United States at the United Na] ”برنامج عمل“ ;the Region to the Presidential Diwan, BRCC, 2837_0002, April 1992, 585 ,[Activities] ” “ نشاطاتOffice of Students and Youth to the Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 2749_0000, Dec. 22, 1991, 567–73; and Memo from the Assistant to the Secretary General of the Founding Leader Branch Command to the Regional Command of Iraq/Office of the Secre- United States began to signal that its ultimate goal tions, French foreign ministry officials told visiting tariat of the Region, BRCC, 2099_0003, Feb. 24, 1999, 505. was indeed to remove Saddam rather than force Iraqis in closed-door meetings that, regardless of Associations and People], BRCC, 3203_0003, Dec. 22, 1991, 355–56. his compliance with U.N. resolutions. France did what happened at the Security Council, they were] ”جمعيات وشخصيات“ 98 99 “Provisional Record of the 2981st Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” 93; and Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” 33–34. Answer from the American President and His Wife], Memo from the General Secretary of the Branch of the Bureau] ”اجابة الرئس االمريكي وزوجته“ 100 of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Iraqi Regional Command/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 2847_0002, July 7, 1994, 589–91. Answer from the French President], Memo from the General Manager of the Office of the Secretariat of the Region to the 104 Paul A. Volcker, Richard J. Goldstone, and Mark Pieth, Independent Inquiry into the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme: Manipulation of] ”اجابة الرئس الفرنسي“ 101 Presidency of the Republic – the Secretary, BRCC, 2847_0002, Aug. 10, 1994, 573–79. the Oil-For-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime, Oct. 27, 2005, 47–78. 102 “Cable: Presidential Call to PM Balladur,” Cable from the American Embassy, Paris, to the Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Declassified 105 Frédéric Bozo, “‘We Don’t Need You’: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991–2003,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 1 (January 2017): 188, Documents Concerning Rwanda, Clinton Library, 62–63, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/47967. https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw011. 103 “Telcon with President Chirac of France,” Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and French President Jacques 106 Paul K. White, “Crises After the Storm: An Appraisal of U.S. Air Operations in Iraq since the Persian Gulf War,” The Washington Institute for Chirac, Nov. 4, 1998, Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq, Clinton Library, 17–18, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. Near East Policy, Military Research Papers, no. 2 (1999): 41–47.

39 40 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone

“working hard to lift the sanctions.”107 Further- the economic blockade.” The Iraqi ambassador political pressure from the nationalist and commu- United States in response to American and British more, as a historian of French foreign policy has explained that “wide circles of the Russian people nist opposition.114 attacks on Iraq in 1998.118 This was the first time noted, the Iraq issue began to define Franco-Amer- are beginning to understand the just Iraqi position, Iraqi Baathists operated cells in Russia that con- since World War II that the Russians had done this, ican relations: “[T]he French were tempted to iden- and to feel that the Russian position toward Iraq is tinued influence operations throughout the 1990s. and it occurred because of Iraq — not the Balkans tify the Iraq problem with what Paris, and indeed an error.” Russian policies toward Iraq, he argued, As internal Baath Party records show, they regular- or NATO expansion.119 In a phone call to Clinton, many capitals around the world, increasingly saw “especially intensify the nationalist opposition in ly held meetings with the heads of Russian polit- Yeltsin made clear that “what is at stake is not just as a U.S. problem—Washington’s increasing unilat- its activities inside parliament and the people’s ical parties. They also organized popular demon- the person of Saddam Hussein but our relations eralist tendencies.”108 In that sense, issues resulting conferences, in the media, and in demonstra- strations, published articles supporting Iraq in the with the U.S.”120 The Russian-American relation- from the Gulf War significantly undermined Ameri- tions.”110 The Iraqi Baathists in Russia continued to Russian press, and, by their own account, contrib- ship, which offered so much promise and hope at can leadership of the international system. press these issues both among politicians and in uted to the “erosion of the American-British posi- the beginning of the decade, never fully recovered. the popular press. In doing so, they helped Rus- tion.”115 At minimum, these actions amplified politi- Russia sian opposition parties turn the fact that Western cal positions in Russia that made cooperation with powers had crushed and humiliated a traditional the United States on Iraq difficult for The fallout from the Gulf War led other countries Russian ally into a wedge issue that inflamed na- Russian leaders. to challenge an American-led order as well. The So- tionalist passions in the country. These domestic The Russian divergence with Ameri- viet Union had been an ally of Iraq until the end of pressures forced Russia’s government, led by Boris ca over Iraq created a real dilemma for the Cold War. Then Moscow sided with Bush in the Yeltsin, to change course. It began defending Iraq Washington and had significant impli- Gulf War and recognized the war’s role in birthing and attempting to lift the sanctions.111 cations for world order. The United a new, post-Cold War system of international rela- As with France, there were several causes for States felt it was necessary to enforce tions. As Russia emerged from the Soviet Union, Moscow’s moving away from Washington in the U.N. resolutions militarily on sever- it initially embraced American attempts to use the 1990s. Russia strongly disagreed with U.S. policy in al occasions in the 1990s. This posed a Iraq issue to forge a new world order. For Iraq, the the Balkans and with NATO expansion into East- problem for U.S.-Russian relations. As loss of its patron was a disaster. Iraqi diplomats ern Europe. Some segments of Russian society also Clinton explained to British Prime Min- claimed that Russia had fallen under the influ- blamed the United States for their economic woes ister Tony Blair, if the Russian govern- ence of the United States and “the Jewish-Zionist in the 1990s. Most of the literature on Russia’s di- ment knew about potential American Lobby in Russia.” Iraqi efforts to restore relations vergence with America at the time focuses on these operations in Iraq, it would likely inform the Iraqi The Middle East with Russian leaders in 1991 and early 1992 were issues. However, Iraq played a critical and largely regime and put American lives at risk. If the Unit- met with repeated rebuffs. A string of invitations overlooked role in Russian-American relations. ed States did not tell Russia, the trust necessary The aftermath of the Gulf War also proved par- for leading Russian politicians to visit Iraq were ig- The economic incentives that Iraq offered Russia to build a cooperative international system would ticularly problematic for Middle East states. Sadd- nored or deflected.109 and Russian officials almost certainly influenced break down.116 More often than not, the adminis- am highlighted the suffering of the Iraqi people and Later in 1992, the Iraqi regime adopted a new, Moscow’s policy.112 Just as important, however, was tration decided not to tell Russia about American his influence operations spread conspiratorial prop- indirect approach. As the Iraqi ambassador in the lingering damage in Iraq caused by the war and operations in Iraq, thus driving the two sides apart. aganda about nefarious American, imperialist, Jew- Moscow reported, “we were forced to extend an sanctions. When Russia wanted to challenge the The breakdown in the U.S.-Russian relationship ish, and Zionist actors as well as their collaborators invitation to the opposition in parliament [to visit United States over its Iraq policy at the Security over Iraq bled into other important issues as well. in Arab capitals. The Iraqis found particularly fer- Iraq].” Unlike the leadership, the opposition “re- Council, the Russian representative often led with As early as 1993, CIA reports claimed that American tile ground for this messaging among Islamists and sponded with enthusiasm” and “when the delega- critiques about the humanitarian situation.113 This actions in Iraq were affecting Russian perceptions even some violent extremists from around the Arab tion returned [to Russia,] it undertook numerous issue also made the Russian opposition’s argu- of the conflict in the Balkans.117 Russian-U.S. ten- world.121 One of the Iraqi regime’s favorite tactics activities inside and outside of parliament.” The ments against American policy in Iraq much more sions over Iraq escalated throughout the decade. was to provide scholarships for Islamist dissidents Russian opposition worked “to explain the truth of potent than they otherwise would have been. As Moscow eventually recalled its ambassador to the from abroad to study at the Saddam University the situation in Iraq, it defended the Iraqi view, and multiple reports from the period argue, one of the it demanded that the Russian government change most important catalysts for Russian divergence 114 See, for example, “Russia’s Yugoslav Policy Reaching Critical Juncture,” Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis, Jan. its position on Iraq and work towards lifting with the United States at that time was domestic 27, 1993, 1993-01-27B, Office of Slavic and Eurasian Analysis re Moscow’s Yugoslav Policy Reaching Critical Juncture, 4, Clinton Library, https:// clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12302; “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” Conversation Between President Clinton and Presi- dent Jacques Chirac, Dec. 17, 1998, Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq, Clinton Library, 53–56, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/ show/16192; and “Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain,” Memorandum for the President from Clifton Wharton, Jr., Feb. 18, 1993, Declassified Documents Concerning John Major, Clinton Library, 43, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/36622. Activities], Memo from the Assistant to the Secretary General of the Founding Leader Branch Command to the Regional Command] ”نشاطات“ 115 .Report], Memo from Secretary General of the Central Office of Students and Youth to the Office of the Secretariat of the Region, of Iraq/Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 2099_0003, Feb. 24, 1999, 505] ”تقرير“ 107 BRCC, 2699_0000, July 3, 2001, 325–33. 116 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, Dec. 108 Bozo, “‘We Don’t Need You,’” 192. 18, 1998, Declassified Documents Concerning Iraq, Clinton Library, 57–59, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. 109 “1992 ” [The Annual Political Report for the Year 1992], Report from the Ambassador (to Russia) to the Foreign Ministry/ 117 “Serbia and the Russian Problem,” Memorandum for the Acting Director for Central Intelligence from Roger Z. George and George Kolt, Jan. Third Political Department, BRCC, 033-4-2, Jan. 1, 1993, 663–65. Quote on page 663. 25, 1993, 1993-01-25, NIC Memo re Serbia and the Russian Problem, Clinton Library, 4, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/12300; and “Russia’s Yugoslav Policy Reaching Critical Juncture,” 2–4. .The Annual Political Report for the Year 1992], Jan. 1, 1993, 664] ”التقرير السياسي السنوي لعام 1992“ 110 118 White, “Crises After the Storm,” 51–64. 111 For example, see “Letter from the Representatives of Iraq and of the Russian Federation Transmitting the Text of a Joint Communique Con- taining Iraq’s Announcement that It Had Withdrawn Its Troops to Rearguard Positions on 12 October 1994. S/1994/1173, 15 October 1994,” in The 119 Ian Jeffries, The New Russia: A Handbook of Economic and Political Developments (New York: Routledge, 2013), 587. United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, ed. Boutros-Ghali, 695. 120 “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation,” Conversation Between President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin, Dec. 30, 1998, Declassified 112 Volcker, Goldstone, and Pieth, Independent Inquiry into the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme, 22–46. Documents Concerning Iraq, Clinton Library, 72–76, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16192. 113 “Provisional Record of the 3519th Meeting, U.N. Security Council,” UNSC Records, S/PV.3519, April 14, 1995, 14, https://undocs.org/en/S/ 121 Samuel Helfont, “Saddam and the Islamists: The Ba’thist Regime’s Instrumentalization of Religion in Foreign Affairs,” Middle East Journal 68, PV.3519. no. 3, (Summer 2014): 361–65, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698590.

41 42 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone for Islamic Studies in Baghdad, where carefully se- though the strikes were already planned and ready to political missteps and reinforced perceptions organizations to reach wider audiences. For exam- lected faculty indoctrinated them. The Baathists for execution.”125 From that point forward, Ameri- of American callousness. Perhaps most infamous- ple, they coordinated with a organization based in recruited students from organizations like the ca’s ability to operate from places like Saudi Arabia, ly, in 1996, Albright was asked on the television Germany and the United States called the Commit- Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Islamic which was an essential state in the original coali- show 60 Minutes whether “the price was worth it” tee to Save the Children of Iraq, which published Jihad. Once these students returned to their home tion against Iraq, was severely constrained. Again, when a “half million children have died” in Iraq and distributed materials on the plight of Iraqi chil- countries, they would agitate, sometimes violently, the fallout from this breakdown in relations had because of U.S. policy. She responded, “I think dren.134 Through this organization, the Baathists on behalf of Iraq.122 global implications. this is a very hard choice, but the price — we drew in unsuspecting but influential voices that had In 1994, Saddam’s son Uday initiated one of Iraq’s think the price is worth it.”129 Albright later stated little sympathy for Iraq’s regime but were appalled most interesting influence operations when he es- that she regretted the comment.130 Nevertheless, by the humanitarian situation there. In 1993, the tablished contact with Osama bin Laden in Sudan. American Frustrations: Drawing a Line her words reflected a genuine sentiment that was boxer Muhammad Ali held a $50-a-plate fundraising After several discussions approved by Saddam from the Gulf War to the Iraq War increasingly isolating the United States from the dinner for 200 people, with all proceeds going to the himself, the Iraqi Intelligence Service agreed to bin rest of the international community. Committee to Save the Children of Iraq.135 The Iraqi Laden’s request to broadcast the Salafi-Islamist The international fallout from the Gulf War also Members of the Baath Party attempted to exploit regime also succeeded in openly recruiting promi- sermons of the Saudi dissident Salman al Awda into damaged American perceptions of the post-Cold America’s blind spot with regard to Iraqi suffering. nent activists. Louis Farrakhan, who headed the Na- Saudi Arabia. After beginning the broadcasts, Iraqi War international system. The United States never As Aziz predicted, Iraqi Baathists were not suc- tion of Islam and had considerable influence among intelligence officers and bin Laden also agreed to fully came to terms with what had occurred in Iraq cessful in influencing the U.S. government directly. some sectors of the African-American community, “perform joint operations against the foreign forc- during the Gulf War. The U.S. Central Command’s Although they targeted members of Congress and visited Iraq several times in the 1990s. In 1995, he es in the Hijaz,” though it is unclear if they actually after-action report for the conflict did not mention politicians such as the former Republican presi- was appointed as a member of the board of the did so.123 The relationship ended in 1996 when bin the damage the war inflicted on Iraqi society. Like- dential candidate, Patrick Buchanan and the for- Baghdad-based, regime-sponsored Popular Islamic Laden moved to Afghanistan and the Iraqi Intelli- wise, the U.S. Department of Defense’s 500-page mer Democratic presidential candidate Gary Hart, Conference Organization and openly campaigned on gence Service lost contact with him. final report to Congress glossed over the destruc- there is little evidence that those efforts were effec- behalf of the Iraqi regime.136 Arab regimes feared the fallout from Iraqi influ- tion the war left in its wake.126 tive.131 The Baathists had more success organizing Baathist operations helped to shift political nar- ence operations and the political narratives the The most influential report on the conflict was an indirect campaign to influence the broader po- ratives about Iraq in the United States. The chang- Baathists promoted. By the mid-1990s, local lead- the Gulf War Air Power Survey, which brought to- litical conversation in the country. They identified ing mood was perhaps most evident in 1998 when ers throughout the Middle East began to distance gether leading experts in government, the military, journalists who were sympathetic to Iraq’s plight CNN hosted Clinton’s national security adviser, themselves from the United States even as they and academia to produce a definitive five-volume and critical of American policy and who could Sandy Berger, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, privately told American officials that they agreed study totaling over 3,000 pages. Despite its recog- reach large American audiences. Then, Baathists and Albright at Ohio State University for a televised with, and wanted to support, American policies in nition of wide-scale damage to Iraq’s infrastructure operating in America fed these journalists stories town hall on the administration’s Iraq policy. Much and the resulting suffering of the or brought them to Iraq, where they received privi- of the audience was openly hostile to U.S. policy, Iraqi population — including tens leged access to Iraqi officials and, in one case, even and the large, raucous crowd repeatedly interrupt- of thousands dead — the survey ul- an opportunity to interview Saddam.132 ed the speakers. Members of the crowd shouted timately concluded that the “strate- Baathist cells in the United States also organized down points they did not like and frustrated the gic air campaign had not only been high-profile demonstrations against American pol- administration officials by accusing Clinton of try- precise, efficient, and legal but had icy and worked with local activists from organiza- ing to “send a message” to Saddam “with the blood resulted in very few [direct] civil- tions as disparate as the Green Party and the Young of Iraqi men, women and children.”137 ian casualties.”127 The Gulf War Air Women’s Christian Association and who shared the Despite this political pushback, some schol- Power Survey had a tremendous goal of ending sanctions against Iraq.133 Iraqi Baa- ars have argued that, in terms of material effects, effect on the way American leaders thists were able to work through these sympathetic the U.S. policy to contain Iraq in the 1990s was a Iraq. It simply was not politically viable for them understood the war. Yet, the notion that the war to do so.124 In 1996, the U.S. government wanted to was fought, as the survey argued, with “a strategy launch strikes against the Iraqi military in response designed to cripple Iraq’s military without laying 129 Madeleine Albright, “Punishing Saddam,” Interview with Lesley Stahl, 60 Minutes, CBS, May 12, 1996. A clip of the exchange can be seen on to its move north to intervene in a Kurdish conflict. waste to the country” did not reflect the sentiment YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbIX1CP9qr4. 128 As a U.S. Air Force officer later lamented, Turkey, on the ground in Iraq or in foreign capitals. 130 Albright, Madam Secretary, 276. Associations and People], Memo from the Official of the Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region to the Regional] ”جمعيات وشخصيات“ Jordan, and Saudi Arabia denied the United States One can easily see how official narratives that 131 use of their bases to launch coalition strikes, “even papered over the humanitarian crisis in Iraq led Command/ Office of the Secretariat of the Region, BRCC, 3203_0003, Dec. 16, 1991, 360–61. 132 “Untitled Letter,” Letter from Ramsey Clark, Jon Alpert, Maryanne De Leo, and Abdul Kadir Al Kaysi on behalf of HBO to Saddam Hussein, BRCC, 033-4-2, January 1993, 557. 122 “Correspondence from the General Secretariat of the Popular Islamic Conference Organization Regarding Nominating Students for Higher 133 For example, “Untitled Memo,” Memo from a Member of the Branch, Official of the Territory to an Official of the Branch (of the Bureau of Studies in the Baghdad Islamic Universities,” CRRC, SH-MISC-D-001-443, 2002. Iraqis Outside the Region), BRCC, 3835_0000, March 7, 1992, 273. Committee to Save the Children of Iraq], Memo from Official of the Organization of Iraqis in America to the Regional] ”لجنة انقاذ اطفال العراق“ Iraqi Efforts to Cooperate with Saudi Opposition Groups and Individuals,” CRRC, SHMISC-D-000-503, 1997. 134“ 123 Command of Iraq – Branch of the Bureau of Iraqis Outside the Region, BRCC, 2837_0002, April 22, 1992, 288–89. 124 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (New York: HarperCollins, 2013), 280. 135 Nadine Brozan, “Chronicle,” New York Times, Oct. 4, 1993, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/nyregion/chronicle-513793.html?au- 125 White, “Crises After the Storm,” 40. th=link-dismiss-google1tap. 126 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Department of Defense, April 1992, 38, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ 136 “Ministerial Order,” CRRC, SH-MISC-D-001-446, November 1994; “‘Islamic Popular Conference’ Issues Final Statement,” Iraqi News Agency, a249270.pdf; and “Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” United States Central Command, The National Security Archive, July 11, 1991. Sept. 16, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information Service; and “Awqaf Minister Meets with Farrakhan,” Iraqi News Agency, Feb. 15, 1996, Foreign Broad- 127 Williamson Murray et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 2: Operations and Effectiveness (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, cast Information Service. 1993), 304–8. 137 For a transcript, see Madeleine K. Albright, William S. Cohen, and Samuel R. Berger, “Remarks at Town Hall Meeting,” Ohio State University, 128 Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1, 94. Columbus, OH, Feb. 18, 1998, U.S. Department of State Archive, https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980218.html.

43 44 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone success.138 As evidence for their claims, proponents on the part of the French and others, they would The 2003 diplomatic crisis over Iraq stemmed the United States faced in the early 1990s and had of such arguments highlight the fact that Iraq re- rather essentially normalize the relationship.”141 from a breakdown in the international system. In the the opportunity to resolve at that time. Left un- mained a poor country, with little economic or mil- Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Af- early 1990s, George H. W. Bush’s new world order addressed, they had plagued U.S. diplomacy ever itary means at its disposal. Moreover, although the fairs Edward Walker clarified, noting that “the per- offered hope for compromise and cooperation. For since. The problematic American policies on Iraq United States did not know it at the time, Iraq did ception” that sanctions were “responsible for the example, while disagreements over Iraq’s humani- clearly predated the George W. Bush administra- give up its weapons of mass destruction and closed problems that the Iraqi people face” eroded the tarian situation at the Security Council were heat- tion. In fact, the official, legal justification for the the programs that produced them.139 However, ability to enforce them. Biden agreed, adding, “I ed in the summer of 1991, member states accepted 2003 invasion rested on U.N. resolutions passed such arguments focus on Iraqi material means and guess maybe that is what is wrong with the U.N.”142 one another’s good intentions and were willing to during the Gulf War. Thus, the Bush administra- assume that they were necessary for Saddam to In the United States, as elsewhere, the unresolved compromise. They continued to work together to tion made the case that it was simply carrying out achieve his objectives. Yet, Saddam’s strategy was situation in Iraq gnawed away not only at bilater- solve international problems, including in Iraq.146 By the policies it had inherited.149 to end the sanctions regime and normalize Iraq’s al relations between individual states but also at the early 2000s, the Iraq issue had embittered these The unresolved dilemmas that the Gulf War cre- diplomatic situation in order to rebuild more tradi- trust in the post-Cold War system as a whole. This relationships to the point that each side assumed ated were mismanaged for a decade, eventually tional means of hard power. By the end of the dec- became unmistakably clear following the Sept. 11, the other was working in bad faith. Washington felt leading to a 2003 conflict that was waged on shaky ade, he was clearly making progress toward those 2001 attacks, when the administration of President that Russian and European leaders were undermin- legal grounds and with limited outside support. goals, despite his material constraints. George W. Bush began pushing for a more aggres- ing world order in favor of their pocketbooks and a This war quickly descended into a quagmire that The system designed to restrain him was falling sive strategy to implement regime change in Iraq. knee-jerk anti-Americanism. European governments cost thousands of lives and trillions of dollars. As apart. In 1998, Saddam violated the Gulf War cease- When Bush first came to office in January 2001, felt the United States only paid lip service to U.N. of this writing in 2021, American forces are still fire agreement by ending U.N. weapons inspec- he adopted Clinton’s policy on Iraq: His adminis- resolutions and only when they aligned with Amer- fighting insurgents who emerged in Iraq following tions. The United States and the United Kingdom tration was officially committed to regime change, ican objectives. They accused Washington of push- the overthrow of Saddam’s regime in 2003.150 launched air strikes in response, but, by that point, but not inclined to carry it out militarily. The Sep- ing regime change in Baghdad, something the Unit- the international community was too divided and tember 11 attacks created new possibilities to ral- ed Nations had not authorized, and insisting that lacked the power to force Iraq back into compliance. ly domestic support for more muscular strategies foreign leaders blindly follow American dictates. No Conclusion Saddam was growing richer from corruption in the to pursue regime change.143 Although the resulting compromise was possible. George W. Bush repeated modified version of the oil-for-food program that war later turned divisive, it initially enjoyed wide, many of the arguments his father had made about Predicting the second- and third-order effects of the Security Council had endorsed in 1995 and that, bipartisan support among policymakers in Wash- history and world order, but the younger Bush’s complex political endeavors such as war and di- as previously mentioned, he finally accepted in 1996. ington. Hillary Clinton voted to authorize the war words fell on deaf ears. plomacy is notoriously difficult. However, that is He was gradually normalizing Iraq’s diplomatic and along with a majority of Democratic senators. Al- Some liberal theorists of the post-Cold War in- no excuse for ignoring the consequences 30 years economic situation while unabashedly flouting U.N. bright later wrote that she found herself nodding ternational order overestimated the system’s ro- later. In fact, such post-hoc critical analysis is vital resolutions. In July 2001, the British Joint Intelli- in agreement when Bush made the case for war.144 bustness and underestimated the George W. Bush for learning the right lessons from the Gulf War gence Council described Saddam as “defiant” and Such sentiments were not shared international- administration’s ability to act outside of it in in- and its aftermath. The United States could have “secure.” It argued that “Saddam judges his position ly. The Gulf War was supposed to cement Ameri- stances such as the Iraq War.147 The frailness of the been more cautious during the war, more clear- to be the strongest since the Gulf War.”140 ca’s role as the organizer of the international sys- system in 2003 can be explained, at least in part, eyed about the damage that it inflicted, and more As a result, American policymakers grew increas- tem. By the time of the Iraq War in 2003, the tables by the fact that American disillusionment with the committed to alleviating the resulting humani- ingly frustrated. In March 2000, U.S. Senate hear- had turned. Instead of “Iraq against the world,” as United Nations and the international system more tarian crisis. Most of all, to create a cooperative ings on Iraqi sanctions showed clear bipartisan George H. W. Bush had argued in 1990,145 it was the generally had been growing steadily since — and to international system, America needed to be more disillusionment with the United Nations as well United States against the world. Even stalwart allies some extent, as a consequence of — the Gulf War. willing to compromise with its allies. In doing so, as the trans-Atlantic alliance that was supposed like Canada refused to participate. Those interna- This disenchantment and cynicism propelled the it could have been better equipped diplomatically to underpin the post-Cold War system. Then- tional leaders who joined Bush’s campaign in Iraq, George W. Bush administration’s war plan forward to build and solidify the new world order whose Sen. Joseph Biden argued that “Saddam is the among them Blair and Spanish Prime Minister José in the face of strong international opposition and creation George H. W. Bush claimed was one of problem.” However, Biden elaborated, “it is clear, María Aznar, often paid a significant political price. without a U.N. resolution. the Gulf War’s primary objectives. However, these frustrations were not new. Nor Instead, the fallout from the Gulf War almost were they unique to the George W. Bush adminis- immediately divided the international community 138 Rovner, “Delusion of Defeat”; and George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 90–103, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2004-07-01/containing-iraq-sanctions-worked. tration. As Bush’s national security adviser, Con- and challenged U.S. leadership. The United States 139 “Misreading Intentions: Iraq’s Reaction to Inspections Created Picture of Deception,” Central Intelligence Agency, Jan. 5, 2006, 16, accessed doleezza Rice, argued, “we invaded Iraq because failed more than once to seize opportunities to Jan. 28, 2021, at National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/; Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Cheater’s Dilemma: we believed we had run out of other options. The change course when they arose. It is impossible Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War,” International Security 45, no. 1 (Summer 2020), 51–89, https://doi.org/10.1162/is- ec_a_00382; and Gregory D. Koblentz, “Saddam Versus the Inspectors: The Impact of Regime Security on the Verification of Iraq’s WMD Disarma- sanctions were not working, the inspections were to know whether a post-Cold War international ment,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2018), 372–409, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1224764. unsatisfactory, and we could not get Saddam to system based on collective security, liberalism, 148 140 “Iraq: Continuing Erosion of Sanctions,” JIC Assessment, July 25, 2001, National Archives of the United Kingdom, https://webarchive.nation- leave by other means.” These were all issues that and the rule of law was even possible. Scholars alarchives.gov.uk/20171123124012/http:/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/203196/2001-07-25-jic-assessment-iraq-continuing-erosion-of-sanctions.pdf 141 “Saddam’s Iraq: Sanctions and U.S. Policy,” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 106th Congress, 2nd Session, March 22, 2000, 5, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG- 146 Litvak, “Iraq (Al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Iraqiyya),” 440–41. 106shrg67659/html/CHRG-106shrg67659.htm. 147 This puzzle of the international order being less robust than predicted was laid out in the new, 2019 preface to G. John Ikenberry, After 142 “Saddam’s Iraq: Sanctions and U.S. Policy,” 19. Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), xvi–xix. 143 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Foreign Policies of the George W. Bush Administration: Memoirs, History, Legacy,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 2. (April 2013): 148 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown Publishing, 2011), 187. 190–216, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dht013. 149 Sean D. Murphy, “Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq,” George Washington University Law School Scholarly Commons (2004), 4–6, 144 Albright, Madam Secretary, 274–89. https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1898&context=faculty_publications. 145 Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress.” 150 On the rise and enduring legacy of insurgencies in Iraq, see Helfont, Compulsion in Religion, 205–33.

45 46 The Scholar The Gulf War’s Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone cannot replay history to know how events may have unfolded if the war had been conducted dif- ferently or the United States had based its post- 1999 war strategies on a more realistic assessment of the possibilities in Iraq. Likewise, it is impossi- ble to know the extent to which disagreements over Iraq divided the international community or whether Iraq simply aggravated differences that would have arisen anyway. Nevertheless, in hind- sight, the war and its aftermath clearly damaged, rather than facilitated, the work of statesmen and 2003 diplomats in their attempts to build a liberal post- Cold War international system or even to pursue American interests more generally. In that sense, the war generated considerable political costs. It was far from the clean, decisive conflict that American narratives depict.

Samuel Helfont is an assistant professor of strat- egy and policy in the Naval War College’s Program 1995 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Cal- ifornia. He is the author of Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgen- cy in Iraq (Oxford University Press, 2018). His cur- rent book project, Iraq Against the World, examines Iraq’s international strategies from 1990 to 2003 and the impact they had on the post-Cold War order. He holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University and is an Iraq War veteran. 1991 The views expressed in this article are the au- thor’s own and do not represent the views of the De- partment of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the Naval War College, or the Naval Postgraduate School.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Ga- len Jackson, Doyle Hodges, Dom Tierney, Tim Hoyt, Scott Douglas, Don Stoker, Michael Brill, John Shee- han, Mike Jones, and Tally Helfont for their help with this article.

47 48 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

Strategic thought in both the United States and China has THE FUTURE OF focused on the potential for a Sino-U.S. interstate war and downplayed the odds of a clash in a foreign internal conflict. However, great-power military competition is likely to take the SINO-U.S. PROXY WAR form of proxy war in which Washington and Beijing aid rival actors in an intrastate conflict. The battlefield of Sino-U.S. military competition is more likely to be Venezuela or Myanmar than the South China Sea. Proxy war could escalate in unexpected and DOMINIC TIERNEY costly ways as Washington and Beijing try to manipulate civil wars in far-flung lands they do not understand, ratchet up their commitment to avoid the defeat of a favored actor, and respond to local surrogates that pursue their own agendas.

n the 2017 movie Wolf Warrior II — the than the heavy-handed proxy conflicts of the Cold highest-grossing Chinese film of all time War and involve diplomatic initiatives, economic — the hero, a veteran of Chinese special aid, cyber war, propaganda, and competition with- operations forces, rescues civilians in Afri- in international institutions. Indeed, Washington caI who are being held by rebels fighting in a civil and Beijing may compartmentalize a particular war. The nefarious puppet masters, however, are proxy campaign — sparring in one civil war while the U.S. mercenaries who control the rebels. The steering clear of each other or even cooperating in movie ends with the hero defeating his American another internal conflict. nemesis and the Chinese Navy obliterating the re- U.S. analysts often characterize the global sys- bel forces. The scenario may be outlandish, but the tem in terms of a shift from the counter-terror- idea that foreign civil wars will become an arena ism paradigm of the post-9/11 era, which was fo- for Sino-American competition is highly plausible. cused on insecure states and nonstate actors, to Strategic doctrine in both the United States and the great-power competition paradigm of today’s China has downplayed the possibility of a clash in a era, which prioritizes U.S. relations with China and foreign internal conflict and in the U.S. case in par- Russia. However, these two paradigms are less dis- ticular, focused on the potential for a conventional tinct than sometimes thought: Future great-power interstate war. However, the odds that the United competition, like earlier counter-terrorism efforts, States and China will engage in an interstate war may occur within insecure states and feature alli- are extremely low due to a number of factors, in- ances with nonstate actors. cluding nuclear deterrence, regime type, trade rela- The question remains whether a Sino-U.S. proxy tions between the two countries, and international war could spiral into an interstate war. The barri- institutions. Military competition is much more ers to direct hostilities make this outcome unlikely, likely to take the form of a proxy war in which but proxy conflicts could still escalate in unexpect- Washington and Beijing aid different actors in an ed and costly ways. The United States and China intrastate conflict because of a systemwide shift may try to manipulate civil wars in far-flung lands away from interstate war and toward civil war, they do not understand. Washington has a history continued American hyper-interventionism, and of wading into strife-torn countries, like Afghani- growing Chinese interventionism. In the coming stan and Iraq, with alien cultures and languages, years, internal conflicts in countries like Venezue- leading to strategic failure. Beijing is even less la, Pakistan, Myanmar, or North Korea could be- prepared to comprehend or shape the contours of come battlegrounds for great-power rivalry. Such foreign civil wars due to a lack of capabilities and U.S.-Chinese proxy wars will likely be much subtler experience. Because of the psychological dynamic

49 50 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

manipulate the course of a civil war. Direct inter- of the type and extent of aid being offered and the vention involves the deployment of armed forces degree of control the intervenor seeks to have over and can take the form of counter-insurgency or local actors. At one end of the scale is donated counter-terrorism efforts (when the intervenor assistance, whereby patrons hand over resources supports a state partner in suppressing a rebel- without any strings attached, hoping for positive lion), a rebel alliance (when the intervenor part- results but effectively ceding control to the part- ners with a politically motivated nonstate actor), or ner.9 A patron may also employ relatively mild peacekeeping (when the intervenor remains impar- diplomatic and economic tools to manipulate an tial in a conflict). Direct intervention can run the outcome in favor of one side in the conflict. At the gamut from a brief raid by special forces to a major other end of the scale are large arms transfers and operation like America’s involvement in Vietnam. efforts to exert extensive control over the regime Indirect intervention is an attempt to manipulate or nonstate actor.10 the course of a civil war without the deployment of Indirect intervention can offer a tempting com- armed forces. This can be done by providing weap- bination of high strategic impact, low cost, and po- of loss aversion, these two great powers may be in foreign civil wars. The third section discusses onry, training, financial support, or other materi- tential deniability. If a country’s rival faces internal willing to ratchet up their commitment in a given how changing global conflict dynamics diminished al aid to local actors. Indirect intervention usually rebellion, providing aid to rebels can undermine proxy war to avoid the defeat of a favored actor. In interstate war and spurred internationalized civil takes one of three forms: capacity building, proxy the rival’s control of territory or resources, pro- addition, local surrogates could act independently war, which has encouraged U.S. hyper-interven- war, or peacemaking. Capacity building is when an voke it to repress its populace and thereby deepen in ways that might escalate a conflict. tionism and increasing Chinese intervention in in- external actor backs a regime.6 A formal alliance domestic divisions, or punish the rival for its own One of the major concerns is that proxy war can ternal conflicts. The fourth section contends that is not required in this scenario, although alliance patronage of insurgents.11 External aid for rebels is worsen foreign internal conflicts. Meddling by out- Chinese and U.S. intervention in foreign civil wars commitments often spur capacity building.7 Proxy one of the strongest predictors of rebel success.12 side actors tends to make civil wars deadlier, longer, is likely to take the form of proxy conflicts rath- war takes place when a state provides material as- Proxy war is not risk free, however. The interests of and more likely to reoccur.1 If the rivalry between er than great-power partnership and describes the sistance to a politically motivated nonstate actor.8 the principal and the agent likely diverge in some the United States and China shifts into foreign in- potential for proxy campaigns to escalate. Proxy war implies a hierarchical principal-agent areas, and nonstate actors may be emboldened to ternal conflicts, it could also impact global govern- relationship between a more powerful state “prin- act in undesired ways, potentially triggering un- ance and norms such as state sovereignty, human cipal” and a less powerful nonstate “agent” that wanted escalation.13 The principal may expend ad- rights, democratization, and the “responsibility to Definitions of Key Terms are both pursuing a common goal, although con- ditional resources trying to keep the agent in line protect.”2 And yet, there is surprisingly little schol- flict could still arise over other diverging interests. and ultimately be forced to abandon its patronage arship on the potential for Sino-U.S. competition We ought to begin by defining the key terms. States can also intervene indirectly in a neutral or intervene directly.14 in an intrastate conflict. As Andrew Mumford has First, it is necessary to define two major types of manner by, for example, engaging in diplomacy or As we just saw, a proxy war can refer to an in- noted, proxy wars in general are “historically ubiq- conflict: interstate war and civil war. An interstate applying sanctions against all civil war participants dividual patron that aids a nonstate actor in a civ- uitous yet chronically under-analyzed,”3 an inatten- war refers to sustained combat between the or- to help end the conflict. This is called peacemaking il war. For example, the United States would be tion that extends to Washington’s relations with ganized armed forces of members of the interstate (not to be confused with peacekeeping, which in- fighting a proxy war by backing rebels in Syria. A Beijing. This paper seeks to offer a corrective to system resulting in at least 1,000 combat fatalities volves direct intervention). proxy war can also occur between external patrons that neglect. per year.4 A civil war refers to conflict that reaches Indirect intervention can range widely in terms if they aid opposing sides in a civil war (either the The article is divided into four sections. The first the same threshold of violence but is “within the section defines the key terms. The second section territorial boundaries of a state system member.”5 explores how strategic thought in both the Unit- Table 1 offers a basic typology of interventions, 6 Eli Berman and David A. Lake, eds. Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019). ed States and China deemphasizes intervention or attempts by an outside actor, usually a state, to 7 Mumford, ​Proxy Warfare, chapter 1. 8 I draw on Groh’s definition of proxy war as “directing the use of force by a politically motivated, local actor to indirectly influence political affairs in the target state” as well as his emphasis on nonstate actors. However, Groh’s requirement for “directing” or explicitly controlling the use of 1 Christopher Linebarger and Andrew Enterline, “Third Party Intervention and the Duration and Outcomes of Civil Wars,” in What Do We Know force narrows the meaning of proxy war and excludes instances of aid without clear strings attached (for example, Groh codes U.S. backing for the About Civil Wars, ed. T. David Mason and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 93–108. mujahadeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s as donated assistance rather than proxy war). I define proxy war as an attempt to influence the course or strategic outcome of a civil war that does not require the patron to direct the recipient’s actions. My definition also differs somewhat from that of 2 G. John Ikenberry, “The Three Faces of Liberal Internationalism,” in Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance, ed. Hughes, who blurs the line between indirect and direct intervention by defining proxy war as “a supplementary means of waging war or as a substi- Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 17–47; and Michael J. Mazarr, Timothy R. Heath, and tute for the direct employment of their own armed forces.” I define proxy war solely as aid to nonstate actors, whereas Mumford defines the term Astrid Stuth Cevallos, China and the International Order (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018). more broadly to encompass aid to rebels and regimes alike: “indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic 3 Andrew Mumford, Proxy Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 1. An exception is Mark O. Yeisley, “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise outcome.” Groh, Proxy War, 29; Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy, 2; and Mumford, Proxy War, chapter 1. See also Michael A. Innes, ed., Making Sense of of China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Winter 2011): 75–91, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-05_Is- Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates, and the Use of Force (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2012), 11–16. sue-4/Yeisley.pdf. See also, Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power (New 9 Groh, Proxy War. Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). 10 If the patron combines both direct and indirect actions — for example, deploying regular troops and supplying weapons to local rebels — this 4 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Inter-state Wars (Version 4.0): Definitions and Variables,” https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/inter- is coded as direct intervention. state-wars-codebook. 11 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Idean Salehyan, “The Dele- 5 Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Patterns of Civil Wars in the Twenty-First Century: The Decline of Civil War?” in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, gation of War to Rebel Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 3 (June 2010): 493–515, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709357890. ed. Edward Newman and Karl DeRouen, Jr. (London: Routledge, 2014), 242. In this paper, “civil war” is used synonymously with “intrastate war” and “internal conflict.” See also Mark Gersovitz and Norma Jean Kriger, “What Is a Civil War? A Critical Review of Its Definition and (Econometric) 12 Daniel Byman, et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Consequences,” The World Bank Research Observer 28, no. 2 (August 2013): 159–190, https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkt005; Patrick M. Regan, Civil Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 709–44, Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 2000), 9; Karen A. Feste, Intervention: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23016231. Shaping the Global Order (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003); Mumford, ​Proxy Warfare; Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The 13 Byman, Deadly Connections, 36-40; and Paul Staniland, “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia,” Interna- Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019); Tyrone L. Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad tional Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 142–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23280407. Option (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); and Geraint Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2012). 14 Groh, Proxy War.

51 52 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

regime versus the rebels or competing rebel fac- “revisionist power” that is seeking to rewrite the foreign policy and rejecting the U.S. military’s in- in a 2018 update, this language was excised.28 The tions). For example, the United States and China rules of the global system.18 In 2018, Vice President volvement in nation building.23 The 2017 National Defense Department’s budget request for 2020 would be considered to be fighting a proxy war in Mike Pence described a seemingly irrepressible Security Strategy made virtually no reference to contended that the focus on “insurgent warfare Syria if Beijing were to back the regime and Wash- contest between the democratic United States and foreign insurgency or unconventional warfare. In- and the threat posed by the rise of violent extrem- ington were to support the rebels. In this scenar- an authoritarian China.19 This heightened Sino-U.S. stead, it highlighted China’s aim to displace U.S. ist organizations … led the U.S. military to expe- io, Washington is engaged in an individual proxy competition is evident in a variety of areas, from influence in East Asia and vowed to “restore the rience damaging trends in readiness and compet- war whereas China is engaged in capacity building. trade and emerging technologies like 5G wireless readiness of our forces for major war.”24 The fol- itiveness,” and that the military would henceforth We also refer to the competition between the great to the cyber domain and multilateral institutions.20 lowing year, in 2018, the National Defense Strategy “re-focus on high-intensity conflict to compete powers as proxy war. How will this rivalry play out in terms of military emphasized China’s assertion of territorial sover- against Great Powers.”29 In 2017, the Army’s “Field conflict? Strategic thought in both the United eignty in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Manual 3-0” prioritized large-scale mechanized States and China tends to downplay all forms of and Taiwan; Beijing’s rapid military modernization; fighting against a peer adversary such as Russia U.S. and Chinese Strategic Doctrine: intervention, including a Sino-U.S. proxy war, and and the need for high-end U.S. technologies, such or China.30 The Department of Defense developed the Primacy of Non-Intervention focus instead on the potential for interstate war. as fifth-generation aircraft.25 According to the Na- the Air-Sea Battle concept to combat Chinese cyber tional Defense Authorization Act, the United States and anti-access capabilities in the context of inter- China’s recent dramatic economic growth has U.S. Strategic Thought should respond to the Chinese threat by “re-es- state naval and air operations, explicitly echoing intensified strategic competition between Wash- tablishing warfighting dominance” in conventional the Cold War-era AirLand Battle concept for inter- ington and Beijing. From 2004 to 2018, China’s U.S. policymakers and analysts prioritize the interstate war, requiring “investments in critical state war with the Soviet Union.31 Vice Chairman share of global gross domestic product more than threat of interstate war with China in both plan- equipment, weapons, and missile defense plat- of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Paul Selva said, “Any fight tripled, from 4.5 percent to 16.1 percent, whereas ning and procurement. According to scholars, the forms to improve munitions that enhance lethali- with China, if it were to come to blows, would be a America’s share fell from 27.9 percent to 23.3 per- traditional American way of war emphasizes inter- ty.”26 In 2019, Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper largely maritime and air fight.”32 cent.15 Current trends suggest that China’s defense state war as the U.S. military’s true vocation and told an audience at the U.S. Naval War College: Prominent analysts have also prioritized the dan- spending could overtake that of the United States deemphasizes counter-insurgency, nation building, “Many of you spent most of your career fighting ger of a conventional war with China. In 2016, a by the 2030s.16 Beijing’s newfound economic and and other forms of intervention in foreign civil con- irregular warfare. But times have changed. We are RAND study concluded that a potential Sino-U.S. military capabilities have translated into increasing flicts as peripheral or regrettable activities.21 After now in an era of great-power competition. Our stra- war “would be regional and conventional” and Chinese assertiveness in foreign policy, heighten- the Vietnam War, for example, the U.S. Army delib- tegic competitors are Russia and China.”27 “waged mainly by ships on and beneath the sea” ing American fears about the fragility of the U.S.- erately avoided thinking about guerrilla war and in- In recent years, the U.S. military has downplayed based on the assumption “that fighting would start led international order. In 2017, General Secretary stead planned for an interstate showdown against planning for counter-insurgency in favor of boost- and remain in East Asia, where potential Sino-U.S. Xi Jinping stated that China had entered a “new the Soviet Union in Europe.22 ing its readiness for interstate conflict. In 2009, the flash points and nearly all Chinese forces are locat- era” and would move “closer to center stage” in The Trump administration underscored this tra- Defense Department described stability operations ed.”33 Elbridge Colby, the former deputy assistant world affairs.17 Meanwhile, the Trump administra- ditional preference by placing the conventional as “a core U.S. military mission that the Depart- secretary of defense for strategy and force develop- tion labeled China a “strategic competitor” and a interstate threat from China at the center of U.S. ment of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with ment, wrote that “the United States must prepare proficiency equivalent to combat operations,” but to fight and achieve its political aims in a war with

15 See, for example, Malcolm Scott and Cedric Sam, “Here’s How Fast China’s Economy is Catching Up to the U.S.,” Bloomberg, June 25, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-us-vs-china-economy/. 16 David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 360–402; and Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower: Why China’s Dominance Is a Sure Thing,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (September/October 2011): 66–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23041777. 23 “Full Text: Donald Trump’s Speech on Fighting Terrorism,” Politico, Aug. 15, 2016, http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-ter- rorism-speech-227025. 17 Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, “Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech: Five Takeaways,” New York Times, Oct. 18, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-party-congress.html. 24 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 18 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ 25 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.hsdl.org/?ab- wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. stract&did=807329; “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. 19 Mike Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China, Oct. 4, 2018, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/remarks-by-vice-president-pence-on-the-administrations-policy-toward-china/. See also Aaron 26 “FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act Executive Summary,” United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, May 2019, https:// L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); Gideon www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY%202020%20NDAA%20Executive%20Summary.pdf. Rachman, Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline from Obama to Trump and Beyond (New York: Other Press, 2016); Robert S. Ross and 27 “Secretary of Defense Esper Tells U.S. Naval War College Students His Focus Is Great-Power Competition,” Military News, Sept. 3, 2019, Øystein Tunsjø, eds., Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China: Power and Politics in East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017); and G. https://www.militarynews.com/news/secretary-of-defense-esper-tells-u-s-naval-war-college-students-his-focus-is-great/article_ba046c84-ce78- John Ikenberry, “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia,” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 1 11e9-93a9-2be2d0a609bc.html. (2016): 1–35, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12430. 28 “Department of Defense Instruction, 3000.05,” Department of Defense, Sept. 16, 2009, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/ 20 Weijian Shan, “The Unwinnable Trade War,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 6 (November/December 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ DD/issuances/dodi/300005p.pdf?ver=2019-01-28-141537-720; and “DoD Directive 3000.05,” Department of Defense, Dec. 13, 2018, https://fas. asia/2019-10-08/unwinnable-trade-war; Nicol Turner Lee, “Navigating the U.S.-China 5G Competition,” Brookings Institute, April 2020, https:// org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf. www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_5g_competition_turner_lee_v2.pdf; Paul M. Nakasone and Michael Sulmeyer, “How to Compete in Cyberspace,” Foreign Affairs, Aug. 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-25/cybersecurity; 29 “Defense Budget Overview: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request,” The Office of the Under Secretary of and Kristine Lee, “The United Nations: An Emerging Battleground for Influence,” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, March 2019, http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_Bud- Commission, June 24, 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Lee_Testimony.pdf. get_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. 21 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 36; Colin 30 “Field Manual 3-0, Operations,” U.S. Army, Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.army.mil/standto/2017-10-10. S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt, “Strategic Studies Institute,” U.S. Army War College, 31 “Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges,” Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013, https://dod. March 2006, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/irregular-enemies-and-the-essence-of-strategy-can-the-american-way-of-war-adapt/; Nadia Schadlow, defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf. War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success Into Political Victory (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017); Dominic Tierney, How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2010); and David H. Ucko, The 32 Aaron Mehta, “The Pentagon Is Planning for War with China and Russia — Can It Handle Both?” Defense News, https://www.defensenews. New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009). com/pentagon/2018/01/30/the-pentagon-is-planning-for-war-with-china-and-russia-can-it-handle-both/. 22 Benjamin Buley, The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political Utility of Force (New York: Routledge, 2008), 74; and Ucko, 33 David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: The New Counterinsurgency Era. RAND, 2016), xi.

53 54 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

dling in foreign civil wars by any outside power, decade so as to have the capability to implement especially to promote human rights and democra- conventional strikes anywhere within one hour.”44 cy, as liable to spur conflict.39 In 2016, the state- In summary, both U.S. and Chinese strategic run China Daily described the “Pax Americana” as thought downplays intervention in foreign civil an era of continual “interference in the domestic wars and, in the U.S. case in particular, prioritiz- affairs of countries,” which triggered a “period of es conventional interstate war. Washington sees incessant warfare.”40 intervention as unwise and a deviation from the Does China also espouse a positive preference military’s core mission to fight and win interstate for conventional interstate war? Beijing tends to be wars, whereas Beijing views intervention as dan- clearer on what it will not do through force of arms gerous and illegitimate. Despite seemingly strongly — i.e., intervene — rather than what it will do in held strategic preferences in both governments, a order to protect an image of the country’s peace- systemwide shift from interstate war to civil war ful rise. Therefore, China is not as explicit as the means that future military competition between United States in prioritizing interstate war. Nev- China and the United States is likely to involve ertheless, by downplaying intervention in foreign proxy wars. In the next section, I discuss how glob- civil wars, interstate war becomes the main focus al trends in conflict have changed in recent dec- almost by default. Beijing does sometimes signal ades and the impact of these trends on U.S.-Chi- a prioritization of interstate war. A major Chinese nese competition going forward. strategic priority is fighting and winning a conven- tional and de facto interstate war with Taiwan.41 A A World of Civil Wars 2015 Chinese defense white paper outlined an “ac- tive defense posture” that emphasized Beijing’s Following World War II, the incidence of inter- newfound maritime capabilities.42 And a 2019 de- state war declined significantly, becoming “rela- fense white paper stated that China’s military de- tively rare,” according to one study.45 The last in- velopment prioritized “phasing out the outdated, terstate war between great powers was the 1950–53 upgrading the old, and developing and procuring Korean War.46 John Gaddis referred to the absence the new, such as aircraft carriers, fighters, missiles of severe interstate war in this period as “the long and main battle tanks, to steadily modernize weap- peace.”47 Scholars have proposed a variety of fac- a great power,” noting that “the last time it fought affairs, a reaction to what Beijing calls an era of co- onry and equipment.”43 Moreover, Beijing often tors to explain this era of interstate peace. The one was in the 1940s.”34 In 2018, a survey of U.S. lonial “humiliation” before 1945; signal that China casts the military threat from the United States in democratic peace theory contends that elected re- government officials and foreign policy experts will act with restraint in order to limit balancing terms of conventional interstate war. The 2013 ver- gimes very rarely fight interstate wars against each found “increasing apprehension over the growing behavior by other states; prevent Beijing from get- sion of the People’s Liberation Army’s The Science other, and therefore the global spread of democra- geopolitical rivalry and potential for conflict be- ting mired in dangerous foreign crises; and allow of Military Strategy described how “[t]he U.S. has cy over the past several decades has created a zone tween the United States and China,” with the most the regime to focus on domestic challenges such as organized and built a global strike command for of interstate peace among representative regimes.48 likely scenario for war being “an armed confronta- economic growth and an aging population.36 unified command of strategic long-range warfare Nuclear deterrence has also reduced the odds of di- tion in the South China Sea.”35 Beijing’s doctrine of non-intervention dates strength … and has planned to develop a new con- rect conflict between states with nuclear arsenals,49 back to the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 and was ventional ‘prompt global strike’ system in the next while multilateral institutions provide arenas for Chinese Strategic Thought enshrined as one of the Five Principles of Peace- ful Coexistence in 1954, reaffirmed at the Band- 39 In 2011, China abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force to protect civilians and civilian-populat- Chinese strategic thought also tends to downplay ung Conference in 1955, and formally written into ed areas in Libya, but Beijing was later sharply critical of the expanded goals of the intervention, including regime change. any involvement in foreign internal conflicts. One the Chinese constitution in 1982.37 In 2018, Xi an- 40 Mazarr, Heath, and Cevallos, China and the International Order, 98. of the most fundamental and longstanding Chinese nounced the Five Nos policy: “no interference with 41 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2020, 116, https://media. foreign policy principles is that of non-intervention development paths, no interference in internal af- defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. — a promise to stay out of the domestic affairs fairs, no imposing one’s will on others, no attaching 42 “China’s Military Strategy,” Xinua, May 26, 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-05/26/content_6507716.htm. of other states. The non-intervention doctrine is political conditions, and no political self-interest in 43 “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, July 24, 2019, accessed at Xinhua, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. designed to ward off outside meddling in China’s investments and financing.”38 China portrays med- 44 The Science of Military Strategy, Academy of Military Sciences, 2013, accessed at Air University, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Dis- play/Article/2485204/plas-science-of-military-strategy-2013/. 34 Elbridge Colby, “How to Win America’s Next War,” Foreign Policy, May 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/05/how-to-win-ameri- 45 Aaron Clauset and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Trends in Conflict: What Do We Know and What Can We Know?” in The Oxford Handbook of cas-next-war-china-russia-military-infrastructure/. International Security, ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 228. 35 “Preventive Priorities Survey 2019,” Council on Foreign Relations, Dec. 17, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/preventive-priorities-survey-2019. 46 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); and John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 36 John Lee, “China’s Economic Slowdown: What Are the Strategic Implications?” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 123–142, https://doi.or g/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1099028. 47 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 37 Daniel Large, “China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan,” Review of African Political Economy 35, no. 115 (2008), 94. 48 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principle for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982,” available at USC US-China Institute, accessed March 18, 2021, https://china.usc.edu/consti- Allan Dafoe, John R. O’Neal, and Bruce Russett, “The Democratic Peace: Weighing the Evidence and Cautious Inference,” International Studies Quar- tution-peoples-republic-china-1982. terly 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 201–214, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12055. 38 “Full Text of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Speech at Opening Ceremony of 2018 FOCAC Beijing Summit,” China Daily, Sept. 3, 2018, http:// 49 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Nuclear Proliferation May Be Good,” in Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Rich- www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/04/WS5b8d5c25a310add14f389592.html. ard K. Betts, 5th ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 418–30.

55 56 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War dispute resolution.50 In addition, economic interde- intervention, not interstate military force, is the in civil war. Therefore, internal conflicts are now China would deviate from long-established strate- pendence raises the costs of engaging in interstate type of armed force that will be most common in the primary arena in which states compete mili- gic preferences: the American desire to focus on war.51 Moreover, memories of World War II and the the coming decades among both major powers and tarily. These dynamics will channel Sino-U.S. mil- conventional interstate war over foreign interven- spread of norms against territorial conquest have less powerful states.”59 Consider that during the itary competition in four respects. First, they will tion and the Chinese commitment to non-interven- helped to delegitimize interstate war.52 last two centuries, the likelihood that a rebel group diminish the odds of an interstate war between the tion in other countries’ internal affairs. Global conflict is now dominated by civil wars — would receive outside assistance has grown from two countries. Second, they will encourage contin- what David Armitage called “the most widespread, about one-in-five to around four-in-five.60 In 2019, ued U.S. hyper-interventionism. Third, they will Continued U.S. Hyper-Interventionism the most destructive, and the most characteristic 22 out of 52 intrastate wars were internationalized promote increasing Chinese interventionism. And form of organized human violence.”53 The number — the highest figure in the post-1946 era.61 The fac- fourth, they will enhance the odds of China and the Since 1945, American foreign policy has been of civil wars increased in the 1970s, peaked after the tors that impede interstate war, such as nuclear United States engaging in a proxy war. defined by hyper-interventionism in foreign civil end of the Cold War, declined somewhat, and then weapons, do not effectively prevent external med- wars — and this behavior is only likely to continue ticked upward again after the 2011 Arab Spring.54 In dling in intrastate conflict. In fact, other dynamics Low Odds of Interstate War in the future. Despite America’s traditional prefer- the post-Cold War era, almost 90 percent of wars have actually made indirect intervention easier. Af- ence in planning and procurement for convention- have been civil wars.55 In 2019, there were two in- ter World War II, the norm of self-determination Global dynamics have sharply reduced the al interstate campaigns, for decades Washington terstate conflicts and 52 intrastate conflicts.56 The helped to legitimize support for rebel groups that chances of a Sino-U.S. interstate war taking place, a has intervened in intrastate conflicts far more fre- factors that inhibit interstate war — such as de- were fighting against colonial rule. Meanwhile, glo- trend that is likely to continue. In the last half-cen- quently than it has waged interstate war.67 Indeed, mocracy and nuclear weapons — do not reliably balization and technological change have made it tury, the United States and China have never even the United States is the most interventionist great prevent internal violence. Meanwhile, the root practically easier for civil war participants to com- come close to war. In 1996, the Taiwan Strait crisis power in modern history. causes of civil war — such as poverty, failing gov- municate messages abroad and recruit supporters briefly raised tensions, but it was quickly resolved After World War II, a combination of American ernance, and ethno-religious tensions — remain and for patrons to transfer weapons and other ma- after presidential elections in Taipei. Crucially, the power and the changing dynamics of global con- prevalent.57 Indeed, the decrease in interstate wars terial aid across borders.62 Indeed, the diminishing United States and China may have in place all the flict spurred numerous U.S. attempts to manipu- and the increase in civil wars may be related. The appeal of interstate war incentivizes states to seek barriers to interstate war discussed above. Both late foreign civil wars. America’s emergence as an norm of territorial integrity, for example, may have new and cheaper forms of influence. States that in countries maintain significant nuclear arsenals economic and military colossus broadened Wash- diminished interstate war, but it also meant that the past might have attacked their rivals directly with second-strike capability,63 are highly interde- ington’s view of national interests, emboldened newly decolonized states were unable to change now pursue their strategic goals by intervening in pendent economically,64 and are active members U.S. officials to confront the threat from interna- their borders, fueling internal conflict.58 foreign civil wars. of international institutions.65 What about regime tional communism, and gave American leaders the States also routinely intervene in foreign civ- In summary, global dynamics have reduced in- type? Of course, China is not democratic, which is tools to contemplate military operations across the il wars. According to one study, “foreign military terstate war but not civil war or outside meddling one of the major impediments to interstate war. world. Newfound power also unleashed an idealis- However, scholars have found that civilian “ma- tic streak in U.S. society and a desire to reshape the chine” autocracies like China are less prone to world in America’s own image — or in John F. Ken- 50 Megan Shannon, Daniel Morey, and Frederick J. Boehmke, “The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and interstate war than personalist or military dicta- nedy’s words, “pay any price” in order “to assure Duration,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 4 (December 2010): 1123–41, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40931157. torships and may engage in war at similar rates the survival and the success of liberty.”68 After the 51 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1986); Michael W. 66 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); and Dale C. Copeland, Economic to democracies. During the Cold War, the United Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, American strength Interdependence and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). States and the Soviet Union successfully avoided reached its zenith and U.S. activism around the 52 John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); and Clauset and Gleditsch, “Trends in Conflict.” an interstate war. Today, the impediments to an in- globe increased still further. Crucially, the global 53 David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New York: Vintage, 2018), 5. terstate war between China and the United States shift from interstate war to civil war guided Amer- 54 Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, and Alexandru Balas, The Puzzle of Peace: The Evolution of Peace in the International System (New York: Oxford are even stronger. ican activism into foreign internal conflicts, as University Press, 2016). The absence of Sino-U.S. interstate war does not Washington saw civil wars in distant lands as vital- 55 Peter Wallensteen, “Future Directions in the Scientific Study of Peace and War,” inWhat Do We Know About War? ed. John A. Vasquez (Lanham, mean the absence of military competition. Instead, ly important for U.S. security and values. MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 263; and Patrick T. Brandt, “When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars,” Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 6 (2008): 415–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/10242690701823267. systemwide dynamics are likely to channel this During and after the Cold War, the United States 56 Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg, “Organized Violence, 1989–2019,” Journal of Peace Research 57, no. 4 (June 2020): 597–613, https:// competition away from interstate war into proxy repeatedly intervened directly in foreign internal doi.org/10.1177/0022343320934986. war. Of course, this requires that Washington and conflicts with troops and airpower. The Interven- 57 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991): Beijing intervene in the same foreign internal con- tion Project dataset found that the United States 76–116, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539061. flict. The question is why the United States and engaged in 500 military missions after 1776, with 58 Hendrik Spruyt, “Civil Wars as Challenges to the Modern International System,” Daedalus 146, no. 4 (Fall 2017): 112–125, https://doi.org/10.1162/ DAED_a_00463; and Boaz Atzili, “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict,” International Security 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/2007): 139–73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137510. 63 Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,” Journal of 59 Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, “The International Military Intervention Dataset: An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars,” Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 447–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.714710. Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 4 (July 2009): 592, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654438. See also Krieg and Rickli, “Surrogate Warfare,” 127; 64 In 2019, Sino-U.S. trade reached $634.8 billion, China owned over one trillion dollars of U.S. debt, and over 350,000 Chinese students stud- Candace Rondeaux and David Sterman, “Twenty-First Century Proxy Warfare: Confronting Strategic Innovation in a Multipolar World Since the 2011 ied at U.S. universities. See, for example, “The People’s Republic of China: U.S.-China Trade Facts,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, NATO Intervention,” New America, Feb. 20, 2019, 41, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/Proxy_wars_one_pager-v2.pdf; and Kaldor, accessed March 18, 2021, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china. New and Old Wars. 65 Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); G. John 60 Ryan Grauer and Dominic Tierney, “The Arsenal of Insurrection: Explaining Rising Support for Rebels,” Security Studies 27, no. 2 (May 2018): Ikenberry, “The Rise of China: Power, Institutions and the Western Order,” in China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, 263–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1386936; and Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, “Non-State Actors in Civil Wars.” ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 89–114. 61 Pettersson and Öberg, “Organized Violence, 1989-2019”; and Vladimir Rauta, “Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two,” RUSI Jour- 66 Jessica L. P. Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). nal 165, no. 2 (2020): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2020.1736437. 67 Robert B. Scaife, “The Regularity of Irregular Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, Oct. 16, 2012, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-regulari- 62 Grauer and Tierney, “The Arsenal of Insurrection”; David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “Non- ty-of-irregular-warfare. State Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no. 5 (November 2013): 516–531, https://doi. org/10.1177%2F0738894213499673; and Berman and Lake, Proxy Wars. 68 “Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, Jan. 20, 1961, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kennedy.asp.

57 58 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War over half of these operations taking place after 1950 war by aiding rebels in countries like Guatemala, proposed May 1, 2021, deadline for U.S. withdrawal implies that intervention is binary — that a state and over one-quarter occurring since the end of Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan. In 1955, of troops from the Afghan civil war.78 either is or isn’t intervening. But there are, in real- the Cold War.69 In 2008, Defense Secretary Robert President Dwight D. Eisenhower said that proxy war The United States has a clear and well-docu- ity, degrees of meddling across multiple domains, Gates noted: was “the cheapest insurance in the world.”73 mented track record of intervening in foreign civil making some form of interference almost inevita- After the Cold War ended, the United States con- wars. However, for a Sino-U.S. proxy war to take ble.79 An external country’s decisions about trade, Think of where our forces have been sent tinued to engage in indirect intervention. Capacity place, China would also have to intervene. This investment, and the training of local forces can all and have been engaged over the last 40-plus building was central to the “War on Terror,” and raises a core question: Why would Beijing deviate impact the course of a civil war. For instance, an years. Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Washington funneled arms and provided training from a seemingly firm commitment to the principal external actor can influence a civil war by allowing Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and intelligence to vulnerable regimes like Iraq and of non-intervention? To answer this question, we arms sales to one faction but not others or by per- Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and more. In fact, Afghanistan under the guise of “security partner- need to look more closely at the nature of Chinese mitting (or denying) arms sales to all sides (there- the first Gulf War stands alone in over two ships.”74 According to Security Assistance Monitor, intervention, including its motivations, its tools, by treating the government and rebel groups alike generations of constant military engagement in 2019, the United States spent $18.81 billion on and its scope. and legitimizing the insurgents).80 as a more or less traditional conventional international security aid and delivered $26.9 bil- The critical problem for the Chinese doc- conflict from beginning to end.70 lion worth of arms to friendly governments.75 In trine of non-intervention is that, oftentimes, 2018, the first U.S. Army security force assistance Beijing is not neutral when it comes During the Trump administration, every major brigade was established to train, advise, and assist to foreign civil wars. Like other major U.S. deployment of troops in a combat zone was in allied actors. Washington also engaged in proxy states, China has interests at stake in a foreign civil war, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, wars by supporting nonstate actors, for example in foreign conflicts and has sought to Syria, Niger, and Somalia.71 Syria after 2012. manipulate their outcome. From the After 1945, America engaged in indirect interven- The era of American hyper-interventionism is late 1950s through the 1970s, China pursued tion with even greater frequency than direct inter- set to continue. The high cost of direct U.S. inter- a militant anti-imperialist (and anti-Soviet) vention. During the Cold War, the United States ventions in Iraq and Afghanistan has not ended foreign policy and sponsored a variety of launched six overt regime change attempts (defined U.S. manipulation of foreign civil wars, but instead rebel factions engaged in “wars of na- as a publicly acknowledged use of force to over- has encouraged Washington to search for cheap- tional liberation.”81 Beijing sent tens of throw a state). It also instigated 64 covert regime er forms of influence through airpower and giving thousands of troops to North Vietnam; change attempts, including assassination, backing a aid to surrogate allies.76 In 2005, Sen. Joe Biden ex- backed leftist political groups in Laos, coup, or meddling in an election — all of which often pressed regret for his 2002 Senate vote that author- Growing Chinese Interventionism South Korea, Thailand, and Oman; and armed rebels occurred in the context of internal conflict.72 Wash- ized the Iraq War.77 Nevertheless, in February 2021, in approximately 20 African countries, including Al- ington undertook capacity building by providing ex- as president, Biden launched air strikes against Ira- Given the systemwide conflict dynamics de- geria, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Congo, Angola, and tensive military and economic aid to regimes facing nian-backed militias fighting in the Syrian civil war scribed above, China’s commitment to the doctrine South Africa.82 Beijing tried to reconcile this overt perceived communist threats in Greece, South Viet- in response to rocket attacks on American forces in of non-intervention has always been ambivalent, if interference with its non-intervention doctrine nam, El Salvador, and elsewhere and waged proxy the region and reportedly considered delaying the not illusory. In recent decades, this doctrine has by claiming that imperialist states do not respect steadily eroded and will likely continue to weaken non-intervention and therefore socialist states were in the future. In a globalized world where civil war obliged to assist popular movements.83 is the dominant type of conflict, even a great pow- In the Deng Xiaoping era of the late 1970s, China 69 Monica D. Toft and Sidita Kushi, “Introducing MIP: A New Dataset on U.S. Interventions, 1776-2017,” presented at the 115th American Political er that genuinely seeks to avoid intrusion in other focused on economic growth, sought to keep a low Science Association Annual Meeting & Exhibition, Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 2019; and Paul B. Rich, “A Historical Overview of US Counter-insurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 25, no. 1 (2014): 5–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.893955. states’ internal wars will struggle to stay out of the profile internationally, and abandoned its patron- 70 “Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Speech, September 29, 2008,” Speech Given at the National Defense University, Sept. 29, 2008, http:// fighting entirely. The concept of “non-intervention” age of wars of national liberation. Nevertheless, it armchairgeneral.com/secretary-of-defense-robert-m-gates-speech-september-29-2008.htm/8; and Ann Scott Tyson, “New Pentagon Policy Says Irregular Warfare Will Get Same Attention as Traditional Combat,” Washington Post, Dec. 4, 2008, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con- tent/article/2008/12/03/AR2008120303495.html?nav=rss_nation/special. 78 Eric Schmitt, “Biden Says Withdrawing U.S. Forces from Afghanistan by May Deadline Is ‘Tough,’” New York Times, March 17, 2021, https:// www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/us/politics/biden-us-forces-afghanistan-may.html. 71 See, for example, Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt, “Despite Vow to End ‘Endless Wars,’ Here’s Where About 200,000 Troops Remain,” New York Times, Oct. 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/world/middleeast/us-troops-deployments.html. 79 George Lawson and Luca Tardelli, “The Past, Present, and Future of Intervention,” Review of International Studies 39, no. 5 (December 2013): 1233–53, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210513000247. 72 Lindsey A. O’Rourke, Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Odd A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 407; and Eric Rittinger, 80 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Martha Finnemore, The Purpose “Arming the Other: American Small Wars, Local Proxies, and the Social Construction of the Principal-Agent Problem,” International Studies Quarterly of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Non-interventionism by one state can also 61, no. 2 (June 2017), 396–409, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx021. During the Cold War, the United States intervened in foreign elections over be an effective form of intervention if other states do not abide by the principle. “The doctrine of non-intervention, to be a legitimate principle of twice as frequently as the Soviet Union. Don H. Levin, “Partisan Electoral Interventions by the Great Powers: Introducing the PEIG Dataset,” Conflict morality, must be accepted by all governments,” wrote John Stuart Mill in 1859. “The despot must consent to be bound by it as well as the free Management and Peace Science 36, no. 1 (2016): 88–106, https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894216661190. States. Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries comes to this miserable issue, that the wrong side may help the wrong, but the right must not help the right.” John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention,” Fraser’s Magazine, December 1859, https://www.jstor.org/sta- 73 Mumford, Proxy Warfare, 100; Westad, The Global Cold War; and Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies ble/40244870?seq=1. For example, the U.S., British, and French policies of “non-intervention” in the Spanish Civil War, or the refusal to sell weapons of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (August 2010): 415–29, https:// to all sides, effectively harmed the Spanish government because the rebels received assistance from Germany and Italy and Madrid was unable to www.jstor.org/stable/40863761?seq=1. purchase arms to defend itself. 74 Thomas Waldman, “Strategic Narratives and US Surrogate Warfare,” Survival 61, no. 1 (2019): 161–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.201 81 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley, CA: University of California 9.1568049. Press, 1973), 47. 75 “Security Aid Dashboard,” Security Assistance Monitor, Center for International Policy, June 12, 2020, https://securityassistance.org/con- 82 David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). tent/security-aid-dashboard; and “Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America while Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability,” Stimson Center, May 16, 2018, https://www.stimson.org/2018/counterterrorism-spending-protecting-america-while-promoting-efficiencies-and-accountability/. 83 Jerome A. Cohen, “China and Intervention: Theory and Practice,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 121, no. 3 (January 1973): 471–505, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol121/iss3/9; John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Volume III: 76 Mumford, Proxy Warfare; Berman and Lake, Proxy Wars; and Krieg and Rickli, Surrogate Warfare. Strategy Beyond Asia and Challenges to the United States and the International Order (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 30–34; Benjamin Barton, “China’s 77 Dominic Tierney, “In Search of the Biden Doctrine,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Nov. 9, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/11/in- Security Policy in Africa: A New or False Dawn for the Evolution of the Application of China’s Non-interference Principle?” South African Journal of search-of-the-biden-doctrine/. International Affairs 25, no. 3 (2018): 413–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2018.1526707.

59 60 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War continued to intervene in foreign civil wars. During different motives that have drawn Beijing further to boost state capacity and construct strategic in- Africa will be affecting China to a much bigger ex- the 1980s, for example, China fought a proxy war into foreign internal conflicts — and, potentially, frastructure or allow an embattled regime to use tent.”96 One Chinese ambassador said, “Of course, against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (in coor- onto a collision course with the United States. Chinese-owned facilities to crush a rebellion. Fur- we are increasingly involved in the politics of Afri- dination with the United States and Pakistan) by thermore, China can utilize political tools in foreign can countries, we are being pulled in, we have no supplying the mujahedeen rebels with everything Tools of Chinese Intervention countries, such as encouraging front organizations choice.”97 As these comments indicate, in recent from AK-47s to donkeys.84 China also gave weapons to propagate pro-Beijing propaganda, punishing decades, China has become an increasingly active and diplomatic backing to the South West Africa Beijing has a diverse set of tools available for inter- scholars and journalists perceived to be unfriendly, player in foreign civil wars. Historically, rising great People’s Organization, a rebel group in Namibia vening both directly and indirectly. As a permanent or bribing politicians.92 powers have tended to meddle in internal conflicts that was fighting South African forces.85 member of the U.N. Security Council, China has the Another instrument China can use to interfere abroad and China is no exception.98 So, what spe- It is true that in the post-Cold War period, China ability to meddle in an internal conflict by support- is U.N. peacekeeping. Until the 1980s, China de- cifically is driving Chinese intervention abroad? was generally less interventionist than other per- ing (or declining to veto) a U.N. resolution author- nounced peacekeeping as a form of intervention First, Beijing manipulates foreign internal con- manent members of the U.N. Security Council. Bei- izing intervention or by blocking such a resolution, and typically abstained from voting on U.N. resolu- flicts to protect its core interests: maintaining po- jing avoided large-scale humanitarian missions like thereby helping the intended target. In addition, tions on peacekeeping missions. Following the end litical control and territorial integrity within China the U.S. intervention in Somalia from 1992 to 1994, Beijing can shape the course of a civil war through of the Cold War, however, Beijing began to perceive and safeguarding the “one China” principle that major nation-building operations like the U.S. cam- arms sales and capacity building. China provides peacekeeping as a means of buttressing China’s im- states that Taiwan is part of China.99 Beijing insists paign in Iraq (2003–2011), or sustained proxy wars sophisticated surveillance technology to partner age as a “responsible power” and gaining experi- that recipients of foreign aid renounce diplomatic like America’s backing of Kurdish fighters in Syria states (including AI-powered facial recognition) ence of military deployments. In 2008, a Chinese ties with Taipei and also discourages criticism of (after 2015). Beijing has opposed unilateral interven- and has deployed military trainers in many African white paper emphasized the importance of “mil- China on other internal issues such as Tibet, the tions and regime change and vetoed numerous U.N. countries.88 From 2014 to 2018, China was the fifth itary operations other than war,” such as peace- treatment of Muslim minorities, and Hong Kong. Security Council resolutions that targeted authori- largest exporter of weapons globally (behind the keeping, disaster relief, anti-piracy campaigns, and Crucially, Beijing is willing to shape the outcome of tarian regimes for human rights abuses.86 When for- United States, Russia, France, and Germany).89 Chi- infrastructure development.93 Over time, Chinese a foreign conflict to ensure that the winner plays eign countries experienced internal violence, Beijing nese weapons manufacturers tend to sell small arms peacekeeping operations became steadily more ball. The Liberian civil war from 1989 to 2003 be- often chose flight over fight by withdrawing its na- and inexpensive light weaponry to countries in the ambitious and muscular. Since 2010, over 15,000 came an effective proxy war between China and tionals — for example, evacuating over 35,000 Chi- developing world. By 2010, China was the number Chinese personnel have been deployed in over a Taiwan, waged through aid and diplomatic support. nese people from Libya in 2011. one supplier of arms to sub-Saharan Africa.90 Data dozen different missions, and the makeup of these In 1997, Liberia shut down relations with China in Nevertheless, during the post-Cold War era, Bei- on Beijing’s arms exports are considered a state se- contingents evolved from non-combat troops, such exchange for tens of millions of dollars from Taipei. jing’s doctrine of non-intervention steadily weak- cret, which facilitates the covert supply of weapon- as engineers, police, and medical personnel, to In 2003, Beijing obstructed a nascent peace plan ened and will probably continue to do so. Chinese ry to foreign conflict zones. Chinese light weapons combat forces.94 By 2020, Beijing was the 10th big- in Liberia and the deployment of a U.N. force until analysts engaged in a vigorous debate about the ended up in numerous civil wars in sub-Saharan Af- gest contributor to peacekeeping missions.95 it received assurances that the new regime would merits of the non-intervention principle, but the rica, and Beijing reportedly tried to block the United abandon Taiwan. China and Liberia subsequently debate centered not on whether to intervene more, Nations from investigating these arms transfers.91 Motivations for Chinese Intervention reestablished diplomatic ties, and the United Na- but instead on how much additional intervention China also has powerful economic and political tions authorized a peacekeeping force, including was appropriate.87 In the following sections, I out- tools available to shape the course of a foreign civil In 2013, Li Shaye, an official in the Chinese Min- hundreds of Chinese peacekeepers.100 line the toolbox of Chinese interventionism and the war. For example, Beijing can provide investment istry of Foreign Affairs, said that China’s interests Second, China intervenes to protect its border in Africa were growing larger “so political unrest in security. For example, the United Wa State Army

84 John W. Garver, China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 418–19; and Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1988), 123. 92 Anne-Marie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping,” Woodrow Wilson Center, Sept. 18, 2017, https:// 85 Ian Taylor, China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise (New York: Routledge, 2006), 156–60. www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping. On Beijing’s use of corruption as a tool, see Philip Zelikow, et al., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 4 (July/August 2020): 107–20, https://www. 86 Barton, “China’s Security Policy in Africa.” foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption. 87 Chen Zheng, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 3 (Autumn 2016): 349–74, 93 “China: The White Paper and Military operations Abroad,” Stratfor, Jan. 23, 2009, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-white-pa- https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow010; and Allen Carlson, “More than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention per-and-military-operations-abroad. See also “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Since Tiananmen,” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (Stanford, CA: Stanford 2019,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_RE- University Press, 2006). PORT.pdf; Andrea Ghiselli, “Civil–Military Relations and Organisational Preferences Regarding the Use of the Military in Chinese Foreign Policy: Insights 88 Gisela Grieger, “China’s Growing Role as a Security Actor in Africa,” European Parliamentary Research Service, October 2019, https://www. from the Debate on MOOTW,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, no. 3 (2020): 421–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1438892. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642232/EPRS_BRI(2019)642232_EN.pdf 94 Barton, Political Trust and the Politics of Security Engagement, 40; Courtney J. Richardson, “A Responsible Power? China and the UN 89 “Global Arms Trade: USA Increases Dominance; Arms Flows to the Middle East Surge, says SIPRI,” Stockholm International Peace Research Peacekeeping Regime,” International Peacekeeping 18, no. 3 (2011): 286–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.563082; Yin He, “China Rising Institute, March 11, 2019, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/global-arms-trade-usa-increases-dominance-arms-flows-middle-east- and Its Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping,” in United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Cedric De Coning and Mateja surge-says-sipri. Peter (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 261; and “Troop and Police Contributors,” United Nations Peacekeeping, https://peacekeeping. un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. 90 Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Policy Paper No. 30, December 2011, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/PP/SIPRIPP30.pdf; Ian Taylor and Zhengyu 95 Lucy Best, “What Motivates Chinese Peacekeeping?” Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 7, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-moti- Wu, “China’s Arms Transfers to Africa and Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 3 (2013): 458, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546 vates-chinese-peacekeeping. 553.2012.664588; Benjamin Barton, Political Trust and the Politics of Security Engagement: China and the European Union in Africa (Abingdon, UK: 96 “Lu Talks with Readers of China Daily Website,” China Daily, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013Diplomats/index.html. Routledge, 2018), 38; and Barton, “China’s Security Policy in Africa.” 97 Verhoeven, “Is Beijing’s Non-interference Policy History?” 56. 91 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10; Obert Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave, 2019), 129. In 1995, shortly after the Rwandan genocide, Tanzania refused to let a 98 Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, MA: Chinese ship unload 152 tons of weaponry and ammunition which were headed to the Tutsi-dominated army of Burundi. In 2008, a Chinese cargo Cambridge University Press, 1998), 132; and Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. ship was discovered with 70 tons of small arms destined for Robert Mugabe’s repressive regime in Zimbabwe, despite international sanctions on the 99 Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Haunted by Chaos: China’s Grand Strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). government. (Following a boycott by South African dock workers, Beijing claimed the ship returned to China). Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 125; Celia W. Dugger, “Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar,” New York Times, April 19, 2008, 100 Evan S. Medeiros, China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 185; and Chi- https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/world/africa/19zimbabwe.html; and Shambaugh, China Goes Global. ung-Chiu Huang and Chih-yu Shih, Harmonious Intervention: China’s Quest for Relational Security (New York: Routledge, 2016), 146.

61 62 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

in neighboring Myanmar is an effective Chinese Sri Lankan elections.105 overseas investments.”110 The 2015 Chinese defense and has extensive energy and mineral investments proxy. The Wa rebels speak Chinese and use Chi- Fourth, economic interests have also driven Chi- white paper, China’s Military Strategy, stated that in the country. Beijing backed the regime by con- nese currency, and Beijing reportedly supplies the nese involvement in foreign civil wars. At the turn defending overseas interests through “open seas structing oil infrastructure; developing Sudan’s arms group with financial support and heavy weaponry, of the century, Beijing encouraged Chinese com- protection” would henceforth share equal bill- manufacturing industry; selling weaponry, including including missiles and armored vehicles. Although panies to step up overseas investment, known as ing with “offshore waters defense,” or protecting helicopter gunships; allowing the Sudanese air force there are a variety of motives for Chinese aid, in- the “Going Out” policy.106 China’s direct overseas China’s immediate periphery.111 From 2012 to 2018, to use airstrips and repair facilities at Chinese oil cluding economic interests and a desire to main- investment subsequently increased dramatically, Beijing deployed peacekeepers in 13 countries, nine installations; and shielding Khartoum in the U.N. Se- tain influence in Myanmar, the primary aim of sup- from $2.7 billion in 2002 to $196 billion in 2016.107 of which were locations of significant Chinese eco- curity Council.118 In 2007, China sought to burnish its porting the group is to prevent the conflict from The centerpiece of Chinese foreign investment is nomic investment.112 credentials as a peacemaker by helping to broker a spilling over into China.101 the Belt and Road Initiative, a trillion-dollar pro- Economic interests drew China deeper into Pa- deal for an expanded United Nations-African Union Third, China interferes in civil conflicts as part of gram that launched in 2013 and includes financing kistani domestic politics. Pakistan is a keystone of peacekeeping force in Darfur and deploying 4,000 its strategic rivalry with India. New Delhi has long for bridges, railways, ports, and other infrastruc- the Belt and Road Initiative, with over $60 billion Chinese personnel to Sudan.119 claimed that China aids insurgents in northeast In- ture in Asia, Africa, and Europe.108 in projects slated for the China-Pakistan Economic China is also a significant actor in South Sudan, dia, an accusation Beijing denies.102 China reportedly These economic interests give China a direct Corridor, including a seaport in the Pakistani town which declared independence from Sudan in 2011 gave sanctuary to rebel leaders and provided weap- stake in the outcome of foreign internal conflicts of Gwadar and plans for housing half a million Chi- and endured a civil war in 2013. Beijing has invest- ons to Indian insurgents, using rebels in Myanmar and encourage Beijing to put a thumb — or more nese workers.113 Construction projects often occur ed billions of dollars in South Sudan and purchased as intermediaries.103 In 2020, an article published than a thumb — on the scale in shaping the course in conflict-ridden regions of Pakistan, such as Bal- almost $4 billion of oil from the country in 2014.120 in the Chinese state-run Global Times warned that of the fighting. Chinese investments are often in uchistan. In 2018, Baluch separatists carried out China pursued a nuanced position in South Sudan, Beijing could respond to Indian support for Taiwan insecure regions, with one-third of China’s oil im- numerous strikes against Chinese interests, includ- talking to all sides (including rebels) and public- by backing rebels inside India: “If India plays the ports coming from Africa. Chinese energy, mining, ing an attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi ly pressuring the combatants to sign a ceasefire Taiwan card,” it stated, “it should be aware that Chi- and construction companies are also more will- that left seven dead.114 From 2014 to 2018, Pakistan agreement.121 In 2015, China deployed 1,000 troops na can also play the Indian separatist card.”104 China ing to operate in unstable countries than West- received 37 percent of all China’s arms exports.115 to South Sudan as part of the U.N. mission in the also helped the Sri Lankan regime crush Tamil sepa- ern corporations.109 Beijing has a strong incentive The two states carried out joint counter-terrorism country — the first time a Chinese infantry battalion ratists in 2009, partly to tilt the balance of power in to protect regimes that sign economic deals with exercises focused on contingencies in Xinjiang, and was sent abroad on an external peacekeeping oper- South Asia away from India. Beijing was Sri Lanka’s Chinese companies and stick to the terms. Ac- China pressured Pakistan to crack down on rebel ation. Beijing deliberately shaped the scope of the biggest donor; its chief supplier of weapons; and its cording to China’s Global Times, “China has al- Uighurs in North Waziristan.116 U.N. mission in South Sudan to safeguard Chinese guardian in the U.N. Security Council, where Beijing ways adhered to the principle of non-interference Economic interests also spurred China to engage economic interests — especially oil interests — re- blocked the chamber from debating the Sri Lankan in the internal affairs of other countries, but that in capacity building in Sudan.117 From 1983 to 2005, sulting in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2155 call- military strategy. In 2015, China reportedly chan- doesn’t mean Beijing can turn a deaf ear to the de- Khartoum fought a civil war in the south of the ing for protecting civilians “in areas at high risk of neled funds to favorable political candidates in the mands of Chinese enterprises in protecting their country against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army conflict including, as appropriate, schools, places of and, after 2003, engaged in another internal conflict worship, hospitals and the oil installations.”122 in Darfur. China is Sudan’s biggest trading partner In Mali, China intervened to aid the government

101 Daniel Schearf, “With Burma in Mind, China Quietly Supports Wa Rebels,” Voice of America, Jan. 25, 2013, https://www.voanews.com/east- asia/burma-mind-china-quietly-supports-wa-rebels; Ming Wai Sit and Tin Yau Cheung, “China’s Enduring Influence Over Wa State in Myanmar,” Nov. 110 Hu Weijia, “China Ready to Play a Greater Role in Resolving Conflicts in South & Southeast Asia,” Global Times, May 1, 2017, http://www. 18, 2019, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/chinas-enduring-influence-over-wa-state-in-myanmar/; and Hak Yin Li and Yongnian Zheng, “Re-in- globaltimes.cn/content/1044849.shtml. terpreting China’s Non-Intervention Policy Towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention,” Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 61 (2009): 111 China’s Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Data- 617–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560903033901. base/WhitePapers/index.htm. See also, Michael McDevitt, “China’s Far Seas Navy: The Implications of the ‘Open Seas Protection’ Mission,” April 102 Shishir Gupta, “Ulfa Chief Traced to China, but Beijing Denies His Presence,” Hindustan Times, Feb. 2, 2014, https://www.hindustantimes. 2016, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/China-Far-Seas-Navy.pdf; M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informationized Local com/delhi/ulfa-chief-traced-to-china-but-beijing-denies-his-presence/story-I92KRfWgvsqdl27sCfGxyJ.html. See also, Kunal Mukherjee, Conflict in Wars,” China Brief 15, no. 13 (July 2, 2015), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars/; and India and China’s Contested Borderlands: A Comparative Study (New York: Routledge, 2019), chap. 5; and Bertil Lintner, Great Game East: India, M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019). China, and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015). 112 Best, “What Motivates Chinese Peacekeeping?” 103 Bibhu Prasad Routray and Mantraya, “China’s New Game in India Northeast,” Eurasia Review, Aug. 9, 2017, https://www.eurasiareview. 113 Mathieu Duchâtel, “The Terrorist Risk and China’s Policy Toward Pakistan: Strategic Reassurance and the ‘United Front,’” Journal of Contem- com/09082017-chinas-new-game-in-indias-northeast-analysis/; Prabin Kalita. “UNLFW: The New Name for Terror in NE,” Times of India, June 5, porary China 20, no. 71 (2011): 543–561, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2011.587158; and Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UNLFW-The-new-name-for-terror-in-NE/articleshow/47547899.cms; and Avinash Paliwal, “Is China Geopolitics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015). Behind a Recent Insurgent Attack in India’s Northeast?” The Diplomat, Sept. 1, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/is-china-behind-a-re- cent-insurgent-attack-in-indias-northeast/. 114 Maham Hameed, “The Politics of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Palgrave Communications 4, no. 64 (2018): 1–10, https://doi. org/10.1057/s41599-018-0115-7. 104 Long Xingchun, “India to Invite Trouble Playing Taiwan Card,” Global Times, Oct. 18, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1203786.shtml. 115 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Global Arms Trade.” 105 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/ world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html; and Kadira Pethiyagoda, “China’s Legacy in Sri Lanka’s Civil War Gives It a Diplomatic Edge,” National Interest, 116 Andrew Small, “The Xinjiangistan Connection,” Foreign Policy, July 30, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/30/the-xinjiangistan-connection/. Nov. 28, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-legacy-sri-lankas-civil-war-gives-it-diplomatic-edge-37447. 117 Huang and Shih, Harmonious Intervention, 146; and Irene Panozzo, “Asian Players in Sudan: Social and Economic Impacts of ‘New-Old’ 106 Hongying Wang and XueYing Hu (2017) “China’s ‘Going-Out’ Strategy and Corporate Social Responsibility: Preliminary Evidence of a ‘Boomer- Actors,” in Multidimensional Change in Sudan (1989–2011): Reshaping Livelihoods, Conflicts and Identities, ed. Barbara Casciarri, Munzoul Assal, and ang Effect,’” Journal of Contemporary China, 25, no. 108 (2017): 820–33, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2017.1337301. François Ireton (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 163–81. 107 Ken Davies, “China Investment Policy: An Update,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment, no. 2013/01 (2013), http://dx.doi. 118 Taylor and Wu, “China’s Arms Transfers to Africa and Political Violence,” 465. org/10.1787/5k469l1hmvbt-en; and “Annual Outflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China Between 2009 and 2019,” Statistica, accessed 119 Large, “China and the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”; International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South March 19, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/858019/china-outward-foreign-direct-investment-flows/. Sudan”; and Jian Junbo, “China in International Conflict Management: Darfur Issue as a Case,” in China and Africa: Building Peace and Security 108 “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 288, July 10, 2017, 3, https://d2071andvip- Cooperation on the Continent, ed. Chris Alden, et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 147–61. 0wj.cloudfront.net/288-china-s-foreign-policy-experiment-in-south-sudan.pdf; and Thomas P. Cavanna, “Unlocking the Gates of Eurasia: China’s Belt 120 Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa, 19. and Road Initiative and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 3 (May 2019), 13, http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/ tsw/2927. 121 International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan.” 109 Harry Verhoeven, “Is Beijing’s Non-Interference Policy History? How Africa Is Changing China,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (Summer 122 “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission in South Sudan, Boltering Its Strength to Quell Surging 2014): 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2014.926209. Violence,” United Nations, May 27, 2014, https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11414.doc.htm.

63 64 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War against rebel groups. Although Beijing does not have concerned over Uighur militants — who are most- extensive investments in Mali, it is concerned about ly Muslim — operating at home and their links to the supply of uranium from northern Mali as well as transnational Islamic militants. Since 2017, China broader regional economic interests. In 2012, Mali has engaged in systematic repression of the Uighur experienced both a rebellion and a coup, and China minority in Xinjiang province.127 China has also ini- supported several U.N. resolutions that authorized tiated counter-terrorism exercises with numerous pro-government intervention, including a major countries; helped found the Global Counterterror- French operation. China deployed a protection unit ism Forum; and backed the Quadrilateral Cooper- to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali, which is ation and Coordination Mechanism, a counter-ter- authorized to take all necessary steps “to prevent rorism institution for China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the return of armed elements” to northern Mali.123 and Tajikistan.128 China views the Syrian civil war in China typically backs regimes in foreign civil wars part through the lens of counter-terrorism. Beijing but, in the case of Libya, Beijing reluctantly aided the displayed growing concern over Uighur fighters rebels. The civil war that broke out in 2011 between in Syria, backing the Syrian government by cast- Muammar Gaddafi’s government and the rebels in ing multiple vetoes in the U.N. Security Council the National Transitional Council threatened over to oppose foreign-imposed regime change in Da- $20 billion of Chinese investment in Libya’s oil, con- mascus and providing limited aid and training to struction, and telecommunications sectors.124 Bei- Syrian regime forces.129 In 2016, China introduced a jing voted for U.N. Resolution 1970, which blamed counter-terrorism law that smoothed the path for LOOKING AHEAD, CHINESE Gaddafi’s forces for the escalating violence; asked the People’s Liberation Army to conduct missions the International Criminal Court to investigate war overseas, which, according to one study, “has the INTERVENTION IS SET TO INCREASE. crimes; and imposed an arms embargo, asset freeze, potential to lead to a dramatic change in the use of and travel ban on senior Libyan government officials Chinese military power abroad.”130 CHINA’S INTERESTS WILL KEEP (but not on rebel leaders).125 Beijing also recognized Finally, Chinese intervention is part of an effort the Libyan opposition even while Gaddafi remained to safeguard the growing Chinese diaspora. The BROADENING, ITS APPETITE FOR in power and abstained on (rather than vetoing) exhortation for Chinese companies to go out into U.N. Resolution 1973, which declared a no-fly zone the world meant that large numbers of Chinese na- ENERGY AND RAW MATERIALS in Libya and further tilted the war in favor of the re- tionals began living and working in insecure states, bels. And yet, in 2011, Chinese arms firms reportedly including an estimated two million Chinese people WILL ENHANCE ITS PERCEIVED offered to sell $200 million of weaponry to Gaddafi’s who live in Africa.131 Islamic fundamentalists and faltering regime, although the extent of official in- other rebel groups target Chinese, as well as West- STAKE IN THE STABILITY OF OTHER volvement was unclear.126 ern, nationals. In 2012, for example, Chinese pri- Fifth, China pursues intervention as part of its vate security contractors coordinated with the Su- COUNTRIES, AND ITS GROWING counter-terrorism strategy. Beijing has become danese military to rescue 29 Chinese nationals who CAPABILITIES WILL BOOST THE 123 Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa; David Shinn, “China’s Response to the Islamist Threat in Mali,” China-US Focus, June 21, 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/chinas-response-to-the-islamist-threat-in-mali/; and Frans Paul Van der Putten, “Chi- TEMPTATION TO ACT. na’s Evolving Role in Peacekeeping and African Security: The Deployment of Chinese Troops for UN Force Protection in Mali,” Clingendael Report, September 2015, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/chinas-evolving-role-peacekeeping-and-african-security. 124 Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa, 108–09; and Yun Sun, “Africa in China’s Foreign Policy,” Brookings Institute, April 2014, 1–45, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/africa-in-china-web_cmg7.pdf. 125 Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa, 123; and Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Diplomacy and the UN Security Council: Beyond the Veto (London: Routledge, 2013). 126 “Did China Sell Arms to Libya?” The Diplomat, Sept. 6, 2011, https://thediplomat.com/2011/09/did-china-sell-arms-to-libya/. 127 Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici, “Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinji- ang,” International Security 44, no. 3 (Winter 2019/2020): 9–47, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00368. 128 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” 16–17; Zhao Jun and Hu Yu, “On China’s New Era Anti-Terrorism Governance in the Middle East,” Yonsei Journal of International Studies 7, no. 2 (2015): 267–83, http://theyonseijournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Jun-Yu-Chinas-Anti-Terrorism-Governance-1.pdf; Daniel L. Byman and Israa Saber, “Is China Prepared for Global Terrorism? Xinjiang and Beyond,” September 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-china-pre- pared-for-global-terrorism/. 129 Liu Zhen, “Chinese Military to Provide ‘Aid and Training Assistance’ to Syrian Government,” South China Morning Post, August 16, 2016, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2004676/chinese-military-provide-aid-and-training-assistance. See also, Courtney J. Fung, “Separating Intervention from Regime Change: China’s Diplomatic Innovations at the UN Security Council Regarding the Syria Crisis,” The China Quarterly 235 (September 2018): 693–712, doi:10.1017/S0305741018000851. 130 Mathieu Duchatel, “Terror Overseas: Understanding China’s Evolving Counter-Terror Strategy,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016, https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR_193_-_TERROR_OVERSEAS_UNDERSTANDING_CHINAS_EVOLVING_COUNTER_TER- ROR_STRATEGY.pdf. 131 Adams Bodomo, “Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Inequalities and Well-being of Africans in China,” Asian Ethnicity 21, No. 4 (May 2020), 526-541, doi: 10.1080/14631369.2020.1761246.

65 66 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War had been kidnapped by rebel forces.132 The end of deployments of ground troops. Indirect interven- Partnership “adventurism,” China acquiesced in recent West- the movie Wolf Warrior II shows the cover of a Chi- tion will likely prioritize security cooperation, cy- ern-led missions in Mali and Libya.143 nese passport and declares: “Citizens of the PRC ber warfare, and surveillance rather than large- In the partnership model, China and the Unit- [People’s Republic of China]: When you encounter scale weapons transfers and will primarily favor ed States would cooperate in managing foreign Proxy War danger in a foreign land, do not give up! Please re- regimes rather than rebels. Beijing will select less civil wars. Washington and Beijing could, theo- member, at your back stands a strong motherland.” contentious cases to test new forms of involve- retically, form an effective team, either as neutral Another possibility is that the United States and ment, such as multilateral U.N. interventions at the peacemakers or as confederates backing the same China will oppose each other in a foreign civil war The Scope of Chinese Intervention invitation of the target regime or African conflicts faction in a conflict. China and the United States and provide support for different sides in the con- that are less salient in Chinese domestic politics share significant interests in insecure regions, flict. Given the significant incentives for the two There is a growing gap between China’s doctrine compared to crises in Asia.135 China’s lack of allies, such as countering terrorism, and bring different countries to cooperate in foreign civil wars, why of non-intervention and how it behaves in practice. aside from North Korea and Pakistan, will also act assets to the table. U.N. peacekeeping is an area would they choose instead to engage in a proxy war? Since the end of the Cold War, China has trended as a constraint on intervention. However, although of relatively open communication between the Strategic competition in an emerging bipolar toward greater involvement in foreign civil wars, tools like economic aid and diplomatic maneuvers United States and China, and the two countries system may encourage a zero-sum mindset where including a sea change in Beijing’s attitude toward in the U.N. Security Council may seem relatively often consult on security issues in Africa. U.S. and both sides seek advantage — where a gain for the peacekeeping; a broadened view of China’s over- mild compared to the use of direct force, they can Chinese goals are largely aligned, for instance, in United States or China is perceived as a loss for the seas interests; a loosening of China’s rules for de- still have a powerful — and even decisive — effect South Sudan, where China worked closely with other side.144 These great powers could manipulate ploying troops in counter-terrorism missions; and on the course of a civil war. the troika of the United States, the United King- internal conflicts to protect a sphere of influence, the opening, in 2017, of Beijing’s first foreign mili- A challenge for Beijing is to reconcile this new- dom, and Norway.138 Some insecure countries co- maintain access to strategic resources, or counter tary base (in Djibouti, where a company of U.S. ma- found activism with its doctrine of non-interven- operate with both the United States and China. the perceived intervention of the rival. Indeed, the rines is also deployed).133 Several drivers of Chinese tion. China cannot renounce the doctrine without For example, Ethiopia has received major Chinese shift from counter-terrorism following the 9/11 at- intervention are longstanding, such as protecting seeming to embrace meddling. Instead, China may investment in infrastructure while also hosting tacks to an era of great-power rivalry today may core interests, border security, and competition define “intervention” ever more narrowly, for ex- CIA facilities, and Kenya is a historic U.S. ally but fundamentally alter how Washington views foreign with India. Other drivers have grown in importance ample to exclude multilateral operations or mis- trades more with Beijing.139 civil wars. In the counter-terrorism paradigm, in- in recent years, such as defending overseas eco- sions that occur with the consent of the target In the past, the United States has sometimes stability abroad is an inherent problem because it nomic interests, strengthening counter-terrorism, state. Beijing has also suggested that when civil pressed China to take a greater role in foreign spurs violent extremism. In this scenario, Beijing and assisting Chinese nationals. conflicts threaten to spill across borders, they are internal conflicts. In 2005, Deputy Secretary of could be a useful ally in countering local militants. Looking ahead, Chinese intervention is set to in- “no longer internal political affairs but regional State Robert Zoellick urged Beijing to become By contrast, in the great-power rivalry paradigm, crease. China’s interests will keep broadening, its security affairs.”136 Meanwhile, Chinese analysts a “responsible stakeholder” in the internation- instability abroad may be threatening or it could be appetite for energy and raw materials will enhance and officials have proposed a variety of euphe- al system by intervening to resolve civil wars in potentially useful, depending on its impact on the its perceived stake in the stability of other countries, misms for activist policies that supposedly respect countries such as Sudan.140 In the wake of costly global strategic balance. China’s efforts to stabilize and its growing capabilities will boost the tempta- non-intervention, such as “creative involvement,” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a renewed foreign states under this paradigm are treated with tion to act. According to the U.S. Department of De- “constructive involvement,” “proactive non-inter- motivation for the United States to share the bur- suspicion. For example, Washington does not see fense, China’s Marine Corps is not yet ready to per- ference,” “persuasive diplomacy,” and “influence den of stabilizing war-torn countries. The Belt and the Belt and Road Initiative as a useful mechanism form “expeditionary missions” but ultimately “will without interference.”137 Road Initiative, for example, could help to satisfy for aiding fragile states and countering terrorism. be capable of operating from land, sea, and air as the the vast need for global infrastructure, which, in In 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson crit- [People’s Liberation Army’s] global military force.”134 the coming decade, will run into the tens of tril- icized what he called Beijing’s “opaque contracts” Meanwhile, Chinese nationalism and domestic poli- Sino-U.S. Intervention: lions of dollars.141 Meanwhile, China has an incen- and “predatory loan practices.”145 Former National tics may encourage a more muscular response when Partnership or Proxy War? tive to tolerate U.S. intervention because Beijing Security Adviser John Bolton claimed that China China’s interests are at stake, especially if Chinese can free ride on security provided by the Ameri- seeks to “hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s nationals are threatened. What will happen when continued American can military and prefers U.S. occupation to chaos wishes and demands.”146 The 2018 Better Utiliza- In the immediate term, Beijing will likely contin- interventionism meets growing Chinese interven- in countries like Iraq.142 Whereas, historically, Bei- tion of Investment Leading to Development Act ue to exercise caution and favor subtler forms of tionism? Two models for how China and the United jing often opposed U.S. and allied interventions as was designed to compete with the Belt and Road manipulation over heavy-handed coercion. Direct States will interact in the context of foreign civil intervention may involve peacekeeping missions wars are partnership and proxy war. and raids by special forces, rather than major 138 International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan.” 139 Verhoeven, “Is Beijing’s Non-interference Policy History?” 140 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” U.S. Department of State, Sept. 21, 2005, http://2001-2009.state. 132 International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan,” 4; Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa, gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. 4; Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchâtel, China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad (London: Routledge, 2015). 141 Cavanna, “Unlocking the Gates of Eurasia.” 133 Barton, Political Trust and the Politics of Security Engagement, 38. 142 Hiim and Stenslie, “China’s Realism in the Middle East.” 134 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019,” 60–61; and Martin Andrew, “The Influence of U.S. Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan on the People’s Liberation Army,” in Chinese 143 Hodzi, The End of China’s Non-Intervention Policy in Africa, 222. Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 144 Groh, Proxy War, 50. College, 2011), 237–75. 145 Aaron Maasho, “Africa Should Avoid Forfeiting Sovereignty to China Over Loans: Tillerson,” Reuters, March 8, 2018, https://www.reuters. 135 Verhoeven, “Is Beijing’s Non-interference Policy History?”; and Henrik Stalhane Hiim and Stig Stenslie, “China’s Realism in the Middle East,” com/article/us-usa-africa/africa-should-avoid-forfeiting-sovereignty-to-china-over-loans-tillerson-idUSKCN1GK114. Survival 61, no. 6 (2019), 153–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1688578. 146 John Bolton, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy,” Speech 136 International Crisis Group, “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan.” Delivered at the Heritage Foundation, Dec. 13, 2018, https://td.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bol- 137 Zeng, “China Debates the Non-Interference Principle.” ton-on-the-trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/.

67 68 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

Initiative by creating a new U.S. agency to facilitate model of state-directed capitalism. Nevertheless, For both the United States and China, indirect a scenario is quite plausible. The two great powers investment in developing countries.147 Beijing resists Western democracy promotion, intervention may be appealing because of the per- currently recognize different regimes in Venezue- Resolving the civil war in Afghanistan might treating it as a form of contamination that could ceived costs of alternative options. Nuclear weap- la. Beijing backs the Nicolás Maduro government, seem to be a natural joint project for Washington infect China itself.151 China has assisted non-dem- ons and economic interdependence largely fore- whereas Washington sees Juan Guaidó as the le- and Beijing, given that the United States is eager ocratic actors from Angola to Zimbabwe or shield- close pursuing direct hostilities. Meanwhile, rising gitimate leader. In 2014, China elevated relations to wind down its war in the country and China’s ed them from censure from the United Nations. security competition and fundamental distrust with Venezuela to a “comprehensive strategic Xinjiang province borders Afghanistan. Since 2016, “Pick a dictator anywhere on the globe,” wrote mean that the partnership model may not be seen partnership.”160 Beijing renegotiated loans to give U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing the James Mann, “and you’ll likely find these days that as an adequate safeguard of each country’s inter- Caracas some breathing room and sold significant the Chinese regime is supporting him.”152 The ests. As alternative options are eliminated, backing amounts of military hardware and surveillance Trump administration generally downplayed local actors may be the only viable means of pro- technology to Venezuela.161 In 2018, Pence said, human rights and democracy in for- tecting interests without provoking a backlash. Bei- “Within our own hemisphere, Beijing has extend- eign policy, but the Biden administra- jing, for example, may conclude that risking direct ed a lifeline to the corrupt and incompetent Ma- tion has reemphasized the “creed” conflict with the U.S. military is reckless, whereas duro regime in Venezuela that’s been oppressing of traditional American values.153 In working indirectly through surrogates offers sig- its own people.”162 And in 2020, the United States 2021, the U.S. secretary of state said, nificant gain at reduced risk. As former National indicted Maduro for narco-terrorism.163 “We will stand firm behind our com- Security Adviser H.R. McMaster has remarked, mitments to human rights, democ- “There are two ways to fight the United States mil- Could a Sino-U.S. Proxy War Escalate? racy, the rule of law.”154 The greater itary: asymmetrically and stupid[ly].”157 emphasis on idealism could introduce The notion of a Sino-U.S. proxy war may evoke Scholars often compare the danger of interstate further tensions in relations with Chi- images of an intense and high-stakes military ri- war between the United States and China today na. In the future, Washington may embrace rebels valry, in which local actors are mere puppets and to the Peloponnesian War in ancient Greece. Just fighting for democratic change or proclaim a re- the outcome of the civil war is primarily shaped as the rise of Athens in the fifth century BCE pro- United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan sponsibility to protect civilians facing mass killing, by decisions made in Washington and Beijing. But voked fear in Sparta, triggering the Peloponne- explicitly referred to China’s Belt and Road Ini- whereas Beijing may back an authoritarian regime. in reality, a Sino-U.S. proxy war would likely be sian War, so too today, the economic and military tiative in the context of encouraging trade in Af- In fact, the United States and China have a long subtle and deniable and would blur into “normal” growth of China could spark alarm in the United ghanistan.148 In 2019, however, Washington wanted history of using different kinds of proxy actors international politics. It would involve the use of States and heighten the risk of conflict — what the language removed and in 2020, the relevant against each other. During the Cold War, the United diplomacy, propaganda, cyber operations, and Graham Allison calls the “Thucydides Trap.”164 It’s authorization referred only to “the efforts of all States and China engaged in proxy war in a number “weaponized interdependence” or control of key notable that the Peloponnesian War began when regional and international partners of Afghanistan of African countries, including the Congo.155 The Vi- hubs in economic networks.158 Surrogate actors outside powers meddled in a foreign civil war. In to support peace, reconciliation, and development etnam War was, in part, a proxy conflict between may seek to influence the great powers, and local 435 BCE, according to Thucydides, the city-state in Afghanistan.”149 Political scientist Barnett Rubin South Vietnam (backed by the United States) and dynamics will usually be determinative in shaping of Epidamnus fell prey to “internal conflicts last- wrote that “the Trump administration continued North Vietnam (aided by China) — although Beijing the course of the conflict. ing many years.”165 Competing factions appealed to oppose even perfunctory expressions of support also viewed Hanoi as a rival and ultimately went to As an illustration, a Sino-U.S. proxy war could to outside actors for aid, which ultimately trans- for Afghan-Chinese cooperation.”150 war against Vietnam in 1979. China has even used occur if Venezuela were to collapse into a civil formed a local civil war into a broader conflict be- Divergent ideologies may also encourage proxy commercial fishing vessels as proxies to challenge war. In this case, the United States might aid re- tween Athens and Sparta. In turn, the campaign war. Chinese foreign policy is pragmatic rather than U.S. and other states’ access to maritime regions.156 bel groups and China might support the regime between democratic Athens and oligarchic Spar- missionary, and Beijing does not seek to export its Taiwan can be considered a U.S. state proxy as well. through economic and military aid or diplomacy ta deepened domestic schisms throughout the (at the United Nations or by pressuring regional Greek world, sparking further brutal civil wars, actors not to cooperate with Washington).159 Such the erosion of norms, and the desecration of 147 “Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018,” S. 2463, 115th Congress (2017–2018), https://www.congress.gov/ bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2463. 148 “UN Security Council Resolution 2274,” United Nations, March 15, 2016, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12283.doc.htm. 157 Peter Bergen, “Trump’s Brilliant Choice of McMaster,” CNN, Feb. 21, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/20/opinions/trumps-brilliant- choice-of-mcmaster-bergen/index.html. 149 “UN Security Council Resolution 2513,” United Nations, March 10, 2020, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/security_coun- cil_resolution_2513_2020.pdf. 158 Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42–79, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00351. See also, Mumford, Proxy​ Warfare; Groh, Proxy War; and Hughes, 150 Barnett R. Rubin, “There Is Only One Way Out of Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Dec. 9, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unit- My Enemy’s Enemy. ed-states/2020-12-09/there-only-one-way-out-afghanistan. 159 Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Robert Muggah, “How to Avoid a Venezuelan Civil War: Latin American Solutions for a Latin American Problem,” 151 Hal Brands, “Democracy vs Authoritarianism: How Ideology Shapes Great-Power Conflict,” Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 61–114, https://doi.org/ Foreign Affairs, Aug. 9, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2017-08-09/how-avoid-venezuelan-civil-war. 10.1080/00396338.2018.1518371. 160 “China, Venezuela Lift Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” Xinhua, July 21, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2014-07/21/ 152 There are some exceptions: China supported sanctions against Iran and North Korea and pressured the Sudanese regime to negotiate with content_33009951.htm. rebels. James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China (New York: Penguin Random House, 2008), 24; Brands, “Democracy vs Authoritarianism”; and Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 7–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/003963 161 Antulio Rosales, “Deepening Extractivism and Rentierism: China’s Role in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Developmental Model,” Canadian Journal of 38.2018.1470755. Development Studies 37, no. 4 (2016), 560–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/02255189.2016.1208605; and “China,” U.S. Energy Information Administra- tion, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=CHN. 153 Ariana Berengaut and Rob Berschinski, “Good Governance Papers No. 9: Building an Effective Human Rights-Based Foreign Policy,” Just Secu- rity, Oct. 26, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/73042/good-governance-papers-no-9-building-an-effective-human-rights-based-foreign-policy/. 162 Pence, “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy Toward China.” 154 Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” U.S. State Department, March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-poli- 163 “Nicolás Maduro Moros and 14 Current and Former Venezuelan Officials Charged with Narco-Terrorism, Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Oth- cy-for-the-american-people/. er Criminal Charges,” U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nicol-s-maduro-moros-and-14-current-and-for- mer-venezuelan-officials-charged-narco-terrorism. 155 Gregg A. Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 164 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 156 Edward Wong, “Chinese Civilian Boats Roil Disputed Waters,” New York Times, Oct. 5, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/world/ asia/06beijing.html. 165 Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, trans. and ed. Jeremy Mynott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 17.

69 70 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War religious sites.166 “Civil strife inflicted many a ter- (MPLA) in the form of a relatively small training Nouri al Maliki government in Iraq to reach out to A Sino-U.S. proxy war may be low-level, covert, rible blow on the cities,” wrote Thucydides, “as mission. This escalated into a large-scale and di- Iraqi Sunnis, worsening the Iraqi civil war.176 In such and deniable. Moreover, even as the United States always does and always will happen while human rect intervention with tens of thousands of Cuban a situation, the local regime’s dependence on the and China seek to manipulate a particular civil war nature remains what it is.”167 ground troops deployed to check South African United States does not translate into U.S. control be- in contrary directions, they may cooperate in other Could a Sino-U.S. proxy war intensify into a larger intervention and ward off the potential defeat of cause Washington cannot credibly threaten to end internal conflicts to achieve shared goals like com- conflict — or even an interstate war like in ancient the MPLA.172 In the context of a potential U.S.-Chi- support: A collapse of the government would also batting terrorism. However, there is a significant Greece?168 The barriers to interstate war between nese proxy war, Washington and Beijing may orig- be a loss for U.S. interests.177 Surrogates may also danger that psychological dynamics, ignorance of the United States and China will likely prevent a inally envision modestly backing a friendly regime escalate a civil war by mistake, worsening an already local culture, and the independence of local actors proxy conflict from escalating to a full-blown con- or rebel group. However, if either country’s sur- tense situation or drawing global condemnation. In could unintentionally deepen the civil war or cause ventional showdown. For one thing, most foreign rogate faces defeat, the patron may increase its 2014, Ukrainian rebels shot down Malaysia Airlines a proxy war to spiral into a larger conflict. civil wars do not threaten the core interests of the support, including sending in ground or air forces Flight 17, using a surface-to-air missile provided, and For both the United States and China, formal great powers. In addition, indirect intervention is to avoid a strategic, moral, or reputational loss.173 subsequently recovered, by Russia. Ukrainian rebels opposition to intervening in foreign civil wars is often deniable, such that one, or both, great pow- Ignorance could also spur unanticipated esca- may have fired the missile in error, believing the tar- a useful myth. America’s prioritization of conven- ers may prefer to ignore the other side’s interven- lation. In recent decades, the United States has get to be a military aircraft.178 Similar events in a Si- tional interstate war aligns strategic doctrine with tion precisely to control the risk of a crisis spiraling struggled to manipulate foreign civil wars in Af- no-U.S. proxy war could spur a retaliatory response, the U.S. military’s comfort zone and also aids par- into a broader, unwanted war.169 ghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere due to a lack particularly given loss aversion, cultural ignorance, ticular organizational interests in the Army, Navy, Nevertheless, low-level proxy war could poten- of knowledge about local cultures, ethnic tensions, and the fog of proxy war. and Air Force by facilitating spending on big-ticket tially escalate in unexpected ways. Scholars have and languages. China is even more likely to blun- A U.S.-Chinese proxy war could also deepen the hardware.182 Meanwhile, China’s doctrine of non-in- found that foreign backing for rebels is correlated der out of ignorance because Beijing’s diplomatic intrastate conflict itself. Scholars have found that tervention serves to diminish fears in the inter- with a heightened chance of militarized interstate corps is not sufficiently trained for complex civil external support tends to exacerbate civil wars.179 national community about Beijing’s rise. Despite disputes.170 Patrons often end up providing more conflicts and China lacks a network of non-govern- Take, for example, recent proxy wars in Libya, Syr- these well-established principles, however, both aid in foreign civil wars than initially planned be- mental organizations. China and the United States ia, and Yemen, which have often spilled across bor- states routinely engage in foreign intervention. cause of overconfidence about the allied faction’s may end up stumbling in the fog of proxy war. In- ders. In Yemen, direct Saudi intervention and indi- What are the policy recommendations for the capabilities. What begins as a minor proxy war can tervention in civil conflicts is often complex and rect Iranian intervention empowered the Houthis, United States? First, the U.S. military and broader evolve into a much more dangerous situation if one covert, making it difficult to accurately perceive a provided fertile terrain for extremists like al-Qaeda national security community should expand their patron decides to step up its involvement and in- patron’s degree of involvement, resolve, or influ- in the Arabian Peninsula and triggered catastroph- thinking about military competition with China, tervene directly with ground forces. ence over surrogates. This uncertainty can encour- ic humanitarian consequences.180 going beyond preparing for highly unlikely scenar- A powerful driver of escalation is simply an age a rival patron to engage in worst-case-scenario ios of interstate war to thinking through far more aversion to losing. Psychologists have found that thinking and misperceive — and perhaps overreact probable scenarios of proxy war. This means “losing hurts twice as bad as winning feels good,” to — the adversary’s involvement. In 2017, a U.S. Conclusion boosting resources for both direct and indirect and in the face of potential loss, actors are willing jet shot down a Syrian aircraft that attacked the interventions, including diplomacy, information to gamble with an increased commitment in the rebel Syrian Democratic Forces. Russia responded In 2007, Robert Gates said that unconvention- operations, foreign aid, training and advisory mis- hope of getting back to even.171 The Vietnam War by suspending deconfliction protocols designed to al wars were “the ones most likely to be fought sions, special forces, and counter-insurgency. The illustrates the potential for a small-scale proxy avoid escalation, illustrating how intervention can in the years ahead.”181 This holds true for military military should institutionalize hard-won lessons conflict to intensify when neither side is willing evolve in unexpected and dangerous ways.174 competition between the United States and Chi- learned from prior unconventional campaigns to accept defeat. Another example is Cuban in- In addition, surrogate forces may pursue an agenda na. Strategic doctrine in both countries downplays like Iraq. Professional education in the U.S. mil- volvement in Angola. In the 1960s and 1970s, Ha- that deviates from the patron’s preferences and po- intervention in foreign civil wars. And yet, any fu- itary should pay greater attention to proxy war vana began giving aid to the communist-aligned tentially escalates the conflict.175 The Obama admin- ture military rivalry between China and America is specifically in order to better understand how in- People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola istration struggled to convince the Shia-dominated likely to take the form of proxy war because of the terventions can evolve, sometimes in unexpected systemwide dynamics that inhibit interstate war. ways. The Army’s decision in 2014, for example, to 166 Jonathan J. Price, Thucydides and Internal War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The battlefield is more likely to be in Venezuela, close its Irregular Warfare Center is hard to justi- 167 Thucydides, The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, 212. Iran, North Korea, or Myanmar than in the South fy when irregular warfare is the dominant kind of 183 168 For the wider issue of escalation in international relations, see Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks China Sea. global conflict. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274. 176 Marc Lynch, “How Can the U.S. Help Maliki When Maliki’s The Problem?” Washington Post, June 12, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost. 169 Austin Carson, Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018). com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/12/iraq-trapped-between-isis-and-maliki/. 170 Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict Over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” Internation- 177 Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017). al Organization 64, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 281–312, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40608016; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization 63, no. 1 (January 2009): 67–106, https://doi.org/10.1017/ 178 Somini Sengupta and Andrew E. Kramer, “Dutch Inquiry Links Russia to 298 Deaths in Explosion of Jetliner Over Ukraine,” New York Times, S0020818309090031; and Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). Sept. 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/asia/malaysia-air-flight-mh17-russia-ukraine-missile.html. 171 Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, “Bad World: The Negativity Bias in International Politics,” International Security 43, no. 3 (Winter 179 Linebarger and Enterline, “Third Party Intervention and the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars.” 2018/2019): 96–140, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00336. 180 Robert Malley and Stephen Pomper, “Accomplice to Carnage: How America Enables War in Yemen,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 2 (March/April 172 Groh, Proxy War. 2021): 73–88, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-09/how-america-enables-war-yemen. 173 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2019). 181 Robert Gates, “Speech to the Association of the United States Army,” Small Wars Journal, Oct. 10, 2007, https://smallwarsjournal.com/ blog/secdef-robert-gates-10-oct-07-ausa-speech. 174 Andrew S. Weiss and Nicole Ng, “Collision Avoidance: Lessons from U.S. and Russian Operations in Syria,” Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Weiss_Ng_U.S.-Russia_Syria-final1.pdf 182 Tierney, How We Fight. 175 Byman, Deadly Connections; Ryan Clarke, Crime-Terror Nexus in South Asia: States, Security and Non-State Actors (New York: 183 “Irregular Warfare Center to Close Oct. 1,” Army Times, Sept. 1, 2014, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2014/09/01/irregu- Routledge, 2012); and Mumford, Proxy Warfare. lar-warfare-center-to-close-oct-1/.

71 72 The Scholar The Future of Sino-U.s. Proxy War

One counter-argument might be that a Sino-U.S. than true democracy and cutting pragmatic deals interstate war is the most dangerous outcome and with opposing factions in internal conflicts. therefore deserves the greatest attention, where- Fifth, Washington should make an effort to as proxy wars are relatively low stakes and the channel Chinese interventionism toward areas American response to an internal conflict can be of shared interests. Although a true global part- improvised, if necessary. However, proxy wars are nership to tackle foreign civil wars is unlikely to far more likely to occur than an interstate war and emerge, there are cases where the great powers’ may have significant consequences for U.S. inter- interests overlap and they can cooperate effec- ests and values. Furthermore, the less that the tively, such as countering terrorism or piracy. United States prepares for proxy war, the more Sixth, if a Sino-U.S. proxy war occurs, it ought these campaigns are likely to happen, either be- to be carefully managed. Decision-makers should cause Washington stumbles into a crisis it does recognize how ignorance of the local culture and not expect or because rational opponents choose ethnic dynamics, an aversion to loss, and inde- to confront America in a scenario where they have pendent action by surrogates can all spur un- the best odds of success. After the Vietnam War, planned or undesired escalation. The United for example, the U.S. military neglected counter-in- States should develop deconfliction protocols like surgency and pivoted to readying for interstate war those used in Syria.184 Proxy wars are unlikely to with the Soviet Union, leaving America unprepared involve existential threats to either Washington for later interventions in foreign civil wars. or Beijing, making it possible to negotiate politi- Second, having developed its toolbox for both cally tolerable outcomes and avoid a foreign quag- direct and indirect interventions, Washington mire from triggering the Thucydides Trap. should employ these tools with much greater dis- cretion. The era of American hyper-intervention- Dominic Tierney is a professor of political sci- ism has also been an era of military failure in Viet- ence at Swarthmore College and a senior fellow at nam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. U.S. power the Foreign Policy Research Institute. His most re- can be a double-edged sword because it tempts cent book is The Right Way to Lose a War: America Washington into unwise adventures. Competition in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (Little, Brown,2012 with China makes picking and choosing foreign and Co. 2015). interventions even more important. Costly U.S. direct interventions like Iraq may only weaken Acknowledgements: The author would like to America and strengthen China. thank Sam Helfont, George Yin, Scott Moore, and Third, the United States should recognize the the reviewers for helpful comments. The author is dangers of perceiving global conflict through the indebted to Kaia Kim, Bram Sturley, John Ashbrook, lens of great-power competition and seeing the Chloe Sweeney, and Sky Park for research assistance. instability of foreign states as potentially bene- ficial because it hurts Beijing more than it hurts Image: Mahmoudreza Shirinsokhan, CC BY-NC 2.0 Washington. The consequences of instability are (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/) notoriously tough to predict. U.S. aid to rebels in Afghanistan in the 1980s, for example, helped force Moscow’s retreat from the country, but it may have also facilitated the rise of al-Qaeda. Fourth, if the United States does intervene in foreign civil wars, emerging Sino-U.S. competition underscores the importance of setting limited and achievable goals. Washington has a track record of fighting for grandiose war aims, such as building a beacon of freedom in Iraq, in part because the U.S. creed of individual rights encourages Ameri- cans to see foreign conflicts in moralistic terms as a struggle between good and evil. As U.S. officials balance local dynamics with the consequences for great-power competition, Washington will usually be well served by aiming for ugly stability rather 2015 2017 184 David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” International Security, 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 85–127, muse.jhu.edu/article/693696.

73 74 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations

The norms that uphold democratic values are a vital part of KEEPING NORMS NORMAL: a healthy system of civil-military relations, but they are not well understood in the United States today. Ancient political philosophers, however, developed rich analyses of what norms ANCIENT PERSPECTIVES are and how they work. We argue Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius established useful ways of thinking about civilian control focused ON NORMS IN on the apportionment of public honor and shame. We apply their insights to an ancient case: the civil-military breakdown in the Roman republic during the time of Marius. We argue that CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ancient modes of civilian control — based on education, honor, shame, unwritten norms, and social pressure — have enduring value. An orientation toward non-material incentives can help us JIM GOLBY better understand why civil-military norms have been weakening HUGH LIEBERT in the United States over recent decades. Ancient modes of civilian control may also help us prevent the type of civil-military problems that hastened the fall of the Roman republic.

uring his first overseas troop visit in had broken no laws. The items Trump signed were late December 2018, President Donald personal items and they had not been distributed Trump signed campaign memorabil- by the White House.2 Nevertheless, several experts ia — including “Make America Great agreed that this behavior, while legal, had crossed Again”D hats and campaign flags — for soldiers the line and violated a norm prohibiting partisan and airmen stationed in Iraq and Germany. When behavior by those in uniform.3 members of the media released pictures of the The norms and informal institutions that many event, controversy ensued.1 Some critics claimed scholars and pundits believe play an important role it was a clear violation of the military’s tradition in civil-military relations increasingly have made of non-partisanship, with uniformed servicemem- headlines over the last few decades. In large part, bers showing partisan favoritism that extend- the storyline has been the same: Long-held norms ed beyond normal respect and deference for the of American civil-military relations may be break- commander-in-chief. No servicemembers were ing down.4 As partisan polarization and confidence formally sanctioned for their actions because they in the military have grown among the public writ

1 David Choi, “People Have a Lot to Say about Trump Signing MAGA Hats for US Troops in Iraq,” Business Insider, Dec. 27, 2018, www.businessin- sider.com/trump-maga-hats-signing-iraq-germany-us-troops-2018-12?r=US&IR=T. 2 Daniel Politi, “Did Trump Break Pentagon Rules by Signing MAGA Hats in Iraq?” Slate, Dec. 27, 2018, https://slate.com/news-and-poli- tics/2018/12/some-analysts-said-that-the-commander-in-chief-seemed-to-confuse-a-visit-to-a-combat-zone-with-a-campaign-rally.html. 3 Kyle Rempfer, “Can POTUS Sign Your MAGA Hat? Experts Weigh-in on Recent Campaign Season Controversies Involving Troops,” Military Times, Sept. 5, 2019, www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/09/05/can-potus-sign-your-maga-hat-experts-weigh-in-on-recent-campaign- season-controversies-involving-troops/. 4 Stephen Saideman, “Civil-Military Relations Are Broken,” Political Violence at a Glance, June 3, 2020, https://politicalviolenceataglance. org/2020/06/03/civil-military-relations-are-broken/; and Ronald R. Krebs and Robert Ralston, “Civilian Control of the Military Is a Partisan Issue,” Foreign Affairs, July 14, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-07-14/civilian-control-military-partisan-issue.

75 76 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations large, so have the incentives for political leaders odological concerns.9 It is far easier for political think critically about how non-material factors — As scholars of American civil-military relations to portray the military as favoring their side in do- scientists to study institutions or behaviors they such as bestowing public honor or shame — might wrestle with the erosion of longstanding norms, mestic political disputes and for military leaders — can observe. When it comes to civil-military rela- constrain or shape behavior. Ancient philosophers our excavation of a rich tradition should help to both active duty and retired — to use their public tions, these limitations are even more pronounced. were concerned not only to prescribe norms but to illuminate the significance of norms in the con- esteem for political, and sometimes partisan, pur- Outside of violations of the Uniformed Code of Mil- understand what norms were and how they shaped temporary study of civil-military relations. Per- poses.5 Since the late 1970s, there is evidence that itary Justice or of election law, material sanctions behavior. Finally, ancient political philosophers haps ancient insights will inspire strategies for more active duty military officers are openly iden- for the violation of civil-military norms occur in- were quite attentive to how politically divided pub- defending against their erosion today. tifying with a political party; more retired military frequently.10 Despite the methodological challeng- lics might threaten civil-military norms. officers are involving themselves in electoral cam- es involved, understanding whether — and how This paper explores the role of norms in struc- paigns and political debates; more civilian political — non-material sanctions might help enforce the turing civil-military relations by returning to the Norms and Informal Institutions leaders are openly soliciting support from veter- unwritten rules of the game should be of particular earliest foundations of the field: not Samuel Hun- ans; and more civilians are interfering in military interest to scholars of civil-military relations. tington’s The Soldier and the State, but Plato’s Re- In the literature on American civil-military re- issues for domestic political gain.6 In this paper, we turn to an often overlooked public. We argue that Plato and his most thought- lations, most discussions of norms begin with a Despite the attention this trend has gained in source of insight on civil-military relations: ancient ful followers established a way of thinking about response to those Huntington proposed as part popular commentary, however, scholars of civ- political philosophy. Although ancient political phi- civilian control of the military that focused on of his model of objective civilian control. Hunting- il-military relations have done relatively little to losophers wrote in a significantly different context the use of public honor and shame — rather than ton’s model attempts to maximize military effec- study precisely what norms currently exist and than we face today — in terms of the structure of material incentives, such as coercion or financial tiveness by requiring a non-partisan, apolitical, how they constrain or shape the behavior of mil- formal political institutions, the pace of technolog- penalties — to enforce the norms that constituted and professional military and non-interfering ci- itary or civilian leaders.7 To the extent that norms ical change, and the geopolitical threats in a state- their society’s rules of the game. The norms that vilians who grant significant autonomy to military are discussed in the subfield of civil-military re- based system — there are several reasons this ap- uphold democratic values are an extremely impor- leaders.11 Importantly, these norms are prescrip- lations, scholars tend to focus primarily on what proach is of particular value. First, ancient political tant part of a healthy system of civil-military re- tive rather than descriptive. Huntington is advo- norms should exist, such as norms against military philosophers devoted a great deal of attention to lations. These norms can be collectively enforced cating what should be instead of exploring what leaders resigning in protest or expressing public the fundamental question of civil-military relations: through the apportionment of honor and shame in is. In this sense, his seminal work and many of the dissent or norms against civilian political leaders how to structure a relationship between a society’s conjunction with — or even in the absence of — responses to it in the civil-military relations liter- invoking military support for electoral purposes.8 rulers and its military that maximizes both the po- other formal institutional or material incentives. ature are highly normative, as Peter Feaver has This emphasis is understandable: As demonstrated litical control of the rulers and military effective- We make this argument in three stages. We be- argued.12 But a normative theory is quite different in the broader political science literature, studying ness. Second, the very lack of formal political and gin by looking at how present-day political scien- than a theory of norms. norms presents significant observational and meth- bureaucratic institutions caused the ancients to tists have approached norms, and we argue that Numerous political scientists have challenged understanding norms as “rules of the game” (a Huntington’s proposed norms on theoretical term we explain below) offers the most fruitful grounds, questioning whether adopting them 5 For historical trends on public confidence in the military, see “Confidence in Institutions, Gallup, accessed March 25, 2021, https://news.gal- lup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspxv. For a discussion of how these changes have incentivized leaders to politicize the military, see Jim way to conceive of their influence on civil-military would, in fact, increase military effectiveness or Golby, “America’s Politicized Military is a Recipe for Disaster,” Foreign Policy, June 18, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/18/us-military-poli- relations. In the second part of the paper, we ex- civilian control, as well as whether a military — tics-trump-election-campaign/. amine a similar approach to norms in the works of or at least its officer corps — can be apolitical or 6 For a discussion of increasing partisanship among officers, see Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military 13 Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Jason K. Dempsey, Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Mili- three foundational political philosophers: Plato, non-partisan in practice. Other scholars have tary Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). On retired officers in military campaigns and public discourse, see James Golby, Kyle Aristotle, and Polybius. We turn to these ancient focused on empirical studies of attitudes and be- Dropp, and Peter Feaver, “Military Campaigns: Veterans’ Endorsements and Presidential Elections,” Center for a New American Security, October theorists not so much to recommend or adapt the havior, often suggesting that certain norms do or 2012, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/military-campaigns-veterans-endorsements-and-presidential-elections; and American College of National Security Leaders, “Retired Generals and Admirals: We Call on Trump to Start Living Up to the Values of U.S. Armed Forces,” Newsweek, particular norms they prescribe, but for their rich do not exist because civilians or members of the Oct. 23, 2019, www.newsweek.com/generals-admirals-trump-kurds-isis-values-1467283. For a discussion of political leaders soliciting veteran analyses of what norms are and how they work. In military hold a certain attitude or because civilians support, see Barbara Rodriguez, “Pete Buttigieg, One of Few Presidential Candidates with Military Experience, Is Reaching Out to Iowa Veterans,” Des Moines Register, Nov. 12, 2019, https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2019/11/12/iowa-caucus- the third section of this paper, we illustrate these or servicemembers exhibit a particular behavior es-democrat-mayor-pete-buttigieg-military-service-veteran-outreach-navy-reserve/2519696001/; and Jasper Craven, “Democrats Are Ignoring One ancient theories of norms in political practice by or set of behaviors.14 There are no major studies Key Voting Group: Veterans,” New York Times Magazine, Oct. 10, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/magazine/veterans-democrats-midterm-elec- tions.html. And, on politicization, see Lolita C. Baldor, “Pentagon Tells White House to Stop Politicizing Military,” Military Times, June 2, 2019, www. applying them to an ancient case: the breakdown in the American civil-military relations subfield, at militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/06/02/pentagon-tells-white-house-to-stop-politicizing-military/. of civil-military norms in the Roman republic dur- least none of which we are aware, that attempt to 7 There is a broad range of civil-military scholarship that focuses on normative explanations of civil-military relations: Samuel P. Huntington, The ing the time of Marius. Finally, we conclude by develop a theory of civil-military norms that identi- Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Pro- suggesting how a theory of norms might be ap- fies why certain norms are adopted, when and why fessional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 2017); Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Civil-Military Re- plied to examples drawn from American politics. they change, and whether the existence of norms lations and Democracy (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, “Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 193–218, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X9902500202; Jerome Slater, “Apolitical Warrior or Soldier-Statesman: The Military and the Foreign Policy Process in the Post-Vietnam Era,” Armed Forces & Society 4, no. 1 (November 1977): 101–18, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X7700400107. 8 See, for example, Risa A. Brooks, “The Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical Is Good for Both the U.S. Military & the Country,” Orbis 57, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 369–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.05.001; and Don M. Snider, “Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Profes- sions,” Orbis 52, no. 2 (2008): 256–77, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2008.01.006. 11 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 2. 9 Julia R. Azari and Jennifer K. Smith, “Unwritten Rules: Informal Institutions in Established Democracies,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 1 12 Peter Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211. (March 2012): 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23327062. 13 Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; Janine Davidson, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: 10 The use of material sanctions to punish normative behavior among other organizations such as interest groups, political parties, and the Explaining the Broken Dialogue,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12006; Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme media are more common. See, for example, Jill N. Klein, Craig Smith, and Andrew John, “Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Par- Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012); and Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, ticipation,” Journal of Marketing 68, no. 3 (July 2004): 92–109, https://doi.org/10.1509%2Fjmkg.68.3.92.34770; Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); and Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan, “Candidate Selection Methods: An Analytical Framework,” Party Politics 7, no. 3 (2001): 297–322, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354068801007003003. 14 Feaver, Armed Servants; Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians; and Dempsey, Our Army.

77 78 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations matters with respect to important dependent varia- between actors within states. Military organiza- as self-enforcing, in the sense that it is not ration- when it comes to issues that are difficult to legis- bles such as civilian control or military effectiveness.15 tions typically possess significant coercive ca- al for any one individual to break a norm because late. For example, there may be general agreement However, some scholars, notably Marybeth Ulrich, pacity compared to other civilian actors inside of the negative consequences that will follow the that a rule needs to exist for a specific situation, have hinted at this deficiency in the literature, cit- the state, but these types of intrastate power dy- breach. This approach to the study of norms has but disagreement on the particulars of that rule, or ing scholars’ lack of understanding of the role that namics are not fully explored in the international some significant drawbacks for understanding so- there may be recognition of the need for a general professional military education currently plays or relations literature. Civil-military norms can po- cial interactions, however. As Julia Azari and Jen- principle that could apply across multiple situa- could play in promulgating civil-military norms, in tentially shape both internal interactions between nifer Smith note, a large crowd of individuals walk- tions, but disagreement about which situations the particular.16 military and civilian institutions as well as inter- ing down a city street on a rainy day may all use an principle should cover. Political scientists and sociologists outside of national relations with other states. umbrella, for example, not because of social pres- The rules-of-the-game approach provides some- the civil-military relations subfield have invested There is also no standard definition of a norm sure to do so, but simply because they do not want what more flexibility in accounting for the social substantially more effort in developing theories among scholars. In fact, there is even some dispute to get wet.22 Additionally, this approach assumes and political dynamics inherent in civil-military about the development, evolution, and impact of over what term scholars should use. Most sociol- that norms exist to help achieve a goal or because norms and holds more promise as a starting point civil-military norms. The work done by interna- ogists and some political scientists use the term they are socially useful. Norms are supposed to for exploring them. We adopt Gretchen Helmke tional relations and comparative politics scholars “norms” to refer to the same phenomena that other be society’s way of coping with market failures, a and Steven Levitsky’s definition of informal in- is particularly impressive. Constructivists such as political scientists — particularly in the rationalist mechanism for internalizing externalities, or a wel- stitutions (or norms) as “socially shared rules, Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, and Jennifer tradition — call “informal institutions.”20 For our fare-maximizing device.23 As a result, this approach usually unwritten, that are created, communi- Mitzen show how identities and norms influence purposes, we will use both terms interchangeably. does not explain norms that are harmful (such as cated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned the way political communities understand their bullying), norms that do not create material bene- channels.”27 This definition has several attractive interests and security.17 Martha Finnemore and Existing Views of Norms fits, and norms based on social inequalities. Finally, features. While it is broad enough to encompass Kathryn Sikkink, as well as John Gerard Ruggie, ex- this way of studying norms attributes changes or the regularized patterns of behavior described by amine how norms develop and change both with- There are three dominant views of norms in the evolutions in norms to outside shocks to the sys- the equilibria approach, it also stipulates that the in nations and across the international system.18 existing literature: 1) norms as equilibria, 2) norms tem, making it unable to account for norms that behavior must be rule-driven, based on shared Audie Klotz and Stacie Goddard, among others, as learned values, and 3) norms as “rules of the break down on their own. expectations. Moreover, it can subsume moral demonstrate that norms and ideas can translate game.” While each of these approaches can help Norms based on learned values are often referred norm explanations because it allows for the social into real political power.19 explain certain aspects of human and group behav- to by sociologists as “moral norms.”24 Moral norms creation, communication, and teaching of norms, Yet, even in this broader literature, scholars’ un- ior, we argue below that understanding norms as are often based on learned behaviors, but adher- while also incorporating the possibility of using derstanding of norms is nascent and incomplete. rules of the game offers the most productive way ence to them is based on purely intrinsic calcula- both material or non-material sanctions and in- The literature focuses on how norms develop and forward for scholars of civil-military relations. tions, such as guilt or pride, rather than on social centives as enforcement mechanisms. Finally, the evolve in an international context as well as on The view that norms are equilibria is grounded expectations. For example, a moral norm would be rules-of-the-game approach also works well with whether and how norms shape the behavior of primarily in game theoretic approaches to stud- said to exist when an individual learns she should existing normative frameworks in the civil-mili- leaders and states as they relate with other states. ying human behavior. It is particularly useful in not litter, either through familial interactions and tary relations subfield because rules, unlike equi- The object of our inquiry is substantially differ- explaining regularized patterns in repeated inter- social instruction or by watching others not litter, libria, prescribe what individuals should do and ent. We are focused on the internal dynamics actions.21 These patterns are generally understood and subsequently chooses not to litter even when “state a standard of conduct.”28 no one else is watching.25 This approach to the Relatively few studies in the modern political study of norms may miss important social interac- science or sociological literature have focused 15 There has been more work on this issue by comparativist scholars. See, for example, Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civ- tions that shape or reinforce expectations about ap- on two important questions that arise within the il-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 27, no. 4 (2001): 525–40, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0095327X0102700402; Anne Aldis and Margriet Drent, eds., “Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU,” Centre for European Security Studies, 2008, https://gsdrc. propriate behavior, however, since it focuses only rules-of-the-game approach to norms: whether org/document-library/common-norms-and-good-practices-of-civil-military-relations-in-the-eu/; and Jan Angstrom, “The Changing Norms of Civil and on the establishment of norms with no account of non-material sanctions can serve effectively as Military and Civil-Military Relations Theory,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 224–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778014. their enforcement or evolution. This approach also an enforcement mechanism, and how and why 16 Marybeth P. Ulrich, “The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations,” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011), 29 https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol41/iss1/14/. excludes the importance of the communal and con- norms adapt or break down. Although modern 17 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring tested context in which many norms are developed scholars of civil-military relations have paid scant 26 1992): 391–425, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858; Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World and enforced. As Azari and Smith have argued, attention to these topics, another group has: an- Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security norms may be particularly prevalent and important cient political philosophers. Dilemma,” European Journal of International Relations 12 no. 3 (2006): 341–70, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1354066106067346. 18 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887–917, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361; and John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the 22 Azari and Smith, “Unwritten Rules,” 40. Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn1998): 855–85, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601360. 23 Kenneth Arrow, “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities,” in Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, ed. M. Intriliga- 19 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995); Stacie E. Goddard, tor (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971); James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Robert “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the Balance of Power,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008/2009): 110–42, https:// Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). www.jstor.org/stable/40207143; or, for a broader review of the literature on norms in international relations and comparative politics, see Vendulka 24 Elster, “Norms,” 196. Kubálková, “What Constructivism?” in Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (New York: Routledge, 2019). 25 Elster, “Norms,” 196. 20 Jon Elster, “Norms,” in The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology, ed. Peter Hedstrom and Peter Bearman (Oxford: Oxford University 26 Azari and Smith, “Unwritten Rules,” 41. Press, 2009); and Jon Elster, “Political Norms,” The Jerusalem Philosophy Quarterly, no. 63 (January 2014): 47–59, https://www.jstor.org/sta- 27 Gretchen Helmke, and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 4 ble/23685971. Additionally, the term “informal institution” is often used in the game theoretic literature focused on norms as equilibria, but recent (December 2004): 725–40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3688540. scholarship has expanded the use of this term to include regularized patterns that are not necessarily equilibria. See, for example, Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Azari and 28 Daniel Brinks, “The Rule of (Non)Law: Prosecuting Police Killings in Brazil and Argentina,” in Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons Smith, “Unwritten Rules”; and David W. Rohde, “Studying Congressional Norms: Concepts and Evidence,” Congress & the Presidency 15, no. 2 (1988): from Latin America, ed. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 139–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/07343468809507942. 29 Elster, “Norms” and “Political Norms,” does develop a theory of social norms in which contempt constitutes a form of punishment, but con- 21 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 2006). tempt works primarily as the impetus to a material sanction or through ostracism and rejection from the social group.

79 80 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations

As noted above, the political science literature when it was first articulated by Plato than it has by virtue of their very nature. A guardian must be the guardian, one need only nurture the guardian’s provides a compelling, but potentially incomplete, ever been stated subsequently. And the series of keen, quick, and strong. Above all, he or she must be soul along the lines that nature provides and so or- explanation of how norms might operate in a civ- responses it provoked among Plato’s immediate in- spirited, assertive, and aggressive in defense of his der it that it responds to its master’s commands. il-military context because it largely omits dis- tellectual heirs — the first of many footnotes — are or her own city.33 When Plato’s Socrates wonders A puppy’s trainer might employ physical pleas- cussion of the hierarchical and coercive nature of likewise of enduring relevance. whether a power strong enough to protect his ideal ures and pains to this end, but in the training of military institutions within the state. The existing Seen from the vantage point of contemporary city (kallipolis) from its enemies might also endan- kallipolis’s guardians Socrates appeals instead to literature also ignores some of the social and cul- civil-military relations, Plato and his heirs make ger the city, he worries not only about civic institu- education — which might described as the social tural factors that might make military organiza- two important claims: First, control of the military tions, but also about the trustworthiness of human creation, communication, and teaching of norms tions different than other domestic institutions. It is a profound problem because those bearing arms in modern political science terminology — is within these gaps in the literature that ancient naturally seek to rule. Second, this problem can broadly construed to include the way we insights might have contemporary relevance. The best be solved by using non-material incentives ought to speak about the gods, heroes, even apportionment of honor and shame are uniquely — praise and shame, primarily — rather than co- animals.34 Educating guardians is no small important to military institutions, in part because ercion or financial incentives to educate for virtue task. Socrates understands it to require these institutions celebrate tradition and cere- and establish unwritten rules of the game to govern something like a cultural revolution, mony. Few other modern institutions so self-con- behavior. Although these philosophers also recom- because the better part of Homer’s sciously refer back to ancient virtues or make them mended norms that should govern the military — poetry would need to be revised (and so central to their own organizational identities, some of them quite utopian, others more practical eventually removed from the city) to education systems, and incentive structures. — understanding them is not our goal here. As in ensure the guardians will grow up Plato and his immediate successors provide im- our discussion of present-day political scientists, thinking the gods are benevo- portant insights on these points and make for an we are interested not in normative theories, but lent, the just are happy, and the unlikely intermediary between contemporary polit- in theories of norms. In that sense, these ancient heroes are stoic and courageous. ical science scholarship and civil-military tradition. thinkers offer a robust and compelling view of civ- The guardians are provided with Writing prior to the development of the modern il-military relations centered on norms as rules of the “greatest safeguard” against state, with its financial and legal tools for restrain- the game rather than punishment. their turning into tyrants, Socrates says, “if they ing the military, many ancient philosophers empha- have been really finely educated.”35 But if a fine sized the norms that govern civil-military relations Plato nature. It is this readiness to explore the psycho- education is as demanding as Socrates suggests, and how and why they might change over time. logical foundations of the civil-military divide that one might rightly wonder whether any real-world Plato’s Republic attempts to answer the central most distinguishes Plato’s approach from that of regime can really guard itself against its guardians. question of civil-military relations: Who shall guard his modern heirs. Plato’s Socrates places at the One might wonder all the more when one consid- Civil-Military Relations in Ancient the guardians themselves? But just as significant as center of his reflections on civil-military relations ers that Socrates himself does not entrust education Political Thought Plato’s peculiar and powerful answer to this ques- not an economic or technological problem, but a alone with the watch. In addition to their education, tion is the fact that his Socrates can put it in the philosophical question: Is it possible for spirited guardians are subjected to severe restrictions on The long tradition of reflecting on civil-military first place — i.e., that he conceives of guardians individuals to acquire expertise in coercive force owning private property and are given a range of relations, much like the European philosophical as distinct from the normal run of men. This func- without aspiring to tyranny? positive incentives for virtuous action. It is neces- tradition, can be thought of as a series of footnotes tional specialization is a philosophical innovation. Socrates ultimately answers in the affirmative sary to prohibit private land, houses, and families to Plato.30 Admittedly, contemporary philosophers Socrates’ guardian, like Huntington’s officer, is an but the conditions for his assent are perplexing. among the guardians lest their loyalty to one part are more conscious of their debts than scholars of expert in violence who must cultivate his exper- The argument begins innocuously enough. While of the city overcome their loyalty to the city as a civil-military relations — and for good reason. It is tise. “Will a man, if he picks up a shield or any oth- it might seem paradoxical that the same warrior whole.36 The best soldier on each campaign, how- not obvious that works written with hoplites and er weapon or tool of war,” Socrates asks, “on that could be harsh toward foreign enemies and gentle ever, is singled out from among his comrades to re- popularly elected strategoi in view could have any- very day be an adequate combatant in a battle of toward fellow citizens, nature provides a paradigm ceive a crown, kiss whomever he pleases, and then thing to teach scholars and statesmen confronted heavy-armed soldiers?”32 Immediate mastery is at- of the paradox’s solution in the “noble puppy,” be worshiped whenever kallipolis “honors the good with military-industrial complexes and profession- tainable in few human endeavors, and it certainly barking and snapping at strangers but never the with hymns.”37 These forms of additional social in- al officers.31 Nevertheless, the political philosoph- is not possible in war. Socrates sets the soldiers of hand that feeds him. Since the city itself supports struction — one blending the dog into the pack, the ical problem at the core of civil-military relations his utopian “best regime” apart from the rest of was stated with perhaps greater clarity and probity the city not only because of their training, but also 33 Plato, Republic, 375a-b. For a recent application of Plato’s notion of “spiritedness” to contemporary politics, see Francis Fukuyama, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); Fukuyama develops here his lucid discussion of spiritedness in The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), esp. 162–91. For helpful analyses of this concept from scholars 30 For this famous saying, see Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Free Press, 1979 [1927–1928]), 39. of Plato, see especially Linda R. Rabieh, Plato and the Virtue of Courage (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 95–111; and Angela Hobbs, Plato and the Hero: Courage, Manliness, and the Impersonal Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1–75. 31 See, for instance, Huntington, Soldier and the State, 20: “The activities of the Praetorian Guard offer few useful lessons for civilian control: the problem in the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician. The cleavage between the military and civilian spheres 34 Plato, Republic, 396b. Socrates forbids the guardians from imitating “horses neighing, bulls lowing … and everything of the sort.” Compare and the resulting tension between the two are phenomena of distinctly recent origin.” Nevertheless, Huntington’s historicism does not prevent him Marybeth Ulrich’s discussion of professional military education in “The General Stanley McChrystal Affair,” 96–98. from drawing on ancient philosophy. “In their criticism of American commercial democracy,” he writes later in the work, American military officers of the 35 Plato, Republic, 416b. late 19th century “were treading on classical ground, unconsciously echoing Plato’s indictment of Athenian commercial democracy twenty-five hundred years previously.” See page 268. This passage, to say nothing of his peroration on Sparta and Babylon (see pages 465–66) and his subsequent adapta- 36 Plato, Republic, 462b-c. The city is best governed, Socrates continues, which is “most like a single being.” Kallipolis is thus a “community of tion of the Praetorian model, suggests that even Huntington acknowledges some permanence in the problem at the heart of civil-military relations. For pleasure and pain” in which “to the greatest extent possible all the citizens alike rejoice and are pained at the same developments.” his adaptation of the Praetorian model see Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968). 37 Plato, Republic, 469b. Note that Socrates extends this honor to “any one of those who have been judged exceptionally good in life when 32 Plato, Republic, 374c-d. Unless otherwise noted we quote from The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991). We dying of old age or in some other way.” In introducing these reforms Socrates invokes Homer’s authority — suggesting that he appeals to Homer’s cite the Stephanus pages (e.g., 374c) as they appear in this edition. Leon Harold Craig notes the resemblance of Plato’s guardians to a “professional notion of the hero, and therefore to glory rather than virtue or philosophy as a motive for human action. Socrates thus violates the strict terms of standing army” in The War Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 7–8, 156. the question Glaucon and Adeimantus had initially put to him.

81 82 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations other calling him by name for a reward — might Ultimately, for Plato, it is up to the rulers to es- Aristotle marshals an army of historical data to different persons; but insofar as it is impos- seem to work at cross-purposes, but they are more tablish — and enforce — the civil-military rules prove the point that changes in a regime’s military sible that those who are capable of using similar than they first appear. Socrates understands of the game. lead to changes in the regime’s politcs. When great compulsion and preventing [it from being virtue to be most effectively incentivized not with generals led their cities in war, the Greeks lived used against them] will always put up with money but with honor (i.e., receiving praise).38 Hon- Aristotle under heroic kings. When many men of sufficient being ruled, to this extent they should be or depends always on the audience that praises. means to keep horses arose in the cities, cavalry the same persons. For those who have au- Genuine public esteem cannot be compelled and it Aristotle’s approach to civil-military relations has became the chief military branch and the Greek thority over arms also have authority over must constantly be renewed. One therefore does not a paradoxical connection to Plato’s. With one hand regimes became oligarchies.45 Once the “hoplite whether the regime will last or not.50 own praise in the same way that one owns materi- Aristotle seems to strike at the heart of his onetime revolution” had demonstrated the military efficacy al property, since praise always belongs to the per- master’s teachings on this subject, while appropri- of heavily armed men locked in tight ranks, Greek It is against the nature of “those who have author- son doing the praising, even after praise is “given.” ating, albeit subtly and in a more moderate form, regimes shifted from oligarchies toward what Ar- ity over arms” to relinquish rule entirely. However, Because Socrates develops his theory of norms in much of its original force. istotle calls politeiai — broad-based rule by a mul- it is not against their nature to accept rule by their the context of a utopian best regime, it is tempting First, the attack: Aristotle claims that Plato’s titude of virtuous citizens.46 Then came a demo- elders because they are confident that they, too, to see the theory itself as utopian. But it is actually Socrates got the psychology of the guardian wrong. cratic revolution, following close on the heels of a will rule as elders.51 Aristotle therefore recommends broadly applicable. Socrates suggests that the rules Socrates found the soul’s capacity for selfless sac- military revolution. Aristotle writes that “The sea- politeia, in which citizens own heavy arms and all that reflect what a group honors are necessarily “so- rifice to be rooted in spiritedness. Aristotle argues, faring mass, through being the cause of the victory others are forbidden both to possess arms and to cially shared” (in the words of Helmke and Levit- to the contrary, that spiritedness generates sacri- at Salamis and, as a result of this, of the leader- participate in ruling. Enslaved farmers and artisans sky) and they can be enforced without being written fice only for what one considers to be one’s own, ship [the Athenians exercised] on account of their afford each citizen the leisure to specialize in mil- down or officially endorsed.39 In the best regime, the not what is commonly owned. It is for this reason power at sea, made the democracy stronger.”47 itary affairs. Under this regime, civil and military guardian never belongs to himself or herself, even that “what belongs in common to the most people The many learned to rule while rowing in unison spheres are indistinct, save for the fact that those in the moment of receiving personal praise. The is accorded the least care.”41 A certain amount of as something akin to socially shared identities and who are actively serving are ruled by veterans. guardian is both trained and incentivized to belong self-interest is essential to spiritedness — it is not norms developed. Everywhere and at every time, Aristotle’s best regime — with its enslaved work- always to the city.40 Although other regimes may use something that can be eliminated through education Aristotle suggests, rule and arms coincide.48 ers, its expert warriors, and its sovereign elders — different norms to govern their guardians, Socrates or with incentives.42 The city must, in some sense, Thus, when Aristotle outlines his best regime, bears a striking resemblance to Sparta. And indeed, suggests that norms of some kind will always figure belong to the guardians for them to relish serving he does not separate civil and military authority Aristotle praises many elements of the Spartan re- prominently in the relationship between rulers and it. But a city belongs most of all to its rulers, and as Plato’s Socrates did. Instead, military power and gime.52 Yet his criticisms of Sparta are trenchant. To their military. it is central to Socrates’ conception of the best re- political rule “should be in a manner assigned to secure the happiness of their city, Aristotle argues Socrates does not ultimately entrust his best re- gime that ruling requires a nature and education the same persons, and in a manner to different per- that Spartans look only to war, while, to secure their gime to the guardians, however, but to philosophers. distinct from what is required for guarding the city sons.”49 Artistotle argues that granting the military own individual happiness, they look to a particularly Virtue that is nurtured by public admiration — the militarily. Aristotle therefore attacks the very notion the promise of future power can keep its natural savage species of courage.53 The problem with this opinion of one’s worth based on honor bestowed of the philosopher-king. Assigning permanent rule thirst for immediate rule in check: conception of city and man became evident not on by an audience — is less secure than virtue that is to one class of men “can become a cause of faction- the plains of Leuctra, when Thebes crushed Sparta’s founded on knowledge. The philosopher who has, al conflict even in the case of those possessing no Insofar as each of these tasks belongs to power once and for all, but in the sullen households or at least is in pursuit of, such knowledge is thus particular claim to merit,” Aristotle writes, “not to a different prime of life, the one requiring and grieved wives that met the shattered soldiers the proper ruler of kallipolis. As in the soul, where speak of spirited and warlike men,” for “spirit is a prudence, the other power, it should be to when they returned home. The true catastrophe of the rational is separate from and superior to the thing expert at ruling and indomitable.”43 The spir- hot-tempered or spirited, so in the city the “civilian” ited guardian may resemble a noble puppy when in its highest form (the philosopher-king) should young, but he aspires someday to lead his own pack. 45 On oligarchies and cavalry, see Aristotle, Politics, 4.3 (1289b36), 4.13. Compare Politics 5.6, where the oligarchs’ reliance on mercenaries causes trouble, and 6.7, where Aristotle suggests that oligarchs can master small arms to counter democrats. On heroic kingship, see 3.14.11-14 be separate from and superior to the military. An Socrates’ attempt to divide military power from civil (1285b3-23) and 5.10 (1310b40-1311a5). Note that Aristotle’s discussion of the heroic kingship ends with the kings gradually relinquishing their civil essential part of the philosopher’s rule consists of power is therefore impracticable.44 The same dispo- and military powers to the many, such that “in most cities the kings were left only with the sacrifices.” But, Aristotle continues, “where there was a kingship worth speaking of, they only held the leadership in military matters beyond the borders.” This is how Aristotle describes the Spartan overseeing the guardians’ training, both through sition that leads a man to want to defend a city also kingship: “it does not have authority over all matters, but when [the king goes outside their territory he has leadership in matters related to war.” education and exposure to honor and shame. leads him, of necessity, to want to rule it. See 3.14.3 (1285a3-6). The Spartan monarchy is thus presented as vestige of the heroic age. 46 See Aristotle, Politics, 1265b29, 3.7 (1279a35-b4), 4.13. 38 Note that Socrates also offers exemplary guardians food and sex, but these rewards fit with our analysis of honor, for both are enjoyed on 47 On the link between the navy and democratization, see Aristotle, Politics, 2.12.5 (1274a12-21), 5.4.8 (1304a22-25). Aristotle later suggests the spot rather than possessed. Socrates claims that kallipolis should give good men and women “what is conducive to their training at the same that it is possible for his best regime to maintain a navy without democratizing — if one fills the rowers’ ranks with mercenaries or slaves. See time as honoring them.” See 468d. Politics, 7.6). See also Barry S. Strauss, “The Athenian Trireme, School of Democracy,” in Dêmokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern, ed. Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 39 Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics.” 48 Note that geography also figures prominently in Aristotle’s theory of civil-military correspondence. See Politics, 6.7. 40 In the end, the guardian becomes the city’s education: The guardian’s ultimate consummation is to enter into the hymns sung at the city’s sacrifices, and thus to shape the souls of his or her successors. 49 Aristotle, Politics, 2.5.25 (1264b6-9), 7.7.6 (1328a6-7). 41 Aristotle, Politics, 2.3.4 (1261b32-34). We refer to book, chapter, section, and Bekker numbers of Aristotle’s text as they appear in Carnes 50 Aristotle, Politics, 7.9.5 (1329a6-12). Lord’s translations of Aristotle’s Politics (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013 [1984]). 51 Aristotle, Politics, 7.14.5 (1332b36-40). “No one chafes at being ruled on the basis of age or considers himself superior, particularly when he 42 Even if one could eliminate possessiveness entirely, one would be wrong to make the attempt, because “it is a very pleasant thing to help is going to recover his contribution when he attains the age to come.” See also 7.9.6 (1329a13-16): “What remains is for this regime to assign both or do favors for friends, guests, or club mates, and this requires that possessions be private.” In short, much of the pleasure of virtue would be things to the same persons, though not at the same time, but as it is natural for power to be found among younger persons and prudence among omitted along with the elimination of the concepts “one’s own” and “common.” See Aristotle, Politics, 2.5.9 (1263b4-6). older persons, it is advantageous and just to distribute them to both, for this division involves what accords with merit.” 43 Aristotle, Politics, 2.5.25 (1264b6-9), 7.7.6 (1328a6-7). Later Aristotle raises the same point: “it is impossible that those who are capable of 52 See for instance Aristotle, Politics, 2.1, 2.6, 4.7, 8.1.4 (1337a30-2). using compulsion and preventing [its being used against them] will always put up with being ruled.” See 7.9.5 (1329a9-11). 53 When Sparta was the only city to train its soldiers, its many successes on the battlefield seemed to prove the excellence of its laws, Aristo- 44 This line of argument in some ways resembles Janowitz’s critique of Huntington’s theory of objective control. See Janowitz, The Professional tle says. But these victories were no more than the triumph of experts routing amateurs, not the defeat of the less virtuous by the more virtuous. Soldier. Janowitz emphasizes the impracticability of civil-military distinctions. When other cities began to train their troops, Sparta lost its supremacy.

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Sparta’s “fall” was that the soldiers considered it severe than Socrates. Whereas Socrates had permit- catastrophic. For what, Aristotle asks, had the Spar- ted both the Phrygian and Dorian modes — a type of tans really lost? It is “ridiculous,” he writes, “that musical style corresponding to a particular scale — they should have lost [the chance for] living nobly in kallipolis, Aristotle prohibits the Phrygian, since, even while abiding by [their legislator’s] laws, and in like the flute, the Phrygian mode is “frenzied and the absence of any impediment to putting the laws passionate.” The Dorian mode, on the other hand, into practice.”54 Had the Spartans known how to live induces a “middling and settled state” and is thus well in leisure and peace, they would have been in- “the most steadfast and has most of all a courageous finitely stronger than they proved themselves to be. character.”58 For Aristotle, the warrior must be capa- Had they known some pleasure other than victory, ble of loving leisured peace as well as war, but the they may well have stood a better chance at Leuctra, sort of leisure a warrior can love is not meant to con- but they certainly would have stood a better chance sist of philosophical flights or divinely inspired fren- of living well in its wake.55 zy. Rather, it is the sedate and moderate pleasure Aristotle’s solution to the civil-military dilemma of the Dorians — the sort of pleasure the Spartans is to teach warriors that there is more to life than themselves might have enjoyed, had they remained war. He does not follow Socrates in severing the true to the best of themselves rather than continual- link between civilian and military spheres, nor does ly marching to the music of the flute.59 he follow Lycurgus in casting the civil in a military Aristotle’s solution to the civil-military problem mold. Instead, he educates warriors with a view was less radical than Plato’s, even though it shared to instilling virtues that, while not self-evidently Plato’s orientation toward what we would call military in nature, are not so elevated as to soften norms. Aristotle recognized the difficulty of subject- their soldierly spirit. The discussion of education ing spirited soldiers to the rule of civilians like Pla- with which Aristotle’s Politics concludes does not, to’s philosopher-kings. Rule by moderate veterans, therefore, touch on metaphysical questions of the educated to enjoy culture at least (if not to philoso- sort Socrates entertained in the Republic (nor even phize), offered a more practicable alternative. Nev- the theological perplexities with which the Athenian ertheless, the success of Aristotle’s regime, like Pla- Stranger wrestled in The Laws). Instead, Aristotle to’s, rested on education and the proper assignment focuses on the use of instrumental music in the ed- of praise and blame, on the development of social ucation of his warriors, and he praises this music expectations and social pressure. Neither formal in- civil-military relations — quite the contrary, in who shall guard the guardians? — that enabled its for its very lack of utility. Music is “liberal and no- stitutions nor a code of law backed by coercive pun- fact.60 But when, in the second and first centuries awe-inspiring conquest. That answer, as we shall ble.”56 It is not made for achieving success on the ishment offers the best way to keep “spirited and BCE, Plato’s heirs confronted the rise of Rome, it see, involved not only the apportionment of mil- battlefield, but for finding rest and relaxation once warlike men” from dominating the city, but norms. was the Romans’ vast empire that piqued their in- itary honor to influence a citizen’s standing, but the battle is done. The aim of education — even, or terest. “Who is so worthless or indolent,” Polybius even more so the power of a new institution — the perhaps especially, a warrior’s education — is the wondered, “as not to wish to know how and with Roman Senate — to regulate the republic’s “econ- proper use of leisure.57 Polybius what sort of regime the Romans in less than fif- omy of esteem.”63 Nevertheless, when Aristotle considers what sort ty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly The Roman regime does not fall within the con- of music the citizens of the best regime should lis- Neither Plato nor Aristotle considered imperial the whole of the inhabited world to their sole gov- ventional taxonomy of regimes developed in Greek ten to and learn from, he proves a censor even more conquest evidence of a regime’s success in regulating ernment — a thing unique in history?”61 Even in political philosophy. The most common theory, ac- framing the question, Polybius suggests his answer: cording to which there are three regime-types (king-

54 Aristotle, Politics, 7.14.18 (1333b23-5). “The chief cause of success or failure in all affairs ship, aristocracy, and democracy), cannot account 62 55 Aristotle, Politics, 2.9.34 (1271b1-7). See also 7.14.22 (1334a6-10): “Most cities of this sort preserve themselves when at war, but once having is the structure of the regime.” Rome enjoyed the for Rome, nor can extrapolations of this theory that acquired [imperial] rule they come to ruin; they lose their edge, like iron, when they remain at peace. The reason is that the legislator has not edu- “best of all regimes,” Polybius thought, and this, double the number of regimes by allowing for good cated them to be capable of being at leisure.” Leuctra reveals that Sparta is essentially a revisionary rather than a status quo power, for they “came rather than military might alone, explained its me- and bad versions of each. The Roman regime is to ruin when ruling [an empire] though not knowing how to be at leisure, and because there is no training among them that has more authority than the training for war.” teoric rise. The Roman regime struck a balance rather a synthesis of all the regimes known to Greek 56 Aristotle, Politics, 8.3.10 (1338a30-4). between civil and military responsibilities unlike political thought — a “mixed regime.” The mixed re- 57 Aristotle, Politics, 8.3.8 (1338a21-4). anything anticipated by Plato or Aristotle. Indeed, gime unites “all the good and distinctive features of 58 Aristotle, Politics, 8.5.22 (1340b1-5), 8.7.8-12 (1342a28-1342b17). Note that the question of what other modes might be included is left for Polybius suggests that it was ultimately Rome’s the best governments” and thus mitigates the ten- “those participating in the pursuit of philosophy and in the education connected with music” to determine — there is a task connected to the best novel answer to Plato’s foundational question — dency of unmixed regimes to degenerate into their regime left for the philosophers. Compare the task implicitly left for the philosopher-kings of the best regime (figuring out the marriage number — a mathematical challenge connected to the irrationality of nature) and the tasks left for the nocturnal council of Magnesia in Plato’s Laws (a version of the one-many problem connected to virtue (how is virtue one and four?)). Also compare to these passages the defense of poetry left to the poets at the conclusion of the Republic and the many details of legislation left throughout Plato’s Republic and Laws, and Aristotle’s Politics for the 60 See Plato’s discussion of kallipolis at war in Republic Book 5, and Aristotle, Politics, 7.1-3. Oracle at Delphi to determine. 61 Polybius, Histories, 1.1.5. Polybius repeats this fundamental, motivating question of his Histories at the beginning of Book 6, signaling its im- 59 On the Spartan love of the flute, see Aristotle, Politics, 1341a17-b7. On the Spartans’ military use of the flute, consider Plutarch, Lycurgus, portance in the whole (6.2.3). We refer throughout to book, chapter, and section number as they appear in F. W. Walbank’s edition of the Histories in Lives I, trans. B. Perrin, Loeb Classical Library 46 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 270–77 (chaps. 21–22): “[the king] himself led in the Loeb Classical Library, 6 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000 [1922-27]). off in a marching paean, and it was a sight equally grand and terrifying when they marched in step with the rhythm of the flute, without any gap 62 Polybius, Histories, 6.2.9-10. in their line of battle, and with no confusion in their souls, but calmly and cheerfully moving with the strains of their hymn into the deadly fight. Neither fear nor excessive fury is likely to possess men so disposed, but rather a firm purpose full of hope and courage, believing as they do that 63 We borrow the term “economy of esteem” from Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit’s The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Heaven is their ally.” Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

85 86 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations worst forms.64 Balanced and stable, Rome’s mixed their status elevated both in camp and at home: of the illustrious dead.75 The death masks of the “fury” that arises when they fight for “fatherland regime appeared to be a novelty sufficiently pro- deceased are displayed conspicuously, and during and children” and for a state in which they share found to account for its unprecedented success. The recipients of such gifts, quite apart from public sacrifices and funerals they enable a ritual the responsibility to rule.81 And whereas the multi- Polybius’ account of the Roman regime includes becoming famous in the army and famous reincarnation.76 The Romans put the masks “on tude has a say in the Carthaginians’ foreign policy a sizeable digression on the organization of the too for the time at their homes, are especial- men who seem to them closest in resemblance to deliberations, in Rome only the most eminent men Roman military, including a peculiarly detailed ac- ly distinguished in religious processions af- the original in stature and carriage,” and these men share in the formulation of strategy.82 Rome’s su- count of the Roman military camp, introduced in ter their return, as no one is allowed to wear then march with all of their ancestor’s magisterial periority to Sparta is of a different sort. Polybius terms that point back to his work’s guiding ques- decorations except those on whom these regalia. For young men “in love with glory and the suggests that the same austere laws that stimulat- tion regarding Rome’s regime. “Who is so averse honors for bravery have been conferred by good it is not easy to behold a more noble sight,” ed Sparta’s spiritedness and secured its domestic to all noble and excellent performances,” he asks, the consul; and in their houses they hand up writes Polybius. A lifetime of such scenes leaves concord ultimately undermined the city-state’s “as not to be inclined to take a little extra trou- the spoils they won in the most conspicuous them “inspired to endure every suffering for the ambitions abroad, for such “enterprises demand ble to understand matters like this?”65 Polybius places, looking upon them as tokens and ev- public welfare in the hope of winning the glory that a currency in universal circulation and supplies frequently compares the camp to a polis of perfect idences of their valor.72 attends on brave men.”77 However, if this did not drawn from abroad.”83 Sparta’s abolition of mon- mathematical precision.66 From the moment an en- incentivize good behavior, there were always dis- ey was the paradoxical source of both Sparta’s sign is planted to mark the consul’s tent, an area The military camp is thus an integral part of incentives. Instead of the soldier’s fear of a grisly strength and its impotence, leaving the city eager of exactly four plethra unfolds and streets exactly Rome’s domestic regime. It plays a central role in fustuarium in camp, the citizen feared divine pun- to dominate but unable “to aspire to any position 50 feet wide emerge.67 The legion’s camp retains its creating and spreading shared norms surrounding ishment. “The Romans’ religious convictions,” Po- of influence in Greece, much less to supremacy.”84 dimensions no matter the terrain — unlike Greek laudatory and damnable behavior, and it estab- lybius writes, “make them most distinctly superior Rome surpassed Carthage owing to superior cour- armies, the Romans trust in their own plans and lishes clear expectations of the kind of praise and to others,” because what is a matter of reproach age and prudence. She surpassed Sparta owing to labor rather than “the defenses which nature it- dishonor that should be given in response to that for others is for them a source of the state’s cohe- superior financial savvy. self provides” — and no matter how many addi- behavior. If the camp is like a microcosm of the Ro- sion — “superstition.”78 Polybius’ Romans are loyal In both cases, Rome’s superiority derives from tional legions join it on a campaign.68 It is versatile, man world, the camp’s regime epitomizes Rome’s to their oaths in part because “invisible terrors” its senate. When Polybius first presents the Ro- scaleable, and modular — and it is not exclusively rule. While the camp is, in theory, a monarchy (un- supplement honor.79 man mixed regime, the Senate’s authority appears Roman.69 Soldiers from allied cities double each le- der the rule of the consul), it is in practice an ar- Polybius suggests that these elements of Ro- confined to the city of Rome. After all, the con- gion’s numbers, and no matter their land of origin istocracy (under the rule of the tribunes). But it man life — the rituals at camp and at home that suls have “virtually unlimited” power over prepa- they take their place alongside the Romans, all of is by no measure a democracy.73 For Polybius, the inspire individual courage and fear — do more to rations for war and over the army once it is de- them in the well-ordered rows under the military success of Rome’s mixed regime depends on each explain Rome’s success than the mere ordering of ployed.85 And even in Rome, the Senate’s authority tribunes’ watch.70 Roman spending between 10 and 20 years in the its governing institutions. Rome shares its mixed seems limited by the people’s “right to confer The Romans and their allies alike are subject to unmixed regime of the military camp.74 regime with other city-states, after all, including honors and inflict punishment, the only bonds punishments such as the fustuarium, where a sol- Polybius’ discussion of the Roman camp in his Sparta and its great rival, Carthage.80 But while by which the kingdoms and states and in a word dier would be publicly beaten and stigmatized for History serves the same function as Socrates’ the Carthaginians employ expert mercenaries, the human society in general are held together.”86 breaches of security and comparable transgres- education of the guardians and Aristotle’s musi- Roman citizens fight themselves. These citizen-sol- The Senate’s power derives, in large part, from sions. They also qualify for honorary prizes granted cal training of soldier-statesmen in the founding diers make up for their lack of expertise with the its control of the public treasury.87 As Polybius’ for varied acts of valor. Both the punishments and works of political philosophy. For Polybius, edu- rewards reach beyond the camp into civilian life. cation proceeds through incentives rather than 75 Polybius, Histories, 6.39. Those who survive the fustuarium are not allowed speech or song, however. The allure of honor is 76 The illustrious man is an epiphanos anêr. The place of his death mask at home is the epiphanestatos topos. to return home, Polybius says, for “none of the fam- paramount. Just like the military camp gathers 77 Polybius, Histories, 6.53.10, 6.54.3. 71 ily would dare to receive such a man in the house.” regularly to bestow public recognition and hon- 78 Polybius, Histories, 6.56.6-7. Those who receive military honors similarly find orary prizes, so Romans gather to hear eulogies 79 On oaths, see Polybius, Histories, 6.56.13-15 and consider the oath administered as soldiers enter the army (6. 21.1-3) and when they enter camp (6.33.1-2). For “invisible terrors” (adêloi phoboi), see 6.56.11. 80 See Polybius, Histories, 6.51.1-2 on the Carthaginian regime: “The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive points. For there were kings, and the house of Elders was an aristocratic force, and the people were supreme in 64 Polybius, Histories, 6.10.6 matters proper to them, the entire frame of the state much resembling that of Rome and Sparta.” 65 Polybius, Histories, 6.26.11-12. Polybius goes on to describe the organization of the Roman military camps as “one of those things really worth 81 Polybius suggests that the Romans’ superior courage figures even in naval war, where one might expect expertise to figure most prominently: studying and worth knowing.” “though the Romans are, as I said, much less skilled in naval matters, they are on the whole successful at sea owing to the gallantry of their men; for 66 See, for instance, Polybius, Histories, 6.31.10, 6.41.10. although skill in seamanship is of no small importance in naval battles, it is chiefly the courage of the marines that turns the scale in favor of victory.” See Histories, 6.52.8-9. Polybius describes the Romans’ initial efforts to provide and maintain a navy with great drama in the early books of his History. 67 Polybius, Histories, 6.27.2. 82 Polybius, Histories, 6.51.6-8. 68 Polybius, Histories, 6.42.2. 83 Polybius, Histories, 6.49.8-10. 69 Polybius, Histories, 6.42.1-5. On adjustments to the Roman camp depending on the number of legions camping together, see Polybius, Histo- ries, 6.32.6-8. 84 Polybius, Histories, 6.49.9-10. On Spartan austerity, also consider Polybius contrasting the Spartan regime with the Cretan regime: “The pe- culiar features of the Spartan state are said to be first the land laws by which no citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal 70 Polybius, Histories, 6.26.5-10, 32.3-5. share of the public land; secondly their view of money-making; for, money being esteemed of no value at all among them, the jealous contention 71 Polybius, Histories, 6.37.4. due to the possession of more or less is utterly done away with; and thirdly the fact that of the magistrates by whom or by whose co-operation the whole administration is conducted, the kings hold a hereditary office and the members of the Gerousia are elected for life. In all these respects the 72 Polybius, Histories, 6.39.9-10. Cretan practice is exactly the opposite.” See 6.45.3-46.1. See also 6.46.7-8). 73 All authority flows from the consul, a distant and shadowy figure in the life of the camp. His lieutenants, the six military tribunes assigned to 85 Polybius, Histories, 6.12.5. Polybius notes that the consuls “are authorized to spend any sum they decide upon from the public funds, being each legion, are the visible rulers. accompanied by a quaestor who faithfully executes their instructions.” See 6.12.8. 74 Polybius, Histories, 346-7 (Book 6, chap. 19.1-4). Lawrence Keppie argues that Polybius’ figures represent the maximum a citizen might serve 86 Polybius, Histories, 6.14.4. rather than the norm. These periods of service are particularly significant in light of premodern life-expectancy. Lawrence Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 33–34. 87 Note that Polybius does not discuss the Senate’s auctoritas.

87 88 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations analysis of the Roman regime progresses, this tains its careful administration of the Roman es- power proves increasingly important. Consuls teem economy, Rome will continue to thrive. Ma- cannot carry on their enterprises without sup- terial factors do play a role in the Senate’s control plies sent by the Senate, and their one-year terms of Rome’s military, but not a strictly instrumental prevent them from seeing extensive campaigns to one. For Polybius, as for Plato and Aristotle before completion unless the Senate appoints them as him, the challenge of civil-military relations is to proconsul or proprietor.88 Furthermore, the Sen- check the natural tendency for arms and rule to ate adheres to tradition — what we would call a coincide. Prior to the rise of modern economies, norm — limiting the number of consecutive terms there were a number of tools one might turn to to which military leaders are appointed. Similarly, the task: One could separate the two by educat- the people have difficulty conferring honor with- ing guardians for virtue and supplementing that out formal occasions for them to do so. Thus, the education with honorific incentives, as Plato’s Senate’s control of funds for triumphs — public Socrates did. Alternatively, one could accept that celebrations to honor a military commander who guardians would inevitably rule and use consti- had led Roman soldiers to victory — gives it con- tutional mechanisms to ensure that older, more siderable control over the city’s “economy of es- prudent guardians restrained their younger, more teem.”89 The Senate’s control of public funding for impetuous heirs, as Aristotle did. Or one could making internal improvements throughout Italy is follow the Polybian path, which at times veered also a mode of rule, both over the Roman people quite close to the world of modern civil-military and over those living on the Italian peninsula as a relations. After all, Polybius linked the power of whole.90 The Senate, then, is the source of Roman the Senate to its oversight of the Roman treas- money and honor. It controls Rome’s army and ury. But even in this moment of close encounter, the army’s consular leaders by obscure financial where Polybius’ voice seems to speak from his means that shape not only material incentives but world into ours, the basic orientation of the an- also set the rules of the civil-military game. It de- cients — toward the use of non-material methods ploys incentives familiar to Spartans and Carthag- to shape civil-military — remains. For it is by pull- inians, but in ways that no mixed regime had de- ing the financial strings of honor (allowing for tri- ployed them before. umphs, for instance) rather than by threatening In the final analysis, however, Polybius did not to defund legions, that the Senate had its most believe his mixed regime could remain mixed. profound influence. Sparta’s mixed regime declined into oligarchy These ancient modes of approaching the prob- with the introduction of foreign currency into the lem of civil-military relations — through education, city, while the Carthaginian mixed regime became honor, and unwritten norms and social pressure — an oligarchy and later a democracy. Both behaved have the virtue of enduring applicability. By tying exactly as Greek political philosophy suggested the political role of the military to the philosophical they would, had they been aristocracies.91 And matter of man’s spiritedness and the ways in which Polybius expects the Roman regime to follow the it can be controlled, these ancient political thinkers same path. Like Carthage and Sparta, he believed can provide insight about how to address today’s the Roman aristocracy would, under the weight civil-military challenges as well as their own. Many of the prosperity brought on by its conquest, slip of the specific norms, educational processes, or en- into oligarchy. Then it would “change its name to forcement mechanisms they recommend may be the finest sounding of all, freedom and democra- difficult to transplant directly into modern politics cy, but would change its true nature to the worst without some modifications to account for our cur- thing of all, mob-rule.”92 One need only refer to rent cultural and political context. Their broader the hoary old Greek cycle of regimes to learn why theory of norms, however, can help us better un- this is so, and to see that on the heels of mob-rule derstand breakdowns in both ancient and modern will come a new monarchy. civil-military relations. However, so long as the Roman Senate takes money in hand without losing its virtue and main-

88 Polybius, Histories, 6.15.4-6. 89 Polybius, Histories, 6.15.8. 90 Polybius, Histories, 6.18. 91 Polybius, Histories, 6.49.8-10. 92 Polybius, Histories, 6.57.10.

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Civil-Military Norms and the Fall officers, including its commanders-in-chief, the Ro- provincial commands and the manning of legions Roman senator and tribune. Saturninus helped to of the Roman Republic man consuls, were all elected annually at the Peo- only from propertied citizens — Marius sowed the secure the Senate’s approval of Marius’ fourth con- ple’s Assembly. Once it had defeated Hannibal and seeds of a powerful standing army and popular- sulship, and, in return, Saturninus was able to ben- The fall of the Roman republic can serve as a case the Carthaginians, Rome faced no immediate exis- ly acclaimed military dictators.100 These changes efit from Marius’ popularity among the people and study for the themes we have discussed so far.93 As tential threat and turned its military toward a num- also created new financial demands that helped his armies.103 When Saturninus was not admonished one might expect, following Polybius’ depiction of a ber of lesser challenges on its expanding frontiers. begin to shift control of the esteem economy away for his role in facilitating the rise of Marius’ political certain sort of civil-military relationship as crucial One such challenge arose not far from where from the Senate to Marius and eventually other power, individual senators likely realized they, too, to Rome’s success, a disorder springing from the Carthage had once stood. In 146 BCE, Rome cre- military leaders as well. might benefit from co-opting military prestige with- relationship between the soldier and Rome’s polit- ated the province of Africa. Roman traders and out fear of punishment. Thus, the norm curtailing ical authorities figured prominently in the repub- businessmen on the Italian peninsula quickly de- The Alliance Between Marius and Saturninus the duration of military command disappeared. Mil- lic’s century-long decay. Gaius Marius is the hero veloped interests in the new province and in the itary leaders observed these changing norms, too, and villain of this story. His reforms of the Roman neighboring client kingdom of Numidia.96 A suc- Marius further widened the cracks in Rome’s and learned that the rules of the game that dictat- military vastly expanded Rome’s power, but at the cession dispute between two potential claimants longstanding civil-military norms for the sake of ed the assignment of honor and shame had funda- considerable expense of upsetting the civil-military to the Numidian throne led the Roman Senate, in military expediency by disregarding the custom- mentally changed. Marius continued his practice of relations Polybius describes. We shall see in this 116, to order the division of the land. Jugurtha, ary interval that prevented consuls from receiving recruiting soldiers from among those without land. section that the creation of a powerful, consolidat- one of the claimants, refused to accept the settle- consecutive commands, and he did so with the ac- He also disregarded the practice of conscripting cit- ed military combined with the relaxation of norms ment, and, as a result, the Roman army was drawn quiescence of the Roman people. As Marius was izens for short terms, instead enlisting volunteers securing the Senate’s regulation of Rome’s econo- into a decade-long conflict to impose the Senate’s claiming victory in North Africa, a more serious for a 16-year obligation. In so doing, Marius further my of esteem to undermine the republic. By gaining will. From 109 to 107, the Roman consul, Metellus, military challenge was emerging in the north from bound his soldiers directly to him and weakened the acquiescence from the Roman people — and even- oversaw what appeared to be an effective strate- two Germanic tribes, the Cimbri and the Teutones. Senate’s control of the financial strings of honor and tually from the Senate — to violate existing norms gy. His progress was halting, however, owing in At Arausio (in the southeast of modern France), shame by serving as an intermediary between the so that he could remain consul in the interest of part to a lack of troops.97 the consul Gnaeus Mallius Maximus suffered the Senate and his soldiers. military expediency, Marius gradually usurped the Gaius Marius, a staff officer under Metellus, re- worst Roman defeat in over 100 years.101 Although By 100 BCE, when Marius returned to stand for Senate’s role as the locus of the esteem economy. turned to Rome to stand for the consulship and Marius had not yet returned from Africa, the Ro- a sixth consulship, his armies had successfully de- won. His victory led the Roman people to over- man people elected him to a second consulship feated the Germanic tribes. Marius owed a great Marius’ Reforms rule the Senate’s extension of Metellus’ African for the year 104 and gave him command in Gaul deal of his success to his military reforms. He had command and send Marius to replace him. This against the Cimbri and the Teutones. In doing so, effectively consolidated control over a standing The armies of the Roman republic grew out of a action broke from a norm that gave the Senate the Roman people disregarded the traditional re- military force with a cadre of experienced career group of citizen militias that dated back to nearly the right to allocate provincial commands.98 In quirement of at least a 10-year interval between soldiers. Increasingly, however, these landless vol- 700 BCE. Initially, there were only three of these short order, Marius himself broke with tradition consulships for the same man, again violating an unteers began to look to Marius to provide spoils militias and they were composed of 1,000 soldiers by reforming the manner in which Rome raised existing norm in the name of military expedien- and help them when they returned from the cam- each.94 As the republic grew and external threats its armies, compounding the deterioration of the cy.102 Marius was subsequently elected consul each paign.104 Because the Roman republic had not de- emerged, however, Rome put as many as several rules of the game Polybius had described. Mari- year until his sixth term in 100, effectively creating veloped any scheme for taking care of veterans, hundred thousand citizen-soldiers under arms.95 us refused to draw his soldiers from only the five new shared expectations surrounding the power of Marius used his relationships with key senators, Rome maintained no standing or professional forc- propertied classes and looked instead to men of military leaders in Rome’s political life and weak- including Saturninus, to ensure the passage of an es, but called up the soldiers required for each lesser means.99 These semi-professional soldiers ening the power of the Senate to dictate the be- agrarian law to provide allotments of land for his campaign season, disbanding them shortly thereaf- soon made up a spirited and sizeable force, and haviors deserving of honor and shame. Marius and men. This was an important change to statutory ter. Prior to 107 BCE, only landowners and citizens they succeeded marvelously in Africa. But their the generals who would follow him began to rely law and the financial incentives offered to soldiers, in one of the five highest wealth classes were offi- loyalty was more to Marius than to the Senate. By less on the Senate for their position and power, rather than the informal rules of the game we have cially eligible for conscription. The army’s senior breaching two norms — the Senate’s control over preferring instead to cultivate their own popularity been discussing so far. Nevertheless, Marius’ rise among their soldiers and the people. to a position of sufficient prominence to carry off 93 We intend this section as a case study rather than an allegory of contemporary American politics. For more direct applications of the Roman Marius went on to break norms that limited the du- such a reform had everything to do with his will- to the American case, consider Andrew Sullivan, “Our Caesar: Can the Country Come Back from Trump? The Republic Already Looks Like Rome ration of consular power, restricted the consul’s ma- ingness to violate Rome’s norms. This reform, in in Ruins,” New York Magazine, Aug. 7, 2019, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/08/is-there-hope-for-the-american-republic-after-trump.html, and the many responses it elicited; James Fallows, “The End of the Roman Empire Wasn’t That Bad: Maybe the End of the American One Won’t Be nipulation of domestic politics, and limited the time turn, gave future consuls new powers that could be Either,” The Atlantic, October 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/10/in-the-fall-of-rome-good-news-for-america/596638/; soldiers served in Rome’s legions. While raising and turned against previously untouched precedents and Jim Golby, “In the Wake of Chaos: Civil-Military Relations Under Secretary Jim Mattis,” War on the Rocks, Feb. 4, 2019, https://warontherocks. com/2019/02/in-the-wake-of-chaos-civil-military-relations-under-secretary-jim-mattis/. training his new army, Marius forged an important and customs. By violating norms to remain in pow- 94 Graham Webster, The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 1–2. political partnership with Saturninus, a powerful er far beyond prior limitations, Marius also was We rely primarily on modern secondary sources for this broad case study, but the reader interested in ancient sources for the periods we discuss can consult Plutarch’s Lives of Marius and Sulla, as well as Sallust’s Jugurthine War. 95 Webster, The Roman Imperial Army, 1–2. 100 See Mary Beard’s succinct and perceptive account of Marius’ reform and its consequences in SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (London: Profile Books, 2015), 267–68; and Keppie, Making of the Roman Army, 57–63. 96 H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome: A History of Rome from 133 BC to AD 68 (New York: Routledge, 1982 [1959]), 47–48. 101 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 52. 97 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 49. 102 Plutarch, Life of Marius, 493 (chap. 12). 98 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 49. See also Sallust, War with Jugurtha, in Sallust, trans. J. C. Rolfe, Loeb Classical Library 116 (Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 289–91 (chap. 73). 103 Plutarch, Life of Marius, 499–501 (chap. 14). 99 Sallust, War with Jugurtha, 323 (chap. 86); Plutarch, Life of Marius, in Lives IX, trans. B. Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 104 Plutarch, Life of Marius, 55. See also Richard Evans, “Gaius Marius: A Political Biography,” Thesis, University of South Africa, 1995, 143–46, 1920), 483 (chap. 9). Michael Crawford notes that the Roman proletarians had also been armed at state expense during the Pyrrhic War. See Mi- on the link between the landlessness of Marius’ soldiers and the agrarian bills Marius and Saturninus supported; and Ernst Badian, “The Death of chael Crawford, The Roman Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 125–27. See also Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 61. Saturninus: Studies in Chronology and Prosopography,” Chiron 14 (1984): 101–47.

91 92 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations able to develop political power that likely caused inside the Forum to resolve domestic disputes, the him. Neither the Senate nor the people could coor- Caesar’s “dictatorship for life” and eventually Au- his soldiers to see him as the source of the reforms rules of the game — and the expectations of re- dinate effectively to oppose him.114 In the absence gustus’ life-long rule (albeit without the dictator’s rather than the Senate. wards and punishments undergirding them — had of both norms and formal laws to orient and re- title). All of these precedents acquired their sub- In late 100 BCE, Saturninus again began to press already collapsed. strain behavior, Sulla’s ability to control greater sequent force thanks to the military changes that for measures to give colonial lands to Marius’ vet- force proved decisive. Marius ushered in, which not only enhanced the erans and to lower the price of state-distributed The Rise of Sulla and the Fall Sulla established control over the city and within prestige of military commanders but also stripped wheat.105 When opposition arose in response to one of the Roman Republic three years had ended the war with Mithridates. the Senate of much of its power over Roman mili- of the bill’s provisions, Saturninus called on a small During the eastern campaign, Sulla would expand tary forces. By raising armies of men who required contingent of Marius’ army to join him in the Forum. Rome’s most fundamental civil-military norms — Marius’ military reforms.115 Sulla allowed his vet- remuneration and ensuring that their wages and With the backing of these veterans, Saturninus rout- the prohibition on settling political disputes through erans to extort the wealth of local communities bonuses were understood to come from their com- ed his opponents and imposed his measures by the military force and the customary authority of the and granted them plots of land without waiting mander rather than the Senate, Marius put a pro- threat of force.106 Riots and violence continued until Senate — would continue to be violated as Rome de- for the Senate’s approval, effectively undermining fessionalized army at the service of its immediate the Senate turned to Marius himself to restore the scended into civil war. In 99 BCE, Marius departed that body’s power. He also implemented a system leaders.118 Less conspicuously, these reforms also safety of the state. Marius then betrayed both his Rome for exile in the east. The republic enjoyed six of taxing and fining conquered provinces. These may have effectively removed the Senate’s power erstwhile political ally and his veterans by cutting years of relative peace until news of the assassina- methods allowed him to expand the size of his to dictate the terms of the civil-military relation- off their water supply and forcing the contingent to tion of Drusus, a tribune who had proposed extend- army and sustain its operations without the sup- ship, by reducing its power to use financial means surrender.107 Disgusted with their rash actions, Mar- ing full citizenship to Rome’s Italian allies, caused port of the Senate. to bestow honor and shame on soldiers and even ius had relinquished the opportunity to seize pow- many of the Italian states to revolt. The ensuing As Sulla began to plot his return from the east, its control over who served in the Roman legions. er and had instead sided with the Senate in putting chaos called Marius once more to Rome. He shortly his rivals organized to resist him.116 They feared Had the Senate regularized the soldiers’ payments down the revolt.108 Yet his prior, repeated violation served alongside Sulla in an attempt to subdue the that he would use his now-consolidated legions to and pensions through legislation — administered of norms had laid the foundations for the very crisis allies, only to withdraw on account of poor health. usurp power, which is, in fact, exactly what he did, perhaps by a republican bureaucracy anticipating he was forced to resolve. Sulla was left to suppress the revolts alone and to once he had won a climactic battle near Rome’s the imperial bureaucracy that would arise on the Although some accounts emphasize Marius’ lack win the loyalty of Rome’s legions.112 Colline gate. Sulla then took control of Rome and republic’s ashes — the soldiers’ allegiance to the of political savvy or ambition in this situation, this The Social War in 91 BCE brought with it the implemented constitutional reforms that allowed republic may have proven stronger than their alle- explanation is rather implausible.109 Having served complete breakdown of coordination between the him to rule as dictator with no term limit. giance to military leaders.119 But perhaps even more six straight terms as consul and having repeatedly Roman Senate and the People’s Assembly. After fundamental was the Senate’s acquiescence to a broken with longstanding traditions to secure the the war concluded in 88 BCE, the Senate made Sul- Lessons Learned thoroughgoing revision of ancient norms, partly in state, Marius was clearly the most powerful man la consul and appointed him to campaign against response to military necessity, partly in response in Rome. He did not want for ambition or savvy. King Mithridates, who had invaded Greece and Over the course of 30 years, Marius’ successive to novel political conditions at home, like the furor He was also, however, a man of some virtue. The was attempting to conquer Rome’s provinces in the violations of Rome’s civil-military norms created over Italian citizenship and the Gracchi’s proposals sight of riots in the Roman Forum — the spectacle east. The People’s Assembly broke with the Senate the conditions for the republic’s first civil war and for redistribution of land and wealth. The combina- of the Rome he loved and served falling apart — and granted Marius the same command. Sulla re- its eventual fall. The precedents set in this tumul- tion of a powerful consolidated military and the re- simply appalled him.110 Seeing senators engulfed in fused to accept the assembly’s decision.113 Joining tuous period eroded the power of the Senate to be- laxation of the republic’s unwritten rules prepared chaos and powerless to act on their own was no his army at Nola , Sulla urged the legions to ignore stow honor and shame. Marius’ and Sulla’s reforms the way for the Roman Empire. less appalling, and so Marius responded to their the assembly’s declaration and accept him as their of the Roman military, meanwhile, allowed Rome call. It was his virtue and his professional identity rightful leader. The army obeyed. Sulla then led to consolidate control over its legions for a time, as a servant of Rome, ultimately, that saved his city them to Rome and launched the first of Rome’s but in doing so they effectively destroyed the re- Conclusion from even greater disorder.111 Although the time civil wars. His six legions easily defeated the small public.117 When the Roman people awarded Marius Marius spent in Polybian-style camps may have im- band of gladiators Marius had managed to cobble the African command held by his one-time superi- Although political scientists have recently fo- pressed upon his own conscience the importance together. Many Roman citizens were shocked and or, Metellus, they violated the norm that granted cused on rationalist and interest-based expla- of the norm that prohibits the use of military force dismayed by Sulla’s actions, while others welcomed the Senate its traditional prerogative over provin- nations of civil-military relations, Plato and his cial commands. The people also repeatedly made earliest respondents suggest not only that norms Marius consul, in violation of the norm dictating matter, but that they should be central to our 105 Erik Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate: The Rise of the Roman Army and the Fall of the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), 43–45. a decade-long period between terms. In doing so, understanding of civilian control. While inter- 106 Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate, 43–45. they presaged Pompey’s rise and then Caesar’s el- est-based explanations have certainly enhanced 107 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 58–59. Plutarch credits Marius with cutting off the water supply. See Life of Marius, 549 (chap. 30). Appian says that “other persons” did it while Marius hesitated. See Roman History: The Civil Wars, trans. Horace White, Loeb Classical Library 4 evation. And when the Senate awarded Sulla an in- our knowledge and should not be scrapped, we ar- (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 65 (1.4.32). definite dictatorship, in violation of the dictator’s gue that modern political scientists should think 108 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 58–59. See also Cicero, Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo, in Cicero Orations, trans. H. Grose Hodge, Loeb traditional six-month term, they foreshadowed more carefully about the role that norms still play. Classical Library 198 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927), 470–75 (sect. 20–21). 109 Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate, 47; and Ernst Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 264–70 B.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 208–10. 114 Even if the Senate and people could have opposed Sulla, they lacked the means to cut off his funding since Sulla’s forces could subsist quite 110 Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate, 47. well in the provinces. 111 Later in his life, however, Marius would be at the center of — and an active participant in — even greater disorders in Rome. Plutarch begins 115 Keppie, Making the Roman Army, 70–71. his narration of this episode in this way: “Marius found a most suitable instrument for the destruction of the commonwealth in the audacity of 116 Scullard, From the Gracchi to Rome, 65–68 Sulpicius, who was in all things an admirer and imitator of Saturninus, except that he charged him with timidity and hesitation in his political mea- sures.” See Life of Marius, 557–61 (chap. 35). See also 585–91 (chaps. 43-44); and Life of Sulla, 348–59 (chaps. 8–10). 117 Harriet I. Flower, Roman Republics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 76–79, 154–59. 112 Hildinger, Swords Against the Senate, 57–61. 118 Flower, Roman Republics. 113 Plutarch, Life of Marius, 559 (chap. 35); and Life of Sulla, 348–51 (chap. 8). 119 Thanks to Josiah Ober for this way of putting the point.

93 94 The Scholar Keeping Norms Normal: Ancient Perspectives on Norms in Civil-Military Relations

The ancients submit that honor and shame — as could continue to adhere to norms of non-parti- and a controversial “show of force” by a National Jim Golby is a senior fellow at the Clements distinct from material incentives like money or sanship when political leaders themselves so Guard helicopter trying to get protestors to dis- Center for National Security at the University of coercion — are important mechanisms that can grossly violate them.121 perse.125 Milley, in particular, faced heavy criti- Texas at Austin and co-host of the Center for Stra- shape behavior in the civil-military relationship. Moreover, the potential use of honor and shame cism for his role in the events in and near La- tegic and International Studies “Thank You for And yet, scholars pay little attention to these — and their importance in shaping civil-military fayette Square. While still somewhat speculative, Your Service” podcast. mechanisms today. There is significant room for outcomes — was also apparent in the cases of initial evidence suggests that this broad public further research on the role of norms in American convicted war criminals Clint Lorance and Ed- reprimand — through the attribution of shame Hugh Liebert is an associate professor in the civil-military relations, both among civilian elites die Gallagher as well as in the case of alleged war — played a significant role in Milley’s decision to Department of Social Sciences at the United States and among the military. criminal Mathew Golsteyn. In all three instances, apologize and to reaffirm the importance of mili- Military Academy. He is the author or editor of six While debates about what norms should gov- attempts to shape the narrative and mobilize pub- tary adherence to the norm of non-partisanship. books, including Plutarch’s Politics (2016). ern civil-military relations will continue, they lic support to mitigate criticism of these men’s The success of the modern republican ap- need to be supplemented by additional empiri- actions were extreme, with Gallagher appearing proach to civil-military relations should not blind Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Kori cal work that examines which norms exist, when on Fox News to defend himself despite being on us to the enduring relevance of the ancient ap- Schake and numerous others who offered helpful they matter, and how they change. Similarly, the active duty and a contingent of their supporters proach. Although Americans may be accustomed feedback on this essay during the 2019 biennial meet- field would benefit from developing a better un- vocally requesting pardons from Trump.122 The to speaking of military virtue with the more ing of the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed derstanding of who controls the articulation of White House statement on the president’s deci- modest and egalitarian label of “professional- Forces and Society, the cadets of West Point’s “So- norms and how they are transmitted to both ci- sion to grant executive clemency to Lorance and ism,” citizens rely all the same on the officer’s cial Sciences 472: The Soldier and the State,” and the vilians and the military. Although most attention Golsteyn and to promote Gallagher referenced a character, particularly in moments of crisis and anonymous referees for helpful comments on drafts in the literature focuses on norms among military petition signed by 124,000 Americans and more temptation. And even if financial and coercive of this article. The views expressed in this article are servicemembers, recent events — and the exam- than 20 members of Congress.123 This decision incentives sometimes complement norms based the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect those ple of Rome’s decline — suggest that civilian ad- sent a clear message about which behaviors are on honor and shame, American society still relies of the United States Military Academy, the United herence to civil-military norms, or the lack there- worthy of honor and which are not. on fame (e.g., medals of honor and other awards) States Army, or the Department of Defense. of, may have an important impact on dynamics Perhaps an even clearer example of the impact and infamy (dishonorable discharges) to shape between political and military leaders. of norms in contemporary civil-military relations the behavior of American soldiers. Even scholars Image: Matt Neale, CC BY 2.0 (https://creative- Contemporary events in American civil-military is the apology of Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of civil-military relations exert some power over commons.org/licenses/by/2.0/) relations indicate that control over honor and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after an appearance norms when they praise or condemn violations of shame still plays a key role in shaping the rela- in his combat uniform with Trump on June 1, “unwritten rules” — like recent breaches in the tionship between civilian society and the mili- 2020. In the midst of divisive domestic debates prohibition of partisan behavior by the military. tary today, and that the rules of the game may be about police brutality and the use of the military While debates about civil-military relations to- changing. Trump is not alone in attempting to po- on domestic soil, the chairman joined Trump for day often begin with the writings of Huntington liticize the military, even if some of his attempts a domestic public relations event only months or Janowitz, ancient approaches to civil-military have been particularly egregious. Elected politi- before a presidential election. Milley followed relations — with their focus on norms and im- cal leaders and aspiring office holders routinely Trump across Lafayette Square, which minutes material incentives — remain relevant. Modern use photo ops and social media to demonstrate earlier had been cleared aggressively by police modes of control rest on a substantial normative their support for the troops, and they frequently with the support of National Guard personnel, to foundation that can be easy to take for granted. recruit retired generals and admirals to support Saint John’s Church for a controversial photo op. As scholars, policymakers, and military officers their campaigns or boost their credibility with the His decision to join the president “created a per- struggle to understand and respond to changes public.120 As in the case of Marius and Saturninus, ception of the military involved in domestic pol- in civil-military relations today, ancient modes of these developments suggest that elected leaders itics.”124 After the appearance, an unprecedented civilian control may be an important source of in- are, at least to some degree, less concerned with cohort of retired senior generals and admirals sight. The less observable, but still powerful, ways how to reward or punish adherence to civil-mili- criticized the president and the administration’s of shaping and maintaining civil-military norms tary norms than they are with how to appropriate response to the Black Lives Matters protests, that Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius proposed — the military’s prestige for their own benefit. In- targeting Trump’s use of divisive language, the through education, honor, unwritten norms, and deed, political scientist Risa Brooks recently went deployment of the National Guard troops to sup- social pressure — have enduring value. Their ori- so far as to question whether and how the military port the police who cleared Lafayette Square, entation toward non-material incentives can help us better understand why civil-military norms have been weakening in the United States over 120 James Golby, Heidi Urben, Kyle Dropp, and Peter D. Feaver, “Brass Politics,” Foreign Affairs, Nov. 5, 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ recent decades, and their insights could poten- articles/2012-11-05/brass-politics. tially help America prevent the same type of civ- 121 Risa Brooks, “What Can Military and Civilian Leaders Do to Prevent the Military’s Politicization?” War on the Rocks, April 27, 2020, https:// warontherocks.com/2020/04/what-can-military-and-civilian-leaders-do-to-prevent-the-militarys-politicization/. il-military breakdown that hastened the fall of the 122 Andrew Dyer, “All the SEAL’s Men: The Fox News Campaign that Made Eddie Gallagher Untouchable,” San Diego Union-Tribune, Nov. 29, Roman republic. 2019, https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/military/story/2019-11-29/all-the-seals-men-the-fox-news-campaign-that-made-eddie-gallagh- er-untouchable. 123 “Statement from the Press Secretary,” The White House, Nov. 15, 2019, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/state- ment-press-secretary-97/. 125 Alex Horton, Andrew Ba Tran, Aaron Steckelberg and John Muyskens, “A Low-flying ‘Show of Force,’” Washington Post, June 23, 2020, 124 Helene Cooper, “Milley Apologizes for Role in Trump Photo Op: ‘I Should Not Have Been There,’” New York Times, June 11, 2020, https:// https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/investigations/helicopter-protests-washington-dc-national-guard/. www.nytimes.com/2020/06/11/us/politics/trump-milley-military-protests-lafayette-square.html.

95 96 The Strategist

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of current and former senior policymakers, members of the military, and civilian national security practitioners. The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69

Richard Nixon’s 1969 Guam doctrine led America’s allies in Asia to AMERICA’S ALLIANCES pursue a variety of strategies based on perceptions of America’s reliability. If the Biden administration wants to strengthen the country’s alliances moving forward, and avoid repeating Nixon’s AFTER TRUMP: alliance errors, its first priority should be to restore confidence in U.S. reliability. LESSONS FROM hortly after media reports declared Joe States. Instead of anchoring to the United States, Biden the winner of the 2020 U.S. pres- many regional states are therefore pursuing alter- idential election, the congratulations natives — augmenting, autonomizing, and accom- from U.S. allies began rolling in. Though modating — often adopting a combination of these suchS notes are expected diplomatic niceties, some four strategies. Allies choose which of these ap- THE SUMMER OF ‘69 leaders made clear their desire to turn the page on proaches to pursue based both on their perception four years of tempestuous alliance relations. The of American reliability and the level of adversary election, declared German Foreign Minister Heiko threat they face.4 Therefore, if the Biden adminis- Maas, provided an opportunity for “a new trans-At- tration wants America’s allies to do more within an lantic beginning, a New Deal.”1 Such reactions are alliance context, its first priority should be to re- hardly surprising. President Donald Trump repeat- store confidence in U.S. reliability.5 LINDSEY FORD edly depicted U.S. alliances as “unfair” and “obso- lete” arrangements.2 Biden, in contrast, promised that closer coordination with allies would be a hall- Echoes of Nixon’s Guam Doctrine ZACK COOPER mark of his foreign policy.3 Yet, a major question remains: Will America’s alliances simply bounce On July 25, 1969, Nixon gave informal remarks back to the status quo ante after four years of U.S. on “America’s role in Asia” while on a stopover in ultimatums or has a more fundamental transfor- Guam.6 At the time, financial constraints and an- mation begun? ti-war sentiment were triggering a reassessment of While it is too soon to offer definitive statements long and costly overseas commitments.7 As a re- about Trump’s long-term impact on American sult, Nixon warned, “The United States is going to alliances, the debate bears hallmarks of an earli- be facing, we hope before too long—no one can say er attempt to recalibrate U.S. alliances: President how long, but before too long—a major decision: Richard Nixon’s 1969 Guam doctrine. The allied What will be its role in Asia?”8 Nixon then laid out responses to the Guam doctrine hold important what became the core of the Guam doctrine: lessons for the Biden administration as it works to strengthen America’s alliances. We argue that the [T]he time has come when the United same concerns about strategic overreach that have States, in our relations with all of our Asian driven U.S. demands for greater “burden sharing” friends, [must] be quite emphatic on two also tend to shake allied confidence in the United points: One, that we will keep our treaty

1 David Biller and John Leicester, “Many World Leaders Express Hope, Relief After Biden Win,” AP News, Nov. 8, 2020, https://apnews.com/ article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-elections-anne-hidalgo-a4f71db8bab46c4dbc00bf02fe5ef3c1. 2 “Trump Worries Nato with ‘Obsolete’ Comment,” BBC News, Jan. 16, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38635181. 3 Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again. 4 On assessments of individual leaders, see Michaela Mattes, “Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design,” International Organization 66, no. 4 (October 2012): 153–72, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831200029X; and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Renshon, “Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 10 (2018): 2150–79, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022002718785693. 5 Danielle L. Lupton, “Biden Has a Narrow Window to Restore U.S. Credibility,” Foreign Affairs, Feb. 8, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/2021-02-08/biden-has-narrow-window-restore-us-credibility. 6 Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, The American Presidency Project, accessed Dec. 17, 2020, https:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/239667. 7 Johannes Kadura, The War After the War: The Struggle for Credibility During America’s Exit from Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press: 2016). 8 Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen.”

99 100 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69

commitments … but, two, that as far as sparked anxiety among Asian allies, but it was • Anchoring: States can commit (or recommit) a result, pursuit of autonomy is effectively the problems of internal security are con- the execution of this strategy — in particular, the to a formal alliance, working more closely a choice of internal balancing through in- cerned … the United States is going to en- unexpected rapprochement with China and even- with that ally. States can signal closer align- creased military spending over external bal- courage and has a right to expect that this tual fall of Saigon — that accelerated rethinking ment to an ally through a variety of actions, ancing through greater reliance on an ally. problem will be increasingly handled by, among Asian leaders about relying on the Unit- including formal treaties, military basing, • Accommodating: Finally, states can realign and the responsibility for it taken by, the ed States. Meanwhile, the administration pre- rotational troop deployments, access agree- by embracing the threatening power, thereby Asian nations themselves.9 pared to draw down its presence in Asia, remov- ments, joint training and exercises, joint avoiding dependence on either independent ing 20,000 service members from South Korea, combat operations, arms sales, military aid, capabilities or external support. Accommo- In asking Asian allies to do more for their own 17,000 from Japan, and 16,000 from Thailand.14 statements of support for an ally, or criti- dation is similar to what Stephen Walt calls defense, Nixon noted that “[a]ll of them now, or U.S. leaders also sought détente with Russia cism of a shared rival.17 These efforts seek to bandwagoning, in which “the bandwagoner virtually all, are on their own feet, at least from an while scaling back their commitments to Taiwan tighten an alliance commitment and increase may hope to avoid an attack on himself by economic standpoint, and are very good customers and Southeast Asia. These decisions suggested to shared capabilities to better deter or defend diverting it elsewhere.”20 This type of accom- of ours.”10 Months later, Nixon delivered a formal regional states that Washington would jettison against a shared threat. modation is, in many ways, the inverse of an- address to the American public in which he argued, commitments that U.S. leaders viewed as incon- • Augmenting: Rather than relying on a single choring, with states choosing to align with “The defense of freedom is everybody’s business sequential or obsolete. formal alliance, states can deepen informal rather than against the source of the threat. — not just America’s business. And it is particular- The regional response to the Guam doctrine relationships to create a stronger regional ly the responsibility of the people whose freedom marked the beginning of a profound realignment. security network. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Most states adopt a combination of these four is threatened.”11 These remarks echoed sentiments Asian allies and partners complained that Nix- Tsuchiyama describe a “community-based approaches, embracing multiple options simulta- he had made in a 1967 Foreign Affairs article sug- on’s new approach reflected a “weakening of the security order” in which power is restrained neously. But how do states choose the right mix gesting the United States could no longer afford to American will to uphold the international order,” “through the operation of co-operative insti- of anchoring, augmenting, autonomizing, and serve as the primary bulwark against Asian insta- suggesting “the inevitable American movement tutions and agreed-upon rules that limit how accommodating?21 We argue that two variables bility. Instead, he argued that Asian counterparts to devolution.”15 Through the 1970s, Asia became power and the use of violence can be em- govern these alignment decisions: perception of ought to “attempt to contain aggression in their more multipolar and regional alignments more ployed.”18 The objective of such a system is adversary threat and perception of ally reliabili- own areas” and “establish an indigenous Asian amorphous. Smaller powers were forced to adapt to better sustain the status quo by enmesh- ty.22 High threat perception leads to anchoring framework for their own future security.”12 to a more uncertain regional power balance in ing great powers in security multilateralism or autonomizing, because countries facing a high At the heart of Nixon’s strategy was the belief which the U.S. role as security guarantor was no in order to dilute their power. threat desire a robust deterrent, which can only be that the United States had hit a point of over- longer assured. Although Nixon left office in 1974, • Autonomizing: Alternatively, states can in- obtained from a formal treaty alliance or substan- reach in which its strategy was no longer guided his theory of “dynamic stability” shaped the re- vest more in defense and pursue independ- tial independent capabilities.23 Low threat percep- by a realistic assessment of U.S. interests. Over- gion for the next half century.16 Regional respons- ent capabilities — such as nuclear weapons tion incentivizes augmenting or accommodating, seas commitments had been allowed to drain es to the Guam doctrine therefore present useful — to maintain freedom of action. James since those approaches are less costly financially valuable American resources. Nixon felt that the historical analogies for today’s alliance debates. Morrow explains that “a rough trade-off be- and do not require devolving political control to United States had developed a fixation on periph- tween autonomy and security exists in the an ally. Meanwhile, when a state views an ally as eral issues, such as the war in Vietnam, that had logic of military alliances. … Purchasing arms highly reliable, it typically adopts an anchoring crowded out more vital priorities. He argued that The Logic of Alignment Decisions raises a nation’s security at the cost of some or augmenting approach, while low ally reliability America’s preoccupation with Vietnam had “dis- wealth; forming alliances can raise a nation’s incentivizes autonomizing or accommodating.24 torted our picture of Asia. A small country on the Before examining specific responses to the security at the cost of some autonomy.”19 As These choices are reflected in Table 1. rim of the continent has filled the screen of our Guam doctrine, it is necessary to describe the 13 minds; but it does not fill the map.” Nixon was range of decisions open to states with existing 17 Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 704, https:// determined to rectify this distortion and reset the asymmetric alliances. Such states have four ba- doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130. terms of American engagement. sic alignment options, each of which is outlined 18 G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Co-operation in the Although Nixon promised the United States below. These four options are best thought of as Asia-Pacific,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (February 2002): 92–93, https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/2.1.69. would remain a Pacific power and uphold its ideal types that can be combined to fit a state’s 19 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 911, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499. treaty commitments, it was clear that American unique security situation: 20 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 8, https://www.jstor.org/ engagement would change. Nixon’s Guam speech stable/2538540. 21 On alliance and alignment choices, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Red- 9 Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen.” wood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 86–120, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887109000045; and Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard 10 Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen.” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 11 Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” Nov. 3, 1969, Richard Nixon Museum and Library, accessed Dec. 17, 2020, 22 On perception and its impact on alignment choices, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/index.php/media/33421. Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300035232; Doug- 12 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (October 1967), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1967- las M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 3 (June 2008): 426–54, https://doi. 10-01/asia-after-viet-nam. org/10.1177%2F0022002707310003; Mark J. C. Crescenzi et al., “Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (June 2012): 259–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00711.x; and Keren Yarhi-Milo, Knowing the Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence, and 13 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam.” Assessment of Intentions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 14 Michael J. Green, By More than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York, NY: Columbia 23 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 3–43, https://doi. University Press, 2017). org/10.2307/2538540. 15 Osamu Miyoshi, “The Nixon Doctrine in Asia,” The Adelphi Papers 12, no. 91 (1972): 13–20, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679327208448263. 24 Todd Hall and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Personal Touch: Leaders’ Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International 16 Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam.” Affairs,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (September 2012): 560–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2012.00731.x.

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Although Nixon’s announcement generated anxie- made possible by the allies’ largely shared concern ty among Japanese leaders, close ties between the about the Soviets. Most in Tokyo viewed the Sovi- two governments helped them weather the tran- ets as a direct threat, a view that would gain trac- sition.31 Bilateral communications from this period tion through the 1970s.36 Japanese leaders had long emphasized Japan’s expectation of a continued “identified the Soviet Union as the fundamental American commitment.32 Indeed, a year after the threat to the country’s security,” notes Matteo Dian, Guam doctrine was announced, a U.S. official re- but a “resurgence of the Soviet threat was caused ported that “relations with Japan are in very good by the collapse of détente and by renewed Soviet ac- shape.”33 Despite Washington rethinking its region- tivism.”37 Japanese leaders worried that they lacked al approach, Japanese leaders largely decided to the capabilities to deter the Soviets on their own.38 anchor their policies to those of the United States. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger noted, Tokyo did augment its regional relationships and “Because Japan was so important, we could not be As Table 1 shows, anchoring typically occurs ability to deter a determined adversary.28 Therefore, seriously consider autonomous capabilities, but indifferent to Japan’s role … We were delighted to when a state faces a high threat and has a reliable efforts to augment a state’s position are more attrac- these hedges against U.S. abandonment ultimately have the [U.S.-Japan Security] Treaty and certain- ally.25 By doubling down on that alliance, the state tive when it faces a less threatening adversary. proved unnecessary because of Washington’s con- ly would not abrogate it; on the contrary we would can quickly bolster the regional balance of power. Finally, if a state does not face a threatening ad- tinued commitment to Japan. strengthen it.”39 The United States thus differentiat- This external balancing, however, is not without versary or have a reliable ally, it is often tempting In some ways, the Guam doctrine played into ed its approach to Japan from its approach toward cost. The weaker ally then becomes more depend- to accommodate. Aligning with a challenger is often pre-existing Japanese preferences.34 When Nixon other alliances, making clear that Japan could de- ent on its stronger ally to uphold its security com- unpopular, and scholars have found a “strong ten- announced his intention to reduce American in- pend on the United States. mitment. In exchange for this commitment, the dency for states to balance when making alliance volvement in Asia, he was signaling a major shift Although Tokyo feared that a rapid U.S. with- weaker ally must often allow the stronger ally more choices.”29 Yet, some states still consider it, particu- not only across the region but with regard to the drawal might destabilize the region, both govern- say over its foreign and defense policies.26 None- larly if they are politically or economically depend- U.S.-Japanese relationship in particular. During ments were committed to decreasing the U.S. mil- theless, if facing a highly threatening adversary, ent on that foreign power. Nevertheless, accom- discussions over a joint communique in 1969, Nix- itary presence in Japan.40 U.S. officials concluded anchoring may be worth the sacrifices. modation comes with serious risks, including that on urged Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato to that Japanese leaders preferred “to see the U.S. What if the adversary is highly threatening but bandwagoning might fail to appease an adversary. embrace more regional security responsibilities.35 bases reduced and amalgamated, or even for the there is no strong and reliable ally available? In this This shift was welcomed by many in Japan who Japanese self-defense forces to take over control or case, a state might pursue autonomy by investing were eager to take on a greater security role and re- management.”41 This mutual desire for a reduction in its own military capabilities. Internal balanc- Asian Responses to the Guam Doctrine gain control of Okinawa. In the final communique, in U.S. forces stationed in Japan was formalized in ing efforts of this sort are attractive because they the Sato administration expressly acknowledged the Okinawa Reversion Agreement of 1971, which avoid reliance on an external power. Nonetheless, Based on this construct, we argue that countries Japan’s interest in the security of both the Korean returned the Ryukyu and Daito Islands to Japanese there are serious risks, particularly for weak states in Asia had four basic options for responding to Nix- Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. This would not control and paved the way for a more self-suffi- that might not be able to match the capabilities of a on’s Guam doctrine, which were driven primarily by only ease the burden on the United States but also cient Japanese defense force.42 It was also critical threatening neighbor. As a result, efforts to pursue their perceptions of threats and allies.30 To deter- help to normalize Japan’s postwar security posture. that Japan acceded to U.S. demands for increased autonomy carry high risks and resource costs, par- mine whether this framework applies to how region- Sato’s decision to anchor to the United States was burden-sharing by spending more on its defense ticularly for smaller states.27 al states reacted to the Guam doctrine, we examine What if the threat from an adversary appears rela- the actions of four of the most important U.S. allies tively low? In this case, an attractive alternative is to during this period: Japan, South Korea, Australia, 31 “Memorandum from John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissing- augment a state’s position by aligning with a broad- and Thailand. er),” Jan. 29, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969–1972, (hereafter FRUS XIX, 2, Japan) Docu- er coalition of like-minded states. The upside of this ment 38, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d38 - fn:1.5.4.2.14.11.16.8. type of coalition building is that states need not cede Japan: An Anchoring Ally 32 “The Nixon-Sato Communique,” New York Times, Nov. 22, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/11/22/archives/the-nixonsato-communique.html. political leverage to each other. The risk, however, 33 “Memorandum from Richard B. Finn, Director of Japanese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green),” March 25, 1970, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 41, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https:// is that a loosely aligned group of states might suf- Japan’s response to the Guam doctrine was the history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d41. fer from coordination problems that undercut their most favorable from an American perspective. 34 “Dr. Kissinger’s Discussion with Mr. Nakasone, Director of Japanese Defense Agency,” Memorandum of Conversation, Sept. 10, 1970, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 53, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d53 . 25 James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political 35 Yukinori Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’: The Nixon Doctrine and Japan’s Defense Build-up, 1969–1976,” Journal of Cold War Studies 16, Science 35, no. 4 (November 1991): 904–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/2111499. no. 3 (Summer 2014): 96, https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00447. 26 Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 158–96, https:// 36 Eitan Oren and Matthew Brummer, “Reexamining Threat Perception in Early Cold War Japan,” Journal of Cold War Studies 22, no. 4 (Fall www.jstor.org/stable/40389236. 2020): 91, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00948. 27 On the limits of autonomy and entrapment concerns within alliances, see Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in Interna- 37 Matteo Dian, The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance: The Eagle and the Chrysanthemum (Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2014), 79—80. tional Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies 20, no. 38 Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 107, 3 (July 2011): 350–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2011.599201; and Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137548. Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, no. 4. (Spring 2015): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197. 39 “Mr. Miki’s Remarks on East Asia Developments,” Memorandum of Conversation, June 23, 1970, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 45, Department 28 Songying Fang, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances,” Internation- of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d45. al Organization 68, no. 4 (September 2014): 775–809, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000137; and Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). 40 “Meeting Between President Nixon and Former Prime Minister Kishi,” Memorandum of Conversation, June 23, 1970, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Docu- ment 56, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d56. 29 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 16. 41 “Dr. Kissinger’s Discussion with Mr. Nakasone,” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 53. 30 For a deeper discussion about alliance choices in the region during and after Vietnam, see Andrew J. Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 42 “Meeting Between President Nixon and Former Prime Minister Kishi,” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 56.

103 104 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 forces.43 Thus, throughout the 1970s, the United was some increased chance that it might be aban- to be destroyed in a nuclear war. This was not an act a double blow to South Korea. Nixon’s largely uni- States and Japan embraced expanded alliance re- doned by Washington. As a result, Japan’s leaders of charity; we did it for ourselves.”52 In this sense, it lateral decisions to transfer more responsibility sponsibilities and a larger regional role for Tokyo, sought more autonomous capabilities to mitigate was the close alignment of American and Japanese to Asian allies, reach out to China, and withdraw including in both the renewal of the security treaty against the risk of abandonment and perhaps to also security interests that caused Japan to anchor, even from Vietnam called into question both South Ko- in 1970 as well as the Guidelines for Defense Co- increase leverage over the United States.49 The U.S. as some in Tokyo began to consider the benefits of rea’s sacrifices abroad and its prospects closer to operation in 1978.44 By framing the Nixon doctrine secretary of state recognized this risk, writing that increased autonomy. home.57 Nixon initially told South Korean President as an opportunity for Japan, U.S. officials avoided Japan’s security contribution would likely come “in Park Chung-hee, “I can assure you that we will not some of the tensions that would damage relation- less helpful forms than we would like.”50 South Korea: An Autonomizing Ally retreat from the Pacific area and we will not reduce ships with other allies.45 In the wake of the Guam doctrine, defense of- our commitments, but I think we need intelligent Yet, the Guam doctrine did increase alliance ten- ficials within the Japan Defense Agency began to Rather than anchoring to the United States, policy, by giving aid to the countries who attempt sions between Washington and Tokyo while also suggest the need for a more independent approach South Korea sought substantially greater autono- to help themselves.”58 Yet, Park disregarded the decreasing U.S. leverage with Japan. American in- for defending Japan. This led Japan to publish its my in response to the Guam doctrine. Seoul threat- possibility that the United States would use the telligence assessed that “Japanese governments first postwar defense white paper in 1970. The new- ened to pursue independent military capabilities Guam doctrine as cover to withdraw forces from will be increasingly eager to demonstrate — to oth- ly appointed director of the Japan Defense Agency, in large part because South Korean leaders were the Korean Peninsula. A U.S. State Department ca- er Asians and to their own electorate — that their Yasuhiro Nakasone, led the charge to craft this new more skeptical about America’s commitment than ble in 1970 noted, “Park had chosen to ignore these policies are independent of Washington’s.”46 U.S. strategy, arguing that Japan should focus first and were their Japanese counterparts. As Adm. John reports and … had been confident that there would leaders worried about “indications of increasing foremost on independent self-defense and should S. McCain Jr. warned after meeting South Korean be no such approach at this time.”59 strains in the relationship as the Japanese move to- double the Japanese defense budget to support officials in Hawaii in 1970, “The posture of the Ko- It soon became clear, however, that Nixon was ward greater independence.”47 Meanwhile, the tran- this goal.51 While Nakasone’s proposals ultimately rean delegation today had a strong flavor of an ag- determined to realign U.S. forces in the region. sition to a reduced U.S. military presence lessened fell prey to domestic constraints, they nonetheless grieved party who was being deprived of his rights Many in Washington believed that American forces American influence over Japan’s decision-making. marked the start of a gradual move toward greater by a faithless friend.”53 in South Korea had more symbolic than military In particular, Washington became more worried Japanese autonomy. Managing this shift became a America’s alliance with South Korea was born out value. U.S. assessments concluded that South Ko- about an independent Japanese military buildup major fixation for the Nixon administration, which of a shared fear about the spread of communism. rea could handle an attack from North Korea. In and the two allies pursuing diverging approaches worked to reconcile its desire for greater Japanese This concern motivated U.S. involvement in the 1970, the National Security Council asserted that to China. That these tensions proved manageable burden-sharing with concerns about a stronger, Korean War and led to the postwar stationing of “there is little or no military need for U.S. ground was due, in part, to the fact that Japanese leaders more autonomous Japan. U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the forces in Korea, with even the current unimproved continued to view the United States as relatively Thus, Japan continued to anchor its security strat- formalization of the two countries’ security rela- ROK [Republic of Korea] force structure.”60 Some committed to the alliance. egy in the United States, despite questions about tionship.54 During the Vietnam War, South Korea in Washington also thought force reductions in Officials in Tokyo could not easily contemplate America’s commitment in the wake of the Guam returned the favor by supplying the second-largest South Korea were necessary to avoid American going it alone against the Soviet Union. Although doctrine. One critical difference between Japan and number of foreign military forces.55 It hoped this overextension. Neither argument was particularly worried about the risk of a nuclear attack, Japan other U.S. allies in Asia was that Washington saw effort would result in economic benefits and closer persuasive in Seoul, where American troops were remained adamantly opposed to developing nucle- Tokyo as a critical bulwark against the Soviet Union. military ties with the United States. Seoul’s partic- still “a symbol of the US commitments to the de- ar weapons of its own.48 This combined with the The relatively high perceived threat to Japan helped ipation in Vietnam was thus a strategic calculation fense of the Republic of Korea, and in fact to all of country’s limited military spending levels to prevent convince leaders in Tokyo that the United States had intended to secure American support in a future Northeast Asia.”61 As a U.S. intelligence document leaders in Tokyo from seriously considering the no option but to maintain its commitment. Indeed, contingency on the Korean Peninsula.56 noted, “A critical element in both North and South possibility of becoming autonomous from the Unit- in 1970, Kissinger reassured Japanese leaders that Against this backdrop, the Guam doctrine dealt Korean thinking during any crisis would be the US ed States. Yet, the government still knew that there “Japan was so important that we couldn’t permit it 52 “Mr. Miki’s Remarks on East Asia Developments,” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 45. 53 “Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Department of State,” July 23, 1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 43 “Mr. Miki’s Remarks on East Asia Developments,” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 45. 1969–1976, Volume XIX, Part 1, Korea, 1969–1972 (hereafter FRUS XIX, 1, Korea), Document 67, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d67. 44 “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japanese Ministry of Defense, Nov. 27, 1978, https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/ anpo/19781127.html. 54 Jimmy H. Koo, “The Uncomfortable SOFA: Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea and The U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement,” American University National Security Law Brief 1, no. 1 (2011), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol1/iss1/5. 45 “Memorandum from Richard B. Finn, to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green),” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 41. 55 Glenn Baek, “A Perspective on Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam War,” The Asian Institute for Policy Studies, April 9, 2013, http://en.asa- 46 “Japan in the Seventies: The Problem of National Power,” National Intelligence Estimate, June 25, 1970, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 46, ninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-53-a-perspective-on-koreas-participation-in-the-vietnam-war/. Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d46. 56 Leon Whyte, “Evolution of the US-ROK Alliance: Abandonment Fears,” The Diplomat, June 22, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/evo- 47 “Proposal for NSC Review of U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” Memorandum from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the lution-of-the-u-s-rok-alliance-abandonment-fears/. President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Feb. 16, 1971, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 67, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://1991.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d67. 57 “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State,” May 29, 1970, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 59, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d59. 48 “Mr. Miki’s Remarks on East Asia Developments,” FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 45. 58 “Talks Between President Nixon and President Pak,” Memorandum of Conversation, Aug. 21, 1969, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 35, Depart- 49 “Proposal for NSC Review of U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” Memorandum from the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Shakespeare) to ment of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d35. the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Feb. 16, 1971, FRUS XIX, 2, Japan, Document 67, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d67; Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with 59 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea,” Aug. 23, 1970, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 57, https://history.state.gov/ China, 1952-1982,” Pacific Affairs 59, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 402–28, https://doi.org/10.2307/2758327; and Gerald L. Cutis, “US Policy Toward Japan historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d57. from Nixon to Clinton: An Assessment,” in New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis (Tokyo: Japan Center for International 60 “ROK Force Capabilities,” Memorandum from Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for Exchange, 2000), 1–38, https://www.jcie.org/researchpdfs/NewPerspectives/new_curtis.pdf. National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Feb. 26, 1970, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 53, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history. 50 “East Asian Chiefs of Mission Conference, July 9–11, 1970,” Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, July 20, 1970, FRUS state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d53. XIX, 2, Japan, Document 49, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p2/d49. 61 “NSSM–27, US Policy for Korea,” Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative to the National Security Council Review Group 51 Komine, “Whither a ‘Resurgent Japan’”; and Michael J. Green, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance: A Brief Strategic History,” Education About Asia 12, no. (Unger) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger), Feb. 17, 1970, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 52, Department of State, Office of the Histori- 3 (Winter 2007), https://www.asianstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/the-us-japan-alliance-a-brief-strategic-history.pdf. an, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d52.

105 106 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69

military capabilities. Park did not share America’s about the Soviet threat to Japan, they exhibited conviction that South Korea held a military edge much less concern about the North Korean threat over North Korea. Indeed, in 1974, Park’s wife was to South Korea. The United States and South Ko- murdered by a pro-North Korea assassin. Park also rea continued to differ in their views of that threat knew there were those in Washington who favored for years, with Washington judging the likelihood removing even more troops from South Korea, of a major attack as unlikely. This disconnect ex- among them Jimmy Carter, who later ordered the acerbated South Korean concerns about America’s removal of the 2nd Infantry Division from South commitment and led Seoul to consider multiple Korea. Against this backdrop, Park set South Korea ways to decrease reliance on the United States. Al- on a path to build nuclear weapons and the means though accommodation was pursued early in the to deliver them. When the United States objected, 1970s, South Korea eventually opted to develop its Park informed American leaders that the price of own independent capabilities as a hedge against nonproliferation was a commitment to retain U.S. decreasing American commitment.71 troops on the peninsula.69 By 1974, South Korea already had a robust nu- Australia: An Augmenting Ally clear power program and was acquiring a repro- cessing plant that would allow for production of Australia’s response to Nixon’s Guam doctrine enough plutonium for roughly one nuclear weap- was quite different from that of either Japan or on per year. In 1975, a full-fledged nuclear weap- South Korea, in large part because Australia did ons program — Project 890 — was initiated. This not face the same kind of proximate threat. Aus- program included teams working on missile de- tralia has long relied on its alliances with “great and signs and nuclear warheads as well as chemical powerful friends” to defend against instability else- warheads. American leaders grew increasingly where in Asia.72 Nixon’s declaration called this concerned about these efforts and worked hard strategy into question. Australian officials offered to retard their progress. American pressure was public support for Nixon’s approach but privately eventually successful, with U.S. intelligence as- worried about its implications in Southeast Asia, sessments concluding that Park’s “willingness to calling the Guam doctrine “potentially self-contra- suspend 890 was strongly conditioned by the poor dictory” and noting that treaty commitments to posture, or what they believe it to be.”62 the North-South Joint Communiqué signed on July performance [of the Agency for Defense Develop- the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEA- Washington was thus aware that “significant or 4, 1972. Seoul tried to shift from a “strategy of mutu- ment] … and by the lack of any immediate need TO) “seem to have been unofficially shelved.”73 rapid reduction in the US presence could cause anx- al hostility” to a “strategy of hope” with Pyongyang, for nuclear weapons development.”70 That need The result was a significant evolution in Australi- iety to the Koreans and be regarded (by both allies aiming to offset “heavy reliance on the big powers dissipated after U.S. officials provided clearer se- an strategy over the course of the 1970s. While re- and enemies) as evidence that the United States in solving basically their internal affairs.”65 This ac- curity guarantees and demonstrated tougher re- maining committed to the U.S. alliance, Australian had lost interest in meeting its defense commit- commodation effort failed, however, as repeated sponses to North Korean provocations than Park policymakers moved to augment Canberra’s ties to ments in Korea.”63 But Nixon went ahead anyway negotiations proved unable to overcome different and other South Korean leaders had expected. Yet, other regional powers. Nixon’s Guam doctrine also and removed the 7th Infantry Division in 1971. This visions for a reunified Korea.66 Meanwhile, South the United States and South Korea would struggle prompted secondary shifts in Australian strategic came as a “profound shock” to Park, who immedi- Korean leaders requested military equipment and to manage these intra-alliance dynamics for years, thinking, generating both closer ties to China as ately threatened to resign, stating, “If GIs go, I go.”64 substantial assistance from America to help estab- and Seoul would consistently use threats of greater well as a new debate about the value of self-reli- But Park stayed and instead sought to consolidate lish domestic military industries.67 Although the autonomy to shape U.S. policies. ance that continues to reverberate even today. his hold on power, undermining democratic institu- United States eventually provided support for a $1.5 Why did South Korea embrace autonomy after Japan’s World War II military campaign had tions through the Yushin Constitution. The result- billion military modernization scheme, South Korea the Guam doctrine? The evidence provided above served as a powerful reminder to Australians of ing criticism from Washington accelerated alliance was not sufficiently reassured.68 suggests that leaders in Seoul saw the United their vulnerability to external threats. Faced with tensions. During this period, South Korean leaders Washington’s failure to reassure Seoul prompt- States as unreliable in the face of a serious threat the prospect of communist insurgencies across reached out directly to North Korea, culminating in ed the government in Seoul to pursue independent from North Korea. Whereas American policymak- Southeast Asia, Australian policymakers em- ers had demonstrated a high degree of concern braced collective defense arrangements such as 62 “Confrontation in Korea,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, Jan. 30, 1969, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 1, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d1. 69 William Caplan and Kenneth B. Turner, “Reconsidering the Reversal: South Korea’s Nuclear Choices,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Feb. 21, 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/02/reconsidering-the-reversal-south-koreas-nuclear-choices/. 63 “NSSM–27, US Policy for Korea,” FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 52. 70 Chung-in Moon, Peter Hayes, and Scott Bruce, “Park Chung Hee, the US-ROK Strategic Relationship, and the Bomb,” Asia-Pacific Journal 9, 64 Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korean and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), 24. no. 44, Oct. 31, 2011, https://apjjf.org/2011/9/44/Peter-Hayes/3630/article.html. 65 Sung Chul Yang, “The Politics of the North-South Dialogue in Korea,” World Affairs 137, no. 1 (Summer 1974): 55, http://www.jstor.org/sta- 71 Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan, eds. “Preface,” FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/preface. ble/20671543. 72 This phrase was first used by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies to describe Australia’s relationships with the United Kingdom and the 66 Kyung Ae Park and Sung-Chull Lee, “Changes and Prospects in Inter-Korean Relations,” Asian Survey 32, no. 5 (May 1992): 432, https://www.jstor.org/ United States. See Coral Bell, “Strategic Thought and Security Preoccupations in Australia,” in A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 40th stable/2644975. Anniversary of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), ed. Meredith Thatcher and Desmond Ball (Canberra: Australian National University, 67 “Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Department of State,” FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 67. 2006), 1–14. 68 “Military Assistance for Korea,” Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Aug. 73 P. H. Bailey, “Memo by First Assistant Secretary P.H. Bailey to the Secretary of the Department of the Cabinet Office,” Jan. 12, 1970, no. 178, in 22, 1970, FRUS XIX, 1, Korea, Document 70, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- “The Guam Doctrine,” July 1969–Sept. 1970, National Archives of Australia, https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/Interface/ViewImage. 76v19p1/d70. aspx?B=3165068.

107 108 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 the Australia, New Zealand, United States Secu- in 1971 with Nixon’s surprise plans to visit Bei- powerful ally.81 An early sign of the new direction close economic partnership with China. rity Treaty and SEATO. Australia’s strategic con- jing. Nixon’s move humiliated the administration Australia was taking was Whitlam’s decision to re- The years following the Guam doctrine also gave cepts and force design were expressly premised on of Prime Minister William McMahon, which was verse nearly two decades of relative estrangement birth to new debates about Australia’s defense the idea of operating alongside American forces in under pressure from the Labor Party to take a between Australia and India. His 1973 visit to In- strategy, with Australian strategists toying for the a forward defense strategy designed to keep Asian more flexible stance toward China. McMahon pub- dia was the first by an Australian prime minister first time with the idea of self-reliance. As one of- threats from reaching Australia’s shores. Australi- licly offered support for the move, but in private in over a decade. This was accompanied by oth- ficial would later argue, “seventy years of tradition an leaders hoped this strategy would keep Amer- cables to Washington complained, “we were placed er surprising policy moves, such as reversing the in defence thinking seemed to have been trashed ica committed both to the alliance and to region- in a quandary by our lack of any foreknowledge … controversial “White Australia” immigration poli- by the outcome of the Vietnam War.”85 The Austral- al stability. Yet, as the United States began to tire the more so because we have attempted under all cies and taking a more neutral line toward India’s ian Defense Committee’s 1971 paper, “Strategic Ba- of bearing the primary responsibility for beating circumstances to coordinate our policies and sup- relationship with the Soviet Union. sis of Australian Defence Policy,” laid the ground- back communism in Southeast Asia, it increasing- port you.”77 Beyond the domestic political mess Whitlam also made similar moves to engage work for Australia to explore greater autonomy. ly demanded more burden-sharing from Australia, Nixon’s diplomatic engagement created for Can- more closely with Japan and the newly established Forward defense, the paper argued, had become an and the Liberal government responded positive- berra, the move further amplified concerns about Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). outdated concept, as it relied on a U.S. “presence, ly. By 1970, over one-third of Australia’s combat the credibility of U.S. treaty commitments. A ca- Whitlam overruled his own bureaucracy to en- policy and commitment to South East Asia” that forces were fighting alongside the United States in ble from McMahon to Japanese Prime Minister dorse the Japanese government’s proposal for a was no longer guaranteed.86 While acknowledg- Vietnam.74 As one Australian journalist wrote at the Sato opined, “In these circumstances, the seating new, wide-ranging bilateral treaty. Arguing that “it ing that Australia faced no immediate threats, the outset of Australia’s involvement in Vietnam: of [China] and the expulsion of Taiwan [from the would be appropriate for Japan and Australia, in paper argued that the country needed new strate- United Nations] seem unavoidable. Without being a formal context, to acknowledge the very great gic concepts that could address “significant chang- Why is Australia getting involved in the Vi- alarmist, I am obliged to question whether this is interdependence they have on each other,” Whit- es … which will have the potentiality of develop- etnam War? Partly because we think a Com- not in fact what the Americans intend.”78 lam pushed his government to begin drafting what ing, in a later decade, into a more active threat to munist victory there would threaten the Australia therefore faced two conflicting stra- eventually became the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friend- Australia’s security.”87 The idea of autonomy thus rest of South-East Asia and jeopardize our tegic trends in the early 1970s. On the one hand, ship and Co-operation.82 Meanwhile, the Whitlam became a more explicit part of Australia’s strate- security and partly because of the need to Australian leaders believed they faced a relatively government reached out to ASEAN, establishing gy in the 1970s, as codified in its 1972 defense re- convince the Americans that we are more benign security environment. Indeed, Prime Min- itself as the association’s first state-level “dialogue view.88 When the government published its first than paper allies. … It’s a sort of life insur- ister Gough Whitlam’s government thought the partner” and advocating for a new pan-Asian re- public defense white paper in 1976, it outlined the ance cover we’re taking out.75 country faced “no direct military threat(s) for the gional organization that would help integrate rationale behind the concept more explicitly: “[E] next 15 years.”79 On the other, Australia was keenly Southeast Asia and its neighbors.83 ven though our security may be ultimately depend- Australia’s early engagement with the Nix- aware that its longstanding patron was likely to Augmenting ties to other regional players was ent upon US support, we owe it to ourselves to be on administration following the Guam speech play a diminished role in the future. Although Australia’s primary response to the Guam doctrine, able to mount a national defence effort that would was reassuring. During a 1969 visit to the White the Australia, New Zealand, United States Securi- but not its only one. Whitlam was also an early ad- maximise the risks and costs of any aggression.”89 House, Australian Foreign Minister John Gorton ty Treaty remained intact and Australian leaders vocate of taking a more accommodating approach The Guam doctrine thus caused a strategic re- secured assurances that America was still com- assessed that “the United States would remain to China. The mainland government, Whitlam in- consideration in Australia. Leaders in Canberra mitted to both the Australia, New Zealand, Unit- the world’s most powerful nation in economic and sisted, was “Chinese first, Maoist second, and believed Australia enjoyed a relatively secure ex- ed States Security Treaty and SEATO. Gorton, in military terms for years to come,” they were also Communist third.”84 Australia quickly normalized ternal environment and maintained confidence turn, promised, “wherever the United States is re- increasingly conscious that “U.S. power was not its relationship with China. This reconciliation that the United States would protect it against di- sisting aggression, … we will go Waltzing Matilda absolute or unconditional.”80 helped to alleviate Australia’s fears about Chi- rect threats, but they did not rest on their laurels. with you.”76 Two surprising developments shifted The Whitlam government therefore began to nese-backed insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Over Instead, the Whitlam government moved quickly Australia’s strategy. First, Nixon shocked U.S. allies pursue a new strategy: augmenting ties to leading time, Australia, like many other Asian allies, en- to augment Australia’s relationships, building ties with an abrupt reversal on China and a chaotic re- Asian nations, which Whitlam had long believed countered a growing tension between its security with Japan, India, Indonesia, and the Association treat from Vietnam. Second, the Australian Labor would hold increasing sway over Australia’s fu- alliance with the United States and an increasingly of Southeast Asian Nations and even, to a degree, Party won Australia’s 1972 election, returning to ture. In a 1973 speech, Whitlam argued that Asian power for the first time in 22 years. regionalism would be “one of the keystones of The lingering doubts Australian officials had -ex Australia’s foreign policy for the 70s,” marking a 81 Gough Whitlam, “Opening Address by the Prime Minister,” Speech at the Australian Institute of Political Science Summer School, Canberra, Australia, Jan. 27, 1973, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-2803. pressed about American reliability were heightened shift away from the country’s reliance on a single 82 Moreen Dee, “Friendship and Co-Operation: The 1976 Basic Treaty Between Australia and Japan,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia in the World, The Foreign Affairs and Trade Files, no. 3, https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/basic-treaty-between-aus- tralia-and-japan.pdf. 74 Malcolm Fraser and Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2014), 142. 83 Graeme Dobell, “Australia in Asia: Echoes of Whitlam,” The Interpreter, Jan. 6, 2011, https://archive.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/austra- 75 Jeff Doyle, Jeffrey Grey, and Peter Pierce, Australia’s Vietnam War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 46. lia-asia-echoes-whitlam. 76 Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War (Sydney NSW: University of New South Wales Press, 2014), 198. 84 Quoted in Tow, Independent Ally, chap. 6, footnote 71. 77 William McMahon, “Outward Cablegram, Prime Minister William McMahon to U.S. President Richard Nixon,” July 18, 1971, no. 94, in “China 85 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 263. – President Nixon’s Initiative (Including World Reaction),” 1971, National Archives of Australia, https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/ Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=3054113. 86 “The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” Australian Defence Committee, March 1971, accessed at “Australia and the United King- dom, 1960–1975, Vol. 27,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed Feb. 16, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publica- 78 William McMahon, “Outward Cablegram, Prime Minister William McMahon to Japan Prime Minister Sato Eisaku,” July 18, 1971, no. 83, in tions/historical-documents/volume-27/Pages/107-report-by-defence-committee. “China – President Nixon’s initiative (including world reaction),” National Archives of Australia, https://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/ Interface/ViewImage.aspx?B=3054113. 87 Australian Defence Committee, “The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy.” 79 Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War, 255. 88 “Australian Defence Review” Australian Department of Defence, March 1972, https://defence.gov.au/SPI/publications/defreview/1972/Aus- tralian-Defence-Review-1972.pdf. 80 Shannon Tow, Independent Ally: Australia in an Age of Power Transition, Kindle Edition (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Publishing, 2017), chap. 6, footnote 20. 89 “Australian Defence,” Australian Department of Defence, November 1976, 10, https://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/wpaper1976.pdf.

109 110 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 with China. These efforts sought to link Australia liable intelligence that the Thai leaders are current- is a hangover from bygone days.”98 Thailand’s leader- Thailand’s striking about-face was, in large part, more closely to its immediate region, enhancing its ly in a mood of questioning and doubt with regard ship, which saw the plan as a key symbol of alliance a function of necessity. Further U.S. military and relationship with like-minded partners and finding to the firmness of the U.S. intentions in Southeast credibility, made clear it viewed these statements economic disengagement left Thai leaders feeling some amount of accommodation with China in a Asia.”93 Yet, it is possible that the Nixon administra- “not only as a disavowal of a joint contingency plan, they had little choice but to seek a powerful new bid to hedge against future changes in U.S. strate- tion could have weathered these problems. It moved but a reneging on a commitment.”99 partner. On the economic front, Thailand was deal- gy. This regionalism became a hallmark of Austral- early to address Thailand’s abandonment concerns In the face of a U.S. Congress and body politic ing with a weakening economy, made worse by the ian strategy that has endured to the present day.90 by providing high-level assurances of America’s that were hostile to committing forces overseas loss of U.S. financial support as the Vietnam War commitment, not just to SEATO, but also to the and unwilling to provide military aid and support wound down. Bilateral disagreements with the Thailand: An Accommodating Ally 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique.94 Although Thai for allies, the Thai government became deeply po- Nixon administration over U.S. rice sales, which leaders expressed some uncertainty about the po- larized. Division arose between military leaders, undercut the competitiveness of Thailand’s most Perhaps the most concerning type of response tential implications of Nixon’s new plan, they were who remained committed to the United States valuable export, created the impression that Amer- to the announcement of the Guam doctrine was also open to the proposal, expressing the country’s and an anti-communist mission, and civilian lead- ica had become not only an undependable military the decision to accommodate communist pow- willingness “to take care of its own defenses.”95 ers, who increasingly doubted American credibili- ally, but also an unreliable economic partner as ers. Thailand provides the most striking exam- The executive branch in Washington, however, was ty. The problem, as the Thai foreign minister ex- well.104 When the 1973 oil embargo further damaged ple of this response. The steady retreat of U.S. not the only actor shaping Thai perceptions of Amer- plained in a meeting with U.S. officials, was that Thailand’s weak economy, Chinese leaders took ad- forces from Southeast Asia and the slow erosion ican credibility. Over the summer and fall of 1969, the “despite [the] expressed intention of President vantage of the opportunity, offering diesel fuel at of SEATO, both of which had provided a bul- U.S. Senate embarked on a series of hearings that Nixon and his administration,” the Thai govern- a “‘friendship’ price” to ameliorate negative public wark against communist insurgencies, sparked were deeply critical of America’s involvement in Vi- ment could not be certain “whether instability in Thailand.91 These realities and the etnam and that singled out the U.S. commitment to American people were really behind the realization that the United States was unlikely to Thailand. The hearings damaged the alliance on two Nixon Doctrine.”100 By the end of 1969, provide adequate military or economic support fronts. First, they provided a public and highly critical it was clear the Thai government was led Thai leaders to shift their strategy. Foreign accounting of financial support the United States had considering an “agonizing reapprais- Minister Thanat Khoman would later summarize provided to Thai forces, a revelation that suggested al” of its foreign policy and the U.S. the lessons of this period in blunt terms: “For to Thai leaders the alliance was viewed as little more alliance.101 Although the government Thailand, … its disappointing experience with SE- than a mercenary racket.96 This narrative also under- continued to offer private support for ATO taught it the lesson that it was useless and mined the Nixon administration’s ability to provide U.S. efforts in Vietnam, it became less even dangerous to hitch its destiny to distant pow- the Thai government with enhanced military aid, sup- vocal in its support for the United States. perceptions of China among the Thai public.105 The ers who may cut loose at any moment.”92 port the Thai government had made clear was essen- The most notable shift in Thai foreign poli- abrupt fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975 led Thailand had been one of America’s staunchest tial to its self-defense.97 cy was its rapprochement with China. Bangkok’s Thai leaders to reevaluate their security relation- allies throughout the early Cold War, enthusiastical- Second, and perhaps most damaging, was the move toward accommodating Beijing was striking ships as well. They ultimately determined that a ly joining the fight against communism and signing public fight between the Nixon administration and for a government that had been one of the most closer partnership with China might provide a but- a U.S.-Thai logistics agreement that facilitated the Sen. J. William Fulbright over a classified U.S.-Thai rabidly anti-communist regimes in Southeast Asia. tress against potential Vietnamese aggression. By construction of multiple U.S. air bases throughout contingency plan that had been developed under Throughout the 1970s, the Thai government began the early 1980s, the security relationship between the country. Thailand’s centrality to America’s re- the Johnson administration. In seeking to assuage to gradually rehabilitate China’s image with the the two countries had blossomed to such a de- gional military presence, however, revealed the rel- congressional outrage over this new, supposedly se- Thai public, and over the course of the next dec- gree that the head of the People’s Liberation Army ative weakness of America’s security guarantees in cret military commitment to the Thai government, ade, this early accommodation grew into a more General Staff pointedly said, “If Vietnam dared to Southeast Asia — a point of longstanding concern both the secretary of state and secretary of defense substantial strategic partnership.102 Chinese lead- make an armed incursion into Thailand, the Chi- for Thai leaders. As Nixon entered office, a cable publicly disavowed the plan. Secretary of State ers quietly agreed to steps such as shutting down nese army will not stand idle. We will give support from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok warned of “re- William Rogers referred to it as “an appendage that support for the Communist Party of Thailand, to the Thai people to defend their country.”106 while the Thais, in turn, agreed to give the Khmer Accommodation was the most significant shift in Rouge access to Thai territory and stayed neutral Thai foreign policy in the early 1970s, but it was not following China’s attack on Vietnam.103 the only one. Thai leaders also sought to augment 90 Shannon Tow makes the argument that Australia has repeatedly sought greater independence from the United States but has consistently done so from within the confines of the alliance. See Tow, Independent Ally, Introduction, 2–5. 91 Ang Cheng Guan and Joseph Chinyong Liow, “The Fall of Saigon: Southeast Asian Perspectives,” Brookings Institution, April 21, 2015, https:// www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-fall-of-saigon-southeast-asian-perspectives/. 98 “U.S.-Thai Relations,” Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Aug. 25, 1969, FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 20, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d20. 92 Thanat Khoman “ASEAN Conception and Evolution,” The ASEAN Reader, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992, https://asean.org/?stat- ic_post=asean-conception-and-evolution-by-thanat-khoman. 99 “U.S.-Thai Relations,” FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 20. 93 “Congratulatory Message to Thai Prime Minister,” Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, March 17, 1969, Foreign 100 “Secretary’s Meeting with Thai Leaders,” FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 104. Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972 (hereafter FRUS XX, Southeast Asia), Document 6, Department of 101 “Telegram from the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State,” Nov. 1, 1969, FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 33, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d6. State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d33. 94 See American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State Historical Division, 1962), 1091–1093; and 102 Pattajit Tangsinmunkong, “Thai Perceptions of China: the 1960s to the 2010s,” Presentation at Beijing University, May 31, 2019, http://wase- “Secretary Rogers, Prime Minister Thanom Bilateral,” Telegram from the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State,” May 23, 1969, FRUS XX, da-china.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/学生发表合集（文章PPT）.pdf. Southeast Asia, Document 11, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d11 . 103 Tangsinmunkong, “Thai Perceptions of China.” 95 “Secretary’s Meeting with Thai Leaders,” Telegram from the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Jan. 11, 1971, FRUS XX, South- east Asia, Document 104, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d104 . 104 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Vice President Agnew,” Dec. 17, 1969, FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 39, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d39. 96 “Symington Subcommittee,” Telegram from the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, Nov. 20, 1969, FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 38, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v20/d38 . 105 Tangsinmunkong, “Thai Perceptions of China.” 97 “Secretary’s Meeting with Thai Leaders,” FRUS XX, Southeast Asia, Document 104. 106 Tangsinmunkong, “Thai Perceptions of China.”

111 112 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 their regional ties through the newly established As- tionships. Thailand, on the other hand, saw little lessons from the Guam doctrine that apply today. as stronger Asian regionalism.115 Washington will sociation of Southeast Asian Nations. Although the option but to accommodate a country it had pre- have to be careful to encourage allies to become association’s establishment predated the Nixon ad- viously seen as an adversary.109 Two key factors in Lesson 1: Threatening Disengagement Accel- more capable but without leaving the United States ministration, America’s perceived retreat from the determining which pathway a country took were erates Hedging on the sidelines in a region that is trending more region in the early 1970s played a significant part in perceptions of external threats and perceptions intra-Asian and less trans-Pacific. encouraging Thai and other Southeast Asian lead- of alliance reliability. When the threat was seen as In 1969, Nixon’s statements and actions made ers to envision a more meaningful role it. Reflect- high and America viewed as reliable, leaders were crystal clear that the United States would decrease Lesson 2: Transactional Policies Undermine ing Thailand’s growing disaffection with the United more likely to anchor to the United States. When its military presence in some parts of Asia and that Alliances States, Khoman decided to “rely more on neighbor- the threat was perceived as relatively low or Wash- America’s regional allies would increasingly have ly mutual support than on stronger states.”107 Thai ington was seen as unreliable, U.S. allies opted to to handle their own affairs. Nixon’s “Asianization” It was not only the waning American military leaders began to explore a more explicitly Asian autonomize, augment, or accommodate. strategy was, in many ways, the Guam doctrine’s presence in the Pacific that sparked anxiety among strategic orientation. They encouraged the idea of Flashing forward five decades, Trump’s “America greatest success as well as its most glaring weak- U.S. allies in the 1970s. It was also the more trans- a “Southeast Asian Community,” considered new First” approach to alliances reads less like a new ness. On the one hand, the United States got exactly actional economic approach that Nixon embraced border security arrangements with fellow ASEAN script and more like a sequel. Shortly after his elec- what it was seeking: Asian states began to explore when he jettisoned the Bretton Woods system. The member states, and supported Malaysia’s push for tion victory, Trump insisted that U.S. allies had not new options to build autonomous capabilities. Some postwar alliance relationships the United States a neutrality concept aimed at preventing external been “paying their bills,” and questioned the value also sought to strengthen the regional order through established in Asia were rooted in far more than powers from interfering in Southeast Asian affairs.108 of keeping forward deployed forces in Japan and strengthening intra-regional ties between the spokes defense guarantees. American trade and invest- Though Thailand was not enthusiastic about the South Korea.110 He also stated that “we have to be in the “hub and spokes” system. The Guam doctrine ment helped propel the region’s dramatic postwar idea of ASEAN neutrality, its eventual acceptance of unpredictable starting now,” invoking Nixon’s so- thereby accelerated Asian regionalism in a way that growth, especially in allied nations like Japan and a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality declaration called “madman theory” — an effort to ensure that ultimately proved more enduring than collective se- South Korea. The Vietnam War offered further in 1971 was another remarkable policy reversal for “you could never put your finger on what he might curity models centered on the United States, such economic benefits, fueling commercial exports a nation with such a staunch anti-communist tra- do next.”111 Trump also announced in his inaugural as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. and trade with allies and generating substantial dition. The Guam doctrine thus pushed Thailand address that he would reconsider the country’s in- On the other hand, a major shortcoming of Nix- U.S. economic assistance in return for allied con- to rethink how to manage relations with non-Asian ternational role, commenting, “From this moment on’s approach was that it accelerated an “Asia tributions to the war effort.116 The United States powers, resulting in a willingness both to accom- on, it’s going to be America First. Every decision for Asians” narrative that implicitly defined the upended these economic ties when it hit allies with modate communist neighbors as well as to insulate on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign af- United States as an outsider. By fueling the belief a 10 percent tariff on imports and unraveled the Southeast Asia from external influence. fairs, will be made to benefit American workers and that America’s exit from Vietnam was simply the Bretton Woods financial system while also winding American families.”112 precursor to a larger retreat from the region, U.S. down its wartime assistance. Biden has been clear that he plans to take a leaders reduced their leverage to shape allied de- Through these actions, the Nixon administration Lessons from the Guam Doctrine different approach with U.S. allies than his pre- cision-making. Allies such as South Korea sought signaled that the United States was becoming less decessor’s. Indeed, one foreign policy expert has independent capabilities that could have further predictable and reliable — not only as a military As the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Austral- suggested that Biden will shift from an “America destabilized the region, while Australia, Thailand, ally, but as an economic partner as well. The end ia, and Thailand demonstrate, the Guam doctrine af- First” stance to an “Allies First” approach.113 Biden and others built regional ties that distanced them of dollar convertibility into gold, which became fected U.S. allies in different ways. All four countries also portends a return to predictability that allies from the United States. Thus, the devolution of re- known as the “Nixon shock,” introduced new fric- adopted elements of multiple strategies, but each and partners will welcome. But just as the Guam gional responsibilities had both positive and neg- tion into U.S. alliance relationships right at the mo- ally adopted a different mix of approaches. Japan doctrine’s impact continued after Nixon resigned, ative effects. It tied regional states more closely ment when U.S. allies were also beginning to ex- largely doubled down on its alliance with the Unit- future U.S. policymakers will likely have to contend together, but in doing so it also undermined Amer- plore new trade relationships with China. Over the ed States, while South Korea and Australia sought with the reverberations of America First long after ica’s leverage in the years ahead. next three decades, Asian allies sought increasingly to increase their leverage and hedge against pos- the Trump presidency. As is often the case, histo- This lesson should provide a warning for leaders closer economic ties with Beijing, which repeatedly sible U.S. disengagement by building independent ry does not repeat itself but it does rhyme. Thus, in Washington. When faced with uncertainty about capitalized on the perceived economic absence of military capabilities or investing in regional rela- the Biden administration should keep in mind four America’s commitment, most regional states are the United States during both the Asian financial unlikely to double down on their alignment with crisis and the more recent pandemic-induced re- Washington. As Kori Schake has noted, “when the cession. In short, transactional American economic 107 Thanat Khoman, “ASEAN Conception and Evolution.” United States steps back, its allies step back even policies accelerated the adoption of transactional 108 Kei Koga, “The Process of ASEAN’s Institutional Consolidation in 1968-1976: Theoretical Implications for Changes of Third-World Security 114 Oriented Institution,” RSIS Working Paper, no. 234, Feb. 24, 2012, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/138882/WP234.pdf. further.” From the push by allies like South Ko- allied security policies. 109 One difficulty in assessing this period is that many U.S. allies had multiple reasons to increase their ties to communist countries, particularly rea to expand their domestic defense industries to Looking forward, if the United States hopes to China. Not only was the United States disengaging from Asia but by 1972, Washington was also engaging Beijing and signaling that it would switch the adoption of two new regional trade pacts, the incentivize its allies to anchor rather augment, au- recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The fact that many Asian states followed suit is not necessarily indicative of a propensity toward accommodation. Instead, it could simply be seen as closer alignment with the policies of the United States. past few years have seen U.S. allies in Asia once tonomize, or accommodate, it will need to focus again openly advocate strategic autonomy as well on the economic underpinnings of its alliance rela- 110 Jacob Gardenswartz, “Transcript: President Donald Trump’s Rally in Melbourne, Florida,” Vox, Feb. 18, 2017, https://www.vox. com/2017/2/18/14659952/trump-transcript-rally-melbourne-florida. 111 Trump quoted in Nick Wadhams, “Trump’s ‘Unpredictable Starting Now’ Foreign Policy Is Here,” Bloomberg, Dec. 4, 2016, https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-05/trump-s-unpredictable-starting-now-foreign-policy-already-here; and “madman theory” described in 114 Kori Schake, “Back to Basics: How to Make Right What Trump Gets Wrong,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 3 (May/June 2019), https://www.foreig- Barton Swaim, “Opinion: How Might Nixon’s ‘Madman Theory’ Apply to Trump?” Washington Post, Dec. 15, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ naffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/back-basics. blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/12/15/how-might-nixons-madman-theory-apply-to-trump/. 115 Evelyn Goh, “ASEAN-Led Multilateralism and Regional Order: The Great Power Bargain Deficit,” International Relations and Asia’s Southern 112 “Inaugural Address: Trump’s Full Speech,” CNN, Jan. 20, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/index.html. Tier, ed. Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (Singapore: Springer, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3171-7_4. 113 Leandro Dario, “Anne-Marie Slaughter: ‘Climate Is Clearly Biden’s Top Priority,’” Buenos Aires Times, Dec. 26, 2020, https://www.batimes.com. 116 Tae Yang Kwak, “The Nixon Doctrine and the Yusin Reforms: American Foreign Policy, the Vietnam War, and the Rise of Authoritarianism in ar/news/world/anne-marie-slaughter-climate-is-clearly-bidens-top-priority.phtml. Korea, 1968–1973,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 12 no. 1–2 (Spring/Summer 2003): 41, https://doi.org/10.1163/187656103793645315.

113 114 The Strategist America’s Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of ‘69 tionships. Transactional relationships based only in approach and ambivalence toward overseas commit- two different periods, some historical similarities are United States remains powerful, principled, pres- shared short-term interests are difficult to maintain. ments may not have been an aberration but could unmistakable. Of America’s allies in Asia, Japan was ent, and predictable. Economic power and influence have given Beijing represent a new turn in American foreign policy.121 A the most comfortable working with Trump, largely This is a tall task, but there is reason for opti- not just clout, but substantial leverage over U.S. clear alignment between the White House and Cap- doubling down on the alliance just as it did under mism about the future of U.S. alliances in Asia. The allies and partners. One need look no further than itol Hill will be necessary to convince Asian leaders Nixon. South Korea struggled with the unpredict- United States still retains many of its longstanding China’s use of economic statecraft against Japan in and Asian publics that the United States will remain ability of both American presidents, leading to its advantages, especially when compared to China. 2010, the Philippines in 2012, Vietnam in 2014, South trustworthy in the years ahead, regardless of whom pursuit of more independent capabilities. Australia First, Washington has dozens of treaty allies and Korea in 2017, or Australia in 2020 to see the effect the American public elects as president. worked in both eras to maintain U.S. engagement a global network of partners. Second, America has Beijing’s economic power is having in the region.117 U.S. allies need to be convinced that presiden- while also deepening its ties with other regional a record of fighting on behalf of its friends around Equally important, regional assessments of Ameri- tial initiatives enjoy support from the legislative security partners as a hedge against American dis- the world. Third, U.S. leaders have often champi- can decline are based largely on perceptions of wan- branch and that any U.S. commitments have engagement. And Thailand sought greater outreach oned (albeit imperfectly) shared values and prin- ing U.S. economic influence and its inward turn on sufficient bipartisan backing to ensure they will to China under both Nixon and Trump, while still ciples that appeal to many of its allies and part- trade.118 U.S. leaders will need to assure allies that endure beyond a single administration. The Oba- maintaining military ties with the United States. ners. Finally, despite Trump’s embrace of America Washington has a plan to restore its economic lead- ma and Trump administrations were both criti- These similarities are not mere coincidences. First rhetoric, foreign publics still trust the United ership in the Pacific in addition to restoring its mil- cized by regional allies for failing to adequately Alignment decisions in Asia are driven by many of States more than China. These substantial and en- itary presence. Better aligning U.S. alliances around implement their Asia strategies.122 As the Biden the same structural factors today as they were 50 during advantages are the reasons why most coun- shared principles and institutions will therefore be administration seeks to craft new Indo-Pacific in- years ago. The region’s geography has not changed: tries in Asia would prefer more U.S. engagement, key for the United States going forward. itiatives, it will need to win legislative buy-in to Japan and South Korea are stuck in Northeast not less. However, if the United States does not de- see them through. Fortunately, Congress is plac- Asia, near the most likely zones of regional con- liver on promises to sustain regional engagement, Lesson 3: Enduring Policies Require Congres- ing ever greater attention on the Indo-Pacific. Re- flict, while Australia and Thailand are thousands of most Asian countries will avoid anchoring and turn sional Support cent support for the Asia Reassurance Initiative miles away. Meanwhile, Japan and Australia tend to toward alternative strategies.125 and Pacific Deterrence Initiative has been noticed expect the United States to be committed to their Few American allies in Asia look back at the sum- The disconnect between the Nixon administration throughout the region.123 The executive and legis- security because U.S. forces are reliant on their mer of ‘69 with any sense of nostalgia. But keeping and the legislative branch over the country’s over- lative branches should build on this momentum. territory for basing access and on their forces for in mind the lessons of the Guam doctrine can help seas commitments was a significant obstacle to im- coalition operations. South Korean and Thai lead- the United States avoid repeating its alliance errors plementing the Guam doctrine.119 Although the Nix- Lesson 4: Structural Factors Drive Alignment ers have been more concerned about the prospects 50 years later. America’s experiences following the in- on administration provided repeated assurances to of abandonment by Washington in both periods, troduction of the Guam doctrine suggests that if the Asian allies about America’s enduring role as a Pacific At first glance, it might seem that the Nixon doc- in part because they play less direct roles in bal- country can leverage its advantages, U.S. allies and power and its willingness to offer assistance, U.S. al- trine has little to do with regional dynamics now, ancing against the chief great-power threats to the partners will be more confident in continued U.S. en- lies became increasingly skeptical that the executive over half a century later. The Soviet Union has since United States. In 1969 and 2016, American leaders gagement and will share more of the burden. branch could deliver on its promises.120 Allies such as dissolved, U.S. allies have flourished, China has ris- sought to refocus on great-power competition by South Korea and Thailand found themselves repeat- en, and many Asian states have democratized. Fur- shifting more of the burden on allies and partners. Lindsey Ford was formerly a David M Rubin- edly disappointed by promises of aid and support thermore, it is hard to think of two more unique lead- Although Nixon’s and Trump’s policies differed in stein fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Insti- that failed to materialize, which contributed to their ers or time periods in recent America history than many ways, structural similarities drove U.S. allies tution. She is currently serving as the deputy assis- eventual decisions to seek greater autonomy and an Richard Nixon in the late 1960s or Donald Trump in to adopt similar alignment choices in both eras. tant secretary of defense for South and Southeast accommodation with Beijing. the second decade of the 21st century. In short, why Asia. The views expressed in this article are those of Today, the combination of perceived American un- should observers believe that Asia in 1969 holds any the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the reliability and Chinese aggressiveness is creating sim- lessons for approaches to the region in 2021? Conclusion official views of the Department of Defense. ilar alliance management challenges. Foreign leaders Although it would indeed be unwise to draw a are weighing the prospect that Trump’s transactional direct connection between ally decisions in these Polling indicates that many Asians perceived the Zack Cooper is a research fellow at the American United States under Trump as weak, unprincipled, Enterprise Institute and conducted much of this re- disengaged, and unpredictable.124 In recent years, search under a grant from the National Asia Research 117 For more on these cases, see Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Mea- allies have indicated that they are considering op- Program, supported by the National Bureau of Asian sures,” Center for a New American Security, June 2018, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/China_Use_FINAL-1.pdf?m- time=20180604161240; and Natasha Kassam, “Great Expectations: The Unraveling of the Australia-China Relationship,” Brookings Institution, July tions beyond anchoring to the United States, in- Research and Institute for National Strategic Studies. 20, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/great-expectations-the-unraveling-of-the-australia-china-relationship/. cluding augmenting, autonomizing, and accom- 118 Hugh White, “Without America: Australia in the New Asia,” Quarterly Essay, no. 68, (November 2017), https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/ modating. There is bipartisan support to reverse Acknowledgements: The authors would like to essay/2017/11/without-america. these trends, but America’s experience after Nix- thank Emily Carr, Annie Kowalewski, Harry Lee, and 119 Earl G. Ravenal, “The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments,” Foreign Affairs 49, no. 2 (January 1971), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/asia/1971-01-01/nixon-doctrine-and-our-asian-commitments. on’s Guam doctrine suggests that it will take time. Michael Tan for their excellent research support. And Washington’s success will vary substantially 120 Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 59–74, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2006.00287.x. depending on the circumstances of the ally or part- Image: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (photo by Pfc. 121 For example, see “The Security and Defense Agenda (As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011),” ner in question. Regardless, American leaders will Karish Mattingly) Washington Post, June 10, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-security-and-defense-agenda-as-delivered-by-secretary-of-defense- have to convince their Asian counterparts that the robert-gates-brussels-belgium-june-10-2011/2011/06/10/AGqlZhOH_story.html. 122 Yoichi Funabashi, “Why a New Asia Policy Is Needed Under Biden,” Japan Times, Jan. 17, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opin- ion/2021/01/17/commentary/world-commentary/api-biden-asia/. 124 Sharon Seah, et al., The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 (Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2021/01/The-State-of-SEA-2021-v2.pdf. 123 Lalit K. Jha, “US to Establish Pacific Deterrence Initiative to Counter China,” Outlook India, Dec. 7, 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/ newsscroll/us-to-establish-pacific-deterrence-initiative-to-counter-china/1989121. 125 Seah, et al., The State of Southeast Asia, 50–51.

115 116 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

The Biden administration, as well as future administrations, U.S. NATIONAL should look to the national security strategy planning efforts of previous administrations for lessons on how to craft a strategy that establishes a competitive approach to America’s rivals that is SECURITY STRATEGY: both toughminded and sustainable in order to guide U.S. foreign, defense, and budget policies and decision-making. In this article, LESSONS LEARNED Paul Lettow gives a history of the processes and strategies of past administrations, beginning with the Eisenhower administration, and draws out the lessons to be learned from them.

PAUL LETTOW n keeping with the practice of U.S. admin- efforts of previous administrations for lessons on istrations for the past several decades, the how to do just that. A number of those lessons are Biden administration is likely to produce positive but are underappreciated today — and a national security strategy within its first some are cautionary, pointing to flaws in outlook yearI or two. Indeed, it has already signaled that it or process that the Biden administration and fu- will begin work on one.1 It will do so while con- ture administrations ought to avoid. fronting an international environment character- Most presidents since Harry Truman have pro- ized by increasingly intense geopolitical challenges duced a written national security strategy, or some- to the United States — most prominently and com- thing akin to it. During the Cold War, national se- prehensively from China, but also from a Russia curity strategies often took the form of a classified determined to play spoiler and destabilizer when written directive to executive branch departments and where it can, and from Iran, North Korea, and and agencies as part of a systematic planning pro- other powers and threats at a more regional level. cess involving senior White House national secu- President Joe Biden has stated that the United rity officials and cabinet secretaries. These strate- States and China, in particular, are engaged in “ex- gies focused, for the most part, on competing with treme competition,”2 while CIA Director William the Soviet Union and its allies. Sometimes, those Burns has said that China is the “most signifi- overarching strategy documents sparked an on- cant threat [and] challenge” to the United States going planning process that generated classified throughout the foreseeable future and that “[o] strategies addressing specific regional or function- ut-competing China will be key to our national al subjects. Since the end of the Cold War, presi- security.”3 To increase the likelihood of long-term dential administrations have issued national secu- outcomes that favor the United States, the admin- rity strategies only in unclassified form for public istration should focus its national security strat- consumption. Those public documents were often egy on establishing a competitive approach to products of a far less rigorous and analytical pro- America’s rivals — especially China — that is both cess than those which had been pursued by Cold toughminded and sustainable in order to guide War presidents and more closely resembled an ex- U.S. foreign, defense, and budget policies and de- tended speechwriting exercise, disconnected from cision-making. The president and his team should any prior or ongoing systematic planning. look to the national security strategy planning The Trump administration broke with that post-

1 Biden issued interim national security strategic guidance “even as we begin work on a National Security Strategy.” Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the interim guidance “gives initial direction to our national security agencies so that they can get to work right away while we keep developing a more in-depth national security strategy over the next few months.” See Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/. 2 Regarding China, Biden said: “[W]e need to not have a conflict. But there’s going to be extreme competition.” Joe Biden, interview by Norah O’Donnell, Face the Nation, Feb. 7, 2021, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-interview-iran-sanctions-nuclear-agreement/. 3 Burns, during his confirmation hearing, added that China is “the biggest geopolitical test that we face.” Martin Matishak, “Biden’s CIA pick vows to focus on a rising China,” Politico, Feb. 24, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/24/cia-william-burns-china-471354.

117 118 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

Cold War trend by taking a hybrid approach. It is- This article draws on a review of available his- allows for input from the president’s cabinet, thus ing out the most critical national interests: the sued a public national security strategy document torical records of a number of previous national ensuring, as much as possible, a unified sense of physical security of the nation and its people, the followed by classified internal directives on specific security strategies, as well as interviews with eight direction to guide the administration’s efforts. maintenance of the country’s constitutional sys- regions and functional topics. The administration’s former national security advisers and many other tem and values, and an international environment national security strategy emphasized the geopolit- senior officials involved in shaping previous nation- conducive to American prosperity. It should set out ical threats posed by great-power rivals, especially al security planning efforts. It gleans from those Why Develop a clear objectives as well as the means necessary to China, and the need for a competitive U.S. strate- sources lessons and principles that apply both to National Security Strategy? preserve U.S. interests over the long term, especial- gy in response.4 Those basic substantive premises the process of developing a national security strat- ly in light of other international actors, including have earned widespread acceptance, even as they egy and to the substantive elements of the most Before examining the most useful aspects of na- great-power rivals, that are pursuing interests and marked a departure from post-Cold War national successful examples. It attempts to shed light on tional security strategies — the what and how — it objectives often directly at odds with those of the security strategies that had downplayed — or mis- how to increase the chances that a national secu- is helpful to understand why presidential admin- United States. It should also account for and em- apprehended — the threats posed by China, Rus- rity strategy will be effective — that is, to guide istrations pursue them. The Biden administration phasize what a president and his team believe they sia, and other state actors that have challenged the an administration’s national security policies, to is likely to produce a written national security must achieve as well as what they will not accept United States over the last several decades. achieve the objectives that strategy outlines by the strategy in part because of custom and law. The and thus must prevent or counteract. A national The United States is at a transitional and con- means it proposes, and to set a foundation upon pattern stretching back for decades of presidential security strategy affords an administration the op- sequential moment. It is newly alert to an era of which future administrations can build. administrations issuing a national security strategy portunity to consider those interests, threats, and great-power competition. The Biden administra- This article first sets out why a president should document generates expectations that the Biden objectives dispassionately, comprehensively, and tion seems to grasp that it should accept and build develop a national security strategy. It then address- administration will follow suit. And a federal stat- systematically, rather than having to try to come on the basic premises and many of the elements es the what and how of national security strategic ute, in place since the Goldwater-Nichols national up with various plans in reaction to disparate crises of its predecessor’s national security strategy, planning by giving a brief history of how adminis- security reforms of the mid-1980s, states that the once they have been forced on the United States, while pursuing more predictable policies and turn- trations from the Cold War onward have, or have president “shall transmit to Congress each year” a when the willingness to consider overall enduring ing away from the vagaries, moral relativism, and not, conducted strategic planning and by identifying national security strategy.6 Over the last two dec- interests and priorities is at a minimum. transactional nature of Trump, which, in ways big some of the consequences of those decisions. The ades, that provision has been honored mainly in Second, a national security strategy can set a di- and small, often proved counterproductive to his article concludes by distilling the lessons from those the breach: Beginning with the George W. Bush ad- rection for an administration, shaping day-to-day own administration’s national security strategy.5 past efforts that may be of help as the Biden admin- ministration, presidents have, sensibly, produced policy and decision-making. It can provide coher- More broadly, the United States is out of prac- istration and future administrations undertake na- one national security strategy for each four-year ence, allowing officials to place discrete issues and tice at developing and pursuing a strategy of high- tional security strategic planning in a difficult, com- term, rather than annually, which would be unnec- actions within the framework, terms, and priorities stakes, long-term geopolitical competition. Such a petitive international environment. essary and perhaps unhelpful. While the statutory set out in the strategy. President Dwight Eisen- strategy, adjusted and corrected over time, ought In summary, the president ought to adapt to the provision has served the purpose of encouraging hower, leading a meeting of his National Security to garner enough bipartisan congressional and present circumstances the best elements of the rig- presidents to develop a national security strategy, Council to consider a draft of a basic national se- public support to endure, be firm in pressing Amer- orous, analytical planning processes that generated it has also coincided with the post-Cold War era of curity policy, emphasized that principle. According ica’s formidable advantages in acute but peaceful successful national security strategies during the national security strategies that were unclassified, to the meeting minutes, “he pointed out that even competition, and be sufficiently far-sighted and Cold War. These include: a classified process that designed primarily for public consumption, and as you dealt with day-to-day problems you needed disciplined to make investments in resources, at- focuses on understanding the nature of America’s mostly disconnected from rigorous planning pro- some kind of a philosophy as a general guide to tention, and time to best position the United States adversaries, what they are up to, and why; a net cesses — a cross between a speech and a check- action.”7 In setting out that directional guidance, a to succeed over the long run. assessment to analyze America’s advantages and the-box exercise. The congressional requirement national security strategy can prioritize particular There is thus much to be gained by reassessing vulnerabilities relative to its rivals; incorporation has been, at best, a mixed blessing and ought to be objectives and the means to achieve them, while al- the advantages that accrue from a sound national of that comparative analysis in the ensuing strate- reexamined. lowing for flexibility and adaptability in execution. security strategy, and the prerequisites and ele- gy directive, such that the strategy aims to assert In addition, the Biden administration, like every This, in turn, allows officials, from the president ments of a successful strategy, as well as the pit- America’s relative advantages, shore up its vulner- presidential administration, has its own reasons on down, to prioritize the allocation of resources falls that should be avoided. There are important abilities, and exploit adversaries’ weaknesses; an for producing a national security strategy. At their — including of their individual and collective time differences between America’s rivals today — their approach designed to meet challenges from China best, written national security strategies can serve and policy goals — rationally and intentionally, nature and the challenges they pose and the type and other rivals on a sustainable basis, obviating multiple purposes. in line with the overall strategy. A national secu- of competition they require — and the rivals of the the need for wild swings from periods of repose to First, a national security strategy can identify and rity strategy thereby helps avoid the “tyranny of Cold War era. This article looks to post-World War frenetic reaction, building on the useful aspects of prioritize the most important U.S. interests, the the inbox” that can otherwise plague senior offi- II history not to encourage replicating it, but to the Trump national security strategy, and increas- threats to those interests, and the objectives that cials and cause them to spend their time and effort understand the principles and practices that can ing the likelihood for public and congressional sup- America must pursue to secure those interests. on distracting, secondary issues without making help the country navigate through the storms that port over the long term; and a planning process A national security strategy should start with lay- meaningful progress on established U.S. priorities. surely lie ahead. that is driven by the White House but nevertheless

6 War and National Defense, U.S. Code 50 (2015), § 3043. On the legislative mandate, see Catherine Dale, National Security Strategy: Man- 4 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/up- dates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Aug. 6, 2013, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43174.pdf; loads/2020/04/2017.pdf. Nathan J. Lucas and Kathleen J. McInnis, The 2015 National Security Strategy: Authorities, Changes, Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44023.pdf; and Kathleen J. McInnis, “The 2017 National Security Strategy: Issues for Con- 5 See Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March/April gress,” Congressional Research Service, Dec. 19, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10842.pdf 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning. Campbell is now coordinator for the Indo-Pacific on the White House National Security Council staff. Ratner is now special assistant to the secretary of defense and leads the Department of Defense’s China 7 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, October 7, 1953,” Foreign Relations of the Task Force. In his confirmation hearing, Burns stated that “out-competing China” requires “a long-term clear-eyed bipartisan strategy.” Matishak, United States [hereafter FRUS], 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1 [hereafter FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1], Document 94, Department “Biden’s CIA Pick.” of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d94.

119 120 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

Third, a national security strategy also helps en- course corrections over time if they periodically re- Washington in February 1946 while he was serving argued that the Soviets thus posed an enormous sure that the different departments and agencies visit and revise as necessary the premises and ob- as U.S. chargé d’affaires in Moscow.10 It was a re- challenge to American interests, but that the Unit- under the president operate in alignment with jectives of the strategy. As an administration pro- sponse to earnest queries from a Washington mys- ed States could best meet it not by belligerence or one another in terms of understanding and direc- gresses, however, a national security strategy can tified as to why the Soviet Union, America’s recent inaction, but through adopting a thoughtful, long- tion. As will be seen, a process that allows sen- also allow them to assess and reject ill-considered ally in the war, was not being more constructive term strategy. Kennan also noted that the nature of ior cabinet-level officials to give their input and arguments or ideas that may be vocally advocat- in cooperating with U.S. plans for the post-war in- the threat meant that the United States had impor- requires them to sign off on the strategy, or at ed for but would ultimately diverge from, or even ternational system. Kennan, a specialist in Russia’s tant advantages. The Soviet Union did not take un- least requires them to understand and acquiesce work at cross-purposes with, the overall strategy. language, history, and culture, was serving his sec- necessary risks when faced with strong opposition to a clear presidential decision regarding strategy, Finally, a national security strategy can help keep ond tour in the Soviet Union and had observed in or likely defeat. It was, relatively, the less powerful tends to ensure that differences among senior offi- a president and his team focused on how best to person Joseph Stalin’s show trials and the opacity force, and because it was overextended and purely cials are comprehended, addressed, and resolved position the country over the long term, by clari- and duplicity of the Soviet leadership. Brooding, dictatorial, it was deeply flawed.12 upfront. This helps avoid an administration being fying and prioritizing the investments that have to sensitive, and possessed of a keen, cynical mind, A year after sending the cable, Kennan anony- consumed by disagreements over basic premises be made now to increase the chances of positive Kennan had despaired that the U.S. government mously authored a Foreign Affairs article titled and directions for years. outcomes in the future. This includes everything up to that point had understood neither the na- “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in which he Fourth, in setting out national security priorities from research and development efforts to overseas ture of Stalin’s Soviet Union nor its implications developed his thesis that the Soviet Union bore and the means necessary to achieve them, a na- bases and deployments to maintaining access to for the United States. In fielding the inquiries from within it the seeds of its own decay, and that U.S. tional security strategy allows a president and his global commons and influence over international Washington, he took the opportunity to help his policies could “increase enormously the strains team to take the initiative in order to create pos- standards-setting institutions. A national security government, as the telegram stated, “apprehend” under which Soviet policy must operate” with the itive outcomes and head off unacceptable ones, strategy does not just match ends to means in the aim, ultimately, of “promot[ing] rather than being forced to take a reactive or de- near-term. It can and should also underscore the tendencies which must eventual- fensive position in response to situations or cri- need to husband and generate the resources that ly find their outlet in either the ses brought about by other actors. A proactive ap- will be essential over the long run. Indeed, a prop- break-up or the gradual mellow- proach, as Henry Kissinger noted while serving as erly conceived national security strategy requires ing of Soviet power.” He wrote, national security adviser, helps ensure that policies that an administration conceptualize, marshal, fatefully, that U.S. policy “must “are not simply tactical responses to immediate and invest in resources in the near term to enable be that of a long-term, patient situations.”8 It encourages and guides officials in success years later, as the best of those strategies but firm and vigilant contain- shaping the decision-making environment in which have emphasized. That is especially so during an ment of Russian expansionist competitor nations operate. era of intensifying great-power competition, with tendencies.”13 Fifth, when crises do arise, officials do not have China growing in power and employing that power Kennan did not set out a grand to assess and deal with them starting from a blank to shape the international environment in its own unified theory for U.S. foreign slate. Instead, they can place the crisis within the favor for the future. that problem and “recognize [it] for what it is.”11 relations based on blue-sky thinking about Amer- overall strategic context, including the most im- The Long Telegram was clear-eyed and stark in ica’s preferences for what the world ought to look portant and enduring U.S. interests and objectives its description of the Soviet leadership, its mo- like. He was not given to wishcasting as a prem- that they have identified and prioritized in ad- The “What” and “How” of tives, and its modus operandi. Combining a tra- ise for American policy. His contribution lay in vance. A strategy can help avoid over-reacting or National Security Strategic Planning: ditional insecurity and a desire to bring together understanding and explaining, compellingly and under-reacting to crises, or becoming befuddled or A Brief History unchallengeable authority and Marxist dogma, resonantly, what Soviet leaders were up to — their overwhelmed by them. In short, it can help prevent Soviet leaders “found justification for their in- motives, interests, and aims, and how they pur- stumbling into disasters by inaction or unwise ac- Kennan and the Birth of Cold War Strategy stinctive fear of [the] outside world, for the dicta- sued them — and what that meant for the United tion for want of a pre-existing framework in which torship without which they did not know how to States. In illuminating the latter, Kennan was able issues and events can be properly prioritized and Looming large over the problem of how to de- rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, to observe that through embracing a competitive considered. Eisenhower was well aware of the ben- velop a sound national security strategy, and what for sacrifices they felt bound to demand.” Kennan but peaceful long-term strategy, the United States efit of advance planning during crisis management, elements it should include, is the legacy of George warned that the Soviet regime continually sought could help to foster the conditions that would pro- and it furthered his determination to lead a sys- F. Kennan. But it is essential to understand what to increase its strength and prestige internally and duce a solution to the challenge posed by the So- tematic national security planning process with his it was about Kennan’s contribution that was so externally, and that it would aim to destabilize viets. senior officials.9 consequential to the formation of U.S. strategy and Western powers and divide them from each other In a kind of “Big Bang” at the start of the Cold Sixth, a properly designed, ongoing strategic what its relevance is today. while expanding its own geopolitical influence. He War in 1946 and 1947, Kennan thus identified the planning process can also help the president and Kennan’s signal statement — the “Long Tele- his National Security Council to make appropriate gram” — came in the form of a cable he sent to 10 “The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State,” Feb. 22, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Volume VI, Document 475, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v06 (also known as “The Long Telegram”). This section also draws from Paul Lettow, “Parallel Lives,” National Review 61, no. 19 (Oct. 19, 2009): 43–45; George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown & Co. 1967); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969); and Nicholas Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War, reissue ed. (London: Picador, 2010; New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 2009). 8 “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Feb. 16, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, 11 Kennan, “The Long Telegram.” Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972 [hereafter FRUS, 1969–1976, I], Document 58, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d58. 12 Kennan, “The Long Telegram.” 9 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University 13 George F. Kennan (X), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4, (July 1947), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/rus- Press, 1998), 89, 258–59. sian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct.

121 122 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned threat posed by the Soviet Union and, in light war bedeviled the administration over the ensuing In their first few months in office, Eisenhower and uted that paragraph from the meeting summary as of that threat, the basic premises that would three years and had ground to a stalemate by the Cutler set up a new committee chaired by Cutler — a separate action memorandum to the National Se- ultimately guide American strategy for decades. time Eisenhower took office. the Policy Planning Board — that consisted of sen- curity Council members — who had already heard It fell to others to craft the strategies for each ad- Eisenhower was a habitual planner who sought to ior planning officials selected from throughout the the president’s message in person — “for the infor- ministration, however, including for Truman. Paul take the initiative rather than respond defensively departments and agencies. The board’s mission was mation and guidance of the Council and its advisory Nitze, building on the premises and insights that to events. He was emphatic that America needed to provide discussion papers and drafts for consid- and subordinate groups.”23 Kennan had established, led the drafting of the to pursue a Cold War strategy that was compre- eration at the National Security Council meetings. With the aid of the Policy Planning Board, Eisen- classified NSC-68 in 1950, which wove together hensive, consistent, and built for the long haul. He Throughout his pre-presidential career, Eisenhower hower’s National Security Council systematically military, political, and ideological policies into an was attentive to the strengths and vulnerabilities of had been frustrated and dismayed by bureaucrat- reviewed and assessed the Truman administra- assertive and coherent whole. It focused in particu- America and its allies relative to their adversaries ic wrangling and rivalries — not least the parochi- tion’s Cold War strategy, including its principles, lar on the hard power — especially military forces and to the need to marshal and deploy resources in al fights among the military services when it came means, planning documents, and budgets, identify- — perceived as necessary to operationalize con- the short term to increase the likelihood of positive to the budget process, fights that Eisenhower saw ing elements that would be preserved and strength- tainment of the Soviet Union.14 outcomes in the future. He sought to wage a vigor- as inimical to pursuing sensible strategy. The stra- ened, and those that would be jettisoned.24 ous, sustained competition with the Soviet Union, tegic planning process that he and Cutler devised Eisenhower and his National Security Council Strategic Planning Under Eisenhower communist China, and communist satellites in the reflected his experience and personality.20 Eisen- then set out and considered different strategic Cold War, and to do it on terms that favored the hower underscored that while members of the Poli- alternatives for a long-term approach to the Cold Before taking office as president, Eisenhower had United States.18 cy Planning Board would represent their respective War, in an exercise known as Project Solarium. The led the Allied invasions of North Africa and of West- Understanding the purposes and advantages of departments and agencies, they would also serve president assembled three teams, each drawn from ern Europe, commanded the Allied Expeditionary sound strategy better than perhaps any president the president and the National Security Council experts inside and outside of government, to study Force in Europe to victory over the Axis powers, and before or since, Eisenhower prioritized the establish- overall and must pursue their work accordingly. Ei- and present on a different basic approach. Alterna- served as Army chief of staff and as supreme allied ment of a rigorous planning process to develop a na- senhower himself approved and appointed each of tive A, which drew on and refined elements of the commander of NATO. He knew the value of plan- tional security strategy. His National Security Coun- the board members, and he sent presidential letters Truman strategy, would “maintain over a sustained ning. And he was determined to impose a rigorous cil — the president, vice president, secretaries of to them charging them with their duties.21 The writ- period armed forces to provide for the security of strategic planning process in the White House. Ei- state, defense, and the treasury, and the senior-most ten summary of a National Security Council meeting the United States and to assist in the defense of senhower shared Kennan’s basic assessment of the military, budget, intelligence, and other relevant of- from Eisenhower’s first year includes the following vital areas of the free world,” “continue to assist threat that the Soviets posed to America’s interests ficials — generally met once a week throughout Ei- statement by Eisenhower, captured in the third per- in building up the economic and military strength and of Soviet methods. He also agreed that, on bal- senhower’s presidency, devoting much of their time son used by the notetaker: of the free world,” and “exploit the vulnerabilities ance, the United States was the stronger power. He during the first year to strategic planning through of the Soviets and their satellites by political, eco- believed that the nature of the Soviet system and of a rigorous process overseen by Eisenhower and his Noted a statement by the President of his nomic and psychological measures.” It would be Soviet geopolitical overreach itself made the Soviet national security adviser, Robert Cutler. conception of the NSC as being a corporate “interpreted and administered” on the basis that Union vulnerable.15 At the beginning of that process, Cutler had not- body composed of individuals advising the “if we can build up and maintain the strength of Eisenhower was also exasperated by what he saw ed to Eisenhower that the president, as chairman of President in their own right, rather than as the free world during a period of years, Soviet pow- as the erratic nature of the Truman administration, the National Security Council, “should exercise that representatives of their respective depart- er will deteriorate or relatively decline to a point especially its swing from making drastic cuts to the leadership by asking for views around the table so ments and agencies. Their function should be which no longer constitutes a threat to the security national security budget in the immediate post- as to bring out conflicts and so as to create a sense to seek, with their background of experience, of the United States and to world peace.” Kennan, war years — which Eisenhower knew was danger- of team participation among those present in mak- the most statesmanlike solution to the prob- who had been closely associated with the Truman ous and foolhardy in the dawning Cold War — to ing the policy which they must later carry out.” That lems of national security, rather than to reach administration, was brought in to lead Team A. a surge in spending, in part to meet the demands suggestion corresponded with Eisenhower’s own solutions which represent merely a compro- Alternative B would establish an explicit cordon of the Korean War.16 The war had originated in an views and inclinations.19 As will be seen, he would mise of departmental positions. The same around the areas then under Soviet and satellite invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea accomplish the twin purposes that Cutler had set concept is equally applicable to advisory and control, beyond which the United States would that had shocked the Truman administration.17 The out with extraordinary patience and skill. subordinate groups, such as the Joint Chiefs permit them no advance without provoking war. Al- of Staff and the NSC Planning Board.22 ternative C proposed to “increase efforts to disturb 14 “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay),” FRUS, 1950, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, and weaken the Soviet bloc and to accelerate the Volume I, Document 85, Department of State, Office of the Historian,https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d85 . See also To drive the point home, the White House distrib- consolidation and strengthening of the free world John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 81–116; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 347, 371–81, 420–21, 467, 735; and Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove, 111–14, 118, 133. Truman formally approved NSC-68 after the outbreak of the Korean War. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 105, 107. 20 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 45, 83–93; “Memorandum for the President,” March 16, 1953, FRUS, II, 1; and “The President to the 15 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 43–54. This section draws on Paul Lettow, “Ike’s Triumphs,” National Review LXX, no. 10 (May 28, 2018): 37–38. Special Assistant (Cutler),” March 17, 1953, FRUS, II, 1. 16 Lettow, “Ike’s Triumphs,” 37–38. 21 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp. 45, 83–93; “Memorandum for the President,” March 16, 1953, FRUS, II, 1; and “The President to the Special Assistant (Cutler),” March 17, 1953, FRUS, II, 1. At the start of the strategic planning process, in his March 17, 1953, memorandum to Cutler, Ei- 17 See Acheson, Present at the Creation, 355–58, 402–13. senhower instructed Cutler to “call the special attention” of National Security Council members to the Policy Planning Board and said that he “place[d] 18 Lettow, “Ike’s Triumphs,” 37–38; and Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 4, 75–80, 88–90. For concise and deeply informed analyses of Ei- great emphasis on the selection of men of high caliber for these positions, able to devote plenty of time to their Planning Board functions.” senhower’s pre-presidential background as a strategist and its impact on his presidency, see Andrew P.N. Erdmann, “’War No Longer Has Any Logic 22 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 13, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Docu- Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945, ment 95, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d95. edited by John Lewis Gaddis et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87–119; and William I. Hitchcock, The Age of Eisenhower: America and the World in the 1950s (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), 3–83. 23 Note 2, NSC Action No. 928, in “Memorandum of Discussion,” Oct. 13, 1953, FRUS, II, 1. 19 “Memorandum for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler),” March 16, 1953, FRUS, 24 See memorandums of discussions of weekly National Security Council meetings from Feb. 11 to April 29, 1953 and on June 9, 1953, associat- 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 50, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d50; and “The President to the Special Assistant ed preparatory papers, and documents summarizing conclusions and adopting policy restatements in in “United States National Security Policy: U.S. to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler),” March 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 51, https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc- Objectives and Programs for National Security; Estimates of Threats to the National Security; Military Posture and Foreign Policy; Organization for uments/frus1952-54v02p1/d51. See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 45, 83–93. National Security,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, documents at 234–323, 370–86, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1.

123 124 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned to enable it to assume the greater risks involved.”25 meetings, letting debates play out, nudging them in of U.S. forces; taking the ideological offensive; and than the administration had given them in its first Eisenhower and his top aides listened to the pres- certain directions with questions and comments, proactively pressing American advantages, espe- year. They pursued their strategic planning as an entations in a special session and then considered and moving with ease and apparent purpose from cially technological, economic, and values-based ongoing process.30 and debated them during later meetings. They di- examining the fundamental premises and principles advantages, to undermine Soviet power and influ- Eisenhower is often quoted as saying “It’s not rected the Policy Planning Board to draw together of containment and deterrence to drilling down into ence peacefully. Eisenhower formally approved NSC the plans, it’s the planning,” or variations on that the best elements of their review of the Truman concrete facts. Along the way, his National Security 162/2 in October 1953 and “direct[ed] its implemen- theme. That statement is a little misleading, how- administration’s policy and Project Solarium, revise Council together weighed and discarded ideas that tation by all appropriate executive departments and ever: He did, in fact, place considerable emphasis them in light of those National Security Council de- some of them had previously held firmly. For ex- agencies of the U.S. Government.”29 on the specific strategy documents that he and his bates and conclusions, and draft a unified strategy.26 ample, Treasury Secretary George Humphrey’s ini- It is possible, perhaps even likely, that the plan- National Security Council developed and that he tial hardline views on restraining national ning process that Eisenhower launched in his first approved, and rightly so. Yet, the statement does security spending were worn down and year in office arrived at the strategy he had had reflect an essential component of his approach to eventually overcome by what the council in mind from the start. But the planning process national security planning. Even if it had not re- collectively came to perceive as a need to he led allowed him, together with his senior-most sulted in any written strategy documents, the pro- keep that spending at a relatively high, but officials who would be responsible for executing cess that he led his security council through would sustainable, level to invest in the military, the strategy, to test their assumptions and precon- still have been valuable, by winnowing out unwise science, technology, and other resources ceptions. It let them consider a range of potential or unworkable ideas, prioritizing issues and objec- that they felt would be essential to play- strategic alternatives, and as a group find their way tives, and establishing baseline approaches that ing the long game in the Cold War. The toward an approach that could guide day-to-day could and did act as a guide to action for those who National Security Council also extensively action and decision-making with the overall aim had to execute them. considered and largely rejected, as being of building enduring strength and succeeding in Another essential aspect of Eisenhower’s ap- both risky and ultimately unnecessary, the long-term, peaceful competition. It thereby ena- proach is that while he and his team adhered to use of direct military force or overt sub- bled them to act in line with the strategic premis- Kennan’s basic analysis of the Soviet Union and the The attention and time that Eisenhower and version to roll back communist control from satel- es and objectives that they had established and to threat that it posed, they also paid close attention to his National Security Council devoted to strategic lite countries where it was already established. The do so with a relatively uniform understanding of an analysis of American capabilities and means. The planning was extraordinary. One National Security council also sought to avoid missteps or misadven- those premises and objectives and the role of each records of the Eisenhower National Security Coun- Council meeting, convened to consider a draft of tures that would dissipate America’s strength and in pursuing them. They applied those premises and cil meetings show a continual emphasis on ensur- what ultimately became NSC 162/2, “Basic National work to America’s long-term disadvantage.28 objectives for example, in their budget planning. ing that the administration’s strategy would wage Security Policy,” resulted in an extended discussion The national security strategy document that Moreover, NSC 162/2 served as springboard, not the Cold War in a way that played to U.S. strengths within the group regarding the nature of the Sovi- they ultimately developed, the top secret NSC 162/2, an endpoint, for the Eisenhower administration’s and would prove sustainable over time.31 For exam- et threat and how to pursue a sustainable U.S. re- amounted to the original peace through strength strategic planning process. Over the course of his ple, Eisenhower and his National Security Council sponse that balanced national security and econom- approach. NSC 162/2 emphasized both geopolitics two terms, Eisenhower and his National Security sought to find a level of national security spending ic concerns. Cutler himself, Eisenhower’s right-hand and hard power as foundations for maintaining U.S. Council systematically reevaluated their strategic that could endure, and to avoid dissipating Amer- man and fellow architect of the process, commented values and America’s way of life and for nurturing objectives and the means to achieve them, seeking ica’s strength through unsustainable commitments that the meeting resembled a “debating society.”27 freedom abroad. It was wary and sophisticated in its to make adjustments accordingly while sticking to of resources or by getting lost or diverted in fights, But Eisenhower knew what he was doing. Through analysis of the Soviet Union and of potential future the basic approach that they had established. They literal or figurative, that were outside of the core in- the process of examining the prior administration’s outcomes. It noted, for example, that although the were especially attentive to areas that ultimate- terests and objectives that they had identified. approach, stepping back to consider a wide range of Sino-Soviet alliance was then “firmly established” ly required more rigorous analysis and definition alternatives, and hashing out their own differences and must be dealt with as such, “in the long run, in considering drafts of a national security strate- basic differences may strain or break” it. The doc- 29 Memorandums of discussions at National Security Council meetings to consider what ultimately became NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security gy, he and his National Security Council continu- ument was attuned to Soviet vulnerabilities and Policy,” prepared by the Policy Planning Board, and associated drafts, reports, and memorandums are available at “National Security Policy,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, including meeting of Feb. 11, 1953, 236–37; meeting of March 25, 1953, 258–63; meetings from September 1953 to November ally worked to identify and prioritize the soundest flaws and to the strengths of the United States and 1953, 464–75, 489–609. For the text of NSC 162/2, Oct. 30, 1953, see “National Security Policy,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, 577–97. See also Bowie and premises, objectives, and means of accomplishing its allies. The strategy document focused on pur- Immerman, Waging Peace, 139–46, 257. those objectives as they built their strategy. suing a steady, sustainable build-up in hard power; 30 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 147–257. The president, aided by Cutler, deftly guided the strengthening alliances and the forward deployment 31 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 11, 1953,” Feb. 11, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 46, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d46; “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” March 31, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 53, https://history.state.gov/ 25 “Paper Prepared by the Directing Panel of Project Solarium,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 69, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu- historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d53; “National Security Policy,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, documents at 323–28, 349–54, 360–66, 387–93, ments/frus1952-54v02p1/d69. 393–75, 489–609. Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, with its emphasis on nuclear weapons, was designed in part to keep defense spending at sus- 26 The documentary record of the origins in May 1953 and ensuing work of the Project Solarium teams, their presentations to the National tainable levels. See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 125–96. In the end, Eisenhower sought and obtained what were remarkably high peacetime Security Council in July 1953, and the resultant council debates and follow-on taskings are set out in “National Security Policy,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, defense budgets as measured by percentage of Gross Domestic Product and of federal spending. As a result of that sustained investment, his 1, documents at 323–28, 349–54, 360–66, 387–93, 393–464, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1. See also Bowie and administration served as the bridge between the U.S. military of World War II and that of today. It was during the Eisenhower presidency that the Immerman, Waging Peace, 123–38; and Thompson, The Hawk and the Dove, 150–51. United States developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, high-altitude spy planes, and spy satellites. Both before and after the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, Eisenhower championed government investment in science and technology, and encouraged 27 Cutler’s quote is from “Memorandum of Discussion at the 165th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday October 7, 1953,” Oct. scientific and technological education. Lettow, “Ike’s Triumphs,” 37. See also Hitchcock, The Age of Eisenhower. Eisenhower also focused on laying 7, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 94, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d94. out for the public and Congress the threats identified and that the United States must set a course for long-term, but ultimately peaceful, compe- 28 “Memorandum of Discussion at the 131st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 11, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, tition. As the Eisenhower administration constructed its own national security strategy, Eisenhower wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: Document 46, 236–37, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d46; and “Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting “[P]rograms for informing the American public, as well as other populations, are indispensable if we are to do anything except to drift aimlessly, of the National Security Council, Tuesday, March 31, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 53, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ probably to our own eventual destruction.” “[W]e must begin now to educate our people in the fundamentals of these problems,” Eisenhower con- frus1952-54v02p1/d53. See also National Security Council meetings from September to November 1953 that considered what ultimately became tinued: “We must have the enlightened support of Americans and the informed understanding of our friends in the world (emphasis in the original).” NSC 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” prepared by the Policy Planning Board, and associated drafts, reports, and memorandums, all available “Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State,” Sept. 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, Document 89, 461, https://history.state.gov/histor- in “National Security Policy,” FRUS, 1952–1954, II, 1, various documents at 464–75, 489–609. icaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d89.

125 126 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations economic needs and concerns than Eisenhower no emphasis on national security strategic plan- draft of the document sent out for written com- and his cohort had been. With a more optimistic ning. Indeed, they appear to have been averse to it, ment elicited a mixed reaction. Bundy expressed Neither Presidents John F. Kennedy nor Lyndon and expansive view of economics and U.S. capabil- as a matter of personality, principle, and politics.37 approval to Rostow of the military sections of the B. Johnson oversaw a rigorous strategic planning ities, they focused less on sustainability.34 Kennedy But that did not mean that no one else in the ad- nearly 200-page draft. But characteristically, Bundy process. They preferred informal and nimble de- in particular was also prone to relying on powerful, ministration attempted it. In late 1961, Walt Rostow expressed skepticism on his own part and that of cision-making, unencumbered by formal strategic bold oratory — eloquent, moving, and inspiring, in shifted from the White House, where he had been the president about the utility of strategy in gener- planning. Partly that was a response to, and a way the case of his inaugural address, but also overly Bundy’s deputy, to the State Department, where he al. With respect to this effort in particular, Bundy to differentiate themselves from, what they and broad, almost boundless — as a guide for policy. took over as director of policy planning. There he also noted that “[t]he paper seems to me to imply a their advisors and much of the media and aca- Each administration also displayed a near-obses- picked up and ran with the task his predecessor kind of equal and adequate effort everywhere, and demia characterized as the stale, bureaucratic, old sion with credibility and image, in terms of both had started of preparing a draft “Basic National I think both abroad and at home we have to have ways of the Eisenhower administration.32 One of domestic and international politics.35 Security Policy” for consideration by the National a clear sense of limits, and of priorities.”41 McNa- the political themes of the Kennedy and Johnson More broadly, with an emphasis on a “flexible Security Council. Rostow seems to have generated mara wrote that “the thrust of the proposed policy administrations was dynamism and vigor, of a new response” approach to crises around the world, the massive document more or less on his own, seems highly suitable.”42 In contrast, Kennan, then generation, possessed of analytical prowess and the administrations focused less on systematically without direction or oversight from the White serving as ambassador to Yugoslavia, was unspar- intellectual self-confidence, taking the helm.33 The assessing the comparative strengths and vulnera- House.38 He was an odd fit for the role. Kennedy ing in his criticism, not least because, as Kennan Kennedy administration was indeed young: When bilities of the United States and Soviet Union and had moved him out of the White House specifically wrote to Rostow, “the paper is deeply imbued with he took office, Kennedy was 43, his national securi- their respective allies — and the need to press U.S. because he was an unceasing advocate for maxi- a relatively optimistic view of the sources of hu- ty adviser, McGeorge Bundy, was 41, and Secretary advantages, peacefully and over the long run, while malist economic aid policies and maximalist in- man nature.”43 of Defense Robert McNamara was 44. avoiding reactive positions in crises forced by oth- volvement in meeting communist challenges when Kennedy was wary of getting pinned down to any The Kennedy and especially Johnson adminis- ers — and more on being able to devise and shape a and wherever they might arise, including in the strategy, much less one produced by an official he trations were also less concerned about balancing suitable response to developments as they arose.36 Third World and including by use of U.S. military had effectively banished from the White House. an active national security approach with domestic For all of those reasons, Kennedy and Bundy put force.39 Those tendencies were also reflected else- So, while the paper encapsulated many of the ba- where in the administration, including in the rhet- sic inclinations of the administration’s flexible re- oric of the president himself — if not always in his sponse approach, it was never formally adopted or 32 “The intent … of the steps below [including the abolition of the Policy Planning Board and giving its functions to national security adviser 44 McGeorge Bundy] is to free up the time and attention of the President and his immediate advisors by relieving them of the burden of immediate super- actions, as will be seen — but Rostow represented approved by Kennedy. In the end, neither Ken- vision of the machinery for continuous policy review and adjustment.” “Draft Paper by the Executive Assistant of the Operations Coordinating Board their distilled essence, as did his draft of the Basic nedy nor Johnson evidently developed a national (Johnson),” undated [January or February 1961], FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy [hereafter FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII], Document 6, 40 Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d6. See also “Record of Actions Taken at National Security Policy in the spring of 1962. A security strategy. They did not want to — Kennedy the 475th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Feb. 1, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Document 8, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1961-63v08/d8 (including a report by Bundy that “in response to the President’s desires a different organization and procedures would henceforth be used in the work of the National Security Council, involving fewer and smaller staff groups” and policy recommendations would not be subject to as much formal development or interagency coordination); “Notes of Secretary of State Rusk’s Daily Staff Meeting,” Feb. 14, 1961, 34 (noting the disman- 37 As the historian Lawrence Freedman has noted, “Kennedy spoke about the need to give a visionary edge to foreign policy and be guided tling of Eisenhower’s White House-coordinated policy process and that the State Department should try to do strategic planning so that “foreign policy by core principles, yet advisers found him fixated by the short term.” Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 6–7. See also Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 40–41; is not made on a fragmented basis by various agencies”); “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 35; and Milne, America’s Rasputin, 148. the President’s Press Secretary (Salinger),” March 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Document 19, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v08/d19 (evidently anticipating press inquiries, stating that Kennedy prefers informal discussions with smaller groups on each national security ques- 38 Notes, excerpts, and documents reflecting the drafting of Rostow’s Basic National Security Policy, and the debate and reactions it generated, tion rather than a more formal National Security Council process); and “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs are available at FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Documents 70–85, 93–95. (Bundy) to the President’s Special Counsel [Speechwriter] (Sorensen),” March 13, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Document 21, 65, 68, https://history.state. 39 Milne, America’s Rasputin, 9–10, 95, 98–104, 110–17, 125; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 28–33, 38–41; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d21 (noting the importance of policymaking by what Kennedy says publicly); and “Memorandum for President 197–271; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 38. Kennedy,” June 22, 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Document 31, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d31. The author of this latter memorandum, entitled “Current Organization of the White House and NSC for Dealing with International Matters,” is not identified, but appears 40 The complete text of the draft of the Basic National Security Policy as of June 22, 1962, is in “Draft Paper, June 22,” June 22, 1962, FRUS, to be inside or otherwise close to the administration. The memorandum notes the Eisenhower planning model and that Kennedy “has changed all that” 1961-1963, Vol. VII, VIII, IX Supplement, Document 271, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07-09mSupp/d271. See also and that Kennedy “works through many people and talks to still more,” but “retains an acute sense of ‘operational’ communication” and “counts on his FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Documents 70–85, 93, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08. people to keep in close touch with each other, and in general they do”; it praises Bundy and his staff as men of a “high level of ability” and “[in]compa- 41 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and rable,” but also warns that “there should be a more clearly defined pattern of preparation for new policy papers, and reporting on existing crisis areas,” Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow),” April 13, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 77, 263, Department and that “much could be ordered that is now somewhat haphazard”; and it wryly notes for Kennedy that those suggested changes “would require a of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d77. Presidential acceptance of routine that might be dull.”). See also Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6–9, 25–26, 34–41; Gordon M. Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam (New 42 McNamara, letter dated June 13, 1962, quoted in “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII, Document 94, https://history.state.gov/historical- York: Henry Holt & Company, 2009), 35, 70–71; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271. documents/frus1961-63v08/d94. 33 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 6–9, 25–26, 34–41; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 35, 70–71; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271. 43 Letter from Kennan to Rostow, May 15, 1962, in “Letter from the Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Kennan) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State,” May 15, 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII, Document 85, 285, 289, https://history.state.gov/histori- 34 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 27–33; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 16; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271, especially 202-04, 259; caldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d85. David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 6–7, 13, 78–81, 84, 132, 151. See also memo- randum for the record of President Johnson and Vice President Hubert Humphrey meeting with the White House National Security Council staff, 44 Milne, America’s Rasputin, 117; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 6–7, 40–41; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 199; “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961- noting Johnson’s points that “in our own interests we have to worry about the other fellow. More than that we can’t rest while other people are 1963, VIII, Document 94, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d94 (noting numerous instances in 1962 when Kennedy miserable in such numbers. … So a nation blessed with the riches ours has can not sit back while others like ourselves [i.e., humans] are in misery,” and/or Bundy simply avoided taking any position on the Basic National Security Policy or whether it would be adopted as policy, leaving the rest and also noting that Humphrey “spoke generally on the same theme of circulating the ideals of the Great Society into a worldwide effort against of the executive branch, which had been responding to and commenting on various iterations of it, to speculate about its status); “Memorandum poverty, disease, and illiteracy.”) “Memorandum for the Record,” May 27, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy, Document 129, From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk,” FRUS, 1961–1963, Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d129. VIII, Document 136, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d136 (noting conversations that Rusk had had with Department of Defense officials about the Basic National Security Policy, that the policy now appeared to be dead as far as the Department of Defense was 35 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, xi–xii, 6–9; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 157–221; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271, especially 211- concerned, and adding, after reminding Rusk that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had each produced fundamental national security 12, 232; Milne, America’s Rasputin, 76–84. See also Bundy’s White House notes from March 21, 1965, as the Johnson administration was steadily policy documents: “Whatever the limitations inherent in any such document, I doubt that it will redound to the credit of our Administration that we deepening U.S. military involvement in Vietnam: “[I]f we visibly do enough in the South [Vietnam] (whatever that may be), any failure will be, in that failed to thrash out any successor document. A BNSP obviously cannot substitute for specific policy judgments; and it should not tie the President’s sense, beyond our control”; “Questions: in terms of U.S. politics which is better: to ‘lose’ now or to ‘lose’ after committing 100,000 men? Tentative hands. But it can provide an occasion for debating and defining the bone structure of policy and communicating it to the troops who never see the answer: the latter.” Quoted in Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 167. four star generals. My first recommendation is, therefore, that you consider with the President whether or not you wish to consider the BNSP exer- 36 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 9, 287; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271, especially 213; Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 220; and Milne, cise as finished.”). Rostow, undaunted and still without any guidance or direction from the White House one way or the other, produced yet another America’s Rasputin, 71, 76. On “flexible response” in the nuclear realm, see Elbridge A. Colby, “The United States and Discriminate Nuclear Options attempt at a Basic National Security Policy in November 1963; he told Rusk “that promulgation of a BNSP would contribute in important ways to in the Cold War,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University effective, coordinated execution of U.S. policy.” Rostow is quoted in “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII, Document 146, https://history.state.gov/ Press, 2014), 49–79. historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d146.

127 128 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

and the role of the strategic policy papers re- by adversaries. But he began to handle them with mains unsettled, although it seems they may greater wariness and savviness. His crisis manage- be more important than Bundy now wishes.48 ment modus operandi, as Freedman has noted, was to keep as many options open as possible, and to The historian Lawrence Freedman has noted feel for a resolution while avoiding the introduc- that the refusal on principle of Kennedy and Bun- tion of direct or significant U.S. military force. That dy to engage in strategic planning “fitted in with approach allowed him to find his way through the the temper of the times,” with the “intelligentsia” various crises after his first half-year in office and from which Bundy came — he had been a Harvard to avert disaster along the way.52 But some of those dean — preferring and celebrating instead its own crises were close-run things. “capacity for analytical problem solving.”49 More Some insecurity seemed to creep in amid the broadly, Freedman has noted, Kennedy “wanted a White House’s self-confidence in its ability to solve national security staff to suit his temperament as crises. Following the Cuban missile crisis, Eisen- Eisenhower’s staff had suited his. . . . He wanted hower apparently suggested the need for improve- a system that extended the range of his options ments in White House national security planning and did not box him in when the moment came and process. In a memorandum to Kennedy in re- to choose… preferring small, intense groups.” Yet sponse, Bundy noted that they had dismantled Ei- “there were costs” to that “informal structure,” senhower’s planning process and committees but Freedman writes. “This less orderly structure pro- placed responsibility for the cause of that disman- duced few clear and properly considered recom- tling elsewhere, especially on Rusk and McNamara. mendations,” with “nobody quite clear on whether He acknowledged that “it is probably also true that the president knew all he needed to know or exact- we did not promptly develop fully adequate new ly what he had decided.”50 procedures of our own.” He then blamed the State Many of those who were responsible for guiding Department for lack of executive management and U.S. national security policy before and after the inter-departmental coordination. He commented Kennedy and Johnson administrations have as- that “we have learned a lot in the last year and a sessed that, at least in part due to a lack of adequate half,” but maintained that “[w]hat we have said, and strategic planning, Kennedy and Johnson too often what I, at least, have deeply believed, is that differ- in particular — and did not try to.45 Bundy not only it.47 A memorandum for the chairman of the Joint reacted to international events and crises rather ent Presidents are bound to have different adminis- did not lead or guide a national security planning Chiefs of Staff by a military staff officer summa- than first developing and then executing a proac- trative methods. General Eisenhower is a believer in process, but he resisted, in a passive-aggressive rized Bundy’s approach during interagency consid- tive approach. That assessment has been bipartisan a military concept of staff operations, and you gov- manner, attempts by others within the adminis- eration of the papers: and not only retrospective.51 And indeed, the period ern by direct personal involvement and decision.”53 tration to conduct strategic planning throughout witnessed rolling crises in Cuba, Berlin, Laos, Cuba Five months later, Bundy wrote another mem- his tenure as national security adviser from 1961 Bundy himself, concerned essentially with again during the missile crisis, and Vietnam. orandum to Kennedy, this one stating: “As you to 1966. operational matters, seems not to believe the After the disastrous Bay of Pigs episode and the know, there has been considerable discussion in In 1963, for example, the State Department, again papers will be of much value in determining embarrassing Vienna summit with Nikita Krush- recent months of the need for strengthening inter- spurred by Rostow, proposed “strategic studies of policies because they may be out of date be- chev, during which Krushchev sought to test Ken- departmental planning and coordination on ma- various countries as a basis for policy making and fore they are finished. His basic approach, nedy with overly assertive bombast, Kennedy con- jor national security issues.” Bundy suggested the programming,” presumably in lieu of any overar- as he admitted today, has been that since tinued to face a cascade of crises pressed upon him possibility of establishing an interagency commit- ching strategy.46 Bundy cast doubt on the idea at he could not stop the Rostow papers from a White House meeting, expressing skepticism of being developed, he could, if necessary, ig- the value of strategy papers, although “admitt[ing] nore them … But [these matters] are seldom 48 “Memorandum for the Record,” Dec. 4, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, VIII, Document 148, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v08/d148. that analyses of the type suggested would produce joined directly. Instead they flit by in short- 49 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 7. information which would be available in time of a hand remarks. … Bundy looked on the White 50 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 40–41. crisis and might facilitate action then.” Character- House role as being the right to intervene 51 Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was scathing in his assessment of the Kennedy administration during its first year in letters to his for- istically, he cast aspersions on the idea of the stud- without any obligation to do so. … [Bundy] mer boss, President Truman. He wrote of “weakness in decisions at the top,” and “a preoccupation here with our ‘image.’” Acheson said that the latter ies but did not take responsibility for the process, said you could not make programming deci- “is a terrible weakness. It makes one look at oneself instead of at the problem. How will I look fielding this hot line drive to short stop? This is a good way to miss the ball altogether.” Letter from Acheson to Truman, July 14, 1961, in Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, Affection and Trust: The Personal guide it, or turn it off, leading the State Department sions in a policy document and, when asked Correspondence of Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, 1953-1971 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 264–65. The next month, after having assisted to gin up a process that again involved the other where these would be made, did not answer Rusk — who had served Acheson at the State Department during the Truman years — with an issue, he wrote to Truman that “to work for this crowd is departments and agencies and again left everyone directly, although he believed they would be strangely depressing. … Rusk wants to approach everything piecemeal. But how you lead anyone unless you first know where you yourself want to go, I do not know.” Letter from Acheson to Truman, Aug. 4, 1961, in Truman and Acheson, Affection and Trust, 267. See also Henry Kissinger, White House wondering where the president — first Kennedy, made in the budget. … In summary, the dis- Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 11, 41; and Winston Lord, interview with the author, July 6, 2012. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had served on the then Johnson — and Bundy would come out on cussion reached no recognized conclusions, State Department Policy Planning Council during the Johnson administration, later stated that neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson White House had done much strategic planning nor pursued much structure regarding national security policy, that they had acted mainly on an “ad hoc” basis, and that they had been “overwhelmed by basic events and crises.” Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012. 45 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 197–271. 52 Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, especially xii, 4, 5, 9, 40–41, 54–57. See also Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 41–47, 63. 46 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII, Document 135, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d135. 53 “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy,” Nov. 16, 1962, FRUS, 47 “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1961-1963, VIII. 1961–1963, VIII, Document 108, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d108.

129 130 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned tee that would include Averell Harriman from the Bundy was how the process of managing U.S. withdrawal from its most important overseas his staff genuinely wanted to fill gaps in their own State Department. Bundy recommended that Har- presidential decisions for Vietnam could have commitments or severe defense cuts, both of which knowledge and understanding of various regions, riman draw on plans from, of all people, Rostow.54 become as disordered as it did for both Ken- he thought would jeopardize America’s long-term functional issues, and developments. And they Following Kennedy’s assassination, the officials nedy and Johnson. Bundy had come to the competition with the Soviet Union.61 wanted to probe for alternative explanations or and ad hoc process that Kennedy had overseen White House with a reputation for brilliance Nixon and Kissinger led a process that was espe- approaches outside the consensus views.65 In that lost the guardrails he had come to provide in the as a bureaucratic manager, the young aca- cially White House-centric by design. They shared first year, the White House convened a number of face of exigencies. For his part, Eisenhower tried demic dean who had tamed the fierce politics an instinct to consolidate policymaking in the White sessions of the National Security Council and sub- to warn Johnson to be more systematic in nation- and formidable egos of the Harvard faculty. House on the most important issues, including on ordinate interagency committees to discuss the al security organization and planning. According The conventional wisdom was that Bundy Vietnam and on relations with the Soviet Union and studies and basic policy options and directions.66 to Bundy — who continued on as national securi- was decisive, commanding, and terse.59 with China.62 Within days of taking office, Kissing- But it was largely Kissinger and his staff who under- ty adviser, ultimately to be replaced after several er flooded the executive branch departments and took the work of shaping and drafting the admin- years by Rostow — “Ike was trying to get the new In his controversial 1995 memoir, McNamara, agencies with classified formal requests for studies istration’s national security policies, in some cases President to abandon all the bad habits of his pre- too, acknowledged in retrospect that the most ba- on almost every conceivable foreign, defense, and through memorandums and directives sent to the decessor.” Somewhat flippantly, Bundy added in a sic issues involved — such as whether South Viet- intelligence issue, in each case sending out multiple departments and agencies, and in some cases sim- memorandum for the record that Eisenhower “has nam was worth the effort poured in, and whether pages of specific questions and often asking for the ply by formulating a policy and then implementing a picture of chaos among the children, I guess.”55 that effort could have been successful in the first bases of various assumptions and alternative hy- it, with or without the involvement of the depart- Eisenhower had resolutely kept U.S. combat place — “were not presented clearly to” Johnson potheses or courses of action.63 The reasons for this ments and agencies. As Winston Lord, who worked forces out of Vietnam, both because of the con- and “remained unanswered throughout his presi- were partly Machiavellian: to gather information on closely with Kissinger throughout the administra- flict’s roots as a French colonial war and because dency.” He wrote: how each department or agency thought about spe- tion as a strategic planner, and who subsequently of the risk of a quagmire that would dissipate cific issues and why for his own bureaucratic rea- served in senior roles in administrations of both U.S. strength. Kennedy, while steadily deepening One reason the Kennedy and Johnson admin- sons. It was perhaps even an effort to keep them parties, has noted, a strategic sensibility pervaded U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, had held firm istrations failed to take an orderly, rational busy with responding while the White House, more Nixon’s foreign policy. On the issues they prior- on that main principle.56 With his death, the re- approach to the basic questions underlying or less fully staffed from the start, could get under itized, Nixon and Kissinger insisted on thoughtful straints fell away. Johnson and his administration Vietnam was the staggering variety and com- way with its policy planning.64 analysis, including by identifying, understanding, stumbled into what became a disaster in Vietnam, plexity of other issues we faced. Simply put, Yet that is only part of the story. Kissinger and and navigating the interconnectedness of efforts in where the connections between interests, prior- we faced a blizzard of problems, there were ities, objectives, and means were never properly only twenty-four hours in a day, and we often comprehended, much less tailored in the execu- did not have time to think straight. 61 In FRUS, 1969–1976, I, see Nixon’s comments in private to French President Charles DeGaulle on March 1, 1969, in which he foreshadowed 57 tion. Bundy seemed unable or unwilling to tee up a move to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the basic concept of which he had been contemplating for a few those subjects for systematic and rigorous review, “This predicament,” he added, “ought to be rec- years, 63–64; speech by Nixon to the North Atlantic Council, April 10, 1969, 69–75; speech by Nixon at the U.S. Air Force Academy, June 4, 1969, 86–88 (“There is no advancement for Americans at home in a retreat from the problems of the world. … America has a vital national interest in a crucial aspect of his job, and for his own part rec- ognized and planned for when organizing a gov- world stability, and no other nation can uphold that interest for us.”); speech by Nixon to the United Nations General Assembly, Sept. 18, 1969, ommended expanded U.S. military action in Viet- ernment.”60 107–08 (“our aim is to place America’s international commitments on a sustainable, long term basis”); and memorandum from Nixon to Kissinger 58 regarding the draft of the first annual report on foreign policy (discussed below), February 10, 1970 (“get back to my theme that the Nixon doctrine nam at critical turning points in 1964 and 1965. rather than being a device to get rid of America’s world role is one which is devised to make it possible for us to play a role—and play it better, His eventual replacement, Rostow, was a vigorous Strategic Planning Under Nixon more effectively than if we continued the policy of the past in which we assume such a dominant position” and suggesting that Kissinger look at advocate of the war. The scholar Gordon Goldstein and draw from Nixon’s Air Force Academy speech, as “the tone and strength of that speech on this issue is very much needed”), 186–87. A comment made by Nixon in a meeting with French President Georges Pompidou in 1971 characterized Nixon’s approach. After Pompidou had given a tour worked with Bundy in the 1990s on a project to On taking office in 1969, President Richard Nixon d’horizon of trends in the Cold War, Nixon said, “in the broad landscape President Pompidou had painted we should now look at the pieces and see analyze retrospectively the U.S. presidency and the and his national security adviser, Kissinger, inherit- how those pieces could be moved to our advantage rather than [the Soviets’].” Kissinger was not present. See “Top Secret Memorandum of Conver- sation,” Dec. 13, 1971, in William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow (New York: The New Press, 1998), Vietnam War during the 1960s. (Bundy died before ed the Vietnam War, domestic turmoil, and tensions 35. See also Winston Lord, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign they could complete it.) In his own resultant book with U.S. allies. Nixon, who had been Eisenhower’s Affairs Oral History Project, April 28, 1998, 54–55, https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lor02/2004lor02.pdf. on Bundy, Goldstein noted that, 30 years after the vice president, insisted that his administration’s 62 Lord, 2012 interview with the author; Kissinger, White House Years, 24–48; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 299–302. See also “Memo- randum From President Nixon to His Assistant (Haldeman), His Assistant for Domestic Affairs (Ehrlichman), and His Assistant for National Security events in question: strategy would aim to place the United States back Affairs (Kissinger),” March 2, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I, Document 61, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d61. on a sustainable course in the Cold War. That was 63 Nearly 50 National Security Study Memorandums issued by the White House to the departments and agencies from Jan. 21, 1969, through [T]he man I observed was still struggling to the purpose of what would become his détente ap- the spring of 1969 requested formal studies. Among these are “National Security Study Memorandum 1, Situation in Vietnam,” The White House, understand how Vietnam happened. … One proach. He wanted both to take advantage of geo- Jan. 21, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_001.pdf; “Na- tional Security Study Memorandum 2, Middle East Policy,” The White House, Jan. 21, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary. of the questions that appeared to preoccupy political opportunities in the Cold War and to avoid gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_002.pdf; “National Security Study Memorandum 3, U.S. Military Posture And the Balance of Power,” The White House, Jan. 21, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/ documents/nssm/nssm_003.pdf; “National Security Study Memorandum 9, Review of the International Situation,” The White House, Jan. 23, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_009.pdf; “National Security 54 “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy,” April 2, 1963, FRUS, 1961- Study Memorandum 10, East-West Relations,” The White House, Jan. 27, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/ 1963, VIII, Document 131. default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_010.pdf; and “National Security Study Memorandum 14, U.S. China Policy,” The White House, 55 Bundy as quoted in Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 101. Feb. 5, 1969, accessed at the Nixon Library, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_014.pdf. 56 Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 50–56, 63–67, 95–96, 239–40. 64 Lord, 1998 interview with Kennedy and Bernkopf Tucker, 48–51; Lord, 2012 interview with the author; and Kissinger, White House Years, 47. 57 Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 98–140, 156–67, 168–249; and Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 235–71. 65 Lord, 1998 interview with Kennedy and Bernkopf Tucker, 48–51; Lord, 2012 interview with the author; and Senior Nixon administration national security official, discussion with the author, March 2012. One of the Department of Defense recipients of the many taskings from the White 58 Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 98–140, 156–67, 168–249. Goldstein characterized one Bundy memo to Johnson from April 1965: “Bundy sub- House was an Air Force officer named Brent Scowcroft, who was impressed that Nixon and Kissinger were reaching down into the departments mitted another memorandum to President Johnson elaborating on the merits of an open-ended and unformulated U.S. military strategy in Vietnam. and agencies for information, and who would later join Kissinger’s National Security Council staff and then serve as national security advisor to … Bundy again argued that America’s strategic objectives did not have to be precisely defined.” Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 169. Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Brent Scowcroft, interview with the author, August 1, 2012. 59 Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster, 70–71. 66 Lord, 2012 interview with the author; and Senior Nixon administration national security official, discussion with the author, March 2012; and 60 Robert S. McNamara with Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), 101, xxi. Kissinger, White House Years, 24–47.

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one area with effort in another, and by pursuing a of the first annual message was to emphasize that One of the effects of Nixon and Kissinger’s White and his attention to hard power and to détente as proactive, not reactive, approach.67 it should convey more forcefully that his policies House-centric planning model was to further mar- a tactic. By the mid-1970s, the premises underlying And yet, the Nixon administration did not develop were aimed at sustaining a strong, enduring Ameri- ginalize the cabinet departments and other agen- Kissinger’s foreign policy had become a political hin- a comprehensive national security strategy docu- can presence and influence in the world and a last- cies and their roles relative to that of the White drance for President Gerald Ford. Ronald Reagan, ment. At Nixon’s urging, toward the end of his first ing ability to compete in the Cold War.71 House. Even Kissinger and his closest aides, in ret- who challenged Ford in the Republican primaries in year in office, Kissinger’s staff sent him a summary The annual reports did involve some input from rospect, realized that Kissinger’s personalization, 1976, criticized Ford and Kissinger’s policy. So did of trends in the international environment, drawn the departments and agencies.72 Yet, they did not even personification, of policy design and execu- Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter in from the interagency responses and discussions have as a primary function, and did not achieve, tion caused needless friction within the govern- the general election, with Carter battering Ford and on the subject that had been one of Kissinger’s re- the creation of an overarching strategy that estab- ment, thereby complicating efforts to pursue the Kissinger’s policy as declinist.75 quested study topics early on.68 But Kissinger and lished fundamental premises regarding the nature strategy successfully.73 his staff did not then use it as a basis for an overar- of the threat posed by America’s adversaries, the It also left the Nixon administration’s national Strategic Planning Under Carter ching, classified, internal planning document. strengths and weaknesses of those adversaries rel- security approach uniquely tied to the strengths Nixon and Kissinger had agreed even before tak- ative to the United States, or the priority objectives and weaknesses of its two architects, especially Carter entered office prioritizing human rights ing office, however, that they would issue unclassi- and methods by which America could exploit those Kissinger. Kissinger was largely of the view that and arms control, but he had less-defined views fied annual reports on U.S. foreign policy from the elements to its advantage. Such honest assess- America was in long-term relative decline and had regarding the nature of the Soviet threat and the White House.69 Kissinger’s staff worked extensive- ments, analysis, and policy direction are essentially to plan and act accordingly, for example, and that proper balance between competition and coopera- ly on the first report, which came out just over a impossible in an unclassified document for public underlying premise colored his approach, including tion in the Cold War.76 His administration did pro- year after Nixon took office, and on the ensuing consumption. Nor did the annual reports require with regard to negotiations with the Soviets.74 That duce a formal, classified national security strategy annual iterations. They are thoughtful reviews of or involve substantial buy-in and sign-off from the premise seems not to have been as clearly or fully directive in its first year, and it provides valuable international trends and of U.S. policy and were various departments and agencies. That in turn shared by Nixon. And, for all of Kissinger’s formi- lessons for today. sometimes predictive, dropping hints of policy meant that the process of developing the reports dable intellect, historical insight, and negotiating Carter’s administration followed a two-track ap- changes to come. Nixon, Kissinger, and their im- did not both empower and constrain the cabinet prowess, that premise was later disproven, or at proach to strategic planning. Carter’s national se- mediate staff placed great importance and priority secretaries and agency heads to follow the direc- least rendered premature, in light of America’s un- curity adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, brought on to on the annual reports, and crafted them careful- tions laid out in the documents with basic unity of ipolar pre-eminence from the late 1980s to the mid- his staff as his chief strategic planner the Harvard ly.70 Characteristically, Nixon’s response to a draft effort, as they otherwise might have. 2000s. It is at least possible that a more systematic political scientist Samuel Huntington, with whom and comprehensive strategic planning process, in- Brzezinski had co-written a book comparing the 67 Lord, 2012 interview with the author; and Lord, 1998 interview with Kennedy and Bernkopf Tucker, 64–65. cluding about basic premises and evaluations of rel- United States and the Soviet Union.77 In the first 68 “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Analysis of changes in international ative strengths and vulnerabilities in the Cold War few months of the administration, Brzezinski and politics since World War II and their implications for our basic assumptions about U.S. foreign policy” and attached paper, Oct. 20, 1969, FRUS, competition along the lines that Eisenhower had his White House staff, including Huntington, pre- 1969–1976, I, Document 41, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d41. The cover memo and the paper itself indicate that Nixon had requested such a document earlier that month. In the cover memo, Kissinger noted that “[o]ne of the first studies [his] Staff undertook led, would have resulted in greater testing and tem- pared for the president a lengthy memorandum was a comprehensive review of major trends in international politics” — see National Security Study Memorandum 9 —and that “[p]art of that pering of those premises. That was especially the outlining specific national security policy objec- rather long review was a summary of those trends in the context of the postwar evolution of American foreign policy and the current mood of 78 reassessment,” and added that the attached study paper represented his staff’s interpretation and summary thereof. case following Nixon’s resignation, which removed tives, with the proposed timing for each. Both 69 Kissinger, White House Years, 158–59; “Report by President Nixon to the Congress,” Feb. 18, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I, Document 60, 195, fn. from the calculus his own geopolitical shrewdness Carter and Brzezinski considered it to be an im- 1; “National Security Study Memorandum 80, The President’s Annual Review of American Foreign Policy,” Oct. 27, 1969, https://www.nixonlibrary. gov/sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nssm/nssm_080.pdf. 70 “Report by President Nixon to Congress,” Feb. 18, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I, Document 60, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ 73 Kissinger, White House Years, 30. That view is implied in some of Lord’s insights and prescriptions in his interview with the author. Lord, 2012 frus1969-76v01/d60. The full text of the report is available at The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ interview with the author. See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 273, 332. first-annual-report-the-congress-united-states-foreign-policy-for-the-1970s. Nixon described that first annual report to members of Congress as “the most important statement made by this Administration,” and said that “all our foreign and defense policies had been gathered together in 74 See Kissinger’s essay “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” in “Essay by Henry A. Kissinger,” 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, I, Document 4 one place.” “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Buchanan) to President Nixon, Notes from Legislative Leadership Meeting,” Feb. (first published in 1968), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d4; “Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant 18, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I, Document 59, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d59. See also Lord, 2012 interview with for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Aug. 14, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, I, Document 69, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- the author; Kissinger, White House Years, 158–59; Lord, 1998 interview with Kennedy and Bernkopf Tucker 54–55, 63, 75; and Gaddis, Strategies of 76v01/d69; Kissinger, White House Years, 54–70; Jeremi Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007), 161–62, Containment, 303. 169, 180–81, 199, 225, 236. 71 See Nixon’s memo to Kissinger regarding the draft of the first annual report on foreign policy in “Memorandum from President Nixon to His 75 Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Paperback ed. (New York: Random House Trade 2006), 26–32. In Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Feb. 10, 1970, FRUS, 1969-1976, I, Document 57, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ remarks made to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1976, Jimmy Carter said, “Our recent foreign policy … has been predicated on a belief frus1969-76v01/d57. (Nixon wrote, “get back to my theme that the Nixon doctrine rather than being a device to get rid of America’s world role is that our national and international strength is inevitably deteriorating. I do not accept this premise.” He continued, saying, “détente is under attack one which is devised to make it possible for us to play a role—and play it better, more effectively than if we continued the policy of the past in today because of the way it has been exploited by the Soviet Union. … [Kissinger] is giving up too much and asking for too little. … To the Soviets, which we assume such a dominant position,” and suggested that Kissinger look at and draw from Nixon’s Air Force Academy speech, as “the tone détente is an opportunity to continue the process of world revolution without running the threat of nuclear war.” “Remarks by Jimmy Carter,” March and strength of that speech on this issue is very much needed.”) Nixon emphasized that basic theme repeatedly in comments after he released 15, 1976, FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy [hereafter FRUS, 1977–1980, I], Document 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc- the first annual report in February 1970, as Buchanan noted in his memorandum on the legislative leadership meeting: “the President said unless uments/frus1977-80v01/d4. In the second presidential debate against Ford, on Oct. 6, 1977, Carter stated that “we’ve become fearful to compete the United States does play a role in the world, if, for example, the United States should return home, the rest of the world in his opinion would with the Soviet Union on an equal basis. … The Soviet Union knows what they want in détente, and they’ve been getting it. We have not known come under Communist domination. … The purpose of this foreign policy is to find a way to stay in the world, not a way to get out of the world.”). what we’ve wanted, and we’ve been out-traded in almost every instance.” “Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1977-1980 I, Document 11, https://history.state. “Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant,” Feb. 18, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I. More generally, see comments from Nixon to Kissinger in gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d11. See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 307, 319. a meeting on October 12, 1970: “The US—what it will be like for the next 25 years depends on whether we have the guts, the stamina, the wisdom 76 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, rev. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, to exert leadership … All right, we will get out of the world. Who is left? The two activists, Russia and Communist China. … We go to the sidelines 1985), 48–50. and there are a couple of big boys out there ready to play—China and Russia.” “Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Oct. 12, 1970, FRUS, 1969–1976, I, Document 2, https://history.state.gov/ 77 See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Books/Compass Press 1965; originally pub- historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v13/d2. lished 1963/1964); and Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski: America’s Grand Strategist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 72–73. 72 “Memorandum from Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Dec. 5, 1969, 78 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter,” April 29, 1977, [hereafter “Memo FRUS 1969-1976, I, Document 46, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d46; “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of from Brzezinski to Carter”], and excerpts of attached paper prepared by the National Security Council staff, “Paper Prepared by the National Se- State (Richardson) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Jan. 22, 1969, FRUS 1969-1976, I, Document 53, https://his- curity Council Staff,” in FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Document 36, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d36; Zbigniew Brzezinski, tory.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d53; “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to Nixon,” Dec. 24, 1969, FRUS, 1969-1976, interview with the author, July 7, 2012; and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 50–57. In his cover memo to Carter conveying the memorandum, Brzez- I, Document 48, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d48; Kissinger, White House Years, 158–59; and “National Security inski noted that “It is not meant to be a public statement—and its publication or revelation would be counterproductive.” “Memo from Brzezinski to Study Memorandum 80.” Carter,” FRUS, 1977-1980, I.

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portant statement of the administration’s aims.79 It objectives and national strategies that may be pur- single, consolidated net assessment report for con- interests and commitments in Third World areas”; was, in essence, exclusively the product of Brzez- sued by our principal potential adversaries and ex- sideration by the National Security Council.85 the U.S. military presence in Third World areas had inski and his staff.80 Brzezinski later stated that amine the alternative national objectives and strat- Huntington’s net assessment has not yet been been reduced; “the Soviets could well feel that” Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of egies appropriate to the United States.”83 fully declassified and released, but significant parts U.S. public opinion and legislative restraints inhib- Defense Harold Brown had of it have been, in final or draft form. It appears to ited any U.S. military response; and the “Soviets seen that memorandum but be an extraordinary work, in ambition, scope, and may feel it necessary for them ‘to win’ a crisis-con- had not provided signifi- execution.86 It was occasionally given over to ac- frontation with the U.S. in order to establish their cant input into it or even ademic, political-science-influenced language and overall equality with the U.S. as a world power.”88 evinced much interest in themes — on historical phases of the Cold War, Huntington looked at the nature of the Soviet that kind of planning.81 In for example — tendencies to which Brzezinski system, the motivations and interests of Soviet all events, Brzezinski may and Kissinger were also prone in their government leaders, and the implications for U.S. strategy with not have gone out of his roles, and that, viewed in retrospect, did not always clear eyes. “Soviet leaders do not easily compre- way to include the depart- prove perspicacious or particularly useful. But for hend the idea of a pluralist world or a balance of ments and agencies in the the most part the document seems to have been in- power. Their domestic experience encourages development of the docu- sightful and illuminating, dispassionately analyzing them to see an international pecking order.” “The ment.82 relative U.S. and Soviet strengths and weaknesses Soviet response to American dominance,” Hunting- Brzezinski and his staff across a wide range of categories and issues and ton wrote, also led a more traditional across different regions of the world. The excerpts strategic planning process that did quoted here come from several declassified sec- has been a political struggle to overthrow involve the departments and agen- tions of what appears to be a near-final draft that the pecking order and to establish a new cies. Their first step was to prepare a compre- Brzezinski and his staff established interagency is undated but seems to be from May or June 1977. subordination, not a new balance. ‘Parity’ is hensive net assessment of the United States and task forces to oversee what ultimately became 11 Huntington underscored that recent years had not, from this viewpoint, a cornerstone con- the Soviet Union. In the secret Presidential Re- preparatory studies on specific functional and re- seen deteriorating trends in relative U.S. military cept for capping the arms race. It is a tactical view Memorandum/NSC-10, “Comprehensive Net gional areas to provide analysis and data for the strength and posture and increased Soviet influ- slogan for an assault on the post-1945 world Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,” net assessment. The head of the Defense Depart- ence and adventurism in regions around the world, strategic edifice.89 from February 1977, Carter directed that Brzezin- ment’s Office of Net Assessment, Andrew W. Mar- especially in the Third World. In certain hard pow- ski would chair an interagency process to develop shall, played an important role supporting the de- er and geopolitical metrics, the Soviets had built Huntington’s writing style was more genteel and a “dynamic net assessment” that “will consist of velopment of the net assessment, as did a number up considerable momentum, trends that altered restrained than that of Kennan, or certainly of review and comparison of the overall trends in the of intelligence officials.84 That interagency work the overall Cold War competition in worrisome Nitze, but his portrayal of what the Soviets were political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ultimately produced a number of written reports ways. “The most significant change that has oc- up to and why, and what the implications were for military capabilities of the United States, its allies, covering specific issue areas. Drawing on all of that curred in the power relationships between the US U.S. strategy, were essentially as stark: and potential adversaries,” and “will evaluate the background and input, Huntington then drafted a and the SU during the past decade has been the growth in Soviet military power in relation to that If the Soviets choose to view the strategic of the United States,” Huntington wrote.87 He as- relationship as a pecking order, American sessed that “[t]he probability that the Soviets will leaders are unwise not to take that into 79 Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012; and Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 45 take one or more military initiatives during the account. ... The Soviet leaders are likely to (quoting diary entry from April 29, 1977: “The National Security Council staff has prepared for me what we call our international goals. This is a good next eight years is high,” for a number of reasons: continue seeking to develop their strength, framework around which to build our day-to-day decisions. I think a growing consciousness of these tangible goals will be good to bind us all to- gether in a common effort.”) See also Brzezinski’s memo to Carter from April 1977 (“Memo from Brzezinski to Carter,” FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Document The Soviets’ capability to take military initiatives not only in arms, but across the board in 36); a memo of a meeting with Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, and members of Congress, (“Memorandum for the Record,” Feb. 1, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, in the Third World was “significantly greater” than political, economic, and military instrumen- Document 19, 80 and fn. 4, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d19); and Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 50–57. it had been; they had “redefined the scope of their talities. The task for American strategy is to 80 Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012. In his cover memo to Carter conveying the memorandum, Brzezinski stated, “The document is not an interagency consensus statement. It was prepared, on the basis of the conceptual framework which you and I have often discussed, by Sam Huntington and myself, with NSC staff inputs.” The cover memo noted that Huntington was also coordinating the PRM/NSC-10 net assessment 85 Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 75–76, 177; and “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, with project, discussed below. “Memo from Brzezinski to Carter,” FRUS, 1977-1980, I, 36. See also Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 50–57. Madeleine K. Albright, Leslie G. Denend, and William Odom,” Feb. 18, 1982, Carter Presidency Project, University of Virginia Miller Center, 2003, 31– 32, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/transcripts/ohp_1982_0218_brzezinski.pdf. (Odom, who assisted Huntington during the process, summarized 81 Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012. Brzezinski’s instructions to Huntington as “’Go out and tell us how we’re doing in the world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,’” and stated that the objective 82 Brzezinski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012. “Let Cy [Vance] assess your more comprehensive goals,” Carter wrote to Brzezinski in July was to construct a “comprehensive net assessment” that encompassed “all the major categories of power.”); and Brian J. Auten, Carter’s Conversion: 1977 in response to a later paper from the State Department which set out four-year goals as the State Department saw it, and which Brzezinski The Hardening of American Defense Policy (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 156–58. had forwarded to Carter. “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National 86 Extensive segments of Huntington’s net assessment report, which appear to be from a close-to-final version that is undated but seems to be Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” June 28, 1877, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, 199, fn. 1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d47. from May or June 1977 [hereafter “Draft Net Assessment Report”], are available at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, in National Security Coun- 83 “Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,” The White House, Feb. 18, cil Institutional Files, 1977-1981, Box 29, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-10, for example. The excerpts quoted here come from that version in 1977, [hereafter “PRM/NSC-10”], https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/memorandums/prm10.pdf. that file location. Those segments have been declassified and released and were made available to the author by the Carter Library. The full text of the Huntington net assessment awaits declassification and release. See also Miller Center, “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 31–35, 39–40; and 84 See “PRM/NSC-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment Organization,” undated, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP- Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 177, on the contents of the Huntington net assessment. In September 1980, Odom summarized the Huntington net 83M00171R001200160001-7.pdf, listing the members of the Net Assessment Group and Net Assessment Working Group, and setting out the 11 assessment and used it to gauge how the administration had done over the intervening period in light of Huntington’s analysis and conclusions and interagency task forces and their chairs, available at the CIA Electronic Reading Room; Edward C. Keefer, Harold Brown: Offsetting the Soviet to set out needed adjustments in strategy, in a memorandum to Brzezinski. “Memorandum from William Odom of the National Security Council Staff Military Challenge, 1977-1981, Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, Vol. IX (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” Sept. 3, 1980, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Document 156, https://history.state.gov/ 2017), 132–37; Andrew Krepinevich and Barry Watts, The Last Warrior: Andrew Marshall and the Shaping of Modern American Defense Strategy historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d156. (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 130–36; and Andrew W. Marshall, oral history interview with Alfred Goldberg and Maurice Matloff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 29, 1992, 1–2, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/oral_history/OH_Trans_MARSHALL Andrew 06-29-92. 87 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” VI-1. pdf?ver=2018-04-10-070002-393. (Marshall stating that “We … got involved in one part of the PRM-10 activity. There were two parts, one run by 88 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV C-5-6. Huntington and Odom, out of the NSC staff, and my office was the principal contributor from Defense because they were trying to replicate at another level a broad assessment of the world situation and major trends.”). 89 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV A-9.

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cope with this competition in its full scope Huntington expressed skepticism and wariness …. All-in-all, American political institutions and core alliance relationships, the trends rather than to view it narrowly as a military of advocates for expanded U.S. (and Western) eco- seem to be emerging from a time of troubles, have been mixed. Trends favorable to the and military-technical issue.90 nomic ties with the Soviet Union. “[T]he profit while Soviet political institutions are possi- United States occur principally in political made by the firm which executed the sale of a tech- bly entering one.97 capabilities (political institutions and capac- Huntington sought to dispel what he saw as illu- nology” had to be weighed against playing into the ities for PIA) and in economic productivity.99 sions in U.S. policy, and to grapple with the impli- Soviets’ attempts to solve their manifest economic Sorting through the various critical regions of the cations for U.S. policy of the Soviets’ own approach and technological weaknesses: their inherent in- world, Huntington zeroed in on Iran as a country of The overall net assessment indicating the follow- to the Cold War. Regarding arms control, for exam- efficiencies and flaws; the constraints on growth long-term importance and short-term vulnerability ing, Huntington reasoned: cooperation will remain ple, Huntington wrote: “it looks doubtful in retro- imposed by massive military spending; and the in- for American interests and the leading potential ge- limited; misunderstandings will persist on many spect that Western strategists have ‘raised the So- creasing drain on Soviet resources posed by Sovi- ostrategic flash point in the coming years, and on key issues; and competition will predominate.100 viet learning curve’ on matters of nuclear warfare et client states, which itself posed significant risks the Middle East more broadly. In doing so, he fore- Huntington’s net assessment served as one of in the sense they have sometimes believed. The and threats to the Soviets in coming years.94 shadowed what would become the Carter Doctrine the bases for ensuing discussions within Carter’s Soviet side has never lost sight of the essentially More broadly, Huntington assessed, “[i]n the three years later.98 National Security Council, from which emerged political character of both military force posture economic competition, most factors favor the US. Huntington reached the following conclusion of the administration’s classified written national and arms negotiations.”91 “American negotiation The difficult choices face the Soviet Union,” such his net assessment: security strategy.101 Another planned input in that success,” he wrote, “will depend on being more as “How to avoid giving up military programs? How process was a review of possible defense strategy adept at exploiting Soviet weaknesses, at putting to respond to the economic realities of East Eu- In sum, a rough overall equivalence exists alternatives led by the Defense Department. But the Soviets on the defensive diplomatically.”92 rope?”95 Huntington again pointed to the implica- in military capabilities. The US remains sig- mismanagement of the conceptualization and or- Huntington delved into an analysis of relative tions for U.S. policy, emphasizing the benefits of a nificantly ahead of the Soviet Union in most ganization of that study by civilian policy officials Soviet weaknesses, including economic and tech- competition-based U.S. approach and the strategic non-military aspects of national power, in- in the department resulted in a document that was nological vulnerabilities relative to the position of error of an overly cooperative policy: “Astute Amer- cluding economic resources and productive essentially useless for that purpose, as even Brown the United States: ican appraisals of the level of Soviet discomfort capability, technology, stability and respon- conceded.102 can provide occasional opportunities for nudging siveness of political institutions, diplomatic The top-secret written national security strategy The slowdown in the Soviet economy and the USSR into more cooperative behavior toward support and access in most regions of the that ultimately emerged from the National Security its weakness in competing with the West the West,” whereas “US neglect of its competitive world, and overall political action, informa- Council discussions was extremely short, at only is due in large part to the political choices opportunities may allow the Soviet leadership to tion, and ideological warfare capabilities. five pages.103 As a strategy, it was vague and sub- made long ago by Soviet leaders and tena- postpone or escape growing constraints on its ca- ject to a wide variance in interpretation. It mostly ciously upheld today. The Soviet command pability to compete.”96 “The present US overall competitive advantage, glossed over the sensitive and perceptive compar- economy may be inefficient, but it reserves Moving to an analysis of relative political insti- however,” Huntington noted, ative analysis that Huntington had developed and the structural allocation decisions for the tutions, Huntington underscored that U.S. political provided little guidance as to U.S. objectives and top leadership. The leadership’s continuing institutions “have successfully emerged from a try- must also be assessed against the dynam- the means to achieve them. preference for heavy industry and military ing decade which involved racial problems, student ics of present and foreseeable change. The The document stated that “US-Soviet relations might has led to an enormous military bur- upheavals, an unwinnable war, and a constitution- trends have been favorable to the Soviet will continue to be characterized by both compe- den, far greater than has normally been real- al crisis.” He highlighted the U.S. political system’s Union or against the US in a number of key tition and cooperation.” It did capture important ized in the West. “adaptability.” In contrast: areas: strategic forces, conventional forces themes from the net assessment in noting that in in Europe, mobilization and force projection the competition, “military aspects aside, the Unit- “Unable or unwilling to cope with economic Soviet political institutions confront seri- capabilities, short-run economic interaction ed States continues to enjoy a number of critical problems through domestic reform,” Huntington ous problems caused by unfavorable de- payoffs, [redacted] and diplomatic relation- advantages: it has a more creative technological continued, “the Soviet leadership has turned to the mographic trends, economic slowdown, an ships, especially in Africa and Latin America. and economic system, its political structure can alternative of importing more advanced technolo- inefficient agricultural sector, nationality In others, including intelligence capabilities adapt more easily to popular demands and relies gy. In other words, the present Soviet trade policy aspirations, and intellectual dissidence. is aimed at avoiding systemic reform not at achiev- During the coming decade, the Soviet sys- 97 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” VI-4-5. 93 ing reform.” tem will also confront a succession struggle 98 See also “Memorandum from William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski),” Jan. 18, 1980, FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979 – December 1980, Document 156, 412, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d156 (noting the prescience of Huntington’s paper as the administration faced the Soviet 90 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV A-13-14. invasion of Afghanistan and the crises in Iran). 91 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV A-13. 99 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” VI-6, 7. 92 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV F-6. 100 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV A-13. 93 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV E-11. See also IV E-1, where the report states, “The apparent goal of the Soviet economic strategy … is to 101 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 177; “Meeting of the Special Coordination Committee, July 7, 1977, Summary of Conclusions,” regarding open Western sources of technology and to draw on them in order to catch up with Western levels of … productivity and to perk up the nodding PRM/NSC-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment, 1-3, in folder SCC 020 – US – USSR Strategic Capabilities and PRM-10, 7/7/77; and “Memorandum Soviet growth rate. On the economic front, accordingly, the Soviet Union has emphasized cooperation that facilitates East-West trade.” to the Special Coordinating Committee from Christine Dodson, NSC Staff Secretary, Aug. 2, 1977,” in advance of SCC Meeting on Aug. 4, 1977, 94 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV E-7, 8. “In the short run, it is in the economic sphere that Soviet alliance calculations will become more regarding PRM/NSC-10, in folder SCC 024 – PRM 10, 8/4/77, both from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional complex and subject to risk. … [G]iven its goals in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union has few real alternatives. … A longer-range dilemma for the Files, 1977-1981, Box 87. Soviet Union is how to allow national solutions without ultimately encouraging nationalist challenges to Soviet political and ideological control.” 102 “I do not think the study provides the basis for a selection of an overall integrated military strategy at this time.” Memorandum from Brown See pages IV D-15, 17, 19. Huntington described a number of negative trends, including that of “a ‘one-way-street’ in transfers of technology and to, inter alia, Brzezinski and Vance, June 6, 1977, “Subject: PRM – 10 Force Posture Study,” 1, with attached agenda for discussion, and attached capital to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,” and said, “The degree of risk involved in these trends must be estimated in terms of individual and “PRM/NSC-10 Military Strategy and Force Posture Review Final Report,” available from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, https://www.jimmy- culmulative [sic] impacts and the significance of each area in the implementation of a national strategy.” See page VI-7. carterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/memorandums/prm10.pdf. See also Keefer, Harold Brown, 120–33, 137; and Auten, Carter’s Conversion, 160. 95 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV E-13. 103 “Memorandum: Presidential Directive/NSC-18, U.S. National Security Strategy,” Aug. 26, 1977, from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, 96 “Draft Net Assessment Report,” IV E-13. https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/directives/pd18.pdf.

137 138 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned on freely given popular support, and it is supported operation with the Soviet Union, as well as a focus The last two years of Carter’s term saw the United viser was unable to coordinate the interagency pro- internationally by allies and friends who genuinely on transnational issues.105 It also may have been States swerve toward a more combative posture in cess and establish guidance with any effectiveness. share similar aspirations.” In contrast, “though due to the competing instincts of Carter himself, the Cold War, featuring increased defense budgets, At the end of his first year, Reagan replaced his na- successfully acquiring military power matching whose worldview encompassed elements of both aid to the Afghan resistance, and the announcement tional security adviser, restored the role to its cen- that of the United States,” the Soviet Union “con- outlooks and, early on at least, resolved clearly in of the Carter Doctrine aimed at heading off Soviet tral coordinating function, and within six months tinues to face major internal economic and nation- favor of neither. Perhaps Brzezinski and his White advances toward the Middle East.108 In the wake of also replaced Haig with George Shultz.110 al difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely House staff saw some advantage, tactical or other- the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter famously At Reagan’s direction, the new national security committed allies.” “In this situation,” the strategy wise, in keeping the document brief and general, or declared, “My opinion of the Russians has changed adviser, William Clark, and his deputy, Robert “Bud” continued, “I direct that US national strategy will perhaps they simply preferred it that way. Yet the most [more] drastically in the last week than even McFarlane, immediately established a rigorous stra- be to take advantage of our relative advantages in upshot was that while the document started from the previous two and one-half years before that.”109 tegic planning process. Reagan perceived not just economic strength, technological superiority, and a premise of competition, its goals seemed just as One of the tragedies of the Carter years was that that the Soviet Union was overstretched but also popular political support.” weighted toward cooperation, and overall it avoid- an appropriately balanced, consistent, competi- that its internal system was vulnerable economically Yet, it then listed five short objec- tion-oriented approach toward the Cold War could and technologically. He emphasized that the United tives that gave only the scantest di- have guided the administration from the start. That States could and should exploit those vulnerabilities rection and no prioritization: 1) “[c] would have only required following through on an- and pursue a competitive strategy that took the in- ounterbalanc[ing]” Soviet power and alytical work — and the competitive implications itiative and played to U.S. strengths. Clark and Mc- influence “in key areas, particular- that flowed from it — that had already been done, Farlane intended that the strategic planning process ly Europe, the Middle East, and East and prioritizing it in the written national security should “reduc[e] to careful writing” the president’s Asia”; 2) competing politically with strategy document, even if that had meant appre- views and set out a comprehensive strategic frame- the Soviet Union “by pursuing the ba- hending, forcing, and resolving some intra-admin- work to guide the prioritization and execution of the sic American commitment to human istration disputes at the front end. administration’s approach.111 rights and national independence”; Reagan signed a directive instructing his ad- 3) seeking Soviet cooperation in re- Strategic Planning Under Reagan ministration to develop an overarching strategic solving regional conflicts and reduc- framework. The first step was to produce an ex- ing areas of tension; 4) pursuing arms control and ed specificity, prioritization, or guidance, giving Perhaps no administration’s national security tended study paper that identified fundamental disarmament negotiations; and 5) “seek[ing] to encouragement and justification to both factions.106 strategic planning has been as underappreciated as U.S. national security objectives and set out a stra- involve the Soviet Union constructively in global Over the next two years, the Carter administra- that of the Reagan administration, although it got tegic rationale and agenda to guide all aspects of activities.” The United States would also “maintain tion struggled to pursue a clear, proactive line of off to a late start. Ronald Reagan, wary of the ten- U.S. national security policy. The second was to an overall balance of military power … at least as foreign and defense policy, with Vance and Cart- sions between the White House and the cabinet de- incorporate the findings of the study in a single na- favorable as that that now exists.”104 er himself often favoring a focus on negotiations partments that had characterized U.S. foreign and tional security strategy directive.112 The extended The vagueness and lack of prioritization or di- and restraint and Brzezinski warning, with growing defense policy under Nixon and Carter, had initial- study was conducted by an interagency group, but rection of the national security strategy may have concern and intensity, that they were neglecting ly downgraded the role of national security adviser. it was chaired and directed by Clark’s White House resulted from a wide variance in the views among the competitive nature of the Cold War and los- That experiment was short-lived and has not been staff. Reagan played an active role in the process, Carter’s principal advisers and a need to capture ing public and international support along the way. repeated since. Secretary of State Alexander Haig reviewing and commenting on draft segments and an approach that could garner agreement among Brown increasingly sided with Brzezinski.107 The clashed constantly with the White House and other sometimes, Clark later noted, sending them “back them easily enough. Brzezinski and Huntington period also saw the further deterioration in many cabinet secretaries and agency heads on both sub- to the drawing board.”113 were more attentive to and concerned with the ad- of the trends that Huntington had already identi- stance and process. Reagan’s national security ad- The review process resulted in a top secret, 87- versarial nature of the Cold War, the need for the fied in the net assessment — growing Soviet mili- United States to pursue a primarily competitive tary buildup and geopolitical adventurism, embod- approach, and the importance of hard power than ied by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — and a was Secretary of State Vance, who emphasized co- crisis and subsequently a series of debacles in Iran. 108 Odom, who served on Brzezinski’s staff as Carter’s military assistant and had worked closely with Huntington on the net assessment, later stated that in 1977 and in 1978 the State Department in particular, and sometimes the Defense Department, “launched vigorously off in other policy directions than PRM 10 seemed to justify,” and that were, in Odom’s eyes, “self-defeating” in light of the findings and implications of the net as- 104 “Presidential Directive/NSC-18, U.S. National Security Strategy,” 1–2. Nearly two pages from the ensuing military strategy part of the docu- sessment. For the ensuing two years, “based on the kind of analyses we had done in PRM 10, we [Brzezinski and his White House staff] had to work ment are still redacted — they appear to address U.S. military strategy in Europe, among other issues. slowly to try to bring the realities to the eyes of the President, the eyes of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and make them realize that we had to tackle some of these policies from very fundamentally different directions.” “[T]here was a lot of tension,” Odom said. “We wouldn’t have 105 Brzezinski noted in his memoirs that “[t]he interagency debate over the PD-18 draft revealed a sharp dispute within the Administration had a case without the earlier analysis.” Miller Center, “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 34–35, 39. Odom said that he had tried “to understand about the implications of PRM-10.” “One side,” Brzezinski stated, “preferred to limit our strategic forces to an assured destruction capability and to the differences of view that beset us in the Carter Administration,” and that it eventually seemed to him that “we split over whether or not the consider reducing our forces in Europe and Korea. The Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region was to be addressed through arms control efforts with the Soviet Union was a status quo power.” Brzezinski and he thought not, that “[t]he power balance had shifted; if anything, the competition was going Soviets.” Brzezinski continued that the “other side, on which I found myself, pointed to the momentum and character of Soviet military programs, to be tougher; the possibility of maintaining the post-World War II international order essentially unaltered was going to be a much larger, more the vulnerability of the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf, and the growing Soviet projection of power” in regions around the world. Brzezinski challenging task,” whereas others “seemed to believe that the U.S.S.R. was becoming benign and status quo, and accepting the international order.” noted that the resultant national security strategy reflected a series of compromises, although it also gave him “additional arguments” on various Miller Center, “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski,” 56. Auten, in Carter’s Conversion, and Keefer, in Harold Brown, discuss the administration’s U.S.-Soviet issues. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 177–78. policy shifts over the four years in detail, as does Brzezinski in his memoirs, Power and Principle. 106 Keefer, Harold Brown, 135–37; and Auten, Carter’s Conversion, 162–68. 109 See Carter’s interview with Frank Reynolds at ABC News, in “Editorial Note,” Dec. 31, 1979, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Document 133, https://histo- 107 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 13, 29–31, 42–48, 177–78. Indicative of the ongoing battles were: an extraordinary memorandum from ry.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d133. Brzezinski to Carter on Feb. 9, 1978, in which Brzezinski warned of negative Cold War trends in Western Europe and in the Third World and stated 110 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 42–47, 60–64. that “[t]he cumulative effect of these trends could be very serious internationally and then domestically,” and that “[b]y the fall we could be under attack for having presided over a grave deterioration in the U.S. global position,” (“Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security 111 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 1–80. The Clark quote is from an interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2001. Affairs (Brzezinski to President Carter,” Feb. 9, 1978, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Document 68, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977- 112 “National Security Study Directive 1-82, U.S. National Security Strategy,” The White House, Feb. 5, 1982, from the Ronald Reagan Presiden- 80v01/d68); and a letter from Vance to Carter on May 29, 1978, setting out his own views and expressing clear frustration with Brzezinski’s hardline tial Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nssds/nssd1-82.pdf. public and internal positions and declarations (“Letter from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter,” May 29, 1978, FRUS, 1977-1980, I, Docu- ment 82, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v01/d82). 113 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 61–70.

139 140 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned page study paper, titled “U.S. National Security where it could. speech. He described in broad terms that the ad- directive should encompass, among other things, Strategy.”114 The study was divided into three parts. The underlying analysis in the study established ministration had undertaken a process to “review the likelihood of changes in the Soviet system, the The first section provided an analysis of the nature a foundation for the stated U.S. national security the results of [the] first year with decisions often sources of tensions and strains within that system, of the U.S.-Soviet competition and the internation- objectives. Those were forward-leaning and aimed being made at the departmental level, to see where as well as the bases for continuity, and how “the Unit- al environment and a statement of U.S. objectives. at Soviet vulnerabilities. One of them was: we were, to make sure our various policies were ed States, its Allies and other mobilizable forces” The second section directed that those objectives consistent, and to set the course for the future” by could “influence the evolution of Soviet policies had to be attained through an “interlocking” set To foster, if possible in concert with our al- a “well-thought through and integrated strategy.” and the Soviet regime in directions favorable to our of diplomatic, information, politico-economic, and lies, restraint in Soviet military spending, Unsurprisingly, Clark did not spell out all of the interests.”127 military strategies. And the final section set out in discourage Soviet adventurism, and weak- specific objectives in the national security strategy. While the State Department chaired the intera- detail a military strategy in pursuit of the adminis- en the Soviet alliance system by forcing But he did note that the administration would be gency group that produced the resultant strategy tration’s objectives.115 the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic prepared “to respond vigorously to opportunities directive, Clark directed the overall process. The The study paper focused on identifying the shortcomings, and to encourage long-term as they arise and to create opportunities where they strategy directive itself was largely drafted by Rich- threats posed by the Soviet Union and the rela- liberalizing and nationalist tendencies with- have not existed before.” And, echoing the presi- ard Pipes, the Harvard historian of Russian and tive U.S. and Soviet strengths and weaknesses. in the Soviet Union and allied countries.118 dent’s rhetoric while capturing the direction of the Soviet history, then serving Reagan and Clark as It was ruthless in specifying and prioritizing U.S. strategy, Clark emphasized “our fondest hope that senior director for Soviet and European affairs.128 policy approaches that sought to exploit America’s The National Security Council took up the study with an active yet prudent national security policy, The strategy directive on U.S. relations with the strengths in peaceful competition over the long paper for consideration and discussion. Clark lat- we might one day convince the leadership of the Soviet Union flowed from the prior national secu- haul. For example, the military strategy compo- er noted that the objective of pressuring the inter- Soviet Union to turn their attention inward, to seek rity strategy. The directive stated that U.S. policy nent of the study noted that the Soviets “face se- nal Soviet system “didn’t have a lot of support” the legitimacy that only comes from the consent of toward the Soviet Union would consist of three vere economic problems” and “a bleak economic from State Department officials, including Haig the governed, and thus to address the hopes and elements. The first was to “contain and over time outlook” and that “[l]iving standards in the USSR — who was about to be supplanted by Shultz in dreams of their own people.”124 reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effec- will probably stagnate owing to the growing de- any event — but the president and other senior The national security strategy codified a sin- tively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union fense burden and inefficient investment practices. officials strongly supported it. It stayed in the gle, unifying framework. It established objectives in all international arenas—particularly in the As Soviet citizens perceive a decline in the qual- document amid the debates within the National that the United States would work peacefully to overall military balance and in geographical re- ity of life, productivity growth will also decline,” Security Council.119 reverse the spread of Soviet influence and to pres- gions of priority concern to the United States.”129 forcing Moscow to “make difficult choices among Reagan approved the study in full and formally sure the Soviet system so as to leave internal re- The second was: priorities.” “[I]t will become increasingly difficult adopted it as the foundation of foreign and defense form as the Soviet leaders’ best, or only, option. It for the Soviets to sustain their military buildup as policy in a top secret directive.120 That national se- also catalyzed a period of intensive strategic plan- To promote, within the narrow limits availa- their economic growth slows.”116 Noting “contin- curity strategy directive stated in the presidential ning within the Reagan administration across a ble to us, the process of change in the Soviet uing [Soviet] difficulties in introducing new tech- first person that “I have carefully reviewed the range of issues: Over the ensuing year, the admin- Union toward a more pluralistic political and nology,” and also the need for a sustainable U.S. NSSD 1-82 study in its component parts, consid- istration issued 75 national security directives, economic system in which the power of the military force and budget, the paper emphasized ered the final recommendations of the National many of them establishing follow-on regional and privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. exploiting “our national genius for technological Security Council, and direct that the study serve functional strategies.125 The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressive- innovation and industrial efficiency, and in our al- as guidance for U.S. National Security Strategy.”121 One of these strategies was specifically on Amer- ness has deep roots in the internal system, liances.”117 A principal theme of the study was that The document listed the “global objectives” out- ica’s policy toward the Soviet Union, building upon and that relations with the USSR should perceived advantages in various specific spheres of lined in the study, summarized the rest of the the premises and guidance set out in the national therefore take into account whether or not the Cold War — military, economic, technological, study, and included the study in its entirety as an security strategy study and directive. The White they help to strengthen this system and its ideological — translated into expanded influence attachment.122 The national security strategy direc- House stated that the development of that strategy capacity to engage in aggression.130 and freedom of action in the overall U.S.-Soviet tive itself made clear that it was the beginning, not directive was to “proceed on the premise that So- competition. Thus, it underscored the need for the end, of the administration’s strategic planning. viet international behavior is determined not only The third was to “engage the Soviet Union in ne- America to seek and exploit opportunities to bol- Additional classified strategies on specific issues by the external environment but also by political, gotiations to attempt to reach agreements which ster its standing in those areas that most worked to and regions were to follow.123 economic, and social and ideological features of the protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are its strengths, while shoring up relative weaknesses Clark then delivered what was for him a rare Soviet system itself.”126 The White House mandat- consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity ed that the review process that would develop the and mutual interest.”131

114 “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Study Paper, April 1982, Records Declassified and Released by the National Security Council, Series III., Related Documents, Subseries B, System II, Box 4, 90283 (NSDD 32), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 124 Clark, “National Security Strategy,” address before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, May 21, 1982, 115 “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Study Paper. in American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1982 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1985), 89–91, 93. 116 “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Study Paper, 2, 9, 13. 125 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 70. 117 “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Study Paper, 73. 126 “National Security Study Directive 11-82, U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” The White House, Aug. 21, 1982, 1, from the Ronald Reagan 118 “U.S. National Security Strategy,” Study Paper, 5. Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nssds/nssd11-82.pdf. 119 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 68. The Clark quote is from an interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2001. 127 “National Security Study Directive 11-82, U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union,” 1–3. 120 “National Security Decision Directive 32, U.S. National Security Strategy,” The White House, May 20, 1982, from the Ronald Reagan Presiden- 128 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 76-80. tial Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd32.pdf. 129 “National Security Decision Directive 75, U.S. Relations with the USSR,” [hereafter NSDD 75] The White House, Jan. 7, 1983, 1, from the 121 “National Security Decision Directive 32,” 1. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd75.pdf. 122 “National Security Decision Directive 32,” 1–8. 130 “NSDD 75,” 1. 123 “National Security Decision Directive 32.” 131 “NSDD 75,” 1.

141 142 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

The strategy directive emphasized that “[i]mple- and the ensuing follow-on strategies, Reagan and threat to the Soviet system, in which the State con- Union, and ensure that U.S. objectives are mentation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the his National Security Council had collectively al- trols the destiny of the individual, is the concept of met as quickly as possible.144 environment in which Soviet decisions are made lowed themselves flexibility in pursuing specific freedom itself,” it stated, and “[w]hile we will seek both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical foreign and defense policies, but left little doubt and experience periods of cooperation with Soviet Strategic Planning Under George H. W. Bush arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relation- about the premises and objectives that would leadership, there will be no change in the funda- ship.”132 It laid out the means by which the Unit- guide those policies, which were both coherent and mentally competitive nature of our relationship un- Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush’s national ed States would seek to influence the factors that particularly assertive. less and until a change occurs in the nature of the security adviser, later expressed disappointment could impel Soviet policy toward directions more McFarlane, who had played an important role Soviet system.”141 Again, the strategy focused on ex- with the efforts at strategic planning that he had favorable to U.S. interests. It established objectives in coordinating the strategic planning process as ploiting comparative U.S. advantages in high tech- led in 1989, the administration’s first year.145 In across U.S. military strategy, economic policy, po- Clark’s deputy and then succeeded him as Reagan’s nology to press U.S. strengths, channel the military some respects, his assessment was too modest, be- litical action, geopolitical strategy, and bilateral re- national security adviser, later stated: “We had a and economic competition into areas that favored cause despite the results of the strategic planning lations.133 For example, it stipulated that the United policy, written down, that said, ‘I am the president the United States and could prove sustainable, and process being underwhelming, the process itself States would pursue “a major ideological political and I want to challenge the Soviet Union political- to undermine the Soviets at their weakest points did produce useful effects. offensive, which, together with other efforts, will ly, economically, and militarily.’ That does tend to and force them toward options — reducing Soviet With Bush’s agreement, Scowcroft conducted an be designed to bring about evolutionary change of have an effect on the Cabinet and on subordinates, defense spending and pursuing internal change — interagency review of policy that was intended to the Soviet system.”134 The strategy directive estab- as it should.” McFarlane added that “the devel- in line with U.S. interests. This time, the strategy generate new strategies to underpin the adminis- lished some specific steps to be taken toward each opment of programs from that leitmotif, included was aided by the Reagan administration’s pursuit tration’s foreign and defense policies. Scowcroft objective, but did not attempt to catalogue them. programs on arms control and human rights and of the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense was motivated, in part, by a desire to ensure that The strategy directive, as assertive as it was, was regional disagreements … and bilateral issues.” All research and development program, announced in the Bush team considered and shaped its own pol- intended to be sustainable. It stated that the “in- of those, McFarlane continued, “contained—well, 1983, which Reagan knew to be a source of enor- icies, rather than simply continuing without reap- terrelated tasks of containing and reversing Sovi- ‘aggressive’ has a legal connotation to it I don’t in- mous military, technological, and economic anxiety praisal the approaches of the Reagan administra- et expansion and promoting evolutionary change tend, but an enthusiastic, energetic, competitive and concern for Gorbachev.142 The United States, tion.146 The White House accordingly requested a within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accom- content. Not a placid, passive content, but compet- the document noted, “must pursue strategies for series of formal interagency studies, including re- plished quickly,” and that the policy it set forth “is itive. For example, the economic policies were spe- competition which emphasize our comparative ad- views of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, East- one for the long haul.”135 cifically designed to weaken the Soviet economy vantages in these areas.”143 ern Europe, and Western Europe, and America’s While Pipes was the primary drafter of the strat- and to do so in any way we could think of within le- The updated Reagan strategy is also noteworthy policy toward the Persian Gulf.147 egy toward the Soviet Union, the interagency nature gal and moral bounds.” McFarlane concluded: “We for its concise statement of the imperative to avoid The classified directives requesting the studies of its development meant that the various depart- established a policy framework that directed us to direct U.S. military engagements that could result were themselves insightful and probing. The se- ments and agencies weighed in at the front end, and explore ways to compete more energetically.”137 in a quagmire and dissipate U.S. strength: cret four-page document directing the review of thus bought into and were constrained by the out- Like the Eisenhower administration, the Reagan U.S.-Soviet relations noted the potential for enor- come. The State Department, for example, sought administration also reassessed and refined its na- In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, mous positive alterations in the relationship, giv- to mitigate the objective of putting pressure on the tional security strategy over time. In September the United States will rely primarily on in- en changes occurring within the Soviet Union and internal Soviet system, succeeding in inserting the 1986, for example, a year and a half after Gorbachev digenous forces to protect their own inter- shifts in its control over Soviet satellites. But it also phrase “within the narrow limits available to us” in had taken power in the Soviet Union and nearly a ests. Commitment of U.S. combat forces expressed wariness: “the USSR remains an adver- the block quote above. But it did not attempt to turn year after Reagan and Gorbachev had met at the will be made only when other means are sary with awesome military power whose interests away from that objective overall, which in any event Geneva summit, the Reagan administration updat- not considered viable. Such commitment is conflict in important ways with our own. The Soviet had been set in the earlier national security strategy ed its classified national security strategy.138 The appropriate only if political objectives are Union already presents a new and complicated po- and was accepted — even underscored — by Reagan updated strategy noted that the “Gorbachev lead- established, our political will is clear, and litical challenge to us in Europe and elsewhere.”148 and the rest of the National Security Council. The ership is more vigorous and dynamic than its pre- appropriate military capabilities are availa- The directive sought a study of Soviet policy objec- final draft of the directive met with little objection decessors” and that “the potential now exists for ble. If U.S. combat forces are committed, the tives, assessments of the Soviet internal situation when the council took up it up for consideration. more creative and energized Soviet foreign policies United States will seek to limit the scope of and foreign and military policies, and a review of Reagan approved it as a formal, secret directive to inimical to U.S. interests.”139 It retained the same the conflict, avoid involvement of the Soviet the sources of U.S. leverage over the Soviet Union guide U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.136 basic objectives as the earlier version.140 The strat- Through the formal strategic planning process egy remained intensely assertive and consistent 141 NSDD 238, 4, 5. that had produced the national security strategy with the earlier version in its aims: “the greatest 142 NSDD 238, 7; and Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 122–248. 143 NSDD 238, 7, 9. 132 “NSDD 75,” 2. 144 NSDD 238, 16. 133 “NSDD 75,” 2–9. 145 Brent Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012; and George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books 1999), 37–41. 134 “NSDD 75,” 8. 146 Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012; and Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 37–41. 135 “NSDD 75,” 6, 8. 147 See “National Security Review-3, Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations,” [hereafter “NSR-3”] The White House, Feb. 15, 1989, from 136 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 78–80. the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsr/nsr3.pdf; “National Security Review-4, Comprehensive Review 137 Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 88–89, 126–29. The McFarlane quotes are from an interview with the author, Aug. 22, 2000. of US-East European Relations,” The White House, Feb. 15, 1989, from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/ files/nsr/nsr4.pdf; “National Security Review-5, Comprehensive Review of US-West European Relations,” The White House, Feb. 15, 1989, from the 138 “National Security Decision Directive 238, Basic National Security Strategy,” [hereafter NSDD 238] Sept. 2, 1986, from the Ronald Reagan George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsr/nsr5.pdf; and “National Security Review-10, U.S. Policy Toward the Presidential Library, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/archives/reference/scanned-nsdds/nsdd238.pdf. Persian Gulf,” The White House, Feb. 22, 1989, from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsr/nsr10.pdf. 139 NSDD 238, 3. 148 NSR-3, 1. In the presidential first person, Bush continued: “My own sense is that the Soviet challenge may be even greater than before 140 NSDD 238, 5–6. because it is more varied.”

143 144 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned and potential policy alternatives newly available to sidering the studies, Bush and his National Security the United States.149 Council engaged in their own discussions of both The administration had announced in broad strategic direction and specific policy courses, terms that it was pursuing a policy review and particularly on Eastern Europe and the future of analysis, creating public interest in the classified, Europe as a whole. That process was itself fruit- internal process. That was especially so given the ful, resulting in specific ideas from Scowcroft and quickening pace of events unfolding in Eastern others that led to proposals and approaches that Europe and within the Soviet Union, including the Bush launched that year. It demonstrated, for Bush loosening grip of communist control over Warsaw and Scowcroft and their colleagues on the National Pact countries, the potential perils of possible re- Security Council, the importance of regularly dis- sponses from Moscow and the satellite govern- cussing the development of policy direction among ments, and the enormous geopolitical ramifica- themselves. It also helped establish the “Core tions for the United States.150 Group” of principals whose work together, guided The review process was hampered from the start by the president and coordinated by Scowcroft, BUSH AND SCOWCROFT’S by the fact that it occurred before the administra- as they brought the Cold War to a successful and tion was sufficiently staffed with its own new ap- peaceful end has rightly earned them admiration pointees. The Defense Department, for example, and esteem.153 did not have a confirmed secretary in place for Both Bush and Scowcroft revered and conscious- NATIONAL SECURITY two months, so the initial taskings for the reviews ly emulated Eisenhower. In announcing his first were handled without the attention and leadership bid for president, in 1979, Bush stated that he ad- from the top that they might otherwise have re- hered to “the principles of Lincoln, Theodore Roo- PLANNING WAS LESS RIGOROUS ceived. Nor did other departments evidently give sevelt, and Dwight Eisenhower,” and even quoted the studies the priority that Scowcroft had intend- Eisenhower directly: “There is in world affairs a ed.151 In all events, Scowcroft later characterized steady course to be followed between an assertion AND SYSTEMATIC THAN the reviews that resulted from the interagency pro- of strength that is truculent and a confession of cess as unimaginative, effectively reiterating past helplessness that is cowardly.”154 Bush and Scow- approaches, and he expressed some regret that he croft’s national security planning was less rigorous EISENHOWER’S. YET, had not delved into and directed how and by whom and systematic than Eisenhower’s. Yet, like Eisen- they were prepared. Especially disappointed with hower, they possessed strategic vision and steadily the proposed strategy on U.S. policy toward the implemented it. One of the ironies of Bush’s presi- Soviet Union, Scowcroft called for a re-do, turning dency was and remains the criticism that he lacked LIKE EISENHOWER, the assignment over to his White House staff ad- an overarching vision. To the contrary, he deserves viser for Soviet affairs, Condoleezza Rice, who then to be remembered as one of the most effective drafted what became the administration’s strategy strategists among presidents. THEY POSSESSED STRATEGIC directive on Soviet policy.152 Bush’s worldview was based on the harsh les- Despite these disappointments, the interagency sons of World War II, as he highlighted in his for- review process did ultimately contribute to the ad- eign-policy memoirs.155 Having been shot down VISION AND STEADILY ministration’s national security successes. In con- over the Pacific at age 20, and having lost his crew-

149 NSR-3, 2–4. IMPLEMENTED IT. 150 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Ear: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, rev. ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hop- kins University Press, 1998), 332–34, 347, 349. 151 Senior Bush administration Defense Department official, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012; and Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012. 152 Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40–43, 53; “Transcript, Interview with Brent Scowcroft,” Nov. 12–13, 1999, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project, University of Virginia Miller Center, 40, 51, http://web1.millercenter.org/poh/ transcripts/ohp_1999_1112_scowcroft.pdf; James A. Baker, III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989- 1992 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 68–70 (Baker noted that “much of the review was run by Reagan administration holdovers” and that “we asked the bureaucracy itself to produce the papers,” which “resulted in least-common-denominator thinking”; “what we received was mush.”). On what became the administration’s formal policy toward the Soviet Union, see “National Security Directive 23, United States Relations with the Soviet Union,” The White House, Sept. 22, 1989, from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/nsd/nsd23. pdf. See also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997, orig. published 1995), 20–31. 153 Miller Center, “Transcript, Interview with Brent Scowcroft,” 31–33; Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012; and Bush and Scow- croft, A World Transformed, 40–56. 154 Bush quoted (including his quotation of Eisenhower) in Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (New York: Random House, 2015), 216–17. See also Paul Lettow and Kori Schake, “The Vision Thing: George H. W. Bush Saw How to Preserve American Strength at a Perilous Time,” National Review 70, no. 24 (December 31, 2018), 32–34. 155 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 60–61.

145 146 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned mates, he knew better than most that things can world in which the United States played the leading relatively heavy on geopolitics — on ensuring an the Bush administration’s focus on its freedom and do go dangerously wrong when America aban- role, in which sovereign states adhered to basic active, sustained, and global American presence, agenda in 2006 or the Obama administration’s un- dons a leadership role, or when its foreign policy rules, and in which structures of power favorable to and on preventing domination or destabilization of derscoring of climate change and other transnation- is not guided by clear-eyed purpose — as with America could encourage international cooperation regions critical to U.S. interests by current or po- al issues and threats.167 Like Nixon’s messages, they the disastrous American policies of the interwar to enforce those rules when necessary.160 tential future rivals.164 sometimes foreshadowed policy developments, as years. Faced with convulsions in Eastern Europe That was their vision for the “new world order.” But Bush and Scowcroft never did set out their with the Bush administration’s 2002 national se- and within the Soviet Union itself, and then in the The inartful phrase was used by Bush in a speech strategic principles in a comprehensive way or ful- curity strategy, written in the wake of the al-Qaeda Middle East with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Bush in the lead-up to the Gulf War, and was maligned ly and effectively explicate them publicly. In some attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 and in advance of the war played the long game. Reminiscent of Eisenhower, from the start.161 But as Scowcroft later noted, and ways, they were like Eisenhower, just without the in Iraq. It declared that “[w]e must be prepared to he constantly, even ruthlessly, worked to preserve the historian Jeffrey Engel and Kaplan have rightly paper. They were guided by basic principles and stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before America’s geopolitical position and strength for emphasized, that slogan has come to mean near- led a group of senior officials who hashed out their they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass the long haul, so that it could serve as a bulwark ly the opposite of what Bush and Scowcroft had differences among themselves, sometimes vigor- destruction against the United States and our allies against the worst possibilities of a brutal and po- intended. Bush and Scowcroft were not Wilsoni- ously but as a team, as they pursued those basic and friends. … To forestall or prevent such hostile tentially chaotic world.156 an, nor did they believe in multilateralism for its principles. Perhaps they would have been well acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if Robert D. Kaplan has astutely summarized Bush’s own sake. They knew that the world was a rough served by getting that basic strategic direction on necessary, act preemptively.”168 worldview: “Tragedy is avoided by thinking tragi- and unforgiving place, and that the United States paper. It certainly would help us more clearly un- The post-Cold War U.S. national security strate- cally.”157 For Bush, that meant, among other things, needed to sustain its strength and leadership and derstand and learn from their example today. For gies operated more as speeches than as strategies. insisting on a unified Germany remaining in NATO, geopolitical standing over the long haul.162 Engel his part, Scowcroft — at least as of 2012, when this But rhetoric is not strategy, and mistaking the for- and the United States strengthening, not abandon- quotes Scowcroft as saying: “The world could be a author interviewed him — enthusiastically sup- mer for the latter is dangerous. Rhetoric is given to ing or curtailing, its position as the preeminent better place. But don’t get carried away.”163 ported the mission of examining past strategic categorical statement and overreach that sweeps power in European affairs. Bush thereby hoped to As noted earlier, the current statutory require- planning efforts, how we might learn from them, away analysis, prioritization, or context. It is best reduce the possibility of future intra-European con- ment for an unclassified annual strategy was enact- and the importance of developing sound and sus- deployed as a tool in the implementation of a strat- flict and to deter other powers from attempting to ed in 1986, as part of the broader Goldwater-Nich- tainable strategy.165 egy. For the most part, the post-Cold War era na- dominate or destabilize the continent.158 As he put it ols package of legislative national security reforms. tional security strategies were disconnected from in a diary entry, the United States had “a dispropor- In addition to their classified, internal national se- Strategic Planning in the Post-Cold War Era: the kind of rigorous, classified national security tionate role for stability,” and he had “to look after curity strategy planning described above, the Rea- Clinton, Bush, and Obama strategic planning often conducted by presidential the U.S. interest in all of this without reverting to gan and Bush administrations also issued unclassi- administrations during the Cold War. a kind of isolationistic or stupid peace-nik view on fied national security strategies almost every year The Bill Clinton administration continued to is- A prerequisite for the best of those Cold War where we stand in the world.”159 In the Middle East, starting in 1987. The Bush administration’s three sue unclassified national security strategies most planning efforts was a searching analysis to try to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 threatened the strategy documents were especially notable. They years, before the George W. Bush administration understand other international actors. U.S. strate- cardinal U.S. geopolitical principle of avoiding the started to lay conceptual foundations for the post- commenced the current tradition of issuing them gists of earlier eras understood well that they were destabilization or dominance by a hostile power Cold War world that were in line with Bush’s and once every four-year presidential term.166 Those ef- maneuvering on a playing field with other impor- of that region — as with East Asia and Europe — Scowcroft’s views: optimistic but wary, and insist- forts by the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack tant actors — some friendly, some not — that were and so he led a coalition to combat and reverse it. ent upon maintaining strong alliances underpinned Obama administrations had their purpose. They operating with motives, interests, and objectives That, in turn, served as precedent for what Bush by American hard power over the long haul. Those were extended public statements meant to empha- of their own. Attempting to understand those mo- and Scowcroft saw as a vision for the post-Cold War iterations of the national security strategies were size critical themes and priorities of each adminis- tives, interests, and objectives with dispassion and tration for an audience that included Congress and rigor was foundational for crafting U.S. strategies. 156 Lettow and Schake, “The Vision Thing,” 32-34; Jeffrey A. Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold the public, as well as friend and foe abroad. Those strategies, in turn, aimed to shape the en- War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2017), 5–10. In some respects, the Nixon administration’s an- vironment in which those actors made decisions. 157 Robert D. Kaplan, “Obama Is No George H. W. Bush,” The National Interest, March 5, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/obama-no- nual foreign policy messages served as early forerun- For much of the post-Cold War era, America’s ef- george-h-w-bush-15406. ners for those documents, which were often written forts to bring about the country’s best wishes have 158 See Engel, When the World Seemed New; Lettow and Schake, “The Vision Thing,” 32–34; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed; and with care and even eloquence. Take, for example, seemed not to have had the desired effect. Until re- Kaplan, “Obama Is No George H. W. Bush,” The National Interest. 159 Bush diary entry, Feb. 24, 1990, in George H. W. Bush, All the Best: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999), 460–61. 160 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 399–400. See also Engel, When the World Seemed New; Lettow and Schake, “The Vision Thing”; 164 National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, March 1990, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/ Kaplan, “Obama Is No George H. W. Bush.” nss1990.pdf?ver=x5cwOOez0oak2BjhXekM-Q==; National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, August 1991, https://history. defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1991.pdf?ver=3sIpLiQwmknO-RplyPeAHw==; and National Security Strategy of the United States, The 161 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 399–400. For Bush’s speech, see “September 11, 1990: Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” White House, January 1993, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1993.pdf?ver=Dulx2wRKDaQ-ZrswRPRX9g==. University of Virginia Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-1990-address-joint-session-congress. 165 Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012. 162 Miller Center, “Transcript, Interview with Brent Scowcroft,” 51–52 (“So as it became clear that there was a new world emerging, I was looking for a cute way to encapsulate and show that we were thinking ahead, that we were out in front. You know, this certainly was not the first time it 166 The Clinton administration’s annual national security strategies appear to be the only such documents that explicitly acknowledged that they were issued in compliance with the requirements of the statute. was used, to be sure, but no, I did not know that it had a Wilsonian connotation, or didn’t think of it at the time. … [I]t wasn’t a vision of a whole 167 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, March 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. world. We didn’t think it was going to be a peaceful world. We thought it was going to be a messy world.”). Scowcroft added that the concept had gov/nsc/nss/2006/; National Security Strategy, The White House, May 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_view- emerged from discussions he had with Bush “about what the future might look like, and how we ought to act to steer the future in directions that er/national_security_strategy.pdf; and National Security Strategy, The White House, February 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ would be appropriate to the United States. It’s all fuzzy other than the New World Order, which I wish I had never thought of. … [B]ecause it’s been default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. Alan G. Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents, U.S. used for all kinds of pernicious things, mostly turning the United States over to the U.N..” “You know, if you come from Utah like I do,” Scowcroft Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, October 2012, xi, 14, 70–98, 112, provides a history of the processes by which the 2002, 2006, and noted wryly, “where every helicopter you hear overhead at night is the U.N., you sort of have second thoughts.” Miller Center, “Transcript, Interview 2010 national security strategies were developed. with Brent Scowcroft,” 52. See also Engel, When the World Seemed New, 415–39, 480; Kaplan, “Obama Is No George H. W. Bush”; and Lettow and 168 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 14–15, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ Schake, “The Vision Thing,” 32–34. nsc/nss/2002/. See Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Crown, 2011), 152–56, 166–72, 291; and 163 Scowcroft quoted in Engel, When the World Seemed New, 10, 480. Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 73–81.

147 148 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned cently, national security strategies in this era have its likely or plausible implications and outcomes planning.175 Hadley helped shepherd a thorough conceived by Barry Pavel, the defense lead on the often been devoid of a clear-eyed analysis of the were for the United States and for the internation- reassessment of strategy for the war in Iraq from National Security Council staff who had started in motives and capabilities of other important inter- al system it had done so much to build and lead.171 the White House in 2006.176 the fall of 2008 under Bush and remained under national actors.169 These fundamental issues could have been thought Bush and Hadley also took some institutional Obama. An important drafter for the project was One of the most fundamental lessons from Amer- through at the time, before the United States pur- steps to lay a foundation for future national securi- Ben Rhodes, then the chief National Security Coun- ica’s Cold War-era national security strategy is one sued such a critical policy direction that persisted ty strategic planning. They reestablished a directo- cil speechwriter and later the deputy national se- of the simplest, albeit the most underappreciated: over decades. And they should have been — sys- rate within the National Security Council staff for curity adviser, who captured Obama’s thinking and America ought to examine — with as much insight tematically, in secret, with rigor, and with a dose of strategic planning,177 of the kind that Brzezinski had voice. Drafts of the document were discussed with and intellectual honesty as it can — what its prin- both hardheadedness and intellectual humility that created and Huntington had led. (Lord had earlier representatives of departments and agencies and cipal geopolitical rivals are up to, why, what kind characterized, say, the Eisenhower administration, served essentially a similar role for Kissinger.) The then provided to help guide them as they under- of challenges that poses to the United States, and which went out of its way to test its own assump- initial leaders of that directorate, the scholar-prac- took their own strategic reviews in the adminis- what might be done about it, other than resorting tions and consider alternative strategies. titioners Peter Feaver and William Inboden, played tration’s first year, but the administration may not to conflict or inaction. The same applies to the Bush administration’s a significant role in the White House review that have had Obama formally sign off on it, at least at That kind of clear-eyed foundational analysis of 2002 national security strategy, which sought to led to the Iraq “surge” and also spearheaded the first, so that he would not be pinned down by it.180 other actors is conspicuous by its absence from rally other major powers around a counterterror- drafting of the 2006 national security strategy.178 That document, the various departmental strate- many of the national security strategies that have ism focus and noted the need to hedge against po- Administrations since have preserved that stra- gic reviews, and the policy speeches by Obama in been produced over the last few decades. By way tential threats if China and Russia turned in hostile tegic planning directorate on the White House Prague and Cairo and elsewhere formed the basis of illustration, the Clinton administration’s nation- directions, but it also noted that “the world’s great staff, although its usage and effectiveness have for the administration’s unclassified 2010 national al security strategy from 2000 emphasized that “[i] powers” are “increasingly united by common val- varied. The Trump administration would elevate security strategy.181 ntegrating the [People’s Republic of China] more ues,” and that “recent developments have encour- and expand it, as will be seen. fully into the global trading system is manifestly aged our hope that a truly global consensus about In 2008, Bush and Hadley, assisted by this au- Strategic Planning Under Trump in our national interest.” It stated that the admin- basic principles is taking shape.”172 It focused on thor, also formally established an interagency na- istration’s trade and economic policies “will create expanding trade and economic cooperation with tional security policy planning committee, chaired In 2017, Trump’s then-national security adviser, jobs and opportunities for Americans through the China, which “will advance openness and rule of by that White House strategic planning directorate Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, wanted to make sure that opening of Chinese markets, promote economic re- law in China,” and on deepening its global role, and comprising all of the senior planning officials the administration had a written national security form in China, and enhance the understanding of and noted that China “has begun to take the road from throughout relevant departments and agen- strategy that provided coherent policy direction. the Chinese people of the rule of law in the devel- to political openness.”173 The document also dis- cies. Those officials were specified in a presidential He brought on Nadia Schadlow as deputy assis- opment of their domestic civil society in compli- cerned “a critical change in Russian thinking that directive and charged in that directive with assist- tant to the president for national security strategy. ance with international obligations,” and that the promises to lead to productive, long-term relations ing the National Security Council and its princi- Schadlow oversaw a handful of directors within an United States was accordingly working “to com- with the Euro-Atlantic community and the United pals with coordinating the preparation of strategic elevated and expanded strategy directorate. Their plete the multilateral negotiation of China’s WTO States.”174 The view may have looked different from planning documents, analyzing and recommending principal task was to spearhead the development accession,” which “offer[s] the best hope of inter- Beijing or Moscow. policy alternatives, and contingency planning.179 In of the written national security strategy. McMas- nal reform” within China.170 To his credit, the national security adviser in essence, the Bush administration was rebuilding, ter, Schadlow, and others on the National Secu- Yet, there is now a considerable debate on several George W. Bush’s second term, Stephen Hadley, or at least allowing for the future use of, something rity Council staff believed that the United States points: whether the United States should have so who had been deputy in the first term, recognized akin to Eisenhower’s Policy Planning Board. was overdue for a national security strategy that purposely facilitated the drastic expansion of com- the importance of strategic planning. He took steps Shortly after taking office, the Obama admin- focused on the challenges that the United States munist-led China’s comprehensive power through to rebuild both a culture of planning and a capacity istration engaged in a classified process aimed faced from China especially, as well as from Russia the World Trade Organization decision and other for it, with the support of the president. at identifying and prioritizing national security and other, more regional rivals such as Iran and choices; the soundness of the premises and assump- The initiation and early years of the war in Iraq threats, challenges, and opportunities in what was North Korea. That approach served as the basis for tions that underlay that policy direction; and what had suffered from a lack of adequate strategic called a national security priorities review. It was the development of the national security strategy.182

175 For different perspectives on how and why this was so, see Rice, No Higher Honor, 161–215; Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 4–7, 168–293; and Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2012, first published 2011), 316–30, 359–60, 413–541. 176 See Rice, No Higher Honor, 538–43, 544–46. 169 As Kissinger told the scholar-practitioners Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier regarding U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War: “Every new administration tries to develop a new strategy. The problem is that they never start with an analysis of what the world is, but what they think it 177 Stephen Hadley, interview with the author, 2012. Full disclosure: This author worked for Bush and Hadley in that strategic planning director- should be.” Kissinger quoted in Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between the Wars: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and ate from 2007 to 2009. the Start of the War on Terror (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 71. 178 See Rice, No Higher Honor, 538–43, 544–46; and Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 70–73, 81–91. 170 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, The White House, December 2000, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/ 179 “National Security Presidential Directive 60, Establishing a National Security Policy Planning Committee,” The White House, Aug. 28, 2008, nss2000.pdf. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-60.pdf. 171 See Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning.” They wrote that contrary to American policymakers’ assumptions and expectations, “China 180 Barry Pavel, interview with the author, April 26, 2021. See also Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” has instead pursued its own course, belying a range of American expectations in the process. That reality warrants a clear-eyed rethinking of the 92–93. United States’ approach to China. … [B]uilding a stronger and more sustainable approach to, and relationship with, Beijing requires honesty about how many fundamental assumptions have turned out wrong.” 181 Barry Pavel, interview with the author, April 26, 2021. The strategic planning directorate established by Hadley played a significant role in the 2010 national security strategy. Rhodes evidently helped draft it and coordinated directly with the president to ensure that it captured his 172 National Security Strategy, September 2002, Preface, ii, and 26. interests, priorities, and voice. See Stolberg, “How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents,” 92–97. On the Prague and Cairo 173 National Security Strategy, September 2002, 27–28. The document stated that “[t]he events of September 11, 2001, fundamentally changed speeches, and on Obama’s rhetoric generally, see Ben Rhodes, The World as It Is: Inside the Obama White House (London: Vintage, 2019, orig. pub. the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power, and opened vast, new opportunities.” See page 28. 2018), 41–42, 48–49, 51–61, 66–69. 174 National Security Strategy, September 2002, 26. 182 Nadia Schadlow, interview with the author, Dec. 18, 2020.

149 150 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

As a foundation for understanding the nature of tegic planning documents from other departments Make it classified and set out America’s enduring interests, and the the threat posed by China and other great-pow- and agencies and within the White House, which principal threats and challenges to them, includ- er rivals to the United States, the White House led to the development of a number of classified The strategic planning process that develops ing from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and team drew on work from inside and outside strategies on specific issues and regions.188 Among the overarching strategy should be rigorous and other state and nonstate actors. In doing so, the the U.S. government on America’s great-power them was the “U.S. Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” searching. By its nature, that involves information administration should remember the importance of competitors and the nature of their challenge, in- a classified planning document from February 2018, and analysis that is classified. The administration geopolitics. Preventing the destabilization or dom- cluding that of Princeton professor Aaron Fried- shortly after the national security strategy and na- should aim to produce a classified national secu- ination of East Asia, Europe, or the Middle East by berg.183 McMaster and Schadlow met directly with tional defense strategy.189 The administration de- rity strategy and then decide, with care and inten- a power hostile to the United States is an endur- relevant cabinet secretaries and agency officials classified and released that framework document, tion, what aspects it will make public and in what ing first principle of U.S. foreign policy. A related at the front end of the process, and established with some redactions, days before Trump left office, form, whether through an unclassified summary or principle is that America should maintain access to interagency working groups to provide input and noting that it “has served, for the last three years, through speeches or other statements.192 lines of communication between and among those analysis on particular issues during the develop- as the Trump Administration’s overarching strategic regions and more broadly to the sea, air, space, and ment of the document. Specific departments or guidance for implementing” the national security The White House should lead cyber commons. Those principles have roots in the agencies within those working groups were tasked strategy within the Indo-Pacific, and that it was be- thinking of the best American strategists even be- with preparing and presenting study papers for ing made public “to communicate to the American The process of developing the national security fore the Cold War, including, among others, Alfred discussion or for follow-up input and analysis. people and to our allies and partners America’s en- strategy has to be driven by the White House. The Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Nicho- The National Security Council staff drafted the during commitment” to the region.190 president has to give priority to it, and the national las Spykman.193 They served as a continual thread actual national security strategy document and security adviser has to provide leadership, respon- throughout U.S. Cold War strategy, beginning with then sent it out for interagency review.184 The ef- sibility, and oversight. At the same time, the rele- Kennan and Truman through the strategies of each fort involved the president, who signed the docu- Lessons Learned vant departments and agencies ought to provide of the Cold War presidents, and in George H. W. ment and launched it publicly.185 meaningful data, analysis, and input. That serves Bush’s conceptualization of the post-Cold War The document’s drafters intentionally sought Several lessons can be drawn from these exam- to inform the development of the overall strate- world. We have learned through painful experi- to set out the challenge to U.S. interests posed by ples of national security strategic planning to help gy, to prevent or mitigate shortcomings in under- ence in the 20th century and the first decades of China and other rivals, and the essential elements guide the Biden administration and future adminis- standing or assumptions within the White House, the 21st the importance of those geopolitical prin- and objectives of a competitive U.S. strategy that trations as they undertake their own planning pro- and ultimately to increase the likelihood of buy-in ciples, which go to the heart of Americans’ safety would be compelling and resonant on a bipartisan cesses. Chief among these lessons are: to the ultimate strategy from senior leaders from and their ability to thrive in the world. basis and would lay the foundation for a long-term the departments and agencies. The most essential There are, of course, other important interests approach.186 That sense was shared among strate- Develop a comprehensive strategy elements of the strategy should be considered and that must be analyzed, many of them related to gic planners at the Defense Department, guided by debated by the president and his or her National those cardinal geopolitical interests and some new Secretary James Mattis, who supported the devel- The Biden administration ought to develop a Security Council. As illustrated multiple times dur- and acute in today’s technological and globalized opment of the national security strategy along these comprehensive national security strategy, for the ing the Cold War, that process itself can be useful. context. They include the importance of sustaining lines, and who ensured that the Defense Depart- reasons stated at the top of this article. Many of The most senior officials, who will have to oversee U.S. influence over critical intergovernmental or- ment simultaneously prepared a classified nation- those responsible for national security strategic the execution of the strategy, can thereby air out ganizations and other international regulatory and al defense strategy, which would complement the planning in administrations during the Cold War and resolve any fundamental differences among standard-setting bodies. The current influence of national security strategy. Mattis was adamant that have agreed that it is just as essential now as it themselves regarding the assumptions, alternative China over the World Health Organization, and the the national defense strategy would follow not long was then and that the government can and should possibilities, and most essential objectives of the ramifications of that in the context of the COVID-19 after the national security strategy, which it did.187 discern and apply lessons from past efforts, even strategy. If the National Security Council together pandemic, is one of many warning signs in that re- The administration’s national security strategy and though the nature of the challenges and challeng- cannot find agreement, then the president can con- gard. Other essential interests include preventing national defense strategy kicked off a series of stra- ers to U.S. interests are different.191 sider the differences and make a clear decision on or withstanding the increasing ability of rivals to them. Either way, that process increases the like- weaken America and its allies at home through lihood of a common understanding, and unity of propaganda or misinformation; manipulation of 183 See Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011). effort in execution, of the strategy. infrastructure or markets; or theft, manipulation, 184 Schadlow, interview with the author, Dec. 18, 2020; and Elbridge Colby, interview with the author, Dec. 3, 2020. and disruption of data. The beginning of a strategic 185 Schadlow, interview with the author, December 18, 2020; Colby, interview with the author, Dec. 3, 2020; and National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Fi- Geopolitics matters, then, now, and always planning process is the time to think through the nal-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. most essential U.S. interests, old and new, and the 186 Schadlow, interview with the author, December 18, 2020. The national security strategy should identify source and nature of the threats to those interests. 187 Colby, interview with the author, Dec. 3, 2020; Schadlow, interview with the author, December 18, 2020. The Defense Department released an unclassified summary of the national defense strategy. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, The Defense Department, January 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 192 Brzezinski recommended, in aid of building congressional support, that an administration convene informal sessions with a small number of 188 Schadlow, interview with the author, December 18, 2020; Colby, interview with the author, Dec. 3, 2020. bipartisan congressional leaders to generate support for the premises and main objectives of its national security strategy. Brzezinski, interview 189 “U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” The White House, February 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/up- with the author, July 7, 2012. Brzezinski’s idea was endorsed, at the time, by Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012, although another, loads/2021/01/IPS-Final-Declass.pdf. more recent former national security adviser, in an interview that summer, expressed some skepticism that it could significantly improve in- 190 “Statement from National Security Adviser Robert C. O’Brien,” The White House, Jan. 12, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/brief- ter-branch or bipartisan relations. In all events, it may be worthwhile to try. ings-statements/statement-national-security-advisor-robert-c-obrien-011221/. For the full statement, see “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” The White 193 See, for example, Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897); Alfred Thayer House, Jan. 5, 2021, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OBrien-Expanded-Statement.pdf. Mahan, The Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon International Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003; originally published 1900); Henry 191 Senior Nixon administration national security official, discussion with the author, March 2012; Lord, interview with the author, 2012; Brzez- Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 29–55 (on Roosevelt); Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), 233–67 (on inski, interview with the author, July 7, 2012; and Scowcroft, interview with the author, Aug. 1, 2012. Also Nadia Schadlow, interview with author, Roosevelt); and Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (London: Routledge, 2007; December 2020. originally published 1942).

151 152 The Strategist U.S. National Security Strategy: Lessons Learned

Rigorously analyze competitors shape the environment in which other actors er’s presidency, as during Reagan’s decades later, number of fundamental reasons — among them make decisions so as to increase the likelihood major combat actions fought by American forces free and fair elections, a free press, divided gov- One of the most important inputs into the strategic of those outcomes being more in line with U.S. were conspicuous by their absence. ernment — America has historically proved able planning process should be an analysis of the interests. That was one of the recurring themes of to self-correct and to remain resilient and adapt- sources and nature of those threats to enduring America’s Cold War strategy, most explicitly in Ei- Hard power underpins soft power, and enables it able even in the face of significant and long-term U.S. interests. For rival great-power state actors senhower’s and especially in Reagan’s strategies. challenges. That capacity was abundant during the in particular, the planning process should include In his magisterial history Diplomacy, Kissinger A competitive strategy built for the long haul and Cold War, when successive administrations sought analyzing their motives, interests, objectives, and underscored that “the art of policy is to create a underpinned by American and allied hard pow- to navigate the circumstances of their times while methods. In essence, the administration should calculation of the risks and rewards that affect the er helps to resolve some of the tensions between building on the best and most constructive premis- ask anew the questions that Kennan answered: adversary’s calculations.”196 It is the essence of a hard power and soft power that have bedeviled es and approaches of their predecessors. We have What are America’s principal adversaries or com- competitive strategy.197 U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War and even done this before. petitors up to, why, and what does that mean for during it. Hard power is essential to the salience the United States? That analysis should, as Kennan Maintain continuity — and consider alternatives and attractiveness of American values. Invoking did, take into account whether and how the mil- and championing fundamental values are most Conclusion itary, economic, or technological challenges from The administration’s planning process should potent when America’s hard-power trajectory and a particular country are linked to the internal na- assess which elements and aspects of its predeces- geopolitical standing are moving upward. The Cart- The United States faces considerable challeng- ture of its governing system and in what way, and sor’s approach ought to be maintained and built er administration had an unquestionable and pro- es ahead. The post-Cold War era — a time of en- what the consequences of that are for U.S. policy. upon. And, as with the Eisenhower administra- found commitment to human rights, but its first thusiasm and ultimately of disappointments and And the analysis should include a searching as- tion’s Project Solarium, it should also step back to years saw an erosion of its geopolitical standing struggles — has given way to a revitalization of sessment of both the strengths and vulnerabilities consider what plausible alternatives exist, even if it that made its championing of human rights less at- great-power competition. In particular, the Biden of America’s principal competitors. In the current results in drawing elements together out of differ- tractive and less effective than it should and could administration confronts a unique and comprehen- environment, that kind of analysis will have to be ent possible approaches to form a cohesive whole. have been. The Biden administration is looking sive challenge from China. And unlike during the done with respect to several different U.S. rivals. to prioritize transnational issues such as climate Cold War, when Kennan captured the essence of The results will help guide the development and Play the long game change. It should carefully consider the factors the challenge and the basic premises of the com- prioritization of U.S. policy objectives and means. and elements that influence the environment in petition more or less from the beginning, this time The administration should focus now on identi- which other powers make decisions in those areas the United States has gotten off to a late start in Analyze the United States, too fying, investing in, and marshaling the resources and think through how best to influence outcomes grasping the nature of the challenge and in estab- that are necessary to increase the likelihood of conducive to U.S. interests. That may involve pos- lishing its response. The Biden administration should undertake good outcomes in the future, and doing so in a itive, cooperative approaches. Yet, successfully America is embarked on an era of difficulty and some kind of net assessment examining the com- way that the American people and Congress are achieving U.S. objectives in those areas may also peril, but the Biden administration and future ad- parative advantages and weaknesses of the United able and willing to sustain over many years. That involve — or, at the least, require building upon ministrations also have before them an opportu- States and its principal competitors, especially Chi- means primarily, but not exclusively, the sinews — a tougher-minded competitive approach over- nity: to set the country on a strategic course that na, which presents the most comprehensive chal- of hard power — military, technological, and eco- all in which American hard power is understood is toughminded, competitive, and proactive, but lenge to U.S. interests. Huntington’s study shows nomic. The most rigorous and effective of the na- to be on the upswing. A long-term competitive also peaceful, steady, and sustainable for the long that such a net assessment can be done with use- tional security strategies of the Cold War looked strategy focused on addressing geopolitical threats haul. To succeed, they will need to understand ful results. In this era, it may be especially helpful and planned ahead and aimed to make invest- that is underpinned by hard power and reinforces and heed lessons — positive and negative — from in illuminating areas where the United States has ments and take steps that limited an adversary’s traditional U.S. values may also be galvanizing for administrations that grappled with national se- traditionally held advantages, such as the ability to decisions and freedom of action over the long run. America’s allies and partners. Indeed, it may be the curity strategy throughout the Cold War. Under- develop and deploy the most innovative technol- Those strategies aimed at what is now known as only strategy that can ensure the maintenance of standing how and why previous presidential ad- ogy for military or dual-use applications, but now peace through strength: proactive, sustained, those relationships, which are, in turn, essential ministrations succeeded or failed at developing require attention and forethought in order to main- peaceful competition on terms that favored the comparative advantages for the United States in a competitive national security strategy is not tain or regain that historical edge.194 The process United States and, critically, avoided causing the great-power competition. merely of academic interest, but is a vital element should identify the limits and capabilities of the country reactively or precipitously to slide into of any effective effort. United States, both relative and absolute, and take disadvantageous positions, when the chance for Lead an ongoing process them into account.195 an ill-considered response or even conflict is high- Paul Lettow served as the senior director for est. A peace through strength approach, one that The national security strategy should serve as strategic planning on the National Security Coun- Focus on the decision-making environment avoids dissipating U.S. strength through ill-ad- the departure point, not the endpoint, of an ongo- cil staff in the White House from 2007 to 2009. He vised U.S. military actions, itself helps to ensure ing strategic planning process that establishes spe- is the author of Ronald Reagan and His Quest to The administration should prioritize how to that the strategy will endure. During Eisenhow- cific strategies for the most important functional Abolish Nuclear Weapons. The views expressed and regional issues. here are his alone.

194 See Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette, 2020). Remain optimistic 195 The author is grateful to Andrew May for encouraging inclusion of this lesson. 196 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 481. Finally, the Biden administration should un- 197 “To expect the Soviet leaders to restrain themselves from exploiting circumstances they conceive to be favorable is to misread history. To dertake its strategic planning effort with a qui- foreclose Soviet opportunities is thus the essence of the West’s responsibility. It is up to us to define the limits of Soviet aims.” Kissinger, White House Years, 119. et self-confidence in the United States. For any

153 154 The Roundtable Feature

Roundtables are where we get to hear from multiple experts on either a subject matter or a recently published book. Roundtable Competitive, Competent, Conservative: Internationalism After Trump

In this issue’s featured roundtable, Michael Singh reviews COMPETITIVE, H.R. McMaster’s book Battlefield and discusses where conservative foreign policy is headed and what challenges the COMPETENT, CONSERVATIVE: United States faces. s the Trump era comes to a close, the will be disappointed. McMaster is determined to debate is just beginning over the admin- look forward, drawing upon his experience not istration’s approach to the world and just at the White House but in the military. He what it means for the future of conserv- offers issue-by-issue criticisms of past U.S. for- INTERNATIONALISM ativeA foreign policy in the United States. President eign policies and prescriptions for future policies, Donald Trump himself was better known for his rather than any grand schema to tie the past and provocative and unpredictable pronouncements present together. than statements of doctrine. Yet, once Trump as- While no consensus doctrine emerges from these sumed office it did not take U.S. partners and allies accounts, what comes across clearly is a sense of AFTER TRUMP long to realize that they faced something altogeth- the conservative foreign policy pendulum in mo- er new in Washington: that old assumptions about tion, its final destination to be determined. Wheth- American policy had to be set aside, and any and all er it lands upon a wan realism of the Ford-Nixon contingencies — the renegotiation or dissolution of era — when, in the estimation of scholar Paul Mill- agreements or American withdrawal from treaties er, “neither America’s material power nor its ideals or geographies — seriously considered. were appreciably strengthened or expanded”4 — a It was left to Trump officials and allies to impute strident and amoral nationalism, or, as McMaster MICHAEL SINGH to him a foreign policy philosophy, which they did implicitly but nonetheless clearly hopes, a more variously. Nadia Schadlow, who served as deputy successful conservative internationalism depends national security adviser for strategy, argued that on arriving at the correct evaluation of the foreign Trump, unencumbered by the assumptions and policy challenges facing the United States and the nostalgias of the foreign policy community, saw most effective ways to confront them. the new reality of a world defined by competition and enacted policies to meet that challenge. She contended that he focused on states rather than Competition Rekindled international organizations as key actors, demand- ing reciprocity from allies and adversaries alike It has become widely accepted among conserva- and rebuilding U.S. military strength.1 Rep. Matt tive commentators that the world the United States Gaetz of the Florida panhandle, on the other hand, faces is more competitive than in the past, affording propounded a “Trump Doctrine” that emphasized U.S. foreign policy less room for error and excess. intervening in international affairs only under the Competition requires two things: that other states gravest circumstances and otherwise leaving other be capable of mounting a challenge and that they states to their own business — the polar opposite be willing to do so. An appraisal of the geopolitical of competition.2 landscape is bracing on both counts. In Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free The gap in economic and material power between World, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) H.R. McMaster consciously the United States and its rivals has inexorably adopts a different approach to taking stock of the shrunk since the end of the Cold War. It is not that Trump administration, one that reflects his long U.S. power has declined. Indeed, America’s gross service as an apolitical officer in the U.S. Army.3 As domestic product (GDP) has grown at a steady clip the highly regarded retired general himself warns for decades, and the U.S. GDP remains the world’s in the book’s introduction, those looking for a cri- highest in the nominal terms that matter geopoliti- tique, defense, or even explanation of Trumpism cally, even if China’s economy is larger when meas-

1 Nadia Schadlow, “The End of American Illusion: Trump and the World as It Is,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 5 (September/October 2020), https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2020-08-11/end-american-illusion 2 “Congressman Matt Gaetz Delivers Major Foreign Policy Speech,” Office of Matt Gaetz, Press Release, May 22, 2019, https://gaetz.house.gov/ media/press-releases/congressman-matt-gaetz-delivers-major-foreign-policy-speech. 3 H.R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York: HarperCollins, 2020). 4 Paul D. Miller, “Conservative Internationalism Out of Power,” Orbis 62, no. 1 (Winter 2018), 105–18, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.11.005.

157 158 Roundtable Competitive, Competent, Conservative: Internationalism After Trump ured in terms of purchasing power parity.5 The U.S. arduous focus on it, McMaster reminds readers of emotion and power.12 McMaster might have in- order. McMaster, to his credit, explicitly recog- military remains the world’s most formidable and that it remains a serious short-term threat, even if stead termed the problem “strategic solipsism” nizes problems such as these. He notes both how battle-tested, and U.S. military spending is roughly near-peer rivals loom larger in the long term. for, while Morgenthau was focused on what he Trump’s groundless accusations of election fraud three times that of China’s and indeed greater than Of course, if the United States were concerned by considered the ills of self-actualization (criticizing, played into Russian disinformation efforts in 2016 the next 10 highest-spending countries combined.6 other states’ economic power and military poten- among other things, plastic surgery and jogging), and 2017, and the damaging effects of America’s Yet, what was once a towering advantage in both tial alone, it might regard the European Union and McMaster is warning against the all-too-common declining reliability as an ally.16 economic and military terms is no longer, due both India as its foremost rivals rather than the partners predilection among U.S. analysts and officials to to the growth and diffusion of economic and mili- they are. What makes states like Russia and China view world events as functions of American policy, tary might around the world — enabled, ironically, threatening is not simply their power — which, in insufficiently cognizant that “rivals and enemies Thriving in a Tougher World: by the very international order the United States Russia’s case, is in fact meager — but their mount- will influence the future course of events” based Five Principles has long upheld — as well as to stagnation on cer- ing willingness to challenge the United States and in part on “their own interpretation of history.”13 At tain key fronts in the United States. For example, the international order itself. These challenges have the same time, he tacitly acknowledges that Amer- The United States cannot turn back the clock. U.S. productivity growth has slowed significantly played out on a grand scale in places like Ukraine, ican assumptions sometimes require revision not Just as the effects of past errors and excesses can- since the mid-2000s, weighed down by flat or de- Syria, and the South China Sea and on a smaller, because they were naively conceived but because not be reversed, nor will the relative advantage in clining infrastructure and research and develop- but more frequent and no less dangerous, scale in circumstances have changed (for example, Xi Jin- economic and military power America enjoyed at ment spending, among other factors.7 Likewise, the air and on the seas, where U.S., Russian, and ping’s ascendancy in China).14 the end of the Cold War be regained. Striving for the U.S. military has fought to exhaustion in places Chinese vessels come into regular contact.9 They Making matters worse, the guardians of the in- an idealized future heedless of the aims and plans like Iraq and Afghanistan while China has focused have also played out in diplomatic conference ternational order have arguably been complicit in of one’s rivals is a fool’s errand, but pining for the heavily on catching up to, and developing the ca- rooms, where U.S. rivals seek to gain the upper its demise to the benefit of adversaries who are return of a mythologized past is just as fruitless. pabilities needed to confront, the United States — hand in setting international norms and standards glad enough to see that order crumble. Democ- Yet, there is every reason to believe that the United a strategy McMaster describes in detail over the and foster alternative multilateral institutions that racy has faced challenges both at the free world’s States can continue to enjoy security, prosperity, course of two chapters on China. The result, ac- exclude or marginalize the United States.10 periphery — where states such as Turkey and and international preeminence with the adoption cording to the Department of Defense’s latest “Chi- Hungary have seen the democratic gains of recent of a strategy that is informed by the lessons of the na Power Report,” is that China has neared parity decades sharply reversed — and at its heart. In past several decades and tailored for today’s con- with, or even exceeded, the United States in certain Order Unravelled the United States and the United Kingdom, for strained and competitive geopolitical environment. areas such as shipbuilding and the deployment of example, only 39 and 31 percent of respondents, Such a strategy should be based on five principles.17 intermediate-range missiles.8 Many commentators attribute this new competi- respectively, indicated to Pew Research in Febru- While the notion of symmetric threats to U.S. tive reality to a failure of the “liberal convergence” ary 2020 that they were satisfied with the state Support Diplomacy with Force, power is alarming enough, McMaster astutely ob- that many policymakers expected to materialize of their country’s democracy — in contrast to 70 Force with Diplomacy serves that challenges to American power continue after the end of the Cold War. In their seminal ar- percent of Indians and 55 percent of Israelis, de- to come in asymmetric forms as well. He describes ticle recounting what went wrong in U.S. policy spite the unending cascade of indeterminate elec- First, diplomacy is most effective when backed by at length “Putin’s playbook” of disinformation, toward China in recent decades, Ely Ratner and tions that the latter have endured.15 force, and vice versa. The former is an article of faith used to divisive effect in advance of and following Kurt Campbell, for example, assert that “the lib- If conservative internationalists criticize their among conservatives — economic and military force the 2016 elections, as well as, in a telegraphic final eral international order has failed to lure or bind liberal counterparts for placing too much faith, should not be considered a last-resort alternative to chapter on cross-cutting threats, the risks the Unit- China as powerfully as expected.”11 McMaster ap- and investing too much hope, in international diplomacy but should be wielded in concert with ed States faces in cyberspace, in outer space, and proaches the matter from a complementary angle, institutions and not enough in American leader- diplomacy to achieve the best outcomes for Amer- from new weapons and technologies. And unlike so harshly criticizing what he describes as American ship, then they must acknowledge that Trump’s ican interests. To ensure that U.S. threats of force many analysts who wish to brush aside the threat “strategic narcissism,” a term inspired by Hans erratic fusillades against allies, his tendency to are deemed credible, the country must build and of terrorism after two decades of unsatisfying and Morgenthau’s late-career work on the intersection withdraw from international commitments and preserve its military strength, allowing it neither to organizations without an alternative plan, and his become outmoded by rivals’ technological advances unprecedented effort to reverse the results of the nor exhausted by peripheral conflicts. 2020 presidential election have diminished Amer- However, the converse is also true — coercion ica’s standing and boosted that of its rivals, while must be undertaken with realistic objectives in 5 For a discussion of this distinction, see Jeffrey Frenkel, “Is China Overtaking the US as a Financial and Economic Power?” The Guardian, May 29, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/29/is-china-overtaking-the-us-as-a-financial-and-economic-power. hastening the decay of the U.S.-led international mind and with an understanding of the perspective 6 “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2020, https://www.sipri.org/publica- tions/2020/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2019. 12 Hans Morgenthau and Ethel Person, “The Roots of Narcissism,” Partisan Review 45, no. 3 (Summer 1978): 337-47, Howard Gotlieb Archival 7 For further discussion, see, for example, Emily Moss, Ryan Nunn, and Jay Shambaugh, “The Slowdown in Productivity Growth and the Policies Research Center, http://archives.bu.edu/collections/partisan-review/search/detail?id=331504. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, “Love and Power,” that Can Restore It,” The Brookings Institution, June 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Productivity_Framing_ Commentary, March 1962, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/hans-morgenthau/love-and-power/. LO_6.16_FINAL.pdf. 13 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 19. 8 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020, U.S. Department of Defense, 2020, https://media.defense. gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF. 14 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 100. 9 “Chinese and American Warships Nearly Collide,” The Economist, Oct. 4, 2018, https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/10/04/chi- 15 Richard Wike and Shannon Schumacher, “Democratic Rights Popular Globally but Commitment to Them Not Always Strong,” Pew Research nese-and-american-warships-nearly-collide. Center, Feb. 27, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/27/democratic-rights-popular-globally-but-commitment-to-them-not-al- ways-strong/. 10 Jonathan E. Hillman, “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” Congressional Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-model-beijings-promotion-alterna- 16 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 50, 270. tive-global-norms-and-standards. 17 These principles are drawn from those offered by Henry R. Nau in Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy Under Jefferson, Polk, 11 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March/April Truman, and Reagan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) and summarized by Charlie Laderman, “Conservative Internationalism: An Overview,” 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning. Orbis 62, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 6–21, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.11.009.

159 160 Roundtable Competitive, Competent, Conservative: Internationalism After Trump of the target. This is where McMaster’s frequent it modestly by offering Iran the meager consola- Capitalize on Shared Values ests.25 Doing so suggests a bond that goes deeper exhortations to “strategic empathy” are valuable. tion prize of international support for its position. than a mere transaction. Conflicts the United States, as a superpower, re- When a U.N. imprimatur is present but no state is Third, the United States should concern itself not During the Cold War, there was not one interna- gards as limited tend to be considered nigh-exis- willing or able to act in support of that mandate only with power but with values. As American En- tional order, but three: There were those that gov- tential by smaller adversaries. This makes those ad- — for example, U.N. Security Council Resolution terprise Institute scholar Zack Cooper has noted, erned relations between the United States and its versaries unexpectedly defiant, even under severe 1701’s call for the disarmament of Hizballah20 — the “the competitions with China and Russia are only allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and coercive pressure, often leading either to stalemate result is underwhelming. partially about power … U.S. worries about China their clients on the other. There was also the or- or outright military conflict.18 Avoiding such out- With this in mind, the United States should de- and Russia are founded as much in clashing values der that implicitly governed relations between the comes requires, first and foremost, setting realistic vote considerable effort to increasing the capa- and visions as in clashing power.”23 While Ameri- blocs. As many analysts have noted,26 the mistake objectives when first crafting a policy, which is less bilities and resilience of its partners, especially ca’s competition with its present-day rivals centers Western policymakers made in their exuberance politically costly than scaling back one’s objectives those that demonstrate the political will to act in far less on ideology than during the Cold War, the at the end of the Cold War was assuming that once failure appears inevitable. McMaster applies furtherance of mutual interests. It should also or- threat the United States and its partners perceive the liberal order led by the United States would this logic to Iran, decrying the 2015 Iran nuclear ganize those partners into cooperative coalitions from Moscow and Beijing is heightened by the way subsume the other two. This proved only partial- agreement as an exercise in diplomacy not backed and networks so that they complement and am- both operate — through repression and control at ly true. While many ex-Eastern Bloc states gladly by the credible threat of force, and the 2018 de- plify one another’s capabilities. As Kori Schake, home and coercion and subversion abroad. joined the U.S.-led international order, Russia and cision to withdraw from the deal as the resort to former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, Furthermore, U.S. values confer an important ad- China proved more interested in contesting Amer- pressure without a clear diplomatic strategy.19 and Joe Felter have noted, allies help to constrain vantage to Washington in its competition with its ican leadership. rivals and magnify, or substitute for, the exercise rivals that far outweighs whatever vulnerabilities The answer to this problem, however, is not to Respect the Role of States of American power. The neglect of alliances en- these values give rise to. Free markets and a vi- scrap the U.S.-led order as a relic of the past, but courages rival networks to flourish.21 Investing in brant democratic civil society help to foster growth to reform it by building, as Miller has suggested, Second, the United States should give proper alliances and enduring partnerships, as opposed to and innovation, promote political resilience, and a “smaller, deeper liberal order” based on shared due to strong states as key actors in international treating cooperation as purely transactional, also even speak to the aspirations of the citizens of values and interests that can magnify U.S. efforts affairs. As much as analysts and policymakers tend generates positive externalities, as existing allies U.S. rivals. While McMaster is rightly skeptical of to counter its rivals.27 Miller proposes building a to invoke the “international community” or call for are more likely to give new requests from Wash- the power of economic openness to liberalize au- separate structure for engaging with those rivals the United Nations or another international body ington a more sympathetic hearing in the future thoritarian states like China — an assessment now through diplomacy, arms control agreements, and to act, the true burden of action lies with individual and may even search out new areas for cooperation widely accepted — he defends the promotion of the like, and, yes, even cooperating with them states and coalitions of states. International insti- themselves. But nurturing alliances need not mean democracy and economic liberalization as a means where doing so is possible and advantageous. The tutions should not be dismissed lightly — they are fostering or encouraging dependency — indeed, as to counter and deter America’s rivals, even as he point of building an order among U.S. allies would important tools in international affairs, lending le- strength and dependency are at odds, Washington notes that the Trump administration unevenly ap- not be to cut them off from U.S. rivals — playing gitimacy, setting norms and imposing constraints, should not shy away from pushing its partners to plied this logic.24 such a zero-sum game would be risky for the Unit- helping to allocate the costs of global public goods, shoulder ever greater shares of collective burdens Shared values also underpin America’s strongest ed States, as Schake, Mattis, Ellis, and Felter note.28 and providing forums for the debate and resolution as their capabilities grow. alliances, as does a shared concern over the threats Rather, it is to permit them to engage with those of problems. They are also arenas for competition, In these respects, McMaster correctly notes posed by the values of U.S. rivals. Relationships rivals collectively and with confidence. Both “or- and American withdrawal from, or neglect of, those that the Trump administration deserves credit for such as that between the United States and Saudi ders” should leverage the advantages conferred institutions benefits rivals, as McMaster notes. building and improving upon the work of previous Arabia are frequently offered as a counterpoint to on the United States by the democratic values it However, success or failure in foreign policy administrations: It increased American defense in- this assertion. In fact, however, they demonstrate shares with its allies, as well as the weaknesses nevertheless depends foremost on the will and vestments in Europe, even as it has pushed NATO its validity. As Democrats’ calls for the incoming inherent in the authoritarian values held by Amer- capacity of states. Sanctions on Iran are a case in partners to spend more on their own defense, and Biden administration to take a tougher line with ica’s rivals.29 point. While the legitimacy of those sanctions in strengthened partnerships, such as the “Quad” in Riyadh attest, relationships that are exclusively in- the eyes of much of the world flowed from the U.N. the Indo-Pacific and Israel’s nascent partnership terest-based and not buttressed by shared values Set Priorities, Match Ends and Means resolutions that endorsed them, their power de- with the United Arab Emirates and other coun- are those most vulnerable in political shifts — or rived from America’s preponderance in, and thus tries in the Middle East. Although he does also shifts in how interests are perceived — on either Fourth, as important as they are, America’s influence over, the international financial system. note that the administration deserves admonition side. This is why, when foreign leaders pen op-eds democratic values should be advanced conserv- As the Trump administration’s “maximum pres- for its “expressions of doubt about the value of in American newspapers, they tend to appeal to atively, keeping in mind the vital importance of sure” campaign has demonstrated, the absence of allies when Russia and China are doing their best shared values rather than simply to shared inter- maintaining domestic support for U.S. foreign pol- significant international support has not reduced to break alliances apart.”22 the power of U.S. sanctions. It has merely offset 23 Zack Cooper, “Bad Idea: ‘Great Power Competition’ Terminology,” Defense360, Dec. 1, 2020, https://defense360.csis.org/bad-idea-great-pow- er-competition-terminology/. 24 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 140. 18 For a fuller discussion of this topic, see Michael Singh, “Conflict with Small Powers Derails U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case for Strategic Discipline,” Foreign Affairs, Aug. 12, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-america/2020-08-12/conflict-small-powers-derails-us-foreign-policy. 25 See, for example, Yousef al Otaiba, “The Moderate Middle East Must Act,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ yousef-al-otaiba-the-moderate-middle-east-must-act-1410304537. 19 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 297. 26 See, for example, Campbell and Ratner, “The China Reckoning.” 20 “Security Council Calls for End to Hostilities Between Hizbollah, Israel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1701 (2006),” United Nations, Aug. 11, 2006, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8808.doc.htm. 27 Paul Miller, “Make the Free World Free Again,” The Dispatch, June 9, 2020, https://thedispatch.com/p/make-the-free-world-free-again. 21 Kori Schake, Jim Mattis, Jim Ellis, and Joe Felter, “Defense in Depth: Why U.S. Security Depends on Alliances — Now More than Ever,” Foreign 28 Schake, Mattis, Ellis, and Felter, “Defense in Depth.” Affairs, Nov. 23, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-23/defense-depth. 29 For further discussion, see “Linking Values and Strategy: How Democracies Can Offset Autocratic Advances, A Task Force Report,” Alliance 22 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 442. for Securing Democracy, October 2020, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Linking-Values-and-Strategy.pdf.

161 162 Roundtable Competitive, Competent, Conservative: Internationalism After Trump icy. McMaster is right to assert that “strengthen- ple’s conflict fatigue. While McMaster often at- threats, and restore the health of its democratic ing democratic institutions and processes in tar- tributes this phenomenon to a failure by consec- institutions and ability to craft foreign policy on a get nations may be the strongest remedy” to the utive administrations to explain the importance bipartisan basis (seemingly the hardest of all given aggression of America’s adversaries, and he advo- of conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan to the country’s experience in 2020). McMaster’s suc- cates for doing so across the board — whether by the American populace, survey data does not bear cessors in the West Wing will need to grapple with supporting activists in Russia, China, and Iran, or this out. For example, Pew Research found in mid- these problems that lie at the intersection of do- by helping to promote democracy in Afghanistan 2019 that veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and mestic and foreign policy, perhaps taking comfort and Iraq.30 Yet, he does not explicitly address the Iraq — who are presumably well informed about that the United States has managed to do so in the need to prioritize among these issues. Such prior- those conflicts — overwhelmingly believe that the past. In 1978, for example, Michael Mandelbaum itization has taken on greater urgency given that costs of those conflicts exceeded their benefits. and William Schneider lamented that the “Cold American resources and power are increasingly at These polls also show that veterans’ views close- War consensus is gone,” and asserted that the in- a premium in a more competitive world. ly track with those of the general public.32 Such coming Carter administration’s most pressing need evidence suggests that the problem is not one of was for “a domestic consensus for foreign policy.”36 The Trump administration’s 2018 National Defense communication but of failing to match realistic Strategy sets out its priorities with laudable clarity: ends with available means — means that are in- creasingly needed elsewhere. If internationalists Conclusion Long-term strategic competitions with China fail to learn from such feedback and from the re- and Russia are the principal priorities for the sults of past policies, public skepticism of their In Battlegrounds, McMaster has offered a use- Department, and require both increased and proposals is likely to deepen and calls for more ful tour d’horizon of the threats facing the United sustained investment, because of the magni- wholesale retrenchment and restraint will mount. States, as well as an entry into a pressing debate tude of the threats they pose to U.S. security over the proper role of the United States in the and prosperity today, and the potential for Husband America’s Strength world. For internationalists of all stripes, the stakes those threats to increase in the future.31 of that debate are high. Radicalism is resurgent in Finally, the United States needs to rejuvenate international relations. The notion that the interna- Far less clear, however, are the policy implica- the wellsprings of its power and influence: its mil- tional system the United States has defended and tions for this prioritization elsewhere, such as in itary and economic strength and its democratic in which it has prospered for decades must not the Middle East. As the defense strategy makes health. While these topics are largely beyond Bat- be preserved, but rather transformed, has gained clear, it almost certainly means operating more tlegrounds’ remit, McMaster touches upon each traction not only in Moscow and Beijing but on through partners. But it should also mean recog- briefly. He notes, for example, that “partisan vitri- the hustings throughout the Western world. The nizing that a dollar spent maintaining or expand- ol” in the United States gives its rivals the impres- time to make the case for what focused, pragmatic, ing the strength, stability, and prosperity of a will- sion that it is incapable of competing effectively,33 and competent American leadership and engage- ing partner — those on the boundaries of the free or that “decisions involving technological and in- ment looks like, and what it has to offer the United world — will almost certainly yield more than that frastructure development must consider how the States and the world, is now or never. same dollar spent seeking to foster accountable proposed technology and infrastructure would governance or promote economic liberalization interact with geopolitical competitions,”34 or that Michael Singh is managing director and Lane- where they do not already exist. competing in cyberspace requires cooperation be- Swig Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for The need to set priorities and follow them when tween the public and private sector.35 Near East Policy. He served at the State Department allocating resources is reinforced by the need The upshot is that no clever strategy for deploy- and National Security Council from 2000 to 2008. to maintain domestic support for foreign policy. ing American power will succeed in countering the Strategists should consider not just what ought to threats it faces if that power itself is permitted to Image: Department of Defense, SSGT Scott T. be done but what can be done given material, as atrophy. To succeed in a more competitive world, Sturkol, USAF well as political and social, constraints. The elec- the United States will need to move more quickly tion of successive presidents who have decried to modernize and make more resilient a military American interventions in the Middle East and that is increasingly vulnerable to the capabilities pledged to reduce U.S. commitments overseas of its adversaries, enact economic policies to boost should be evidence enough of the American peo- productivity and protect against national security

30 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 140. 31 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States, Department of Defense, 2018https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docu- ments/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 32 Ruth Igielnik and Kim Parker, “Majorities of U.S. Veterans, Public Say the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Were Not Worth Fighting,” Pew Research Center, July 10, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/10/majorities-of-u-s-veterans-public-say-the-wars-in-iraq-and- afghanistan-were-not-worth-fighting/. 33 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 443. 34 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 411. 36 Michael Mandelbaum and William Schneider, “The New Internationalisms,” International Security 2, no. 3 (Winter 1978): 81–98, https://muse. 35 McMaster, Battlegrounds, 406. jhu.edu/article/446200.

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