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to print:Layout 1 23/06/2010 11:04 Page 145 CHAPTER 11 THE PERCEPTION OF POLICING CHANGE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN-RIGHTS NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS ) Maggie Beirne and Martin O’Brien INTRODUCTION his chapter will focus on the perception of policing change in Northern Ireland from the perspective of an independent Thuman-rights group, both in the wake of the publication of A new beginning: policing in Northern Ireland, the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland1 in September 1999, and in the early years of implementation of its recommendations. However, to understand fully the significance of the Patten Report itself, and the difficulties faced in implementing its recommendations, it is important to situate the Report in some historical context. POLICING PRE-PATTEN Policing had long been a contentious issue in Northern Ireland. In essence, before the changes initiated by the Patten Report, the police were seen by many as composed of members of the one (majority) community, with responsibility for policing the other (minority) community. As the state came under increasing criticism, and eventually violent attack, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was seen (by many in both communities) as a force for maintaining order, and therefore as defending the status quo. This ‘political’ role for policing put the RUC centre-stage when the most recent phase of ‘the Troubles’ started. An official government 145 to print:Layout 1 23/06/2010 11:04 Page 146 P OLICING THE N ARROW G ROUND inquiry into the causes and nature of the street disturbances and vio- lence in Derry in October 1968—the Cameron Commission2— determined that one of the major factors in the sense of grievance that led to the street disturbances was the resentment, particularly among Catholics, as to the ex- istence of the Ulster Special Constabulary (the ‘B- Specials’) as a partisan and paramilitary force recruited exclusively from Protestants.3 The report also cited a number of problems with the policing of the violent disturbances, and concluded that the conduct of the police ‘was an immediate and contributing cause of the disorders which subsequently occurred’.4 Interestingly, an important recommendation of the Cameron Report was the establishment of an independent system for investigating allegations of police misconduct—a reform that took almost 40 years to be substantively implemented.5 One is left wondering, ‘what if’ this basic safeguard had been intro- duced in the 1960s? Would an early and effective response to genuine complaints have prevented grievances about policing from festering? Instead, in the absence of an independent complaints system, the police were excoriated over the death of people like Samuel Devenney (father of nine and one of the first casualties of the conflict);6 TV pic- tures of civil-rights marchers being brutally attacked; allegations of involvement in shoot-to-kill operations; excessive and abusive use of emergency powers; ill-treatment in interrogations; harassment of defence lawyers; collusion; and sectarian policing.7 Both the reality and the perception of police wrong-doing contributed to feeding and fu- elling the conflict. The 30 years from 1968 to the signing of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was a tragic period in terms of the loss of life.8 Police officers bore severe losses because they were considered ‘legitimate targets’ by republican paramilitaries and were thus deliberately targeted for assassination: 303 police officers were killed during those years and thousands injured. Yet the terrible extent of the fatalities among police officers was mis-used by some segments of society to obscure the reality that policing was a cause as well as a consequence of increasing political polarisation in Northern Ireland. Those raising legitimate policing concerns were ignored (where possible) or, when they could no longer be ignored, were demonised and characterised as ‘fellow-travellers’ of those responsible for the killing of police officers. 146 to print:Layout 1 23/06/2010 11:04 Page 147 The perception of policing change POLICING PRE-PATTEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF NGOS At the very heart of the practice of policing in any democratic society is the principle of ‘policing by consent’. This principle is, however, unattainable in situations where the police are seen to be defending a status quo that, in the eyes of a sufficient number of people, is unac- ceptable. In Northern Ireland, the police were required to perform a highly militarised function, and police weaponry, transport and build- ings all deterred, rather than facilitated, interaction with civilians. Whilst the police were becoming more militarised, civil society organisations were in retreat. Peaceful protest was irretrievably damaged by the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972,9 which led also to the demise of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA).10 An or- ganisation committed to change by way of peaceful protest and civil disobedience was rendered manifestly incapable of securing change, and genuine grievances remained unaddressed. The 1970s saw the highest level of violent deaths in Northern Ireland, and it was not until the 1980s that a concerted and sustained effort was made to develop a broad range of cross-community, non-governmental efforts on policing and justice issues. The Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) came into being in 1981, after a conference at Queen’s University Belfast recommended the creation of a permanent, independent watchdog body to review and monitor the administration of justice.11 From the outset, many of CAJ’s publications and interventions related to the powers of the police—an examination of emergency law, stop-and-search practices and interrogation techniques. A consistent concern from 1982 onwards was the need for an effective complaints system, and CAJ issued regular publications on this topic.12 Police accountability was also an ongoing topic on CAJ’s agenda,13 as were concerns around public-order policing.14 Yet, despite consistent campaigning, it would be fair to say that NGOs like CAJ were ‘fire-fighting’ much of the time. CAJ reported on police abuses, proposed structural and legislative changes and tried to secure domestic support for its proposals. Over time, however, it became apparent that sufficient domestic pressure was either not forthcoming or, more often, inadequate to the task. Indeed, the very fact that groups like CAJ criticised bad police practices from an impartial human-rights perspective left it occasionally isolated. In a divided society where the ‘us and them’ dynamic reigns and everyone is expected to be loyal to 147 to print:Layout 1 23/06/2010 11:04 Page 148 P OLICING THE N ARROW G ROUND one side or the other, independent criticism can often be portrayed as misguided or even deliberately dangerous.15 In part to counter any such isolation, CAJ increasingly sought ex- ternal support for, and endorsement of, its efforts. Human-rights NGOs hoped that, since the UK government was unresponsive to domestic pressure, it might be more amenable to international pressure and criticism. This proved to be the case, in part because the early 1990s was a time when the UN treaty bodies were beginning to flex their muscles.16 So, by way of interventions at the United Nations,17 with the US president, at hearings in the US Congress18 and at the European Court of Human Rights,19 CAJ sought to embarrass domestic authorities into tackling serious human-rights abuses in Northern Ireland. The ‘naming and shaming’ efforts were invaluable,20 but progress was extremely slow; there was still little constructive en- gagement on the part of the authorities and change appeared frequently to be grudgingly secured. The first ceasefires in 1994 changed this. At the local level, communities prepared the ground for change and started to hold small-scale conferences and debates to explore, with some excitement, the concept of policing a peaceful society.21 On the official side, the winds of change were also blowing and in 1996 the then assistant and subsequently Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan published the ‘Fundamental review of policing’.22 Though it presented a largely technocratic, rather than fundamental, reform agenda for policing, Flanagan’s initiative suggested that a window of opportunity was opening up for constructive dialogue. NGOs like CAJ started to think beyond documenting immediate policing problems, and began to develop a more comprehensive picture of how human-rights compli- ant policing should look in future. Joint statements with international human rights groups, ‘Chatham House rule’ events and a large cross- community conference, all contributed to a more forward-looking policing and justice agenda.23 Even with the breakdown of the ceasefire, when policing change seemed again to become a far-distant aspiration, CAJ pursued its work on a major piece of international comparative policing research. The eventual report (Human rights on duty)24 looked at best practice in terms of training, composition, organisational structures, legal and democratic accountability and transitional arrangements. Drawing on experiences of policing change from Australia, Belgium, Canada, El Salvador, the Netherlands, South Africa and Spain, the report 148 to print:Layout 1 23/06/2010 11:04 Page 149 The perception of policing change developed a detailed blueprint of good policing. The timing of its publication could hardly have been more fortuitous; it was completed in November 1997, thus placing CAJ and others in Northern Ireland in an ideal position to inform the thinking of all the political parties engaged in the peace negotiations of early 1998, and thereafter. THE PATTEN COMMISSION STARTS WORK Having looked at experiences around the world, one of the conclu- sions reached in Human rights on duty was that political will is a major factor in preventing or facilitating successful change in policing.

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