Four

LOYALTY TO A WORTHY CAUSE AND PROVINCIALISM AS “SAVING POWER” IN JOSIAH ROYCE

In this chapter, I propose to examine Josiah Royce’s philosophy of loyalty from the point of view of values and powers (as defined throughout the book). Values and powers are crucial in his attempts to axiologically, ontologically, and socially vindicate the idea of loyalty. I claim, firstly, that Royce’s famous book on loyalty refers both to “values” and to “powers,” despite not providing us with either a theory of values or a theory of powers. He does refer to values and powers frequently in crucial contexts, especially while trying to vindicate what should be the cause of loyalty and what character this cause should have. Secondly, I show that he speculates whether values or powers should be the ultimate vindication of loyalty. Yet, for some reasons, he was unable to estab- lish his conclusion successfully and convincingly, and has left us with the assumption that both values and powers vindicate loyalty. Thirdly, I argue that we can see his discussion (in “Provincialism”) over “the worth of provincial- ism” and his view of provincialism as a “saving power” as an original comple- ment and stimulating supplement to his idea of loyalty, as regards the practical dimension of the issue.

1. Absolute Pragmatism and Pragmatism in the Context of Values and Powers

Royce appears in the Part Two of the present book, instead of Part One or Part Three, since within the area of the philosophy of loyalty (and provincialism) he is quite close to pragmatism. Although, as we know, Royce’s inclusion in the camp of pragmatists is disputable. I would like to avoid, at this place, a detailed discussion about the philosophical relation between pragmatism and Royce’s absolute pragmatism, as he called his system of thought (Royce, 2005, pp. 381- 382, 813), which appreciated a significant role of Platonic Ideas in life. I must confess that, generally speaking, I prefer the term “absolute pragmatism” as the best description of Royce’s philosophy and its specificity. This is notably the case in the earlier stage of his philosophical career, and in face of the pragmatism of William James (whose disciple Royce, in “William James and the Philosophy of Life,” proudly claims to be), John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and Richard Rorty. I do not see Royce as a “post-Kantian” or a “Hegelian,” and as a result reduce him to someone who merely reacted to this or that philosophical idea, which was uttered by someone else in the past. I 82 VALUES AND POWERS believe that he deserves to be treated as a more or less separate thinker who has created an independent and unique system of thought, although, still, within the philosophical tradition of American pragmatism. Royce’s approach to the relationship between values and powers offers a litmus test for the pragmatism of his thought at given moments in its development. Also, it allows us to see how much of this or that aspect of his approach can be considered as convergent with the thoughts of other pragmatists. Roughly speaking, if Royce sees the valuable or the worthy as something created and re-arranged by the practical use of human internal energies for the sake of the daily interests of all the members of the community, then this is a good point to start to think of Royce’s pragmatism, not merely his absolute pragmatism. This strain was quite visible later in his career when he devoted his philosophical energy to writing about practical and daily social activities seen from the viewpoint of ethics and ethical action. In his philosophy of loyalty, he provides us with a complex study of the problem and exceptional material on the issue for us to consider. Also, this material can be seen from the point of view of its possible implementation into the practice of public life, and as a significant complement to pragmatic ethics. I do not suggest that his philosophy of loyalty should be seen exclusively from the viewpoint of pragmatic ethics. Instead, I claim that it should be regarded as a part of pragmatic ethics, despite originally treating it as part of his absolute pragmatism. At the same time, we can approach Royce’s philosophy of loyalty from the angle of its contribution to ethics in general, without any division into ethical schools and philosophical trends. Basically, his philosophy of loyalty deserves general recognition as a proposal for an ethical view that can be studied, practiced, and commented upon regardless of the philosophical tradition it came from and to which it is to be ascribed. Royce’s idea of loyalty to loyalty or “loyalty to the universal loyalty of all mankind” (Royce, 1908/1995, p. 58) offers a significant contribution to global deontology, greatly needed and discussed in this era of globalization when we are seeking universal norms and loyalties as intensively as almost ever before. It should also be noted that his frequent deliberations on the ongoing diversification of old moral standards, the dissipation of culture, and the distraction of the world sound quite familiar to us exactly one hundred years after Royce originally wrote these words. Additionally, Royce’s hopes regarding the huge role of loyalty and provincialism are not as old fashioned as they might at first appear. Namely, today, we witness a strong tendency in Europe (and I think elsewhere), especially in the European Union, to elevate the role of loyalty to one’s province or to one’s native region along with its traditions, language, habits, and customs. I wonder whether Royce’s reflections on the role of provincialism were not, to some degree, prophetic. Local patriotism, or loyalty to local traditions, is a significant current issue faced by many residents who recognize