WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN: AN EXAMINATION OF ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONSHIPS DURING THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

by

Alessandra E. Tiberi

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts with

Honours in History

Acadia University

April, 2014

©Copyright by Alessandra E. Tiberi, 2014

This thesis by Alessandra E. Tiberi

is accepted in its present form by the

Department of History & Classics

as satisfying the thesis requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honours

Approved by the Thesis Supervisor

______

Dr. Paul Doerr Date

Approved by the Head of Department

______

Dr. Paul Doerr Date

Approved by the Honours Committee

______

Dr. Matthew Lukeman Date

ii

I, Alessandra E. Tiberi, grant permission to the University Librarian at Acadia University

to

reproduce, loan or distribute copies of my thesis in microform, paper or electronic

formats on a

non-profit basis. I, however, retain the copyright in my thesis.

Signature of Author

Date

iii

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents, Janet Hutchinson and Fino Tiberi, for their support and enthusiasm, without which I would never have made it this far. I acknowledge my brothers as well, for showing interest in my topic and helping me suss out what I wanted to say

I would also like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Paul Doerr, for inspiring me to write a thesis. His guidance, support, and advice have been invaluable throughout this process. He was also instrumental in helping me obtain the primary documents I relied on for this project.

Thanks also goes to Dr. Stephen Henderson, my second reader, and the rest of the professors in the Acadia History department. All of them have been founts of knowledge, understanding, and advice for the last year.

A heartfelt thanks has to be extended to all my friends here at Acadia for making sure I ate, slept, and pulled myself away from my books for at least half an hour a day. Thank you also for putting up with my discussion of diplomats and foreign policy. I know it was of interest to absolutely no one, but thank you for humouring me nonetheless.

Finally, I would like to thank the other History Honour’s students for their camaraderie, sense of humour, and shoulder to cry on throughout this adventure. Against all odds, we have pulled through and completed this.

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Table of Contents

Title page i Approval Page ii Permission for Duplication iii Acknowledgement Page iv Table of Contents v Abstract Page vi

Introduction 1

Chapter One 3 Background 3 British Interests 6 Historiography 9 Nyon Historiography 24

Chapter Two 30 Relations to 1937 30 The Abyssinia Crisis 33 The Spanish Civil War 36 Non-Intervention 39 Mediterranean Problems 41 The Gentleman’s Agreement 44 After the Agreement 48 Conclusion 51

Chapter Three 53 Summer 1937 54 The Nyon Conference 59 Eden Resigns 66 The Easter Agreement 71 Conclusion 73

Conclusion 76

Bibliography 79

v

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Britain’s foreign policy during the

Spanish Civil War, paying close attention to how its policy shaped, and was shaped by,

Italian action in Spain. Particular attention is paid to the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1937, the Nyon Conference of 1937, and the Easter Agreement of 1938.

The first chapter of this work provides some background into the Spanish Civil

War, and looks at various international reactions to the event, including that of Britain.

The first chapter will also look at the historiography of British foreign policy during the

Spanish Civil War, focusing on the myriad of reasons British policy makers had for choosing non-intervention. The historiography of the Nyon Conference of 1937 will also be considered. The second chapter briefly studies Anglo-Italian relations following the

Abyssinian Crisis of 1935 and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, before assessing how British policy towards the Italians played out during the first two years of the Spanish Civil War. The third chapter examines the Nyon Conference of September

1937 and how it represented the one break in the policy of conciliation towards Italy that

Britain had been following. It also deals with the growing tensions between Neville

Chamberlain and Anthony Eden that arose over how to deal with Italy, and how the resignation of Anthony Eden in 1938 affected Anglo-Italian relations for the rest of the

Spanish Civil War.

vi

Introduction

The Spanish Civil War is a topic almost forgotten in most history classes. In studies of the 1930s, it tends to be overlooked as a sideshow in a relatively unimportant country while the bigger drama of German rearmament and British appeasement played out. Yet the Spanish Civil War was not a wholly domestic affair—it managed to capture international attention and influence the relations between the Great Powers of the 1930s.

As George Orwell wrote: “The outcome of the Spanish war was settled in London, Paris,

Rome, Berlin — at any rate not in Spain.”1

The importance of British foreign policy during the Civil War is significant to understanding how some of the alliances of the Second World War—especially that of

Germany and Italy—came about. Britain’s desire to prevent Italy from intervening in the

Spanish Civil War competed with a desire to maintain good relations with Italy at any cost. The ‘bias’ towards Italy present in Britain’s policy during this period unwittingly shaped other international alliances that would play prominent roles in coming years.

In terms of historiography, British foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War has tended to be neglected. The lack of scholarly work devoted solely to this aspect of

British foreign policy can be attributed to two major factors. First, there is the tendency to see said policy as an extension of appeasement played out in a relatively unimportant country. The Spanish Civil War is seen, as has previously been mentioned, as a sideshow to the bigger problem of German rearmament. The second trend is to view British policy in the larger context of international intervention in the Civil War, comparing how policy makers in Britain acted in relation to those in Germany, France or Italy. British foreign

1 George Orwell, “Looking Back on the Spanish War,” in England, Your England and Other Essays (London: Secker and Warburg, 1953), 169.

1 policy between 1936 and 1939 is important to study outside the context of both of these relationships, however, as it offers insight into how Britain shaped its policy around Italy to the detriment of other aspects of foreign policy.

The first chapter of this thesis provides background to the Spanish Civil War, drawing attention to the reactions of the international community to the conflict. This background is important to consider, as the issue of the Spanish Civil War consumed

British policy makers between July 1936 and March 1938.2 It will also look at some of the factors that influenced the British in choosing their policy of non-intervention. The chapter will also examine the historiography both of British foreign policy during the

Spanish Civil War and the Nyon Conference of 1937. The second chapter will discuss

Anglo-Italian relations up to 1937, focusing especially on the effects that increasing

Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War had on their diplomatic relations with

Britain. The third chapter will focus on the Nyon Conference, and how it demonstrated a break in the diplomatic pattern Britain had established towards Italy during this period.

The growing division in opinion regarding Italy that occurred between Prime Minister

Neville Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden will be explored as well, especially its eventual implications on foreign policy. Analyzing each of these aspects will demonstrate how British foreign policy towards Italy affected and shaped the alliances present during the Second World War.

2 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1979), xiii.

2

Chapter One

Background

By the 1930s, Spain had declined so far from its former position of prestige that the Great Powers of Europe hardly ever cast an eye towards its affairs and the country played a relatively small role in world politics.3 Spain was a backwards country, far removed from the machinations of the rest of Europe. The establishment of the Second

Spanish Republic in April 1931, which replaced the Alfonist monarchy, drew the attention of the great powers back into Spain for a variety of reasons, commercial and economic, but also in relation to international issues such as disarmament and

Mediterranean security.4 It was, however, the increasing ideological polarization between the Left and the Right in Spain, at a time when the same polarization was occurring throughout the rest of Europe, that drew the most attention. The Spanish Left was composed of anarchists (Federación Anarquista Ibérica), socialists and labour unions

(Partido Socialista Obrero de Español), communists, and various other small parties. The

Right was composed of primarily monarchist parties, much of the Spanish military, the

Catholic Church, and the Spanish Fascist Party, known as the Falange Espanol.5

The Republic, when it came to power in 1931, had to deal with problems deeply ingrained in Spanish society, such as agrarian reform, the issue of relations between the state and the Catholic Church, and the economic problems plaguing the country.6

However, the Republic tried to attempt too much domestic reform at once, alienating

3 Glyn Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 1931-1941 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1. 4 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 1. 5 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 2. 6 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War (London: Phoenix, 2007), 23.

3 powerful interests as it did so.7 Any reforms it managed to enact brought no substantial change to the country.8 The elections of 1933 brought the Right back to power, and land reform halted.9 During this period, tensions increased between the Left and the Right in

Spain and strikes broke out across the country. In the elections of February 1936, a coalition of leftist groups called the Popular Front, made up of liberals, socialists, communists and anarchists, was voted into power. Though they won by only a narrow margin of two percent of the vote, they achieved an absolute majority of seats.10

The victory of the Popular Front was not accepted by the Spanish Right, and tensions began to escalate between the opposing sides. On July17, 1936, the army, led by

General José Sanjurjo and supported by Generals Francisco Franco, Manuel Goded, and

Emilio Mola, staged a coup d’etat against the government following the murder of

Monarchist chief José Calvo Sotelo. Their initial coup failed, however. The rebels managed to secure most of the traditionally Catholic regions of Spain in the north and west, while the Republicans controlled the industrialized areas of Spain, including

Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and the Basque Country.11 By July 20th, the country was essentially split in two.12 The insurgents regrouped to try again, while the Republican government prepared to defend itself despite its lack of military strength. The Civil War that came about due to the partial failure of the coup became increasingly bloody, finally ending April 1, 1939 with a Nationalist victory.

7 Beevor, The Battle for Spain, 24. 8 Paul Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 195. 9 Beevor, The Battle for Spain, 32. 10 Beevor, The Battle for Spain, 42. 11 Francisco J. Romero Salvado, The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcomes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 61. 12 Salvado, The Spanish Civil War, 60.

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The Civil War was far from being a solely domestic affair, however, and caused ideological splits not seen since the religious wars of the Middle Ages.13 Within days, the

Germans and Italians had found common ideological cause with the Nationalists and had begun supplying them with machinery and men. By the end of the Civil War, the Italians had provided almost 50,000 troops, 660 aircraft, and 150 tanks.14 The Soviet Union supported the Republicans, the only country to do so. Volunteers from other countries

(including the United States and Canada), organized into the International Brigades, travelled to Spain completely independent of their governments to fight for the Republic, with whom they had ideological sympathy.

France was most immediately concerned with the outbreak of Civil War in Spain.

The original impulse of the government was to send help to the Republic, which was ideologically similar to the French Popular Front government (June 1936-June 1937).

However, France itself was dealing with heightening tensions between the Left and the

Right, and President Leon Blum worried that the Spanish conflict could spread into

France.15 The French government, then, decided that the best way to preserve the country from a civil war of its own was by adopting a policy of non-intervention in regards to

Spain, and suggested that the rest of Europe follow suit.16 The French initiative led to the creation of the Non-Intervention Agreement, which was quickly adopted by 26 countries, among them Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.17 The agreement, however, did not possess the legal force of a treaty, meaning no nation was punished for breaching the

13 William E. Watters, An International Affair: Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: Exposition Press, 1971), 50. 14 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 196. 15 W.M Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering: A Study of British Policy During the Spanish Civil War (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 7. 16 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 52. 17 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 197.

5 proposals of Non-Intervention.18 The Non-Intervention Committee that was formed in

September of 1936 to ensure the signatory countries were upholding the proposals would prove to be ineffective as well, doing little to stop the continuing intervention of

Germany and Italy on the side of the Spanish rebels.19

British Interests

In composing their response to the Spanish crisis, British policy makers had to keep a few important factors in mind. The protection of Gibraltar, one of the key pieces to their foreign policy, was one of the most important factors. Another was the desire to keep the Spanish Civil War contained, lest it transform into a second international war.

Third was Britain’s desire to hold onto Italy as an ally and separate Fascist Italy from

Nazi Germany. The combination of these three concerns led to the British government, or more correctly the Foreign Office, to support the policy of Non-Intervention long before the French proposed it to them. These three factors will be explored in more detail below.

One of the first factors the British policy makers looked at when determining what to do about Spain was the strategic implications of the Civil War. Foremost in their mind was Gibraltar, a British Overseas Territory located on the tip of the Iberian

Peninsula in the south of Spain. It was considered a crucial part of British military strategy. The Straits of Gibraltar gave the British access to the Mediterranean, both for trade and military purposes. It provided Britain with a route to export goods to India, but the route required Spanish goodwill to maintain.20 Gibraltar also played a huge role in

18 Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 59. 19 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 197. 20 Alpert, A New International History, 16.

6

British military thinking: “It was a cardinal point of British policy that the Balearic and

Canaries should never be allowed to fall under hostile control, and that the Moroccan side of the Straits of Gibraltar should be occupied by a weak yet friendly Spain.”21 Gibraltar itself was vulnerable to an overland attack, and the threat of an attack there was also a threat to Britain’s position in the Mediterranean.22 Losing Spain as an ally, or at least losing Spanish benevolent neutrality, could expose Gibraltar to an attack.23 The best course of action was to not take sides at all, so as not to earn the enmity of whichever side eventually won the Civil War.24 This fear of Gibraltar’s vulnerability also extended to any alliances that Spain could potentially make with Adolf Hitler’s Germany or Benito

Mussolini’s Italy. If Franco won the Civil War, an alliance between Spain, Germany, and

Italy based on common ideology could threaten Gibraltar.25 Italy and Germany had interests in the area, after all. Germany wanted to set up submarine bases in Spain, while

Mussolini hoped for naval bases on the Balearic Islands.26 The British thought they could prevent a strong alliance between the German, Italian, and Spanish fascists by insisting that all countries agree to non-intervention.

Second was the desire to avoid further wars, especially with Germany. Fear was prevalent across Europe that the “rivalries of Spain would be fought on the soil of

Europe” as the Civil War spread past Spanish borders.27 No one in Britain was prepared to fight another international war, but continued foreign intervention in Spain was

21 Alpert, A New International History, 16. 22 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 198. 23 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 198. 24 George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939 (London: Longman, 1995) 194. 25 Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1935, 196. 26 Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1935, 196. 27 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 6.

7 threatening to make this possibility a reality. The fact that the Civil War split countries down ideological lines, lumping them into the rough category of either ‘Communist’ or

‘fascist’ increased the worry.

The last important factor, one that would increasingly shape Britain’s policy as the Civil War continued, was the desire to keep Italy as an ally. Relations between Italy and Britain were quite amiable prior to the Civil War, and Britain hoped that they could remain so. The first half of the twentieth century, for example, had seen cooperation between the two countries: they had been allies during the First World War, both had signed the Locarno Treaty in 1925, and the Italians were participants in the Stresa front of

1935.28 Both countries also believed they had to support an Austria free of German influence. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) in 1935, however, drove a wedge in relations between the two countries. Abyssinia, a member of the League of

Nations had requested assistance from the League following Mussolini’s aggression.

Britain was caught between upholding League principles and maintaining good relations with Italy. Britain did impose economic sanctions against Italy, but these were half- hearted in their application and served to isolate Italy.29 This isolation was something that

Britain wanted to repair. In June 1936, when reports of a military conspiracy in Spain were reaching London, Britain had already initiated a policy of conciliation towards

Italy.30 The intention was to restore harmonious relations with Italy and avoid a potentially dangerous German, Japanese and Italian alignment.31 The desire to keep Italy

28 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 212. 29 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 2. 30 Enrique Moradiellos, “British Political Strategy in the Face of the Military Rising of 1936 in Spain,” in Contemporary European History, vol. 1 no. 2 (Jul. 1992), 124. 31 Moradiellos, “British Political Strategy,” 124.

8 as an ally would eventually manifest as a “weakness” towards Italian action in Spain, a problem that will be discussed later in this thesis.32

Historiography

The topic of British foreign policy during the course of the Spanish Civil War has drifted in and out of the scholarly spotlight throughout the years. While both the policy of appeasement and the military and political nature of the Spanish Civil War have received considerable, extensive work, British foreign policy regarding Spain during the Civil War years has not been given quite as much attention.33 As mentioned in the introduction, the major trend when discussing this topic has been to place it in the broader context of another topic: either as a component of the larger policy of appeasement the British practiced throughout the 1930s, or as another Great Power that had a vested interest in

Spain during the Civil War. No matter where the topic is placed, the level of attention it is given varies depending on what the author deems as more important. For example, some works concerning appeasement in the 1930s devote a few pages to the Spanish

Civil War.34 On the other hand, in his comprehensive work on the Spanish Civil War, The

Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, Antony Beevor focuses mostly on the military aspects of the war and how it affected Spain. International involvement is given secondary consideration, and there his main focus is on the participation of the international brigades. The foreign policy of intervening countries is barely considered.35

32 Alpert, A New International History, 16. 33 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, vii. 34 See for example R.J.Q Adams, British Politics and Foreign Policy in the Age of Appeasement, 1935- 1939 (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 50-52, but there are many others. 35 Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939, (London: Phoenix, 2007).

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The relative neglect given to this topic, however, has not stopped a number of scholars from researching it in greater depth. A few works have been published through the years, mostly appearing after the 1960s, that are solely devoted to examining British policy towards Spain between 1936 and 1939.

Before the opening of the relevant British archives in the late 1960s and the publication of memoirs by prominent policy makers, a question much debated by university scholars of this topic was which side the British government supported. Some tended to identify British policy as truly neutral, not willing to draw the ire of either side, or as supporters of the legitimate Republican government, although populist leftist writers alleged British support for Franco. Works published after the 1960s contested this view, asserting that the British supported Franco and the rebels for a variety of reasons. In recent years, however, this debate has become less and less prominent. Scholars have either come to accept that the British government favoured the rebels in the conflict, or do not outright state which side, if any, the British government supported. Instead, they examine the policies and opinions of the different parties in Britain, looking at the factors that led to them favouring one side over another in the conflict. This historiography will examine both the major controversy—which side the British supported and why—as well as how the level of attention paid to this particular aspect of British policy in the 1930s has changed in the last seventy years.

One of the first works—probably the first work— examining British foreign policy in Spain was published in 1937 by Henry Blythe. His book, entitled Spain Over

Britain, examines the effect of Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War on the defense of the British empire. In his work, he declares the Iberian Peninsula “the most

10 strategically important area of the world,” as it is a junction that France and Britain rely on, and that Spain dominates.36 Blythe maintains that in any dispute that arises in Spain,

Britain is likely to be neutral, and that “the form of the political government in Spain is immaterial” so long as it is not weak enough to be dominated easily.37 Written in the middle of the Civil War, the book differs from others in that Blythe suggests the course of action the British should take—one of complete neutrality.

Following Blythe, one of the first major works on the international nature of the

Spanish Civil War is Patricia A.M van der Esch’s Prelude to War: The International

Repercussions of the Spanish Civil War. Published a scant 12 years after the war’s official end, van der Esch’s work focuses solely on the international aspects of the Civil

War, leaving the domestic political, social and military aspects to other historians.38 The book is not completely Anglo-centric in its arguments, instead focusing on all the countries she considers to be major players during Civil War (specifically Italy,

Germany, France and the USSR). When discussing the political factors that shaped

British policy in Spain, van der Esch makes the claim that the British government was on the side of the legally elected Government of Spain, and that the coup Franco was attempting “could not be supported by the democratic and constitutional government of the British Isles which always tended to be on the side of law, order and democratic government against rebellion and revolution which were foreign to the English way of life.”39 She gives no arguments to back up her claim beyond the belief that the democratic

36 Henry Blythe, Spain Over Britain: A Study of the Strategical Effect of Italian Intervention on the Defence of the British Empire (London: Routledge, 1937), 1. 37 Blythe, Spain Over Britain, 8. 38 Patricia AM Van der Esch, Prelude to War: The International Repercussions of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1951), IX. 39 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 17.

11

British government could do nothing less than support a similar government. In terms of the factors behind the British Government’s decision to support the French Non-

Intervention plan, van der Esch notes that Britain was primarily concerned with resurrecting the League of Nations and disarmament, and that the conflict brewing in

Spain did not alarm the British because of their distance from the country.40 Her work draws from the few primary sources that were obtainable in the 1940s and 1950s. These include newspaper articles, Debates from the House of Commons and the House of

Lords, and a few memoirs that had been published prior to 1952. Her work has been cited by several other authors in this historiography, making it the first staple of this particular topic.

Two major developments in the 1960s affected the historiography of British foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War. First, the British archives were opened in

1967, giving authors a chance to examine sources that were previously unavailable to them. Second was the publication in 1962 of the memoirs of Anthony Eden (Secretary of

State for Foreign Affairs three separate times, and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1955 to 1957). The first volume of his work, Facing the Dictators reveals some of the inner workings of the British government during the Spanish Civil War. His memoir is unique in that, unlike some of the other memoirs of government officials during this time, he devotes considerable attention to the Spanish conflict.41 However, he does not state if the government was favouring one side over the other. Eden instead details two of the reasons the British chose the path of non-intervention when dealing with the Spanish

Civil War. According to him, it was important to localize the conflict, because “once

40 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 16. 41 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, xii.

12 internationalized, its consequences would be uncontrollable.”42 Second, “…the British

Government had no wish to be involved in a Spanish Civil War, nor were they convinced that, whatever its outcome, the Spaniards would feel any gratitude to those who had intervened.”43 Eden comments that this was a lesson learned during the Peninsular War of

1807-1814, where British soldiers found their allies to be xenophobic. He deems both of these “forceful” reasons why the British government favoured a policy of non- intervention in Spain.

The same year that Eden released his memoirs, one of the first books to deal exclusively with the Spanish Civil War and British foreign policy was published. W.M.

Klein-Ahlbrandt’s Policy of Simmering, published in 1961, quickly became a staple for anyone interested in British foreign policy between 1936 and 1939. Although still unable to draw upon sources that would aid later writers on this topic, he had considerably more to draw from then van der Esch. His work does not specify if Britain favoured one side over another in the Spanish conflict. Ahlbrandt outlines the political atmosphere in

Britain prior to July 1936, namely that both collective security and the League of Nations had proven to be dismal failures, completely bankrupting British foreign policy. British relations with Italy were also at an all-time low following the Abyssinian incident, and relations with France were strained. 44 His book is more focused on the topic of whether or not Non-Intervention was a French or British proposal, which was somewhat of a controversy at the time.45 He does, however, note that the British public was far more

42 The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 401. 43 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 401. 44 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 3. 45 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering. It is now agreed between scholars in this field that non- intervention was a French proposal that the British supported.

13 pro-Republican than pro-Nationalist, perhaps because the terror under Franco seemed to be more organized and deliberate.46 The sources he used in creating his argument range from published documents on foreign affairs in Britain, the USSR and Germany, memoirs, speeches and annuals from prominent diplomats and politicians at the time, and a handful of secondary sources, most of which are biographies.

Margaret George’s The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy 1933-1939, published in 1965, is one of the first works to place British foreign policy during the

Spanish Civil War into the broader picture of appeasement, examining it in context with the rest of the decade. Mainly a political work, focussing on the policy of appeasement and how it developed during the 1930s, the author gives the Spanish conflict a chapter, designating it Britain’s third successive foreign policy problem after Italy’s invasion of

Abyssinia and the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Germany.47 The question of which side the British government supported in the Civil War is not addressed. Instead, she examines the ideological leanings of different individuals in the British government, stating that their private views circulated in the background while they decided foreign policy.48 She draws mainly on newspaper articles from the time, published debates, and the memoirs of Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1936-1943, and Anthony Eden to make her points.

One of the staple works dealing with the Non-Intervention is William E Watters’

An International Affair: Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, published in 1971.

Watters has compiled a detailed account of the Non-Intervention Committee, detailing

46 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 22. 47Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy 1933-1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 93. 48 George, The Warped Vision, 98.

14 the reasons why particular nations joined (though focusing especially on the Great

Powers) and narrating meetings that might get a cursory mention in other works.

However, Watters only mentions that the British Labour party took the side of the

Republicans from the very beginning.49 He does not indicate if the British government favoured one side over another in the war. An International Affair is interesting as, for a fairly thorough volume detailing the intricacies of Non-Intervention, it has an incredibly small bibliography. The work only draws on 20 sources, all of which are considered primary documents. Watters looks at newspapers (the majority of which are London based), parliamentary debates from both Britain and France, and Foreign Office reports from the USSR, Germany, France, but no secondary works that were published prior to his work.

Britain Divided: The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on British Political Opinion by K.W. Watkins is another book dealing exclusively with British foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War. Its focus is domestic, though, exploring how the country was affected by the non-intervention policy that Britain chose and the reasons for choosing it.

Watkins examines both the motivations of the British Right and the British Left separately, citing the reasons they chose to support or oppose non-intervention. In his view, the British Right was guided by one of two things: motivations derived from Spain itself, and those derived from international events and the world.50 Some prominent members of the British Right shaped their support of Franco’s rebels through class

49 William E. Watters, An International Affair: Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (New York: Exposition Press, 1971), 31. 50 K.W. Watkins Britain Divided: The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on British Political Opinion (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976), 84.

15 sympathy or religion. Others were motivated more by anti-Communism.51 While the

British Right was divided on a course of action for the Spanish Civil War, namely to stay neutral or support Franco, the Left was far more united in its support for the Spanish

Republic.52 Watkins stresses that this does not mean the Left agreed wholeheartedly on what to do, though, and that divisions were still present within the Left. The major source of their disagreement was to what extent they were prepared to turn their words of support into action.53 Watkins’ sources include a variety of British newspapers, parliamentary proceedings, memoirs (including Anthony Eden’s), and secondary sources that deal with life in Britain in the inter-war years.

The major work dealing with British foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War is Jill Edwards’ The British Government and the Spanish Civil War. Published in 1979,

Edwards was able to use sources not available to any of her predecessors, such as papers from the newly opened archives and memoirs of prominent policy makers. Her book examines every facet of British policy during the Spanish Civil War in great detail, including in-depth looks at the personal motivations of some of the key diplomatic and political figures at the time. Her book looks at the origins of the policy of non- intervention, British participation in the Non-Intervention Committee, the economic factors that shaped British policy, and the attitude of the Royal Navy during the Spanish

Civil War. She also looks at the problem of volunteers and foreign intervention that played a crucial role in shaping Britain’s foreign policy. Edwards opens her book with the statement that the Conservative-dominated government of Britain in 1936

51 Watkins, Britain Divided, 84. 52 Watkins, Britain Divided, 141. 53 Watkins, Britain Divided, 142.

16 sympathized with Franco’s rebels, who had pledged to stop the “extreme radicalism” that the Popular Front government spread.54 To her, then, the main motivation the British government had for sympathizing with Franco was fear of radical change. She uses one chapter to compare this attitude with that of the Royal Navy, which she states was

“consistently and emphatically anti-Republican,” but the main focus of her book is on the civilian government.55 She relies mainly on evidence drawn from primary sources, such as documents from the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Admiralty, and the Non-Intervention

Committee. She also uses the leading memoirs of the 1930s to construct her arguments, such as those of Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan (Deputy Under-Secretary of State), and Sir

Robert Vansittart (Permanent Under-Secretary of State) but draws attention to the fact that some of these men give the Spanish Civil War little mention, despite the fact it took such a prominent position in the Cabinet at the time.56 Her secondary sources include

Kleine-Albrandt and Watkins. Edwards’ work has, since its publication, become one of the most cited sources for other authors examining this topic, as the rest of this historiography shall show.

The article “Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-

Intervention in the Spanish Civil War” by Douglas Little offers another factor that influenced the British government in their decision to take up a policy of non- intervention in Spain. Little steps away from broader diplomatic considerations most other scholars in this historiography focus on, like the goal of keeping the Civil War contained, and instead focuses on ideology—namely, the desire of the British

54 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1979), 1. 55 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 101. 56 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, xii.

17 government to prevent the spread of Bolshevism in Western Europe and avoid the emergence of a communist Spain. He argues that on the eve of the Spanish Civil War, the

Foreign Office was less troubled by fear of war than the threat of communism.57 Little traces the fear of communism that was prevalent in the British Foreign Office and government in the 1930s, a fear that increasingly shaped foreign policy as the Spanish

Popular Front government appeared increasingly communistic.58 He concludes that, when it came to drawing up policy to deal with the Spanish Civil War, the overwhelming attitude in Britain was “better Franco than Stalin.”59 Little makes use of plenty of foreign office records and memoirs to make his arguments, and draws on secondary sources such as Edwards only to compare her approach to British non-intervention with his own.

Tom Buchanan’s Britain and the Spanish Civil War, published in 1991, deals mainly with the effect of the Spanish conflict on Britain as a whole. His book looks at not only government, but the International Brigades—people from other countries who volunteered to fight in Spain— and the general populace. His chapter on the British government during the war is of most concern to this historiography. He analyzes each of the different parties in Britain, looking at their different reactions to the Civil War, the belligerent parties, and foreign intervention. According to him, the British government would be happy with any outcome in the war so long as the regime was “stable, independent, and did not threaten Britain’s strategic position [in the Mediterranean].” He adds, however, that British officials believed it would be all the better if Franco and the

57 Douglas Little, “Red Scare, 1936: Anti-Bolshevism and the Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr. 1988), 292. 58 Little, “Red Scare,” 299. 59 Little, “Red Scare,” 307.

18 rebels won.60 He also argues that in adopting their policy of impartiality, Britain had the option of staying on good terms with both belligerents.61 Buchanan looks extensively at

Foreign Office documents and parliamentary debates for primary sources, and of the handful of secondary sources he uses, Jill Edwards is the most cited.

One of the most recent sources to deal with the international aspects of the

Spanish Civil War is Michael Alpert’s A New International History of the Spanish Civil

War. Published in 1994, 20 years after Edwards published her work, his book has become a staple in studying the international context of the Spanish conflict.62 His book parallels the major events in the Spanish Civil War with the major events happening internationally as a result of it, with each major country involved getting attention.

According to Alpert, the British had three dominating concerns in planning their foreign policy in the face of the Spanish Civil War: repair the breach with Italy that had come about because of Abyssinia, keep the USSR out of Western Europe, and guard the British

Mediterranean route.63 The British were resolved to stay out of the Spanish conflict because they did not want to support Popular Fronts that might sign an alliance with the

USSR, and because they did not want to bring the Germans and Italians closer by appearing to combine against them.64 These factors, Alpert argues, created a ‘weakness’ towards Italy that would manifest itself as the Spanish Civil War progressed.65 He draws on some of the authors already mentioned in this historiography, including Edwards,

Kleine-Ahlbrandt, and Watkins. He also uses Eden’s autobiography to help him shape the

60 Tom Buchanan Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 43. 61 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 46. 62 Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), ix. 63 Alpert, A New International History, 15. 64 Alpert, A New International History, 15. 65 Alpert, A New International History, 16.

19 general background in Britain, and many published documents on British foreign policy to help cement his arguments.

Continuing the trend of examining British policy during the Spanish Civil War in a larger context is British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 by Canadian historian Paul Doerr, published in 1998. Doerr maintains that the driving factor for British policy makers during the war was the desire to stay on good terms with whichever side won the war, thereby protecting Gibraltar.66 Like other authors in this historiography, he does not outright declare if the British government supported one side or the other in the Civil

War. He does mention that Pro-Franco sympathy was widespread among members of the government, but also argues that that had no bearing on policy. The goal of the officials was to prevent power in the Mediterranean from tilting.67 His main sources for this topic include Edwards, Glyn Stone, and K.W. Watkins.

Glyn Stone is another prominent historian who focuses on British policy during the Spanish Civil War, though he tends to look at British policy alongside the policies of other countries as opposed to focusing on just Britain itself. In Spain, Portugal and the

Great Powers, 1931-1941, published in 2005, he argues that the British government was clearly “anti-Republican and pro-insurgent”.68 This support for the Rebels was born of dislike for Communism and the inability of the Popular Front to restore order to their country.69 According to Stone, the British stuck to a policy of non-intervention as a way of supporting Franco’s rebels without drawing the ire of France or their own people at home, since openly and actively supporting a rebellion was hardly possible for the

66 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 198. 67 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 199. 68 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 53. 69 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 53.

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Government.70 Since his work deals with all the Great Powers, his bibliography is quite extensive, but the publications he cites when discussing the British include Jill Edwards and Kleine-Ahlbrandt.

Of all the historians noted in this historiography, Enrique Moradiellos is the only one of Spanish origin to deal extensively with British foreign policy during the Spanish

Civil War. His works range from numerous articles to a few books, such as Neutralidad benévola: el gobierno Británico y la insurrección militar Española de 1936 published in

1990 and La Perfidia de Albión: el gobierno británico y la Guerra Civil Española, from1996.71 Despite publication dates ranging from 1993 to 2011, his basic thesis has not changed. He regards the British policy of non-intervention as a “peculiar neutrality”, one

“which combined respect for the legal status of the recognized government with de facto equal status for the rebels.”72 Although he shies away from outright declaring which side the British supported, he makes it pretty clear that the British were aware that non- intervention did not favour the legitimate government, yet stuck to the policy regardless.73 Moradiellos, like Edward and Stone before him, states that, prior to the Civil

War, Britain was dealing with unique strategic and diplomatic issues when considering foreign policy. Its over-extended empire was potentially facing three threats: Japan in the

Far East, Nazi Germany in Central Europe, and Italy in the Mediterranean. Britain did not have the resources to fight all three, so its policy was aimed at avoiding a situation in

70 Stone, Spain, Portugal and the Great Powers, 54. 71 Translated as “Benevolent Neutrality: The British Government and the Spanish Military Insurrection of 1936” and “The Treachery of Albion: The British Government and the Spanish Civil War”, respectively 72 Enrique Moradiellos, “British Political Strategy in the Face of the Military Rising of 1936 in Spain,” Contemporary European History Vol.1, No. 2 (July 1992), 123. 73 Enrique Moradiellos, “The Origins of British Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War: Anglo-Spanish Relations in Early 1936,” in European History Quarterly 21:339, (1991), 340.

21 which it would have to do just that.74 In order to prevent such a situation from occurring, then, the first goal of British policy makers was repairing relations with Italy, an objective that took priority in June 1936 and shaped policy to 1939. He also argues, though, that the British first decided on non-intervention due to the belief that the Civil

War would not last very long. Moradiellos’ bibliography, again, consists of many other books mentioned in this historiography. Jill Edwards, Tom Buchanan, K.W. Watkins, and

Glyn Stone all feature heavily in his works.

One of the more recently published studies is The Triumph of the Dark: European

International History 1933-1939 by Zara Steiner. This monumental work is a comprehensive look at all aspects of European international relations in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War, and includes a chapter dealing exclusively with the Spanish Civil War. She mentions that, in London, there had been little sympathy for the Spanish Popular Front in 1936. The British government was worried that the

Spanish government was dangerously unstable and was therefore a danger to Britain’s extensive mining interests in the county and its naval base at Gibraltar.75 Steiner focuses on individual personalities in the British government and the reasons they had for choosing Non-Intervention. For example, she mentions that Stanley Baldwin, Prime

Minister of the United Kingdom from 1935 to 1937, was concerned by the “communist” makeup of the Popular Front government and worried that any support for it would lead to increased Bolshevik presence in Western Europe.76 Steiner argues that the British

74 Enrique Moradiellos, “Appeasement and non-intervention: British Policy during the Spanish Civil War,” in Britain and the Threat to Stability in Europe, 1918-1945, edited by Peter Caterall (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), 96. 75 Vara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 201. 76 Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, 202.

22 government’s overall motivation for choosing non-intervention was not the lack of sympathy for the Republicans held by several prominent government members, but the desire to keep the war contained. Her sources include several authors already mentioned in this historiography, including Alpert, Buchanan, Edwards and Moradiellos.

This historiography has done its best to trace the evolution of scholarship on

British foreign policy during the Spanish Civil War. The number of scholars who actually focus on Britain’s Spanish policy between 1936 and 1939 as still a part of appeasement, but a distinct and important aspect of it that deserves its own study, are few, but their contributions are much used. Beyond that, however, the topic is mostly neglected, shoved away as a relatively unimportant contribution to the overall policy of appeasement that

Britain clung to during the 1930s. It is not without its own controversies, however, as the question of who the British Government supported in the Civil War and why is still debated by the historians who study this topic. The Spanish Civil War went on for three long years, during which time British foreign policy was ostensibly non-interventionist, but with much confusion and divided opinions behind the scenes. British policy was very complex and meshed with other aspects of appeasement, hence the historiographical confusion and general uncertainty.

As has been previously mentioned, Britain’s relations with Italy played a major factor in the decision to make non-intervention a guiding policy during the Spanish Civil

War. Anglo-Italian relations, following the crisis in Abyssinia in 1935, had hit an all-time low. The British wanted to mend their relations with the Italians, hoping that by doing so they could prevent a strong Italo-German alliance. The following chapters will explore

British and Italian relations between 1936 and 1939, focusing on the apparent ‘weakness’

23 the British demonstrated towards Italy when it came to formulating and carrying out their policy regarding Spain, and how British relations with other countries were affected as a result.

Nyon Historiography

The third chapter of this thesis details the Nyon Conference of 1937, examining its effect on Anglo-Italian relations. The Nyon Conference was arranged in September

1937 to deal with ‘pirate’ submarines (actually Italian) that were attacking merchant vessels off the coast of Spain. Although Britain and France extended invitations to all the

Mediterranean powers, Italy declined the initial invitation. The Mediterranean Agreement that was signed as a result of this conference divided the Mediterranean into six zones, to be patrolled by the British and French. The Tyrhennian Sea was, on the request of

Chamberlain, left to the Italians on the chance they decided to join.77 The Italians did eventually demand to join, which changed the terms of the original agreement.78 The conference also aggravated the growing tension between Anthony Eden and Neville

Chamberlain on the topic of Italy, which will be explored later in this thesis.

As is the case with the previous section, not much major scholarly work exists on this conference, and it only sporadically appears in publications. Even in some works dealing with the international involvement in the Spanish Civil War, the Nyon

Conference is barely mentioned, given a page or two of brief detail. When it is a subject of discussion, however, there is a debate over how effective the conference, and therefore

Britain, was at subduing Italian aggression. Depending on the author, the Nyon

77 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 124. 78 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 125.

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Conference was either a break in the traditional British policy of appeasement towards

Italy, or another attempt at conciliation.

One of the first publications about the Nyon Conference was printed in September of 1937 in the Bulletin of International News. The publication is a short, strictly objective account of the conference, giving brief background to the events that led to the conference, and detailing the clauses of the Mediterranean Arrangement. The article touches on the reactions of some of the main signatories, notably Britain, France, and the

Soviet Union. The article also looks at Italy’s initial reaction to the results of the conference, which to it were unacceptable, as Britain and France would control most of the Mediterranean while Italy, if included, would only be given the Tyrrhenian Sea, which would not protect their vital Mediterranean interests.79

Eden dedicates a chapter to the Nyon Conference in Facing the Dictators. He describes the events leading up to the Conference itself and the attitudes of British policy makers. Eden argues that the Nyon Agreement not only had an ‘”excellent” effect on the prestige and power of Britain and France, but also proved that “cooperation between

Britain and France can be effective….”80 He goes on to address the effect of the

Conference on Italy, describing Italy’s reaction as “confused and resentful” as the area set aside for Italian patrol was seen as unacceptable as their interests in the Mediterranean required them to have “conditions of absolute equality with any other power in any zone of the Mediterranean.”81 His description of the success of Nyon conference reflects his belief that it was successful in curbing Italy’s aggression. Although Mussolini eventually

79Na. “The Nyon Conference and Its Result”, Bulletin of International News, Vol. 14, No.6 (Sep. 18, 1937), 14. 80 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 468. 81 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 470.

25 decided to take part in the agreement, Eden stresses that this action did not signal to him that the atmosphere was right for continued conversations with Italy.82 He reasserts that

Britain had to avoid being in opposition to Germany, Japan and Italy simultaneously, but that retreating from the triple threat was not the best way to avoid that situation. Nyon, then, was a way of counterattacking against the weakest member of the trio, Italy.83

“The Nyon Conference: The Naval Aspect” by Peter Gretton is different from the other scholarly works looked at so far in that its focus is not on policy makers and diplomats. Gretton instead analyzes the perspective of the British and French navies in regards to the Nyon Conference, though he places more emphasis on the British

Admiralty. While the majority of the article is a strictly objective account that details the thinking of the British and French navies during the Nyon Conference, Gretton argues that the Nyon Conference and its results were an effective use of international cooperation to prevent the breaking of international law.84 He also sees the Nyon

Conference as having been a “refreshing contrast to the disappointing results achieved by the Non-Intervention Committee and to the uselessness of the League of Nations in attempts to limit the civil war in Spain.”85 He draws primarily upon British Admiralty documents to help him with his analysis, though the memoirs of Eden and Ciano are also used.

The topic of the Nyon Conference is also covered by Jill Edwards in The British

Government and the Spanish Civil War in her chapter on the policies of the British and

82 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 471. 83 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 471. 84 Peter Gretton, “The Nyon Conference-The Naval Aspect,” in The English Historical Review, vol. 90 no. 354 (Jan.1975), 112. 85 Gretton, “The Nyon Conference,” 112.

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French navies to the Spanish Civil War. Edwards gives background to the events leading up to the conference, namely the sinking of British merchant vessels by ‘unknown’ submarines (though the Admiralty knew them to be Italian.)86 She then focuses her discussion on the reactions of the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, looking at the conflict that arose between Eden, who wanted to finally make a stand against Italy, and the Admiralty, which found the notion ridiculous. Edwards argues that it was the increasing “extravagance” in Italian foreign policy at the end of August, such as

Mussolini’s boastful advertisements about Italian involvement in Nationalist campaigns, which allowed Eden to convince his colleagues of the need to stand up against Italy and therefore set up the conference.87 The initial agreement, the one that the Italians did not sign, was seen as a triumph. Edwards argues, however, that the reality was different from the intention the British had for the conference, as Count Ciano believed the Nyon

Conference to be another bluff.88 She also argues that the alteration of the treaty to accommodate Italy was a meaningless gesture, and that only Chamberlain believed it had any value whatsoever for Anglo-Italian relations.89 However, she goes on to conclude that the Nyon Conference, despite its faults, was the “first, and last, real attempt to take swift and aggressive action against illegal and bullying tactics of either Italy or Germany until World War II.”90

The article “The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, and the

Appeasement of Italy in 1937” published by William C. Mills in 1993, looks at the

86 Edwards, British Foreign Policy,118. 87 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 120. 88 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 124. 89 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 125. 90 Edwards, British Foreign Policy, 127.

27 increasing tension between Chamberlain and Eden as a result of the conference. Mills argues that the Nyon Conference should “not be interpreted as a strong stand against aggression, however, but rather as an attempt to avoid confrontation,” as it “fit more comfortably with Chamberlain’s search for appeasement than with Eden’s opposition to it.”91 Mills also argues that the importance of the conference has been overemphasized by

British historians, such as Edwards, mainly due to Eden’s selfsame emphasis on the conference as a stand against aggression.92 Mills agrees with Edwards’ argument that the original success of Nyon was undone when alterations were made to the agreement to include Italy. He also argues that Eden, far from taking a stand against Italy, was in fact obeying Chamberlain’s wishes to keep the Italians mollified, as he stuck only to technical matters and allowed Italy to escape punishment for its actions.93

The Nyon Conference is also briefly discussed by Zara Steiner in The Triumph of the Dark. She focuses on all the countries involved in an objective manner, not delving into the intricacies of their foreign policy. Britain and France do feature prominently, however. She agrees with Edwards’ point that Eden had to fight with the Admiralty to set up the conference, as the Admiralty did not want to retaliate against the Italians for the submarine attacks.94 Steiner argues that the conference was another example of how

British determination to appease Italy proved to be stronger than their concern for Spain

91 William C. Mills, “The Nyon Conference-Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, and the Appeasement of Italy,” in The International History Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), 3. 92 Mills, “The Nyon Conference”, 3. 93 Mills, “The Nyon Conference,” 21. 94 Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 237.

28 or international justice.95 She also mentions that the Nyon Conference marked the end of any serious international tensions generated by the Spanish Civil War.96

The rather short historiography of the Nyon Conference proves that there has not been much work done on the subject. The conference, however, helped to aggravate the growing tensions between Anthony Eden and Neville Chamberlain on the question of how to best deal with Italy. This tension would eventually lead to the resignation of Eden, one of the strongest voices of dissent against appeasement, leaving Chamberlain free to maintain good relations with Italy as he saw fit. As previously stated, this topic will be dealt with in the third chapter of this thesis.

95 Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, 238. 96 Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, 238.

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Chapter Two

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 added another international problem to the already growing list that British policy makers had to deal with. Since the end of the First World War, the British Foreign Office had been trying to repair relations with Italy, which had been fractured by the Versailles Peace Settlement. This goal became even more important as worry over a potential three front war against Germany,

Italy and Japan increased in the early 1930s.

The problems associated with the Spanish Civil War, and therefore the policy that had to be formulated to cope with them, did not exist in a vacuum. The Spanish Civil

War further stressed to the British Foreign Office that more cordial relations with Italy were necessary in order to attain general European peace and maintain British supremacy in the Mediterranean.

Between the end of the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935 and the Nyon Conference in

1937, British policy towards Italy was conciliatory, despite the objection of key British politicians like Anthony Eden. The ultimate goal the British had in mind was regaining cordial relations with Italy and separating it from Germany. Despite their best attempts, however, their policy up until 1937 failed to do anything but convince Mussolini he could do anything he wanted without having to worry about British retaliation.

Relations to 1935

In 1882, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary signed a secret agreement known as the Triple Alliance. The agreement, which was periodically renewed up until the outbreak of the First World War, promised that Italy would assist Germany if Germany

30 were attacked by France. When the war started, however, Italy decided to stay neutral, citing the defensive nature of the alliance. In Italy’s view, the aggressive actions of

Germany in 1914 could not be seen as defensive.1 This allowed Britain and France the opportunity to persuade Italy to join the Triple Entente. This was accomplished with the

Treaty of London, a secret treaty signed April 26, 1915 between the three countries. In signing the treaty, Italy agreed to give up her membership in the Triple Alliance—which included turning her back on her alliance with Germany—and instead enter the war on the side of the Entente. In return, Italy was promised several major territorial concessions, including Trent, Southern Tyrol, Istria, Gorizia, and Dalmatia.2 With these concessions, the Adriatic would essentially become an Italian lake. Italian nationalists were satisfied with the promise of these gains.3

The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the subsequent Versailles Treaty between the victorious Allies and defeated Germany heralded the start of a downhill turn in relations between Italy and Britain. The Treaty of London was all but nullified at the

Versailles Peace Conference, as it had been secretly arrived at and therefore was, according to President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, not valid. Wilson refused to give Slavic populated areas to Italy, as doing so would violate the principle of national self-determination. While Italy received some territorial concessions, namely South

Tyrol, Trieste, and Istria, these gains were far less than what had previously been promised by the Treaty of London.4 Italian resentment was exacerbated by British and

1 Paul Doerr, British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 46. 2 Gaines Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defense, 1934-1937 (London: Cornell University Press, 1993), 42. 3 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 47. 4 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 47.

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French colonial gains, and they considered the results of Versailles to be a gross betrayal by their former allies.5

Despite this disruption, the 1920s proved to be a fairly peaceful, hopeful period for Anglo-Italian relations. Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922 was not met by much apprehension in Britain. Instead, there was sympathy and respect for Fascism, which was seen as a bold attempt to crush Bolshevism, the far more worrying ideology.6 Although some British diplomats were concerned with Mussolini, events during the 1920s quelled fear of international unrest. The 1920s seemed like they would be a period devoted to restoring stability and peace to a continent that had been wracked by a terrible war.

During these years, Anglo-Italian relations were, if not on the same level of joviality they had been prior to the Versailles Treaty, at least were not beyond the hope of repair.

The Locarno Pact of 1925 not only demonstrated the extent to which European countries wanted to maintain peace and stability, but was also a highlight of Anglo-Italian cooperation. The pact itself was a border guarantee between Germany, France, and

Belgium, recognizing German borders with the other two countries as they had been established at Versailles. The three countries also promised to never attack each other.

Italy and Britain acted as guarantors of the pact, promising to come to the assistance of any signatory that found itself a victim of aggression. Despite the fact Germany did not guarantee its eastern borders, the Locarno Pact was hailed as a great success by the general European public.7

5 Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 7. 6 Alpert, A New International History,8. 7 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 89.

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Cordial relations continued into the 1930s. The British and Italians, along with the

French, were also signatories of the Stresa Front on April 4, 1935. By signing this pact, the three countries agreed to oppose “any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may endanger the peace of Europe.”8 Essentially, the Stresa Front warned Adolf Hitler to stay out of Austrian affairs in the wake of an attempted pro-Nazi coup in that country. This pact, informal though it was, led Britain to believe that its interests meshed well with those of Italy despite ideological differences. Both believed that it was vital Austria be kept free of German occupation.

Before 1935, then, Anglo-Italian relations on the whole looked good. While the two countries might not have attained the same level of cordiality they had enjoyed prior to the outbreak of the First World War, they had made significant gains in restoring harmony to their relations.

The Abyssinia Crisis and Heightening of Tensions

The Abyssinia Crisis started November 22, 1934 with a clash between Ethiopians and Italian-backed Somalis at Walwal. Mussolini used the event as a pretext for invasion, and he began to amass an army in preparation for a war. Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations, of which it was a member, for assistance against unprovoked aggression. The

British were torn between two courses of action. On the one hand, the League was still popular with the British public. Many in the country wanted to see the League of Nations handle this crisis and stop the aggressor. On the other hand, an Italian takeover of

8 W.M Laird Kleine-Ahlrandt, The Policy of Simmering: A Study of British Policy During the Spanish Civil War (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 2.

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Abyssinia would not endanger British interests in the area, and the British were reluctant to act against Italy for fear it would drive a wedge in their relations.9

The Abyssinian Crisis had not gone unnoticed during the build up to the Stresa

Conference. Anthony Eden, then Lord Privy Seal, had suggested that Ramsay

Macdonald, British Prime Minister and representative at Stresa, mention to Mussolini that an invasion of Abyssinia would be frowned upon by the British. The topic was never brought up during the formal meetings, however, as the British representatives wanted to keep the Stresa Front solely focused on Austria.10 Sir Eric Drummond, the British ambassador to Rome, feared that confronting Italy over Ethiopia would drive Italy into the waiting arms of Germany.11 Although the Stresa Front had indicated to the British that they had much in common with the Italians, it suggested to Mussolini that the British would not object to his plans to invade Ethiopia.12

The British tried to settle the Abyssinian Crisis before they had to choose between supporting the League and keeping good relations with Italy. The Foreign Office drew up a compromise plan, wherein Ethiopia would cede its southern province of Ogden to Italy.

In return, Ethiopia would receive a land corridor leading to the port of Zeila. The hope of the Foreign Office was that this compromise plan would appease Italy and stop the crisis before the League of Nations got dragged in.13 If that were to happen, Britain would have

9 It was later noted, however, that although an Italian conquest of Ethiopia “would not directly and immediately threaten any vital British interest, the balance of power in this area would be altered to Italy’s advantage and a possible, if remote, threat to British control over the Sudan and the upper waters of the Nile must be taken into account.” This possibility, however, was still deemed too unlikely to risk losing Italian friendship over. (Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement, 86) 10 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 180. 11 W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Volume 14, Series 2, No. 296, pg. 191. 12 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 180. 13 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 182.

34 to side with the League, rupturing the Stresa Front and driving Italy closer to Germany.

The proposal, however, stood very little chance of success. Mussolini was not content with anything less than the whole of Ethiopia and rejected the entire plan out of hand.14

On October 3rd 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia. Britain was now out of options.

Membership in the League of Nations entailed, under Article 16 of the League Covenant, an obligation to participate in collective sanctions against Italy.15 The application of these sanctions, which were solely economic in nature, was half-hearted at best from the

British side, who feared the damaging effect they would have on their relations.16

While publicly the British were supporting the League, privately they were trying to find a way to settle the Ethiopian Crisis while still retaining Italian friendship. Samuel

Hoare, then the Secretary of State, met with Pierre Laval, his French counterpart, on

December 7th to devise another compromise plan. Their scheme was for Ethiopia to receive Zeila in exchange for Ethiopia handing over large chunks of territory to Italy.

Before this plan, known as the Hoare-Laval Plan, could be suggested, however, news of it was leaked to the French press on December 9th. The general public in Britain reacted with outrage, Mussolini rejected the plan, and Hoare was forced to step down as Foreign

Secretary on December 18, 1936.

By May, Mussolini had taken over Ethiopia, but Italy’s relations with Britain had been ruined. The withdrawal of sanctions against Italy in June 1936 was seen as a new opportunity to reduce Anglo-Italian friction in the Mediterranean, as well as prevent a dreaded alliance between Germany, Japan, and Italy. Such an alliance would threaten

14 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 183. 15Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement, 84. 16 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 2.

35

Britain on three separate fronts, and it did not have the resources to face all three threats.

Germany and Japan were considered the more serious threats, however, and Britain did not want to waste armaments on Italy.17 As a result, British policy became increasingly geared towards repairing the breach in Anglo-Italian relations that the Abyssinian Crisis had caused, and therefore preventing the dreaded triple alliance.

By July 1936, the importance of relations with Italy was hard to downplay. As

Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador to Italy from 1933 to 1939 wrote in a letter to

Anthony Eden on July 17th, “Italy becomes as it were the pivot on which hope of future general European collaboration rests.”18 This statement would only be proven true by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War that very same day.

The Spanish Civil War

As news of the failed coup and the outbreak of fighting in Spain reached the

British, policy makers were charged with the task of balancing this new crisis with already existing international problems. The belief in the Foreign Office was that the

Spanish Civil War was a minor issue that would quickly resolve itself.19 In any event, though, British policy considerations for the Spanish Civil War were driven more by events outside of Spain, like the continued quest to repair relations with Italy and defend the empire, than events inside Spain itself.20

17 Steve Morewood, “Anglo-Italian Rivalry,” in Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War, edited by Robert Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989), 173. 18 Foreign Office Italy 36/13 Letter from Eric Drummond to Anthony Eden, July 17th 1936, hereafter referred to as FO It/36/13 19 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1979), 10 20 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 37

36

The Prime Minister of Britain in July 1936, Stanley Baldwin, who had taken over from Ramsay MacDonald June 7, 1935, was little interested in foreign affairs. Thus, the task of formulating policy rested on the shoulders of Anthony Eden, who had taken up the mantle of Secretary of State following the debacle of the Hoare- Laval Plan. Eden’s new job would not prove to be easy, however, as British policy towards Italy following the Abyssinian Crisis was in disarray.21 Eden, as well, had a strong dislike for Mussolini, though he claimed that their relationship was never a factor in his policy.22

The British had to formulate their policy for the Spanish Civil War quickly, given the speed at which events were happening in the country. Within weeks of the breakout, the Germans and Italians had started to send supplies and men to the Nationalists.23 The policy the British eventually came up with for dealing with the Spanish Civil War was not far separated from their general European policy. They wanted to protect their empire, and they wanted to regain friendly relations with Italy in order to counter growing German strength. The Spanish Civil War, however, added some interesting dimensions.

One major factor in planning a policy for the Spanish Civil War lay in strategic planning. British policy makers had to keep in mind their base at Gibraltar, which was a

21 Post, Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement, 83. 22 The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 422. 23 On July 30, 1936, Mussolini sent twelve Savoia-Marcheti 81 bombers, two transport planes, and a ship loaded with fuel and ammunition to Spain. On August 7, he sent 27 Fiat fighters, five Fiat-Ansaldo light tanks and twelve field guns (all with ammunition and trained personnel). On August 13, three seaplanes were shipped off, and six more fighters were sent on August 19. Shipments of weapons from Germany started on the first of August and included Panzer Mark I tanks, and 20mm and 88mm anti-aircraft guns. Shipments of this nature continued steadily for a few weeks, but German intervention did not become fully established until November 1936 with the creation of the Condor Legion. Antony Beevor, The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939, (London: Phoenix, 2007) 152-154.

37 lynchpin for their position in the Mediterranean.24 It was key to their military policy that the Balearic and Canary Islands never fall under hostile control, and that the Moroccan side of the Straits of Gibraltar be occupied by a weak, but friendly, Spain.25 For this reason, it was crucial to the British that they stay allied with, or at least maintain friendly relations with, Spain. This fear of losing Spain as a benevolent neutral translated into the belief that the best course of action was to not take sides at all, thereby guaranteeing they would not gain the enmity of whichever side won.26

Events in the 1920s and early 1930s had shown, however, that any considerations of the Mediterranean naturally needed to include Italy, as Rome had significant interests in that region as well. The fear over the vulnerability of Gibraltar extended to any alliances Spain could make with Mussolini, who had made it clear he hoped for naval bases on the Balearic Islands.27 If the Nationalists won the Civil War, an alliance between

Germany, Italy and Spain based on a common ideology could threaten Britain’s position in the region.28

It quickly became clear that the Italians were going to intervene on behalf of

Franco and the Nationalists. On July 30th, twelve Italian fighter-bombers were shipped to

Spain to the benefit of the Nationalists.29 This posed a difficult problem for the British.

While the individual political ideologies of members of the British government differed, it was clear that Britain simply had to support the legitimate Republican government of

24 Enrique Moradiellos, “British Political Strategy in the Face of the Military Rising of 1936 in Spain,” in Contemporary European History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1992), 124. 25 Alpert, A New International History, 17. 26 George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context 1931-1939 (London: Longman, 1995), 194. 27 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 196. 28 Doerr, British Foreign Policy, 196. 29 Alpert, A New International History, 39.

38

Spain. This, however, could once again be a factor that pushed Italy and Germany into closer cooperation if Mussolini interpreted British policy as hostile to his ambitions.

Another factor in determining a course of action to take in Spain was how to balance relations with Italy with public opinion, which was pro-Republican and Pro-League, at least on the Left.

Non-Intervention

The policy of non-intervention originally started as a French proposal designed mainly to prevent France from falling into a civil war akin to the one happening across the border.

It was hoped that, by advocating for this policy and insisting the rest of Europe follow suit, the Spanish Civil War could stay contained to its own borders and end quickly. The

French government first presented it to the British and Italians, believing that as the three countries most interested in the events in Spain, they should be the ones to set the example for the rest of Europe.

The French proposal meshed well with the policy considerations of the British.

By adhering to a policy of non-intervention, the British could ensure the friendship of whichever belligerent party was victorious in the Spanish Civil War. This would help guarantee the safety of the base at Gibraltar. If the proposal was adopted by other interested countries as well, such as Italy, the British position in the Mediterranean could be assured. Lastly, a formal declaration of neutrality would also prevent the Italians from feeling as though Britain disapproved of their support for the Nationalists. Britain,

39 however, refused to outright adopt the French proposal until such a time as Germany and

Italy had shown more than mere “agreement on principle”.30

On August 15th, the principle of non-Intervention between France and Britain was formalized in the form of the Non-Intervention Agreement. The agreement was quickly adopted by 26 countries after that, among them Germany, Italy and the Soviet

Union. The agreement, however, did not possess any of the legal force of a treaty. This meant that no nation could be punished for breaching any of the proposals of the Non-

Intervention Agreement. To this end, a working committee was soon convened to ensure all signatory countries were upholding the precepts of the agreement. France, however, did not want to play host to this committee, and suggested that the delegates meet in

London instead. The British were less than pleased with this suggestion, as they did not want to play such a conspicuous role.31 Regardless, the first meeting of the Non-

Intervention Committee was held in London on September 9, 1936.

Before long the committee was plagued with complaints from the Soviets about continuing Italian and German intervention. Complaints along these lines would become a central problem for the Non-Intervention Committee from its inception in August until

November 1936. Britain, in an attempt to not appear too hostile to the Italians, tried to play the mediator when these accusations arose, and “went to exasperating lengths to give the violators the benefit of the doubt long after the doubt had been removed.”32

30 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 30. 31 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 43, FO 371/20530. 32 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 14.

40

Mediterranean Problems

The Italian occupation of Majorca, one of the Balearic Islands, in August of 1936 was a large cause for concern among British policy makers.33 As already stated, it was a vital part of British strategic policy that the Balearics not be occupied by a hostile power.

The British Foreign Office worried that this move was a way for the Italians to weaken

British power in the Mediterranean, using the Spanish Civil War as an excuse.34 This led to another debate in the Foreign Office. Some believed that a display of force was needed in this case to show Mussolini that the British were not afraid to respond to him.

However, this again ran the risk of alienating Italy. Three possible lines of actions were discussed. First that a note be sent to the Italians warning them that a change in the status quo of the Mediterranean would not be looked upon favourably. This plan was favoured, as the Foreign Office was convinced that the Italians would “fish for what they can get in these areas” and would not leave unless they were warned off.35 The second option was that the British consult the French over what to do in the area, as the Chiefs of Staff considered the Italian acquisition of the Balearics to be more of a danger to the French.36

The last option was that the British increase naval presence in the Mediterranean. The

Foreign Office chose the first option and sent a note on September 2nd to the Italians warning them that any change in the status quo in the Mediterranean was “a matter of the

33 Majorca was overrun by an Italian-led fascist militia in August 1936. Republican forces were expelled, and the Italians gave no indications of leaving the island following the victory. (Alpert, A New International History, 68-69). 34 Alpert, A New International History, 69. 35 W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 151, pg. 191. 36 DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, pg. 192.

41 closest concern in His Majesty’s Government.”37 This note would help jumpstart the talks for a potential Anglo-Italian agreement, discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

By the last few months of 1936, Italy appeared to be growing closer and closer to

Germany. In October, Germany formally recognized the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, a step Britain had not yet taken. On November 1, Mussolini proclaimed the Rome-Berlin

Axis, and publicly dropped any objections to German absorption of Austria. On

November 25, 1936, Italy, along with Germany and Japan, signed the Anti-Comintern

Pact. This pact was particularly ominous for the British policy makers, as it appeared to be a first step towards the three-front war they had come to dread. It was another particularly worrying development in Anglo-Italian relations as well, as it was

Mussolini’s way of telling Baldwin that, while he did still desire negotiations with

Britain, any attempts to ruin the Rome-Berlin Axis were useless.38

Events in Spain were also further complicating British policy. In November, a

Nationalist victory seemed imminent as their armies closed on Madrid. On November

18th, the Germans and Italians formally recognized Franco’s government, a move the

British were considering if Madrid fell. Some in the Foreign Office felt this was an important move to take to prevent Franco from being too deep in the pockets of the dictators if his victory was only a matter of time.39

As the Nationalists’ strength grew, the British were also faced with the problem of belligerent rights. Belligerent rights allow parties engaged in a wartime blockade the ability to stop and search ships they believe are transporting weapons to their enemies.40

37 Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, 69. 38 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 103. 39 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 27. 40 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 107.

42

The British government had been dragging its heels in regard to granting belligerency rights to one side or the other in Spain, as in this case belligerency rights would have implied formal diplomatic recognition. This had a somewhat ideological basis as the

Royal Navy, which was staunchly anti-Republican, did not want to submit to the

“communistic” blockade that the Republicans had set up in August of 1936, and therefore would not agree to the granting of said rights.41 The Royal Navy also could not foresee the Republican government being able to hold the blockade for an extended period of time.

The Republicans managed to maintain their blockade for longer than expected, however, and the problem was further compounded as German and Italian intervention on behalf of the Nationalists increased the power of Franco’s navy. The Nationalists themselves attempted to set up a blockade on November 17th. This left Britain having to balance two wholly incompatible policies: on the one hand, it was crucial they remain, at worst, strictly neutral with whoever emerge victorious in Spain. On the other hand, they could not give offense to Italy by granting the Republicans belligerency rights. If they wanted to repair relations with Italy, they would have to accommodate the Nationalist cause “as was compatible with the maintenance of sufficient semblance of neutrality to avoid alienating the Spanish Republican government.”42 As a result, Britain chose not to grant belligerency rights to either party, a solution which solved nothing and pleased nobody. This question of belligerency rights would become a new bargaining chip when dealing with the Italians.

41 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 107. 42 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 108.

43

The Gentleman’s Agreement

By late 1936, the problem of repairing relations with Italy was tied up not only with keeping peace in the Mediterranean, but also with Italian intervention in Spain. The

British Foreign Office was searching for a way to solve all three of these issues.

The debate over what to do about the Italians was consuming the British Foreign

Office. According to Eden’s memoirs, the argument he heard most often was that, if

Britain were to make a concession to Italy, Mussolini would respond in kind and peaceful relations could be restored between the two countries. Eden believed these thoughts were a misinterpretation of Mussolini’s personality, however, and that Mussolini would see any British concessions as a sign of weakness. 43 Eden advocated for “cautious advances” in dealing with Rome: that is, he believed Britain had to give evidence of goodwill, but surrender no vital interest, or “count upon Fascism to keep its promises when they become inconvenient.”44

Meanwhile, events in Spain were making it hard for Eden to dally in relation to

Italy. The Italians still occupied Majorca, though as discussed earlier, the British had warned them that a change in the status quo of the Mediterranean was a close concern to the British. The Italian Foreign Secretary, Count Ciano, responded to this note by assuring the British that “neither before the revolution in Spain nor since it broke out had the Italian Government engaged in nor in future would the Italian Government engage in any negotiation with General Franco which might alter the status quo in the Western

Mediterranean.”45

43 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 421. 44 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 421. 45 DBFP, Vol. 17, Series 3, No. 188, page 259.

44

Later in September, Anthony Eden met with Dino Grandi, the Italian ambassador to London, to discuss Anglo-Italian relations. Grandi assured Eden that Mussolini truly desired closer relations with Britain. A casual remark made by Mussolini to a pro-Italy

British journalist that a “Gentleman’s Agreement” on the Mediterranean would not go amiss further indicated that the Italians were willing to enter into talks with the British.46

These casual remarks resulted in numerous discussions between representatives from Britain and Italy, including Anthony Eden, Count Ciano, and Eric Drummond. The talks that led up to the eventual signing of the Gentleman’s Agreement were lengthy.

Eden, though not knowing what the exact nature of this Anglo-Italian agreement would be, knew exactly what he wanted from it: “I repeated that we were not prepared to take any course liable to arouse the fears and suspicions of other Mediterranean countries, nor would we limit the size and location of our military and naval forces in the Mediterranean or Red Sea. I refused for the present to recognize the conquest of Abyssinia. We wished the Italian Government to accept without qualification the territorial status quo in the

Mediterranean and renounce Anti-British propaganda in the Near East.”47

In a telegram to Eric Drummond, Eden listed a few points for Drummond to keep in mind when drafting the Gentleman’s Agreement. First, it was important to remember that the Italians had asked for “clarification of the present situation in the Mediterranean with a view to improving Anglo-Italian relations generally.” Because of this, it was up to the Italians to contribute where necessary to the improvement of Anglo-Italian relations.48

Second, the French had to be kept in mind. It was crucial that the French not be

46 Alpert, A New International History, 91. 47 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 429. 48 DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 426, 611.

45 concerned this agreement would work against them in any way. Following this vein, care had to be taken to not give legitimate worry to any other Mediterranean country.49 Eden suggested that the declaration itself be written in as general terms as possible, and only touch on immediate problems in the Mediterranean. The question of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia, for example, was not one Eden wanted the Gentleman’s Agreement to deal with. He preferred that be dealt with in a separate conversation.50

The first draft of the agreement was written in late December 1936 by Eden. It was then shown to Count Ciano in Italy by Eric Drummond. The Italian Foreign Minister declared he had little to object to in the text except for the passage that stated the two countries “disclaim any desire to modify, or, so far as they are concerned, to see modified, the national status of the territories in the Mediterranean area, particularly the territories of Spain.”51 Ciano was ready to give formal assurances to Britain that, as far as

Italy was concerned, all Spanish territories would remain Spanish. He had, in fact, already done so quite publicly. Count Ciano felt, however, that to repeat it on a formal declaration would do irreparable damage to General Franco, whose government the

Italians had recently recognized.52 In Ciano’s mind, including this stipulation in the

Gentleman’s Agreement was implying that General Franco had designs to cede the territory.53 This problem was eventually settled by the promise of a separate exchange of notes wherein the integrity of Spanish territory would be assured.54

49 DFBP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 426, 611. 50 DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 426, 614. 51 DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 483, 698. 52 DBFP, Volume 17, series 2, No. 499, 716. 53 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 431. 54 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 431.

46

The problem of the Italian presence on the Balearic Islands was also discussed when Drummond presented the draft agreement to Ciano. The occupation of Majorca still loomed large in British public opinion, and it was necessary that the situation be fixed.55

Ciano assured Drummond that the activities of any Italian agents on Majorca had been suspended, putting to rest some of the distrust in the Foreign Office.56 With these two major points of contention settled, the final draft of the Gentleman’s Agreement was written up.

Even after discussion of content had been settled, though, the name of the agreement itself was debated. Eric Drummond, the British Ambassador to Italy, asked that the proposed arrangement be called an “Exchange of Assurances” instead of a

“Gentleman’s Agreement”, believing the former to be a better title. He acknowledged, however, that such a change might not be able to be achieved without causing offense.57

Subsequently, the title of the agreement was kept as it had been proposed by Mussolini himself.58

On January 2nd 1937, the Gentleman’s Agreement, also known as the

Mediterranean Agreement, was signed. The text read:

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government: Animated by a desire to contribute increasingly, in the interests of the general cause of peace and security, to the betterment of relations between them and between all the Mediterranean Powers, and resolved to respect the rights and interests of those Powers; Recognise that the freedom of entry into, exit from, and transit through, the Mediterranean is of vital interest both to the different parts

55 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 431. 56 DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 499, 716. 57 FO IT/36/30, Personal Message from Sir E. Drummond to Sir Anthony Eden, December 9th, 1936, hereafter referred to as FO IT/36/30. 58 Editor’s note, DBFP, Volume 17, Series 2, No. 461,667.

47

of the British Empire and to Italy, and that these interests are in no way inconsistent with each other; Disclaim any desire to modify or, so far as they are concerned, to see modified the status quo as regards national sovereignty of territories in the Mediterranean area; Undertake to respect each other’s rights and interests in said area; Agree to use their best endeavours to discourage any activities liable to impair the good relations which it is the object of the present declaration to consolidate. This declaration is designed to further the ends of peace and is not directed against any other power.

The promises made by Mussolini proved to be fickle. Scant days after signing the

Gentleman’s Agreement, 4,000 Italian volunteers landed in Spain.59 The landing of the volunteers was also seen by Eden as a violation of the Gentleman’s Agreement, as

Mussolini had to know his action had “impair[ed] the good relations which it is the object of the present declaration to consolidate,” but had not altered his plans in the slightest.60

The failure of the agreement taught Eden an important lesson that would shape his future dealings with Italy: “…there was no value in negotiating with Mussolini again, unless he first carried out the engagements he had already entered into.”61 Eden also took away from this failure the notion that he had been too complacent towards Mussolini, an oversight he intended to fix with any future dealings.62

After the Agreement

Following the failure of the Gentleman’s Agreement, no other agreements were signed between Britain and Italy in 1937. Instead, the British focused their attention on getting Italy to withdraw their troops from Spain and stop sending in more volunteers.

59 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 433. 60 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 433. 61 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 433. 62 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 433.

48

Exchanges of diplomatic notes that occurred following the Gentleman’s Agreement hinted at the possibility of another agreement, but nothing substantial took place.

In May 1937, Baldwin stepped down as Prime Minister and Neville Chamberlain took over. Anthony Eden expressed great excitement at being able to work “with a Prime

Minister who would give his Foreign Secretary energetic backing.”63 It became evident quite quickly, however, that Eden and Chamberlain had very different ideas about how to treat Italy. While Eden was increasingly convinced that Britain had to start taking a firmer position in regards to Italian intervention in Spain, Chamberlain believed that

Britain could not afford to antagonize Italy over Spanish affairs.64 The divide between

Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary was one that the Italian foreign office would seek to exploit in the future.

By the summer of 1937, Mussolini’s ambitions in the Mediterranean were becoming much more ambitious, and he was far more vocal in his demands that Britain grant de jure recognition of his conquest in Abyssinia. Drummond believed that until the recognition was granted, relations with Mussolini would not improve.65 News also came into the British Foreign Office of more Italian troops being sent to Spain.66

The Non-Intervention Committee also became entangled in the question of volunteers. Following the first few months of its existence, when it had dealt mainly with accusations of intervention in Spain, the committee now turned its attention to stopping the continued flow of volunteers and arms into Spain. The British envisioned a three-step solution to this problem: first, the Non-Intervention Committee would find a way to

63 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 445. 64 Alpert, A New International History, 143. 65 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 448. 66 Avon, The Eden Memoirs,449.

49 control the flow of arms and foreign manpower into Spain. With the Spanish Civil War thus contained, an armistice could take place between the Nationalists and the

Republicans. When peace was restored to the country a plebiscite would let the Spaniards choose their own form of government. Meetings of the Non-Intervention Committee showed, however, that this was easier said than done.67 Republican Spain was not willing to comply, and neither Italy nor Germany wanted to run the risk of a Communist government being established in Spain.68 This option having failed, the British then tried a direct approach to deal with the problem of volunteers. This too met with little success.

Italy refused to halt the flow of volunteers into Spain unless it could be assured that the

Republic would not win. Ciano also mentioned that, while Rome had no intention of authorizing any further departures, it still could not withdraw all the volunteers currently in Spain or commit to not sending more. This turned out to be another lie—Italy was preparing to send more troops to Spain to participate in an attack against Malaga.69

The Non-Intervention Committee also tried to implement a control scheme in the first half of 1937 to cover “the recruitment of, transit through, or the departure from the countries of the respective signatories, or of any person of non-Spanish origin for the purpose of service in the Spanish war.”70 The control scheme was divided into three parts: a Naval patrol, Sea Observation, and Land Observation. The Land Observation

Scheme would make use of neutral countries to patrol the borders of Spain to prevent the continued flow of volunteers into the country. The Sea Observation scheme, likewise, would draw on neutral countries to staff it, while the Naval Patrol would be entirely

67 Klein-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 42. 68 Klein-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 42. 69 Klein-Ahlbrandt, A Policy of Simmering, 45. 70 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 51-52.

50 under the control of Britain, France, Germany and Italy. The Naval patrol scheme also had some fairly large faults, namely that by the time it was finally implemented, foreign intervention by all interested parties, including Italy, was so well established that any pretence of neutrality had been abandoned. Another weakness was the sharing of the

Naval Patrol by countries that were actively supporting one side or another. While Britain did not formally support either the Republicans or the Nationalists, it was still trying not to offend either of the dictators.71 The scheme had a very brief existence— by May 1937, the Germans and Italians had withdrawn from the scheme, and the Portuguese withdrew their permission for border patrols. The French did likewise on July 13, 1937, suspending their permission for border patrols.

The question of belligerent rights also continued to resurface in the first half of

1937. The Italians and Germans wanted the British to grant these rights to Franco before they would discuss the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain. This issue became deadlocked in both the Non-Intervention Committee and in Anglo-Italian relations.

Attention was diverted, however, by mysterious attacks on shipping that occurred in the

Mediterranean in August 1937.

Conclusion:

By the time the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936, British policy makers were already trying to determine how to reduce the tension in their relationship with Italy. In the years between the end of the First World War and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil

War, Anglo-Italian relations had been on the decline. This decline, combined with the

71 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 57.

51

Rome-Berlin Axis between Italy and Germany and the Anti-Comintern Pact between

Italy, Germany, and Japan, led the British to worry about a potential three-front war. As a result, their foreign policy was overwhelmingly about staying on good terms with Italy and drawing it away from Germany.

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War did not help matters. The Italians began to intervene in Spain almost immediately, leading to increased British worry that their position in the Mediterranean would be threatened. Any hostile action, however, could further fracture relations between the two countries, leading to closer cooperation between Germany and Italy. As a result, British policy towards Italy became increasingly conciliatory, as they “overlooked” expanding Italian intervention in Spain despite the terms of the Non-Intervention Agreement and their own desire to see Italian troops withdrawn. As 1937 continued on, it became clear to many in the British Foreign Office that a new policy was needed if they wanted to stop Italy.

As the next chapter will discuss, the Nyon Conference of September 1937 would break this established pattern of diplomatic dealings with Italy. At the same time, however, it would help exacerbate tensions within the British government over how to deal with Italy, culminating in the eventual resignation of Anthony Eden and a new direction for British foreign policy.

52

Chapter Three

During the first half of 1937, the British Foreign Office was concerned with the fallout from the Gentleman’s Agreement, the increasing problem of foreign intervention in Spain, and the question of how to re-establish Anglo-Italian relations. Added to these problems was the division between Anthony Eden and Neville Chamberlain. The Foreign

Secretary was growing wary of Mussolini and believed that any further dealings with

Mussolini had to include a hard-line stance, while the Prime Minister held fast to the idea that the Spanish conflict was not a sufficient reason to lose Italian friendship.

“Pirate” submarine attacks (known to be Italian) on merchant shipping in the

Mediterranean in the summer of 1937 presented the opportunity for Britain to take a firm stance against Italian actions. In an atmosphere of public outrage and acting on a French suggestion, Anthony Eden managed to convince the British Cabinet and the Admiralty of the need for a conference to deal with the pirate submarines.

The Nyon Conference demonstrated the one instance where the British government broke with the diplomatic pattern it had established and actually took a firm stance against Italy. The triumph of the Nyon Conference, however, was short-lived and led to a greater division between Sir Anthony Eden and Sir Neville Chamberlain, culminating in the resignation of Anthony Eden as Foreign Secretary. Following Eden’s resignation and his replacement with Lord Halifax, who was much more agreeable with

Chamberlains policies, Chamberlain was free to pursue foreign policy as he saw fit, which resulted in a return to conciliation as a way of keeping Italy out of Germany’s sphere of influence. Thus, British foreign policy returned to doing whatever possible to

53 gain Italian friendship, to the detriment of other obligations in Spain such as non-

Intervention.

Summer 1937

As the previous chapter briefly discussed, the British Foreign Office spent the first half of 1937 dealing with the fallout from the failed Gentleman’s Agreement, attempts to reopen Anglo-Italian talks, and the situation in Spain. Anthony Eden was now convinced that Mussolini could not be trusted, however, and was not prepared to discuss another Anglo-Italian agreement unless Mussolini stopped intervening in Spain.72 As far as Eden was concerned, any future settlement with Italy had to be based on Italian goodwill in Spain, especially on the crucial question of “volunteers.”73

Neville Chamberlain took over as Prime Minister on May 17, 1937, which led to a new dynamic between Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Where Baldwin was content to deal with internal affairs and let the Foreign Office have free rein,

Chamberlain wanted to have more of a hand in managing international relations. Anthony

Eden expressed excitement at “working with a Prime Minister who would give his

Foreign Secretary energetic backing.”74 It quickly became clear, however, that the two of them had a very different idea on how to deal with Mussolini. Chamberlain felt that it was worthwhile to make sacrifices, such as backing off the Spanish issue, in order to secure Mussolini’s goodwill. Eden, on the other hand, did not think it was possible to

72 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 60. 73 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 60. 74 The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 445.

54 gain Mussolini’s friendship, and did not think it worth having in any case.75 The difference in opinion between the two would only grow more pronounced as 1937 progressed and the prospect of renewed Anglo-Italian discussions loomed.

At the forefront of the Foreign Secretary’s mind during the first half of 1937 were the withdrawal of volunteers from Spain and the implementation of a patrol scheme. The patrol scheme, addressed in the previous chapter, had failed by May. On June 29, the

British proposed a plan to withdraw an equal number of volunteer troops from both sides in the Spanish Civil War. Both Germany and Italy pressed for belligerent rights to be granted to the Nationalists, something Eden refused to do unless sufficient progress was made with the withdrawal of volunteers. The issue reached a deadlock in the Non-

Intervention Committee. Germany and Italy, of which Italy was the more stubborn, insisted on the granting of belligerent rights before any withdrawals occurred.76 Despite the considerable amount of effort put into this plan by Eden, little progress was made.77

In July, the possibility of Anglo-Italian talks was again raised. Dino Grandi, the

Italian ambassador in Britain, was given a letter by Mussolini that expressed the Duce’s wish for Anglo-Italian friendship. As Grandi recalled:

First of all, the Duce wished to convey to me that he had no ambitions, either politically or territorially, in Spain…He went on to say that he regretted very much the continuance of bad feelings between the two countries. He regarded the Agreement of last January as a beginning, but only a beginning, of better relations and he was desirous of filling in the framework.78

75 RAC Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1993), 95. 76 W.M. Laird Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering: A Study of British Policy during the Spanish Civil War (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 61. 77 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 58. 78 As translated by Dino Grandi and recorded by Neville Chamberlain, W.N. Medlicott and Douglas Dakin, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 64, pg. 188.

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The letter was shown solely to Chamberlain, who reciprocated the sentiments expressed by the letter and sent a reply back to Mussolini: “Since I became Prime

Minister I have been distressed to find that the relations between Italy and Great Britain are still far from that old feeling of mutual confidence and affection which lasted so many years.” 79 Chamberlain and Grandi met twice on July 27 with Eden’s knowledge, but not his presence.80 Chamberlain also refused to show Eden the letters he had written, as he had the feeling Eden would object to it.81 Despite Eden’s distrust of Mussolini, he made no complaint when the Foreign Office authorized Eric Drummond, the British ambassador to Italy, to tell the Italian government that Britain was open to conversation in September with the goal of friendship.82

Mussolini became more vocal about his desire to see Britain give de jure recognition to his conquest of Ethiopia. Drummond pointed out that “the essential condition for any successful negotiations with Italian Government for a general détente is recognition on our side of Italian sovereignty over Abyssinia. Unless we are prepared to grant such recognition conversations are bound to result in failure.”83 Eden found this to suggestion to be a “distasteful thing”, and worried that such an unequal move— exchanging recognition of Ethiopia for vague promises from Italy—could be mistaken for feebleness.84

The quest to stop intervention in Spain and attain better relations was temporarily halted in August with an attack on merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. On August 6,

79 DBFP Volume 19, Series 2, No. 65, pg. 120. 80 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 63. 81 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 63. 82 Pamela A.M Van der Esch, Prelude to War: The International Repercussions of the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1951), 95. 83 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 87, pg. 152. 84 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 448-449

56 three merchant ships were attacked off the Algerian coast, while a week later eight more vessels were torpedoed. By the end of the month, thirteen more merchant ships had been attacked, including six British vessels. While the attacks started off targeting Spanish shipping, by the end of August many of the victims were British. These submarine attacks on merchant shipping were described as “piracy”, though the British Royal Navy had broken Italian naval codes and were aware they were actually Italian.85 The diplomacy of conciliation prevented the Italians from being explicitly mentioned, though the press in Britain did hint at the true identity of the submarines.86

Through the course of August, many warnings were sent to the Italians regarding the submarine attacks. On August 10th, for example, the tanker British Corporal was attacked by aircraft. Two days later Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the Italian Chargé d’Affaires Signor Crolla “in a friendly and informal manner that His Majesty’s Government were satisfied that the attack on the

British Corporal had been carried out by aeroplanes based on Palma. He added that there was a tendency in press and other circles to reason that the aeroplanes were therefore quite possibly Italian.”87 He added that, in light of the submarine attacks, it was becoming increasingly difficult to “dissuade the press from publishing reports to the effect that

Italian submarines etc. are responsible for or have connived at some of the attacks in question….”88

85 Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994),144. 86 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 462. 87 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 99, pg. 186. 88 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 99, pg.186.

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The same message was passed on by British diplomat Edward Ingram to Count

Ciano in Italy a week later, with the added sentiment that “His Majesty’s Government were sincere in their desire that nothing should disturb the present atmosphere which was so favourable to the forthcoming Anglo-Italian negotiations. They were therefore all the more anxious that no further incident should occur in the Mediterranean which might be attributed by mischief-makers to supposedly Italian activities.”89 Count Ciano appreciated the message, and “cordially agreed that the last thing to be desired was that anything should disturb the present atmosphere.”90 Ciano brushed off the implications that both the attack on the British Corporal and the submarine attacks were Italian in origin, however, instead putting the blame on the Spanish Government.91

The British Admiralty had no desire to retaliate against the recent submarine attacks. When the attacks first began, the Admiralty instead wanted to opt out of the matter completely and just award belligerent rights to both the Republicans and the

Nationalists.92 In a meeting of Ministers held on August 17 to discuss both the attacks and possible courses of action, Eden came away with a victory over the Admiralty. The meeting resulted in a firm and public warning regarding the recent Mediterranean attacks:

“H.M. Government has issued warning through press that if a British merchant ship is attacked by submarine without warning, H.M Ships are authorised to counter attack.”93

This warning failed to prevent attacks, however, and another solution had to be found.

89 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 100, pg. 187. 90 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 100, pg. 187. 91 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 199, pg. 187. 92 Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1979), 119. 93 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 96, pg. 184.

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The Nyon Conference

The genesis of the Nyon Conference came from a French suggestion on August

28th to summon the Mediterranean powers in order to publicly chastise Italy, either in front of the League of Nations or the Non-Intervention Committee.94 Eden disagreed with the proposal to bring Italy before the Non-Intervention Committee, as “the question of security on the high seas is one which transcends any question arising out of the Spanish

Civil War, and it would only confuse the issue to link it up with the problem of non- intervention in Spain.”95 Keeping the issue out of the Non-Intervention Committee also served two other purposes. First, it meant that there was a better chance the Italians would take part in the conference.96 Second, any attempt to bring Italy before the Non-

Intervention Committee would only serve to hasten its demise.97

Eden’s plans to take a firm stance against Italy were limited, however, by the objections of his Prime Minister. To Chamberlain, it was important to solve the issue of attacks on merchant shipping in the Mediterranean without threatening Italy with an

Anglo-French front.98 Eden also had to fight to convince both the Admiralty and other members of the British Government that it was necessary to finally confront Italy. Many saw it as a waste of time that would accomplish nothing.99

Finally, Eden found the ammunition he needed to convince the Admiralty and the

Cabinet of the need to stand firm against Italy. His argument was helped by two events.

First, on August 27th Mussolini publicly congratulated Franco and his troops on having

94 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 459 95 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.133, pg. 242. 96 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.133, pg. 242. 97 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 120. 98 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 6. 99 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 6.

59 captured Santander, a move which boosted Mussolini’s vanity and did not come across as favourable in British eyes.100 The second event was the attack on the British ship Havock by a “pirate” submarine on September 1st, which snapped the British government out of the political apathy it had fallen into.101 A meeting of Ministers was convened for the next day to deal with the situation. During the meeting, it was noted that the attacks on shipping were increasing in number and frequency, and were not limited to just the southeastern coast of Spain.102 Eden managed to convince the Admiralty that the French suggestion provided the best means of protecting British shipping.103

In planning the conference, Eden had four proposals in mind that he hoped the rest of the conference attendees would agree to:

(i) That in view of the piratical acts carried out by submarines in the Mediterranean against the shipping of various countries, the powers concerned shall give instructions to their naval forces to take the action indicated in (ii) and (iii) with a view to the protection of all shipping (ii) That any submarine attacking a merchant ship in a manner contrary to the rules as to the action of submarines with regard to merchant ships contained in the Procès-Verbal signed in London on the 6th November 1936, is to be counter-attacked and, if possible, destroyed. (iii) This instruction extends to any submarine in the vicinity of a position in which a merchant ship has recently been attacker or sunk. (iv) The above instruction will remain in force one month at the end of which the position will be reviewed.

100 William C. Mills, “The Nyon Conference: Neville Chamberlain, Anthony Eden and the Appeasement of Italy,” in The International History Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb. 1993), 12. 101Peter Gretton, “The Nyon Conference: The Naval Aspect,” in The English Historical Review, Vol. 90, No. 354 (Jan. 1975), 105. 102 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 114, pg.212. 103 Willam C. Mills, “The Nyon Conference,” 14.

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When informally polling the opinion of his colleagues, Eden noted that even those who were in favour of placating Mussolini could find no faults with these proposals, regarding them as realistic.104

The location of the conference was a small village in Switzerland called Nyon about fifteen miles from Geneva. This location was chosen as it was close to Geneva, home of the League of Nations, but far enough away that the Italians would not be offended by the location. Italy was estranged from the League of Nations, and holding the conference in Geneva could potentially be insulting to the Italians.105

Italy was invited to take part in the Conference, but the British Foreign Office received worrying reports that Mussolini would reject the invitation after he received a note from the Soviets that openly and formally accused Italy of being behind the attacks.106 It was clear to Eden that, if the Italians did appear at the planned conference after receiving this note, they would face further open accusation.107 He retained hope, however, that the Italians would still attend: “We trust that these reports [that the Italians would reject the invitation to the Nyon Conference] are not justified and that Italy will not allow herself to be influenced by accusations from any quarter as to past happenings.”108 Eden felt that a successful outcome at this conference would be a good prelude for the upcoming Anglo-Italian conversations.109 The Italians, along with the

Germans, declined to attend the conference, however.

104 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 463. 105 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, The Policy of Simmering, 65. 106 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 128, pg. 239. 107 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 123. 108 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.130, pg. 240. 109 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 462.

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The Nyon Conference itself went smoothly and quickly, lasting only three days, despite the absence of Germany and Italy. All of the attendees came into the Conference with a good idea of what they wanted the outcome to be.110 By midnight on September

11th, only slightly more than 24 hours after the first meeting of the Nyon Conference, all attendees were in full agreement as to a plan of action.111 Essentially, the participants agreed to determine fixed routes to be followed by all merchant ships, with each route patrolled by destroyers and aircraft. In this way, any pirate submarine attack could be followed by quick retaliation.112 By the final session of the conference, held September

14th, the attendees were satisfied with the progress. The new arrangements would come into force on September 20th.113

The Mediterranean Agreement that came about as a result of this conference split the Mediterranean into six zones, to be patrolled mostly by the British and French. The

French and British forces carrying out the arrangement would also be allowed to visit each other’s ports and fly over and land on each other’s territory without previous notice or diplomatic authorization.114 Patrols in the Aegean Sea were split between Russia and

Turkey in the north, and Greece and Yugoslavia in the south. At the request of

Chamberlain, the Tyrhennian Sea was left to the Italians in case they decided to join in on the agreement. Eden did not expect Italy, if it wanted in on the agreement, to accept the offer outright, but it could be used to form the basis of bargaining.115 As Eden pointed out to Chamberlain in a letter after the Conference adjourned, “the Italian government has

110 A final list of attendees at the conference included Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Bulgaria and Romania. 111 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 467. 112 Gretton, “The Nyon Conference,” 108. 113 Gretton, “The Nyon Conferene,” 108. 114 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 169, pg. 300. 115 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 467

62 been kept in touch and has been treated with more courtesy than any other Power which refused to attend a conference in similar circumstance.”116

Eden saw the Nyon Conference as a complete success: “We have reached our agreement rapidly. The proposals accepted by every Power at the Conference should be effective in putting a stop to piracy in the Mediterranean. We have reserved an area for

Italy which you will remember was not contemplated under the original scheme B before the Cabinet…”117 As well, it had brought the Italians to heel without isolating them. The

Nyon Conference, contrary to the fears of many members of British Government, had not been anti-fascist in its nature.118 It instead managed to avoid creating an Anglo-French-

Soviet bloc brought together on an ideological basis. So pleased with the outcome of the

Nyon Conference was Eden that, in a moment of elation, he declared he would eat his hat if there was another pirate attack in the Mediterranean.119

Eden did note one “fly in all this ointment” during the Nyon Conference: the

Italian attitude towards the conference itself. He had entertained some hopes that the

Italians would cooperate with the rest of the conference attendees, but realized that “Italy never wanted this scheme to succeed, partly no doubt because of her plans in Spain, partly also on account of national pride.”120 He also realized the possibility that the Italian reaction to the conference could be violent, but nevertheless believed Britain had to

“stand firmly and quietly by our decision. This is an issue upon which he have, I am convinced, support of all public opinion and the Dominion….So far as Mussolini himself

116 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 124. 117 Foreign Office 954/2 Letter from Anthony Eden to Neville Chamberlain, September 14th, 1937, hereafter referred to as FO 954/2. 118 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, 60. 119 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 469 120 FO 954/2.

63 is concerned, though he may be very angry for a while, he is likely to respect us all the more in the end.”121

Italian reaction to the agreement made at the Nyon Conference was not favourable, though it was not “outwardly, at least, explosive.”122 The Italian Government expressed its dissatisfaction with the portion set aside for them should they decide to take part in the agreement: “The situation which would result for Italy appears inacceptable.

Her vital interests in the Mediterranean and the fact that it is along her lines of communications that greatest traffic runs make it necessary that Italy should have conditions of absolute equality with any other Power in any zone of the

Mediterranean.”123 Mussolini refused to even consider signing on to the agreement unless

Italy was guaranteed parity in the agreement.124 Edward Ingram expressed concern that the Nyon Conference had snubbed Italy over her prestige as a Mediterranean Power and driven her further into the German camp.125 Ingram suggested that the British

Government meet Mussolini halfway over the Nyon scheme, as doing so could prevent him from irrevocably tying himself up with Hitler and make possible the future initiation of Anglo-Italian conversation.126

Shortly after the Nyon Conference ended, the Italians decided they did want to take part in the patrol scheme, but objected to the area that had been set aside for them, as

Eden had previously guessed. One of the main clauses the Italians had a problem with read:

121 FO 954/2. 122 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.170, pg. 301. 123 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.165, pg. 292. 124 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.177, pg. 309. 125 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.179, pg. 310. 126 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No.179, pg. 311.

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The other participating Governments possessing a sea border on the Mediterranean undertake within the limit of their resources to furnish these fleets (i.e. the British and French) any assistance that may be asked for, in particular that they will permit them to take action in their territorial waters and to use such of their ports as they shall indicate.

France and the Balkan states were adamant that the above clause not apply to Italy should they adhere to the Mediterranean Agreement. These countries did not wish to allow Italy access to their ports.127 The concessions the British made to ensure Italy signed on to the agreement negated the firm stance Eden had been hoping to take against

Italy and were a substantial deviation from the original agreement.128 On September 29th, the initial agreement was amended to bring in the Italians. In essence, the changes to the agreement now meant that, since Italy was denied access to foreign territorial waters, the

French and British would waive their access as well.129

The Nyon Conference demonstrated a deviation from the placating turn British foreign policy towards Italy had taken at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. It was the one instance in the three year period of the Spanish Civil War where Britain took firm action against an aggressive power. The results of the Conference, however, were rather limited. Italian submarine attacks had ceased on September 4th, weeks before the Nyon

Conference itself began.130 Shortly after the Mediterranean Agreement was signed,

Franco received two more submarines from Italy. The British again compromised their firm stance when they changed the terms of the agreement to allow Italy to sign on.

127 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 125. 128 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 125. 129 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 125. 130 While the British had broken the Italian naval code, it is not clear whether or not Eden actually knew the Italians had called off the submarine attacks prior to the start of the conference. (Mills, “The Nyon Conference,” 16.)

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Finally, the submarine attacks started up again in January 1938.131 Despite these problems, the Nyon Conference was hailed as a success, and Eden hoped British policy could continue in this vein. His desires to continue standing firm against Italy would come up against Chamberlain’s wishes to placate Italy, however, resulting in a large difference of opinion between the two.

Eden Resigns

Although the Nyon Conference was seen as a success by Eden, Chamberlain was of a different opinion. He believed that the conference had been too hard on Italy, and that any other moves of that nature could jeopardize Britain’s relationship with Italy. He also did not believe that Britain should risk losing the friendship of Italy over events in

Spain. He was anxious to reach a settlement on outstanding issues between Britain and

Italy, and regarded the Spanish issue as a major obstacle to this achievement.132

Both Eden and Chamberlain agreed that it was important to separate Italy and

Germany, but “where the former was prepared to stalk his prey cautiously, the latter knew no such subtlety.”133 Eden was spurred into action by the French threat to re-open their borders to Spain following rumours that Italy was sending still more troops to Spain.

Such an action would essentially mean a declaration of withdrawal from the Non-

Intervention agreement.134 To uphold non-intervention, Britain and France agreed to begin talks for a tri-partite conversation with Italy. On October 2nd, the two countries sent a note to Italy, stating their wish to build off the success of Nyon. The two countries

131 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 126. 132 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 129. 133 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 128. 134 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 216, pg. 361.

66 wanted to improve the international situation with Italy through an agreement over Spain.

Eden too sent a note, indicating the British would see these tri-partite talks as a prelude to

Anglo-Italian talks. He wanted to continue standing firm against the Italians, and intended to include the French threat to reopen their border in his note. Thanks to

Chamberlain’s intervention, however, the note he ended up sending to the Italians was much milder than originally intended. It deleted all mention of the French threat to open their border, and did not reference any reminders of previous Italian assurances that no

Italian troops would be left in Spain or the Balearics after the hostilities had ceased.135

Mussolini’s reply to this note indicated Italy would not be interested in talks without first consulting Germany.136

Mussolini was slow in answering the formal note sent by Britain and France. On

October 9th, he finally responded by saying Italy would not agree to talks without including Germany, and that any attempt to deal with problems in Spain outside of the

Non-Intervention Committee would merely add to misunderstandings.137 Italy’s insistence that any talks about Spain take place in the Non-Intervention Committee led to the tri-partite talks being scrapped, as the USSR and France would object to Germany being involved.138

Neville Chamberlain opened lines of communication with Mussolini in December

1937 through his sister-in-law, Lady Ivy Chamberlain, who was a good friend to

Mussolini. She held informal conversations with both Count Ciano and Mussolini, and communicated back to her brother-in-law that Mussolini desired improved relations

135 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 157. 136 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 158. 137 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 159. 138 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 233, pg. 381.

67 between the two countries. Lady Chamberlain also wrote to Eden to inform him of

Mussolini’s stance: “I came away with the impression that he really wants an understanding and does not realise why conversations have not commenced.”139 On

December 23, 1937, the Italian Embassy sent a note to Eden discussing the possibility of

Anglo-Italian talks: “The Italian Government are still of the opinion that the problem of the relations between Italy and Great Britain should be approached and solved in its entirety and not partially.”140 It was felt by many in the British Foreign Office that this note had been sent as a result of Lady Chamberlain’s informal discussions with

Mussolini, and that refusing to open discussions for any reason would lead to Mussolini coming to the conclusion that “we [Britain] do not wish for an understanding with him and that we are waiting till we are sufficiently re-armed for our ‘revenge’…he will frame his future policy accordingly.”141

In January and February of 1938, a plethora of notes were sent around the Foreign

Office and to the British Ambassador in Italy discussing the possibility of Anglo-Italian talks. Eden held firm to his view that de jure recognition of the Ethiopian conquest should not be granted to the Italians until they had honoured their Non-Intervention commitments.142 He also believed that Anglo-Italian talks had to include discussion on

Italy’s intentions in Spain. On February 10th, Grandi announced that Italy was ready for formal discussions with Britain to resolve their differences. Eden was lukewarm to the idea and delayed in responding.143

139 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 392, pg. 677. 140 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 402, pg. 698. 141 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 403, pg. 698. 142 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 108. 143 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 110.

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Anglo-Italian conversations were hastened along by the threat of Austria falling under Nazi control. The Italians saw there had to be conclusions to Anglo-Italian talks before this event, otherwise the Germans would interpret an Anglo-Italian agreement as a hostile move. The rest of the world, on the other hand, would interpret the move as the

Italians begging for British friendship under German pressure.144 On February 17, Ciano wrote to Grandi “instructing him to urge earnestly on you [Eden] that an early start should be made with Anglo-Italian conversations in view of possibility of certain future happenings.”145 Despite the threat of Anschluss, Eden was still reluctant to open up conversations with Italy: “It would be humiliating for us to be talking there [Rome] when

Hitler marched into Vienna, and while Mussolini was reinforcing his troops in Spain and asking for recognition of his Abyssinian empire.”146 However, a meeting with Grandi went ahead in spite of the Foreign Secretary’s distaste for the idea.

The meeting between Chamberlain, Eden and Grandi on February 19th turned out to be the breaking point between Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary. According to

Grandi’s report to Ciano following the meeting, Chamberlain and Eden acted like “two cocks in true fighting posture” during the meeting.147 Grandi insisted that the Anglo-

Italian conversations start immediately, while Eden maintained the two countries needed to settle the situation in Spain first.148 Eden described Grandi’s “remarkable” account of

Anglo-Italian relations since the Stresa Front, wherein it appeared all the faults lay with the British.149 When questioned about Italy’s plans for Spain, Grandi “maintained that it

144 See Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers as referenced in the second editor’s note of DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 538, pg. 912. 145 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 538, pg. 912. 146 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 579. 147 Alpert, A New International History, 153. 148 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 145. 149 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 580.

69 would be a mistake to hold up progress in Anglo-Italian conversations over a matter which involved others,” a statement that did not sit well with Eden.150 Grandi also refused to comment on whether or not Mussolini was prepared to withdraw their volunteers from

Spain. The fact that the split between Eden and Chamberlain became so pronounced during this meeting was due to Grandi’s skill as a diplomat. Anything Grandi said was used by Chamberlain as ammunition against Eden, resulting in the isolation of the

Foreign Secretary.

Chamberlain and Eden met after the meeting with Grandi to hash out their issues privately. Chamberlain wanted to open conversations with Italy immediately, while Eden pointed out the conversation had made little progress on the Spanish problem. Eden was unable to agree to the course of action proposed by Chamberlain and asked instead for a

Cabinet meeting to decide whether or not the conversations should be opened.151 The

Cabinet meeting did not help matters. No suitable compromise could be found that pleased Eden, and he formally resigned on February 20th much to the surprise of his colleagues.152 He was replaced by Lord Halifax five days later.

The resignation of Eden meant that there was no chance of a firm policy concerning Italy.153 Lord Halifax, Eden’s successor, was much more apt to agree with

Neville Chamberlain’s belief that Britain could not take an overly firm stance with Italy.

As a result, their main policy fell back to conciliation.

150 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 582. 151 Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 582. 152 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 114. 153 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 146.

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The Easter Agreement

The diplomatic pattern established pre-Nyon Conference returned following the resignation of Anthony Eden. Both Lord Halifax and Chamberlain agreed that good relations needed to be re-established with Italy, and on March 8th conversations with the

Italian government officially began. Lord Halifax sent Eric Drummond a list of topics to include in discussions with the Italian government. First and foremost was the problem of

Spain. Drummond was told to assure Count Ciano that the Non-intervention Committee would continue to deal with the tasks allotted to it, but added a caveat: “If, however, owing to Italian action things do not go well in that committee, the British Ambassador in

Rome should be instructed in any particular case to draw the attention of Count Ciano to the difficulties and ask for his help in solving them.”154 Drummond was also instructed to obtain a reaffirmation of the Mediterranean Agreement of January 2nd, 1937, though

Count Ciano had already expressed willingness to agree to this.155 The talks for the agreement fell into a pattern Eden had feared, where Britain was giving more than taking.

Britain conceded major points, like the recognition of Abyssinia, in exchange for vague promises from Mussolini about the withdrawal of volunteers.

On April 16th, the Anglo-Italian Agreement was signed by Count Ciano and Eric

Drummond. It consisted of a series of eight separate and self-contained instruments that dealt with a range of Anglo-Italian problems, including an Italian promise to cease anti-

British propaganda and reaffirm territorial boundaries in the Middle East. Most importantly, it re-affirmed the agreement of January 2, 1937.156

154 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 620, pg. 1002. 155 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 620, pg. 1002. 156 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 662, 1086.

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Although the agreement had been signed, the British government refused to ratify it, or give de jure recognition to the conquest of Ethiopia, until the Italians had withdrawn a substantial number of volunteers from Spain.157 This provision had been determined beforehand by Lord Halifax while planning the agreement:

The present intention is that the agreement, while containing no specific reference either to the question of withdrawal of volunteers from Spain or to recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, should include a provision that it would not come into effect until a date to be determined by the two governments in consultation. Our intention would be that this date should not actually be determined until such time as we were satisfied that sufficient progress had been made in the settlement of the Spanish problem.158

As a result of this provision, the Agreement sat dormant for almost seven months.

The provision within this agreement reflects the stance taken by Eden while he was still

Foreign Secretary. However, the provisions represented a move Eden had thought the

Italians should make prior to the signing of any agreements. During the intervening months, Britain tried to hold firm to this provision even as the Italians complained it was badly damaging Anglo-Italian relations.159 It was not until November 1938, when the

Italians withdrew “half” of their forces (amounting to about ten thousand men) from

Spain, that the agreement was properly ratified.160 The withdrawal, token though it was, was deemed enough to fulfill the requirements of the agreement, and it was ratified on

November 16th.

157 The British Government had only granted Mussolini de facto recognition of his Ethiopian conquest— that is, they only tentatively recognized that Italy exercised control over Ethiopia. Mussolini wanted the British government to grant him de jure recognition, which would accredit him as “King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.” (E.L Woodward and Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Volume 3, Series 3, No. 355, pg. 341) 158 DBFP, Volume 19, Series 2, No. 645, pg. 1070. 159 Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Policy of Simmering, 128. 160 E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, Volume 3, series 3, No. 331, pg. 322.

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Although the Italians had supposedly withdrawn half their troops, many still remained on Spanish soil and were being supplied daily, and the withdrawal had not included artillery.161 The Easter Agreement was yet another example of Britain accepting

Mussolini’s promise to withdraw troops, only to have him simultaneously break said promise.162 Mussolini’s assurances had proven enough for Chamberlain, however, even if they had again been lies. In November and December of 1938, Mussolini sent more troops and planes to Franco to help him with his final attacks.163

The ratification of the Easter Agreement in November gave Mussolini all he needed from Britain. Britain now recognized his conquest of Ethiopia, something he had been pushing for since 1936, and had stopped insisting all Italian troops be withdrawn from Spain. Chamberlain, in fact, insisted that since the Spanish Civil War was no longer threatening international peace, the Spanish problem was solved.164 Italian troops remained in Spain even after the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939, just as Mussolini had always intended.165 Despite Chamberlain’s best efforts, Britain still lost Mussolini to

Germany as 1938 wore on and Hitler became more aggressive on the international stage.

Conclusion

Following the failure of the Gentleman’s Agreement in early 1937, the British

Foreign Office focused its attention on achieving the withdrawal of volunteers from

Spain, while attempting to deal with the diplomatic fallout of the Gentleman’s

161 DBFP, Volume 3, Series 3, No. 500, pg. 520. 162 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 153. 163 Van der Esch, Prelude to War, 154. 164 Van der Esch, 153. 165 Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 180.

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Agreement. Baldwin’s resignation as Prime Minister led to his replacement by Neville

Chamberlain, a Prime Minister who was eager to be much more involved with foreign policy and international relations. However, Chamberlain and Eden harboured different ideas as to what should be done about Italy. Eden, distrustful of Mussolini following the

Gentleman’s Agreement, held fast to the notion that Britain needed to take a firmer stance against Italy and give up nothing until Mussolini held up his end of any deals.

Chamberlain still believed there was a chance of separating Mussolini from Hitler, and did not think it was worth losing Italy over problems in Spain.

The Nyon Conference represented the one instance during the Spanish Civil War where Britain took firm action against Italy, something it had failed to do since the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936. While the results of the Conference were rather limited in their scope, given that the “pirate” attacks ceased before the conference began and started up again after the Conference was resolved, the Nyon Conference nevertheless demonstrated what could have been if British foreign policy had been less geared towards the conciliation of Mussolini during the Spanish Civil War. The

Conference was considered a success.

The Nyon Conference also affected the dynamic between Anthony Eden and

Neville Chamberlain. Where Chamberlain believed the best course of action was to reconcile with Italy and avoid any tough actions, and that Spain was not a worthwhile cause to lose Italian friendship over, Eden remained convinced that the British had to start taking a firm stance against them, especially in Spain. While the Nyon Conference was a personal triumph for Eden, Chamberlain worried for the effect it would have on

Anglo-Italian relations. The divide between Eden and Chamberlain grew to be so large

74 that, by February 1938, no compromise could be reached. Eden resigned, and

Chamberlain was free to pursue relations with Italy as he saw fit. This resulted in the

Easter Agreement of April 16th, which saw Britain recognize the conquest of Ethiopia for very little in return. The Easter Agreement did not positively affect Anglo-Italian relations for long, as soon Mussolini planted himself firmly in Hitler’s camp as Hitler became more aggressive. German aggression would quickly overshadow other international problems.

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Conclusion

The Ethiopian Crisis of 1935 marked a turning point in Anglo-Italian relations.

Britain and Italy had enjoyed a relatively good relationship prior to Italian aggression in

Ethiopia. Following the crisis, the British were eager to repair their relations with Italy, as in the early 1930s British policy makers had been increasingly alarmed by the emergence of the so-called triple threat of Japan, Italy and Germany. Italy appeared to be the easiest country to placate, and as a result British foreign policy towards Italy became steadily more conciliatory. This policy manifested especially during the Spanish Civil War.

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936 added yet another international problem for the British to deal with, one which greatly pre-occupied British policy makers. The hope in the British Foreign Office was that the belligerent parties in

Spain would be left alone to sort out their problems, a hope that quickly proved to be unfounded. Italy found common ideological cause with the Spanish Nationalists, and almost immediately began sending both troops and weaponry to support their cause.

Italian actions proved worrying for the British Foreign Office. Gibraltar guarded

Britain’s access to the Mediterranean and was therefore a crucial factor in British military strategy. Spanish goodwill was essential to the security of Gibraltar. The British hoped that by preventing foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War, they could localize the effects of the war. Britain also wanted to ensure the benevolent neutrality of whichever belligerent party emerged victorious. The Italian intervention in Spain, however, led to concern that the Italians would threaten the British position in the Mediterranean. The

Non-Intervention Committee was one attempt to remove Italian intervention in Spain.

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Despite the pressure put upon the Italians to remove their troops from Spain, however, little was achieved by the Non-Intervention Committee

In the months following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, the British worked to accomplish some sort of agreement with the Italians, especially concerning the

Mediterranean. Their ultimate goal was achieving cordial relations with Italy, separating

Mussolini from Hitler, and retaining British supremacy in the Mediterranean. In January

1937, Italy and Britain signed the so-called Gentleman’s Agreement. The two countries agreed to maintain the territorial status quo of the Mediterranean. The results of this agreement were limited, however, as within days of signing the agreement more Italian troops were sent into Spain.

The Nyon Conference of September 1937 represented the one instance during the

Spanish Civil War that British policy towards Italy attempted something different. The

British now took a stand against the Italians, something they had failed to do since the

Ethiopian Crisis. While the results of the Nyon Conference were rather limited in scope, as the “pirate” submarine attacks that made the conference necessary in the first place ceased before the conference began, the conference nevertheless demonstrated what might have happened if British foreign policy had been less geared towards the conciliation of Mussolini during the Spanish Civil War.

Almost immediately following the Nyon Conference, the British lapsed back into a policy of conciliation. This owed mainly to the growing divide between Anthony Eden and Neville Chamberlain, who had opposing views on how to deal with Italy.

Chamberlain believed strongly in continuing the policy of conciliation, while Eden remained convinced that conciliation had gotten the British nowhere. Eden’s resignation

77 from the post of Foreign Secretary in February 1938 signalled the end of any firm stance being taken against Italy for the remainder of the Spanish Civil War. This is especially evident in the Easter Agreement of April 1938, where the British made several concessions to Mussolini in exchange for vague promises to stop Italian intervention in

Spain. Once again, Mussolini failed to live up to his end of the agreement and more troops were sent to aid the Nationalist cause.

The issues surrounding the Spanish Civil War, including intervention by the

Italians, occupied the British Foreign Office until 1938. As German pressure towards

Austria increased, however, the problems in Spain received less attention from the

British. Instead, it became increasingly important for the British to focus on Germany.

Ultimately, the conciliatory policy the British had pursued during the Spanish Civil War proved futile, as German-Italian friendship was solidified despite Britain’s best efforts.

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