DOCSLIB.ORG

Ebook Download Spetsnaz: the Inside Story of the Soviet Special

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ebook Download Spetsnaz: the Inside Story of the Soviet Special SPETSNAZ: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SOVIET SPECIAL FORCES PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Viktor Suvorov | 232 pages | 30 Sep 1988 | W. W. Norton & Company | 9780393335576 | English | United States Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces PDF Book Nevertheless, there were some rumors that such group does indeed exist and is assigned to execute very specific special operations abroad primarily for protection of Russian embassy personnel and internal investigations. A man can reach any heights in life in any sphere of activity. From that moment Kuusinen's career was closely linked with Soviet military intelligence officers. Only then would they set about him, usually at night. Moreover, in his speech at the 18th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party Stalin had had this to say about Britain and France; In their policy of nonintervention can be detected an attempt and a desire not to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty work Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2 ed. The Kremlin had been informed of the kidnapping of four Soviet diplomats by the militant group, the Islamic Liberation Organization a radical offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. The high point in the partisan war against Germany consisted of two operations carried out in But without a common frontier Stalin could not get into Europe. The hostage-takers were the Riyadus-Salikhin Battalion , sent by the Chechen terrorist warlord Shamil Basayev, who demanded recognition of the independence of Chechnya at the United Nations and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. Community Reviews. He could knock a man's teeth out. Kohati aga A tense standoff ensued, until the commanding officers of the unit managed to bluff the Japanese forces into surrendering. Content protection. The average training period for a TsSN officer is about five years. At the same time the partisans would be constantly attacking him in the rear. And the cubs' first victim is their weaker brother. This book was at once horrifying and thought provoking. The beginning was very good but somewhere in the middle this book lost its mojo. The lack of a common frontier was at the time a serious obstacle to the penetration into Germany of substantial forces of Soviet subversives. That night all the young recruits would get beaten. As an athletic skill the long jump without a run is the most reliable indication of the strength of a person's legs. The second generation of Spaniards is used by the Soviet Government in many ways for operations abroad. But spetsnaz is not idle in peacetime either. As a result of spetsnaz work the partisan movement had been taught the latest methods of warfare and the most advanced techniques of sabotage. In Georgy Zhukov advocated the creation of 46 military spetsnaz companies, each consisting of servicemen. Zolnierzy specnazu uczy sie zabijac. The soldier grasps it not with his head, but with his feet, his shoulders and his sweat. Joseph rated it really liked it May 18, On both occasions the sentence was commuted to deportation, from which he had no great difficulty in escaping. Za czasow zimnej wojny rezerwisci specnazu, juz po przeszkoleniu i przejsciu do rezerwy czesto podejmowali prace w aeroflocie, w klubach sportowych itd. The event led to security and political repercussions in Russia; in the aftermath of the crisis, there has been an increase in Ingush - Ossetian ethnic hostility, while contributing to a series of federal government reforms consolidating power in the Kremlin and strengthening of the powers of the President of Russia. The Washington Post. Hitler guessed rightly what Stalin's plans were, as is apparent from his letter to Mussolini of 21 June Two years in a penal battalion and then the month in spetsnaz that he had not completed. Just imagine a cold day most of the days in Russia are cold , you are in a new place and getting trained by hard men who have institutionalized brutality. A man like that will kill anyone who gets in his path. They had been formed up into a provisional group and been put through a month's course for young soldiers which every one of them would remember all his life in his worst nightmare. Outlying areas could be dealt with later one at a time. Jednak mysle, ze nikomu nie trzeba mydlic oczu. His [Crabb's] task was to measure the cruiser's propeller and to discover how the ship managed to travel at twice the speed originally estimated by British naval intelligence. The men slept in two-tier metal bunks. Archived from the original on 13 October Sometimes he will chase his prey for days, reducing it to a state of exhaustion. At the end of the s the spetsnaz record in this exercise, which has not been recognised by the official sports authorities, was 3 metres 51 centimetres. Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces Writer Even among the stariki not everyone is not on the same level: they also have their various levels of seniority. From there it gets wider and wider. Then they saw that The Demon had survived and they continued to beat him. But that had been before the Red Army had started to advance at great speed. Finally a soldier is taught to throw the spade as accurately as he would use a sword or a battle-axe. But therein lies Soviet strategy: to remain neutral until such time as the enemy exhausts himself in battle against someone else, and then to strike a sudden blow. On both occasions the sentence was commuted to deportation, from which he had no great difficulty in escaping. It was a secret school and operated under the disguise of a parachute club, while being completely under the control of the Razvedupr GRU. It was a magnificent defence system. For example: he can do 40 press-ups. I found it to be a well-written book, full both of information useful for th Viktor Suvorov's book on the Spetsnaz is a bit dated--he defected from the Soviet Union in and wrote the book a few years later--but judging from recent instances of Spetsnaz in the news, not much has changed. Before letting them back into their mud-covered, sodden tent at the end of the day each sergeant had time to show his platoon the extent of his authority. Archived from the original on 4 April Their most famous operation, Operation Storm , was executed on 27 December which saw Soviet special forces storming the Tajbeg Palace in Afghanistan and killing Afghan President Hafizullah Amin , his son and over of his personal guards in 40 minutes. To do that he places his hand on the stump of a tree with the fingers spread out and takes a big swing at the stump with his right hand using the edge of the spade. They are good at that. Thomas More describes only one of the strategems employed, but it is the most important:. Flag as inappropriate. Main article: Operation Storm In these clubs had parachute towers from which members made up to half a million jumps, adding to their experience by jumps from planes and balloons. If he is not ordered to advance, he digs in deeper and deeper. Suworow opisuje pewna anegdote na temat tego jacy sa zolnierze specnazu. They had been formed up into a provisional group and been put through a month's course for young soldiers which every one of them would remember all his life in his worst nightmare. A conflict may begin with a sudden, treacherous attack by one man on another. Such a group would suddenly land on an airfield close to an important Japanese headquarters. The second generation of Spaniards is used by the Soviet Government in many ways for operations abroad. Archived from the original on 13 October The spetsnaz Soviet special forces are one of the more shadowy and ruthless secret special forces in the world. Russian Defense Policy. While he was falling The Otter struck another one in the teeth. Armia potrzebuje miec swoj wywiad a w ramach wywiadu potrzebuje silne oddzialy specjalne przeznaczone do dzialalnosci terrorystycznej tego slowa uzywa Suworow dywersyjnej, rozpoznawczej. Two gangsters in the Guy Ritchie film RocknRolla have a 'scar competition' in which they show healed wounds and describe how they occurred from injuries they incurred whilst on several Spetsnaz operations. Paralysis at the centre meant that counteraction on the outskirts was split up. Among the various ways of finding leaders a very effective one is the fight with whips. A battle reported as having been fought between the Pakistanis and Soviet troops took place in Kunar Province in March Wikimedia Commons. It is bloody cold is all i can say. A notable member of these genuinely voluntary units was Boris Bazhanov, formerly Stalin's personal secretary, who had fled to the West. It was a partisan war in spirit and in content. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. During the Civil War he commanded an army and a number of fronts. But he was like a sprung steel plate. Once he has completed his two years' service in spetsnaz a soldier has three choices. Six months later they offered him a place at the very top. On the occasion of the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution the working masses were to come out on the streets for mass demonstrations. Spetsnaz: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces Reviews Two spade lengths are a metre. It is interesting to note that such groups were formed even before the Red Army existed, before the Red Guard, and even before the Revolution.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. targeted organizations and senior leadership both Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these institutionally and politically. agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have become integral to the security and stability of the Russian Law Enforcement and Internal government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Security Agencies and Heads now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in (as of September 2020) the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the x Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition x Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. x Interior Troops (VV) sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. x Kadyrovtsy Overview and Context Federal Security Service (FSB): Alexander Bortnikov
    [Show full text]
  • Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam As a Tool of the Kremlin?
    Notes de l’Ifri Russie.Nei.Visions 99 Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin? Marlène LARUELLE March 2017 Russia/NIS Center The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the few French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European and broader international debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. This text is published with the support of DGRIS (Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy) under “Observatoire Russie, Europe orientale et Caucase”. ISBN: 978-2-36567-681-6 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2017 How to quote this document: Marlène Laruelle, “Kadyrovism: Hardline Islam as a Tool of the Kremlin?”, Russie.Nei.Visions, No. 99, Ifri, March 2017. Ifri 27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15—FRANCE Tel.: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00—Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Email: [email protected] Ifri-Bruxelles Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 1000—Brussels—BELGIUM Tel.: +32 (0)2 238 51 10—Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email: [email protected] Website: Ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection dedicated to Russia and the other new independent states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan).
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Islamic Diplom
    Russia's Islamic Diplom Russia's Islamic Diplomacy ed. Marlene Laruelle CAP paper no. 220, June 2019 "Islam in Russia, Russia in the Islamic World" Initiative Russia’s Islamic Diplomacy Ed. Marlene Laruelle The Initiative “Islam in Russia, Russia in the Islamic World” is generously funded by the Henry Luce Foundation Cover photo: Talgat Tadjuddin, Chief Mufti of Russia and head of the Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia, meeting with the Armenian Catholicos Karekin II and Mufti Ismail Berdiyev, President of the Karachay-Cherkessia Spiritual Board, Moscow, December 1, 2016. Credit : Artyom Korotayev, TASS/Alamy Live News HAGFW9. Table of Contents Chapter 1. Russia and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation: Conflicting Interactions Grigory Kosach………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5 Chapter 2. Always Looming: The Russian Muslim Factor in Moscow's Relations with Gulf Arab States Mark N. Katz………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 2 1 Chapter 3. Russia and the Islamic Worlds: The Case of Shia Islam Clément Therme ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 25 Chapter 4. A Kadyrovization of Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Autocrats in Track II Diplomacy and Other Humanitarian Activities Jean-Francois Ratelle……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3 1 Chapter 5. Tatarstan's Paradiplomacy with the Islamic World Guzel Yusupova……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3 7 Chapter 6. Russian Islamic Religious Authorities and Their Activities at the Regional, National, and International Levels Denis Sokolov………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 41 Chapter 7. The Economics of the Hajj: The Case of Tatarstan Azat Akhunov…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..4 7 Chapter 8. The Effect of the Pilgrimage to Mecca on the Socio-Political Views of Muslims in Russia’s North Caucasus Mikhail Alexseev…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5 3 Authors’ Biographies……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5 9 @ 2019 Central Asia Program Chapter 1.
    [Show full text]
  • May 2001 Vol. 13, No. 3 (D) RUSSIA
    May 2001 Vol. 13, No. 3 (D) RUSSIA/CHECHNYA BURYING THE EVIDENCE: THE BOTCHED INVESTIGATION INTO A MASS GRAVE IN CHECHNYA MAP OF DACHNY VILLAGE ....................................................................................3 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................4 Dachny Village .............................................................................................4 The Discovery of the Mass Dumping Ground .....................................................................5 The Recovery and Identification Process .........................................................................6 The Burial of the Unidentified Bodies ...........................................................................7 BACKGROUND ON THE IDENTIFIED BODIES ....................................................................8 Magomed Magomadov, Odes Mitaev, and Said-Rakhman Musaev .....................................................8 Nura Lulueva, Markha Gakaeva, Raisa Gakaeva, and Aset Elbuzdukueva ...............................................9 Rustam Riskhanov, Ramzan Riskhanov, and Tasu Timarov .........................................................10 Islam Tazurkaev ...........................................................................................11 Umatgeri Edilbekov and Magomed Malsagov ....................................................................12 Three Additional Cases Documented By Memorial ................................................................12
    [Show full text]
  • Evolution of Russian Military Force Since 1979 Christopher Chappell
    IJOIS Spring 2017, Volume III Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security Evolution of Russian Military Force Since 1979 Christopher Chappell University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Abstract This paper aims to show the evolution of the Russian military through the wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine. Each conflict provides a lesson in army organization, strategy, and tactics to the Russian military. The section on Afghanistan details the strategy of the Soviet invasion. Rough terrain as well as too much emphasis on holding critical routes drew attention away from creating positive interactions with the local population. Only protecting critical routes allowed the Mujahideen to operate freely and harass Soviet helicopters. The section on Chechnya argues that the Russian military learned that contracted, professional soldiers in conjunction with special forces were more effective than conscripts. The conflict in Georgia broadened warfare to include cyber, economic, and political attacks. The final section about Ukraine argues that through the Gerasimov doctrine, Russia is able to use ambiguity to achieve its foreign policy goals in countries of the former Soviet Union. 1 Evolution of Russian Military Force Since 1979 Chris Chappell Introduction Russia is no stranger to armed conflict—a large amount of their patriotism and cultural identity stems directly from the hard fought battles and eventual victory of World War II. Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz famously said, “War is the continuation of politics by other means,” referring to the point after diplomacy has broken down or perhaps even sidestepped altogether. In a period defined by multinational coalitions and cooperation, Russia has largely remained true to a doctrine of unilateral problem solving that put it at odds with much of the Western world.
    [Show full text]
  • Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare
    November 2019 Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing the Role of Private Military Security Contractors in Russian Proxy Warfare Candace Rondeaux Last edited on November 05, 2019 at 11:41 a.m. EST Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Peter Bergen and It is worth noting that some of the best research Daniel Rothenberg, co-directors of the New America/ produced about the Wagner Group and Russian Arizona State University Future of War project for private military security contractors has been their support throughout the production of this paper. produced by anonymous open source intelligence A deep debt of gratitude is owed to David Sterman researchers, human rights activists and investigative for applying his sharp editorial eye to the text and journalists in Ukraine, Russia, Syria, and elsewhere. sharing his analytical intuition throughout the This paper would not be what it is without their brave research for this report. I also benefited greatly efforts to hold power to account and the extensive Sergey Sukhankin’s research on Russian military advice and help of so many people, many of whom affairs and the Wagner Group and his direct could not be named here due to security concerns. contributions to the historical sections of this report All errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, the covering Moscow’s Cold War strategy in the Middle author’s alone. East elevated the analysis greatly. Navvar Saban’s research on private security contractors and pro- Assad militias likewise helped answer critical questions about Russia’s influence over local proxy forces in Syria. Christopher Miller, Mike Eckel, and many other long-time Russia hands who have spent time living and covering the Kremlin and the conflict in Ukraine were essential sounding boards and critical pillars of support throughout.
    [Show full text]
  • The Use of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War
    Conflict Studies Research Centre B59 The Use Of Russian Airpower In The Second Chechen War Marcel de Haas Contents Introduction 3 Figure 1: Levels of Strategy in the Conflicts in Dagestan & Chechnya (1999-) 3 The Use Of Russian Airpower In Dagestan (August-September 1999) 4 Background & Course Of The Conflict 4 Russian Grand Strategy: Actors & Objectives 4 Russian Military Strategy: Command & Control Structure 5 Russian Operational Level: Organisation Of Airpower 5 Russian Tactical Level: Application Of Airpower 6 Failures 7 Successes 7 Chechen Insurgents: Strategy & Operations 7 Subconclusions 8 Russia 8 The Chechen Insurgents 9 The Second Chechen Conflict (October 1999-Present) 9 Background 9 Course Of The Second Chechen Conflict 9 Russian Grand Strategy: Actors & Objectives 11 Russian Military Strategy: Command & Control Structure 11 Russian Operational Level: Organisation Of Airpower 12 Russian Tactical Level: Application Of Airpower 13 Tasks & Lessons Learned 14 Failures, Problems & Losses 14 Successes 15 Chechen Strategy & Operations 15 Subconclusions 16 Russia 16 Chechen 19 Comparison Of the Use Of Airpower In Both Chechen Conflicts (1994-1996 & 1999-date) 19 Structural Problems 19 Improvements 19 1 The Use Of Russian Airpower In The Second Chechen War Conflict Studies Research Centre ISBN 1-904423-18-3 January 2003 B59 Marcel de Haas Characteristics 20 Russia 20 Chechen 21 Dominants Characteristics 21 Conclusions 22 2 B59 The Use Of Russian Airpower In The Second Chechen War The Use Of Russian Airpower In The Second Chechen War Marcel de Haas Introduction This paper describes part of the second Chechen conflict, which started in autumn 1999. The purpose of this document is not to provide a comprehensive study of this conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Utility of the Russian Spetsnaz
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2016-12 Strategic utility of the Russian Spetsnaz Atay, Abdullah Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/51562 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE RUSSIAN SPETSNAZ by Abdullah Atay December 2016 Thesis Advisor: Hy Rothstein Second Reader: Douglas A. Borer Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2016 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE RUSSIAN SPETSNAZ 6. AUTHOR(S) Abdullah Atay 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress
    Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress November 24, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46616 SUMMARY R46616 Russian Military Intelligence: Background and November 24, 2020 Issues for Congress Andrew S. Bowen Following Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and invasion of eastern Ukraine in Analyst in Russian and 2014, many observers have linked Russia to additional malicious acts abroad. U.S. and European European Affairs officials and analysts have accused Russia of, among other things, interfering in U.S. elections in 2016; attempting a coup in Montenegro in 2016; conducting cyberattacks against the World Anti- Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2016 and 2018, respectively; attempting to assassinate Russian intelligence defector Sergei Skripal in the United Kingdom in 2018; and offering “bounties” to Taliban-linked fighters to attack U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. Implicated in all these activities is Russia’s military intelligence agency, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GU), also known as the GRU. The United States has indicted GRU officers and designated the GRU for sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, cybercrimes, and election interference. The Department of Justice has indicted GRU officers for cyber-related offenses against the World Anti-Doping Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, NotPetya malware attacks in 2017, various cyberattacks against the 2018 Olympics, and interference in the 2016 U.S. elections. The GRU as an agency has been designated for sanctions under Executive Order 13694, as amended, and Section 224 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA; P.L.
    [Show full text]
  • A View from Chechnya : an Assessment of Russian
    Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of Russian Counterinsurgency During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts in Defence and Strategic Studies at Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand. Sean Renaud 2010 Abstract Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the myriad of smaller engagements taking place around the world in conjunction with the global war on terrorism, military academia has increasingly focused study on historical counter-insurgencies. The study of historical counter-insurgency has been very beneficial to the conduct of contemporary counter-insurgency operations. Although lessons can be learned from historical study, any conclusions tend to be subjective and are time, space and country specific. Notwithstanding this, historical case studies of counter-insurgency operations reveal a number of consistent themes. These themes include: the recommended approaches towards the conduct of information, security, hearts and minds, and reconstruction operations, the use of allied indigenous forces, the importance of unity of effort between the various counter-insurgent forces, the correct use of air power, the manipulation of the media, the proper training of counter-insurgent forces, logistics operations, and the importance of morale during counter-insurgencies. In the last two decades Russia has fought two counter-insurgency conflicts in Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies
    September 14, 2020 Russian Law Enforcement and Internal Security Agencies Russia has an extensive internal security system, with of opportunities for enrichment and political advancement. multiple, overlapping, and competitive security agencies Competition frequently leads to arrests and prosecutions, vying for bureaucratic, political, and economic influence. often for real or imagined corruption allegations to undercut Since Vladimir Putin assumed Russia’s leadership, these targeted organizations and senior leadership both agencies have grown in both size and power, and they have institutionally and politically. become integral to the security and stability of the government. If Putin extends his rule beyond 2024, as is Russian Law Enforcement and Internal now legally permissible, these agencies could play a role in Security Agencies and Heads the leadership succession process and affect the ability of a (as of September 2020) transitional regime to quell domestic dissent. For Members of Congress, understanding the numerous internal security Ministry of Interior (MVD): Vladimir Kolokoltsev agencies in Russia could be helpful in assessing the National Guard (Rosgvardiya, FSVNG): Viktor Zolotov prospects of regime stability and dynamics of a transition Special Purpose Mobile Units (OMON) after Putin leaves office. In addition, Russian security Special Rapid Response Detachment (SOBR) agencies and their personnel have been targeted by U.S. sanctions for cyberattacks and human rights abuses. Interior Troops (VV) Kadyrovtsy Overview and
    [Show full text]
  • Spetsnaz: Russian Special Forces Training
    Offered in cooperation with The Systema Group, Inc. Incredible Adventures, the company that offers Covert Ops, Specops and Urban Ops, is proud to present Russian Ops—A Training Adventure with Spetsnaz, the Russian Special Forces. This is as real as it gets. You’ll receive the same elite military training given to members of the Russian Special Forces inside the guarded gates of the facilities where they train. You’ll stay in military-style barracks and tents. If you do spend time in a hotel, it won’t be a five-star. The better physical condition you are in when you arrive, the more you’ll get out of these programs. That said, we’ve taken all the substance of training and removed the psychological and physical stress. You will be strongly encour- aged to opt out of any training you might find excessively difficult to avoid the risk of injury. VITYAZ ANTI-TERROR TRAINING Seven Days - CALL FOR DATES - Balashikha, Russia • Firearms techniques, including one day at • Training in patrol, ambush and counter ambush tech- Spetsnaz training Polygon for firearms training, niques. including Russian pistols, rifles, and machine guns. • Learn wilderness and night survival skills. • Drive light tanks and armored personnel carriers. • Conditioning exercises and strength training. • Learn psychology of terrorists and assailants. • Training may last up to 10 hours per day. • Training and execution of hostage and wounded per- sonnel rescue. Cost: $3250 plus air travel to Moscow, Russia. • Rappelling. Class Size: Minimum 10 participants. • Elite Firestorm and Anti-Terror Obstacle courses and • You must be at least 18 and in reasonably good health training with explosives.
    [Show full text]