Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014
Feeding the Fire Illicit Small Arms Ammunition in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia
Introduction Most of the reviewed cartridges Methodology fall within a few standard calibres, Consistent access to small arms ammu- primarily of Soviet design, along The findings presented in this Issue nition is vital to armed conflict. As with some NATO standards. Other Brief are derived from data compiled studies conducted over the past decade calibres are comparatively few in as part of the Small Arms Survey’s have pointed out, this is particularly variety and quantity. study of illicit small arms, light weap- true in conflicts involving non-state Most of the small arms ammuni- ons, and ammunition in conflict zones. armed groups that rely on illicit small tion observed was manufactured An assessment of some of that data was arms and light weapons as their pri- in China, Iraq, the former Soviet published in the Small Arms Survey 2012 mary tools of war. Indeed, researchers Union, and Sudan. (Schroeder and King, 2012). This paper are giving the subject matter increas- All of the observed calibres were applies a narrower focus, analysing ing attention (Greene, 2006, pp. 1–8). designed and adopted before or only the data on small arms ammuni- A detailed examination of seized or during the cold war era. No mod- tion, which includes hundreds of thou- documented small arms ammunition ern calibres—ones designed and sands of rounds seized in Afghanistan, may help to reveal the history and adopted during the past 30 years— Iraq, and Somalia. alliances of a conflict, while the trac- were documented. In addition, the paper draws heav- ing of illicit ammunition can identify Analysis of small arms ammuni- ily on open-source documents, as well manufacturers and supply routes.1 tion is often limited as a result of as on consultations with ammunition This Issue Brief analyses small arms poor documenting practices. experts, explosive ordnance disposal ammunition found in the holdings of non-state armed groups in three recent conflict zones: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. It provides an overview of the various documented calibres, the relevant supply chains, and, whenever possible, the corresponding ammunition manufacturers. The paper identifies numerous sources of illicit small arms ammunition in an effort to inform meas- ures for reducing illicit proliferation to conflict zones and within them. Based on available data, it also evaluates the serviceability of ammunition observed in the holdings of armed groups in the three countries under review.2 Its key findings include the following:
The main calibre observed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia is the Soviet-designed 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge.3 Ammunition of this cal- ibre is used with AK and AKM4 assault rifles, as well as other Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and variants produced in numerous An Afghan soldier displays ammunition found during a search operation in the Guzara district of Herat province, October 2009. countries. © Fraidoon Pooyaa/AP Photo
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 experts, researchers, and former mili- than 1,100 arms caches recovered by rounds, weight, and packaging, which tary personnel with relevant experience. Iraqi and Coalition authorities from is often described using generic terms For the purposes of this study, January 2008 to September 2009. These such as ‘crates’, ‘boxes’, ‘magazines’, the maximum calibre range for small records contain references to more than and ‘belts’. These limitations preclude arms ammunition was set to 14.5 mm; 500,000 rounds of illicit small arms accurate estimates of the quantities of everything larger is to be considered ammunition (Schroeder and King, 2012, specific calibres seized. ammunition for artillery and infantry p. 317). Sources of the data include As a consequence of the inconsist- support weapons. This range is consist- documents on 100 seized arms caches encies and deficiencies of much of the ent with the Warsaw Pact definition provided by the US Central Command, data, this Issue Brief presents only ver- of small arms ammunition (MOD data on 74 arms caches obtained from ified calibres and general conclusions. USSR, 1965). the US military by Felter and Fishman In some cases, the analysis of supple- Much of this paper relies on the (2008), and press releases and other mental materials, including images identification of cartridges based on documents housed in the US Defense and video footage of captured small headstamps—the markings on case Video & Imagery Distribution System. arms and ammunition, allowed for heads—in conjunction with other iden- Data on illicit small arms ammu- the provision of supporting informa- tifying characteristics. Headstamps nition in Somalia was collected from tion and more substantive findings usually identify the manufacturer, reports submitted by the United (Military News Network, 2009). Some although they may also reveal the cal- Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitor- conclusions on calibres were made ibre, the year of production, and other ing Group from October 2005 to July based on seized weapons for which details. Yet counterfeit headstamps,5 2011 (Schroeder and King, 2012, p. 315). the calibre was known. commercially available cases and other These reports contain references to components, and the ability to reload tens of thousands of rounds of small or otherwise modify cartridges and arms ammunition, at least some of Analysis of the data cartridge cases all complicate the iden- which were transferred to Somalia after tification process. The firmest verifica- the adoption of the UN arms embargo by country tion of the origin of ammunition in a in 1992.8 Almost all the information Afghanistan conflict zone is provided by packaging on observed headstamps in Somalia is The illicit small arms ammunition material and associated documenta- drawn from the Small Arms Survey 2014 encountered within the Afghanistan tion,6 which represent the best available (Florquin and Leff, 2014). data set is a mixture of pre-1979 gov- evidence for identifying the cartridge ernment stockpiles, supplies obtained manufacturer, entities that have placed Limitations of the data from the Soviet Union or later US-led the order, and possible middlemen. Coalition forces, new ammunition Although the identification of the The country data sets used in this Issue imported by the current government, analysed ammunition was verified Brief have inherent limitations. Each and stockpiles trafficked into the coun- whenever possible, any manufac- data set contains records of arms and try by various non-state groups. All of turer or country identified in this ammunition collected by numerous study must thus be regarded under individuals and institutions, whose the ammunition listed in the Afghani- 9 the provision that the information reports were not necessarily produced stan data set originates from abroad. applies primarily to the case manufac- in a rigorous or standardized manner. Since most of the data on the seized turer, or to the customer who ordered In many cases, insufficient data was arms caches provides little informa- the cases in question.7 provided. For example, instead of listing tion on the manufacturer, model, and a complete designation, many records manufacture date of the ammunition, it of small arms calibres simply state is not possible to identify which rounds Data ‘7.62 mm’, which could refer to calibres date from which era. As described The data set on ammunition seized in such as 7.62 × 25 mm, 7.62 × 39 mm, below, however, the observed cart Afghanistan used for this report con- 7.62 × 54R mm, or even 7.62 × 51 mm ridges are consistent with ammuni- sists of records provided by the US NATO—all of which are common. tion known to have been present in Army that summarize the contents of While the reports vary in their level modern Afghanistan. 331 caches seized in 2006, as well as of detail, none of them identify the Ammunition listed in Table 1 pre- records of more than 100,000 rounds of manufacturer or date of manufacture. sents the observed calibres as well ammunition that British forces recov- Some only refer vaguely to the recovery as the corresponding manufacturers ered from arms caches in Helmand of ‘small arms ammunition’ without and countries of origin, if available. Province from September 2007 to providing further details. Moreover, the Manufacturers are listed only once September 2008. In all, at least 200,000 reports contain few photographs, which per calibre as it was not possible to rounds of small arms ammunition were are often necessary for identifying (or determine multiple years of produc- recovered from the caches in these two confirming) the specific manufacturer, tion by any single manufacturer due data sets (Schroeder and King, 2012, model, and date of manufacture of to the lack of headstamps or other pp. 330–31). seized ammunition. Quantities were information. Images in the table are The data on ammunition seized in not recorded in a standardized format; representative and were not contained Iraq was compiled from records of more units of measurement include individual within the original data.
2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Table 1 Small arms ammunition documented in Afghanistan
Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm) Pistol, revolver, 5.6 x 16R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined and sub-machine 7.62 x 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined gun 7.62 x 39R n/a n/a n/a Afghanistan Herat workshop Regenstreif (1983, p. 93) 7.65 x 17SR n/a n/a n/a Czech Republic Sellier & Bellot, Recovered by Soviet forces (Czechoslovakia) Vlašim between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1) 9 x 18 38 73 1973 Russian Federation Yuryuzan Mechanical Confidential source #1 (USSR) Factory, Yuryuzan
9 x 19 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined Rifle and 5.45 x 39 n/a 60 76 1976 Kyrgyzstan Bishkek Machine Build- Confidential source #1 machine gun (USSR) ing Factory, Bishkek n/a 3 79 1979 Russian Federation Ulyanovsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Factory, Ulyanovsk
17 79 1979 Russian Federation Barnaul Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Barnaul
539 75 1975 Russian Federation Tula Cartridge Works, Confidential source #1 (USSR) Tula
n/a 270 76 1976 Ukraine Lugansk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Works, Lugansk 5.56 x 45 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined 6.5 x 55 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined 7.62 x 39 n/a 60 70 1970 Kyrgyzstan Bishkek Machine Build- Confidential source #1 (USSR) ing Factory, Bishkek 711 82 1982 Russian Federation Klimovsk Specialized Confidential source #1 (USSR) Cartridge Plant, Klimovsk n/a 3 70 1970 Russian Federation Ulyanovsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Factory, Ulyanovsk n/a 17 69 1969 Russian Federation Barnaul Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Barnaul n/a 539 69 1969 Russian Federation Tula Cartridge Works, Confidential source #1 (USSR) Tula 270 75 1975 Ukraine Lugansk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Works, Lugansk
IK 85 1985 Bosnia and Igman, Konjic Recovered by Soviet forces Herzegovina between 1985 and 1989 (Yugoslavia) (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 031 704 1974 China Unidentified Factory code and pro- (suspected) duction year additionally encrypted with suspiciously added ‘0’; recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confiden- tial source #1); photo © confidential source #1 31 76 1976 China Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 3 Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm) Rifle and 7.62 x 39 61 64 1964 China Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces machine gun between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 n/a 71 80 1980 China Chongqing Changjiang Recovered by Soviet forces Electrical Group, between 1980 and 1989 Yueqing City (confidential source #1) 601 77 1977 China Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 811 1I Unidentified China Unidentified Year obscured or encoded on purpose; recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confiden- tial source #1); photo © confidential source #1 9121 79 1979 China Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 bxn 79 1979 Czech Republic Sellier & Bellot, Recovered by Soviet forces (Czechoslovakia) Vlašim between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 Arabic script 1980 Egypt Factory #27, Shoubra Recovered by Soviet forces Company for Engineer- between 1980 and 1989 ing Industries, Cairo (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 Arabic script 1988 Iraq Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces between 1988 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 Arabic script 1966 Syria Établissements Indus- Recovered by Soviet forces triels de Défense, between 1979 and 1989 Damascus (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 7.62 x 54R 17 79 1979 Russian Federation Barnaul Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Barnaul
n/a 188 73 1973 Russian Federation Novosibirsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Novosibirsk n/a 60 77 1977 Kyrgyzstan Bishkek Machine Confidential source #1 (USSR) Building Factory, Bishkek n/a 7.62 x 54R n/a Not specified as Wolf Performance Chivers (2010) WOLF production is con- Ammunition, Placentia, tracted to several California, United countries States
4 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm) Rifle and 7.7 x 56R n/a n/a 1980 China Unidentified Not examined machine gun (confidential source #1) ZV 56 VIII Z 1956 Czech Republic Sellier & Bellot, Recovered by Soviet forces (Czechoslovakia) Vlašim between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 n/a n/a n/a Pakistan Unidentified Not examined (confidential source #1) n/a n/a n/a United Kingdom Unidentified Not examined (confidential source #1) Defaced n/a Unidentified Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces headstamp between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 No headstamp n/a Unidentified Unidentified Recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confidential source #1); photo © confidential source #1 11.43 x 61R n/a n/a n/a United Kingdom Unidentified Not examined (confidential source #1) 12.7 x 108 n/a 3 * 70 * 1970 Russian Federation Ulyanovsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Factory, Ulyanovsk 188 * 80 * 1980 Russian Federation Novosibirsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Novosibirsk
n/a n/a n/a China Unidentified Not examined; recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confiden- tial source #1) Arabic script Year illegible Iran Defense Industries Confidential source #5 Organization, Tehran
88 1988 United States Olin Corporation, Saboted Light Armour Winchester Division, Penetrator (SLAP) East Alton, Illinois round made for mujahideen during Afghan–Soviet war; no longer observed in Afghanistan (confidential source #4) 14.5 x 114 n/a 3 * 72 * 1972 Russian Federation Ulyanovsk Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Factory, Ulyanovsk 17 * 81 * 1981 Russian Federation Barnaul Cartridge Confidential source #1 (USSR) Plant, Barnaul
14.7 x 51R n/a n/a n/a United Kingdom Unidentified Not examined; recovered by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989 (confiden- tial source #1) 18.5 mm n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined shotshell
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 5 Colonial-era ammunition is still During the Soviet–Afghan war, the a non-mandatory arms embargo (UNSC, being observed in armed group hold- United States supplied large quanti- 1996; 2000). After the 2001 invasion, ings. Single samples of 7.7 × 56R mm ties of various types and calibres of the demand for small arms ammuni- (.303 British),10 11.43 x 61R mm (.577- ammunition to the mujahideen (Crile, tion rose, with local non-state armed 450 Martini-Henry), and 14.7 × 51R mm 2003). Some of the ammunition deliv- groups seeking larger quantities than (.577 Snider)11 have been reported. The ered by the United States was designed during previous years. These groups British brought this ammunition into and made specifically for the conflict began trafficking ammunition into Afghanistan before the country declared in Afghanistan. In at least one case, Afghanistan from neighbouring coun- independence in 1919. According to one producers of these rounds applied tries as early as 2001. Given the types source, Soviet troops captured these Western technology to typical Soviet- of weapons used by the insurgents, rounds during their occupation.12 calibre cartridges to make them more obtaining ammunition in Warsaw Pact Recent reports on seized weapons reveal effective. For example, special 12.7 × calibres became the priority. The diver- that various Enfield rifles—which are 108 mm armour-piercing cartridges14 sity in trafficking routes and methods chambered for the rounds in question— were produced in the United States in precludes a definitive accounting of are still encountered today (Schroeder 1988.15 Yet the majority of Western- supply paths, although routes report- and King, 2012, p. 332). Although this supplied small arms ammunition was edly traversed or originated in Pakistan, ammunition is considered unservice- not produced in the United States, Iran, and Tajikistan (IWPR, 2005; able due to its advanced age, it remains but instead under contract in several Parks, n.d., p. 4; Schroeder and King, present in some holdings. other countries. China appears to be 2012, p. 335). Small arms ammunition Afghanistan has never manufac- the most prominent source16 (AI, 1995); was documented as a result of many tured ammunition on an industrial however, cartridges produced in other seizures at the Afghan border and in scale; however, some production did countries were also captured by the border regions. occur on a very small scale, and under Soviet forces,17 demonstrating how In 2002, the UN embargo was modest technical conditions, in the many countries were involved in modified to apply solely to the sale early 20th century (Regenstreif, 1983, the supply of ammunition to the or supply of arms to the Taliban or p. 92). In particular, 7.62 × 39R mm mujahideen. Ammunition from these Al-Qaeda, thereby permitting arms M1895 Nagant revolver cartridges stockpiles has been in circulation in transfers to Afghanistan (UNSC, 2002).18 were produced in the Herat region, Afghanistan since the withdrawal of Since then, the new Afghan govern- almost by hand. This production Soviet troops. ment has acquired stockpiles of small occurred in the 1920s–30s,13 and any The presence of most of the NATO- arms ammunition for its security ser- remaining cartridges are assumed to calibre ammunition can be attributed vices (Schmitt, 2008). The ammunition be unserviceable. None of these rounds to the period beginning with the US- in question came from numerous were identified in the data sets. led invasion in 2001. Coalition forces sources, with some purchased on the Supplies of Soviet-designed ammu- brought in immense amounts of their international civilian market, as well nition entered Afghanistan next, in own small arms ammunition—mainly as surplus ammunition donated by two distinct phases: before the Soviet 5.56 × 45 mm and 7.62 × 51 mm. The NATO members and surplus stock- invasion and then during the Soviet same forces also began supplying piles acquired from the international occupation. Between 1919 and 1979, the M16 rifles and other weapons cham- market (Chivers, 2010). Some ammu- Afghan government acquired stock- bered for NATO standard calibres to nition from these arsenals has been piles of small arms ammunition that the Afghan National Security Forces lost, stolen, or acquired illegally by non- found their way to armed groups dur- (USGAO, 2009, p. 1). NATO ammuni- state armed groups (Sarwary, 2012). ing the Soviet occupation (Nawroz and tion captured from Coalition forces is Some Afghan soldiers and law enforce- Grau, 1995). supposedly the smallest amount of ment officers have reportedly sold their The Soviet–Afghan war of 1979 illicit small arms ammunition held by issued duty weapons or defected with to 1989 led to a large influx of Soviet non-state armed groups in Afghanistan the arms and ammunition available to ammunition, which spread throughout as it can only be acquired or captured them at the time of their defection (Crilly Afghanistan. During the war, Afghan in very limited quantities. Such minor and Babakarkhail, 2013). In some cases rebels captured significant quantities losses by occupying or peacekeeping soldiers defected with large quantities of ammunition from Soviet troops and forces are incurred in all hostile and of weapons, ammunition, and equip- probably from the Afghan government combat environments. Of potentially ment (Chivers, 2010; Latif, 2011). (Nawroz and Grau, 1995). Sizeable stock- greater concern are the losses of NATO- Table 1 contains samples of head piles were also left behind when the calibre ammunition from Afghan stamps found in Afghanistan. While Soviet forces withdrew from Afghani- National Army stockpiles. A US govern- the coverage is not comprehensive, stan in 1989 (AI, 1995). The 40th Army ment audit of weapons and ammuni- the identifiable countries of manufac- alone left 15,000 tons of ammunition in tion supplied to the Afghan National ture include: Bosnia and Herzegovina Afghanistan (Grau, 2007, p. 15). Given Army reveals a lack of accountability (Yugoslavia), China, the Czech Repub- the enormous amounts of small arms and control measures to prevent losses lic (Czechoslovakia), Egypt, Iran, Iraq, ammunition reportedly left behind by and theft (USIG, 2008, p. 6). Kyrgyzstan (USSR), Pakistan, the Rus- the Soviets, it is widely assumed that In 1996, the United Nations Secur sian Federation (USSR), Syria, Ukraine some of it remains in circulation today. ity Council placed Afghanistan under (USSR), and the United Kingdom.
6 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Table 2 Small arms ammunition documented in Iraq
Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm)
Pistol, revolver, 5.6 x 16R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined and sub-machine 7.62 x 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined gun (Minaya, 2007)
7.63 x 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Military News Network, 2009)
9 x 19 Arabic script Illegible Iraq Unidentified Photo © Lewis E. Curtis (Gig Concepts)
9x19 07 2007 Iran Defense Industries Photo © Lewis E. Curtis Organization, Tehran (Gig Concepts)
9 x 20R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
11.43 x 23 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
Rifle and 5.56 x 45 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined machine gun 7.62 x 39 Arabic script 1969 Iraq Unidentified
Arabic script 1973 Unidentified Unidentified Assumed to be foreign production for Iraq
Arabic script 1973 Unidentified Unidentified Assumed to be foreign production for Iraq
Arabic script 1976 Unidentified Unidentified Assumed to be foreign production for Iraq
Arabic script 1976 Unidentified Unidentified Assumed to be foreign production for Iraq
Arabic script 1978 Unidentified Unidentified Assumed to be foreign production for Iraq
Arabic script 1979 Unidentified, Unidentified Assumed to be foreign suspected to be production for Iraq Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia)
Arabic script 1989 Iraq Unidentified
Arabic script 1994 Iraq Unidentified
Arabic script 1999 Iraq Unidentified
No headstamp n/a Iraq Unidentified Clandestine production
321 96 1996 Romania S.C. Uzina Mecanica SADU, Bumbesti Jiu
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 7 Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm)
Rifle and 7.62 x 39 322 02 2002 Romania S.C. Uzina Mecanica machine gun SADU, Bumbesti Jiu
ППУ 1999 1999 Serbia (Yugoslavia) Prvi Partizan, Uzice
7.62x39 2001 Syria Établissements 2001 Industriels de Défense, Damascus (suspected)
7.62x39 7 2002 Syria Établissements 2002 7 Industriels de Défense, Damascus (suspected)
7.62 x 51 No image available n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
7.62 x 54R Arabic script 1980 Suspected to be Sellier & Bellot, Production for Iraq Czech Republic Vlašim (suspected) (Czechoslovakia)
7.7 x 56R Arabic script 1959 Iraq Unidentified Photo © Peter Petrusic (Forensic Service Wellen)
Arabic script 1967 Iraq Unidentified
12.7 x 99 Arabic script 1969 Syria Établissements Loaded in cooperation by Industriels de Défense, factory #823 and #837; Damascus production for Iraq; photo © Javier Torijano
12.7 x 108 Arabic script 1974 Iraq Unidentified Assumed to be foreign (unconfirmed) production for Iraq
Arabic script 1981 Iraq Unidentified Photo © confidential (unconfirmed) source #2
Arabic script 1982 Iraq Unidentified Assumed to be foreign (unconfirmed) production for Iraq
Arabic script 1986 Iraq Unidentified Photo © confidential (unconfirmed) source #2
Arabic script 1987 Iraq Unidentified Photo © confidential (unconfirmed) source #2
14.5 x 114 Arabic script 1982 Iraq Unidentified
Arabic script 1987 Iraq Unidentified
Arabic script 1999 Iraq Unidentified
18.5 mm n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined shotshell
8 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Iraq ammunition was recovered from arms As of 2004, when the UN embargo caches;19 however, the year of manu- was officially lifted, the new Iraqi gov- Of the case study countries, Iraq is the facture (2007) indicates that the ammu- ernment was able to import small arms only one that has historically produced nition arrived several years after the ammunition for its security forces its own small arms ammunition and 2003 invasion (see Table 2). The data (UNSC, 2004). Part of the ammunition other ordnance on an industrial scale. sets, which are not comprehensive, in question was purchased on the inter- This production ceased following the do not allow for the identification of national civilian market (Chivers, 2010); 2003 invasion, until which point gov- Iranian ammunition manufactured additional ammunition was donated ernment stockpiles contained domes- prior to 1988. by NATO member states and secured tically produced and officially imported Iraq has produced its own small from European and other surplus stock- small arms ammunition. Since 2003, arms ammunition since 1932, with the piles (Czech Republic, 2006). Some ammunition has been brought into the earliest known sample dating from ammunition from these stockpiles country by Coalition troops, imported 1934 (Elks, 1979, p. 7); it has also has been lost, was stolen, or is other- for the Iraqi security forces, or illicitly trafficked. imported ammunition, some of which wise unaccounted for; some has been Table 2 lists ammunition calibres was manufactured to Iraqi specifica- observed in the possession of non-state made and used in Iraq as well as avail- tions (see Table 2). The domestic pro- armed groups (Kelly, 2012, p. 328). There able information on the manufacturers duction was at least partially carried have been numerous documented 20 and countries of origin. Manufacturers out on Western-delivered machinery, instances of Iraqi law enforcement are listed only once per calibre. Dates while a variety of small arms ammu- and military personnel selling their of manufacture are not evaluated nition was produced outside of the issued duty weapons and ammuni- separately due to the lack of detailed country for Iraq, bearing Iraqi mark- tion, or defecting with supplies of the information. ings. Some cartridges exhibit partially same. In some cases this has resulted Not unlike in Afghanistan, colonial- incorrect Iraqi headstamps, pointing in the loss of considerable quantities era ammunition remnants remain in to production in non-Arabic-speaking of weapons, ammunition, and other 21 circulation in Iraq today. Although countries. After the fall of the Hussein materiel, including vehicles, personal British-manufactured ammunition regime, the lack of security at govern- protection gear, night vision devices, was not identified in the arms caches ment storage facilities allowed non-state and radios (Rasheed and Colvin, 2007; studied, firearms chambered for these armed groups to access ammunition Graham-Harrison, 2012). calibres—Enfield rifles—were recov- stockpiles (Roane and Pound, 2004). Table 2, which lists illicit small ered from these caches (Schroeder and With the 2003 war, new supplies arms ammunition documented in Iraq, King, 2012, p. 320). Given their age, of ammunition entered Iraq. While reveals headstamp information that colonial-era rounds are not likely to Coalition forces brought enormous identifies Iran, Iraq, Romania, Serbia be serviceable. quantities for their own use during (Yugoslavia), and Syria as countries 22 During combat operations of the the conflict, additional ammuni- of origin. Iraq–Iran war of 1980–88, Iraqi forces tion—predominantly in Warsaw Pact recovered or captured Iranian stock- calibres—was supplied to the fledg- Somalia piles of ammunition. This ammunition ling security apparatus of the Iraqi The absence of domestic ammunition was either captured from or abandoned state. Some of this ammunition was production capacity in Somalia has lost, captured by armed groups during by Iranian forces (Global Security, n.d.). led various armed actors to import combat, or stolen by defecting Iraqi Captured ammunition is often a wel- ammunition. The small arms ammu- soldiers (AP, 2006; CNN, 2007). come addition to the armouries of nition encountered in the holdings of Iraq was under an arms embargo less-developed countries, particularly non-state armed groups operating in from 1990 to 2004 (UNSC, 1990; 2004). during periods of high ammunition the country today was acquired from With the increased demand for small expenditure and limited ongoing three main sources. 2003 supply. Capturing supplies of ammu- arms ammunition due to the First, armed groups looted govern- nition is particularly advantageous invasion and the subsequent disman- ment stockpiles after the Barre regime when both parties to a conflict are tling of manufacturing capacity, local collapsed in 1991 (Forberg and Terlinden, using the same calibres, as was the armed actors had to turn to new supply 1999, pp. 15, 20). The Somali govern- case with Iran and Iraq, which both sources. Since 2003, a notable quantity ment had officially acquired these used 7.62 × 39 mm ammunition in their of small arms ammunition has been arsenals between 1960 and 1991, ini- Kalashnikov-pattern weapons (Ezell, trafficked into Iraq from neighbouring tially from the Soviet Union and then, 1988, pp. 208–11). Such stockpiles prob- countries by non-state groups. The beginning around 1978, from the United ably remained in Iraqi depots until supply routes have not been exten- States. If ammunition looted from 2003 and may have found their way sively documented, although research these stockpiles remains in circulation to non-state armed groups thereafter. has confirmed the entry of supplies in the country, it may still be service- These arsenals cannot be distinguished from Iran,23 Syria, and, to a lesser able, depending on the quality of the from ammunition made prior to 1988, extent, the United States and Europe ammunition and its storage conditions. which could have been trafficked into (Parks, n.d., p. 5; Schroeder and King, Second, ammunition has been Iraq at a later point. Iranian 9 × 19 mm 2012, p. 328). trafficked into the country by various
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 9 Table 3 Small arms ammunition documented in Somalia
Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm) Pistol and sub- 7.62 x 25 n/a 12 51 O * 1951 Czech Republic Sellier & Bellot, machine gun (Czechoslovakia) Vlašim n/a 21 32 15 53 1953 Poland Mesko, Skarżysko- Kamienna 710 * 47 * 1947 Russian Federation Podolsk Cartridge (USSR) Factory, Podolsk
n/a T 46 1946 Russian Federation Tula Cartridge Works, (USSR) Tula n/a 11 * 55 * 1955 Serbia Prvi Partizan, Uzice (Yugoslavia) n/a 270 * 50 * 1950 Ukraine Lugansk Cartridge (USSR) Works, Lugansk 9 x 18 LVE 10 9mm 2010 Russian Federation Novosibirsk Cartridge Makarov Plant, Novosibirsk
9 x 19 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined 9 x 20R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Ezell, 1988, pp. 324–26) Rifle and machine 5.56 x 45 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined gun 7.92 x 33 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, p. 37) 7.62 x 39 n/a 11 3 84 1984 Albania K.M. Poliçan, Poliçan n/a S 06 2006 Algeria Entreprise des Réalisations Industrielles de Seriana, Seriana 10 65 1965 Bulgaria Arsenal JSCo., Kazanlak
n/a 61 08 2008 China Unidentified 81 69 1969 China Henan Arsenal
n/a 811 08 2008 China Unidentified n/a Arabic script 1979 Egypt Factory #27, Shoubra Company for Engineer- ing Industries, Cairo n/a No head- n/a Ethiopia Homicho Ammunition stamp Engineering Complex, Bahir Dar and Gonder 04 73 1973 Germany VEB Mechanische Photo © Hans Migielski (German Democratic Werkstätten Republic) Königswartha, Königswartha 23 83 1983 Hungary Mátravidéki Fémmûvek, today RUAG Hungarian Ammotec n/a 60 76 1976 Kyrgyzstan Bishkek Machine (USSR) Building Factory, Bishkek
10 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm)
Rifle and 7.62 x 39 539 80 1980 Russian Federation Tula Cartridge Works, machine gun (USSR) Tula
711 73 1973 Russian Federation Klimovsk Specialized (USSR) Cartridge Plant, Klimovsk
ППУ 1999 1999 Serbia (Yugoslavia) Prvi Partizan, Uzice
n/a 1 10 39 2010 Sudan Military Industry Corporation, Khartoum
n/a LI 04 2004 Uganda Luwero Industries, Kampala
n/a 270 76 1976 Ukraine (USSR) Lugansk Cartridge Works, Lugansk
n/a 05 107 2005 Unidentified Unidentified
7.62 x 51 10 62 1962 Bulgaria Arsenal JSCo., Kazanlak
n/a No headstamp n/a Ethiopia Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex, Bahir Dar and Gonder
7.62 x 54R n/a 61 08 2008 China Unidentified
n/a 71 99 1999 China Chongqing Changjiang Electrical Group Co., Yueqing City
945 05 2005 China Unidentified
n/a AM 02 2002 Ethiopia (suspected) Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex, Bahir Dar and Gonder (suspected)
n/a No headstamp n/a Ethiopia Homicho Ammunition Engineering Complex, Bahir Dar and Gonder
n/a 17 92 1992 Russian Federation Barnaul Cartridge Plant, Barnaul
7.7 x 56R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
7.92 x 33 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, p. 37)
7.92 x 57 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Terlinden, 1999, p. 37)
12.7 x 99 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, p. 37)
12.7 x 108 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
14.5 x 114 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 11 groups—such as Ethiopian troops24 Analysis of observed illicit small pistol cartridges. The 7.62 × 25 mm and personnel of the African Union arms ammunition in the countries and 9 x 19 mm ammunition was doc- Mission in Somalia (Young Pelton, 2011). umented in all three countries. While Third, armed groups have ille- studied 9 × 18 mm was not encountered in gally acquired ammunition from the The variety of calibres of small arms Iraq, it was recorded among armed Transitional Federal Government ammunition identified in the three groups in Afghanistan and Somalia. (Schroeder and King, 2012, p. 347). countries examined is very limited Table 4 lists a range of additional cali- Since the data set contains reports col- and reflects the standard calibres of bres observed in the three countries. lected through 2011, more recent allega- the major powers of the cold war. Rifles and light machine guns25 are tions of ammunition leakage from the Ammunition in Warsaw Pact calibres the backbone of operations conducted Federal Government of Somalia—which is the predominant standard, with by non-state armed groups and require replaced the Transitional Federal Gov- NATO-calibre cartridges coming in a the highest possible standardization ernment in 2012—are not addressed distant second. The calibre profile of a in both weapons and calibres used. (Charbonneau, 2014). country mainly depends on its politi- Interchangeability of both is a crucial Since at least 1991, non-state armed cal and strategic orientation, financial factor in combat. In countries where groups have trafficked small arms means, and domestic infrastructure. supplies of weapons and ammunition ammunition into Somalia from neigh- Countries that were under the influ- are irregular or limited, there may be bouring countries. While data limita- ence of Western powers often employed very few standard calibres and weap- tions prevent the mapping of all supply NATO calibres; most other countries ons. The rifle and machine gun calibres routes, there are credible reports of were either aligned with the Warsaw studied show that certain calibres are trafficking from (or through) Eritrea, Pact or were independent and thus common to non-state armed groups Ethiopia, and Yemen. UN monitoring sought their own supplies on the in the three countries assessed. The groups have found that arms transfers world market. States in the latter two calibres identified reflect practices of that were diverted to Somalia origi- groups tended towards Warsaw Pact standardization in the countries of nated in countries such as Iran, Italy, calibres in most instances. As is the case origin—NATO and former Warsaw Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and for states, price and availability are Pact states—where small-calibre the United Arab Emirates (Schroeder probably the critical selection criteria ammunition is largely standardized and King, 2012, p. 344). for non-state armed groups seeking to as a matter of course. NATO-calibre ammunition encoun- purchase ammunition. The following rifle calibres were tered in Somalia was provided as Following the collapse of the Soviet observed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and military aid by the United States and Union, the flooding of international Somalia: several other Western countries before markets with surplus cold war stock- 1991, imported for use by peacekeep- piles significantly advanced the pro- 5.56 × 45 mm: Since few available ers during the UN intervention in liferation of Warsaw Pact-calibre arms. firearms are chambered for this 1992–95, and, to a small extent, traf- Such arms are available at compara- calibre, armed groups use both ficked (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, tively low prices from countries such the arms and the corresponding p. 15; Ezell, 1988, pp. 324–26; Florquin as China and the former Soviet Union. ammunition on a small scale. In and Leff, 2014, pp. 205–07). The most Since the calibres of ammunition pur- Afghanistan and Iraq, illicit ammu- recently produced ammunition encoun- chased are tied to the availability of nition of this calibre was probably tered in Somalia was made in Algeria weapons chambered for them, the wide lost by, or stolen or otherwise cap- (2006), China (2008), the Russian proliferation of Warsaw Pact-calibre tured from Coalition troops by non- Federation (2010), Sudan (2010), and weapons has led to a high demand state armed groups. The origin in Uganda (2004). for corresponding ammunition. All Somalia is less clear, as cold war Table 3 lists the calibres and, if other calibres discussed in this Issue holdings and UN troops stationed in available, the countries of origin and Brief are marginal in quantity. Pistol the country from 1991 each brought manufacturers of small arms ammu- and sub-machine gun calibres are in the calibre into the country (Ezell, nition in Somalia. Manufacturers are comparatively low demand, as such 1988, p. 325). Post-1991 trafficking listed only once per calibre. weapons represent mainly self-defence cannot be ruled out. Based on the headstamps featured or back-up weapons and are not fre- 7.62 × 39 mm: This calibre is docu- in Table 3, the illicit small arms ammu- quently used in high-intensity conflict mented in all three countries in large nition documented in Somalia origi- zones such as those reviewed here. quantities. It is the standard calibre nated in Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Table 4 provides an overview of for which many Kalashnikov-pattern China, the Czech Republic (Czecho- all calibres observed in illicit use in weapons are chambered, and these slovakia), Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. The are easily the predominant weap- (German Democratic Republic), Hun- data identifies a total of 22 calibres, on used in each country. While Iraq gary, Kyrgyzstan (USSR), Poland, the of which nine are pistol calibres and produced this calibre before 2003,26 Russian Federation (USSR), Serbia 13 are rifle and machine gun calibres. Afghanistan and Somalia did not (Yugoslavia), Sudan, Uganda, and The greatest variation in calibres was and have depended on imports or Ukraine (USSR). observed among the nine documented trafficking for supplies.
12 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Table 4 Overview of all documented calibres in the three countries assessed
Firearm type Calibre Alternative calibre Country of origin Observed in Remarks (mm) designation (year invented/adopted) Afghanistan Iraq Somalia
Pistol, revolver, 5.6 x 16R .22 long rifle United States (1887) A rimfire cartridge, used with hunting, and sub-machine sporting, and training weapons gun 7.62 x 25 7.62 mm Tokarev USSR (1930) Used with TT pistols and PPSh-41 and PPS-43 sub-machine guns; Russian calibre
7.62 x 39R 7.62 mm Nagant USSR (1895) Used with M1895 Nagant revolvers
7.63 x 25 7.63 mm Mauser, Germany (1896) Cartridge for German C-96 pistol series .30 Mauser
7.65 x 17SR 7.65 mm Browning, United States (1897) Cartridge for a vast variety of small pistols .32 ACP
9 x 18 9 mm Makarov, USSR (1951) Cartridge for Makarov pistol and sub- 9 mm PM machine guns
9 x 19 9 mm Luger, Germany (1904) Most widespread pistol cartridge for a huge 9 mm NATO variety of pistols and sub-machine guns
9 x 20R .380/200 Enfield United States/ Cartridge for .380 Enfield revolvers Mk I/II United Kingdom (1922)
11.43 x 23 .45 ACP United States (1911) Cartridge for Colt M1911 government pistol and sub-machine guns
Rifle and 5.45 x 39 .215 USSR (1974) Cartridge for AK-74 variants and RPK-74 machine gun machine gun
5.56 x 45 5.56 mm NATO, United States (1967) Cartridge for M16, M4, G36, SA 80, FAMAS .223 Remington F1, etc.; NATO cartridge for a huge variety of weapons
6.5 x 55 6.5 mm Swedish Germany (1896) Swedish rifle and machine gun cartridge Mauser
7.62 x 39 7.62 mm Model 1943 USSR (1943) Cartridge for AK, AKM, RPK, RPD, etc.; cartridge for Kalashnikov-pattern weapons
7.62 x 51 7.62 mm NATO, United States (1954) Cartridge for M14, M60, M240, FN FAL, MG3, .308 Winchester G3, etc.; NATO cartridge for a huge variety of weapons
7.62 x 54R 7.62 mm Mosin- USSR (1891) Cartridge for various rifles and PK-series Nagant and other machine guns
7.7 x 56R .303 British United Kingdom (1889) Cartridge for Enfield rifles and Vickers machine guns
11.43 x 61R .577-450 Martini- United Kingdom (1871) Cartridge for Lee-Metford, Lee-Enfield, and Henry Martini-Enfield rifles
12.7 x 99 .50 Browning United States (1921) NATO cartridge for M2 Browning machine machine gun gun and sniper rifles
12.7 x 108 12.7 mm DShK USSR (1930) Cartridge for DShK and NSV machine guns
14.5 x 114 14.5 mm KPV USSR (1941) Cartridge for KPV-series of machine guns and during WWII PTRD and PTRS anti-tank rifles
14.7 x 51R .577 Snider United Kingdom (1867) Cartridge for Snider-Enfield rifles (converted muzzle loaders)
18.5 mm 12-gauge United Kingdom Cartridge for shotguns shotshell (date unknown)
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 13 7.62 × 54R mm: This cartridge is the tical reasons. In many cases, national Conclusion second most prominent standard armies have yet to adopt these modern Most of the observed calibres in calibre found during the research. calibres as they are also conscious of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are cold This versatile round is used in the costs and administrative burden war-era designs whose first use dates machine guns, rifles, and sniper involved in replacing existing small 60 rifles. Cartridges with Iraqi head arms and ammunition stockpiles. back at least years. No ‘modern’ stamps have been documented It is important to note that the calibres—that is, those developed dur- 30 and may be attributed to foreign27 manufacturers identified in this study ing the past years—were observed and domestic production before were not necessarily responsible for during the course of this research. 2003 (see Table 2). supplying the observed ammunition This absence suggests that large quan- 7.7 × 56R mm (.303 British): This to non-state armed groups in the three tities of the small arms and correspond- calibre was inherited from British countries. Illicit diversion of ammuni- ing ammunition were sourced from colonial troops along with rifles of tion can take place at any point in the surplus stockpiles, and, in the case of the Enfield design in each of the supply chain, and ammunition supplies Iraq, pre-war domestic production. countries under review. These may also be captured or lost. Many Cartridges identified in the data sets as weapons were very popular after ammunition manufacturers and gov- newly manufactured are rare, though colonial troops withdrew; they are ernments of manufacturing countries recent research does suggest that the still widely used, albeit in much never gain knowledge of where their supply of recently produced ammuni- smaller numbers than Kalashnikov- ammunition is finally used, nor can tion to conflict zones may be increasing pattern weapons. they typically influence what is hap- (Conflict Armament Research, 2012; pening with the ammunition once it Leff and Florquin, 2014). Non-state armed groups in each has left the country of manufacture Unsurprisingly, Warsaw Pact stand- of the countries assessed have also (Jenzen-Jones, 2013). ard calibres are the most commonly 28 made use of heavy machine guns It is necessary to reiterate that the observed for assault rifles and machine chambered for 12.7 x 108 mm and analysis is limited due to incomplete guns. This dominance is less pronounced 14.5 x 114 mm cartridges. These reporting. Thorough recording of seized with handguns, however, as these weapons have an effective range of stockpiles of small arms ammunition firearms often serve a secondary role up to approximately 2,000 m and are and small arms by experts is essential in conflicts. Interestingly, the range of normally mounted on vehicles, tri- for successful tracing work. In the past calibres available in a conflict zone is pods, or towed mounts. Both calibres decades seized stockpiles in almost often a partial reflection of a broader are effective against lightly armoured any conflict zone were poorly recorded modern history of the country. In each vehicles and reinforced positions while and thus excluded potentially valuable country under review, ammunition left the 14.5 × 114 mm has superior ballis- information. over from colonial periods, cold war tics and is unmatched by comparable When markings, headstamps, pack- alliances, and 20th-century conflicts calibres fielded by Western militaries ing material, and possible shipping were found in the holdings of local to date (Watson, 1984, p. 68). Of the documents are recorded in detail and armed groups. countries studied, only Iraq is known complemented with proper photo- This study highlights the need to have produced these calibres. graphic documentation, ammunition for more detailed and complete data During the course of this study, experts and researchers are much more on small arms ammunition seized the author did not encounter any likely to be able to reach conclusions from armed groups and other illicit modern calibres—those designed on the weapons used, manufacturers, users. Summaries of seized arms and adopted during the past 30 years. and, in some cases, geopolitical ties. In caches and other reports on illicit The 5.45 × 39 mm cartridge, designed addition, such data greatly enhances weapons in the countries studied for AK-74-series rifles, has been in an expert’s capacity to trace the diver- often provide some information circulation for four decades but is sion path of the ammunition, pin down on weapons but contain few details uncommon in conflict zones when com- the source country, and, in some cases, on small arms ammunition. Better pared to the 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge, identify the individuals involved. If publicly available data on illicit small which was designed for the AK series. they are able to refer to detailed field arms ammunition would aid in the Newer calibres, such as the Russian research, ammunition specialists are tracing of illicit ammunition and would 9 × 39 mm for the A-91 and VSS rifles also better placed to determine possible improve the public understanding of and the Belgian 5.7 x 28 mm for the P90 attempts to produce or distribute its proliferation, manufacturers, supply sub-machine gun were not observed ammunition bearing clandestine or lines, and traffickers. at all. Typically, the high cost of newer fake markings (mainly headstamps), calibres and the logistical burden of which may have been applied in an converting to weapons chambered for attempt to mislead researchers and Acknowledgements them is a significant barrier to non- investigating authorities. In such cases, Thanks go out to Federico Graziano, Benjamin state armed groups. Surplus stock- original samples are crucial to accu- King, Jonah Leff, Hans Migielski, Philippe piles from the cold war are available rate identification, as even good photo- Regenstreif, and Matthew Schroeder—as at much lower prices and are typically graphic documentation may not display well as to the people who wished to remain the first choice for economic and logis- key characteristics. anonymous.
14 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 16 See Table 1, which lists several Chinese- Conflict Armament Research. 2012. The Dis- Endnotes manufactured cartridges that were captured tribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: 1 See, for example, Florquin and Leff (2014); by Soviet forces between 1979 and 1989. Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation. Pézard and Anders (2006); Schroeder and 17 The other countries were Bosnia and Herze- December.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 15 Latif, Aamir. 2011. ‘Flood of US Weapons in Polynational War Memorial. n.d. ‘Ethiopia UNSC (United Nations Security Council). Afghanistan and Pakistan Fueling Militant vs Somalia.’ Updated 15 August 2013. 1990. The Situation in Iraq. S/RES/660 Groups, Experts Say.’ Global Post. 22 June.
About the Small Arms Survey The Small Arms Survey serves as the principal interna- Authors: Alexander Diehl with N.R. Jenzen-Jones tional source of public information on all aspects of small Copy-editor: Tania Inowlocki arms and armed violence, and as a resource centre for governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. In Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson addition to Issue Briefs, the Survey distributes its findings Design and layout: Rick Jones ([email protected]) through Research Notes, Occasional Papers, Special Reports, All images: © Alexander Diehl unless credited otherwise a Book Series, and its annual flagship publication, the Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey The project has an international staff with expertise in 47 Avenue Blanc security studies, political science, international public policy, 1202 Geneva law, economics, development studies, conflict resolution, Switzerland
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16 SmallSudan ArmsIssue BriefSurvey NumberIssue Brief 6 April Number 2007 8 July 2014