Feeding the Fire: Illicit Small Arms Ammunition in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia
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Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Feeding the Fire Illicit Small Arms Ammunition in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia Introduction Most of the reviewed cartridges Methodology fall within a few standard calibres, Consistent access to small arms ammu- primarily of Soviet design, along The findings presented in this Issue nition is vital to armed conflict. As with some NATO standards. Other Brief are derived from data compiled studies conducted over the past decade calibres are comparatively few in as part of the Small Arms Survey’s have pointed out, this is particularly variety and quantity. study of illicit small arms, light weap- true in conflicts involving non-state Most of the small arms ammuni- ons, and ammunition in conflict zones. armed groups that rely on illicit small tion observed was manufactured An assessment of some of that data was arms and light weapons as their pri- in China, Iraq, the former Soviet published in the Small Arms Survey 2012 mary tools of war. Indeed, researchers Union, and Sudan. (Schroeder and King, 2012). This paper are giving the subject matter increas- All of the observed calibres were applies a narrower focus, analysing ing attention (Greene, 2006, pp. 1–8). designed and adopted before or only the data on small arms ammuni- A detailed examination of seized or during the cold war era. No mod- tion, which includes hundreds of thou- documented small arms ammunition ern calibres—ones designed and sands of rounds seized in Afghanistan, may help to reveal the history and adopted during the past 30 years— Iraq, and Somalia. alliances of a conflict, while the trac- were documented. In addition, the paper draws heav- ing of illicit ammunition can identify Analysis of small arms ammuni- ily on open-source documents, as well manufacturers and supply routes.1 tion is often limited as a result of as on consultations with ammunition This Issue Brief analyses small arms poor documenting practices. experts, explosive ordnance disposal ammunition found in the holdings of non-state armed groups in three recent conflict zones: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. It provides an overview of the various documented calibres, the relevant supply chains, and, whenever possible, the corresponding ammunition manufacturers. The paper identifies numerous sources of illicit small arms ammunition in an effort to inform meas- ures for reducing illicit proliferation to conflict zones and within them. Based on available data, it also evaluates the serviceability of ammunition observed in the holdings of armed groups in the three countries under review.2 Its key findings include the following: The main calibre observed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia is the Soviet-designed 7.62 × 39 mm cartridge.3 Ammunition of this cal- ibre is used with AK and AKM4 assault rifles, as well as other Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and variants produced in numerous An Afghan soldier displays ammunition found during a search operation in the Guzara district of Herat province, October 2009. countries. © Fraidoon Pooyaa/AP Photo http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 experts, researchers, and former mili- than 1,100 arms caches recovered by rounds, weight, and packaging, which tary personnel with relevant experience. Iraqi and Coalition authorities from is often described using generic terms For the purposes of this study, January 2008 to September 2009. These such as ‘crates’, ‘boxes’, ‘magazines’, the maximum calibre range for small records contain references to more than and ‘belts’. These limitations preclude arms ammunition was set to 14.5 mm; 500,000 rounds of illicit small arms accurate estimates of the quantities of everything larger is to be considered ammunition (Schroeder and King, 2012, specific calibres seized. ammunition for artillery and infantry p. 317). Sources of the data include As a consequence of the inconsist- support weapons. This range is consist- documents on 100 seized arms caches encies and deficiencies of much of the ent with the Warsaw Pact definition provided by the US Central Command, data, this Issue Brief presents only ver- of small arms ammunition (MOD data on 74 arms caches obtained from ified calibres and general conclusions. USSR, 1965). the US military by Felter and Fishman In some cases, the analysis of supple- Much of this paper relies on the (2008), and press releases and other mental materials, including images identification of cartridges based on documents housed in the US Defense and video footage of captured small headstamps—the markings on case Video & Imagery Distribution System. arms and ammunition, allowed for heads—in conjunction with other iden- Data on illicit small arms ammu- the provision of supporting informa- tifying characteristics. Headstamps nition in Somalia was collected from tion and more substantive findings usually identify the manufacturer, reports submitted by the United (Military News Network, 2009). Some although they may also reveal the cal- Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitor- conclusions on calibres were made ibre, the year of production, and other ing Group from October 2005 to July based on seized weapons for which details. Yet counterfeit headstamps,5 2011 (Schroeder and King, 2012, p. 315). the calibre was known. commercially available cases and other These reports contain references to components, and the ability to reload tens of thousands of rounds of small or otherwise modify cartridges and arms ammunition, at least some of Analysis of the data cartridge cases all complicate the iden- which were transferred to Somalia after tification process. The firmest verifica- the adoption of the UN arms embargo by country tion of the origin of ammunition in a in 1992.8 Almost all the information Afghanistan conflict zone is provided by packaging on observed headstamps in Somalia is The illicit small arms ammunition material and associated documenta- drawn from the Small Arms Survey 2014 encountered within the Afghanistan tion,6 which represent the best available (Florquin and Leff, 2014). data set is a mixture of pre-1979 gov- evidence for identifying the cartridge ernment stockpiles, supplies obtained manufacturer, entities that have placed Limitations of the data from the Soviet Union or later US-led the order, and possible middlemen. Coalition forces, new ammunition Although the identification of the The country data sets used in this Issue imported by the current government, analysed ammunition was verified Brief have inherent limitations. Each and stockpiles trafficked into the coun- whenever possible, any manufac- data set contains records of arms and try by various non-state groups. All of turer or country identified in this ammunition collected by numerous study must thus be regarded under individuals and institutions, whose the ammunition listed in the Afghani- 9 the provision that the information reports were not necessarily produced stan data set originates from abroad. applies primarily to the case manufac- in a rigorous or standardized manner. Since most of the data on the seized turer, or to the customer who ordered In many cases, insufficient data was arms caches provides little informa- the cases in question.7 provided. For example, instead of listing tion on the manufacturer, model, and a complete designation, many records manufacture date of the ammunition, it of small arms calibres simply state is not possible to identify which rounds Data ‘7.62 mm’, which could refer to calibres date from which era. As described The data set on ammunition seized in such as 7.62 × 25 mm, 7.62 × 39 mm, below, however, the observed cart- Afghanistan used for this report con- 7.62 × 54R mm, or even 7.62 × 51 mm ridges are consistent with ammuni- sists of records provided by the US NATO—all of which are common. tion known to have been present in Army that summarize the contents of While the reports vary in their level modern Afghanistan. 331 caches seized in 2006, as well as of detail, none of them identify the Ammunition listed in Table 1 pre- records of more than 100,000 rounds of manufacturer or date of manufacture. sents the observed calibres as well ammunition that British forces recov- Some only refer vaguely to the recovery as the corresponding manufacturers ered from arms caches in Helmand of ‘small arms ammunition’ without and countries of origin, if available. Province from September 2007 to providing further details. Moreover, the Manufacturers are listed only once September 2008. In all, at least 200,000 reports contain few photographs, which per calibre as it was not possible to rounds of small arms ammunition were are often necessary for identifying (or determine multiple years of produc- recovered from the caches in these two confirming) the specific manufacturer, tion by any single manufacturer due data sets (Schroeder and King, 2012, model, and date of manufacture of to the lack of headstamps or other pp. 330–31). seized ammunition. Quantities were information. Images in the table are The data on ammunition seized in not recorded in a standardized format; representative and were not contained Iraq was compiled from records of more units of measurement include individual within the original data. 2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 8 July 2014 Table 1 Small arms ammunition documented in Afghanistan Firearm type Calibre Image Headstamp Year Country of origin Manufacturer Remarks (mm) Pistol, revolver, 5.6 x 16R n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined and sub-machine 7.62 x 25 n/a n/a n/a n/a Unidentified Not examined gun 7.62 x 39R n/a n/a n/a Afghanistan Herat workshop Regenstreif