NAVY NEWS WEEK 47-3
28 November 2017
Seychelles: 6 Suspected Somali Pirates Transferred to Seychelles for Possible Trial Six suspected Somali pirates have been transferred to Seychelles after they were caught attacking a container ship and a fishing vessel in the Southern Somali Basin, officials said. The suspects were apprehended by an Italian navy frigate, ITS Virginio Fasan, after they attacked a Seychelles-flagged 52-tonne container ship and a fishing vessel last week. The incident took place over a 24-hour period from Friday, Nov. 18 to Saturday, Nov. 19. The acting superintendent of prisons, Raymond St Ange, said the pirates have been transferred to Seychelles based on an agreement with the European Naval Force Operation Atlanta (EU NAVFOR). "The agreement allows us to initiate prosecution during any act of piracy. But prosecution will depend on evidence analysed by the office of the Attorney-General," said St Ange. The suspects arrived in Seychelles, a group of 115 islands in the western Indian Ocean, on Thursday morning at the Port of Victoria. St Ange said that a delegation from Somalia will also arrive in the country to discuss the issue of piracy. There are 15 Somali detainees in the Seychelles' main prison facility at Montagne Posee. In an article in the online navaltoday website, the EU NAVFOR Somalia said, "the pirates launched a number of rocket-propelled grenades against the container ship during their attack." "All crew on both attacked ships are safe thanks to adherence to BMP4 (Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia), the presence of a security team on one of the vessels and good seamanship," the article quoted the EU NAVFOR as saying. The Seychelles' archipelago -- 115 islands in the western Indian Ocean -- has been on the forefront of the fight against piracy since 2005, when the scourge began expanding, adversely impacting the nation's tourism and fishing industries. Despite the decline in pirate attacks off the vast coastline of Somalia from 236 in 2011 to two reportedly unsuccessful attacks in 2014, Seychelles has remained on the alert and St Ange had said last year that recent intelligence suggests that pirates threats still exist. More recently, the Seychelles' chair of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), Ambassador Barry Faure, said seafarers should bear in mind pirates will always be there as long as there is no stability on the grounds in Somalia. Source: Maasmond Maritime
Malaysia says vessel carrying 4.5 mln USD palm oil robbed in waters near Indonesia The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) said on Friday that a vessel carrying about 3,700 ton of palm oil had been robbed in the waters near indonesia. mmea said it received report by a malaysian company that Ever Omega , a barge it owned, was hijacked in the waters near Indonesia on Wednesday The barge, along with tugboat Ever Prosper, was sailing from Bintulu in the eastern Malaysian state of Sarawak to Penang off the Malay Peninsula when it was robbed by a group of machete-wielding pirates in wee hours, said the statement. The six crew members on the barge and the four crew on the tugboat were tied up by the robbers, who took away the barge but left the tugboat behind. The crew on the tugboat later managed to free themselves and sailed the ship toward water off Malaysia‟s southern Johor state, the statement said. MMEA said it had since requested assistance from the Indonesian authorities and was informed on Thursday that the barge Eve Omega had been found, but the cargos on the ship worth around 18.5 million ringgit (4.5 million U.S. dollar) were believed to be robbed. Based on the record, it is the fourth time that the ships owned by the company were robbed, said MMEA, adding that around 5,449 tons of palm oil were robbed in two incidents in 2016. Source: Xinhua
'Chennai Six' found not guilty, according to supporters Six Britons jailed in India on weapons charges while working as security guards on anti-piracy ships have won their appeal. 18:39, UK, Monday 27 November 2017 The so-called "Chennai Six" - former British soldiers jailed in India on weapons charges - have won their appeal, according to supporters. Thirty-five men were imprisoned in October 2013 while working as guards on anti-piracy ships in the Indian Ocean. According to a supporter's post on social media, a decision by the country's Appeal Court found all 35 men, including the six Britons, not guilty of those weapons charges. The men are: :: John Armstrong, 30, of Wigton, Cumbria :: Nick Dunn, 31, of Northumberland :: Billy Irving, 37, from Argyll and Bute :: Nicholas Simpson, 47, of Catterick, North Yorkshire :: Ray Tindall, 42, of Chester :: Paul Towers, 54, of Pocklington, East Yorkshire Supporters said: "The Appeal Court has today found all 35 men NOT GUILTY we now wait to hear as and when the men will be allowed home to their families. "This may take some time whilst the authorities decide whether they agree with the outcome or wish to appeal. "If they wish to appeal the men might be released from prison but not allowed back to the UK," the supporters' post said. Sentenced to five years in 2016, the men had consistently denied the charges - which had initially been quashed and then later reinstated by the Indian courts. They were arrested while working aboard the MV Seaman Guard Ohio, a vessel owned by an American company offering armed protection services to ships travelling between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Indian authorities arrested the men after finding weapons and ammunition aboard the vessel, which they claimed had not been properly declared. The charges were overturned when the men showed papers for the weapons had been issued by the British government and that they were lawfully held for anti-piracy security. However, a lower court in India reinstated the charges against the men, leading to their conviction in January 2016. "The families are understandably delighted that finally common sense and justice has prevailed," the supporters' group continued. Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said word of their successful appeal was "fantastic news" and that he hoped the men would be able to return home "as soon as possible". He added: "The FCO has worked tirelessly behind the scenes to reunite these men with their families. The importance the UK Government places on their case cannot be understated. "The men, their families and their supporters, who have campaigned unrelentingly, must be overjoyed. I share their delight and I hope they can return home as soon as possible." Source: https://news.sky.com
HMAS Darwin sails into Sydney Harbour for final time
HMAS Darwin flies her decommissioning pennant as she sails toward Fleet Base East for the final time as a commissioned ship. Photo: Australian Navy
Twelve former Commanding Officers have sailed onboard Royal Australian Navy frigate, HMAS Darwin, today as she transited through Sydney Heads into her home port for the last time. Darwin was escorted through Sydney Heads by Navy‟s newest ship HMAS Hobart for a traditional “cheer ship” as she passed the fleet before being welcomed alongside Garden Island by former sailors, officers and support staff. The Adelaide Class frigate is scheduled to be decommissioned at the end of the year to make way for the Navy‟s new fleet of Hobart Class Guided Missile Destroyers. Darwin‟s Commanding Officer, Commander Phillip Henry, said the significance of the final passage was not lost on the ship‟s company. “Darwin has a proud history of 33 years of service and every member of the crew both past and present have contributed to that,” Commander Henry said. “We all want to see her fare welled in a manner fitting this significant occasion. “It will be sad to see her go but it is time to make way for the newer and more capable Destroyers.” Twelve former Commanding Officers, including Captain Martyn Bell, joined the ship in Jervis Bay for an overnight steam to commemorate the end of her long and distinguished career in the fleet. “It’s fantastic to be back in this ship. It was the highlight of my Navy career to be the Commanding Officer of Darwin,” Captain Bell said. Darwin was commissioned on 21 July 1984 and in the course of her duties has steamed more than a million nautical miles across the globe. She has deployed to operations in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands as well as seven times to the Middle East region. On her most recent deployment to the Middle East for Operation MANITOU in 2016, Darwin and her ship‟s company completed three seizures of heroin worth $800 million of the coast of Africa. Darwin will decommission in a traditional Navy ceremony on December 09th. Source: Naval Today
LPD-17 San Antonio Class: The USA’s New Amphibious Ships Nov 27, 2017 04:58 UTC by Defense Industry Daily staff
LPD Flight II click for video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI5GFP_b7kQ
November 27/17: Contracts BAE Systems has been awarded a $8.7 million US Navy contract modification to complete the fitting out availability process for the USS Portland (LPD-27) and for continued efforts associated with the post shakedown availability for the USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26). Work on the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships will take place at BAE‟s San Diego facility in California with work on the USS John P. Murtha scheduled to be completed by February 2018, followed by the USS Portland in October 2018.
LPD-17 cutaway
LPD-17 San Antonio class amphibious assault support vessels are just entering service with the US Navy, and 11 ships of this class are eventually slated to replace up to 41 previous ships. Much like their smaller predecessors, their mission is to embark, transport, land, and support elements of a US Marine Corps Landing Force. The difference is found in these ships‟ size, their cost, and the capabilities and technologies used to perform those missions. Among other additions, this new ship is designed to operate the Marines‟ new MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, alongside the standard well decks for hovercraft and amphibious armored personnel carriers. While its design incorporates notable advances, the number of serious issues encountered in this ship class have been much higher than usual, and more extensive. The New Orleans shipyard to which most of this contract was assigned appears to be part of the problem. Initial ships have been criticized, often, for sub- standard workmanship, and it took 2 1/2 years after the initial ship of class was delivered before any of them could be sent on an operational cruise. Whereupon the USS San Antonio promptly found itself laid up Bahrain, due to oil leaks. It hasn‟t been the only ship of its class hurt by serious mechanical issues. Meanwhile, costs are almost twice the originally promised amounts, reaching over $1.6 billion per ship – 2 to 3 times as much as many foreign LPDs like the Rotterdam Class , and more than 10 times as much as Singapore‟s 6,600 ton Endurance Class LPD. This article covers the LPD-17 San Antonio Class program, including its technologies, its problems, and ongoing contracts and events. Source: https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com
The Westerdam leaving San Diego for a one week cruise to Mexico with the USS Midway Aircraft Carrier museum in the front photo : Anko Staas (c)
Ottawa does not command a second vessel at the shipyard Davie By: Marc-André Gagnon Despite pressures from the business community, mayors and the Quebec government, Ottawa does not intend to order a second supply ship in the shipyard Davie, where hundreds of layoffs are still expected. “The government does not plan to buy another supply ship,” said the minister of national Defence, Harjit Singh Sajjan, through its press attaché, Byrne, Furlong. The Royal Canadian Navy just doesn‟t need a second supply vessel as the Asterix, that Davie should be completed by the end of the month Once the ship is delivered, hundreds of workers may be laid off. Already on Thursday, the axe fell for a hundred workers and fifty sub-contractors. About 800 jobs are at risk. Davie will have to find the book elsewhere Much hope was based on the possibility that Ottawa is purchasing a second supply vessel, which would have this time been baptized Obelix, but the shipyard of Lévis will have to visibly turn to a different customer than the federal government to replenish its order book. “The supply needs for the navy and the coast guard have been the subject of an in- depth study and are the subject of a long-term planning, which does not include the second supply ship”, said Ms. Furlong. On Thursday, the minister delegate to the maritime Strategy, Jean D‟amour, had sounded the alarm by pressing the federal government to give back the work at the shipyard Davie. “If we don’t have this contract, it falls into the void, and this is not what you want. In my opinion, this is very serious, because there are few things in the backlog,” said Mr. Love. Source : The Quebec telegram
Pella Shipyard launches Karakurt-class first serial corvette (Project 2280) ‘Typhoon’ Leningradsky region, Russia based Pella Shipyard today at its new shipbuilding facility launched the first serial missile corvette "Typhoon" (codenamed Karakurt), Project 22800 (Hull No 252), the shipbuilding company said. Karakurt-class corvette (Project 22800) The vessel keel was laid on December 24, 2015. The Project 2280 flagship "Uragan" is currently docked at the shipyard‟s berth and is undergoing outfitting. The FAC Typhoon launching ceremony was attended by Viktor Bursuk, Chief of Shipbuilding, Armament and Operation, Deputy Commander-In-Chief for Navy‟s Armament; Vitaly Vdovichenko, Chief of Surface Ships Departement, Deputy Head of the State Defence Orders Department of the Russian Defence Ministry, Cap. 1 rank; Viktor Chirkov, Chief Advisor to the USC President for Naval Shipbuilding; Alexander Shlyakhtenko, General Director, Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau; Herbert Tsaturov, CEO, Pella Shipyard; senior executives and representatives of Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, of the SRI Shipbuilding and Armament of the Navy, of the Navy‟s Military Training Centre “Naval Academy”, of SBERBANK, officers of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Navy‟s General HQ, the shipbuilding firm‟s management and employees. The Typhoon Sponsor Julia Andreyeva is a consultant for the SDO Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence. The fast attack craft was designed to conduct combat operations in the near sea zone and to support both military and humanitarian tasks. Project 22800 (Code Name Karakurt) was developed for the Navy by the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau in conjunction with the Military Science and Training Centre of the Navy. The 22800-series ships armament include complexes of attack and anti-aircraft armament, the systems of management, target detection and designation and communications system. The vessel armament include high-precision long range, medium-range missiles. The newest vessel made her debut at the Army-2015 Expo International Military-Technical Forum. General characteristics: LOA: about 67 m, Beam: about 11 m, Displacement : about 800 tonnes, Full Speed: 30 knots, Cruising Range: up to 2500 nm, Endurance: 15 days. Leningrad region, Russia based Pella Shipyard was founded in 1950. In 1992 Pella was privatized as Pella Holding Co. comprising the parent company and several subsidiaries. The shipbuilding firm specializes in building harbor tugs with rated power of 1,000-5,000hp, pusher tugs, escort tugs, pilot boats and rescue boats for Russian and foreign customers. Pella Shipyard can simultaneously build at least 8 sea-going ships per year with length ranging between 50 meters and 100 meters and 6-meter draft, including Arctic class ships. source : portnews
The Dutch submarine HNLMS Walrus has arrived in Devonport for specialised sea training. Photo : Raymond Wergan, Newton Ferrers ©
The Evolution of the PLA Navy and China’s National Security Interests November 27, 2017 Guest Author
Chinese carrier Type 001A is transferred from drydock on April 26, 2017. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)
By Steve Micallef Since the beginning of the 21st century the People‟s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has steadily developed into a blue-water force able to rely on an ever increasing amount of modern equipment and platforms. This has been the result of years of intense effort on the part of naval planners in support of a more-forward oriented Chinese foreign and security policy. Indeed, until the 1990s, the PLAN was mostly a littoral or brown-water force tasked with protecting China‟s waterways and never venturing far from coastal waters. Today the PLAN is enjoying an influx of money and new equipment as well as the fruition of development programs started in the 1990s and 2000s. All this has resulted in a professional force which is able to protect Chinese interest abroad, further Chinese foreign policy, and build Chinese prestige worldwide. Strategic Context The communist victory in 1949 was achieved through the efforts of the Army. The PLA could not project power far beyond Chinese Communist shores, indeed Taiwan remained under Kuomintang rule whilst the Kuomintang navy sailed with impunity, raiding coastal installations, merchant craft, and fishing vessels. The PLAN‟s first task was to secure the Chinese coast and the Yangtze River and prepare for an invasion of Taiwan.1 Despite this there was a great lack of amphibious equipment and training, naval transportation and air cover for a successful invasion of Taiwan. Despite this, the PLA did manage to occupy Hainan although at a very heavy cost. Renewed American interest in the area at the start of the Korean War and the perceived American commitment to defend Taiwan stopped any further expansion.2 This highlighted the main problem that the PLAN has faced since then, that is, it has limited ability to project power beyond its shores. Although during this period it was mostly due to technological and equipment deficits, geographically China is also disadvantaged. Even if it had managed to acquire blue water capability in the 1950s, China is surrounded by U.S. bases and allies checking its expansion. To an extent this also remains the problem today. Looking outward from China, one immediately realizes how precarious its geographical position is. Its economy depends on the manufacturing of goods and their export. China depends on oil imports to maintain its economic growth. All shipping movements have to pass through narrow straits and shipping lanes that can be easily cordoned off in case of war. Indeed, the whole of East Asia can be cordoned off through a series of islands that run from north to south, these include the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Northern Philippines, and Borneo; from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Malay Peninsula. This is known as the first island chain3 and having control of the features and waterways of the chain effectively means control of access to both the China Seas and the Sea of Japan. Similarly, there is also the Second Island and the third island chains. The second island chain runs from Japan in the North, South towards Indonesia encompassing the North Mariana Islands, Guam, and Palau.4 The third island chain includes the Hawaiian Islands and runs through the mid-Pacific to New Zealand in the South. From Beijing‟s perspective these island chains cut off China‟s access to the high seas, keeping it isolated. Understandably, the Chinese are obsessed with these geographical features and their naval strategy is dictated by them. As its economy grew and became more dependent on sea trade, China set out to remedy its weakness at sea. For a traditional continental power like China, what Chinese admirals and generals see looking out from Beijing are concentric rings of American naval power stretching all the way across the Pacific (many would consider the U.S. West Coast as the fourth chain with Naval Base San Diego at its center). All these island chains are either directly occupied by the U.S. or by allies who give the U.S. access to ports and facilities. The first to envision a shift in role for the navy was General Liu Huaqing (1916-2011) in the mid-1980s.5 Until this point the PLAN‟s role was that of a subordinate to the PLA, it was a brown-water navy operating close to shore. Using its small units, it was expected to operate up and down the coast in guerrilla style attacks under the cover of land-based artillery and aircraft. This has been labelled as the “coastal defense” strategy. General Liu was instrumental in shifting the PLAN‟s strategy into one of “Offshore Defense” and transitioning the navy from a brown- water force to a green-water force, and subsequently to a blue-water one. For this, he has been labelled as “the father of the modern Chinese Navy.”6 According to Liu, the PLAN should strive to develop four important capabilities: the ability to seize limited sea control in certain areas for a certain period of time, the ability to effectively defend China‟s sea lanes, the ability to fight outside China‟s claimed maritime areas, and the ability to implement a credible nuclear deterrent.7 To achieve this Liu suggested expanding the Navy and strongly advocated for the PLAN to acquire aircraft carriers. Huaqing outlined a three-step program for the PLAN. In the first phase, which was to be achieved by the year 2000, the PLA Navy needed to be able to exert control over the maritime territory within the First Island China, namely the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. In the second phase, which has to be achieved by 2020, the navy‟s control was to expand to the second island chain. In the third phase, to be achieved by 2050, the PLA Navy is to evolve into a true global navy.8 This is the broad outline of the PLAN‟s strategy and since the 1980s it has been gradually acquiring the capabilities to carry it out. Today we are seeing the outcomes of this strategy. The PLAN has expanded rapidly, acquiring the capabilities for a true blue-water force able to protect Chinese interests abroad while Chinese foreign policy expanded concurrently. The Early Years of the PLAN In the early 1950s most of the PLAN‟s equipment was taken from the naval forces of the Republic of China as they retreated from the mainland. Officially the PLAN was established in September 1950, grouping together all the regional forces, some of which had defected, into a centralized command. The state of the PLAN was nothing to boast about. It was increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union to provide it with training and advisors, while home-built systems were basically none existent. As many as 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were deployed to China to boost the training of Chinese sailors while the Soviet Union also provided much of the PLAN‟s equipment. With the help of the Soviet Union the PLAN was reorganized in 1955 into three operation fleets9 and divided into five distinct branches. Today, the PLAN mostly maintains the same composition: its units are divided between the Submarine Force, the Surface Force, the Coastal Defense Force, the Marine Corps, and the Naval Air Force (established in 1952). All these fall under the responsibility of the three main commands: the North Sea Fleet, based in the Yellow Sea; the East Sea Fleet, based in the East China Sea; and the South Sea Fleet, based in the South China Sea. Throughout the 1950s indigenous shipbuilding programs were instituted, shipyards were constructed, and Soviet-licensed designs were constructed without Soviet assistance. In 1958 when the Soviet Union refused to support the development of Chinese SSNs and SSBNs, the PLAN opened up the first institutes dedicated to the study of shipbuilding, naval weapon systems, underwater weapons, hydro acoustics, and other areas in a bid to remove its dependence on foreign designs. Expansion continued into the 1960s with the Chinese licensing more complex ship designs and weapons from the Soviet Union. By the mid-70s the PLAN could call upon a series of indigenous designs. In 1971 the Type 051 destroyer was commissioned. This was the first modern surface combatant to be designed and built in China, and the first Chinese ship to be fitted with an integrated combat system. This was followed by the commissioning of the Type 053 frigate and its various subclasses for air-defense, anti-surface, and export purposes. In 1974 the first indigenous designed nuclear submarine started service (the Type 091). Together with this a host of other smaller surface combatants, including gun boats and torpedo boats, also entered service. However, China had little interest in dominating the seas beyond defense. Its large border with the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet Split meant that China preferred to spend its resources guarding the border with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The risk of a land invasion was perceived as a greater threat and took precedence over maritime power projection. Preoccupied with matters closer to home, the navy continued its training and expansion, competing for resources from other branches. In the 1980s naval construction fell below the levels of the 1970s. Up until that point the PLAN was still considered a regional naval power with green-water capabilities. Emphasis was placed on personnel development, reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine, and force structure in favor of more blue-water operations; as well as training in naval combined-arms operations involving all elements of the PLAN (submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces). The PLAN also started to venture beyond coastal waters and into the Pacific. However the strong Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay kept most naval units tied down in defense of the coast. It also prevented more Chinese involvement in the various Sino-Vietnamese skirmishes.
Gen. Liu Huaqing in March 1996, at closing ceremonies for the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. Credit Greg Baker/Associated Press
Spurred in part by the growth of the Chinese economy and the concentration of industry to coastal areas the Chinese increasingly looked at the sea as an economic lifeline. This was also the era when Liu came to prominence. His friendship with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping allowed him to influence the development of the PLAN. His programs included the reorganization of the navy, redeveloping the Marine Corps, upgrading bases and research and development facilities, and reforming the school system.10 These efforts can be considered as the origin of the professional navy that it is today. Despite these advances the PLAN was still largely subordinate to the People‟s Liberation Army Ground Force until the 1990s. However, during this decade the PLAN continued with its modernization with the acquisition of more modern equipment from Russia and deployments to the Western hemisphere with visits to the U.S., Mexico, Peru, and Chile. The 21st Century Navy The PLAN came into its own in the first decade of the 21st century. In terms of equipment the navy is increasingly relying on indigenous constructions. Today, of the entire surface force, only the 4 Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers and a number of Kilo and improved Kilo-class submarines are of foreign origin.11 The PLAN has also managed to acquire an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier from Ukraine which it has commissioned into service as the Liaoning. Whilst its combat capability is limited, it is being used as a testbed and indigenous designs are already under construction. A number of destroyers and frigates of indigenous design capable of blue-water operations are also in service. The Type 052 destroyers and the Type 054 frigates are all indigenous, proven designs which have been deployed in various operations worldwide. Effort has also gone into the creation of quieter indigenous SSBN. One may argue that it is not the equipment used but rather the way it is used that is of most interest. While in the early years the PLAN was mostly in charge of coastal defense this has now changed, the main reason being the growing Chinese economy which relies increasingly on the maritime domain for the export and import of goods. The PLAN‟s main mission today is to “independently or jointly with the Army and Air Force, to guard against enemy invasion from the sea, defend the state’s sovereignty over its territorial waters, and safeguard the state’s maritime rights and interests.”12 The world got its first demonstration of the PLAN‟s new worldwide presence in 2008 when for the first time PLAN vessels were deployed operationally off the Horn of Africa on an anti-piracy mission. PLAN vessels have been escorting merchant shipping in collaboration with other navies ever since.13 The message here is clear, the Chinese leadership is placing the security of its seaborne trade as critical for the overall development of the nation. The sea lines of communication must remain open.14 Overall these missions have been a resounding success for the PLAN and the Chinese have demonstrated remarkable willingness to collaborate on this issue, presenting China as a responsible player on the world stage but also gaining important operational experience in the process. Indeed, short of an all-out war, these operations were the closest that PLAN personnel got to quasi-combat missions.15 The construction of a PLAN base in Djibouti in 201716 is expected to enhance the Chinese presence in the area while also increasing the Navy‟s capabilities to project power abroad. This is part of a wider effort to secure vital sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean.17 The PLAN has been more active worldwide since the first decade of the 21st century. It has been invited and attended RIMPAC in 201418 and 2016,19 and has again been invited in 2018.20 It trained with the Russian Navy during Joint Sea 2016 and 2017 military exercises, the later involving exercises in the Sea of Japan21 and the Baltic Sea.22 The fact that Chinese ships travelled to the Baltic is a testament to how far the PLAN has come. En route the flotilla of Chinese ships made various goodwill visits to Western ports. Whilst the PLAN has been active in combating piracy abroad, closer to home it has also been employed for less „noble’ purposes. The PLAN has been actively supporting the Nine-Dash Line claiming most of the South China Sea. The dependence on seaborne trade, the relative ease by which South China Sea-bound maritime traffic can be blockaded, and the ability of the USN to sail in it without impunity (as during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996 when two aircraft carrier groups were deployed near Taiwan) have reinforced Chinese conviction that it needs to strengthen its defenses. Through its claim of the South China Sea, China has been engaged in a significant land reclamation project and turned minuscule features into military bases, from where aircraft, ships, and shore-based weapons could readily target the shipping transiting the critical waterway. As Admiral Harry Harris put it, the Chinese are building a “Great wall of sand.”23 While the Nine-Dash Line is hardly new, never before has China been able to enforce it. Indeed, after the Second World War, none of the features in the Spratly and Paracel islands were occupied, today various claimants maintain a multitude of facilities.24 This could not have been possible without naval support. China has also demonstrated an unwillingness to compromise, as events regarding Scarborough Shoal, Vietnam‟s oil drilling, and the ITLOS ruling have demonstrated. The Chinese Navy and coast guard have steadily pushed out Philippine fisherman from traditional fishing grounds, and China has been left in de facto control.25 In this situation might has made right and China is certainly succeeding in getting its way in the South China Sea. Beyond the protection of trade this could also have other implications. Since the end of the Second World War the U.S. has been able to maintain a permanent presence in the region through a network of alliances and military bases. Under its hegemony the region has prospered economically. A powerful navy would allow China to challenge U.S. dominion in the region and usher in an era where China could be the hegemon in Asia, perhaps even envisioning its own version of the Monroe Doctrine. Conclusion The modernization of the PLAN and the broadening of Chinese foreign policy are both linked. A larger, more advanced navy has allowed China to be more present on the world stage. Beyond prestige the PLAN has allowed China to be more engaged and aggressive in its foreign policy dealings. The need to maintain sea lines of communication has pushed China to further develop its navy. One can only speculate on what effect this will have in the long run; whilst some welcome a more present PLAN which can help secure the seas for all, there are those that reason that Beijing will increasingly use its newfound naval strength to expand its sphere of influence, creating an international or regional system that more suits its needs at the expense of others. After all, navies are the chief tool of global power projection and why build capability if not to use it? Steve Micallef graduated from the University of Malta with a B.A. (Hons) in International Relations in 2015. He also holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. References [1] Cole, B. D. (2010). The Great Wall at sea: China‟s Navy in the twenty-first century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 7. [2] Ibid. 8-9. [3] Yoshihara, T., & Holmes, J. R. (2013). Red star over the Pacific: China‟s rise and the challenge to U.S. maritime strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 20. [4] Ibid. 21. [5] http://cimsec.org/father-modern-chinese-navy-liu-huaqing/13291 [6] Ibid. [7] Ibid. [8] Cole, B. D. (2010). The Great Wall at sea: China‟s Navy in the twenty-first century. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. 176. [9] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan.htm [10] Ibid. 16. [11] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2017). The Military Balance, 2017. London: Routledge. 281-283 [12] Zhao, Z., & Luo, Y. (2010). China‟s national defense. China Intercontinental Press. 66-67. [13] Zhao, Z., & Luo, Y. (2010). China‟s national defense. China Intercontinental Press. 144-147. [14] Kamphausen, R., Lai, D., Scobell, A., Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, Bush School of Government & Public Service, National Bureau of Asian Research, . . . Texas A & M University. (2010). The PLA at home and abroad: Assessing the operational capabilities of China‟s military. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. 296. [15] Ibid. 301 [16] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-djibouti/china-formally-opens-first-overseas-military-base-in-djibouti-idUSKBN1AH3E3 [17] https://www.csis.org/analysis/issues-insights-vol-14-no-7-revisiting-chinas-string-pearls-strategy [18] http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2014/participants/ [19] http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/participants/# [20] https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/rimpac-2018-china-to-participate-in-major-us-naval-exercise/ [21] https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/chinese-russian-navies-hold-exercises-in-sea-of-japan-okhotsk-sea/ [22] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html [23] http://www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/harry-harris/speeches/2015/03/ASPI-Australia.pdf [24] Hayton, B. (2014). The South China Sea: the struggle for power in Asia. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.61. [25] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-philippines-witne/a-journey-to-scarborough-shoal-the-south-china-seas-waterworld- idUSKBN17E09O Source: http://cimsec.org