English Privateers and Their Effect Upon Venice at the End of Elizabeth’S Reign Joseph Davies
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F Myth or Reality? English Privateers and Their Effect upon Venice at the End of Elizabeth’s Reign Joseph Davies Discussions of the Venetian Republic are inevitably shrouded in a myriad of myths:’ those of the Republic’s legendary autonomy and democracy, of the competency of her citizenry, of her shrewd businessmen and cunning diplomats, and of her great maritime prowess and naval strength. As with many myths, these originated in some level of reality. But as the Republic aged, so did her reality, leaving her nothing but myth. Crucial pieces of this Venetian Myth are called into question by examining English privateering in the Mediterranean and its effect upon Venice. Myths are equally inescapable in discussions of pirates and privateers. The words “pirate” and “privateer’2 may conjure romantic visions of Captain Blood and the Crimson Pirate, flamboyantly dressed, faces to the wind, women by their sides. These were honorable rogues with a hearty laugh, a zest for life and a flagrant disregard for rules. “Pirate” and “privateer” may also bring forth an equally vivid vision of opportunists roaming the sea, seeking booty and prisoners for ransom. Neither of these myths is without base. To an Englishman, the holder of a letter of marque was a swashbuckler doing his duty for God, country, and king while simultaneously enlarging his purse. To a Spaniard or a Venetian the holder of a letter of rnarque was a vile sea ‘For discussions of the myth of Venice see Edward Muir’s Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice; Fredric C. Lane’s Venice: A Maritime Rc’pubtic, and Myron Gilmore’s essay in Renaissance Venice, ed. J. R. Hale. ‘The choice to use the word “pirate” or “privateer” can prove somewhat problematical for the modem historian. In many circles there is no difference between the two. In the past, however, a privateer was an individual who was given a commission by the state to privately arm a ship and, as a naval auxiliary, engage the expressed enemies of the state. As reward for his service to the state the privateer was allowed to take booty during these engagements. A pirate was an individual who had taken it upon himself to arm a ship and, without state approval, attack vessels solely in pursuit of profit. This often involved assaulting one’s own countrymen. But these separate definitions coLild easily blur, as a fully commissioned privateer could act against neutrals or the allies of the state which he served. How one defined ‘pirate” or “privateer” depended a great deal upon one’s perspective. Thus it is often difficult for the historian to describe a man of the past as either a pirate or a privateer in absolute terms. To that end, I have tried to use the terms as they would have been applied in the past. That is, a privateer is a sanctioned auxiliary acting in the interests of the state, and a pirate is an outlaw acting strictly in his own interests. It was not always possible to maintain this distinction and the terms are occasionally used somewhat interchangeably. r 2 ex post facto dog roaming the ocean seeking defenseless merchantmen. One man’s outlaw was another’s patriot, depending upon one’s position relative to the sword or cannon. A more realistic image, however, is one of privateers and pirates as instruments of foreign policy and economic corn petition for the burgeoning nation-states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During this period, the English used privateers and pirates to carry out foreign policy objectives.3 Alberto Tenenti and fredric C. Lane have discussed the detrimental effects that piratical practices had upon the Venetian Republic. Tenenti pays special attention to the pirates of Northern Europe. Although both Tenenti and Lane acknowledge the role piracy played in the decline of Venice, neither uses it to question the myths surrounding Venice. Had they done this, they would have revealed the true relationship between piracy, foreign policy, and economics, while exposing the myth of Venice. Priva teering England had a long tradition of privateering. It was expensive to outfit and maintain a navy that could both defend the island’s shores and protect England’s interests in distant seas. The problem was solved by supplementing the standing navy with privateers. The Tudor navy relied upon issuing letters of marque. Letters of marque commissioned individuals to arm merchantmen and put to sea to fight enemies of the Crown. The admiralty relied upon these privateers to provide coastal defense while the regular navy carried out operations on the high seas. In time of war additional letters of marque would be issued to further augment the regular navy for operations against the enemy. Some privateers served directly under the command of the Lord Admiral while others were unleased to wreak what havoc they would upon the enemy. There were, of course, risks involved with accepting this type of commission. After all, it involved seeking out and engaging the enemy. The incentive to do this lay in the allure of prizes. Ships and cargoes captured in combat were kept by the privateer. The more aggressive a ship’s commander, the more profit he could make and the more damage he could do to the enemy. This system worked because round ships could easily straddle the line between merchantman or man-o’-war. Because of the ease of heavily arming a round ship without sacrificing cargo space, many were both.4 This blurred the line between trading ships and war 3This can also be said of the Dutch. 1See Appendix 2. T English Frivateers 3 ships,5 prompting a Venetian Senator to add this comment to a motion: “[S]eeing that many of her Majesty’s subjects, who in port appear as merchants, but on the open seas are nothing but tt6 public pirates. The Venetian ambassador to Constantinople reported a comment made by the English Ambassador at the same court that accurately depicts the position privateering held in England: The Ambassador said that in truth very few ships did sail for tmding but the Kingdom of England, though a very rich feeding ground, was not able to support the whole nation, therefore they had to take to the sea, and to be fully armed, on account of the Spanish, their powerful foes; besides, these ships were the bulwarks of the country. Sometimes they did not find any booty on the open sea, and so . pushed further. This also demonstrates the English turn to the Mediterranean in search of profit and adventure. This would hold dire consequences for the Republic, as Englishmen began to prey upon Venetian ships with impunity. Once the privateers put to sea it became difficult for the commissioning government to control their actions. Often privateers ceased to function in the spirit of their commission, assaulting neutral and ally ships. This often caused them to be outlawed at home.8 This could also work to the advantage of the commissioning government, as they could not be held responsible for their citizens’ actions. This aspect would come to play a large role as England inserted herself into the Mediterranean. Fredric C. Lane’s essay National Wealth and Protection Costs discusses the costs and benefits incurred by nations who utilized violence to compete with their economic adversaries.9 Lane examines two distinct views of the use of violence as it relates to economies. The first is the view of the mercantilists, who saw power as a means to wealth and wealth as a means to power. 5The Venetian ambassador to Constantinople had this to say concerning that subject: “I replied that the best way would be for the English ships to abstain from coming here [the Mediterranean]; for they had but little trade, nor cotild distinguish I those that came for trading only; for all of them were hampered with artillery, and provisioned for a year, even to the water, and in order that they might be handy in fighting they were kept clear, leaving not only the quarter deck but also the main deck, where goods are usually placed, free for artillery. Theft is their proper business and the object of their voyage. Horatio F. Brown, ed., Calendar of State Papers. Venetian 7592-7603 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1897), 433 #931. 6lbid., 418 #896. 7lbid., 433 #931. 5This is somewhat of an empty punishment, especially prior to the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Capturing and disciplining these outlaws was not trtdy taken up with sincerity until that time. Fredric C. Lane, Venice and I-listorL/: The Collected Papers of Eredric C. Lane (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). r 4 ex post facto That is to say, victory in violence brought victory in the marketplace. The competing view, associated with Adam Smith, states that the use of violence incurs costs that may equal or outweigh the profits gained in commerce.1° Lane’s discussion sheds light upon the hidden economic consequences of a violent foreign policy used to influence commerce. Lane argues that such policies can be a double-edged sword. This relates to an evaluation of privateering, as the primary goat of privateers was not to engage hostile navies but rather to disrupt the economies of antagonist nations. England used this technique to great success against the Spanish in the Atlantic. Lane’s argument suggests that England should have incurred great costs in perpetrating this disruption. England, however, had found a means of getting around this paradox by using privateers. Privateers cost the English Crown nothing, yet they achieved the political and economic objectives of the Crown.