University of Florida Thesis Or Dissertation Formatting

THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS OF 1959: EVERYDAY VIOLENCE AND POST-COLONIAL MEMORY

AURELIE MAKETA MAWETE

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2020

“To my family, thanks for everything”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the result of months of work and endeavor; it would not have become a reality without the support, supervision, and encouragement of a significant number of people and institutions during both the research and writing phases. My thanks go in the first place to my advisor, Nancy Rose Hunt, and all my professors here at the University of Florida, notably

Suzanne O’Brien, and my committee members, Philip Janzen and Alioune Sow.

I would also like to thank my friends Nancy Nswal Nson, Felicien Maisha Masanga,

Ange Asanzi Afurawa, Cristovao Nwachukwu, Nourridine Siewe, Macodou Fall, Raphael

Iyamu, and Mosunmola Adeojo; thank you for your time and friendship.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. My mother Celine Nkuizulu Mufuta, my aunt

Vicky Mufuta Miakiedika and her husband Professor Jacob Sabakinu Kivilu, my brother Thomas

Maketa Lutete Nsanda Junior and his family, my sister Vivi Maketa Tevuzula and her family, my niece Celine Maketa Miakiedika, and my cousin Leslie Sabakinu Lukwikilu. Thank you for always checking up on me and always being there for me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 4

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 6

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 7

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 9

2 RIOTS AS EVENT: A HISTORY ...... 14

3 FROM RIOTERS TO LOOTERS ...... 20

4 CONGOLESE REPORTING IN NEWSPAPERS ...... 22

5 THE RIOTS: A LENS ONTO CLASS STRUGGLES ...... 30

6 A NATIONALIST MEMORY PROJECT: MOBUTU’S RECASTING OF THE 1959 RIOTS ...... 39

7 THE RIOTS AND DECOLONIZATION ...... 45

8 CONCLUSION...... 49

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 51

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 54

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

4-1 Inside cover of La voix du Congolais showing a class taught outside after the January 1959 riots. The scene is at Ngiri-Ngiri, one of the African neighborhoods of Léopoldville...... 23

4-2 Destruction in an African neighborhood. Pages 64, 65 and 67 of La Voix du Congolais...... 24

4-3 Page 68 of La Voix du Congolais. Peace after the riots. First picture, a view of the central market. Second picture, a bus in a Léopoldville street. Last, a classroom in a destroyed building...... 27

4-4 Page 5 of Présence Congolaise First picture on the top: Arthur Pinzi facing the crowd at YMCA. The second picture shows Pinzi trying to calm down the crowd...... 29

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABAKO Association des Bakongo

ACP Agence Catholique de Presse

ANC Armée Nationale Congolaise

APIC Association du personnel Indigènes du Congo Belge

CRISP Centre de Recherche et d'Information sociopolitiques

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

MNC Mouvement National Congolais

OCA Office des cités Africaines

PSA Parti Solidaire Africain

V-Club Vita Club

YMCA Young Men Christian Association

Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts

THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS OF 1959: EVERYDAY VIOLENCE AND POST-COLONIAL MEMORY

Aurelie Maketa Mawete

May 2020

Chair: Nancy Rose Hunt Major: History

On January 4, 1959, a riot broke out in Léopoldville, the capital of the Belgian Congo.

The riot began some hours after the cancelation of a political ABAKO meeting and the defeat of

Vita-Club, a well-known soccer team. The disturbances lasted three days, took the lives of more than forty Congolese, and destroyed a significant part of Léopoldville’s African quarters.

According to contemporary Congolese newspapers, these riots were not a revolution against

Europeans, but a step back for nationalist movements Most people at the time considered the rioters to be criminals and looters. In recent years, on January 4, Congolese commemorate the rioters as martyrs of the independence movement and celebrate them as heroes. How did the depiction of these rioters change so drastically? This work draws on evidence from archival materials and the rich historiography about nationalist memory projects to examine how, after his coup in November 1965, Lieutenant General Joseph-Desiré Mobutu used the memory of the

1959 riots to legitimize his power.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

On January 4, 1959, a series of riots erupted in Léopoldville, the capital of Belgian

Congo, during which an angry mob of more than 3,000 people destroyed a significant part of the

“indigenous” neighborhoods of the city. The event lasted for three days and cost the lives of more than forty Congolese. According to some Congolese journalists at the time, the rioters were criminals, looters, and delinquents, while the riots were a considerable step back for this colony edging towards decolonization, that is, for the fight for Congolese autonomy from Belgium. In recent years, on January 4, Congolese commemorate the rioters as martyrs of the movement for decolonization and celebrate them as national heroes.

This thesis argues that the best way to understand the history and mythology around the riots and their transformation within Congolese national imaginary is to analyze the debates and tensions that surrounded them at the end of the 1950s. This analysis seeks concrete ways to understand tensions in the social structure of Congolese society and Kinshasa (before

Léopoldville) from the end of the Second World War to the eve of independence and beyond.

Using primary sources from the 1950s, this thesis tells the story of the riots while highlighting class struggles that existed within Congo and its capital city during that period. The class tensions shaped Congolese society in a way sustained after independence and that were instrumentalized by Joseph-Desiré Mobutu to serve his political agendas. This analysis also challenges the notions of security and stability in Congolese colonial cities and argues that

"indigenous" neighborhoods were not only unsafe but crowded and sometimes violent. This social promiscuity or density underlined and complicated class and social differences among

Congolese.

The goal here is not to simply retell the stories of the January 1959 riots in Léopoldville, nor of Mobutu’s rise to power. It is rather to document and analyze class conflict within

Congolese society in Léopoldville and other cities during the colonial era and understand how these same struggles played a role in the production of national memories years later. The idea for this study came out of a graduate seminar on policing and cities; then, I studied “the martyrs” of independence. My argument was that the January 1959 riots were proof of a Congolese political awakening just before decolonization arrived in 1960. The more contemporary sources that I investigated about the riots, the more I realized that Congolese journalists who described the event at the time depicted them in a way quite different from what I grew up learning about them in Kinshasa. One question emerged over and over again: How did the 1959 rioters become symbolic of resistance against Belgian colonial tyranny?

The answer to that question emerged from developing this thesis, which views the 1959 riots as a window into everyday life and realities in this colonial city, including matters of cohabitation, insecurity, violence, social promiscuity, and racial strife. This thesis also underlines debates among Congolese évolués and postcolonial intellectuals about the riots. It investigates how these debates were once representative of class tensions within late colonial Congolese society in Léopoldville and still have postcolonial reverberations. Thirdly, this thesis discusses how the Belgian responses to the 1959 riots were important to future framings of these events as a major turning point on a “the path” to independence. Finally, it suggests how diverse individuals and groups instrumentalized memories of the riots to extend a specific ideology or script history in their interest.

This essay converses with scholarship on collective memory and links between history and memory in Africa, notably work by Rumarisai Charumbira and Abdelmajid Hannoum.

Rumarisai Charumbira has investigated the uses of the past by Zimbabwean nationalists in building their nation. Abdelmajid Hannoum has described myths surrounding riots as narratives with social functions that have been reinterpreted by groups or individuals to defend an ideology.1

This study also converses with scholars interested in violence in the Congolese context.

Several historians have begun to investigate security and violence within colonial cities in

Africa. Didier Gondola, Nancy Hunt, Amandine Lauro, and Jean-Luc Vellut have differently criticized and challenged Belgian colonial concepts such as the "model colony" or “Pax

Belgica,” used to promote the Belgian colony as a space of order with a skilled, stabilized labor force, high standard of living borne of welfare capitalism and advanced, pronatalist public health system.2 Colonial anxieties also prevailed in big cities like Léopoldville, which grew beyond easy control after the end of the Second World War. The transformations of such colonial landscapes posed new security and reputational challenges for the Belgian authorities, and they coincided with dramatic socials change and the rise of a new generation of anticolonial disorder and upheaval. Colonial towns and cities generated new kinds of concern about the dangers of

1 Abdelmajid Hannoum, Colonial histories, Post-Colonial memories: The legend of the Kahina, a North African heroine. (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2001). Rumarisai Charumbira, Imagining a nation: History and memory in making Zimbabwe. (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2015).

2 Amandine Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order: Urbanization, Security Anxieties and Police Reforms in Postwar Congo (1945-1960)," in Policing New Risks in Modern European History, eds. Jonas Campion and Xavier Rousseaux (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); Nancy Rose Hunt, A Nervous State: Violence, Remedies, and Reverie in Colonial Congo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016); Jean Luc Vellut, "Le Katanga industriel en 1944: malaises et anxiétés dans la société coloniale,” in Le Congo belge durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Recueil d’études, ed., Jean Stengers (Bruxelles: ARSOM), 1983.

unruly “detribalized” Congolese. Colonial security and policing institutions seemed increasingly inadequate in rural and urban zones alike.3

This paper relies on evidence from colonial and post-colonial archival documents, such as newspapers, decrees, speeches, and the records of parliamentary sessions, including those contained in Congo, a collection published by CRISP, an independent Belgian-Congolese research institution created by Jules Gérard-Liebois in 1958. CRISP aimed to study political decisions in the Belgian and European contexts. It is a valuable as it published many unpublished documents, speeches, pamphlets, and meeting reports from 1960 to 1967.4

This study will mine two significant newspapers from Léopoldville edited by Congolese for Congolese audiences. La Voix du Congolais, a monthly periodical, was the first Congolese serial publication approved by the colonial state in 1945 to respond to Congolese requests for a print culture medium by which to express themselves. Présence Congolaise was a weekly newspaper published by SODIMCA, an independent press. The latter began in January 1957 as the Congolese supplement to Courrier d’Afrique, a Léopoldville newspaper of long date.

Présence Congolaise became autonomous in July 1958. This newspaper was independent, neither attached nor subservient to any political organization. However, the tone of the newspaper was often influenced by the political loyalties of its editor-in-chief, Joseph Mbungu

3 Amandine Lauro, "Maintenir l’ordre dans la Colonie-modèle. Notes sur les désordres urbains et la police des frontières raciales au Congo Belge (1918-1945)," Crime, Histoire & sociétés/Crime, History & Societies, 15, no. 2 (2011).

4 The CRISP is an independent institution which aims to study political decision in Belgium and the European context, see http://www.crisp.be/a-propos/: "Les travaux du CRISP s’attachent à montrer les enjeux de la décision politique, à expliquer les mécanismes par lesquels elle s’opère, et à analyser le rôle des acteurs qui y prennent part, que ces acteurs soient politiques, économiques, sociaux, associatifs… Les sujets étudiés englobent l’ensemble de la vie politique, sociale et économique : à côté des partis politiques, des organisations représentatives d’intérêts sociaux et des divers groupes de pression, le CRISP étudie les groupes d’entreprises, qui sont les structures les plus importantes du pouvoir économique.”

(the mayor of Léopoldville’s Matete), and one of its most famous journalists, Joseph Ngalula.

Both were members of the MNC party of Congo’s most famous politician of these years, Patrice

Lumumba.5 Many Congolese intellectuals and journalists published in these two newspapers, which are interesting resources for debates about the riots.

This project relies on two other sources. The first is Jean-Marie Mutamba's Du Congo

Belge au Congo Independent 1940-1960: Emergence des Évolués et Genèse du Nationalisme, published in 1998, which follows the évolués from their emergence to the years of independence.

Mutamba’s provides an insightful view of the évolués during the colonial period, their demands, victories, and tensions and frustrations surrounding their status. The second is a theoretical not an empirical source. It is Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, published in 1952. It offers a valuable theoretical analysis of the impact of colonialism upon the colonized in a range of possible contexts. While Fanon’s work focused on Martinique, his approach to "psychological trauma" in the colonized may be applied to the Belgian Congo. His work enables understanding the social situations and divisions among Congolese during the colonial era.

5 Jean-Chrétien D. Ekambo, Histoire du Congo RDC dans la presse : Des origines à l'indépendance (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2013), 229.

CHAPTER 2 RIOTS AS EVENT: A HISTORY

Since 1966, Leopoldville’s rioters of 1959 have been celebrated as national heroes, first in Zaïre and then in the Democratic Republic of Congo; they have been known as the “martyrs of independence.” In the 1950s, many Congolese journalists and politicians, such as Mbungu, who were fighting for native rights and autonomy, considered them to be looters and delinquents.

They refused to admire the rioters or connect their actions to the fight for colonial emancipation.

Thus, it is important to ask: What happened in January 1959 in Léopoldville? This section and the next reconstruct a chronology for the riots through official and independent reports and media.1

René Lemarchand and Crawford Young have made direct connections between the political party of ABAKO, its meeting on January 4, 1959 at the YMCA, and the riots. They argued that the cancelation of the ABAKO meeting, organized to claim immediate independence, resulted in the riots of January.2 However, other documents from the close of the 1950s show that these riots were accidental rather than resulting from an explicit call to protest.

This section juxtaposes media and independent reports from 1959 with Cleophas

Kamitatu's memoir, La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa, in order to reconsider the causes of the riots and highlight differences between scholarly descriptions and those of narrators

1 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 262.

2 Crawford Young, Politics in Congo: Decolonization and Independence (Oxford: Princeton Legacy Library, 1965); René Lemarchand, Political awakening in the Belgian Congo (Berkeley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964). ABAKO was a Kongo-based political and ethnic association created in 1950 at Léopoldville by Edmond Nzeza Landu. Its original objective was to unify, conserve, and perfect the Kongo language. It is under Kasa-Vubu;s leadership from 1954 that ABAKO became a political organization, see Yolanda Covington-Ward, “Joseph Kasa-Vubu, ABAKO, and performances of Kongo nationalism in the independence of Congo,” in Journal of Black studies, October 3, 2011, http://jbs.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/09/27/0021934711424491 (Accessed January 7, 2019), 43

from 1959.3 Kamitatu's depiction of the riots as a direct consequence of the ABAKO meeting is representative of the official story in Congo that of the scholars. His depiction of 1971 may be found in these words:

At noon…, the population was at the YMCA to listen to the latest decisions taken by the leaders [of ABAKO] in their campaign against Belgian colonialism. At the time of the meeting, Kasa-Vubu declared that the authorities had just revoked his permission to speak. As a sign of respect to the law and the authorities, Kasa- Vubu decides to leave the YMCA; it is at that moment, that the angry crowd exploded. From that moment on, the riot was inevitable.4

Kamitatu's version contradicts the 1959 reports about the scope of the meeting, as he claimed that members of the general populace were at the YMCA meeting, implying that it was an event for a wide public. The CRISP report represented the ABAKO meeting as a private event organized by ABAKO Kalamu, one section of the political Bas-Congo party, ABAKO.5 The

CRISP statement indicated that the location chosen by the organizers was a YMCA conference room with limited capacity, not the basketball court known as the piste Hébert at the same

YMCA, which had a capacity for more than 4,000 people.6 Moreover, it indicated that in their

December 28, 1958 letter to the colonial authorities, the organizers did not ask for permission to

3 Jean Marie Mutamba, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant 1940-1960 : Emergence des "Evolués" et genèse du nationalisme (Kinshasa : IFEP, 1998), 439. Kamitatu began his political career at Kikwit around May 1959 and stayed in politics until his death in 2008. Kamitatu led the delegation of his political party PSA to the Belgo- Congolese Round Table conference. That meeting took place from January 20 to February 20, 1960 in Brussels, Belgium, and enabled a consensus about the date of Congolese independence date, 30 June 1960. Kamitatu is thus one of the “fathers” of independence. His memoir narrates his political experience from independence until Mobutu's coup d'état in 1965.

4 Cléophas Kamitatu, La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa, les crimes de Mobutu, (Paris : Maspero, 1971), 25: Dès midi, …, le peuple était présent au YMCA, pour entendre les dernières décisions arrêtées par les dirigeants dans leurs mouvements de lutte contre le colonialisme belge. A l'heure fixée, Kasa-Vubu apparait, non pour tenir son meeting devant la population rassemblée, mais pour annoncer que les autorités de la ville viennent de lui retirer l'autorisation de s'adresser à la foule. Soucieux du respect de la loi et de l'autorité établie, Kasa-Vubu se retire ; c'est alors que la foule furieuse, se déchaine. A partir de cet instant, l'émeute est inévitable [Translation by author].

5 "Éléments pour une Sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959, CRISP, Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2, no.2 (1959), 9.

6 "Éléments pour une Sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville," 11.

organize the meeting; they only informed them it would be held. Private meetings did not require administrative authorization at the time.7

Kamitatu also recalled that the ABAKO leaders planned to share their latest decisions in their anticolonial campaign. According to two organizers, Antoine Kingotolo and Filibert

Luyeye, the meeting's primary purpose was an official presentation by the ABAKO Kalamu committee.8 The other topic for the meeting would be a debriefing by Arthur Pinzi, the mayor of

Kalamu and president of a workers’ union, APIC, following his trip to Belgium for an international trade union conference .9

Another discrepancy between Kamitatu’s account and the contemporary reports concerns whether the colonial authorities had canceled this meeting. CRISP asserted that that morning of the January 4 the organizers decided to postpone the meeting until January 18 because Pinzi had canceled his presentation. Apparently Pinzi was still ordering his notes and wanted to present them to Governor General Hendrik Cornelis first.10 The cancelation of the meeting seemed obvious when none of the organizers were at the YMCA that morning. Kasa-Vubu and Pinzi were called when the disorder started because they worked and lived in Kalamu, close to the

YMCA.

Despite the meeting’s cancelation, the organizers were not able to inform their militants on time. That morning of January 4, a crowd of more than 4,000 people had already flocked to

7 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 251.

8 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo belge au Congo Indépendant, 366.

9 "Éléments pour une Sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959", 10.

10 Ibid., 10.

the YMCA.11 Why, one must wonder, despite the apparently private scope for the meeting, were there more than 4,000 ABAKO activists present? Two indications explain the influx of people.

The first is a speech by the Belgian King Baudouin, scheduled for January 13. Many of the militants assumed that Pinzi already knew the contents of the King's impending speech.

Moreover, a rumor circulated about the participation of Gaston Diomi, the mayor of Ngiri-Ngiri, at the meeting.12 Like Lumumba, Diomi had participated in the 1958 All-African Peoples'

Conference in Ghana. The rumor suggested he was going to speak about the conference and independence.13 The second indication is that one week before, on December 28, a meeting of the rival party, MNC, had been a huge success with more than 3,000 participants. Thus, it became important for ABAKO activists to show that they were still the most popular political party in the city. On January 4, Lumumba, the MNC president, was circulating in the YMCA neighborhood to check which militants were attending.14

Another discrepancy between Kamitatu’s account and official records lies in chronology.

Kamitatu recalled that the disorders began immediately after Kasa-Vubu's speech. However, reports from the time confirm that after Kasa-Vubu's speech at around 3 p.m., the crowd followed the President and began to disband slowly, leaving the YMCA.15 Thus, a narrative that

11 “Commission parlementaire chargée de faire une enquête sur les évènements qui se sont produits à Léopoldville en Janvier 1959“, Chambre des représentants, Séance 1958-1959, 27 mars 1959, 38.

12“Éléments pour une sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville, » 10.

13 “All-African People's Conferences” International Organization, 16, no. 2, Africa and International Organization (Spring, 1962). The All-African Peoples' Conference went from December 8 to 13. It was a non-governmental assembly attended by more than 300 political and trade union leaders from 28 African countries. The conference aimed to encourage nationalist leaders in their efforts to organize political independence in their countries and to plan strategies for nonviolent revolution in Africa.

14 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 255.

15 Antoine Roger, Bolamba, "Léopoldville a été le théâtre de triste incidents," La voix du Congolais, February 1959, 63 ; "Journées tragiques à Leo: des nombreux morts, des centaines de blessés et des destructions sans nombres,

explains the riots as resulting from the cancellation of the ABAKO meeting by the colonial administration is likely inaccurate. Rather, after the cancellation, the situation around the YMCA was partially tense but still calm, with many activists leaving the area. According to Présence

Congolaise, an external event caused these disorders: the presence in the crowd of angry supporters of the V-Club.16 On that Sunday afternoon, a soccer game took place between this famous team from Léopoldville, and Mikado-Sabena, the team of the Belgian airline company.

During the quarter final of this national tournament at the King Baudouin Stadium, located in

Kalamu and near the YMCA, V-Club lost against Mikado-Sabena. After the match, some one thousand disappointed fans joined those still milling around the YMCA.17

In his testimony to the Belga news agency on January 6, 1959, Pinzi—a direct witness of the riot’s outbreak—revealed that even after the arrival of the police, the situation was under control. If the group hanging around the YMCA was threatening, it was not violent. It was only after a police officer, overwhelmed by the crowd, fired his gun that the rioting began. The mob began throwing stones at police officers and destroying all vehicles in sight.18

This situation, where a crowd of angry persons ransacked the city after the defeat of their athletic team, resembled events in June 1957. On June 16t, 1957, a friendly match between

Congolese and Belgian soccer teams ended with a riot and the Belgians won. Congolese spectators assumed that the white referee had been biased and threw stones at the Europeans in

"Présence Congolaise, January 10, 1959, 1. The two newspapers confirm the content of Kasa-Vubu’s speech and this chronology of events.

16 "Journées tragiques à Léo : des nombreux morts, des centaines de blessés et des destructions sans nombres," 3.

17 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 253.

18“Éléments pour une Sociologie d’une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959,” 12: The report of CRISP converges with one of the newspapers; the police started shooting. Even the report of La voix du Congolais confirms that the police were the first to shoot.

the stadium. The result was 132 injured, 10 Congolese arrested, and 50 cars destroyed.19 A difference between the two events is that there was no allegation of cheating in 1959, when the triggering factor seemed to have been a police gunshot.

19Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 254.

CHAPTER 3 FROM RIOTERS TO LOOTERS

According to official reports, the disturbances lasted two more days and reached most of the nine "indigenous" communes or quarters of the city. At the end of three days, the casualties were 47 dead and 265 injured – with 241 civilians and 24 soldiers – for Congolese, and 60 injured – with 11 soldiers – among Europeans.1 During the night of January 4 to 5, the rioters became looters. One of their first targets was Foncobel, a commercial district in an "indigenous" quarter where most shops were owned by Portuguese and Greek merchants.2 After three days of looting, according to a Présence Congolaise reporter, there was nothing left. The stores were empty, and the buildings burned down.3

Another target of the looters was corporate investment and savings institutions such as cooperatives, especially one known as OCA, which was in charge of collecting rents in African neighborhood. Présence Congolaise explained that the looters were trying to steal the files and erase their debt.4 Finally, schools were a main target of looting. Looters destroyed more than fourteen missionary and secular schools, emptying them of all materials and burning up some of them just as they had done to the shops. The CIP correspondent explained that the schools were destroyed by the thousands of young people rejected by the educational system.5According to the

1 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo Indépendant, 1940-1960, 379.

2 "Éléments pour une sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959, " 12.

3“Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier, “ Présence Congolaise, January 10th, 1959, 3.

4 Ibid.,” 3.

5 "Éléments pour une Sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959, 14.

Parliamentary committee report, Catholic schools had rejected many applications because of government financial restrictions.6

While it is hard to know who the rioters were precisely, evidence suggests that they were members of more disadvantaged classes. Official sources reported that 40% of the arrested were unemployed, and most of the 47 dead were youth between 13 and 17 years old.7 Also, during the looting, the slogan most shouted by the crowd was not independence but ofele, a Lingala word that means “free of charge,” suggesting that items usually too expensive for them to afford were now free for one and all.8 The mob’s behavior is consistent with another attempt to take revenge for social inequalities, given that their targets were symbols of prestige, such as commercial sites, corporate investments, welfare homes, savings institutions, and schools. All the destructive acts suggest protests and revenge against colonial institutions that oppressed or rejected them.

The causes of these Léopoldville riots were more complicated than presented by scholars

Lemarchand or Young, since they were more a consequence of persistent colonial circumstances than a reaction to the mere cancelation of a political meeting. After the first day, the rioters turned to looting that destroyed most of "indigenous" neighborhoods. It is, therefore, important to investigate how Congolese journalists covered this outburst of violence at the time.

6 “Commission parlementaire chargée de faire une enquête sur les évènements qui se sont produits à Léopoldville en Janvier 1959“, Chambre des représentants, Séance 1958-1959, 27 mars 1959, 29.

7 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo R.D.C. dans la Presse, 262.

8 “Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier,” 3.

CHAPTER 4 CONGOLESE REPORTING IN NEWSPAPERS

A good place to determine the Congolese reaction is in newspapers of the time, even though usually only the views of évolués were represented.1 This section will focus on La Voix du Congolais and Présence Congolaise, two newspapers published in Léopoldville and written by Congolese for Congolese audiences. They provide an overview of the riots and their coverage by Congolese journalists of the day. La Voix du Congolais and Présence Congolaise had

Congolese editors: Antoine Roger Bolamba and Joseph Mbungu, respectively. This work does not consider ethnically-based newspapers – such as Congo Pratique of the Bandibu Manianga association or ABAKO’s Notre Kongo. The aim is rather the overall reaction of multiethnic

Léopoldville in a period after the colonial administration banned in 1957 more controversial newspapers such as Philippe Kanza’s Congo or Quinze.2

La Voix du Congolais and Présence Congolaise were critical of the rioters. Both newspapers asserted that a large part of the population frowned upon the rioting and the looting and emphasized the outsider status of the rioters and the negative consequences of the riots for the city and for Congolese living there. The front page of La Voix du Congolais, for instance,

1 According to Jean-Marie Mutamba Makombo, the term évolués came from cultural and social evolutionist theory of the second half of the nineteenth century in Europe. That theory created a hierarchical value among cultures. In that scheme, non-European human societies were perceived as savages, primitives, and backward and thus were at the first stage of evolution, and white European societies were defined as civilized and on the top of social evolution. The évolué class lay in between these two poles: they were individuals who, through a specific process, were evolving to become similar to Whites. Even if the term was used in the Belgian Congo since the 1930s, it became officially established after the Second World War. To be regarded as évolués, Congolese had to meet specific criteria. First, they needed a certain degree of instruction; the minimum was a middle school diploma (four years of post-primary) and the ability to express themselves in French. They needed a minimum monthly income that allowed them to dress correctly, live in a modern house, and own at least a bicycle, a phonograph, a glowing lamp, a sewing machine, and a radio. Being évolués meant having a career, high professional awareness, and good morality. See Jean-Marie Mutamba, "Les évolués : situation au Congo belge," https://books.openedition.org/pusl/10394?lang=en; and Jean Marie Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant, 1940-1960, 50-51.

2 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant, 1940-1960, 305.

showed the picture of a classroom held outdoors with the caption: “After the Léopoldville incident and the destruction of infrastructure, lessons must be given outdoors at the primary school of Ngiri-Ngiri.” 3 (Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. Inside cover of La voix du Congolais showing a class taught outside after the January 1959 riots. The scene is at Ngiri-Ngiri, one of the African neighborhoods of Léopoldville.

In the only article that covered the riots, "Léopoldville a été le théâtre de triste incidents,"

Bolamba described the rioters as irresponsible, vandals, and delinquents. This journalist insisted on the destruction, and he deplored the big step back that the looting represented for the city and its inhabitants.4 The editor used pictures of vandalized welfare homes, clinics, and schools to represent the riots, and pointed to the suffering of Congolese with the following words: "20,000 black children cannot study anymore," "Hundreds of women are seeing their progress slowed down," and "How many patients can no longer be treated as they should be?" (Figure 4-2).

Bolamba' s article failed to acknowledge fatalities among Congolese. He only stated: "there were

3 La voix du Congolais, February 1959, cover.

4 Antoine Roger Bolamba, “Léopoldville a été le théâtre de triste incidents [sic.], "66-67: Bolamba listed seven public schools, forty shops owned by Africans, eleven welfare homes, four-city halls, eleven mission, four clinics, six markets, three police stations, seventeen public buildings, six European houses, six major construction areas and four gas stations.

some victims” of the Force Publique.5 The article praised most of the Force Publique’s actions, which, they claimed, succeeded in securing the city. It also praised the colonial state's reaction that prevented more destruction by imposing a curfew and forbidding more than five persons from gathering at the same time in a street.6

Figure 4-2. Destruction in an African neighborhood. A) Pages 64 and 65 of La Voix du Congolais after the riots. On the left, from the top to the bottom: two views of professional schools for Congolese at N’Djili, and a class in Ngiri Nigiri’s Athénée. On the right, from the top to bottom: The inside of a welfare home, center of familial education foyer social site for women; Saint Peter’s missionary shop; and a burnt car in a street of Léopoldville. B) La Voix du Congolais, 67. A dispensary at the Matete neighborhood after the riots.

5Antoine Roger Bolamba, “Léopoldville a été le théâtre de triste incidents [sic.]," 66: The Force Publique was the name of the Belgian Congo’s armed forces.

6 Ibid., " 66.

La Voix du Congolais was an officially approved Congolese periodical, and thus its critical tone toward the rioters is understandable. However, even Présence Congolaise, which had an MNC editor, was critical.7 In its issue of January 10, 1959, Présence Congolaise dedicated five of its eight pages to covering the event, and the words for the rioters were harsh. One columnist presented them as thieves and looters, and two of three articles on the riots described destruction in the city and the big step back that the riots represented for the city and the colony.

In "Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier," Mbungu introduced the rioters as a bunch of idle youth.

When describing the city in the aftermath, he revealed that in some neighborhoods, such as

Ngiri-Ngiri and Bandalungwa, schools, clinics, city halls, and churches were empty and burned down. As he explained, "when we stopped by the Athénée interracial, at 4 pm on Tuesday [5

January 1959], it was still burning, and I heard a rumor that the looters stole 3 million francs intended for paying teachers at Léopoldville’s official schools.”8 For Mbungu, such incidents were against Congolese interests because many were unemployed and thousands were likely to fall into misery from the damages..9 In another article, “Devant ces heures sombres, gardons notre sang-froid," an anonymous journalist complained that the first day of school had to be canceled because of building destruction. He described the rioters as a band of robbers who in schools, clinics, and welfare homes destroyed all the “progress” that had been made in the

7 Ekambo, Histoire du Congo RDC dans la presse, 231.

8 Joseph Mbungu, "Des actes dont on n'est pas fier, " Présence Congolaise, January 10th, 1959, 3. « Lorsque nous sommes passés, mardi à 16 heures, l'Athénée Interracial flambait encore. Et il parait, d'après le bruit qui court qu'on y avait dérobé plus de 3 millions de francs, argent destiné à la paie du personnel enseignant des écoles officielles de la Cite [Translation by author].

9 Ibid., 2.

Belgian colony – without questioning the meaning of the word progress in this late colonial situation.10

In Présence Congolaise, journalists acknowledged the dead and asked for investigations and justice. The two articles that most discussed these casualties attributed them to the over- zealousness of anonymous civilians and soldiers under the pretext of law enforcement.11

Moreover, most of the dead were presented as being among those who tried to stop the rioters and protect Europeans present in African neighborhoods.12 Yet the acknowledgment of deaths amongst the rioters did not stop the journalists from also praising the Force Publique for their management of the disorders. In the newspapers, even when pointing to deaths, the rioters appeared in a negative light.

The Présence Congolaise gave a more political edge to its coverage of the event, however, and published a note from the MNC party to the Belgian parliament asking for a commission of inquiry.13 An official declaration from all Léopoldville’s Congolese mayors was different in tone from the newspapers. It condemned then Belgian colonial power and its bloody repression of the uprisings, and it asked for a detailed record of the race of each person left dead.14

10 “Devant ces heures sombres, gardons notre sang froid, “ Présence Congolaise, January 10, 1959, 3.

11 “Journées tragiques à Léopoldville,” Présence Congolaise, January 10t, 1959, 3.

12 “Devant ces heures sombres, gardons notre sang froid, 3.

13 "Télégramme du MNC aux chambres belges," Présence Congolaise, January 10, 1959, 1.

14 "Après les troubles : Motions des Bourgmestres Congolais," Présence Congolaise, January 10, 1959, 2: Nine mayors signed the motion :Joseph Mbungu of Matete, Pierre Canon Saint-Jean of Lingwala, Eugene Lutula of Kinshasa, Gaston Diomi of Ngiri-Ngiri, Oscar Ngoma of Bandalungwa, Arthur Pinzi of Kalamu, Alphonse Tshinkela of Kitambo, Boniface Kiesse of N’djili, and Paul Swanga of Barumbu.

Both newspapers distinguished the rioters from the rest of the city’s populations.

Bolamba in La Voix du Congolais dedicated a part of his article to pictures demonstrating how life continued despite the rioting and looting (Figure 4-3). Présence Congolaise went further.

Firstly, one article explained that despite the troubles, some people worked as usual on the following Monday, January 5. The article "Journées tragiques à Léopoldville" described further how, during the lootings, many on the street were simultaneously curious and shocked by the damage. It highlighted that many tried to attend as usual to their work in European neighborhoods on the Monday, but were stopped by the army.15 Mbungu, in his analysis of the aftermath, declared that all the Congolese he met condemned the acts of vandalism.16 In “Devant ces heures sombres," this same journalist praised the many who, in these tragic circumstances, tried to rescue Europeans from the looters even putting their own lives on the line in the process.17

Figure 4-3. Page 68 of La Voix du Congolais. Peace after the riots. First picture, a view of the central market. Second picture, a bus in a Léopoldville street. Last, a classroom in a destroyed building.

15 “Journées tragiques à Léopoldville,” 3.

16 Mbungu. "Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier,” 2.

17 “Gardons notre sang froid,” 3.

In their portrayal of the events, Bolamba and Mbungu clearly differentiated elites who tried to prevent destruction from the crowds who destroyed the city. Bolamba highlighted the aborted attempts of Kasa-Vubu and Pinzi to calm the crowd. Présence Congolaise took a whole paragraph to explore Kasa-Vubu's discourse on January 4 with a photo montage on Pinzi who tried to calm the mob (Figure 4-4). For the journalists of La Voix du Congolais and Présence

Congolaise, it seemed essential to reassure Europeans that the incidents were not an utter rejection of Belgian rule, but rather the actions of a small part of the Congolese population. The two newspapers used their platforms to make a plea for further unifying what they called – in keeping with their days -- the "Belgo-Congolese family." Bolamba' s article advocated for preserving trust between the Belgian Congo's black and white members. He praised those who, despite the troubles, stayed calm and acted heroically.18 Mbungu asked all Europeans to stay calm and pleaded for continuing the dialogue begun between Congolese and Belgians.19 Another

Présence Congolaise article praised the bravery of Congolese, those who rescued Europeans, and highlighted the friendship formed between the two communities before the riots. For this small cross-section of journalists, Europeans should not focus on the threat of rioters, but on the friendship suggested by the rescuers. One journalist concluded by stating that it was not yet time to talk about the causes of the riots. Rather, it was essential to focus on processes of reconciliation.20 Mbungu's article summarized well the reaction found in these two newspapers; he stated that the riots were not the result of any revolution against the Belgians, but instead

18 Bolamba, “Léopoldville a été le théâtre de triste incidents [sic]," 67.

19 "Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier, ” 2.

20 “Gardons notre sang froid,” 3. The journalist illustrated his point with the story of a young white girl saved by her neighbors.

suggested a war between rich and poor Congolese, even implying that these were due to colonial social situations found worldwide at this global moment of unfolding decolonization.21

Figure 4-4. Page 5 of Présence Congolaise First picture on the top: Arthur Pinzi facing the crowd at YMCA. The second picture shows Pinzi trying to calm down the crowd.

In 1959, as we have seen, Congolese intellectuals strongly criticized Léopoldville's rioters at a time when many Congolese activists and politicians, such as Lumumba and Kasa-

Vubu, were fighting for greater autonomy, less paternalism, better access to education for their children, and the Africanization of the colonial administration. Congolese journalists did not analyze the rioters or their actions in the light of these fights for social equality though they were continually present in articles, discussion columns, and readers’ letters. In La Voix du Congolais, an article following Bolamba’s was an essay by Jean-Francois Iyeki that also discussed

Congolese claims for more autonomy without acknowledging the riots.22

21 "Des Actes dont on n'est pas fier,” 2. « Il ne s’agit pas ici, à notre avis d’une révolution contre les blancs mais c’est une affaire de pauvre et de riches; elle découle de la situation sociale actuelle que le monde connait.»

22 Jean-Francois Iyeki, “Congo, terre d’avenir,” La voix du Congolais, February 1959, 68. Jean-Francois Iyeki was a writer and journalist for La voix du Congolais and Présence Congolaise.

CHAPTER 5 THE RIOTS: A LENS ONTO CLASS STRUGGLES

One of the only statements in the two newspapers that made a direct connection between the riots and Congolese aspirations for autonomy was the statement made by Léopoldville’s

Congolese mayors. Even if this was a short sentence, it clarified that all the city’s black mayors favored the aspirations of Congolese for independence and for justice without racial discrimination."1 Even when the Présence Congolaise asserted a politicized tone into its coverage, it spoke for the rights and responsibilities for Congolese intellectuals; this newspaper was not trying to talk on behalf of the looters or understand their struggles and actions. For instance, a considerable part of the motion made by from the Congolese mayors was dedicated to a discussion about the absence of real authority among Congolese politicians. The mayors pointed out that they needed municipal administrative police to control and protect their neighborhoods. They also declared that the Kalamu incident had escalated into a bloody catastrophe because the colonial administration did not consult Mayor Pinzi before making decisions.2

On the eve of the 1960s, this reaction from Congolese journalists can now be explained in three main ways. First, for Congolese of all social classes, violence in Léopoldville was a daily reality. Insecurity was one of the main characteristics of the city’ African neighborhoods during the 1950s. Gangs of young men threatened residents. They were said to loiter in public spaces, raping, killing, and using fear and violence to impose their way on the city. Police reports revealed that Léopoldville was insecure, especially at night. A 1954 report by a substitute for

1 "Après les troubles: Motions des Bourgmestre Congolais," 2. « … tout comme vous, condamnons le pillage, les vols et les viols des individus. Nous sommes résolument en faveur des légitimes aspirations de la population congolaise vers son indépendance et pour la justice sans discrimination raciale. [Translation by author].

2 Ibid., 2.

Léopoldville's royal prosecutor declared that at night the city was entirely unsafe.3 The colonial authorities hardly acted against such criminality. In 1926, they had created the first urban- administrative police force to guarantee that Europeans and Africans respected orders necessary for safe living in the two communities of this colonial urban space.4 In reality, most police resources went into protecting the European neighborhoods and ensuring respect for racial boundaries.5 As Amandine Lauro has stated: "in colonial situations, police priorities were focused more on the defense of imperial rule and interests than on the prevention of criminality among colonized communities."6 Such was true in Belgian Congo. As late as 1958, the general inspector of the colonial police was still asking for appropriate reforms of the police in Belgian colonial cities. Léopoldville's security situation was well known inside the Congo, while even in a remote region like northern Kwango-Kwilu, the first reaction to the Léopoldville riots was:

"there are always troubles in Léopoldville."7

Didier Gondola has explained the excess of violence by claiming that the many "non- educated" Congolese living in the city expressed violence due to their frustrations with colonial society and the double discrimination they underwent. As black persons in a segregated society who had not been educated in a Western sense, assimilation into European ways through adopting évolué values and practices was the only form of social mobility available. Congolese from the lower classes who terrorized Léopoldville’s inhabitants were usually recent immigrants

3 Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order," 65.

4 Lauro, "Maintenir l’ordre dans la Colonie-modèle," 1.

5 Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order," 65-66.

6 Ibid., 65.

7 Herbert F. Weiss, Political protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 189.

from rural Congo who moved to the city following the Great Depression or during the Second

World War.8 Their favorite targets were educated, urbane Congolese whose neighborhoods they shared. Many considered these évolués to be living proof of colonial unfairness. Due to their education, social status, and assimilation into European culture, évolués were the only Congolese qualified to apply for cards of civic merit or of Immatriculation. These two official recognitions gave them some prerogatives, including the right to be assimilated to Europeans.9

Desoto, a former gang member interviewed by Gondola in 2009, remembered that snatching a girlfriend or mistress from évolués was extremely popular among gangs in the 1950s.

When a gangster found an évolué with such a girl, he would beat the man and carry her off.

Desoto said this was a way to emasculate an évolué and expose his inability to protect his girlfriend or wife despite all the benefits to which he was entitled.10 Gondola's interpretation is confirmed by tensions that arose when Congolese and Europeans came together in the same public spaces in Léopoldville. During the 1950s, vehicle accidents caused by European drivers and that hurt Africans always escalated into violence. A 1955 report recorded an angry crowd of some one hundred Congolese who nearly killed a European; the situation became so serious and frightening for Europeans that some felt the need to carry guns to protect themselves.11

At the end of the Second World War, the colonial state allowed a group of Congolese to serve on the Léopoldville Council for the first time and used that opportunity to discuss

8. Didier Gondola, Tropical Cowboys. Westerns, Violence, and Masculinity in Kinshasa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 18

9 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant, 1940-1960, 74. “They were assimilated to Europeans in term of judicial and criminal procedure. To be detained in a particular jail to avoid whipping in jail; to circulate in the city during the night. To attend cinematographic events; to buy and drink alcohol or to possess land and property.”

10 Gondola. Tropical Cowboys, 133.

11 Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order," 64

insecurity in the neighborhoods. Congolese criticized the inability of Belgian authorities to provide security in their quarters and attributed troubles in their neighborhoods to the weakness of the police. The delegates decried the police shortfall in Congolese areas, which did not offer strict control of undesirables. They complained about juvenile delinquency and the little interest paid by the police to African problems. These évolués delegates were chosen for their schooling, morality, and professional success.12 Their complaints were similar to others made during the

Léopoldville riots when a reporter complained that the main reason for the destruction of African neighborhoods and the high number of Congolese fatalities was the absence of police protection for Congolese and the concentration of police efforts on European residential areas. Indeed, the disorder started on the afternoon of Sunday, January 4, but it was only around 10:30 am on the following Monday that the armed forces reached “indigenous” neighborhoods.13 Thus, in a sense, for Congolese journalists, the January 1959 events were hardly extraordinary; this outburst of violence in an already unsafe and violent city had a déjà vu aspect.

Another factor explaining the reactions of Congolese newspapers to the riots is the stark class difference between participants and journalists. The latter were part of the évolué class, or the Congolese educated elite. They constituted less than 0.4% of all Congolese and were the only ones able to officially communicate with Belgian authorities. In the aftermath of the Second

World War, the colonial administration-initiated reforms to give more agency to Congolese and provide them with opportunities to express their concerns. In 1945, the government created a press committee open to Congolese. It was composed of several media: a newspaper, a radio

12 Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order," 66-67.

13 “Journées tragiques à Léopoldville,” 3.

station, a cinema, and a library.14 A year later, in 1946, the government gave Congolese workers the right to organize themselves into trade unions and attend state council meetings. 15 However, most of these requirements discriminated against non-évolués. To be able to become a member of a trade union, most Congolese had to be 20 years old, without a criminal record, and have been in the business for at least five years; for those who had a middle-school diploma, the minimum was one year in business.16 Thus, non-évolués did not have access to the means of expression permitted by the colonial administration.

Évolués were the ones who could officially speak on behalf of all Congolese. Yet most

évolués overlooked non-educated Congolese, viewing them as inferior. Fanon once described educated blacks as those who tend to overcompensate and redeem their years of colonial humiliation through a superiority complex against fellow blacks.17 In the Belgian Congo, the paternalistic colonial system infantilized blacks and assumed their inferiority. Jean Labrique, a

Belgian press secretary to a Governor General of Belgian Congo, described that process quite well when he stated that paternalism was integral in the colony because.

Europeans who arrived freshly in the Belgian Congo felt, believed, and claimed for themselves the role of the tutor, whatever their profession or their line of work… bookseller, for instance, …censures what black customers should and should not read. Merchants, grocers, and butchers all participate in educating their black clientele at designated checkout counters.18

14 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant, 58.

15 Ibid., 59-68.

16 Ibid., 60-61.

17 Frantz Fanon, Peaux noirs, masques Blancs (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1952) 210.

18 Gondola, Tropical Cowboys, 43

Évolués felt these constant reminders of their "inferior" status. These feelings can be seen in Paul

Lomami Tshibamba's complaint in 1945. He stated that the évolués “thought that for them, assimilation toward their bienfaiteurs was the key to the accomplishment of their social destiny.

Unfortunately, the actions of those whom they thought they would be assimilated to showed them that they were wrong.”19 A similar complaint can be seen in Patrice Lumumba's improvised speech at the 1960 independence ceremony when he stated that: “Who will forget that to a nigger they were saying ‘tu,’ not because he was a friend but because the more respectful "vous" was only used for whites.”20

In sum, évolués overcompensated, and some treated non-évolués with a contempt similar to what they received from Europeans. At the end of 1944, Louis Abangapokwa, who later became the first president of the évolué association in Stanleyville, defined évolués as individuals transformed by civilization who lived differently than “primitives.” He added that instead of the non-civilized, évolués had proper thinking, good consciences, greater understanding, correct initiatives, and self-love.21 The évolués considered themselves to be mindele-ndombe, a Lingala expression suggesting white-blacks or Europeanized Africans; they despised the uneducated as broussard or basenzi.22

19 Paul Lomami-Tshibamba, « Quelle sera notre place dans le monde de demain ? » La voix du Congolais, 1e année, no. 2, mars-avril 1945, 49. « De par le milieu où nous sommes nés comme aussi de par l'orientation de notre culture, nous croyions avec conviction que seule notre assimilation complète avec nos bienfaiteurs constitue notre réelle destinée sociale. Mais hélas ! De jour en jour, en présence et même victimes de faits, gestes, attitudes etc. de ceux auxquels nous croyions être assimiles, notre âme ulcérée et aigrie nous fait douloureusement croire que nous avons dévoyé, ou mieux, l'on nous a sciemment mis hors de la voie qui doit nécessairement mener l'homme vers sa destinée sociale. [Translation by author].

20 Ndaywel e Nziem, Histoire générale du Congo, 538

21 Jean-Marie Mutamba, "Les évolués: situation au Congo belge, "https://books.openedition.org/pusl/10394?lang=en

22 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant , 49. These two words were supposed to show the backwardness of the non-educated’; broussard is a French word that means from the woods, and basenzi is a Lingala and Swahili word that means wild, rude, or bad-mannered.

The évolués increasingly wanted a special status in colonial society. Tshibamba expressed these frustrations by stating that because of their education and the mentalities they had received, évolués had the right to have a status different from the masses.23 This desire to be a privileged class can be seen in their demands that concerned their own group. In 1945,

Abangapokwa wanted the évolués to be an intermediary class between Europeans and ordinary people. Meanwhile, he asked for separate spaces for them in public transport, dispensaries, hospitals, public gatherings, housing, post offices, administrative offices, shops, and banks.24

Those claims of 1944 were similar to those expressed by Bolamba in La Voix du Congolais in

1959. In the February 1959 issue, he discussed the medical system in the colony and the need for hospitals to create separate bedrooms for évolués to avoid unpleasant interactions with the uneducated.25 The contrast between such Congolese and those supposed to represent them was so significant that, during the 1950s, one of the subjects that received the most attention from La

Voix du Congolais was international travel for évolués.26 Thus, Congolese journalists could not easily identify themselves with the crowds of January 4.

Another reason for elite Congolese reactions and their attempts to distance themselves from the rioters is related to Fanon's theorization of colonial working classes. Fanon defined the elite as a bourgeois class of skilled workers and civil servants; this fraction of a colony was irreplaceable if the colonial machine was to run smoothly. 27 For Fanon, the same class was not

23 Paul Lomami-Tshibamba, « Quelle sera notre place dans le monde de demain? », 114

24 Mutamba, "Les évolués: situation au Congo belge, “https://books.openedition.org/pusl/10394?lang=en

25 Antoine Roger Bolamba, “Quelques doléances des habitants de Popokabaka," La voix du Congolais, February 1959, 92.

26 Jean-Luc Vellut, Congo. Ambitions et désenchantements, 1880-1960 (Paris: Karthala, 2017), 463.

27 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963), 109.

revolutionary because it remained part of the colonized. Still, it was the most pampered by the colonial regime and had everything to lose.28 In the Belgian Congo, despite the segregation and an exclusionary colonial state, Congolese elites enjoyed many privileges. Most of the postwar reforms were to their advantage. Moreover, beside all their privileges, the administration, in collaboration with European social workers and nuns, created welfare homes in which évolué wives learned how to speak French and how to run European-style houses. From 1949, many decrees improved the working conditions of Congolese, such as a decree for compensation in the case of work accidents or sickness (1949); a decree about familial allocations (1952); a decree about minimum salaries (1954); and a decree about retirement benefits for "indigenous workers”

(1957).29 Thus, évolués had more to lose from a direct break with Belgium than the rest of the

Congolese population. According to Fanon, the lumpenproletariat –Marx's term – beneath them was a reactionary and revolutionary class because these at the bottom had nothing to lose.30

Beginning in 1956, many évolués shared their aspirations for a future without Belgium in peaceful ways. Following the 1956 Van Bilsen plan advocating the implementation of a thirty- year program for Belgian Congo's political emancipation, a group of Congolese Catholic intellectuals responded with a Conscience Africaine manifesto that endorsed this thirty year time frame under the condition that the colonial administration include Congolese in the conception of the project. ABAKO responded with a counter-manifesto that rejected this extended transition

28 Ibid., 108.

29 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant 1940-1960, émergence des "Evolués" et genèse du nationalisme, 83.

30 Adam Branch and Zachariah Mampilly. Africa uprising: popular protest and political change (London: Zed Books, 2015), 31.

and asked for immediate independence and more political rights for Congolese.31After these beginnings, Congolese continued with debates about independence through many platforms. In

1958, Kasa-Vubu expressed the ABAKO political party’s aspiration for independence during his inaugural speech as mayor of Dendale.32 This evidence suggests that the violence and disorder of the January 4 crowd were not in keeping with the political agendas of the évolués at the time..

In 1959, on the eve of the global 1960s, Congolese society in Léopoldville was starkly divided. An elite minority, the évolués, did not wish to be grouped with all the rest whom they regarded as inferior; this class of intellectuals were fighting through peaceful means for more recognition by the colonial state. The majority, the lower classes, felt silenced by their relative lack of higher education and pressured by colonial discriminations against them.33 They often chose violence to express themselves. The riots of January 1959 and the debates that followed in

Congolese newspapers illustrate these division within metropolitan society between those who chose violence because they had nothing to lose and those who chose diplomacy because they had too much to lose. Over time, perceptions of the rioters changed from being urban delinquents to being the martyrs of independence. The next section turns to this subject now.

31 Covington-Ward, “Joseph Kasa-Vubu, ABAKO, and performances of Kongo nationalism in the independence of Congo,” 78.

32 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo Belge au Congo indépendant, 351-352.

33 Bernadette Lacroix, "Pouvoirs et structures de l' Université Lovanium,” in Les Cahiers du CEDAF n° 2-3, (Bruxelles 1972), 9 A 1956 survey showed that there was a big gap between the number of children who attended elementary school and the number who actually knew how to read and to write. In addition, elementary school was usually in Congolese languages. So, it was only children who had the opportunity to get a higher education who were able to learn proper French.

CHAPTER 6 A NATIONALIST MEMORY PROJECT: MOBUTU’S RECASTING OF THE 1959 RIOTS

On June 30, 1966, on the sixth anniversary of Congolese independence, Lieutenant

General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, President of Congo since his coup on November 24, 1965, introduced himself as an heir of those who died during the 1959 riots for the independence of their country and also as a leader seeking to restore to Congolese their independence, since stolen from them by politicians.1

It was not the first time that Mobutu used a narrative of a corrupted political class to appear as the ally of his citizens. In his first address to the nation on November 24, Mobutu claimed that he seized power because politicians were failing to work for the interests of

Congolese. He also pledged to provide the peace, calm, tranquility, and prosperity that people had lacked since the country gained its independence.2 From his first day in office, Mobutu distanced himself from the political class who, in his words, were only fighting for political power without considering the population's wellbeing.

In 1967, with ordonnance n0 67/475, Mobutu made January 4 a national holiday and officially defined the 1959 rioters as “martyrs” of independence. Why did Mobutu choose

January 4 as a symbol of resistance against oppression? One key to answering this question lies in further understanding class struggles within Congolese society since the colonial era. As we have seen, colonial society was divided, with the évolués on one side enjoying its advantages and the lower classes struggling to compete in a world that discriminated against them. With independence, political authority passed from the Belgians to Congolese, and the former évolués

1 Liebois and Lierde, eds., Les dossiers du CRISP, Congo 1965, 415.

2 Ibid., 413. « Dès l'accession du pays à l'indépendance, l'Armée Nationale Congolaise n'a jamais ménagé ses efforts désintéressés pour assurer un sort meilleur a la population. Les dirigeants politiques, par contre, se sont cantonnés dans une lutte stérile pour accéder au pouvoir sans aucune considération pour le bien-être des citoyens de ce pays. [Translation by author.]

became the leaders of the country. As Fanon put it, the colonial process was violent; it produced oppressed “natives” whose permanent dream was to become the persecutors.3 In the Congolese case, the disillusionment of the lower classes still characterized the postcolonial years.

Tshibamba, who worked in government administration after independence, shared the disappointment he perceived among Congolese: "people did not see any difference between the colonizers and us; instead, they feel like the situation is worse than before." Tshibamba saw these perceptions as a sign that the new state was failing to provide for its citizens. In postcolonial society, two worlds cohabitated: one belonging to the bourgeoisie some of whom lived better than the Belgians during the colonial era, and one belonging to the masses who lived in misery and hunger.4

In that context of such social disparity, Mobutu used the riots as a symbol of the resistance of the lower classes against abusive powers, represented by the corrupt Congolese political class. Mobutu was clear about that in his speech of 30 June 1966

When Congolese deserved the reward for their fight, fight of tears, fire, and blood (… )fair and just (… )crucial to end the humiliating slavery imposed by the colonial state" (...) politicians controlled by foreign states, intentionally emptied the independence of its meaning, deceived the population and betrayed the Nation.5

3 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 98.

4 Pierre Hafner, « Un entretien avec Paul Lomami Tshibamba,” in Papier Blanc, encre noire, cent ans de culture francophone en Afrique centrale (Zaïre, Rwanda et Burundi) volume 2, edited by Marc Quaghebeur, Emile Van Balberghe, Nadine Fettweis and Annick Vilain (Bruxelles : Editions Labor, 1992), 314. « Le régime colonial était dur, policier, on était entrainé comme des bêtes, mais avec l'indépendance arrivent sévices sur sévices, on est désorienté et on se méfie de tout. Voici donc une société séparée de notre société actuelle, des bourgeois actuels, qui vivent mieux que les Blancs de l'époque de la colonie, les élites du groupe des bourgeois nés de l'indépendance ! de l'autre coté il y a les villageois qui vivent dans les taudis, malheureux, crevant de faim du matin au soir. Un cousin m'a dit : Mon frère, nous n'attendons que la mort, c'est tout. Nous n'avons plus rien a espérer [Translation by author].

5 Jules Gérard-Liebois, Benoît Verhaegen, Jan Vansina, and Herbert Weiss, com., Les dossiers du CRISP, Congo 1966 (Bruxelles-Paris: CRISP-INEP, 1967), 128: Alors que le peuple congolais était en droit d'attendre les fruits de « cette lutte qui fut de larme, de feu et de sang … noble et juste… indispensable pour mettre fin a l'humiliant esclavage qui nous était imposé par la force » ; … les politiciens, volontairement …, obéissant à des consignes

Mobutu implied that the rioters were the real providers of independence and thus the true heroes.

Moreover, he affirmed that while the Congolese spared no effort to recover their dignity as free men, politics had made them the laughingstock of the world.6 Thus, according to Mobutu, his coup d'état was a continuation of a fight begun in January 1959 for Congolese independence.

Mobutu was adept at mythologizing Congolese history for his own ends, allowing him to stay in power until 1997. His endorsement of the January rioters was part of his design to present himself as a nationalist in order to heighten his position in Africa and inside Congo, where nationalist beliefs were still popular among the lower classes.7 In his attempt to appeal to the lower stratum, Mobutu affirmed that he needed everyone's contribution to build a new Congo.

He invited Congolese from all social classes to work with him in operations such as Retroussons nos manches in which he invited each citizen to act to make Congo a better place.8

Thus, through appropriating the story of the riots, Mobutu affirmed the right for people to stand against abusive power and showed that, unlike other politicians, he was an ally of one and all. The idea of a rupture with the old postcolonial regime was recurrent in his speeches, and

Mobutu never missed an occasion to get angry at incompetence and cupidity. A clear rupture between Mobutu and the former leading class occurred at the time of the Pentecôte trial that resulted in the public execution of four political leaders: Alexandre Mahamba, a former Minister of Land Affairs; Emmanuel Bamba, a senator; Evariste Kimba, a former Prime Minister; and

Jérôme Anany, a former Minister of Defense. Those politicians were publicly hanged because of

extérieures, firent de l'indépendance du Congo un mot vide de sens, déçurent les populations et trahirent la Patrie [Translation by author].

6 Ibid., 127.

7 Ludo de Witte, L’assassinat de Lumumba (Paris : Karthala, 2000), 354.

8 Ibid., 445.

their alleged participation in an assassination plot against Mobutu. His speech on June 30, 1966 making the rioters heroes came 28 days after that notorious public execution, and Mobutu presented it as a sacrifice necessary for the interests of the nation.

Despite Mobutu's declaration that he cared about the masses and their rights and aspirations, he also made controversial political decisions such as forbidding strikes, allegedly because workers were protected under his new regime.9 He also assumed full power for five years.10 This decision canceled elections and took away Congolese people’s opportunity to choose their leaders. Thus, Mobutu recognized that the lower classes had the power to lead successful resistance movements when he recognized the 1959 rioters as those who had issued in independence, but did not recognize their right to act in the early postcolonial period or decide upon further changes.

His approach was similar to that found in the Vietnamese writer Nguyen Nghe's view of the lumpenproletariat as those with a capacity to bring revolution to a successful conclusion.

Nguyen Nghe tempered Fanon’s view of the revolutionary strength of the lumpenproletariat by suggesting that if they could support revolutions, they were not given permission to lead revolutions: "the peasant may be a patriot and die heroically…but if he remains a peasant, he will not be able to lead the revolutionary movement."11 By using the 1959 rioters as he did, Mobutu rejoined politicians he criticized, yet he did not recognize the masses’ ability to make decisions for themselves.

9 Liebois, Verhaegen, Vansina, and Weiss, Les dossiers du CRISP, Congo 1966, 121.

10 Ibid., 128.

11 Nguyen Nghe, “Frantz Fanon and the Problems of Independence,” La Pensée, no. 107 (1963), 31.

What mattered was no longer the actual rioters or the "true" story of the riots of January

1959, but what both represented: a symbol of resistance against tyrannical power. Paradoxically, this symbol became so anchored in Congolese society that even Mobutu's challengers began to use the riots to show their affection for the lower classes. For instance, in a 1970s memoir,

Kamitatu used the rioters to depict himself as a patriot ready to make sacrifices for the nation.

First, he presented himself as the voice of Congolese silenced by Mobutu's dictatorship. To do so, he pointed to the riots and drew a parallel between repression during Mobutu's era and during the colonial period. He said that state brutality caused the riots of January 4, 1959, yet this was nothing compared to the vexations and killings under Mobutu.12 This approach allowed him to appear like one advocating for the masses. Kamitatu, who was accused of treason by his former political party, drew a parallel between his situation and that of the rioters.13 Like the rioters who broke the law to enable Congolese independence, Kamitatu went against the motions of his political party as he stood for Congolese security and unity. He spoke to the duty of individuals to stand up for their rights by stating that when citizens realize that there is no possibility for dialogue between them and their rulers, they must revolt.14 Thus, Kamitatu dismissed the accusations of opportunism against him and presented his actions as proof of patriotism.

The Kamitatu example is not an isolated case; in the Congolese imaginary, the 1959 riots remain a symbol of resistance. In December 2017, many Congolese in Kinshasa were killed by

12 Kamitatu, La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa, 17.

13 In August 1961 during the Lovanium Conclave, Kamitatu supported the nomination of Cyrille Adoula as prime minister against his political party’s motion. And in 1962, Kamitatu became minister in the Adoula government. Many Congolese nationalists considered Kamitatu a traitor. Kamitatu discusses those accusations and rejects them; for him, the inflexible attitude of the nationalists during the negotiations was a threat for national security and unity. According to Kamitatu, Adoula was the slightest harm for the country; see Kamitatu, La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa, 93.

14 Kamitatu, La grande mystification du Congo-Kinshasa, 24. « Quand un peuple réalise qu'il n'existe entre lui et les gouvernants aucune possibilité de dialogue, il se révolte.» [Translation by author].

the police during a peaceful protest organized by a Catholic association (CLC) to protest against postponing the Presidential election. One month after this repression, on January 4, 2018,

Cardinal Laurent Mosengwo Pasinwa, Archbishop of Kinshasa, used a mass commemorating

January 4 to compare those who died in December 2017 to the martyrs of January 1959. Later, the Abbey Bruno Kabambu, another celebrant, presented the martyrs of independence as if the true heirs of Christ because they were not afraid to die for their beliefs.15

These recent interventions from two prominent figures of the Catholic Church are interesting because, in 1959, Catholic churches, welfare homes, and schools were the most damaged by the looters' destructions. While the Catholic Church celebrated the January 1959 rioters as heroes in 2018, Catholic circles condemned the event, even blaming Kimbanguist adherents of another church for the destruction of schools and missions.16

Over time, the rioters became symbols of the fight for independence. Yet their status as the martyrs of independence has not gained general approval. Justine Kasa-Vubu, the daughter of the leader of ABAKO in 1959, Joseph Kasa-Vubu, has challenged the perception of the rioters as those who brought in independence. She has proposed a campaign of civil disobedience organized by ABAKO at the end of 1959, under her father, as the turning point in the fight against colonial rule. She acknowledges that the riots had an impact upon the Congolese “road” to independence, but she reduces their importance. We turn now to the actual impact of the 1959 riots on decolonization in Congo.

15 Junior Kitambala, Le Cardinal Monsengwo salue la mémoire des martyrs de 1959 et des victimes du 31 décembre 2017, DIA, 5 janvier 2018, consulte le 02/21/2018, http://www.diacenco.com/le-cardinal-monsengwo-salue-la- memoire-des-martyrs-de-1959-et-des-victimes-du-31-decembre-2017/.

16 "Éléments pour une Sociologie d'une émeute Léopoldville-Janvier 1959", 17.

CHAPTER 7 THE RIOTS AND DECOLONIZATION

In 1959, Congolese évolués in Léopoldville criticized the rioters, fearing that their actions would be a step back in their quest for greater autonomy, political power, and independence.

Since the 1960s, however, the riots have become a symbol of independence and political awakening, not only for politicians seeking the praise of the popular masses, but also for scholars interested in Congo. In 1960, Antoine Rubbens, a Belgian lawyer, began an article about the political awakening in Belgian Congo with the January riots.1 Crawford Young, an American political scientist, in 1966 wrote of the riots as a "profound watershed in Congolese history."2

Rene Lemarchand, a French political scientist based at the University of Florida, described the riots as one of the first steps in “the path” of Congolese independence. Congolese historian,

Isidore Ndaywel, asserted that it was only because of the January 4 martyrs that peaceful decolonization came to Belgian Congo.3 If, in 1959, Congolese politicians did not endorse the rioters, later on many politicians, activists, and scholars such as Mutamba praised them and admired their nationalism and aspirations for freedom.4 It is important to note that, beyond this transformation in attitude and the use made by Mobutu of the rioters to legitimize his political position, the rioters did have a significant impact on how independence came to the Congo .

This essay has already explained that if Congolese évolués were so critical of the riots, it was because of their perceptions of their city. For them, Léopoldville was unsafe, full of violent

1 Antoine Rubbens,” Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo,” Civilisations 10, no 1(1960)

2 Crawford Young, “Background to Independence,” Transition no. 25 (1966), 25.

3 Isidore Ndaywel e Nziem, Histoire générale du Congo : De l'héritage ancien à la République Démocratique, 538, René Lemarchand, Political awakening in the Belgian Congo (Berkeley and Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1964).

4 Mutamba Makombo, Du Congo belge au Congo indépendant, 366.

neighborhoods where even the police were afraid to circulate at night.5 They had been asking for more control and security for years, and the riots in 1959 stemmed from this preexisting violence. For Belgians in the metropole, the explosion of violence came as a shock, in part because colonial propaganda always presented Belgian Congo as a model territory with Pax

Belgica, thus little social tension between different categories of the population.6 Many scholars who wrote in the aftermath of the riots pointed out the surprise that prevailed in Belgian public opinion at the time. Marjory Taylor wrote about the riots in 1959 in the English language. She began her essay by stating that the riots in Léopoldville put an end to illusions about the Belgian

Congo as a colony of ever-increasing prosperity and a contented population.7 For Alain Mazery,

January 4, 1959 was a revolution and revelation for Belgians because the Congo that they believed had been preserved from the harmful germs of nationalism and antiracist politics was awakening.8 Even the American New York Times called the riots a noteworthy outbreak because until then, the Belgian colony had been prosperous and placid.9

5 Lauro, "Maintenir l’ordre dans la Colonie-modèle," 98.

6 Lauro, "Suspect Cities and the (Re)Making of Colonial Order," 59. Lauro explained that scholars define the Pax Belgica as the absence of disorder and violent repression between the end of the Second World War and the eve of decolonization in the Belgian Congo. She argues that “while it remains true that there were no significant uprisings or massive riots and few formal nationalist pro-independence movements for the period, Pax Belgica looks like a posteriori reconstruction, at least in the light of police records for the colony. It is also consistent with official metropolitan mythologies of a 'peaceful' colony, untouched by the troubles, social unrest, and anticolonial turmoil that informed reporting habits, political discussions, and the 'colonial common sense' of Belgian rulers during that period and contributed to rendering less visible the scale of anxieties and doubts of so many records of local colonial administration.”]

7 Marjory Taylor, "The Belgian Congo Today: Background to the Léopoldville Riots," The World Today, Vol. 15, No. 9 (Sep. 1959), 352.

8 Alain des Mazery, “Emeutes a Léopoldville,” Présence Africaines, Nouvelle série, No 23 (December 1958-January 1959), 113.

9 Riots in the Congo, New York Times (1923-Current file); Jan 7, 1959; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, 32.

Such perceptions of Congo explain why many Belgians perceived the riots as a wakeup call and began talking seriously about independence, notably with the Congolese community who had expressed itself for years, since the first manifesto of Conscience Africaine in 1956.10 If many évolués did not remake their demands in the wake of the riots, Belgians in the metropole interpreted the riots in light of longstanding évolué demands.

Consider the special Belgian parliamentary session of January 8, 1959, when Belgian deputies argued that Congolese populations needed more autonomy and criticized the silence of

Belgium in the face of their claims. The session discussed the result of a commission report of

1958 with a recommendation that envisaged independence for the colony or at least more autonomy. Hyacinthe Housiaux, a Belgian deputy, deplored that political developments in Congo had not yet been a priority for the parliament.11

It is important to recall that the January 1959 riots were not the first troubles disorders to occur in Léopoldville. Why were these riots taken so much more seriously than those of 1957?

A key difference between the two events lies in the repression and also casualties among

Congolese in 1959. The state sent its armed police against the rioters in 1959, against people mostly armed with sticks and stones, and the colonial administration sent more than 3,600 soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns.12 Even though Maurice Van Hemelrijck, the

Minister of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, told the Parliament during an extraordinary session that the riots had been repressed with a minimum of casualties,13 many Belgian observers

10 Taylor, "The Belgian Congo Today," 358.

11 Chambre des représentants. Annales parlementaires. Séance du 8 Janvier 1959, 8.

12 “Commission parlementaire chargée de faire une enquête sur les évènements qui se sont produits à Léopoldville en Janvier 1959“, Chambre des représentants, session 1958-1959, 27 mars 1959, 51 and 54.

13. For Belgian involved in the colonial journey, the high level of casualty in case of a massive disorder within the Congolese neighborhood, was an eventuality. In 1958, the police general inspector declared that without a police

deplored the Congolese deaths and criticized the excessive violence of the armed forces in stopping the rioters. From all sides, voices began to rise to request an investigation. In Belgium, after the extraordinary session, the deputies created a commission of inquiry to investigate the event.14

Belgium’s new interest in Congolese claims appeared in King Baudouin’s speech of

January 13, 1959, which opened up new perspectives on the Belgian colony: “Our resolution today is to lead the Congolese people to independence, prosperity, and peace, without any fatal procrastination, and without any haste.”15 Once the King used the word independence, it seems as if everything moved quickly. On June 30, 1960, Belgian Congo became an independent nation-state.

reform, the army would be the only solution to contain a hostile crowd, and against guns, machine guns, and canons, he feared that the only result would have been too many cadavers See Chambre des représentants. Annales parlementaires. Séance du 8 Janvier 1959, 3 ; also Lauro, "Maintenir l’ordre dans la Colonie-modèle., 117

14 Chambre des représentants. Annales parlementaires. Séance du 8 Janvier 1959, 7.

15 Jacques Brassinne de La Buissière and Georges-Henri Dumont, “Les autorités belges et la décolonisation du Congo, “ CRISP, Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP, 18, n° 2063-2064 (2010), 20.

CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

By analyzing the debates surrounding the riots of January 1959 at Léopoldville in two major Congolese newspapers from the period, this thesis has shown that at the end of the 1950s

Congolese society in its capital city was divided. The évolués enjoyed many advantages based on their assimilation into European culture, whereas a larger lower stratum lived in a society that discriminated against them as blacks living in a segregated colonial society and as those who lacked higher education and other forms of European assimilation and social mobility. This these has highlighted how the cohabitation of these two groups in African neighborhoods in

Léopoldville resulted in unsafe, violence spaces that worsened the class and social differences.

This analysis has also shown how class struggle shaped Congolese colonial and postcolonial society. After independence, Joseph-Desiré Mobutu used these same class tensions to legitimize his power following his coup of November 1965. He used the rioters to transform the image and reputation of the lower classes while endorsing their actions to present him as their ally. The endorsement of the rioters allowed him to present his coup as a continuation of the fight against oppressive power begun in 1959. It was with this vision that Mobutu recognized the rioters of 1959 as martyrs of independence through an official decree in 1967. Since that time, this official representation of the rioters has been used by many Congolese politicians seeking popular approval and by political activists wanting to legitimize their struggles against oppression.

Beyond this political use of the riots, it is important to acknowledge that they had a significant impact upon the manner in which decolonization arrived in Congo. Their brutal repression by the Belgian colonial power shocked the world and soon the Belgian authorities

were considering more seriously the claims for independence that Congolese elites had been gesturing towards for years.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Aurelie Maketa Mawete is currently a 2nd year Ph.D. student in the History Department of the University of Florida. Aurelie studied history as an undergraduate at the University of

Kinshasa. At the end of her study, she became an Assistant Lecturer in history. However, due to financial constraints, she needed to find other employment. She first started teaching history in a private high school. It lasted just one year, but the background work she had to do to prepare her lessons made her realize her interest in research. After this job, she was accepted into the highly competitive Discover program of Vodacom Congo, a cellular phone network. While working, she wrote a book entitled Les méandres d’une vie en RD Congo that was published by the French publisher L’Harmattan. She wrote that story of a young modern Congolese girl who became a single mother and has to fight every day to give her child a better future as a representation of how people navigate modern urban Congolese society. Aurelie decided to leave her job at

Vodacom Congo in 2018 to start a Ph.D. at the University of Florida.