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Lebanon's New Government

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Lebanon's New Government International Foundation for Electoral Systems Lebanon’s new Government 9 November 2009 A Council of Ministers has been agreed Article 64 (2) of the Constitution: Five months after the June 7 elections, and following [The Prime Minister] shall sign with the President protracted wrangling between the different Lebanese political the decree of the Government’s formation. The factions over the allocation of portfolios, the proposed Government must present its general statement of members of the Council of Ministers were today announced by policy to Parliament in order to gain its confidence within thirty days of the date of President Michel Sleiman and the Prime Minister designate, issuance of the decree in which the Government Saad Hariri MP. In accordance with Article 64(2) of the was formed. The Government shall not exercise Constitution, the new Government now has 30 days to prepare its powers before it gains confidence … except in its statement of policy and to present that statement of policy the narrow sense of a caretaker government. to Parliament for a vote of confidence. The “15–10–5” Government The proposed 30-member Council of Ministers reflects the attempts to agree upon a post-election ‘Government of National Unity’ with ministerial portfolios divided up between representatives from all of the major political factions. It includes 15 Ministers of the parliamentary majority, ten from the parliamentary opposition as well as five Ministers without political affiliation who have been nominated by President Sleiman. The 2009 Government Ministers nominated by Ministers nominated Ministers nominated by the Parliamentary Majority by the President the Parliamentary Opposition Prime Minister Finance Justice Defence & DPM Foreign Affairs Telecoms Saad Hariri MP Raya AlHasan Aafar Ibrahim Najjar Elias Murr Ali Chami Charbel Nahass FM * LF Non-Affiliated Amal FPM Sunni FM Greek Orthodox Greek Orthodox Shia Greek Catholic Sunni Economy Social Affairs Information Interior Energy & Water Health Mohamed Safadi MP Salim Sayegh Tariq Mitri Ziyad Baroud Gebran Bassil Mohamad Khalife Independent Kateab Independent Non-Affiliated FPM Amal Sunni Maronite Greek Orthodox Maronite Maronite Shia Culture Labour Public Works State Agriculture Tourism Salim Warde Boutros Harb MP Ghazi Al Aridi MP Adnan Hussein Hussein Hassan MP Fadi Aboud LF Independent PSP Non-Affiliated Hezbollah FPM Greek Catholic Maronite Druze Shia Shia Maronite Displaced Education Environment State Industry Admin Reform Akram Chehayeb MP Hassan Mnaymneh Mahmood Rahal Adnan Qassar Ibrahim Dedeyan Mohamad Fneish MP PSP FM FM Non-Affiliated Tashnag Hezbollah Druze Sunni Sunni Sunni Armenian Orthodox Shia State (Parliament) State State State State Youth & Sports Michel Pharon MP Jean Ogassapian MP Wael Abou Faour MP Mona Ofeich * Youssef Saade Ali Abdullah Independent Independent PSP Non-Affiliated Marada Amal Greek Catholic Armenian Orthodox Druze Greek Orthodox Maronite Shia FM Future Movement PSP Progressive Socialist Party LF Lebanese Forces FPM Free Patriotic Movement * indicates Ministers who are women DPM Deputy Prime Minister The previous Government (formed on 11 July 2008) also consisted of 30 Ministers from the parliamentary majority and opposition, but positions were allocated between political blocs along a 16–11–3 formula. The 2008 Government Prime Minister Justice Economy Education Finance Deputy P M Foreign Affair Agriculture Youth Sport Interior Fouad Siniora Ibrahim Najjar M. Safadi Bahia Hariri M. Chatah I. Abu Jamra Fawzi Salloukh Elias Skaff Talal Arslan Ziyad Baroud FM LF Ind FM FM FPM Amal Ind. LD Non-Affiliated Sunni G. Orthodox Sunni Sunni Sunni G. Orthodox Shiite Greek Catholic Druze Maronite Information Public Work Environment Culture Displaced Labour Energy Water Telecoms Health Defence Tarek Mitri Ghazi Aridi Antoine Karam Tamam Salam Raymond Audi M Fneish A Tabourian Gebran Bassil M Kalifeh Elias Murr Ind. PSP LF Ind. Ind. Hezbollah Tashnag FPM Amal Non-Affiliated G. Orthodox Druze Maronite Sunni Greek Catholic Shiite A. Orthodox. Maronite Shiite G Orthodox Admin Reform Tourism State State State State State Industry Social Affairs State Ib. Shamseddine Elie Marouni Nassib Lahoud K Qabbani Wael A Faour J Ogassapian Ali Qanso Ghazi Zoayter Mario Aoun Youssef Taqla Ind. Kataeb DRM FM PSP Ind. SSNP Amal FPM Non-Affiliated Shiite Maronite Maronite Sunni Druze A. Orthodox Shiite Shiite Maronite G. Catholic The International Foundation for Electoral Systems is an independent, non-governmental organization providing professional support to electoral democracy. Through field work, applied research and advocacy, we strive to promote citizen participation, transparency, and accountability in political life and civil society. www.ifes.org/lebanon [email protected] International Foundation for Electoral Systems Lebanon’s new Government 9 November 2009 The Constitution requires a two- Article 65 (5) of the Constitution: . Comprehensive and long term thirds majority of Ministers as The following basic national issues development projects require the approval of two thirds of the . Appointment of Grade I quorum to hold meetings of the members of the Council of Ministers government employees Government and also for the taking named in the Decree forming the . Review of the administrative map of key decisions known as ‘basic Government: . The dissolution of the Chamber of national issues’. The current . Amendments to the Constitution Deputies allocation of ministerial positions . Declarations of a state of emergency, . Electoral laws mobilization or war . Nationality laws along a 15–10–5 formula has . International agreements and treaties . Personal status laws therefore removed the possibility of . The annual government budget . The dismissal of Ministers a so-called ‘blocking third’. The new Government: representation by gender and confession 2008 Cabinet 2009 Cabinet Majority Opposition President Total Majority Opposition President Total By Gender Men 15 11 3 29 14 10 4 28 Women 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 By Confession Maronite 3 2 1 6 2 3 1 6 Sunni 6 0 0 6 5 0 1 6 Shia 1 5 0 6 0 5 1 6 Greek Orthodox 2 1 1 4 2 0 2 4 Druze 2 1 0 3 3 0 0 3 Greek Catholic 1 1 1 3 2 1 0 3 Armenian Orthodox 1 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 Ministerial representation by Political Affiliation Majority Opposition President s y s s l c i t t t c c e t e t t a t i i r i t l h n n s e v t e t n n n d i d g i a ot a a a l e a e s s s a i a i e l b e e e a s l e e l P a oc r r r y e d e d r e d i a t t s w a n t t f S ol m m m a t c a a n n n n f u e e e r a i i h r s t t e oc e e a m a oc b l on l r e e i a s n n i A i i P a l a z u or b f b f - p t p a a A P e m f m f a i e F F ov e i ov ov e a og K e e e M e e T r R r A A L L e d d H on y M M M N r P oc D D n n S I I F N S 2008 4 2 2 1 1 6 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 2009 4 2 3 1 0 5 3 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 3 Ministerial portfolios by Political Bloc t r s r m r r i t r s te k o te a r s n o n r f i i e p M a f e a o o r S n e s f n i d y Af P u ti m W R o e e t y & r m a M W l e m n Af e m n r c c ti y r s ty o o u tr n g c e o l a i o i m c u n a i e i th g l s c i u c c r l a th r n r r c l n r i e i e o i tu p e u p f a a l m m ti u u r l r u e v o b c o s i b te s f d e e e i n u e o o r c d n n u o i a o n u n n P D F I D F E E J T H E E I P Ag L I S Y C D Ad T 2008 2009 * * * * * * * * Minister retains the portfolio Minister has moved portfolios from 2008 The position of Deputy Prime Minister, a separate Ministerial portfolio in 2008, is now held concurrently by the Minister of Defence. 2008 2009 Majority Opposition President Total Majority Opposition President Total Ministers of State (without full portfolio) 4 1 1 6 3 1 3 7 .
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