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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permissionpermission of of the the copyright copyright owner. owner. FurtherFurther reproduction reproduction prohibited prohibited without without permission. permission. THE FUTURE OF ONTOLOGY AFTER ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

by

Jennifer Leslie Torgerson

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in

Philosophy

Chair:

John Shosl

-rr?r ^ Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

2000

American University

Washington, D.C. 20016

■ V . > r. w.ery-M.. i i t . »«-»•* -

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE FUTURE OF ONTOLOGY AFTER ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

by

Jennifer Leslie Torgerson

ABSTRACT

"You cannot step into the same river twice for different and again different waters flow

This fragment of Heraclitus demonstrates the problem of identity Since all things are in

an universal flux, nothing can be the same from moment to moment. Every moment, there

is a new river, and the waters continue to flow. Order and regularity were explained by

Heraclitus as a result of the Logos, the cosmic ordering principle. Hence, changes are

measurable. The problem of identity that is present within Heraclitus’ is that the

river is a succession of entities, each a new river, yet still river-like. Heraclitus had an

ontological commitment to the Logos, the ordering principle, and hence escaped total

chaos and confusion. Ontological commitments are very important. Ontological

commitment influences one’s entire philosophy.

Ontological commitment influences one's entire philosophy This paper will

Heraclitus. 12: K 217. All Heraclitus quotes come from Merrill Ring. Beginning with the Pre- Sr>crancs. (Mountain View. CA. Mayfield Publishing Company. 1987).

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. examine the ontological commitment o f W. V. Quine. He is the most influential analytical

philosopher of the twentieth century. His view of ontological commitment changed

throughout his career, unfolding in three distinct periods. I will examine the essays "On

What There Is" and "Two Dogmas of " as examples of his early period; Word

and Object is the example used to illustrate the second; Web o f and Ontological

Relativity for the third. In his early period he claims that experience counts against our

beliefs and that nothing can be systematically said about sentences. He abandons the

analytic-synthetic distinction. In his middle period, this denial leads him to the

indeterminacy of translation. There are no objective facts about which the words,

descriptions, or sentences have the same . The ontology of a theory is the range of

things that must exist if that theory is true. Quine holds that we can state a theory of

ontology only relative to a translation manual and a background In his later

period he mixes this with a hint o f physicalism, which conflicts with his earlier view of

and his lack of dependence upon empirical dogmas. It is in his earlier view that

we see the most valuable Quine. I hope to make the river stand still.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT n - in

Chapter

1 THE RIVER STOOD STILL 1 -9 Ontology: A Brief Historical Overview

2 QUINE ON ONTOLOGY 10-45

Meaning and Naming

Realism. Conceptualism, and Formalism

Four Kinds of Nominalism. Predicate, . , and Resemblance

Phenomenalism and Physicalism

3 QUINE ON ANALYTICITY 46-67

Meaning is not Naming

Definition and Meaning

The Grounding of Analyticity in Semantic Rules

Radical in Empiricism and the Problems with the Theory of Verification

The Two Dogmas of Empiricism

4 PREDICATION, MEANING, .AND ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY 68-87

Proxy Functions and Indifference of Ontology

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5 CAN PHILOSOPHY OVERCOME ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY OR WILL ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY ELIMINATE PHILOSOPHY9 ...... 88-90

The River Revisited

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 91-95

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

THE RIVER STOOD STILL

My art of midwifery' is in general like theirs; the only is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth. And the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man’s thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and . I am so far like the midwife, that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom; and the common reproach is true, that though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in

Philosophy has for more than two thousand years debated the issues of substance

and , and there is yet a concrete view regarding reality and how this reality is

known.2 There are several different uses of the term substance. It can be the essence, the

matter, or the universal concept, just to name a few Origin, or as the ancient Greeks

called it. arche, the basic “stuff’ of reality', is that which causes the things in the universe.

Substance is what makes them real The question about substance is whether or not it is

of one cause, or several. Accordingly, is there one kind of stuff, or several stuffs out of

Plato Theaetetus 150 B - C. All Theaetetus quotations from Walter Kaufmann. Philosophical C 'lassies: Thales to Ockham. (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prenticc-Hall. Inc.. 1968)

This is evident by reading the texts of philosophers of the tw entieth century

I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. which objects are composed? This ontology is concerned with the being of objects, and

the understanding of their true natures.

Reality, it seems, is not so obviously known. Essence can be known in two

primary ways in the epistemological philosophical tradition, namely a priori, and a

posteriori A priori knowledge is knowledge which is apprehended, at least to some

extent, prior to sense experience, and a posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is known

after sense experience. It would seem that knowing the essence (if it does exist, or can be

known) of the stuff of reality takes some blending of both ways of knowing. Primarily

most philosophers have chosen one method or the other.1 Hence, in order to try to really

know reality, not only must one investigate stuff and knowledge, but the very way in

which we convey this knowledge. If language and knowledge of reality, are so

transparent, why has there been such a long debate9

ONTOLOGY A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW2

The main metaphysical debate, to be discussed in this paper, is between the

realists, or those that hold the view that universals exist and are not mind dependent, and

nominalists, or those that hold the view that universals do not exist but that are

merely names for things. The realistic perspective will be demonstrated by briefly

The way our ideas about what we know is conveyed to others through language.

W.V Quine. From Stimulus to Science. (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1995). 1 Quine did something similar in his essay entitled 'Days of Yore" in the collection actually set the form for such discussions in his Metaphysics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. explaining the views of and Aristotle regarding substance and knowledge. The

realistic perspective will be compared to that of W.V.O Quine, who will represent the

nominalistic perspective. Nominalists reject the existence of universals, and in effect reject

the existence of essence ( ousia). The focus of this paper will be an explication of Quine's

empirical and nominalistic philosophy, which will be critically examined in the final

chapter The acceptance of a relative, empirical, nominalistic philosophy like that of

Quine's could in effect eliminate the study of ontology, and even the endeavor of

philosophy in and of itself.

The Pre-Socratics were concerned with the question of what is real, but this was a

question about natural elements What natural element was the cause of what is real?

Thales. Anaximander and Anaximenes of the Ionian school each chose a single element

which was more basic or fundamental than the rest. Sophists, such as , questioned

man's ability to know reality as it is at all. True knowledge of reality it seemed was

unknowable, or if it was knowable, it was not communicable.

Plato and Aristotle each have their own contrasting answers to the question of

"how do we know what is real9” Plato is certain that reality was not changeable, and the

understanding relied on unchanging essences. Material, or changeable things are not real.

Without logic, sense experience would be meaningless. We could not imagine that one

object was like or unlike another without these basic laws of logic. The logical laws do

not require demonstration, since they are self-evident. Without the three logical laws,

phenomena would be simply present.

Plato made imagination the lowest level of the epistemological side of the

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"divided-line.” The epistemological levels are: imagination, , reason (knowing

how or mathematical reasoning), and understanding (knowing why or dialectical

reasoning). Plato also separates imagination and perception (which are types of opinion or

belief) from that of reason and understanding (which are types of knowledge)

Corresponding to these epistemological levels were levels of reality or existence.

Corresponding to imagination were obscured images, such as shadows or the mirage on

the road Corresponding to perception were sensible objects; corresponding to knowledge

(knowing how or mathematical reasoning) were mathematical Forms, or Forms of objects

with material embodiment. Understanding (knowing why or dialectical reasoning)

corresponds to the higher Forms, or the essences of abstract ideas and of ideas which have

no embodiment, such as justice, moderation.-' Plato’s explanation of reality demonstrated

that sense experience in and of itself could not be the cause or basis of truth. We get lost

in our own imagining. Plato tells us this through Socrates in the Theaetetus (2 lOa-b):

”[W]hen we are inquiring after the nature of knowledge, nothing could be sillier that to

say that it is correct belief together with a knowledge of differentness or of anything

whatever So, for Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief nor the addition of an

"account” to true belief can be knowledge.”4 Plato explains that knowledge is neither

Plato Republic 511 A. All quotations arc from The Collected Dialogues. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Caims. (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994 'This then is the class that I described as intelligible, it is true, but with the reservation first that the soul is compelled to employ assumptions in the investigation of it. not proceeding to a first principle because of its inability to extricate itself and rise above its assumptions, and the second, that it uses images or likenesses the very objects that arc themselves copied and adumbrated by the class below them, and that in comparison with these latter arc esteemed as clear and held in honor."

Plato Theaetetus 210 A.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. belief nor is it perception, but something higher.5 Knowledge, according to Plato, of the

Ideal Essences or natures of things could only be known a priori Knowledge of essence

was not to be learned via sense experience, because of difference, corruption and

individuation. Essence or form was only to be imitated in sensible things, and the cause of

the essential nature of things was not within the things themselves. The things

experienced by sensation are changing and limited The Forms, or Ideas, are the true

objects since they are unchanging and eternal. The basic law s of logic are known a priori.

The law of identity, (that something is what it is) the law of contradiction (or non­

contradiction, that nothing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same

respect), and the law of the excluded middle (that something either is or it is not) are all

ideas not solely intelligible by sensation alone, but require what Simonds calls

"imagining."6 The three principal laws of logic that were implicit in Plato’s philosophy are

Plaio Afeno 100 A. All quotations arc from The Collected Dialogues. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994) "If all we have said in this discussion, and the questions we have asked have been right, virtue w ill be acquired neither by nature nor by teaching Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation without taking thought, unless he be the kind of statesman who can create another like himself. Should there be such a man. he would be among the living practically w hat Homer said Tircsias w as among the dead, w hen he described him as the only one in the afterworld who kept his wits — 'the others arc mere flitting shades.' Where virtue is concerned such a man w ould be just like that, a solid reality among shadow s ' Also sec Theaetetus 210 B. w here Plato acknow ledges that he docs not know w hat know ledge truly is.

Roger Simonds. Beginning . (Lanham. MD: University Press of America. Inc . 1978). 196 Roger Simonds' explanation Plato's view of the ' divided line" in his Beginning Philosophical Logic illustrates the problem eloquently: There is no way to contemplate a pure logical relation (such as implication, identity, class-mcmbcrship. etc.) without at least imagining it's terms (, individuals, attributes, etc.). Pure phenomena, on the other hand, arc meaningless or unintelligible by themselves: they arc simply present. Without logical concepts, we could not think that one image w as similar to another or different from another, w e could not imagine the persistence of an image no longer present: we could not recognize it as belonging to a class of images. Thus images take on meaning and value by being exemplified in experience. But this notion of "exemplification" in rcrcpresentation is itself a relational notion, and it is really none other than the notion of analogy or isomorphism Hence we postulate a world of sensible-mathematical objects as a way of spelling out the analogy."

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made explicit by Aristotle.

Plato’s separation of matter from form, or chorismos , was problematic. How

could essence be known if it was not in the things of the natural world? Aristotle held the

realistic perspective that form must be immanent in the matter.7 Things in the natural

w orld must be caused by things in and of this world, and not by some separated essences

that somehow cause in things their essential natures Since the qualities are sensed by the

intellect, and this is how they become to be known, according to Aristotle, an empirical

view of reality appeared to be most effective in explaining how the essences of things can

be known Aristotle explains in the Metaphysics about being prior in respect of potency:

[I]n respect of nature and substance i.e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them- a distinction which Plato used. (If we consider the various senses of “being.” firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior; secondly, according as potency or complete reality, e.g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the part to the whole, and the matter to the concrete substance, but in complete reality the whole has dissolved that they will exist in complete reality.) In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior and posterior are so called with reference to this fourth sense; for some things exist without others in respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole. And the same is true in other cases.8

Hence, being prior, as Plato had said of the essence of things, meant they had to be prior

to those things of w'hich they are essential natures of, hence presents another potential

problem of potency Essences of things must be prior to those things of which they are of

Aristotle Metaphysics 1013 A. John H. McMahon, translator. (Ainhcrst. NY: Prometheus Books. 1991). "In one way that is called cause is from which, as inherent, anything is produced: as. for example, the brass of a statue, and the silver of a cup. and the genera of these: but. in another way. the form and exemplar arc regarded as causes: and this is the reason of the formal cause and the genera of these: as. for instance, in number and the parts, those that are in the ratio, belong to this order of cause.”

' Aristotle Metaphysics 1019 A 1 - 15.

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essence The Ideal Forms were the archetypes of the several things which are in the natural

world of change and flux (Becoming). Individual things were merely imitations of their

Ideal Forms. Things cannot be without Form. The Form contains the ideal of every kind

of thing. Particular flaws and differences are to be found only in the natural world. In the

Formal realm there is only one Form for each of the many things of that kind in the natural

world. There is a necessary form prior to the individual thing which is caused by that form,

i f in fact the form and matter actualize their potentiality.

Movers move insomuch as they are moved by the immovable, according to

Aristotle. A thing cannot be prior to, or moved by itself.9 Aristotle used a Unmoved

Mover, which causes the efficient causality of others while not itself being moved.

.Aristotle thought our knowledge of things is of those which are caused to be, and are

actual entities; we are not capable of knowing things separate from their essences. It is the

essence that gives meaning to sensations. Without the forms, our sensations would be

relative and confusing. Aristotle acknowledged that there had to be some kind of

organization of sensations in accordance with essences The only way we can know the

kinds of things as they are is because their matter contains their essence, and it is this that

is perceived by subjects.10 Essence, or essential qualities (the ‘this’) are not the same as

Aristotle Metaphysics 1072 A. In my opinion. Aristotle would agrees that there is an actual substance, that is first and primary to all others, w hich is immovable (thought) If it is the case that the form and matter arc moved to be what they are. they are at once both in and of themselves. [Sec Metaphysics 1031 B.| “For if the actual good be a different thing from the being good, and animal from the being animal, and entity from the essence of entity, there will exist both different substances, and natures, and idea, besides those mentioned; and those substances w ould be prior if there be in existence the essence of substance. And if they arc. indeed, unconnected with one another, of such there would not be scientific know ledge, and they will not be entities " Aristotle also said that "it is according to form that w e know all things." Metaphysics 1010 A.

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the matter, nor the universal (abstract concepts). We cannot know what things are, we

can only know the “that’, not the ‘this.’ The this (substance, or what makes a thing a thing

that it is) cannot be described. This paper is concerned with the univeral concept, and

whether or not it has an existence Existence of the this is not being examined. It is not

ciear how such an endeavor could even be described

Aristotle called the law of non-contradiction “the most firm of all first principles",

and the law of the excluded middle Aristotle called “a necessity, if he is to say anything at

all."11 .Aristotle recognized that such first principles were not demonstrable, yet necessary

for discourse Many recognize the problems with the law of identity Philosophers do not

yet understand what is, as it is. The law of the excluded middle cannot be applied to

future circumstances, and only is applicable when essential qualities are examined, not

mere accidentals. Are the laws of logic and, in particular, the law of contradiction, like the

laws of nature9 Should the law of contradiction be revised and verified using observation.

Aristotle On the Soul 430 A. All quotations arc from Hippocrates G. Apostle. (Grinncll. I A: The Pcnptctic Press. 1986). page 51. 'Since in each genus of things there is something, e.g.. matter, as in even case (things by| nature (and matter is that which is potentially each of these things), and also something else which, by producing those things, is the cause and is capable of acting, as in the case of art in relation to its material, these different [principles] must belong to the soul also. And one is such that, like a sort of disposition, it can make all things, as in the case of light: for in a certain sense light, too. makes potential colors be actual colors. And the latter intellect is separable and cannot be affected by or be blended with anything, and in substance it exists as an actuality-, for that which acts is always more honorable tlian that which is acted upon, and the principle [of a thing which has matter is always more honorable] than the matter [of that thing).' See also Aristotle Sense and Sensihilia 448 B 11 - 25. for more on Aristotle’s argument against relativity

Aristotle Metaphysics 1006 A. “But we have now taken it to be impossible, in the case of an entity. tliat it should be and not be a the same time: and by means of this have w e demonstrated that this is the most firm of all first principles. Now . some also demand a demonstration of this, from ignorance, for it is ignorance the not knowing what things ought to seek a demonstration and of what things he should not For. indeed the w hole, it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of all things: for one would go on in this case to infinity , so there would be no demonstration at all in this way."

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It seems that the law of contradiction cannot be empirically proven, and that changing it

would not suffice. The law of contradiction, as it is (analytic and necessary), is the

fundamental means for our understanding of what we do observe in nature. Anthony

Quinton explains the result of Quine’s philosophy upon the status of such logical laws

I do not think it can be proved that anything other than the law of non­ contradiction is indispensable, rather than is never, reflectively, dispensed with. But to regard logical in general, as on a par with the most comprehensive laws of nature, as Quine’s holism does, fails to account of the fact that either we accord some statements in the whole a special inferential status or no element in the whole is, so to speak, relevant to any other. The formally conceivable option of hanging on both to observation reports, however refractory, and the currently accepted array of laws of nature and adjusting the laws of logic to make them fit is too radically unappetizing to sustain the conclusion that the difference between the laws of logic and nature is only one of the degree to which we are unwilling to drop them.1-

A view in contrast to realists, like Plato and Aristotle, is nominalism Quine is an

important contemporary philosopher whom employs nominalism in his philosophy. An

attempt will be made to summarize some of the important issues discussed by Quine in this

paper The purpose of explaining this view of nominalism is to show that it has its

disadvantages, and how it continues many of the false problems of philosophy. One such

false problem is the problem of substance The rejection of essence for concepts is a result

of the lack of confidence in substantial knowledge of things in themselves that has been

persisted since the beginning of

Anthony Quinton. "Doing Without Meaning" as in Perspectives on Ouine. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, editors. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). 307

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

QUINE ON ONTOLOGY

This chapter will examine four ontological topics. First to be examined is Quine’s

distinction between meaning and naming, followed by a discusion of the differences

between realism, conceptualism, and formalism. The third topic examined is the

distinction between and physicalism. The fourth section briefly examines

four kinds of nominalism , predicate, concept, class, and resemblance.

In his essay, ‘"On What There Is”, Quine begins by establishing a list o f things

which do not grant the existence of an universal concept. First singular terms can be used

without entailing the existence of an entity named. Second, general terms or descriptions

can be used without entailing that these words refer to abstract entities. Third, claims of

synonymy can be made without the entailment of some realm of meaning. Quine does not

use empirical evidence to develop his categories; they seem to come to him innately

Quine also discussed the limit to the range of a bound variable, and concedes that to be is

not to be the value of a bound variable.15 He also described realism, conceptualism, and

"On What There Is. " W.V.O. Quine. From A Logical Point Ofl'iew. (Cambridge. MA: Harv ard University Press. 1980). 15

10

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formalism in terms of what each would permit a bound variable to range over, and Quine

found nominalism to be the most suitable of the ontological views yet he did not discuss

this view, but he employed it implicitly He then explains the difference between

phenomenalistic conceptual schemes and physicalistic conceptual schemes, seeming to

favor physicalistic schemes over phenomenological ones, but in the end of this essay

claims that the phenomenological conceptual scheme takes epistemological priority. 17

Quine does abandon phenomenalism by the time of Word anti Object in 1960

Ontology is the study of being, or what it means to be. Ontology is a study of essence,

not existence .An important issue in the study of ontology is whether or not universals

exist Quine addresses this issue in '"On What There Is.” He begins by asking the basic

ontological question “What is there0” 16 Quine argues that no one would disagree that the

answer to the question is “everything,” but this a vague answer.17 What is this everything

that is° If two people disagree on an ontological issue one would have to affirm that

something is the case, while the other denies that something is the case. “It would appear

that in any ontological dispute the proponent of the negative side suffers the disadvantage

of not being able to admit that his opponent disagrees with him ” ls This forces the

Ibid.. 19.

Ibid.. 1.

Ibid Jaakko Hinlikka remarks of this response giv en by Quine, that 'everything' is a response only an univcrsalist can give. "For a universalist. there is only one range for one's (first order) quantifiers, viz.. all the individual objects in the world. It is for such reasons that Quine has been concerned w ith the unification of universes even in his technical logical theory and has argued that there is basically only one sense of existence." . "Quine As A Member Of The Tradition" as in Perspectives nn Quine. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, editors. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). page 164

s Ibid

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proponent of the negative side to posit that which the proponent claims does not exist as

that which is not. Quine goes on to mention that this is the old dilemma created by Plato

of non-being. According to Quine, there must be something which is non-being, or

something which is not in contrast to that which is 19 This leads philosophers to

"mistaken” points of view, that even Pegasus exists, or to “impute being where they might

otherwise be quite content to recognize that there is nothing ”20 Because w e know that a

being must be a certain kind, it does not follow that there needs be an existing being of

that kind. Quine is correct in making his distinction between actual and imaginary, but in

doing so, he is not shifting the discussion towards existence. He is not concerned with

there being an actual object existing, but merely a possible object. An object is a thing of a

certain kind if there is a being that has such and such attributes, but there need not be any

such object

The epistemological distinction between concept and object, when the referent is

actual, is clear. Yet in the case of concepts which do not refer to actual objects, such as

Pegasus, Quine argues that it is necessary to say that there is something which is not. In

order to escape this dilemma, and to separate himself from realistic philosophers, Quine

uses the copula ‘is’ without the existence predication.21 Quine echoes Kant's criticism, of

the ontological argument, as applied to the existence of God, that existence is not a real

Ibid

Ibid.. 2.

Ibid.. 3

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predicate." Hence Quine has concluded that using terms like ‘Pegasus' does not in fact

presuppose an existent being that is being named by that term. “Russell, in his theory of

so-called singular descriptions, showed clearly how we might meaningfully use seeming

names without supposing that there be entities allegedly namedQuine calls these "so-

called singular descriptions” because such descriptions usually are phrases which describe,

and are not singular terms.

[T]he burden of objective reference which had been put upon the descriptive phrase is now taken over by words of the kind logicians call bound variables, variables of qualification namely, words like something’, ‘nothing’, everything’. [...] These quantificational words or bound variables are, of course a basic part of language, and their meaningfulness, at least in context, is not to be challenged 24

Bound variables now replace descriptive phrases and are functional because they are more

general. Hence we can use more general terms, and they as well as other terms, need not

imply the existence some entity.

So it can be said that “the round square cupola on Berkeley College is not” is a

Immanual Kant. Critique o f Pure Reason, translated by JMD Mciklcjohn. (Buffalo. NY: Prometheus Books. 1990). 335. "Now if I take the subject (God) with all the predications (omnipotence being one), and say. God is. or. There is a God. I add no new predicate to the conception of God. I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject w ith all its predications— I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same: and there is no addition made to the conception, w hich expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object— in the expression, it is— as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars "

Ibid.. 5. . Logic and Knowledge. (New York. NY: Routledgc. 1994). 51. Russell defines his singular-descriptions: "Thus if C is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity x (there cannot be more than one) for which the "x is identical with C' is true, this proposition being interpreted as above. We may then say that the entity x is the denotation of the pharsc C”

:: Ibid.. 6-7.

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descriptive phrase that does not refer to some actual entity.23 “Now what o f‘Pegasus’9

This being a word rather than a descriptive phrase, Russell’s argument does not

immediately apply to it.”26 All we have to do, Quine continues, is to substitute a phrase

for the singular term, that is synonymous with the singular term. The singular term must

be translated into a description.27 Russell had come up with a solution to Plato’s paradox

with his , and Quine acknowledges his acceptance of it as well 2S

Ibid.. 7

;-> Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. I think that Quine employs the use of Russell's theory of descriptions. There is considerable controversy over the theory of descriptions. Strawson agrees with me. and also notes that singular-descriptions will in effect eliminate singular terms. Peter Strawson. Individuals. (New York. NY Roulledgc. 1990). 195

Russell uses the theory of types, which refers to classes, to escape the paradox. The problem is that some classes are members of themselves. This results in a contradiction. Is R a member of itself1 If it is a member of itself it belongs to the class of all classes that are members of themselves. If it is not a member of itself it belongs to the class of all classes that arc not members of themselves So cither w ay. it still is a member of itself. To remedy this problem. Russell describes his theory for a gradation of types, in his essay "Mathematical Logic as Based on a Theory of Types." '"'Whatever contains an apparent variable must not be a possible value of that variable.' Thus w hatever contains an apparent variable must be of a different type from the possilbc values of that variable, w e will say that it is of a higher type. Thus the apparent variables contained in an expression arc what determines its type. (...) The terms of elementary propositions we will call individuals", these form the first level or lowest type. (...) Elementary propositions together with such as contain only individuals as apparent variables vvc w ill call first-order propositions. These form the second logical type. We thus have a new totality. that of first-order propositions. We can thus form new propositons in wiiich first-order propositions occur as apparent variables. These vvc will call second-order propositions', these form the third logical type ” Logic and Knowledge. 75-76.

Russell defines the difference between description and acquaintance in his Problems o f Philosophy. Bertrand Russell. Problems o f Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997). page 46. "Know ledge of things by description, always involves. (...) some knowledge of truths as its source or ground " On the other hand knowledge of tilings by acquaintance docs not require knowing any such truths He goes on to define acquaintance as "anything of which vvc arc directly aw are without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths." To describe a table is to note certain truths about tables.

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Quine states in W ord a n d Object

It is the difference, so central to Russell’s philosophy, between description and acquaintance. It is kept before us in synchronic behavior as a difference between the non-observable occasion sentences, with their random variation in stimulus from speaker to speaker, and observational sentences with their socially ' uniform stimulus meanings. 29

What if the singular term was an obscure term9 Would a description like “the thing that

is-Pegasus” lead to the contention that universals exist? Quine thinks not. “If in terms of

pegasizing we can interpret the noun ‘Pegasus’ as a description subject to Russell’s theory

of descriptions, then we have disposed of the old notion that Pegasus cannot be said not to

be without presupposing that in some sense Pegasus is.” ’° Quine has stated that

descriptions for singular terms do not imply that there is a being to which the description

refers in existence.

Quine describes the accepting of the existence of entities in "Plato’s heaven” as

non seqiulur, and that he is not interested in non-being or being of universals ' 1 To posit

universals would be to create a bloated universe as far as Quine is concerned.'2

W.V.O. Quine. Word and Object. (Cambridge. MA: The MIT Press. 1960). section 13: ' Translation and Meaning.” 56. In section 12. 53 Quine states: "We cannot even say what native locutions to count as analogues of terms as we know them, much less equate them with ours term for term, except as we have also decided w hat native devices to view as doing in their various w ays the w ork of our own various auxiliaries to objective reference: our articles and pronouns, our singular and plural, our copula, our identity predicate.” In section 20. "Predication” Quine goes on to explain that terms like Pegasus' are learned by description, (page 95).

Ibid.. 8.

Ibid.

Ibid.. 3

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MEANING AND NAMING

The existence of universals, or the existence of attributes or categories based on

like objects all having something in common, is merely trivially true for Quine. '' He notes

that one's ontology is fundamental to formulating an or conceptual

scheme’/ 4 Unfortunately, Quine does not define ‘conceptual scheme’/ 5 Ontological

statements need no justification because they are basic and important for understanding

our conceptual schemes “One’s ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which he

interprets all experiences, even the most commonplace ones Judged within some

particular conceptual scheme — and how else is judgment possible9 — an ontological

statement goes without saying, standing in need of no separate justification at all. " '6

In identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis” Quine describes his pragmatic approach to

ontology as a type of ontological relativism. "Concepts are language, and the purpose of

language, and the purpose of concepts and of language is efficacy in communication and in

predication. Such is the ultimate duty of language, science, and philosophy, and it is in

relation to that duty that a conceptual scheme has finally to be appraised.”' 1 When a

Ibid.. 9

Ibid.. 10.

Word and Object." 3 Quine discusses conceptual schemes in "Word and Object." "There is every reason to inquire into the sensory or stimulatory background of ordinary talk of phy sical things. This mistake comes only in seeking an implicit sub-basement of conceptualization, or of language. Conceptualization on any considerable scale is inseparable from language, and our ordinary language of physical things is about as basic as language gets "

"On What There Is." 10.

W.VO Quine. From .1 Logical Point O f View. (Cambridge. MA. Harvard University Press. 19X0). 79.

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conceptual scheme that multiplies entities beyond necessity to use Ockham’s razor, or is

"too unwidely for our poor minds to cope with effectively” in Quine’ terms, then

elegance is simply a means to the end of a pragmatically acceptable conceptual scheme. But elegance also enters as an end in itself -- and quite properly so as long as it remains secondary in another respect; namely, as long as it is appealed to only in choices where the pragmatic standard prescribes no contrary decision. Where elegance doesn’t matter, we may and shall, as poet, pursue elegance for elegance’s sake.’8

Simplicity and elegance as means to an end echoes Kant once again. Quine states how we

must see ontology as basic to conceptual schemes, and all judging is from within such a

scheme

He also notes the difference between meaning and naming. '9 Meaning is

conceptual, or mind dependent. Meanings explain what a thing would need to be if it

were of the kind in question. It does not, he contends, imply that there is a named or

actual entity that exhibits theses qualities.40 Quine claims that it is the confusion of

meaning with naming which induces philosophers to acknowledge the existence of

universals He is also claiming that it is this confusion of between meaning and naming that

Ibid.

Of this Orcstein remarks: "Tims, singular cxistentials such as Quine exists', w ere said to be meaningless because the string (3x) Quine' is not well formed. Fortunately fashions have changed. Strawson has reminded us how much names arc like descriptions (Strawson 1963)." Alex Orcstein. "Is Existence . as in Perspectives on Ouine. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, editors. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). 266.

"On What There Is." 9. Quine contends that it is a moot point. Quine is not concerned with proving that his definition of meaning is correct, but in showing how those that accept the existence of universals have misunderstood the difference between meaning and naming. Named objects are not merely conceptual Accordingly, meanings arc not. on their own. evidence for the existence of a namablc (actual) entities

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leads to belief in universal concepts.

There is a gulf between meaning and naming even in the case of a singular term, which is genuinely a name of an object. The following example from Frege will serve The phrase “Evening Star” names a certain large physical object of spherical form, which is hurling through space some scores of millions of miles from here. The phrase “Morning Star" names the same thing[ ] [. . .] But the two phrases cannot be regarded as having the same meaning[ ] The meaning, then, being different from one another, must be other than the named object, which is one in the same in both cases.41

Those who hold that universals exist have confused meaning with the named object,

according to Quine, and what they have mistakenly called universals are actually

attributes. Just because there are red houses and red sunsets, Quine in no way thinks that

this leads to the affirmation of the existence of red-ness. The way he avoids the universal

is to reject meaning, or the intensional meaning. Quine seems to only be rejecting

intensional meaning, since he thinks there a confusion between meaning and naming 42

"'[T]he only way I know how to counter it is by refusing to admit meaning.”4'' It does not

Ibid Kripkc agrees with Quine on this point, and thinks that such truths arc contingent, and not necessary "But neither of those arc necessary truths even if that's the way we pick out the planet. These arc the contingent marks by which we identify a certain planet and give it a name. " Saul A Knpke. .Yarning and Xecessin-. (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1980). 105

FromLogical Point O f View. 139 -159. Intensional objects can be quantified over by bound variables, if they are analytically equivalent. Quine rejects the notion of analvticity in his "Tw o Dogmas of Empiricism."' An analytical judgment is a judgment in which the predicate term contains no more information tlian the subject term. The predicate is synonymous with the subject.

"On What There Is. " 11. In "Word and Object."' Quine explains about : "One may accept the Brcntano thesis cither as show ing the indispcnsability of intensional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as show ing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano s. is the second. To accept intentional usage at face value is. we say. to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions ' 221. Quine is not interested in connotation, but denotation. Quine prefers "is true o f to the usage of "denoting" Sometimes cxtcnsional meaning is described as denoting, while intensional meaning is described as connotation. Quine explains: "The phrase "is true o f is less open to misunderstanding: clearly "wicked" is not true o f the quality of w lckedncss. nor the class of w icked persons, but of each wicked person individually." W. V. Quine. Methods o f Logic. Fourth Edition. (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1982). 94.

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follow that Quine thinks that words and statements are not meaningful. Quine considers

the reliance upon definitions to convey meaning is a reliance upon an illusion.44 Does one

have to admit to the existence of universals merely because some meanings are

synonymous? Quine offers, of course, the negative answer to this question.

Quine has not abandoned meaning. He wants to ensure that the confusion between

meaning and naming will be eliminated, and this can be accomplished if meaning is

restricted to extensional meaning. Intensional meaning is the set of characteristics a thing

must have to be named the thing that it is. In contrast, extensional meaning is the set of

things to which the definition applies, and involves the naming of things that fit the

meaning or characteristics of the class (class concepts). He wants to ban intensional

objects by using extension instead.45

Quine is not referring to actual, physical entities with his naming. He is referring

to variables Ontological committal descriptions are the kind to which Quine wants to

apply his bound variables. Quine contends that names are easily convened into

descriptions, but what of the bound variable? 46 Quine says that the use of the bound

variable is the only situation in which ontological commitments are involved.47 We could

change the name, or eliminate them all together: "To be assumed as an entity is, purely

"On Wliat There Is." 12

If 'oril and Object. 191.

S awing and S'ecessity. 27 "Frege specifically said that such a description gave the sense of the name ' Names that do not stand for descriptions don't have any sense.

"On What There Is." 12

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and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.”48 This answers the question of

being: "that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun.”49 He will say a few

pages later: "To be is be the value of a variable.” This results in an indeterminacy of

translation. There are no such things as non-relative facts. Quine contends that use of

bound variables in ontology will not explain what there is. but about w'hat one to

be what is Perhaps all we can know is our beliefs about what that object or other is. but

not the this (or its essence). This is not a claim about existence, but about language and

belief

Objective truth is not possible given Quine’s usage of ontological relativity

Variables are bound in the scope of a quantifier. Statement functions use bound

quantifiers; such statements have variables that are all abound within the scope of the

same quantifier. 50 Quine defines pronoun as "the basic media of reference ”31 Bound

variables like ’something’, ’nothing’, and ’everything’ are included in ontologies, and the

existence of such ranging variables does not necessary imply the existence of the entities

being described. Quine believes that: ”[W]e are convicted of a particular ontological

if, and only if, the alleged presupposition has to be reckoned among the

entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true.”3"

I b i d . . 1 3

I b i d . . 1 5

Daniel Bonevac. Simple Logic. (Fort Worth. TX: Harcourt Brace. 1999). 344.

"On What There Is." 13. He adds, "nouns might have been named propronouns.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Quine offers an example to illustrate his point To accept the presupposition ‘Some dogs

are white’ is true there has to be at least some actual dogs that are in fact white, hence the

bound variable ‘something’ ranges over actual entities i f this is the case. This bound

variable, or the use of the existential quantifier, in no way forces him to accept or admit

that there is some entity o f‘whiteness’ or ‘dogness’. Quine contends. Only if there are

some white dogs, the presupposition ‘some dogs are white’ is true. He in no way wished

to commit to the existence or being of abstract entities.

REALISM. CONCEPTUALISM. AND FORMALISM

Quine believes we now have a clear standard to determine the truth of

, or “an implicit standard whereby to decide what ontology a given theory

or form of discourse is committed to: a theory is committed to those and only those

entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring in order

that the affirmation made in the theory be true." “ This brings Quine to the descriptions

of possible ontological theories, or “points of view’’ that had been debated in medieval

philosophy and were now entering into discussions among modem mathematicians.54 The

debate among the modem mathematicians. Quine relates, is this: to what extent do the

bound variables actually range over entities, or what range of entities is acceptable for

Ibid

Ibid.. 13-14

Ibid

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bound variable reference? 55

Quine defines realism, conceptualism, and formalism to illustrate their similarity

with modem mathematical positions of logicism, intuitionism, and formalism for various

answers to the question of the reference of bound variables. 56 Realism is, according to

Quine "the Platonic doctrine that universals or abstract entities have being independently

of the mind, the mind may discover them but cannot create them.”57 Realism as conceived

by Aristotle still maintained that we could only know our of the world, and

not the independent objects (composite of matter and form or hylomporphic composition)

existing in the natural world as they truly are. Plato, an idealist, made the knowledge of

essence even more difficult by separating matter from essence (or form).5s This is

mirrored in the Logicism of Frege, Russell. Whitehead, Church, and Carnap / 9

Logicism [is t]he view pioneered by Frege and Russell, that received mathematics, in particular arithmetic, is part of logic. The aim was to provide a system of primitives and axioms (which on interpretation yielded logical truths) such that all arithmetical notions were definable in the system and all theorems of arithmetic were theorems of the system. If successful, the program would ensure that our knowledge of mathematical truths was of the same status as logical truths.60

I b i d . . 1 4 .

Ibid.. 14-15.

Ibid . 14 "Realism [is the view j (in scholastic philosophy [,..| contrasted with nominalism) that universals hav e a real and substantial existence, independently of being thought. [ , .| Most commonly the view (contrasted with idealism) that physical objects exist independently of being perceived. Thus understood, realism obviously reaffirms the standpoint of ."

Antony Flcw.editior. .1 Dictionary o f Philosophy. (New York. St. M artin's Press. 1984). 299.

"On What There Is." 14.

A Dictionary-of Philosophy, 215. But arithmetic was lowered to the realm of set theory.

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He claims that Ockham, a medieval nominalist, had his razor dulled by cutting through the

unnecessary entities of Plato’s universe.61 A nominalist is one that denies the existence of

forms or universals Nominalists call forms as merely names; universals are only to be

found in predicatations in our language-making Nominalism is the view that universals do

not have an independent existence but are merely names.62 Quine is a nominalist. Quine

makes no secret of his disagreement with Plato.6'' Plato accepted the existence of

universals separate from the things of the sensible world. Of course, this is what Quine is

denying As realist, Aristotle, differed on the “location” of the universals. claiming that to

be known the forms must be immanent in the matter of which they are forms, or

hylomorphic composition. Universals are abstracted from particulars. Nonetheless, this is

still an affirmation of a class or group of essential entities, separate from the mind, and

hence, realism. The logicians accept “the use of bound variables to refer to abstract

entities known and unknown, specifiable and unspecifiabie, indiscriminately."6'* Quine will

not tolerate this use of bound variables ranging over possible instead of actual entities

The entities must be known to determine whether the bound variables accurately range

over them. Being known and determinate is not just a mere concept but a reference to

something real known by our senses. This kind of reference or verification cannot be done

"On What There Is." 2.

A Dictionary-of Philosophy, 250.

"On What There Is.” 5. "I have spoken disparagingly of Plato's beard, and hinted that it is tangled." And it is this "inconvenience" of "putting' up with Plato's theory that led Quine to develop his own ontology

Ibid.. 14.

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with abstract entities, especially unknown entities of any kind. An example of such a

mathematical abstract entity is n + 1. The natural number series could not continue

without the potentiality of n + 1 (in example l + l=2;2-f-l=3;3+l...) There cannot

be 2 without 1 The existence of such a continual series is not known a posteriori, but

only a prio n. and is a mathematical concept. But is there a concept of 1 which itself

exists'7 Do universals exist as separate entities'7 Quine does not think that universal or

abstract terms have an existence.

Conceptualism is, according to Quine, the view that “there are universals but they

are mind made.”65 “Conceptualism [is t]he theory of universals according to which general

or abstract terms (such as ‘substance’ or ‘humanity’) have meaning because they name or

otherwise refer to corresponding non-physical entities, called concepts. In the most

substantial, and perhaps least plausible view, these concepts are taken to be mental

images.”66 According to Quine, sense experience and language are interwoven and cannot

be separated from each other. Language is an expression of thoughts in the “mind". The

mind is not a collection of separate things, each with its separate empirical definition.67

There is not a separate mind, according to Quine, where thoughts, in any form, exist

independent from experience. Nor can experience exist independent of what is thought

about it.

Ibid.

.1 Dictionary o f Philosophy, 69.

W. V. Quine. Hays o f Paradox and Other Essays. Revised Edition. (Cambridge: University of Harvard Press. 1976). ”On Mental Entities." 221.

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Conceptualism is in opposition to realism because the conceptualists hold that

universals or concepts are mind made, while the realists do not think that universals are

mind made, or mind dependent, since universals are abstracted from the Forms that are

present in the objects in Aristotle’s view. Intuitionism is the modem view similar to

Conceptualism. Of their range of acceptance of bound variables referring to abstract

objects Quine states: "only when those entities are capable of being cooked up individually

from the ingredients specified in advance ”68

Intuitionism [is a] system produced by Brouwer, identifying truth with being known to be true, that is, proven. The main theses of intuitionism are: that a mathematical entity exists only if a constructive existence proof can be given; and that a (mathematical) statement is true only if there is proof of it, and false only if a proof of its denial can be given. Brouwer’s idealist inclinations led him to describe mathematics as investigation of the (ideal) mathematician’s "mental constructions” The view is notable for its rejection o f classical logic, and in particular the law of double negation, the law of the excluded middle, and the classical reductio [ad ahsurdum].69

The opposition between realists and conceptionalists is not a mere "quibble.” The position

one takes will influence one’s view of mathematics and in particular one’s view of the

levels of infinity.70 Realists have orders o f infinity that are ascending, while conceptualists

do not go beyond the first level of infinity, or lowest order of infinity, and in effect

abandon classical mathematical laws regarding real numbers.71

T b i d .

. I Dictionary• o f Philosophy. 178.

'On What There Is." 14.

Ibid. 15

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Formalism is, according to Quine, “the unbridled recourse to universals." 72 The

Formalists are much like nominalists, in that they do not admit to the existence of

universals in the way that realists and even the conceptualists do, but nonetheless cling to

them for safety We need not throw out mathematical principles like the conceptualists,

but the formalists admit to the existence of abstract entities, and this is something

conceptualists do not recognize. The rules that govern mathematical systems need only be

examined and this can serve as an adequate basis of agreement among individuals of any

ontological following: “[Tjhese syntactical rules being, unlike the notions themselves,

quite significant and intelligible ” 75 From this statement, Quine attempts to find a suitable

ontology among the options, but he asks: “[H]ow are we to adjudicate among rival

ontologies'7" 74

Perhaps we need not abandon all elements of an old theory of ontology to establish

a n e w one. ”[i]f the new theory can be so fashioned as to diverge from the old only in

w a y s that are undetectable in the most ordinary circumstances, then it inherits the evidence

of the old theory rather than having to overcome it. Such is the force of conservatism

e v e n in the context of revolution.”75 It cannot be accomplished by using “To be is the

v a l u e of a variable”, a mere semantic formula. 76 Quine notes that we are not trying to

I b i d

I b i d .

I b i d .

W. V Quine and J.S. Ullian. The II eh o f Belief. Second Edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill. Inc.. 1970). 76.

Ibid

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discover what there is, but what someone else says there is. 77 Hence, according to Quine,

we can only know our beliefs about the world, and not the world in and of itself. Our

beliefs about the world are changing. The web of beliefs is constantly being examined and

reexamined. When it is discovered that a belief no longer suits our uses, it is changed or

discarded. Things cannot be known in and of themselves; all we know are the predicates

in our language-making. Hence the only possible ontology is ontological relativism. W'e

cannot look merely to the bound variable to find the ontological standard, since the bound

variables must be verified to actually range over the entities they bound over, in

conformity to a pre-existing ontological standard. 7h This has been a semantic discussion in

the debate over what there is; there was the predicament of not being able to admit that

there are disagreements, and the side of the opponent was disadvantaged.

Quine hopes that the collapse or reduction of this debate into a debate over words

may eliminate any question-begging. 79 Is this a mere debate of words'7 It seems the

reliance upon an empirical sense field theory from which our perceptions of the world are

obtained ensures such a relativity. This kind of relativity leads to the inability to hold one

theory as better at explaining the nature of reality than another -- there could always be

another paradigm shift. Ontological relativity w'ould, Quine hoped, end mere quibbles

over words, but it has not. This reminds me of a passage in Through the Looking Glass

where Alice is told by Humpty Dumpty, after a discussion of un-birthday presents that are

Ibid. Hcncc Quine is not concerned with quid erat esse, but merely about what there is.

Ibid.

I b i d . . 1 6 .

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given 364 days a year opposed to once a year for birthday presents, "there’s glory for

you!" so Alice replies that she is not sure what he means by glory'. “O f course you don’t—

till I tell you I meant ‘there is a nice knock-down argument for you!”’ Humpty Dumpty

retorts

But glory does not mean ‘a nice knock down argument’,” Alice objected. “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more or less.” “The question is,” said .Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be the master— that’s ail.S!

Hence if such ontological relativity is permitted, words can mean just about anything an

individual likes. If this is the case. Philosophy has not progressed beyond the ideology of

Protagoras and his homo mensnra. Too bad the king did not really mean that all his

horses and all his men could really put Humpty Dumpty back together again Therein lies

the problem. If ontology, and thus meaning of words can be relative, no one will be sure

of what anyone else is really trying to express anymore Hence, Quine attempts to ground

his relativity with the physical sciences. Due to the fact that the physical sciences are

themselves in a state of constant change, and revision, constantly shifting meanings within

its theoretical statement making. Quine has tried to ground the relative in the relative. In

Quine's view, we should be the master of words in our conception-making. Thus, we

should only agree to those concepts that fit into a set of true beliefs about the world,

supposedly gained from mere sense stimuli:

’ Lewis Carroll. Alice's Ach’entures in Wonderland & Through the Looking-Glass. (New York: Bantam Classic. 1988). 168-169.

s: fbid.

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Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say a system of physics: we adopt, as least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disorded fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged’ .82

Our sense experiences must be organized; raw experience has to be arranged into a

conceptual scheme. Quine again employs the notion of a ‘conceptual scheme’ and the

simpler the better. Like Ockham, Quine sees no reason to violate the doctrine that entici

non sunt multiphcanda praeter necessitalem Unlike Ockham, Quine found no reason to

ground meaning in some sort of universality. Quine wants to ground his ontological

relativity in the physical sciences, yet his nominalistic view of reality does not leave room

for physical entities.

PHENOMENALISM AND PHYSICAL1SM

Phenomenological conceptual schemes are epistemological, while physicalistic

conceptual schemes (based in material-epiphenomenalism) are "physically fundamental” 8’

Phenomenological schemes do not claim to know substance, as it is noumenal or beyond

appearance All that can be known about the world is how it appears. Physicalists do

make a claim about substance, that it is material, or that causation all takes place within a

material substance Hence phenomenalism and physicalism are contrary positions

Quine spends little time discussing the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme

This epistemological dualist scheme admits a distinction between analytic statements, in

'On What There Is." 16

Ibid.

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which the predicate term is contained in the subject term and the synthetic term, in which

the predicate information cannot be known to apply to the subject without verification

from sense experience. Examples of phenomenalistic conceptual schemes are found in the

schemes o f Hume and Kant. Quine abandoned the analytic-synthetic distinction as well as

challenged the concept of necessity He asks: “Which should prevail9” 84 If we eliminate

the analytic-synthetic distinction, then it is not yet clear which type of statements should

prevail Should analytic statements prevail or should synthetic statements prevail9 Quine

does not see how analytic propositions can be verified as true, and he thinks that only

synthetic propositions have this quality. Do they really9 It would appear that synthetic

propositions or matters of fact, fall short of such verification.

Quine says of the physicalistic conceptual scheme, since it claims to talk about

external objects, that it “offers great advantages in simplifying our over-all reports. By

bringing together scattered sense events and treating them as perceptions of one object,

we reduce the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable conceptual

”85 This rule is a counter-Humean rule. Hume wanted all simple ideas to be

traced back to simple impressions as their source.86 Hume defines the distinction between

impressions and idea in his A Treatise o f Human Nature:

All the impressions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds,

[bid.

Ibid. 17

Hume. "A Treatise of Human Nature." in Philosophers Speak for Themselves: Berkeley. Hume, and Kant, edited by T V Smith and Maijorie Grcnc. (Chicago. IL: University of Chicago Press. 1957). 106-107

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which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought and consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may call impressions; and under the name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.*7

Impressions and ideas can be divided into the simple and the complex 88 All simple

ideas must be traced to simple impressions as their source. Hume states this principle in

his Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding "When we entertain, therefore, any

suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is too

frequent), we need but inquire, from what impressions is that supposed idea derived?" 89

However, the bundles o f perception inhibited the ability to find these simples, since a

collection of experiences masks the individual impressions that led to the idea. Quine

seems to find these bundles simplifying, while Hume thought them to be the leveling of

knowledge both of matters of fact and relations between ideas It seems unclear how

conceptual schemes can be simplifying. Quine explains the rule of simplicity as: “[Ojur

guiding maxim in assigning sense data to objects: we associate an earlier and later round

of sense datum with the so-called name penny, or with two different so-called pennies, in

Ibid. Hume also defines these tenns in his Enquires Concerning Human ( nderstanding (Book 1. section 2. 12.)

'1 1 I must make use of the distinction, of perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that manv of our complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and mam of our complex impressions are never exactly copied into ideas.” "Treatise.” 108.

x' Da\id Hume. Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, revised third edition. P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995). 22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world picture” 90 For the

sake of simplicity, we assign names to sense data, and when we see objects which exhibit

the standard named, we use same name for each. It matters not if the penny in my pocket

is not the same as the penny I had last weekend. It is a penny none the less.

Of phenomenological and physicalistic conceptual schemes, both have advantages.

He appreciated that phenomenalism only admits to knowing things as we believe them to

be due to their appearances. All that is known about reality is that which appears In

phenomenalism, search for essence, and substance is not possible, since essential qualities

and substance are hidden behind the veil of appearance. While using a phenomenalistic

view, there was no need for Quine to commit to anything beyond appearance Quine later

rejects the phenomenological view for the concrete objects o f physicalism, as physics

demands. The physical sciences deal with actual physical entities, and not just the mere

appearance of those entities. Most of the important entities of the physical sciences don't

always appear to the unaided human eye Quine eventually finds an advantage in the

physicalistic conceptual scheme because it brings together "scattered sense events” that

are linked to "so-called” objects.91 Does it really? If the objects in question are too small,

or elemental, Quine does not consider them to be concrete objects, although such objects

are the bread and butter of the physical sciences. Hence the advantage o f the physical

"On What There Is." 17. Quine explains the rule of simplicity as: “(OJur guiding inaxim in assigning sense data to objects: \vc associate an earlier and later round of sense datum with the so-called name penny, or with two different so-called pennies, in obedience to the demands of maximum simplicity in our total world picture"

Ibid.

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sciences seems to be diminished by Quine's limitation.

Quine, of course, is not optimistic that it is possible to convert

phenomenological conceptual schemes into physicalistic conceptual schemes.92 "Now

what of classes or attributes of physical objects, in turn?” Quine recognizes that for the

phenomenologist, the physicalistic conceptual scheme is as much myth or superstition, as

the phenomenological conceptual scheme is to physicalists. Can we know the attributes of

objects via either schema0

In his conclusion to “On What There Is,” Quine wants to see how far the reduction

of a physicalistic conceptual scheme will fit into a phenomenalistic conceptual scheme.9'

Quine wants to have mathematics free of Platonic myth, but at the same time inquires into

its Platonic foundations 94 Quine claims that the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme is

best able to handle the job, and it also takes what he calls "epistemological priority,” since

it only claims to know objects as they appear and not the substance.95 Quine believed this

because the phenomenological conceptual scheme is willing to admit that "ontologies of

physical objects and mathematical objects are myths.”96 Myth has a relative quality. Each

epistemological point of view is one among several points of view, each of which

correspond to different interests and ends.97 Hence Quine adopts and practices an

I b i d . . 1 8

I b i d . . 1 9

I b i d .

I b i d .

I b i d .

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ontological relativity.98 The question of ‘on what there is’ does not refer to what there is

in existence, but what we experience, and hence all we can know is about what there is.

Theories can take yet more drastic turns: such not merely to threaten a cherished ontology of elementary particles, but to threaten the very sense of the ontological question what there is. What I have been taking as the standard idiom for existential purposes, namely quantification, can serve as a standard only when embedded in the standard form of regimented language that we have been picturing: one whose apparatus consists only of truth functions and predicates. If there is any deviation in this further apparatus, then there arises a questions of foreign exchange: we cannot judge what existential content may be added by these foreign intrusions until we have settled on how to translate it all into our standard form. [...] A kindred notion may then stand forth that seems sufficiently akin to warrant application of the same word; such is the way of terminology Whether to say at that point that we have gained new insight into existence, or that we have outgrown the notion and reapplied the term, is a question of terminology as well„ l l 99 ' '

Relativity is to be overcome by the use of a first order logical language. If the

terms can be defined and consent is established, then truth can be established within the

system. There could be quibbles over the meaning of words. Without anything but our

impressions of the world to guide defining, might there be difference in opinion over the

meaning of terms, as in Through the Looking Glass0 However, mere quibbles over shades

of meaning is not the true difficulty. There are beliefs that cannot be translated into this

logical syntax Are such beliefs meaningless because they do not fit the system or is the

system merely inadequate to account for such experience9 It is difficult to convert our

Ibid.

W V O. Quine. Ontological Relativity and other essays. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1969). 138.

W.V.O. Quine. Pursuit o f Truth. (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press. 1990). 35-36

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sentiment and beliefs into a concrete logical syntax.100 There would be different kinds of

beliefs for different believers, and such difference may be overlooked, or complicate

understanding the meaning conveyed by the terms all together. Quine contends that we do

not have the ability to know if things exist, only our perceptions. The relativity of

perceptions makes it difficult to understand what the terms truly mean. Hence not only is

Quine unable to know the things themselves, it seems that he is unable to explain the

meaning of linguistic terms within a set web of beliefs. This relativity is a result of a lack

of universal understanding of the essential qualities that make a thing a certain kind of

thing, and it is this essence that is being described by language. Without

acknowledgement of essential qualities which are a necessity to describe kinds of things,

all descriptions, as well as things themselves, seem to be ambiguous.

Quine is willing to use a theory that has efficacy and utility, and it seems that

physicalism and nominalism are those theories. It too seems that the claim of the

phvsicalists that matter is real is a bit strong a position for a nominalist to take. What the

realists call '‘forms” are merely names according to nominalists. Essence or form is

essential (primary) substance or ousia. Ousia is best defined as quid eral esse, or what it

was to be Nominalism comes from the Latin word nominalis which means name, so

nominalism is literally name-ism. So what is real? Most nominalists like to remain

substance neutral, but Quine favors a type of physicalism in his later philosophy.

Wittgenstein comments in Philosophical Grammar, that there is nothing to be gained by using the Russellian notation 3.\. "Ordinary language says "In this square there is a red circlethe Russellian notation says "There is an object which is red circle in this square." [,..| Perhaps even the expression "there is” is misleading " page 267. . Philosophical Grammar, edited by Rush Rhccs. (Berkeley: University of California Press). 266-267.

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Closeness of association with stimulation has stood up poorly as an argument for giving physical objects preferential status. But something could still perhaps be salvaged from it. For, grant that the question whether to dignify given words as terms is a question of what was said earlier for physical objects, viz. that terms for them are fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation, perhaps we could say this: sentences fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation exhibit terms for physical objects in all sorts o f term positions, not just in rather special positions. It seems plausible that common terms for physical objects come out better by such a standard than abstract terms do. 101

Some do not even like to discuss matters of ontology in terms of existence of universal

concepts like formal essences. The only existence nominalists will grant is the existence o f

particulars Today, talk of particulars has been changed to talk about objects. Quine

groups objects into kinds: “[*]n general we can take it as a very special mark o f the

maturity of a branch of science that it no longer needs an irreducible notion of similarity

and kind.”102 However, the manner in which we identify these objects is not agreed upon

by nominalists either.

FOUR KINDS OF NOMINALISM: PREDICATE.

CONCEPT. CLASS. AND RESEMBLANCE

Nominalism, in general, is the view that universals do not exist, but that only

particulars exist All forms of nominalism share this basic premise. Quine makes a major

shift in his philosophy. At first he criticizes nominalism, but in his later philosophy

Word and Object. 237-238.

"Natural Kinds." 138. See Metaphysics 1015 a. "Nature is styled the substance of things that exist by Nature: [ ,.| metaphorically speaking and generally, every substance is called Nature, also is a certain substance." Xaming andXecessity. 127. Kripke defines natural kinds as being like proper names, and applies this view to mass terms such as gold and water.

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embraces the view. Quine in fact is criticizing other forms of nominalism in favor of

another. Hence a discussion of the some of the main kinds of nominalism is essential to

understanding Quine’s view. The limitations of predicate, concept and class wall be

illustrated as to shed light upon why Quine favors resemblance nominalism. Presently,

Quine favors a nominalistic approach by holding the view that universals are not real, and

do not have an existence what so ever. Universals are only to be used as predicates. He

does not appear to favor the view here in “On What There is,” and in Word and Object

makes a claim against nominalism.

Let a word therefore, have occurred as a fragment of ever so many empirically well-attested sentential wholes; even as a rather termlike fragment, by superficial appearances. Still, the question whether to treat it as a term is the question whether to give it general access to positions appropriate to general terms, or perhaps to singular terms, subject to the usual laws of such contexts. Whether to do so may reasonably be decided by considerations of systematic efficacy, utility theory. But if nominalism and realism are to be adjudicated on such grounds, nominalism’s claims dwindle. The reason for admitting numbers as objects is precisely their efficacy in organizing and expediting the sciences. The reason for admitting to classes is much the same.10’

All nominalists claim that what realists call universals are in fact merely names.

There are several forms of nominalism, including predicate nominalism, concept

nominalism, class nominalism and resemblance nominalism. Nominalists think that the

realists have gone to far in positing an existence of essences, or universals merely based on

the word “is.” This word is merely a copula, or linking verb, and in no way can imply the

existence of something, since it is not a real predicate.104 The predicate adds no new

Word and Object. 236-237.

Bertrand Russell. "The Existential Import of Propositions." The Collected Dialogues. I d/ume 4: Foundations o f Logic 1903-1905. (New York: Routlcdge. 1994).

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information and predicates must predicate of something. Kant uses this in his Critique of

Pure Reason as a criticism of ontological arguments for the existence of God. The word

“is"’ added no new information than we had already had in the subject to begin with, hence

'"is” is not a real predicate.

Ockham had one of the earliest criticisms of realists like Plato and Aristotle,

although he was not the first nominalist. Ockham denies that there could be some

existence of essence separate from the individual that contains that essence. Essences

could not apply to more than one thing, since each thing is an individual or particular.

In an individual, there is no universal nature really distinct from a contracting difference. Such a nature could not be posited there unless it were an essential part of the individual itself. But there is always a relation between whole and part such that, if the whole is singular and not common, then analogously each part in the same way is singular. For one part cannot be more singular than another. Therefore, either no part of the individual is singular or every part of the individual is singular. But not no part. Therefore every part. Likewise, if two such really distinct factors were in the individual, does it not seem to involve a contradiction that one could be without the other. In that case, the individual degree could be without the contracted nature or conversely, which is absurd.105

If this is the case universals do not exist, only individuals. Every part of every

individual is singular, or a particular, and in no way universal. Ockham is famous for his

anti-realistic stance. He first called universals, ficta, or entities that only have intensional

being Ockham later abandoned intensional being, and identified what realists call

universals with the acts of understanding.106 All nominalists are not of the Ockham

' ' William of Ockham "Five Questions on Universals" Paul Vincent Spade (translator and editor). Five Texts on the Medieval Problem o f Universals. (Indianapolis. IN: Hacken Publishing Company. 1994). 152.

116 Dictionary. 374.

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variety, and there are several forms of nominalism today. Predicate nominalism, concept

nominalism, class nominalism, and resemblance nominalism are all forms o f nominalism

discussed in this section. All forms of nominalism have a fundamental belief that

universals do not exist, but are merely names.

The first form of nominalism to be discussed is predicate nominalism.

Predicate nomimalists, link general terms, predicates, to the subjects to which they apply.

These predications are not universals, but merely names or qualities or attributes of a

subject. The predicate is said to be true of the particular, but philosophers like Armstrong

think this to be misleading, since the predicate nominalist has not verified this using an

objective process. How can we be certain that these predicates are in fact true of the

particular we apply it to?107 Since there can be many interpretations of the sense fields of

empirical experience via which empirical nominalists gain their knowledge of the world, it

is impossible to even objectively know the world as it is. The predicate nominalists use a

method of analysis like: “/I has F if and only if a falls under the predication F \ l0%

But since there is no way to verify this application empirically (a posteriori) or rationally

(a priori), how can we be so certain? This does not eliminates nominalism, since predicate

nominalism is only one type.

The second form of nominalism is concept nominalism. Concept nominalism is a

lot like conceptualism, in that these nominalists use concepts. This is very much like the

“ D. M. Armstrong. Nominalism and Realism, Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. 1. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978). 13.

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predicate nominalism just discussed. They even use the same method of analysis as the

predicate nominalists: “A has property F if and only if a falls under the predication F \ 109

Armstrong goes on to state that since predicate and concept nominalisms are so close in

relation, one criticism could be used to attack both effectively. The problem is with the

concepts used as predicates. What is whiteness? Can one definition suffice? Can we

employ an axiom that all things similar to this thing is a white thing? What does white

mean? This is an infinite regress much like the one posed by Plato’s separation of matter

from form. Will the term be applied by all individuals universally in the same way? An

empiricist may be tempted to show whiteness to another to prove its meaning — but what

allows the empiricist to bracket a determination of whiteness at that time? Can that

bracketing apply to all situations of whiteness? It is hardly likely. And furthermore, can

predicates be taken to be real properties? It does not seem possible that such concepts can

be accurate predications of real particulars since, as it has been said before, there are no

objective means to verify predication using empirical means absent universal essences.

Class nominalism is a third type of nominalism which attempts to class group

particulars into categories o f similarity. Many, like Quine, consider this type of

nominalism to be self-contradictory .110 If we have really abandoned Plato and his realism

then what are we using abstract entities for anyway? Armstrong dismisses Quine’s

criticism, and includes class nominalism as a real type of nominalism. Class nominalists

Ibid.

11' Ibid. Quine believes that: "[tjhe>* [set theorists] treat of no distinctive objects and indiscriminately of all." M ethods o f Logic, fourth edition. 302.

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use this method o f analysis: “A has property, F, if and only if A is a member of the class of

F ’s”ul The problem arises in class nominalism in a case where classes are identical only

if they have identical members, such as F and G, which have identical members. But this

violates the rule given to us by the class nominalists, since the class of F is identical to the

class of G. This is even more problematic if F and G are empty sets, and hence refer to

the same (non) set of entities.112 F and G would have every property, identically, and

hence why make a distinction between F ’s and G ’s in the first place? What does it really

mean to “be a member o f’ a class?

What makes ontological questions meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but circularity. A question of the form “What is an F?” can be answered only by recourse to a further term: “An F is a G.” The answer makes only relative sense: sense relative to the uncritical acceptance of “G.”11"'

Quine acknowledges that there is no way to answer the dilemma of the third man - what is

a 'G “? He thinks that it must be uncritically accepted since ‘G’ is without possible

definition. “All G 's are X.” “What is an A?” is the next question. These are circular

definitions and it is never clear what G is. Leibniz, in his Monadology, was well aware of

this difficulty and came up with his principle of indiscemibles. “For there are never in

nature two beings which are exactly alike, and in which it is not possible to find a

difference either internal or based on intrinsic property.”114 There must be a difference

Ibid.

Armstrong. 35-36.

"Ontological Relativity," 153.

G. W. Leibniz. Xionadology. (Lasalle. IL: Open Court Classics. 1995). 252. (#9).

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between every G and every X or there would not be the distinction of G-ness and X-ness

perceived in the first place.115

Resemblance nominalism is the fourth type of nominalism to be discussed in this

paper. The type o f analysis used is this: “A has the property F, if and only if A suitably

resembles a paradigm case (or paradigm cases) of an f nU6 Quine calls such test cases

“foils."

Without serious loss of accuracy we can assume that there are one or more actual things (paradigm cases) that nicely exemplify the desired norm, and one or more actual things (foils) that deviate just barely too much to be counted into the desired kind at all, then our definition is easy: the kind with paradigm a andfoil b is the set of all the things to with a is more similar than a is to b. More generally, then a set may be said to be a kind if and only if there are a and b, known or unknown, such that the set is the kind with paradigm a and foil b nl

So, if we can compare the particular to its other kinds, then we can fit it into a group of

others which resemble it. Quine claims we learn how to make this fit by ostension .118

Hume states of resemblance: “that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of

joy or sorrow, acquires new force and vigor.”119 We will learn how to fit the members

into groups to which they resemble, by trial and error.

‘' Donald Davidson and J. Hintikka. Word and Objections: Essays on the Work ofW. IOuine. (Boston: D. Rcidcl Publishing Company. 1975). 260. Berry's essay "Logic With Platonism" explains the "Platonistic interpretations of G." G here is "the best grand logic.' Bern- asks: "How then do we find out about this realm of extra-mental, non-particular, unobserv able entities? Our knowledge of them, like our knowledge of the extra-mental, unobservable objects of the physical sciences, is indirecL being tied to perceived things by a fragile web of theory."

Armstrong. 15.

‘1 Ontological Relativity and other essays. 121.

Enquiries. 51.

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Quine uses a mixture of verification and falsification, but the foil, too, needs to be

verified as being the foil. Armstrong thinks that finding truth by trial and error is more of

a statement of the problem of nominalism rather than a solution.120 Resemblance

nominalism is no better than class nominalism, and in fact it contains all the same

difficulties What does resemblance really mean? How far can we apply the resemblance?

Cannot all particulars resemble all others in that they are all particulars? This is not very

informative. White cannot, according to Armstrong, be an essence like a Platonic form,

nor is it just a mental concept.121

Nominalists do not pretend to know anything beyond the particulars or objects

they observe. But because of the relativity of sense data, and the lack of an absolute

interpretation of sensations, it is not clear how a nominalist like Quine can know

particulars at all. Most empiricists admit that all that is knowable is these perceptions and

not that which the perceptions are about, the objects in and of themselves. It is due to

Quine’s view of resemblance nominalism that he seeks to favor the phenomenalistic

conceptual scheme in the end of “On What There Is.”122 He does this, because, in order to

check our logical claims, to determine the extents to which bound variables apply, the

nominialistic view is that what can be bound by a variable must be rooted in the qualities

Armstrong. 44.

Armstrong. 44.

' ~~ Quine notes how the formalistic mathematical scheme was the one to which he subscribed in "On What There Is." 18. The discovery of Russell’s paradox and other contradictions arose in set theory and became a challenge to Quine and his resemblance nominalism, and he notes how ~[t|hcsc contradictions had to be obviated by unintuitive, ad hoc devices: our mathematical myth making became deliberate and evident to all.” So. Quine, a nominalist was not free from myth as he admits, since he adopted the myths of mathematics and physics.

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of the objects being observed. How else can we know things except by way of “raw

experience”?123 That is all that is real, according to Quine — objects. He resorts to

physicalism over phenomenalism.124 Using the principle of simplicity, the actual qualities

of the actual objects could be quantified by bound variables. Such a principle relies on the

notion of synonymy. Quine cannot demonstrate that he knows the things in the world are

as they are, and hence his use o f sense fields and ontological relativity makes it impossible

to know that by which variables are bound.

At first Quine seems to be a phenomenalism holding the position in his

earliest years that things cannot be know themselves. Only the appearances seem to be

knovvable. This fits Quine’s early view of nominalism, especially his resemblance

nominalism. Things are kinds of the same type if they are more like each other than they

differ. Phenomenalism was selected rather than physicalism, it seems, since physicalism

does make a claim about things as they really are. Things are physical, or made out of

matter Typically matter is seen a substance. Some claim that even the physical is a mere

appearance, and thus there is not a conflict between phenomenalism, and physicalism. I

beg to differ. It must be the case that there are fundamental differences between the two

positions, otherwise they would be distinctions without a difference. There is a major

distinction between phenomenalism and physicalism: the distinction is that phenomenalism

'■ "On What There Is." 14.

;:! Perspectives on Ouine. 322. Quine’s view is described as a kind of physicalism and cpiphcnomcnalism by Bany Stroud in his essay "Quine’s Physicalism." The use of proxy functions will ensure that the dualistic dilemma of the separation of mind and the physical [solipsism] is avoided. Stoud also describes Quine's sense field theory on page 323.

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does not pretend to know that which transcends appearance, while physicalism does. The

physical existence of things is not mere appearance, but a quality that goes beyond

appearance. The basic building blocks of matter, subatomic particles, are beyond

appearance when using only the human eye, yet we know they exist by other means, such

as electron microscopes. There exists something beyond the mere appearance of things.

Quine does not abandon his nominaiistic position when he makes his shift to

physicalism in his later philosophy. This seems very inconsistent. Nominalism claims that

things are merely names, and not universals, and not physical entities. It is imporant to

recognize this contrast in his early and later views regarding ontology. Where before he

was not going to favor either physicalism, nor conceptualism or realism, language and

sense experience were interconnected and could not be independent of one another. We

had no more understanding about one or the other.

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QUINE ON ANALYTIC IT Y

Chapter three contains five main topics, based on Quine’s essay “Two Dogmas of

Empiricism.” First we are reminded that meaning is not naming, followed by a section

which examines definition and meaning. The third section examines how analyticity is

grounded in semantic rules, and why Quine abandons analyticity. Section four considers

the radical reductionism in empiricism and the problems with the theory' of verification.

Finally the fifth section examines the conclusion to Quine's important essay “Two Dogmas

of Empiricism"

In order to demonstrate how ontological relativity fails to explain what variables

are variables of, a discussion of Quine’s view of epistemology is necessary The rejection

of the analytic-synthetic distinction is discussed in Quine’s essay “Two Dogmas of

Empiricism ” The two dogmas of empiricism are: (1) the belief in an analytic-synthetic

distinction, and (2) the dogma of reductionism, or the belief that all statements can, in

complete isolation from all the others, admit the confirmation or infirmation of all the

others 126 Quine defines analytic as “grounded in meanings independent o f fact. ” 127

From .1 Logical Point Of I lew. 41.

"Two Dogmas O f Empiricism." 20.

46

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Synthetic is the opposite or “grounded in fact.” 126 Quine defines the dogma of

reductionism as: “the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical

construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience.”127 The outcome of

abandoning these dogmas of empiricism, according to Quine is two-fold: (1) there will be

a blurring between metaphysics and the natural sciences, and (2) a shift toward

pragmatism 12s Kant was not the first to make the analytic-synthetic distinction. Leibniz

had his distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact.129 Truths of reason were

true in every possible world, and not even God could change these truths Quine defines

truths of reason as “those which could not be possibly false.” 1'0 What verifies such truths

is that they cannot violate the law of contradiction. Nothing can both be and not be at the

same time and in the same respect. This is what an analytic statement is: a statement that

cannot be denied without contradiction. Quine thinks this is a definition of very little

value ’ Self-contradictoriness is a board notion that also needs clarification just as much

as the notion of analyticity does, according to Quine.1'2 Truths of fact are verified by

sense experience and are only true if observed or true in this actual world (the best of all

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mnnadology # 33. 258.

"Two Dogmas O f Empiricism. ' 20.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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possible worlds) Synthetic judgments are judgments which cannot not be verified without

sense experience to legitimate them. Truth is a synthesis of the understanding o f the

meaning of the terms used and verification of the states of affairs they describe as being

the case in reality The truth of synthetic statements is contingent upon reality, and

analytic statements are necessarily independent of reference to sense data, and are

sometimes called tautological since they are always true.

Hume called this distinction relations between ideas and matters of fact 1" This is

sometimes called Hume’s fork. Relations between ideas are also verified by the law of

contradiction, and are necessary Only the relation between the ideas in the judgment are

examined. Matters of fact are verified by sense experience, and hence are contingent upon

being true in the world or fact. Kant made the distinction between the analytic (necessary,

independent of sense experience) and the synthetic (contingent, dependent upon sense

experience) Descartes had too made such a distinction before him. An analytic statement

is a statement in which the predicate term is contained in the subject term, or as Quine

defines it: "one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained

in the subject." K'4

MEANING IS NOT NAMING

Quine reminds us that meaning is not naming.1'5 There are several illustrations of

Enquiries, page 25. (Book 1. section 4. part 1. 20).

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism, ' 20-21.

Also sec sections 37. 41. and 42 in Word and Object for more about this point. Although Quine

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the fact that “terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning.” 1,6 Consider the

following example. While driving down an unfamiliar road while a passenger is giving

directions, the driver may ask for clarification: “Turn left?” The passenger responds by

exclaiming "Right!” So what is the driver to do; should the driver turn right, or is the left

turn in fact correct9 Such semantic is common among words that are the same,

but have different meanings. Quine is refering to another kind of ambiguity An example

is the age-old confusion of the morning star and the evening star as two separate objects,

when in fact the different terms refer to the same object, the planet Venus. Sure enough,

the morning star is there in the early morning, and the evening star in the evening, but to

think that they are two separate objects is the true confusion. Being both the morning star

and the evening star is true of the planet Venus. General terms, or predicates, whether

they be concrete or abstract, such terms do not name entities, but are "true o f’ an entity

according to Quine. 1'7 The example that '9' and ‘the number of planets’ name the same

abstract thing, but are not at all similar in meaning. ‘ 's This can not be solved using an

analytic process, according to Quine, since empirical evidence is needed to show that there

are in fact 9 planets in our solar system "The class of all entities of which a general term

is true is called the extension." 1,9

Extension is the set of all things to which the general term applies. There is a

abandons singular terms and names here, he reparsed names later in his career.

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 2 1.

Ibid.

^ Ibid.

Ibid

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parallel, Quine continues, between the meaning of a singular term, and the entity it is to

name, and the meaning of a general term, and the class of all things to which the general

term applies (extension). 140 The confusion of meaning with general terms is not as typical

as confusion of meaning with singular terms.141 It is, Quine contends, typical to reject

intension (connotation) for extension (denotation), like Ockham had.1'2 Quine notes how

the essentialism of Aristotle led to the modem notion of intension.14'' Aristotle thought

that there were essential qualities that made a thing the kind of thing that it is 144

Accidental qualities in contrast are qualities which are changeable and are not necessary' to

make a thing the thing that it is. Aristotle thought that man was essentially a rational

animal. This essentialism o f Aristotle is different from meaning, Quine points out.145

“Things have essences, for Aristotle, but only linguistic forms have meanings Meaning is

what essence becomes w'hen it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the

word "l46 This is no longer a question about things, but of meanings "[Wjhat sort of

things are meanings9”147 First Quine points out that meaning and reference are distinct

Ibid.

:: Ibid.

Ibid. Remember Quine prefers to call denoting is true of.' Methods o f Logic. 94

Ibid

Metaphysics. 1015 B - 1016 A.

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 22 Quine is mistaken about Aristotle's view. According to Aristotle, the subject was part of what ousia (what it was to be or quid erat esse) means, and this entails using linguistic forms that have meanings. The formal cause includes the definition (as well as the shape and form). Metaphysics 1010 A - 1013 A. and Categories 5.

Ibid.

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from one another.148 The theory of meaning depends on the synonymy of linguistic forms

and the analyticity of statements. 149 But, Quine sees neither validity in synonymy nor

analyticity, and hence he says that meanings ought to all together be abandoned. 150 He

examines the problem of analyticity.

Analytical statements fall into two classes, according to Quine: the first class is

called "logically true,” and the second class of analytical statements depend on the notion

of "synonymy,” which Quine thinks also needs clarification. 151 An example of a first-class

analytical statement is, according to Quine, "no unmarried man is married.” 152 This

statement, Quine contends, is logically true, or "remains true under all reinterpretations of

its components other than the logical particles.”15'' The subject term contains a double

negation and the predicate an affirmation of the same term. He describes unmarried man in

this way since he doubts the synonymy of unmarried man with bachelor Hence, there is

this other class, the second class, and Quine uses the example following for an analytical

second class statement: "No bachelor is married" 154 The second class uses synonyms.

Ibid. Meanings arc things Linguistic forms have essences. Quine is in fact setting up a kind of essentialism much like Aristotle's (sec Posterior Analytics).

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

M "Tw o Dogmas O f Empiricism." 22-23.

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 22.

"Tw o Dogmas O f Empiricism." 23

: *•' Ibid.

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which are logically containing the same information, but Quine seems skeptical.155 Some

may lack synonym pairs, and, for such languages, Carnap appealed to what he

called "state-descriptions.”156 In such languages “No bachelor is married” is a synthetic

statement.157 "Analyticity serves its purpose only if the atomic statements of the language

are [...] mutually independent.”158 If truth were assigned to both "John is married” and

"John is a bachelor” then “No bachelor is married” becomes a synthetic statement. This

example of the second class depends heavily upon the notion of synonymy.159 Such an

example would violate the law of non-contradiction if such qualities were essential to

John’s being John. John cannot be both a bachelor and married at the same time. Quine is

certain that "not not married” is synonymous with “married”, but does not think that "not

bachelor" is synonymous with "married.”

DEFINITION AND MEANING

Since definitions rely on synonymy, Quine brings his attention to them. The first

class o f analytical statements relied upon definitions. Quine’s first example is:

(1) "A bachelor is an unmarried man.”

"A bachelor is an unmarried man” is a definition of bachelor. Hence an unmarried man is

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

” Ibid. Or. they are not defined in terms of each other. This is close to Descartes' definition of substance, as that which can be conceived alone.

"Two Dogmas O f Empiricism." 24.

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both a necessary condition (this is a necessary condition for that if and only if that cannot

be without this) and sufficient condition (this is a sufficient condition for that if and only if

this alone can guarantee that) for being a bachelor. That is how definitions are supposed

to work, if the synonymy is real. “[Rjeport of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as

the ground of the synonymy/'160 Quine thinks that the criteria for determining synonymy is

not at all clear, but synonymy is nonetheless granted in the conventional use of

language.161 These conventions are established by usage But such usage has already

been rejected for grounds for accepting the synonymy

Explication is not synonymy, since it aims to aid in the understanding of the

cJefimendum. and is not just merely an outright repetition But no matter, most all

definitions, with rare exception, rely on prior notions of synonymy 162 Definitions did not

help with the understanding of the grounds for synonymy. Hence, Quine leaves that, and

moves on to discuss interchangeability.16' Interchangeability is the ability to exchange two

linguistic forms for one another without any change of truth value. 164 Quine explains that

Leibniz called this salva veritate 165 This in no way eliminates vagueness, since the

linguistic forms may be synonymous in their vagueness 166 Quine contends to demonstrate

I b i d

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism. ' 25.

" Tw o Dogmas Of Empiricism.' 27.

For more about tliis see Word and Objeci. sections 13 and 14; and Methods o f Logic. 63.

" Two Dogmas O f Em piricism .' 27.

I b i d .

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that all synonyms are not interchangeable salva veritate. He easily has many options to

replace with bachelor, but his example is '"Bachelor’ has less than ten letters.” 167 It is

quite apparent that 'bachelor’ and 'less than ten letters’ is not going to be salva veritate

However Quine is not playing fair. The lack of interchangability is due to his using

denoting (is true of) instead of connotation.

Assuming once again that analyticity is possible Quine offers another example:

(2) '.All and only bachelors are unmarried men.”158

This is to be a criterion for a cognitively synonymous statement, and it is salva veritate, in

which the truth is saved Quine is looking for an account of analyticity which does not

depend on prior synonymy. Is this a sufficient condition for cognitive synonymy, the

interchangeability of bachelors and unmarried men, as in the statement ''All and only

bachelors are unmarried men.”169 If that will not convince, perhaps the next example will

finally shed light on the grounds of analyticity:

(3) "Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors ”

”[S]upposing necessarily [is] so narrowly construed as to be truly applicable only to

analytic statements.”1'0 The resulting , assuming salva veritate would be:

(4) "Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men.”1,1

Ibid.

"Two Dogmas O f Empiricism." 28.

"Tw o Dogmas Of Empiricism. " 29.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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To claim that “Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true is to say that:

(5) “Necessarily all and only unmarried men are bachelors”

is true and this would make “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” an analytic

statement, and that bachelors and unmarried men are synonymous.172 But Quine contends

that a deception has gone on here.1'' I had a student in one of my logic classes claim that

her boyfriend was not a bachelor and he was an unmarried man. This seems to pose a

problem for the analyticity of bachelor with unmarried man. This example is not really a

fair use of the term bachelor, since bachelors are indeed necessarily unmarried men But

what of the married man that acts as if he is a bachelor or lives the life of the playboy9

Does such a person make it impossible of there to be certainty in the meanings of our

terms9 Surely he is married; ask his wife if she thinks he is both married and at the same

time a bachelor. He is just playing the part, and is not in fact truly a bachelor as bachelor

are

The above statement supposes we are working with a language rich enough to contain the adverb "necessarily’, this adverb being so construed as to yield truth when and only when applied to an analytical statement. But can we condone a language which contains such an adverb? Does the adverb really make sense9'74

The only way to make sense of the adverb 'necessarily' is to already understand the

grounds for the notion of analyticity, which have not as yet been determined to Quine's

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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satisfaction. Quine thinks that the above argument is circular 175 To admit some prior

grounds for synonymy is to admit to a priori knowledge, something Quine is not willing

here it appeal to Quine gives an example o f an extensional language to make his point.

He makes a language using one place predicates (F. where Fx means x is a man); many

place predicates (Gxy\ where Gxy means x loves >); atomic sentences which can be

composed of one or more variables (*x\ ‘y \ etc.), and atomic functions ('not\ 'and\

or", etc.) 176 "Now a language of this type is extensional, in this sense: any two

predicates which agree extensionally (that is, are true of the same objects) are

interchangeable salva veritate."177

In such languages, there is no certainty that synonymy will hold for the type as

desired, and there is no reliance upon meaning when it comes to random matters of

fact 178 Quine thinks that appeal to cognitive synonymy was wrong, though it did explain

the analyticity of “All and only bachelors are unmarried men.”179 Cognitive synonymy

also works for many-place and one-place predicates.!SQ Quine concludes that singular

terms may be said to be cognitively synonymous w'hen it is a statement of identity using

an equivalence (p

The argument is circular. "Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 30

Ibid.

Ibid. For more about logical connections sec section 13 of Word and Object.

"Tw o Dogmas Of Empiricism." 31.

Tbid.

fbid

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necessity) for an interchangeability of his own salva analyticitate (rooted in descriptive

phrases). 182

THE GROUNDING OF ANALYTICITY IN SEMANTIC

RULES

Quine abandons the discussion of definition and meaning and focuses on

analyticity, since its grounding is at the source of the issue

Analyticity at first seemed most naturally definable by appear to a realm of meanings On refinement, the appeal to meanings gave way to an appeal to synonymy or definition. But definition turned out to be a will-o-the-wisp, and synonymy turned out to be best understood by dint of prior appeal to analyticity itself ~185'

Quine questions if the statement 'Everything green is extended" is actually analytic. 184

This is an example o f a de re necessity, that to have color, an object must be

extended. Quine explains this confusion is not because he fails to understand the meaning

of green or extended, but he is not sure what analytic means. 185 Quine claims that in

ordinary language it is difficult to always differentiate analytic statements from synthetic

statements because of the vagueness of ordinary language. But artificial languages can be

constructed, which follow “semantical rules” which are supposed to eliminate any

"Two Dogmas O f Em piricism ." 32.

Ibid For more about synonymy see page 47 of Word and Object and page 76 of Pursuit o f Truth.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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confusion and vagueness. 186 An example of what such a rule does is place conditions

upon statements S, in language L, that require they be analytic.187 “[T]he problem is to

make sense of this relation generally, that is, for variable "S' and Z.’.” 188 What does it

mean that S is analytic for Z., and limiting the bounds of L does not eliminate the

vagueness9 Any such “semantic rule” which contains the term “analytic’ is not meaningful

because it is not yet clear what being analytic for any language means. “[T]he rules contain

the word “analytic’ which we do not understand!” S is only analytic to language L, but

what is this “analytic for’ relation9 How are we to determine the relation if analyticity is

not understood9 Quine attempts to dump the word “analytic’ for a term, K IS9 Hence

this would be "S is only K to Z.” But Quine even acknowledges that this only will lead to

an understanding of what the relation of S is to K, but not what K-ness is in and of itself.

Once again, analyticity, according to Quine, had eluded clarification

Quine examines another class of ““semantic rules” which simply include what

have been called analytic statements among the class of truths It does not imply

anything about interchangeability. Such a rule would specify what characteristics

statements must have in order to be classified as truths. Hence the statement is not

analytic because it is necessarily true, but is a truth because it adheres to the “semantic

rules of truths” and this makes it analytic 190

Ibid.

"Two Dogmas Of Em piricism .3 3.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Two Dogmas O f Empiricism.” 34. Quine has totally missed the point here. He acknowledges

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Not every true statement which say that the statements of some class are true can count as a semantical rule-- otherwise all truths would be “analytic" in the sense of being true according to semantic rules. Semantical rules are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on a page under the heading ‘Semantical Rules’; and this heading is itself then meaningless.191

Although it appeared that the second class of analytical statement which adhere to

"semantical rules of truth” did not at all shed light upon what analyticity means, because

the rules themselves are meaningless. Quine then compares semantic rules to

postulates 192 Semantical rules are meaningful, if they are seen as postulates Quine

contends "[I]f conceived in a similarly relative spirit-- relative, this time, to one or

another particular enterprise of schooling unconversant persons in sufficient conditions for

truth of statements of some natural or artificial language L."19' If this was the case, Quine

informs, then no semantical truth would exclude any other. 'Brutus killed Caesar' would

have a different meaning entirely if killed has another meaning, such as begat. 194 “Thus

one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable

into a linguistic component and a factual component ”195 This is from where the false

acceptance of the analytic-synthetic distinction arises, and then it is acceptable to find that

that semantic rules are merely arbitrary, but tliinks that necessity, if there is any. is based on adherence to such rules, and this is where the notion of analyticity comes from. The semanitic rules require necessity , hence he has put the cart before the horse. An example of such a mlc is that analyticity requires that the predicate term of a proposition be contained with its subject. Quine needs to attack de dicio necessity, and not merely just de re necessity

Ibid

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 35.

Ibid.

"Two Dogmas O f Empiricism. “ 36.

Ibid.

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analytical statements are factually null.196 But Quine does not think a clear boundary

between analytical statements and synthetical statements has been demonstrated. “That

there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of the empiricists, a

metaphysical article of faith.”197 Why empiricists have accepted this a priori notion, which

Quine calls mere faith, is quite beyond him, and Quine is not willing to accept the

distinction

Since Quine had set aside the question of meaning earlier, he returns to it now.

”[W]hat [...] of the verification theory of meaning9” Quine asks I9S The verification

theory of meaning is “the meaning of a statement is the method of empirically

confirming or infirming it. An analytic statement is that limiting case which is confirmed

no matter what." 199 Hence, usually empirical evidence is used to support or verify

meaning, but with analytical statements, since they are true regardless of empirical

evidence, are not verified in this way. In reference to synonomy, it can now be said that

two statements are synonymous is and only if they are verified by empirical confirmation

or infirmation.200 Quine notes that this is not a comparison of linguistic forms but of

statements, but from the concept of synonymy of statements, the synonymy of other

linguistic forms could be similarly defined. 201 “So if the verification theory can be

Ibid

"Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." 37

Ibid.

Ibid

Ibid.

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accepted as an adequate account of statement synonymy, the notion of analyticity is

saved after all.” 202 But Quine does not accept the theory of verification. What set of

empirical criteria demonstrates that two statements are in fact synonymous? "What, in

other words, is the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences which

contribute to or detract from it confirmation9” 20'' This leads question leads Quine to

examine the nature o f radical reductionism in empiricism.

RADICAL REDUCTIONISM IN EMPIRICISM AND THE

PROBLEMS WITH THE THEORY OF VERIFICATION

Radical reductionism is the view that “[e]very meaningful statement is held to be

translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate experience.” 204 This notion

of radical reductionism is something that empiricists Locke and Hume held. Locke and

Hume thought that knowledge was acquired after sense experience, and hence ail simple

ideas could be traced back to simple impressions as their source. Simple impressions

were fleeting immediate sense experiences, and simple ideas are fainter copies of

impressions in imagination. Complex ideas are compounds of simple ideas Hume

found that he could legitimate no ideas in this manner, since the bundles of perception

prevented him from tracing simple ideas back to their simple impressions as their source

■ : Two Dogmas Of Empiricism." page 38

: ; Ibid.

: ! Ibid.

Ibid.

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Hume realized the difficulty with such a reductionism. Quine acknowledges this by

saying "the doctrine remains ambiguous as between sense data and sensory events and

sense data as sensory qualities; it remains vague as to the admissible ways of

compounding 71 20S Compounds are made out of simples, but it quite possible to create

compounds of simples that have nothing to do with reality. Since ideas are fainter copies

of impressions in imagination, it cannot be determined if any of our ideas are really

correct in describing the world. The true problem of the theory' of verification is in its

blind acceptance of such an reductionism. since such empiricists only try to match words

to sense-datum, and not the entire sentence in question. This is a type of reductionism

that Quine does not find tolerable. Quine wants the entire sentence to be translated into

sense-datum language. 206 Quine fails to recognize that descriptions do not solve the

problem Quine thinks that Locke and Hume would welcome this acceptance of the

sentences as the significant units rather than the words. 207 “This reorientation whereby

the primary vehicle of meaning came to be seen no longer in the term but in the

statement." 208 This is an important shift in the verification o f meaning, and now it is the

sentences which must be verified by sense experience. Carnap tried to translate

significant discourse into a sense-datum verified language. 209 Camap did not start with a

Ibid.

“Tw o Dogmas O f Empiricism." 39.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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sense datum language, because his language included notions of logic and set theory. 210

Carnap was able to define some sensory concepts with his system, and. ‘[h]e was the

first empiricist w'ho, not content with asserting the reducibility of science to

terms of immediate experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction/’2"

Carnap had not seen that such system, even of the most basic statements, could not

clearly show that they were true about the world.212 Because of this vagueness, Carnap’s

theory cannot be used to show that our ideas do match the world, but Camap did show

that it is statements and not words that have to face up to the scrutiny of empirical

verification

THE TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM

The two dogmas of empiricism; (I) the analytic synthetical distinction, and (2)

the dogma of reductionism are in fact two aspects of the same dogma, since at root the

dogmas are identical. 21"

We lately reflected that in general the truth of statements does obviously depend both upon language and upon extralinguistic fact; and we noted that this obvious circumstance carries in its train, not logically but all too naturally, a feeling that the truth of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component. The factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to a range of confirmatory experiences. In the extreme case where the linguistic component is all that matters, a true statement is analytic.214

:: I b i d .

::: Ibid.

"Tw o Dogmas Of Empiricism. " 40.

"Tw o Dogmas Of Empiricism." 41.

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Quine thinks that true empiricists would require the verification of statements using

sense-data. But there is still this so-called false notion of analyticity and

syntheticity of statements according to empiricists, but, even so, there still seems to be the

existence of statements that do not require sense-data for verification, but can be verified

using the linguistic component alone. So it seems that Quine wants to eliminate the

analytic-synthetic distinction, but still insists on making the verified by sense-data or

verified by linguistic component distinction that is at the root of the analytic-synthetic

distinction I have long thought that there was a false dualism regarding the analytic-

synthetic distinction. But empiricists tend to favor the sense-datum verification, while

rationalists favor the linguistical verification, and neither is willing to admit that the other

form of verification does not exist or is not meaningful. Hence there are always bound to

be linguistically verified statements in any empirical theory, as well as empirically

verified statements in any rationalistic theory. Quine hopes that his discussion has shown

that the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been shown to be a

distinction which is hard to make in a clear, distinct way.215 Quine thinks the real

problem is in thinking that there is this division between the linguistical component and

the factual component of individual statements. 216 Science is dependent on both

language and experience, and it is this belief of some dualistic nature of statements has

made some favor the empirical rather than the linguistic component, since science has

For more about the stimulus analytic see pages 67-68 of Ward and Object (and sections 14-15).

'Two Dogmas Of Empiricism.” 42.

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statements that seem to not reflect this duality, science may think that it is free of the

dilemma 217 Quine notes that words were too narrow for verification, and so are mere

statements "The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.” But we must

bracket in some way to make verifications. Postulates are a form of convention. Logic is

must rest on a convention. But this convention cannot be merely definitional, since

definitions do not found truths, only transform them. Quine would not accept a type of

conventionalization of analytical definitions, that make them merely conventionally

necessarily true 2IS

Quine defines science as being like “a field of force whose boundary conditions

are experience." 219 Science is bound with sense-datum verification. There has to be a

method of determining truth value, and such values range over statements. Quine takes a

pragmatic approach to truth in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." "Truth values have to

redistributed over some of our statements. Reevaluation of some statements entails

reevaluation of others, because their logical interconnections -- the logical laws being in

turn simply certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the

field"220 But experience is not bound by determined boundaries, and it is difficult to know

what to reevaluate and in light of what evidence. It is clear that particular statements

cannot be traced back to particular experiences, in the same way that simple ideas could

Ibid.

I! ays n f Paradox. “Truth by Convention.” 88.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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not be traced back to simple impressions. All we can do is to take a pragmatic approach,

and “accept indirectly through considerations o f equilibrium affecting the field as a

whole ”221 Hence all the statements make a field, and each statement is evaluated and

reevaluated again, and is judged according as it best fits into our system of beliefs. No

statement is immune to revision. 222 And what of the abstract entities of mathematics'7

"Epistemologically these are myths on the same footing with physical objects and gods,

neither better nor worse except for differences in degree to which they expedite our

dealings with sense experiences.” 223 Hence ontological concerns are on the same level as

questions of science and mathematics. It is important to the natural sciences to find a

conceptual framework. The only real way to make a distinction between ontological

concerns and scientific concerns is by maintaining the distinction between analytic and

synthetic Quine wants to eliminate such a distinction it seems without eliminating the

factual component of verification nor the linguistic component of verification What he is

not in favor of is a reductionism of one kind of statements to another. So how can this

factual-linguistic distinction be eliminated, or at least, how can there be two ways of

verification if there is not a analytic-synthetic distinction? Linguistically verified

statements are not required to be verified by sense experience, and hence the dichotomy

cannot be neatly reduced to a singular type of verification. Perhaps understanding the us

Ibid Quine abandons the pragmatic approach for the coherence approach in Word ami Object and Web o f Belief. For more about this sec Word and Object, page 23. and Pursuit o f Truth pages 33. 79. 134-135.

Ibid.

;:3 Ibid.

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of predication, the possibility of reification may be made more clear.

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PREDICATION, MEANING, AND ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

In his book Word and Object . Quine discusses the nature of predication.226 What

is a real predicate? Quine begins the discussion on predication by making a distinction

between general terms and singular terms, and he thinks that this distinction is

overrated.227 "[T]he singular term differs from the general terms only in that the number

of objects of which it is true is one rather than some other number/’22* It is not that

general terms are terms true of many objects, and that singular terms are true of only one

object that makes the distinction.229 Singular terms, like ’black’ actually are true of no

object, and general terms like 'natural satellite of the earth' only refer to one object ~'°

How then are singular terms to be distinguished from general terms? Quine explains it is

Ward and Object, section 20: "Predication.” 95-100.

Ibid.

Ibid.. 95 In Methods o f Logic Quine defines general terms as monadic general terms and states that "(wjhether these nouns be thought of as substantive of adjective is an insignificant question of phrasing." (page 93).

::v Ibid.

Word and Object. 95-96.

68

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by their grammatical role.226 This grammatical role is the role o f predication. Quine

explains: “Predication joins a general term and a singular term to form a sentence that is

true or false according as the general term is true or false o f the object, if any, to which the

singular terms refersSchematically 'Fa1 is an example of a predication, where ‘a’ is

representational of a singular term, and F’ is representational of a general term. There

could be many general terms applied to a singular term. Quine’s examples are: "Mama is

a woman" (Fa), “Mama is big” (Fa), “Mama sings” (Fa) Mama is the singular term and

w oman, big, and sings are the general terms Fa has several meanings. It is not only said

to mean that “Mama is a woman”, where F represents a substantive, but is could also be

used as an adjective, as in “Mama is big”, or it could be used to represent a transitive

v erb, as in “Mama sings.” 228 Verbs may been seen as the most basic form of predication

because they do not require a copula (is) to produce a statement.229 This copula merely

serves as a linking verb, linking the general term and the subject term together in a

statement Copulas convert adjectives and substantive forms to verbal forms.2"'°

"Conversely, ‘-ing’ and ‘-er’ are suffixes serving to convert a general term from verbal form to adjectival or substantive form, [...] and ’thing’ and ’-ish’ are suffixes for converting adjectives into substantives and vice versa.” ~ 1

Ward and Object. 96.

Ibid.

Tbid. For more on substantives see Ward and Object. 162. Also see Methods o f Logic. 283.

Ibid. 'They've a temper, some of them— panicularly verbs: they're the proudest — adjectives you can do amlhing with, but not the verbs — however. I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That's what I say!" Humpty Dumpty exclaims to Alice, in Through the Looking-Glass. 169.

Word and Object. 97.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Adjectives can be converted into substantives, as in expressions such as 'Red is a

color A1'2 The abstract term red is not to be deemed to correspond to some formal

redness"; hence red is a substantive, while redness is not. "" Quine does not want to

elude to some sort of universal with such substantives. Such abstract terms can have a

“faithful substantial rendering [...], if not the briefest, can be got from the adjective by

appending 'thing" or ‘stufF.”2j’4 Adjectives are like mass terms, that are cumulative in

reference ~5 So much for the kinds of predicates. What of the dichotomy of singular

terms and general terms9 Mass terms act like general terms when following a linking

verb like “is”, and mass terms act like singular terms when their occurrence is prior to

linking verbs.2’6 Hence Quine thinks it simplest to treat mass terms like general terms

when they are after the linking verb, and mass terms should be treated like singular

terms when they are prior the linking verb Quine’s example of a mass term (prior to

and after the linking verb) the linking verb is; 'The white part is sugar '“ s Quine is not

concerned with the compounded singular term "the white part,” in this example that will

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be ov erlooked, since all he is concerned with here is predication of mass terms in

singular forms, and that singular terms are prior the linking verb in such statements. Sugar

is a mass term that is after the linking verb, and hence can be treated as a general term. "In

general, a mass term in predicative position may be viewed as a general term which it true

of each part [...] down to the single molecules, but not the atoms/’,2"'9 If we go too far, we

will lose identity, so Quine stops at the molecules of sugar, and single pieces of furniture,

but not the atoms, nor the legs, nor spindles.240 There is no reason to ponder why w-ater

can be used in the subject position as a singular term, and color is a general term, which is

true of many different wavelengths of light .241 General terms are used to identify parts of

objects (arms), as well as refer to a mass object which are scattered (water) or unscattered

(Mama) 242 Quine shows that this fails because there are parts of water, so scattered, that

they are too small to be counted as water (namely hydrogen di-oxide). Also what is too

Word and Object. 98.

Ibid "The notion of macroscopic objects, tables, and sheep, differs from that of molecules and electrons mainly, from an cpistcmological point of view, in point of degree of antiquity. Molecules are posited consciously in historic times, whereas the positing of the external objects of common sense is an onginal trait of human nature. Men have believed in something very like our common-sensc world of external objects as long, surely, as anything properly describable as language has existed. " H ay s o f Paradox. "On Mental Entities.” 223.

Ibid. “Doubtless a child's first glimmering of the mechanism of general and singular terms docs depend on the conspicuous unity of something seen against a contrasting background, but in time he masters less \-isibly bounded entities, certainly for us adults, retrospectively describing the behavior of terms, there is no reason to boggle at water as a single " Word and Object. 98.

Word and Object. 99 "Mass terms, before the copula haring been assimilated to singular terms thus by appeal to scattered terms, the idea suggests itself of earn ing the artificiality a step farther and treating mass terms thus as singular terms equally after the copula." For more on divided reference sec Word and Object. 90.

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small to count in a furniture example (arms), is not too small to count in the water

example, hence the degrees of smallness vary from general term to general term. “So the

limitation needed cannot be worked into any general adaptation o f‘is’ or ‘is a part of, but

must be left rather as the separate reference dividing business of the several mass terms,

conceived as general terms.” 24 ’ Quine maintains that generally mass terms are to be

treated as singular terms when they take the subject position in a statement (before the

copula) and mass terms are treated as general terms when they occupy the predicate

position in a statement (after the copula).244 Ordinary terms like apple can be used as

general terms.245 Quine uses the example of the term lamb to show that lamb can be used

three ways: as a mass term, which is too a singular term (Lamb is scarce), a general term

(Agnes is a lamb).246 Quine has shown that in this aspect, reference is divided into three

types when expressed in terms, mass terms, singular terms, and general terms. Even

words derived from analogy will take these three forms This is what makes reference

difficult

Ibid. "So the limitation needed cannot be worked into any general adaptation of is' or is a pan of. but must be left rather as the separate reference-dividing business of the several mass terms, conceived as general terms ~

Word and Object. 99 Strawson points out the problem with learning singular names: The simplicity-ordering is backed by the observation that to learn the name Fido" the child has only to appreciate the similarity of Fido-presentations whereas to leam dog' he lias to appreciate a second-order similarity between the similarity-basis of "Fido " and the similarity-bases determining other enduring dogs’ But the child is said to be learning ‘Fido" and “Mama” as singular names or what will eventually qualify as such If this is so. it is not enough that the child should not in fact encounter, or be confronted by. a plurality of simultaneous but spatially separated presentations sufficiently similar for all of them to count for him as Fido-presentations. It must be a part of his mastery that Fido' is unique. "

Ibid.

I b i d .

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Quine discusses reference in his book Pursuit o f Truth 247 He notes the

advantage in starting with observational sentences, rather than with terms.248 The

advantage is that describing the nature and utility of reification could be delayed until the

proper epistemological setting had been developed.249 To reify is to hypostatize.

Hypostasis is Latin for substance. To hypostatize is:

the process of regarding a concept or abstraction as independent of a real entity The verb forms ‘"hypostatize” and “reify” designate the acts of positing objects of a certain sort for the purposes of one’s theory. It is sometimes implied that a fallacy is involved in describing these processes or acts, as in “Plato was guilty of the reification of universals. ” This issue turns largely on the criteria of ontological commitment. 250

Hence. Quine had to wait to get the epistemological setting developed before he could

discuss reification He does not want to be accused of a Platonic reification. Quine is

trying to reify sense fields and not universal conceptualizations The first step to

reification, according to Quine, is seen in the predication of observational sentences;

these sentences focus on a narrow segment of the observed scene. 2=1 The second step of

Pursuit o f Truth. "Reference". 23-36.

See Ibid.. 3. for definition of observational statements, and section 10 (40-46) of ll'ord and Object

Ibid.. 23.

Dictionary." 352. Quine defines reification (or reference) in his book Outddities. Some terms refer to objects such as tables or stones, while others do not refer since they do not have a referent (such as unicom). "Reference by general terms - common nouns, adjectives, intransitive verbs - is denotation. [ | What we reify arc what we reckon as admissible values of w ' in "objects x such that;' in other words what can be referred to by the "which' and it' of relative clauses. [... J another value of reification is that it tightens links between scientific theory and the observations that support it." W. V.O. Quine. Quiddities: An Intermittently Philosophical Dictionary. (Cambridge. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 19X7). 180-183.

■'Reference". 23.

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reification was to move toward focal observational categories.252 “[F]ocal categories

requires the features ~ ‘Raven’ and ‘Black,’ say — to fuse in the scene, while the free

category does not.” 255 While observing the black raven for the initial time, the concepts

of raven and black w'ill be linked together, while the free category of black does not

imply raven, as well as the free category raven is not black. The focus of the black raven

scene is the raven, while other scenes may focus on black initially. Hence there is always

relativity involved depending of the focus of the observer. 254

What is the process of reification? For children that have not gone beyond

observational sentences, reification is not prompted.255 Individuation has not taken place,

and the child is at the feature-placing stage, to use Strawson’s phrase.256 “The recurrence

of bodies is characteristic of the use of reification in our system of the world.”257 One

could refer to the penny in one’s pocket as "penny”, a reification, and perhaps on careful

Ibid.

Ibid. In Methods o f Logic Quine remarks about a similar example: "The things that arc swans and black (FG) arc not the swans and the black things, but just the black swans. " Once again Quine makes it clear that he is not will to accept the existence of univcrsals. (page 114)

’: "Reference." 24. "By virtue of the narrow focus, however, the focal observation category unlike the free one— has decidedly the air of general discourse about bodies: willow s in the one example, raven in the other. This is where is sec bodies materializing, ontologically speaking as ideal nodes at the foci of interesting observ ation sentences."

I b i d .

Ibid. In example, all woman arc “Mommy" before individuation is understood. In “Three Indctcrminacics" (Perspectives on Quine. 9) Quine states: "Primitive observational categories may even thus start the child down the path to reification I think the initial utility of reification lies in just such stacking of qualities: in conveying that the cat and the w hite arc the same part of the scene.” For Strawson's definition see Individuals. 202.

"Reference." 25.

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observation make a distinction between the penny in one’s pocket now, and the one that

was in one’s pocket last week. Is the penny in fact the one and the same penny.258 Is

individuation possible even after carefully considering their observational differences

between the penny now and the penny then? If the observations show differences, then

individuation is possible between the pennies. If memory is fallible, and the

observations relative, can real differences be recognized and demonstrable9

The use of pronouns is a type of reification.259 Focal observation is

in fact quantification.

The construction ‘x such that . . x. . ’ will hereafter be rendered '{x:. . . x. . . | ’ and called term abstraction. The complex general term thus formed will be called an abstract. [. . .] [RJeduction of a predicate ‘{x. . . x. . . }y<-». y. . . ’ I call concretion. When the sentence that I have represented as \ . x. . .' is just a simple predication, say 'x is wise’, the abstract becomes merely a redundant rendering o f'w ise ’ itself; {x. x is wise} = wise. Thus [. .] {x. Fx} = F, {x: Fx}y <-> Fy [. . .] This expression is called an open sentence. It differs from a closed sentence or statement, in containing a variable in place of a name. It is neither true nor false The analogue o f a free variable in ordinary language is a pronoun for which no grammatical antecedent is expressed or understood, and the analogue of an open sentence is a clause containing such a dangling pronoun.260

Ravens are black' becomes "Ail ravens are such that ravens are black” in which Quine

uses an universal quantifier with the method of quantification (V){x:raven x —» black

Also see Perspectives on Oume. 7. Quine clarifies in his "Three Indctcrminacies" the penny example "To us the question whether we arc seeing the same old ball or penny or just a similar one is meaningful ev en in cases w here it remains unanswered. It is here that reification of bodies is full blown [ | If I were to uy to decide whether the penny in my pocket is the one that was there last week, or just another one like it. I would try to reconstruct the simplest, most plausible account of my interim movements, costumes and expenditures."

"Reference." 26.

Methods o f Logic. 132-139.

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xj 261 Quine notes that “[fjree observational categories would be construed similarly,

usually by quantifying over times and places.”262 Again, Quine returns to the claim “to be

is to be the value of a variable.”26'

The existential quantifier is a symbolic rendering of there is something x such

that 264 Quine notes that some have argued is that this is a matter of fact, and not a

matter of language He agrees, but then states that it is too a matter of a language.

"and this is the place of bound variables.”265 Quine has been accused of using logical

notation for an ontological commitment, and some find this narrow.266 But he has stuck

with this standard since it is applicable to any alternative language, in as much as we can

agree on the quantification procedures.267 "The notion of quantification is what is most

familiar, currently, where one is expressly concerned with ontological niceties; hence my

choice as a paradigm.”268 But can all ideas or experiences be converted into a first order

logical language9 It seems that there are emotions and non-cognitive experiences that

cannot be quantified. Is Quine taking such experiences as non-referential. Reference is

Which becomes Vx(Fx -v Gx) instead of the usual V{x:Fx -* G x ).

'Reference.'' 26 3x is not equivalent to existence. (See Perspective on Ouine. 256).

Ibid Sec "On What There Is." 15 for the initial statement of this claim.

"Reference." 27.

I b i d .

I b i d

I b i d .

Ibid. Q uantification is no im provem ent over B oolean schem ata. Sec Methods o f Logic. 1 3 7 .

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thought to deal with singular terms, and yet these terms convey very little usually. It is set

theory that teaches that there are bound, unspecified objects. “Variables [...] take all

objects as values.”269

Quine’s answer to the ontological question 'what is real9’ is that to be is to the

value of a bound variable.270 He reiterates this in his chapter on “Reference” that

quantification is the paradigm of choice. This is a change in his position since "On What

There is” in 1953 He chooses quantification because it is "what is most usual and

familiar.”271 It may be most usual or familiar to Quine, but isn’t that an emotional

response which is not deducible to a first order logical language9 Quine contends that

reference is: "relating names and other singular terms to their objects.”272 However,

Quine also acknowledges that smgular terms actually fail to refer to anything in

many instances. 27' This is the case in set theory, and no matter how complicated and

diverse the notation is, there will still be ‘unspecifiable objects’ 2/4 What Quine finds so

wonderful about variables is that they take objects as values.275 Language, too, uses this

"Reference." 28

"Reference. " 27. In "On What there Quine claims quantification is his paradigm of choice, and then takes it back. "On What There Is". 15: "Certainly the answer cannot be provided by the semantic formula "To be is to be the value of a bound variable": this formula rather, conversely, in testing the conformity of a given remark or doctrine to a prior ontological standard. " It is not by claiming “what is” that makes the semantic formula useful, but in the determination of what does not fit. The value of a bound variable is " what is".

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid

r ! Ibid.

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type of predicate calculus, and language, which uses sentences, can "dispense with

singular terms altogether leaving only variables to refer to objects.”276

Quine thinks that shorthand developed by Russell introducing a singular description

recaptures the singular term.277 Even Quine would admit that we have not overcome

Hume’s criticisms of epistemology. The bundles of perception prevents the ability to

truly know simple ideas, since they could not be traced back, or separated from the

bundles, to the initial simple impression Quine admits that not being able to define

there is' adequately may prevent the assessment of the speaker’s ontological

language 278 This certainly is the case when someone claims that ‘there is a piece of

chalk', and that ‘there is something that chalk is,’ it is not clear merely from those

expressions the ontological commitment of the speaker It is only until ‘there is’ is

defined that this becomes more evident. Quine also acknowledges that some languages

I b i d .

"R eference." 28. T he problem w ith set theory explained in Methods o f Logic, p a g e

136 E quivalence, is defined by Q uine as: "T here is som ething (Som ething has quality x. and a is

equivalent to that quality x f as equivalent to that som ething has the quality a. and for every instance of

this, the context o f equivalence still can be m ade, hence reducing all occurrences o f a to "an indissoluble

predicate A ' absorbing the singular term ." "A t the sam e tim e it seem s that singular term s can depart

w idely in form from the singular th e' idiom and still be fairly deem ed translatable into descriptions:

w itness "John's m other'." Q uine explains in Methods of Logic. 2 7 6

Ibid. In Stimulus to Science. Quine explains that Russell came up with his contextual definition of the singular descriptions, inspired by Bcntham and Booles s work in logic, and differential calculus on methods of operators, which reduced a complicated equation to fix. y. /.). "Three operators and their ostensible sum represent fictious quantities, to state the matter from Bcntham's point of view. (... jThc economical foundation achieved in Principia \\fathemathica vol. 1. 66|. and further reduced by subsequent logicians, now comprises only truth functions and quantification elementary logic plus the two place predicate "c‘ of class membership. The whole conceptual scheme of mathematics boils down to t h a t . " Stimulus to Science. 7 - 9 .

Ibid.

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may not even have an adequate translation of ‘there is.,279 We only dupe ourselves if we

think we can assess the ontological commitment present in such languages.280

Quine uses the process of reification when he reducing all occurrences of a to “an

indissoluble predicate ‘A’ absorbing the singular term.”281 He now contrasts this kind of

predication with conjunction. Conjunction is the joining together of attributes with a

conjunctive term like ‘and.’ Quine acknowledges that predication is a stronger

connection than conjunction.282 Predication “requires the immersion of the pebble in the

blue, and the raven in the black, while mere conjunction allows the features to go their

separate ways ” 28"' Predication allows for a “tightening up on truth functions” due to the

reification’s contribution “to the logical connections between observation and theory.”284

Quine uses the example of “A white cat is facing a dog and bristling.” to demonstrate

his point285 He first notes the four simple observational statements contained within this

one statement The four simple observational statements are (1) cat, (2) white. (3)

dog facing, and (4) bristling. 286 This combines the four observationals under an

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. The sons of objects Quine is positing arc bound variable Variables take objects as values. Quine also resorts to the theory of descriptions (not to that of types).

In Methods o f Logic. 54. Quine notes that '[1 logical notation, unconcerned with rhetorical distinctions, expresses conjunction uniformly "

"'Reference." 29.

Ibid.

:ss Ibid.

Ibid

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existential quantifier, namely something. 287 Well what are we going to do9 Quine

answers: ‘reification to the rescue.” 288 Since there is no possibility to know each

observation as an atomistic concept all alone, without relation, yet construction from

elements to form observational statements is ‘mandatory’.” 289

Observational statements refer to things, in that context, of the moment Quine

defines 'observational statement’ as: "A sentence whose whole occasion of affirmation

is the intersubjectively observable present occasion, hence a statement that can be

learned ostensibly and one to which all speakers of the language assent under the same

stimulations." 290 There is no requirement to posit the existence of an essence of enduring

catness to speak in observational statements about the moment about cats.291 We will

need to ignore any scientific debate about the nature of time, and “suppose that we have

somehow worked our way far enough up into scientific theory to treat time earlier and

later"292

Science has reified the invisible air, and we integrate such reifications when

entities are too small to individuate.29'’ What distinguishes one electron from another9

Ibid

Ibid.

Ibid.

Web o f Belief 143.

"Reference. " 30.

Tbid.

'Reference. " 25. In Word and Object. 91. Quine clarifies this point: " So-called mass terms like "water", "footwear", and "red", have the semantical property of referring cumulatively: any sum of parts which arc water is water." Quine explains that he has followed Goodman in calling a "mass term" a

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Each electron has its own loci, but it is tempting to reify about such unseen entities. It

may be the case that all there is one electron seen by many relativistic perspectives.

Science, too, uses all sorts of abstract entities that have too been reified. Quine does not

think that reification makes sense for abstract objects.294 Quine does not think that

abstract objects such as elements, atoms, and electrons are ontological entities. Hence, the

most imporant elements of the physical sciences do not fit within the realm of reification,

according to Quine Quine asks at this point what counts as reification9295 Do we have

to make an ontological commitment just to understand reification? Quine wants to dodge

the ontolosical commitment.

PROXY FUNCTIONS AND INDIFFERENCE OF ONTOLOGY

Quine follows the discussion of reification with a discussion of the indifference of

ontology Reference to objects and an ontological commitment "recede thus to the status

'collective term'.

•'Reference. ' 26. Russell agrees with Quine in that things beyond appearance, or that are not empirically given, cannot be known as entities, and arc such only if you arc accepting a dogma or logical fiction. "You find that a certain thing has been set up as a metaphysical entity can cither be assumed dogmatically to be real, and then you will have no possible argument either for its reality or against its reality : or. instead of doing that, you can construct a logical fiction having the same formal properties to those of the supposed metaphysical entity and itself is composed of empirically proven things, and that logical fiction can be substituted for your supposed metaphysical entity and will fulfill all the scientific purposes that anybody can desire. With atoms and the rest it is so. with all the metaphysical entities I moan those which arc supposed to be part of the ultimate constitutes of the world, but not to the kind of thing that is ever empirically given— I do not say merely not being itself empirically given, but not being the kind of thing that is empirically given." Bertrand Russell. The Philosophy o f . (La Salle. IL: Open Court. 1985). 144. Russell refuses to affirm the existence of anything (but he is not denying the existence of anything). Quine is too accepting a logical fiction by affirming that there are things that arc empirically given, but attempts to do this within the context of descriptions, instead of using formal properties.

"Reference." page 25.

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of mere auxiliaries.”296 Determining true sentences “observational and theoretical

are the alpha and omega of the scientific enterprise.”297 Reference to actual objects

is what makes the determination of true statements possible To see that objects or

atoms of experience as secondary seems to miss the point. Verification is not

possible Objects, referred to by singular terms, must be put in a sentential context to be

intelligible; hence looking at just an object, abstracted from its context, will not be very

enlightening “What particular objects there may be is indifferent to the support they

lend to the theoretical sentences, indifferent to the success of the theory and its

predictions." 298 Quine notes that this point may best be shown by explaining the nature

of proxy functions.

Quine defines a proxy function as “any explicit one-to one transformation./,

defined over the objects in our purported universe. By ‘explicit’ I mean that for any object

x. specified in an acceptable notion, we can specify f x .’,299 Thus a proxy' function is a

function in which an object x goes through a transformation. But there needs to be an

acceptable determination of what the object is, prior, and after this transformation to

make the one to one correlation necessary to maintain the singular reference to object x.

But the focus is shifted away from the object, to the kind. Quine wants to use proxy

functions to: “shift our ontology' by reinterpreting each o f our predicates as true rather of

“Reference." 31.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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the correlates f x of the objects x that it had been true of. Thus, where Px’ originally meant

that x was a P, we reinterpret ‘Px’ as meaning that x is/o f a P." ~00 In this way, singular

terms, which refer to particular objects can be ignored or “passed over,” to concentrate on

the kind ( P) of x in relation to f (its transformation). '01 If the elimination of the object

focus is not bad enough, Quine is also accepting of relations that are not necessarily one

to-one in correspondence. Quine refers to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem as an example

of what indifference to ontology would amount to. "If all o f a class of quant ificational

schemata come out true together under an interpretation in a nonempty universe, they

come out true together under some interpretation in the universe of positive integers.”

Extension to an infinite class of schemata is a genuine extension according to the

Lowenheim-Skolem theorem (stated in italics)."02

When applied to a theory that has been fitted to predicate logic, cleared of singular terms, and encompassed in a finite lot of axioms, what this theorem tell us is that there is a truth-preserving reinterpretation of the predicates that makes the universe come to consist merely of natural numbers 0,1.2 ...... This theorem does not, like proxy functions, carry each o f the old objects into a definite new one, a particular number. This was not to be hoped for, since some infinite domains-- notably that of irrational numbers— are too high a cardinality to be exhausted by correlation with natural numbers.

Hence reference on a one-to-one basis may not even be possible, so why set the standard

"Reference."" 32. Also sec Perspectives on Ouine. 7. "The gross bodies themselves, charter members of our ontology, could thus be superseded by proxies and not be missed. "

" 1 Ibid. "The observational sentences remain in associated with the same sensory stimulations as before, and the logical interconnections remain in tact. Yet the objects of the theory have been supplanted as drastically as you please"

Methods o f Logic. 209.

"Reference."" 32.

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on the particulars when it is the correlation between observation (or abstract theory) and

logical structures that can be expressed by language. There is a difficulty here. How

do we understand the logical structures if the singular terms are ‘passed over’? '°4

The particulars must be referred to by these proxy functions, because this is the only way

in which science about particulars is possible/05 Quine wants to apply this application of

proxy functions to ontological relativity

When two ontological theories both explain empirical observations

adequately, there are no real empirical grounds for determining which ontology is the true

ontology “What is empirically significant in an ontology is just its contribution of neutral

nodes to the structure of theory.” '°6 Hence there are no empirical grounds for

determining realism, nominalism, formalism nor conceptualism as being true, or false.

The meanings of objects should function as “'neutral nodes to the structure of the

theory"07 The meanings behind names are relative and not fixed upon some sort of

enduring universal nature. “We could reinterpret “Tabitha’ as designating no longer the

cat, but the whole of the cosmos minus the cat; or again, as designating the cat’s skeleton,

or unit class ” '08 We could apply such a reinterpretation strategy to all of the words in a

'Reference. ' 32-33 Quine notes that: "we could not have arrived at our science in the first place under that interpretation, since numbers do not correspond one by one to the reifications tltat were our stepping stones.” "Reference."' 32-33

"Reference." 33.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

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language, and hence: “we come out with an ontology interchangeable with our familiar

one ” '°9 I am not sure how interchangeable these might be, but there still would be no

real reason to name an object a particular name. Objects are known in relation to others in

any relativistic ontology. "Bodies still continue, under their cosmic complements and from

their singletons: they are distinguished in a relativistic way, by their roles relative to one

another and to the rest of the ontology. Hence my watch word is ontological

relativity " 'I0 Quine is keen to embrace a relativistic approach to ontology He is not

doing so to be pragmatic, but coherent. There is also a difference to be noted between

observational statements and the terms which are supposed to have come from them. The

observation cannot be captured in the terms themselves, but in the arrangement of such

terms, or nodes, we attempt to reconstruct the experience

The term does not continue to conjure up visions appropriate to the observation sentences through which the term was learned, and so it be: but there is no empirical bar to the reinterpretation. The original sensory associations were indispensable genetically in generating the nodes by which we structure our theory' of the world. But all that matters by the way of evidence for the theory is the stimulatory basis of observation sentences plus the structure that the neutral nodes serve to implement. The stimulation remains as rabbity as ever, but the corresponding node or object goes neutral and is up for grabs

The problem with this view is that Quine is certain that observational statements are

learned first, and then the terms are secondary, and becoming detached from the initial

observation, via bundles of perception. The then object becomes a neutral node according

I b i d .

■Reference." 34

Ibid.

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to Quine. Terms only have meaning in sentences. Terms and what objects they refer to

are meaningless without sentential context. But are the sentences learned first? It seems,

according to Quine, that small children, when learning to speak, learn word, after word,

and eventually build to sentence construction.' 12 .Albeit these terms are learned in the

context of the moment, and without that context the terms would never take meaning.

Science has reinforced the notion of ontological relativity in Quine’s view “Light waves

rest on a tenuous analogy; unlike water waves, they are not waves on or in anything. The

more tenuous these aids to the imagination, the less odd ontological relativity may

seem." ' l'

Theories are constantly being challenged, and paradigms in science change. This is

not just a threat to a singular ontology but to very question of existence. Science, and

language, are "rooted in what good scientific language eschews. In Wittgenstein’s figure,

we climb the ladder and kick it away.” "u Hence we can use an ontological theory to get

to one level of interpretation and then throw it aside, as evidence dictates, and employ a

new ontology "Theories can take yet more drastic turns: such not merely as to threaten a

cherished ontology of elementary particles, but to threaten the very sense of the

ontological question what there is.” 'I5 Consequently, the abandonment of a singular

static ontology is what Quine is arguing for Ontology should fit the scientific data,

Web o f Belief. 143. "Learning by ostension is learning to associate heard words with objects or situations simultaneously observed: such learning depends on no prior acquisition of language."

"Reference." 34.

' Reference." 34-35

’’’ "Reference." 35.

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collected by empirical observation, and converted into observational statements. Quine

has a standard approach, however, to the form of such scientific observational statements.

"[T]he standard idiom for existential purposes, namely, quantification, can serve as a

standard only when embedded in the standard form of regimented language that we have

been picturing: one whose further apparatus consists only of truth functions and

predicates ” '16 The question of what there is could only be answered, according to Quine,

w ithin a system of truth functional and predicate logic. To stray beyond these apparatuses

is to get into the dispute over ontology again, and what objects are cannot be known,

beyond that, to be is to be the value of a variable The value of a variable is all we can

hope to determine at this point. Translation into a predicate logic is necessary to make

judgments, but not the judgment of what exists, beyond those statements Others want to

abandon predicate logic altogether Quine admits. ’17

Ibid.

"Reference." 36

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CAN PHILOSOPHY OVERCOME ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY OR WILL

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY ELIMINATE PHILOSOPHY9

In conclusion, ontological debates may not be settled until one system or standard

can be employed. This system, according to Quine, is quantification. There needs to

be a standard for quantifying as well if we are all going to arrive at the same truth

functions and predicates. Ontologies vary, and hence the logic must be able to cross the

divides Perhaps quantification is not the solution, and to be is not to be the value of

a bound variable. '2-'

This paper's purpose was to examine some of the basic questions of philosophy in

regards to Quine’s answers to them. To be, we found, according to Quine was to be the

value of a bound variable. His answer is a very unlike many philosopher's answers.

Many, including myself, have not quite known what to make of this view. Quine wishes

to remain ontologically neutral, because ontology is relative and always changing, so to

adopt one rigid ontology will not suffice. Quine is continually shifting to meet the needs

of the natural sciences. As Stroud explains: "'Questions of reference and ontology have

become incidental to what the world is like, and now, as Quine puts it, 'the lexicon of

ff ays o f Paradox. 272. The notion of the variable is not merely purely a notion according to Quine.

88

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natural science, not ontology, is where the metaphysical action is.” Since academic

discourse is in a state o f flux, metaphysics, taken in Quine’s way, will too always be in a

state of flux. It reminds me of Heraclitus, in that we can’t step into the same metaphysical

schema twice. Extreme relativity is the result, and this creates problems for language,

such as the indeterminacy of meaning. There is nothing in the world known by sensation

that can give such meanings.

Quine’s greatest difficulty is in his acceptance of a relativistic empiricism that is

based on sense data fields. “Field theory for Quine speaks only of the distribution of

v arious states over space time regions. With talk of material content of those space-time

regions eliminated, that is all we are left with. What then is there'7 What objects exist?

What entities do such theories commit us to*7 If not physical objects even in Quine’s

extended sense, what becomes of physicalism?” 04 It is not clear, based on a relativistic

ontology, what there is. Logical concepts themselves appear to be the stuff of reality.

Every observational statement is subject to revision. "The primitive observational

categorical "When the sun comes up, the birds sing’ is refuted by observing sunrise

among silent birds ” ’25 Hence we cannot assume that the behavior of things will remain the

same in the future. It seems that all observational statements must be continually

reverified. The need for reification shows that that there are such loose connections in

Barn Stroud. "Quine s Physicalism.” Perspectives on Ouine. edited by Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). 326

Ibid.. 323.

\V V Quine, as in Perspectives on Quine, edited by Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). “Three Indeterminacics." 10

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truth functions.

To us the question whether we are seeing the same old ball or penny or just a similar one is meaningful in cases where it remains unanswered. [. . .] If I were to try to decide whether the penny now in my pocket is the one that was there last week, or just another one like it, I would try to reconstruct the simplest, most plausible account of my interim movements, costumes, and expenditures. [. . .] The technical contribution of all such reifications seems to consist in a tightening of implications and high theory, by reinforcing loose truth functional relations. '26

It seems that Quine is being a gadfly, much in the way Socrates was. Quine urges us to

convert all singular terms to predicates. Particulars cannot be defined, so this is the best

we have when trying to get to know singular terms. '27 Marcus explains that as long as

they're not sorties, or only non-sortal modals, Quine is willing to accept a type of

essentialism. Quine wants to acknowledge the need for essentialism, without admitting to

the existence of universals. "There is no longer a problem of'making sense’ of

expressions in modal operators attached to open sentences or modal operators in the

scope of quantifiers.”' 28 So if we leave our statements open, there is no difficulty. We will

know if the birds will sing when the sun rises tomorrow and not before.

It seems unclear when using the sense field theory how general terms can be

defined The nominalistic approach of Quine, using physicalism, has still made it

impossible to know the world as it is. This seems very phenomenalistic, in that the world

as it is will never appear to us. All we seem to be able to know is our perceptions about

"Three Indctcrminacies." 7

Ruth Barcan Marcus, in Perspectives on Ouine. edited by Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson. (Oxford: Blackwell. 1993). "A Backward Look." 240.

" A Backward Look." 241.

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the world. Quine makes the best use of this truth he can in developing his ontological

relativity To be is to be the value of a variable. Aristotle thought that ontology was a

singular study and that it was not at all relative. Aristotle also thought that ontology was

the study of universals. j29 He also said that unity is only possible because of substance.

The attributes or general terms would not have anything to adhere to or to be embodied in

if it were not for substance. Quine has reduced attributes of substance to mere

predications about objects. Universals are reduced to substantives Quine does not go

deep enough into physical objects, and he misses the essence. He avoids the atomic level

in order to preserve identity and this leads to the opposite result. Objects are reduced to

mere values.

In order to clear up the problem of indeterminacy that is created by the acceptance

of an ontological relativity, a reassessment must take place. Quine abandoned realism in

favor of resemblance nominalism. He "grounded'’ his nominalism in the shifting physical

sciences, which only complicated the dilemma. This reliance upon the physical sciences

causes Quine to committ to two positons that are oppositional: nominalism and

physicalism. Quine had rightfully abandoned the two dogmas of empiricism, but he clung

to yet a third: physicalism.

Quine also does not adequately show that necessity is not possible. He only

criticizes de re necessity and not de dicto necessity. In order to understand reality,

ontology as a science cannot be reduced to relativity. What is cannot be a mere belief, a

Metaphysics. 1059b and 1060b.

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mere predication, or the value of a bound variable.

THE RIVER REVISITED

While at the park on a clear autumn day, overlooking the Patapsco river, all things

seemed to just be. The river was a pane of glass. It appeared to be standing

still I thought of Heraclitus, and the flux of our experience, and how. for one brief

moment order, not change, was in control. It was as if I could for a brief time, know the

river as the river itself Perhaps it is just an individual river, and an individual experience.

In the stillness, the essence of the river was revealed. It was not sensible, as much as it

was intelligible. The river is a well-ground phenomena of my river experience. The river

idea, in its perfection, has not changed. Indeed, that experience w'as many autumns ago,

yet the river remains.

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