5
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA CASE NO : In the matter between :
SWARTBOOI, NTLELI GABRIEL 1st Applicant TSOAI, GODFREY MOJAKI 2nd Applicant THEDISI, SABATA ELIAS 3rd Applicant MATSEPE, SANAH MOTSHEHOANE 4th Applicant MATUBE, DANIEL NGAKE 5th Applicant PHOLO, JACOB 6th Applicant NDONGA, TSIETSE ANDRIES 7th Applicant LETSHOARA, KHUMISI JOSEPH 8th Applicant MOLETSANE, MOLIFI ERNEST 9th Applicant SWARTBOOI, NTSOKOLO APRIL 10th Applicant MEPHA, MERRIAM PULANE 11th Applicant KGANG, BETHUEL POGISHO 12th Applicant MOLISENYANE, KONTSANE JONAS 13th Applicant MATHIBE, MAKGOBE REGINA 14th Applicant LEKHELEBANE, LIPHAPANG DAVID 15th Applicant MASUMPA, TLANGANISO ISHMAEL 16th Applicant LESEANE, MARTHA DIKELEDI 17th Applicant MOGOJE, THEKO AUBOU 18th Applicant and
BRINK, LILIAN RAY 1st Respondent NIEUWOUDT, GERITT 2nd Respondent
FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT
I, the undersigned,
NTLELI GABRIEL SWARTBOOI do hereby make oath and say : 6
1 I am an adult male employed at the Civic Centre, Preller Street, Bothaville. I am the
speaker of the Municipality of Nala Local Municipality. I am the First Applicant in
this matter.
2 The facts contained herein are within my personal knowledge and are both true and
correct.
3 The Second Applicant is GODFREY MOJAKI TSOAI, an adult male Councillor of
the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 351 Mpomela Street, Kgotsong,
Bothaville. The Second Applicant is also the mayor of the Nala Local Council.
4 The Third Applicant is SABATA ELIAS THEDISI, an adult male Councillor of the
Nala Local Municipality who resides at Stand No.3697, Monyakeng, Wesselsbron.
5 The Fourth Applicant is SANAH MOTSHEHOANE MATSEPE, an adult female
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 808 Swartbooi Street,
Monyakeng, Wesselsbron.
7
6 The Fifth Applicant is DANIEL NGAKE MATUBE, an adult male Councillor of the
Nala Local Municipality who resides at 1939 Phola Street, Monyakeng, Wesselsbron.
7 The Sixth Applicant is JACOB PHOLO, an adult male Councillor of the Nala Local
Municipality who resides at Wesselsbron.
8 The Seventh Applicant is TSIETSE ANDRIES NDONGA, an adult male Councillor
of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 3190 Mokgage Street, Kgotsong,
Bothaville.
9 The Eighth Applicant is KHUMISI JOSEPH LETSHOARA, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 2616 Kgotsong, Bothaville.
10 The Ninth Applicant is MOLIFI ERNEST MOLETSANE, an adult male Councillor
of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 2205 Sebotsa Crescent, Kgotsong,
Bothaville.
8
11 The Tenth Applicant is NTSOKOLO APRIL SWARTBOOI, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 85 Mbuthu Street,
Monyakeng, Wesselsbron.
12 The Eleventh Applicant is MERRIAM PULANE MEPHA, an adult male Councillor
of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 518Mogoaladi Street, Monyakeng,
Wesselsbron.
13 The Twelfth Applicant is BETHUEL POGISHO KGANG, an adult male Councillor
of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 160 Church Street, Wesselsbron.
14 The Thirteenth Applicant is KONTSANE JONAS MOLISENYANE, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 536 Moalusi Street,
Kgotsong, Bothaville.
15 The Fourteenth Applicant is MAKGOBE REGINA MATHIBE, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 2229 Maile Street,
Kgotsong, Bothaville.
9
16 The Fifteenth Applicant is LIPHAPANG DAVID LEKHELEBANE, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 115 Mohau Street,
Kgotsong, Bothaville.
17 The Sixteenth Applicant is TLANGANISO ISHMAEL MASUMPA, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 7598 Kgotsong, Bothaville.
18 The Seventeenth Applicant is MARTHA DIKELEDI LESEANE, an adult male
Councillor of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 1173 Motlhaoleng,
Kgotsong, Bothaville.
19 The Eighteenth Applicant is THEKO AUBOY MOGOJE, an adult male Councillor
of the Nala Local Municipality who resides at 926 Letsie Street, Kgotsong,
Bothaville.
20 The First Respondent is LILIAN RAY BRINK, an adult female residing at 37
Greyling Street, Bothaville.
10
21 The Second Respondent is GERITT NIEUWOUDT, an adult male businessman
whose further particulars are currently unknown to the Applicants.
22 All the Applicant have duly authorised their attorneys of record in this matter,
Ramsurjoo-du Plessis Incorporated to bring this application on their behalf. In terms
of the rules of the Court it is not necessary to annex the powers of attorney, but they
can be produced, if necessary. I am a competent witness in this matter due to the fact
that I have knowledge of the facts set out hereunder.
23 I make this affidavit in support of an application for leave to appeal in terms of Rule
20 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court against an order of the Supreme Court of
Appeal made on 5 July 2002, refusing the Applicants leave to appeal against the
judgment of the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High Court of South
Africa delivered 31 January 2002 in terms of which the Applicants were ordered to
pay the costs of the application under Orange Free State Provincial Division of the
High Court of South Africa, case number 2125/2001 on the attorney and own client
scale de bonis propriis.
24 HISTORY IN BRIEF 11
The brief history of the present matter is as follows :
24.1 On 13 June 2001 the Respondents issued a notice of motion in terms of Rule 53 of the
Rules of the High Court, citing me, in my capacity as the speaker of the
Municipal Council of the Nala Local Municipality as the First Respondent and
the Nala Local Municipality as the Second Respondent. In terms of this notice
of motion the Respondents requested the High Court to review certain
decisions of the Nala Local Municipality, to which more detailed reference
will be made hereunder, and requested that the Nala Local Municipality be
ordered to pay the costs of the application on the attorney and client scale.
This application was opposed and affidavits were exchanged. The record of
the proceedings before the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High
Court is annexed hereto as “NGS2".
24.2 On the 10th of December 2001 the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High
Court of South Africa delivered a judgment (Coram Malherbe JP and Cillié J)
in terms of which the Respondents’ application for the review of decisions was
upheld. Furthermore, the court mero motu issued a rule nisi with a return date 12
of 31 January 2002 in terms of which all the members of the Municipal
Council of the Nala Local Municipality were called upon to show cause why
they should not be ordered to pay the costs of the application on the attorney
and own client scale de bonis propriis. A copy of this judgment is annexed
hereto as annexure “NGS3".
24.3 As a result of the rule nisi having been issued, the Applicants delivered an affidavit in
opposition to the proposed cost order, which I annex hereto as annexure
“NGS4". Another councillor, David Christie Ross, also delivered an affidavit,
which I annex hereto as annexure “NGS5".
24.4 On 31 January 2002 the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High Court
confirmed the rule nisi and ordered the Applicants to pay the costs of the
application on the attorney and own client scale, de bonis propriis. A copy of
the Court’s judgment in this regard is annexed hereto as annexure “NGS6".
24.5 During February 2002 an application for leave to appeal was brought against the
decision of the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High Court. Such
application is annexed hereto as annexure “NGS7". On the 15th of March 2002 13
the Orange Free State Provincial Division of the High Court dismissed the
application for leave to appeal with costs. I annex hereto as annexure “NGS8"
a copy of such judgment.
24.6 An application for leave to appeal, which is annexed hereto as annexure “NGS9", was
directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, requesting leave to appeal against the
decision by the Orange Free State Provincial Division. On 5 July 2002 such
application for leave to appeal was refused with costs. I annex hereto as
annexure “NGS10" a copy of the order. As is customary, the Supreme Court
of Appeal did not furnish any reasons for its decision.
25 THE DECISION IN RESPECT OF LEAVE TO APPEAL IS SOUGHT
25.1 The attention of the Honourable Court is drawn to the fact that the application for
leave to appeal brought in the High Court and in the Supreme Court of Appeal
was directed against both the decision to review the decisions of the Municipal
Council of the Nala Local Municipality and the cost orders granted against the
abovementioned Applicants in their personal capacities.
14
25.2 However, based on advice that was received subsequent to the dismissal of the
application for leave to appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal, it was decided
not to persist with the appeal against the judgment in terms of which the
decisions of the Local Council was reviewed and set aside.
25.3 Furthermore, the Respondents resigned as members of the Nala Municipal Council on
the 11th of December 2001, the day after the judgment on the review
application was delivered. An appeal in respect of the merits of the review will
therefore be academic. The order in respect of the review itself became
academic once the Respondents resigned. In view of the resignation, it is not
clear why the application for review was brought in the first place.
25.4 However, the Applicants wishes to appeal against the decision by the High Court in
terms of which they were ordered to pay the costs of the application de bonis
propriis.
25.5 As stated above, and in the notice of motion, the purpose of this application is to
obtain leave to appeal against the refusal of the Supreme Court of Appeal to
grant leave to appeal. 15
26 CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER
26.1 In terms of Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 the Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional matters.
26.2 Furthermore, in terms of Section 167(3)(b) the Constitutional Court may decide only
constitutional matters, and issues connected with decisions on constitutional
matters.
26.3 Furthermore, in terms of Section 167(3)(c) the Constitutional Court makes the final
decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or whether an issue is
connected with a decision on a constitutional matter.
26.4 It is respectfully submitted that the application brought by the Respondents in the
High Court for the review of the administrative action taken by the Nala Local
Municipality is a “constitutional matter” for purposes of Section 167 of the
Constitution.
16
26.5 Furthermore, the costs order granted against the Applicants in the present matter is an
issue that is connected with such constitutional matter.
26.6 Consequently, it is respectfully submitted that the Constitutional Court is the highest
court, not only in respect of the review application, but also in respect of the
cost order granted in such review application.
26.7 Apart from the fact that the costs order granted in the review application is connected
with the review application, it is respectfully submitted that the granting of a
costs order de bonis propriis against members of a local council resulting from
decisions taken by the council is in itself a constitutional matter. In this regard
I state that the granting of costs orders against members of a Local Council
may have a profound effect on the functioning of a local council, in that there
may be a reluctance on the part of members of the public to make themselves
available for public office if cost orders can be granted against them without
sufficient grounds existing for such costs orders to be granted. It may also
result in the situation where elected councillors may be reluctant to act
decisively, fearing that there may be personal consequences flowing from
decisions taken. In this regard I can state that the cost order granted in the 17
present matter already had a stifling effect on the functioning of the Nala Local
Municipal Council.
26.8 Therefore, I respectfully submit that the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal in respect of the refusal of the application for leave to
appeal against the costs order granted both because it is connected to a
constitutional matter, i.e. the review application, and because issue of the costs
order in itself is in the circumstances of the matter a constitutional matter.
27 COSTS DE BONIS PROPRIIS AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIAL
27.1 I am advised that the High Court could only grant an order against the Applicants in
their personal capacities in the event of the High Court being in a position to correctly
find that the Applicants acted with malice in taking the decisions that have been taken.
27.2 As will appear hereinbelow, there was indeed no basis upon which the High Court
could make any finding of malice on the part of the Applicants, and therefore, with
respect, erred in making the costs order which it did. As will be pointed out 18
hereunder, there is a reasonable prospect that another court will come to a different
conclusion on the matter of costs.
27.3 It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court of appeal erred by not at
least granting leave to appeal in respect of the costs awarded against the Applicants.
28 THE RESPONDENTS’ APPLICATION
28.1 The Respondents brought an application for the review of certain decisions taken by
the Council of the Nala Local Municipality and requested an order in the
following terms :
“Dat die besluit van die Tweede Respondent dat die Eerste Applikant
en Tweede Applikant geskors word as raadslede van Tweede
Respondent of dat Eerste Applikant en Tweede Applikant uitgesluit
word van deelname aan die bedrywighede en werksaamhede van
Tweede Respondent en sy raad, geneem op ‘n spesiale vergadering
gehou op 19 April 2001, hersien en ter syde gestel word.”
19
and
“Dat die besluit van die Tweede Respondent dat die Eerste Applikant
geskors word as Raadslid van Tweede Respondent vir ‘n tydperk vanh
twaalf maande en sonder enige vergoeding, geneem op ‘n
maandvergadering van Tweede Respondent gehou op 24 April 2001,
hersien en ter syde gestel word”.
29 THE BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION OF THE 19TH OF APRIL 2001
29.1 The Honourable Court is respectfully referred to paragraph 7 of the Respondents’
founding affidavit before the High Court. During 1945 a notarial lease
agreement was concluded between the Bothaville Town Council and the
Bothaville Landbougenoodskap. This lease agreement would have endured for
a period of 50 years from the date of registration of the notarial contract. Such
registration took place on the 2nd of August 1945. Clause 12 of the lease
agreement provided that at the expiry of the lease period the lessor (i.e. the
Town Council) would be obliged to compensate the lessee (the Bothaville 20
Landbougenoodskap) in respect of the value of buildings, structures and other
improvements effected by the lessee on the premises. The lease period in
terms of the notarial contract expired on the 2nd of August 1995. It is alleged
that the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap gave written notice to the Town
Council that compensation was claimed in terms of the agreement and relied
on a valuation provided by an attorney, Michael George Robert Rafferty. He
valued the improvements on the property in the amount of R517 278,00. It is
alleged that subsequently a settlement agreement was concluded between the
Bothaville Town Council and the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap in terms of
which an amount of R500 000,00 was to be paid in full and final settlement in
respect of the Landbougenoodskap’s claim in respect of the improvements.
The amount of R500 000,00 was allegedly paid by the Town Council to the
Landbougenoodskap during October 1995.
29.2 The Honourable Court is also referred to paragraph 5 of the Respondents in the High
Court’s answering affidavit, where the following points were raised:
29.2.1 That there appeared to be no proof that the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap in fact
was responsible for the erection of the buildings and other 21
improvements in respect of which the compensation was paid by
the Town Council during October 1995, as required by the
notarial lease agreement. In fact it was alleged that the Council
financed some of the improvements.
29.2.2 From the investigations, it appeared that the amount of R500 000,00 was not paid
directly or at all to the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap by the
Bothaville Town Council, but that the money was first paid to
attorneys Carey & Botha and that on the 4th of September 1996
Carey & Botha paid an amount of R562 400,66 to a Section 21
company, called Miela Vereniging.
29.2.3 Miela Vereniging is a Section 21 company of which both the Respondents were
directors.
29.2.4 The result was that the view was formed that the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap did
not exist during 1995 and that the funds were unlawfully
channeled to Miela Vereniging.
22
29.3 It is respectfully submitted that the allegations contained in the answering affidavit,
namely that the funds were channeled to Miela Vereniging, instead of to the
Bothaville Landbougenoodskap called for an explanation by the Respondents
in their replying affidavit.
29.4 However, in their replying affidavit no explanation whatsoever was given by the
Respondents why the funds were in fact paid to Miela Vereniging, instead of
to the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap.
29.5 Against this background, the Respondents referred in their founding papers to a
meeting of the Municipal Council of the Nala Local Municipality on the 19th of
April 2001. The Honourable Court is referred to paragraph 12 of the founding
affidavit.
29.6 In paragraph 13 of the founding affidavit the Respondents describe the meeting that
occurred as follows :
“13 Hierdie vergadering het soos volg verloop:
23
13.1 Reg aan die begin van die vergadering het die Eerste
Respondent gesê dat ek self en Tweede Applikant verbied
word om aan die debat deel te neem.
13.2 Hierna het die Eerste Respondent sy gemelde verslag
behandel. Hy het onder andere gesê dat alle korrupsie
uitgeroei moet word. Hy het gesê dat hulle soek die geld,
verwysende na die gemelde bedrag van R500 000,00, hy
wil weet waar dit gespandeer is. Hy het die vraag gevra
of die Bothaville Landbougenoodskap verander is na
NAMPO. Hy het ook gesê dat die Landbougenoodskap
nie bestaan het in 1995 nie. Hy het gesê dat die pre-
interim fase begin het in Desember 1994. Hy het gesê
dat daar gekies is vir ‘n artikel 7(c)
koördineringstruktuur, soos hy dit genoem het. Hy het
gesê dat hy deur die notules gegaan het en nie so ‘n item
gevind het wat gedien het voor die Koördineringsraad
nie en dat hy wil weet wat weggesteek is.
24
13.3 Hierna het Mnr Swartbooi (Jnr), ‘n lid van die
uitvoerende kommittee, gesê dat die bedrogeenheid van
die S.A. Polisie ingeroep moet word.
13.4 Mnr K. Letsoara ook ‘n lid van die uitvoerende
kommittee van die Raad van die Tweede Respondent, het
hierna gepraat. Hy het gesê dat die gemelde bedrag ‘n
ongemagtigde uitgawe was en dat alle voormalige
raadslede wat daarby betrokke was, die geld moet terug
betaal. Hy het gesê dat bedrog vermoed word. Hy het
ook gesê dat die raadslede wat daarby betrokke was, nie
raadvergaderings moet bywoon nie en ook nie naby die
amptenare van die Raad mag kom nie.
13.5 Hierna het ‘n ander lid van die Raad, Mnr D.
Lekhelepane melding gemaak daarvan dat die
aangeleentheid terug verwys moet word na die kantoor
van die Ouditeur-generaal en nie na agente van die
Ouditeur-generaal nie. ‘n Ander Raadslid, ek kan tans 25
nie onthou wie dit was nie, het gesê dat die openbare
beskermer ook ingeroep moet word.
13.6 Hierna het die Burgermeester aan die woord gekom. Hy
het gesê dat die wortel van die probleem van die Raad
binne in die Raad is, verwysende na die Assistent
tesourier. Hy het verwys na ‘looting’ en ‘plundering’
van fondse. Hy het gesê dat tot die bodem van alle
kwaad gekom sal word en dat die Tweede Respondent
‘dysfunctional’ is. Hy het gesê hy waarborg dat geen
genade getoon sou word teenoor mense wat korrup is
nie, almal sal ontslaan word. Hy het ook gesê dat
amptenare versoek is om vorendag te kom met inligting
aangaande korrupsie.
13.7 Hierna het die Eerste Respondent gesê dat Tweede
Applikant vervang moet word as ‘n lid van die
dissiplinêre kommittee van die Tweede Respondent.
26
13.8 Op hierdie stadium kon ek dit nie meer hou nie en het ek
my hand opgesteek op die gebruiklike manier om ‘n
spreekbeurt te kry. Daar was toe met handgebaar deur
Eerste Respondent duidelik aangedui dat ek nie sodanige
geleentheid sal kry nie. Ek het ook geen geleentheid
gekry om enigiets te sê nie en dieselfde geld vir die
Tweede Applikant.
13.9 Hierna het die Eerste Respondent bloot aangekondig dat
die volgende die besluit is :
1) Die Bedrogeenheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse
Polisiediens sal genader word om die
aangeleentheid van die betaling van die bedrag
van R500 000,00 aan die Landbougenoodskap te
ondersoek.
27
2) ‘n Siviele saak sou begin word om die bedrag
terug te vorder van die persone wat destyds
Raadslede was.
3) Die Ouditeur-generaal se kantoor moet versoek
word om die aangeleetheid weer te oudit, die
oudit gedoen te word deur die kantoor van die
Ouditeer-generaal self en nie deur agente nie.
4) Dat die kantoor van die Openbare Beskermer
betrek word.
5) Dat ek self en die Tweede Applikant ‘... should
recuse themselves from Council meetings and not
tamper (sic) or collaborate with officials’.”
13.10 Hierna het die vergadering verdaag. Die hele
vergadering het ongeveer een uur geduur.
28
29.7 Against the background of the fact that there was a reasonable suspicion that the
Respondents, having been directors of Miela Vereniging, were involved in the
misappropriation of the R500 000,00 presumably paid by the Bothaville Town
Council to the Bothaville Landbougenoodskap, it is respectfully submitted that
the desire on the part of the Council to take action against the Respondents was
perfectly reasonable.
29.8 Once again the attention of the Honourable Court is drawn to the fact that the
Respondents did not attempt to explain the involvement of the Miela
Vereniging in their replying affidavit. Consequently, the High Court should
have found that the suspicion against the Respondents was reasonable and that
consequently action against them was not actuated by malice.
29.9 Furthermore, from the exposition of what occurred during the meeting by the
Respondents in their founding papers, it clearly appears that everybody that
spoke during the meeting was genuinely concerned about the occurrence of
corruption and the misappropriation of public funds.
29
29.10 Furthermore, it appears from both the Applicants’ founding affidavit and the
answering affidavit that there was concern over the fact that the R500 000,00
was paid by the Bothaville Town Council at a time when the Local Council
was in the process of transition in terms of a new constitutional dispensation.
29.11 It was in the light of the suspicion against the Respondents that the decision was made
that “they should recuse themselves from Council meetings and not tamper or
collaborate with officials”.
29.12 For purposes of this application, the Applicants are prepared to accept that the
incorrect procedure was used in dealing with this matter, that the Respondents
did not have an adequate opportunity to place their views before the Council,
and that the Council did not have the power to exclude the Respondents from
Council meetings. Therefore, the Applicants are prepared to accept that the
High Court correctly set the decision aside on review.
29.13 However, there is no basis upon which the High Court could have made a finding that
the decision was motivated by malice and consequently the High Court erred 30
by granting costs against the Applicants on the attorney and own client scale
de bonis propriis.
29.14 A correct cost order would have been for the Court to order the Nala Local
Municipality to pay the costs of the application.
29.15 The Honourable Court is referred to the opening remarks by the learned Judge in the
judgment of the 10th of December 2001, where the Honourable Judge President
made the following remark :
“Applikante is Raadslede van Tweede Respondent. Hulle groot sonde
is blykbaar dat hulle gedurende 1995 Raadslede was van Tweede
Respondent se voorganger, te wete die Stadsraad van die Munisipaliteit
van Bothaville”.
29.16 There is no basis upon which the Honourable Judge President could have found that
the real motivating factor leading to the decisions having been taken was the
mere fact that the Respondents were members of the Bothaville Town Council
during 1995. It is clear that the Honourable Judge President, in making this 31
statement, with respect, politicised the matter on his own initiative, where no
basis for the views he adopted appeared from the papers. Whilst it is true that
the suspicions against the Respondents flowed from their conduct as members
of the Town Council during 1995, it was not the fact that they were members
that gave rise to the events described above, but the fact that they were
perceived to have been involved in the misappropriation of public funds.
29.17 On page 11 of the judgment the Honourable Judge President (from line 22 onwards)
made the following statement :
“Die notule van hierdie vergadering dui aan dat die Eerste Respondent
die vuur aan die brand gesteek het en die ander Raadslede, insluitende
die Burgermeester, op sleeptou geneem het deur hoogs
onverantwoordelike en polities gelaaide uitsprake te maak”.
29.18 It is respectfully submitted that the statement by the learned Judge President that I
made highly irresponsible and politically charged statements is not borne out
by the facts before to the Honourable Court. As indicated above, the
statements that I made was to the effect that corruption has to be rooted out. I 32
fail to understand how this can be either described as irresponsible or
politically charged. To the contrary, it can be said that my statement that
corruption should be rooted out was a statement by a conscientious public
official genuinely concerned about corruption in the public service.
29.19 The Honourable Court is also referred to the following portion of the judgment by the
learned Judge President, which is to be found on page 15 of the judgment from
line 24 onwards :
“Daardie besluite kon nie redelikerwyse geneem gewees het nie, en
veral die eerste besluit, het ‘n sterk ondertoon van rasisme en
kwaadwilligheid”.
29.20 It is respectfully submitted that the learned Judge President erred grossly by finding
that the first decision, i.e. the one taken on the 19th of April 2001, smacked of
racisism. There is absolutely no basis upon which the learned Judge President
could have made such a finding. Similarly, there is absolutely no evidence that
any of the decisions were taken with malice.
33
29.21 On that basis it is respectfully submitted that the court, with respect, erred grossly in
granting costs against the Applicants in their personal capacities.
30 THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S CASE IN RESPECT OF THE DECISION
TAKEN ON THE 24TH OF APRIL 2001
30.1 The First Respondents set out her case in support of the second prayer to her notice of
motion in respect of the decision taken on the 24th of April 2001 as follows:
“22 Tweede Respondent is as regsopvolger van sy regsvoorganger,
die Bothaville/Kgotsong Plaaslike Oorgangsraad, die bedrag
van R22 186,87 plus rente aan my verskuldig. Ondanks die feit
dat aanspreeklikheid hiervoor nooit betwis is of ontken word
nie, het ek nooit betaling daarvan ontvang nie. Op grond van
regsadvies het ek gevolglik dagvaarding teen Tweede
Respondent laat uitreik en ook vonnis by verstek by die Tweede
Respondent verkry. Voorspruitend hieruit het ek die skrywe
ontvang waarvan ek ‘n afdruk hierby aanheg as aanhangsel
“I”, die inhoud waarvan vir sigself spreek. 34
23 In antwoord hierop het ‘n volledige skrywe gerig gedateer 5
Maart 2001. ‘n Afskrif van laasgemelde skrywe tesame met die
aanhangsels daartoe, word hierby aangeheg as aanhangsel “J”.
Voortspruitend hieruit het die Eerste Respondent ‘n skriftelike
verslag voorberei, welke verslag op ‘n spesiale vergadering van
Tweede Respondent gehou op 13 Maart 2001, voor Tweede
Respondent gedien het. ‘n Afskrif van gemelde verslag word
hierby aangeheg gemerk aanhangsel “K”. Uit gemelde verslag
blyk dat die Eerste Respondent tot die oortuiging gekom het dat
daar wel gelde aan my verskuldig is en het hy die aanbeveling
gemaak dat ‘n kommittee aangestel word in terme van reël
100(c) van die standaard reëls. My reaksie, vervat in
aanhangsel “J” hiertoe, was nie aangeheg by aanhangsel “K”
nie en het nie deel gevorm van die stukke voor die Raad by die
vergadering van 13 Maart 2001 nie. Ek het egter die gemelde
skrywe volledig deurgelees by die vergadering, daarna het
Tweede Respondent besluit dat ‘n kommittee soos deur die
Eerste Respondent voorgestel, aangestel moet word om die 35
aangeleentheid te ondersoek. ‘n Uittreksel uit die notule van
gemelde vergadering word hierby aangeheg as aanhangsel “L”.
24 Daar het ‘n sitting van hierdie ondersoekkommittee plaasgevind
op 2 April 2001. Ek het daardie sitting bygewoon en weer die
skriftelike stuk, aanhangsel “J” hiertoe, ingedien en mondelings
toegelig. Daarna, op 11 April 2001 het ek ‘n skrywe gedateer 9
April 20001 ontvang, waarby aangeheg was ‘n verslag van die
ondersoekkommittee. Ek heg gemelde brief en verslag hierby
aan as aanhangsel “N”. Per skrywe gedateer 17 April 2001, ‘n
afskrif waarvan hierby aangeheg word as aanhangsel “N”, het
ek op gemelde dokumente gereageer. Soos blyk uit aanhangsel
“M”, is hierdie aangeleentheid geplaas op die agenda vir die
vergadering vir die Tweede Respondent se maandvergadering
op 24 April 2001.
25 As direkte gevolg van die voormelde besluit van Tweede
Respondent van 19 April 2001, kon ek nie en het ek nie die
vergadering van 24 April 2001 bygewoon nie. Ek het gevolglik 36
nie die geleentheid gekry om my saak op enige van die tersake
aspekte, te stel nie.
26 Per brief gedateer 25 April 2001, is ek in kennis gestel dat die
Tweede Respondent op 24 April 2001 besluit het dat ek
ingevolge reël 102/11/a van die staande reëls, met onmiddelike
effek geskors is vir ‘n tydperk van twaalf (12) maande sonder
enige vergoeding. ‘n Afskrif van gemelde kennisgewing word
hierby aangeheg as aanhangsel “O”.
27 Ek voer weereens met eerbied aan dat die bogemelde besluit
tersyde gestel moet word vir enigeen van die ondergemelde
redes :
27.1 Die Tweede Respondent en sy Raad het nie die
bevoegdheid om my as Raadslid te skors nie. Daardie
bevoegdheid berus slegs by die LUR vir Plaaslike
Bestuur van die Provinsie Vrystaat en hy kan daardie 37
bevoegdheid slegs uitoefen nadat die proses deurgevoer
is soos uiteengesit in Hoofstuk 8 van die staande reëls.
27.2 Artikel 103 van die staande reëls bepaal uitdruklik dat
die bepalings van Artikel 100 van die reëls van
toepassing is by die oorweging deur ‘n Raad van ‘n
verslag deur so ‘n ondersoekkommittee. Dit word
duidelik deur gemelde Artikel 100 bepaal dat die
betrokke Raadslid die geleentheid moet kry om te
antwoord op al die beweringe en bevindinge aangesien
die Raadslid daar die reg het, asook die reg het om
dokumente te bestudeer, dokumente in te handig en
getuies te roep. Soos hierbo volledig verduidelik, het ek
geen geleentheid gehad om gemelde reg uit te oefen, of
om in terme van die reëls van natuurlik en geregtigheid
my saak te stel nie.
27.3 Verder word met eerbied aan die hand gedoen dat
hierdie besluit ook nie rasioneel verbonde is aan of 38
redelikerwys regverdig waar is in lig van die
aanbeveling van die ondersoekkommittee nie.
30.2 The Applicants persist with their contention, as contained in their answering affidavit
before the High Court that the decision that was taken on the 24th of April
2001, i.e. that the First Respondent “be suspended” was not intended to be a
suspension per se, but in fact a decision in terms of which the Council was to
apply to the MEC to suspend the First Respondent. It is respectfully submitted
that this intention appears clearly from the reference to Rule 102(11)(a) of the
standing rules and orders, which reads as follows :
“If the investigating committee recommends that -
(a) the Council must apply to the MECs to suspend the
Councillor concerned for a period, it must make a
recommendation as to the period of suspension”
39
30.3 However, I am prepared to accept that the resolution did not reflect the intention of
the Council correctly in that the impression may have been created that the
First Respondent was summarily suspended.
30.3 Furthermore, the Applicants are prepared to accept for purposes of this
application that the correct procedure was not used in adopting this resolution,
and that the High Court correctly set this decision aside on review.
30.4 However, with regard to the question of costs having been granted de bonis propriis
against the Applicants, I draw the attention of the Honourable Court to the
following :
30.4.1 The Respondents did not make any allegation in their papers that the decision of the
24th of April 2001 was motivated by malice;
30.4.2 The High Court found (page 12 line 10 onwards) that the decision was taken in the
absence of the First Respondent and that she was not given an
opportunity to put her side of the matter before the Council.
Although this is a correct finding, the High Court failed to deal 40
with the fact that on the Second Respondent’s own version she
was given a full opportunity to put her case before the
investigating committee that was appointed earlier. The fact
that the First Respondent was given such an opportunity, shows
that there was in fact no malice on the part of any of the
Applicants. The fact that the First Respondent did not attend the
meeting on 24 April 2001, was the unfortunate result of the
decision that was taken on the 19th of April and the fact that she
did not state her case during the meeting of the 24th of April
2001 was not as a result of any malice on the part of any of the
Applicants.
30.4.3 The High Court did not make any finding to the effect that the second decision was
actuated by malice.
30.5 It is also respectfully submitted that the High Court could not make any finding that
there was malice on the part of the Applicants on the facts before the Court.
41
31 THE INCONSISTENT APPROACH BY THE HIGH COURT IN NOT
GRANTING A COSTS ORDER AGAINST COUNCILLOR ROSS
31.1 The Honourable Court is referred to the judgment of the High Court dated the 31st of
January 2002 on the question of costs.
31.2 I must point out that costs should be granted de bonis propriis against the Applicants
was raised mero motu by the High Court.
31.3 As a result of this view adopted and the rule nisi issued, Councillor David Christie
Ross, a Democratic Alliance councillor delivered an affidavit, which is
annexed hereto as annexure “NGS10". In paragraph 5 of his affidavit he stated
the following :
42
“Op 19 April 2001 se Raadsvergadering het ek as DA-Raadslid
kennisgeneem van Tweede Respondent se besluit op tot tyd en wyl ‘n
ondersoek na spesifiek die Mila aangeleentheid geloods en uitsluitsel
verkry is, Eerste Applikant uit te sluit van sekere bedrywighede en
werksaamhede van Tweede Respondent en sy Raad. Ek het in die
belang van deursigtigheid geen beswaar teen hierdie inisiatiewe en
ondersoek geopper nie, aangesien ek geglo het in die onskuld van
Eerste en Tweede Applikante”.
(my emphasis)
31.4 From the Respondents’ founding affidavit it appears that the decision of the 19th of
April 2001 was simply adopted without the matter having been put to a formal
vote, and that Councillor Ross was a party to such unanimous assent.
However, in the judgment of the 31st of January 2002, the High Court refrained
from issuing a costs order against Councillor Ross, simply on the basis that
Counsel for the Respondents did not request a costs order against Mr Ross.
31.5 In view of the fact that the question of costs was raised mero motu by the Court, I fail
to understand how the fact that Counsel for the Respondents did not request a 43
costs order against Councillor Ross could have played any part in the Court’s
decision. On Councillor Ross’ own version, he had not objected to the action
against the Respondents for the sake of transparency.
31.6 On the facts before the Court, and if the Court was true to its own reasoning, a costs
order should also have been granted against Councillor Ross.
32 THE JUDGES DESCENDING INTO THE ARENA AND POLITICISING THE
MATTER MERO MOTU
32.1 It is respectfully submitted that the Judges in the present matter descended into the
arena and unjustifiably politicised the matter mero motu.
32.2 As indicated above, the Respondents did not make any allegation that any of the
decisions were motivated by politics or by malice.
32.3 However, as indicated above, the learned Judge President, with respect, politicised the
matter mero motu by unjustifiably stating that in his opening remarks that the
Respondents’ “groot sonde” was apparently that they were members of the 44
Bothaville Town Council during 1995. The reference to the Respondents’
“groot sonde” is a sarcastic and ironical statement which conveyed the idea
that the Respondents were victimised as a result of their membership of the
previous (pre-transformation) Town Council. As stated above, no evidence of
such victimisation or accompanying malice is on record or exists.
32.4 Furthermore, the Honourable Judge President, with respect came to the conclusion
that the decision of the 19th of April 2001 was the result of “irresponsible and
highly politically charged statements” and racism. Once again there was no
factual basis for any of these remarks made by the learned Judge.
32.5 It is for this reason that I state that the Honourable Judge President, with respect mero
motu politicised the matter and turned it into a matter where racial
considerations were alleged to be the motivating factor, where no evidence
existed in support of such a finding.
32.6 The Honourable Judge President therefore, with respect, allowed his own judgment to
be clouded by what can only be his own view of the matter.
45
32.7 It is respectfully submitted that the Court therefore erred in its finding of malice and
erred in granting a costs order against the Applicants de bonis propriis.
32.8 Furthermore, the Court also erred in granting costs on the attorney and own client
scale where no grounds for granting such costs order existed.
33 FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE HIGH COURT’S
ERRONEOUS APPROACH TO COSTS DE BONIS PROPRIIS
33.1 In the judgment dated 31 January 2002 (on page 2, line 15) the learned Judge
President stated the following:
“As die betrokke raadslede die kostebevel aan hulle eie sakke voel, sal dit hulle
moontlik aanspoor om in die toekoms hulle besluite beter te oorweeg in belang
van die gemeenskap wat hulle verteenwoordig.”
33.2 Taking into account that the High Court’s, with respect, erroneous finding of malice
and racism was predominantly in respect the decision of the 19th of April 2002, I 46
submit that the evidence before the High Court indeed indicated that the Applicants,
and indeed also Councillor Ross, acted in the public interest.
33.3 Apart from the fact that the above statement has a wrong factual premise, it is also
flawed in law. The above statement contains the express aim of teaching the council
members a lesson. The purpose of the costs order is to force the council members to
consider their decisions more carefully. As such, the statement conveys that members
of a local council generally run the risk of being penalised with costs for wrong
decisions. In this regard the High Court has watered down the test for awarding costs
de bonis propriis against public officials considerably.
33.4 The test applied by the High Court has serious constitutional implications in that, in
accordance with the High Court’s approach, public officials are exposed to an
unnecessary high risk of personal liability.
33.5 It is submitted that the erroneous approach by the High Court will have a stifling
effect on the public administration.
47
33.6 It is submitted that on appeal the erroneous approach of the High Court should be
corrected.
34 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
34.1 It is respectfully submitted that there is a reasonable prospect that another court will
come to a different conclusion on the matter of costs.
34.2 For this reason, it is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court of Appeal erred
by refusing leave to appeal in respect of such costs order.
34.3 It is also respectfully submitted that if leave to appeal is granted, there is more than a
reasonable prospect that the appeal will succeed.
34.4 I therefore respectfully request the Honourable Court to grant leave to appeal
against the decision refusing leave to appeal.
34.5 RELIEF SOUGHT
48
Therefore, I respectfully request the Honourable Court to grant the relief set out in the
notice of motion.
______
DEPONENT
I CERTIFY that the deponent has acknowledged that he/she knows and understands the contents of this affidavit which was signed and sworn to, before me, at JOHANNESBURG on this the 23rd day of July 2002, the Regulations contained in Government Notice
No.R.1258 dated 21 July 1972 (as amended) and Government Notice No.R.1648 dated 19
August 1977 (as amended) having been complied with.
______
COMMISSIONER OF OATHS