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Creationism and Evolution Acknowledgments We acknowledge the Wurundjeri people of the Kulin Nation – the traditional custodians of the land on which this Conference is held – and pay our respects to owners and Elders, both past and present. Conference organizing committee Dr. Norva Y. S. Lo (La Trobe) Dr. Luca Moretti (La Trobe) Dr Edoardo Zamuner (La Trobe) Dr. Sam Butchart (Monash) Dr. Laura Schroeter (Melbourne) Dr. Francois Schroeter (Melbourne) Editor: Dr. Sam Butchart, School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University. Cover Image: The image on the front cover is Jacob’s Ladder , by local Melbourne artist Lucy Lincoln. ([email protected]). You can see more of Lucy’s work here: http://www.thepicturebox.com.au. (Look under “Gallery”, then “Featured Artists – photo media”). DISCLAIMER While we have attempted to ensure accuracy in the contents of this booklet, the information is subject to change. Besides, most of it has been provided by or written up by philosophers. Accordingly, the University of Melbourne, La Trobe University and Monash University, and any other official body that might thought to be in any way associated with this publication will take no responsibility at all for any loss, damage, frustration or inconvenience resulting from believing anything included here. And that goes for the conference committee too. 1 TABLE of CONTENTS THE UNIVERSITIES ............................................................... 3 MAPS ..................................................................................... 4 THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE ..................................................................... 4 UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE CAMPUS ............................................................... 5 INVITED SPEAKERS ............................................................... 6 SYMPOSIA ........................................................................... 10 SYMPOSIUM ON FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY .................................................. 10 SYMPOSIUM ON SKILLED ACTION ..................................................................... 10 2009 GRADUATE CAREER WORKSHOP ........................................................... 11 ABSTRACTS ......................................................................... 12 AESTHETICS .................................................................................................. 12 APPLIED ETHICS ............................................................................................ 14 ASIAN AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY .......................................................... 19 ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY ....................................................................... 20 EPISTEMOLOGY ............................................................................................. 21 EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY ................................................................................ 24 EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY .......................................................................... 27 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................... 28 META -ETHICS ................................................................................................ 31 META -PHILOSOPHY ........................................................................................ 36 METAPHYSICS ................................................................................................ 37 NORMATIVE ETHICS ....................................................................................... 48 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE ........................................................................... 51 PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE .......................................................................... 55 PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS ..................................................... 56 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND .................................................................................... 60 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION .............................................................................. 67 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ............................................................................... 69 POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY ................................................................................. 75 SOCIAL EVENTS................................................................... 81 OPENING RECEPTION ..................................................................................... 81 CONFERENCE DINNER .................................................................................... 81 FAREWELL LUNCH .......................................................................................... 85 OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION ............................................ 87 2 THE UNIVERSITIES University of Melbourne The 2009 AAP Conference has been jointly organized by the three philosophy School of Philosophy, departments of Monash University, Anthropology and Social University of Melborune and La Trobe Inquiry University. Located centrally in La Trobe Univeristy cosmopolitan Carlton, the School of Department of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne is an old one, with a Communication, Arts wealth of history and achievements. Philosophy and Critical Inquiry was taught at the University from its foundation La Trobe University in 1853, and the Boyce Gibson Chair of opened its doors to Philosophy, founded in 1886, is, in fact, the oldest students in 1967, with Brian Ellis as its chair of philosophy in Australia. Two of its foundation professor of philosophy. Many current research strengths are in Applied Ethics (a of Australia's leading philosophers either major interest of Tony Coady, who succeeded studied at La Trobe or taught there for part Goddard in the Chair) and Philosophical Logic (a of their careers, including J. J. C. Smart, major interest of the present Chair, Graham John Bigelow, Robert Pargetter and Peter Priest). Singer. Frank Jackson took his Ph.D. at La Trobe, taught there for a while and has recently returned as research professor. The Monash University Australasian Journal of Philosophy was edited at La Trobe for many years. Under its School of Philosophy and present chair, Andrew Brennan, philosophy Bioethics at La Trobe is pluralist, with staff Deep in the South Eastern specializing in both analytic and continental suburbs of Melbourne, the philosophy. Monash philosophy department commands a view from the Dandenong ranges to Port Philip Bay from the ninth floor of the modernist Menzies Building. Monash was founded in 1961 and philosophy was there from the beginning. Hector Monro and Camo Jackson were foundation professors, followed by Peter Singer, Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow. Current research and teaching strengths at Monash are logic and metaphysics, applied ethics, bioethics, moral philosophy and the history of philosophy. 3 MAPS The University of Melbourne Parkville, Melbourne, Victoria, 3001. Enter from Grattan Street, Swanston Street or Royal Parade. Telehone: (+61 03) 8344 4000 After hours emergencies: (+61 03) 8344 6666 Ormond College Conference buildings located in this region. See next map. 4 University of Melbourne Campus Old Arts Building: 149 Zoology Building: 147 Economics and Commerce Babel Building: 139 Building: 148 Botany Building: 122 5 INVITED SPEAKERS (1993); "Practical Tortoise Raising," Mind (1995); Simon Blackburn "Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism," Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Mind (1998); "Is Objective Moral Justification Philosophy, University of Cambridge Possible on a Quasi-realist Foundation," Inquiry (1999); "Normativity a la Mode," Journal of Ethics Distinguished Research Professor in (2001); "Realism: Deconstructing the Debate," Ratio Philosophy, Department of Philosophy (2002); “Fiction and Conviction,” Philosophical Papers University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (2003); "Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability," Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledg e (2004); "Quasi- Reason and Representation Realism No Fictionalism" in Fictionalism in Abstract: We talk about reasons to signal Metaphysics , Calderon, ed. by Eli (2005); "Antirealist what is good about actual or potential Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in The Oxford movements of the mind. One standard of Handbook of Ethical Theory , ed. by Copp (2006); goodness is that the movement will either "Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in put us or keep is in touch with how the Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory , ed. by Dreier world is. But different standards are (2006); "The Semantics of Non-Factualism, Non- possible, and even the aim of keeping in Cognitivism, and Quasi-Realism" in The Blackwell touch with the way of the world has Guide to the Philosophy of Language , ed. by Devitt different elements, giving rise to different (2006). He enjoys “mountaineering (declining with demands and different standards. age), sailing (sprightly), black-and-white photography (becoming overtaken by digital), SIMON BLACKBURN (Honorary LLD, reading (constant), conversation (improving).” University of Sunderland; Ph.D., Cambridge) works in philosophy of mind, Ned Block philosophy of language, and philosophy of Silver Professor of Philosophy, Psychology, and psychology. He is the author of many books, Neuroscience, Departments of Philosophy and including, Spreading the Word (1984); Essay in Psychology, and Center for Neuroscience, New Quasi-Realism (1993); The Oxford Dictionary of York University Philosophy (1994); Ruling Passions (1998); Truth (Co-edited with Keith Simmons, 1999); The empirical case
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