[Communicated to the Council Qfficial N o . Q , 3 1 4 . M. 140. 1934. VII. and the Members of the League.] Geneva, August 16th, 1934.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

DISPUTE BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY

OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARAGUAYAN GOVERNMENT ON THE CHACO COMMISSION'S REPORT

Note by the Secretary- General : The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council and Members of the League the Paraguayan Government’s observations on the Chaco Commission’s report transmitted to him on July 9th by the Paraguayan delegate accredited to the League of Nations.

[Translation.] Paris, July 9th, 1934. Sir, On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to communicate to you the memorandum containing the Paraguayan Government’s observations on the Chaco Commission’s report, together with the atlas attached thereto. I shall be glad if you will kindly communicate the translation of this document to the Members of the Council and of the League. (Signed) R. V. Caballero d e B e d o y a , Delegate to the League of Nations, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Paraguay in France.

Observations of the Paraguayan Government on the Report of the Special Commission of the League of Nations.

The special Commission which the League Council decided, on May 20th, 1933, to send to the scene of hostilities to study the Chaco conflict, after working from November 3rd, 1933, the day on which it was constituted in the city of Montevideo, to March 12th, 1934, the day on which it announced in Buenos Aires its return to Geneva, adopted and signed, on May 9th, 1934, the text of the report which it submitted to the Council. The report1 consists of an “ Introduction ” and six chapters. The “ Introduction ” contains a general review of the Commission’s work. Chapter I deals with “ Geographical Facts concerning the Chaco Chapter II is entitled “ The Chaco Dispute ”, and contains a summary of previous diplomatic negotiations; Chapter III gives an account of “ The Commission’s Work for a Settlement of the Conflict”; Chapter IV concerns the “ Enquiry into the Responsibility for the W ar”; Chapter V gives a " Survey of the Military Situation ” ; and Chapter VI contains “ The Commission’s Conclusions”. The report actually consists of two parts : a summary of the numerous diplomatic documents >n existence concerning the Chaco conflict and an account of the efforts made by the Commission to restore peace between Paraguay and Bolivia. Both parts contain serious defects which make it absolutely impossible for the Paraguayan Government to accept the text of the report. The account of the history of the dispute is incomplete, and in many places obviously biased, predominant

1 Document C.154.M.64.1934.VII.

S.d.N. 1.280 (F.) 1.000 (A.) 9/34. Imp. Kundig. Series of League of Nations Publications VII. POLITICAL 1934. VII. 6. — 2 — importance being attached to the Bolivian standpoint. As regards the description of the Commission’s work, the one aim is to justify its draft treaty of February 22nd, 1934, and to explain its failure to hold an enquiry into the responsibility for the war, as it should have done in accordance with its terms of reference. In justifying their treaty and explaining their action, the Commissioners have openly displayed their hostility towards Paraguay. The Commission has attached more importance to the rejection of its peace proposals than to the outbreak of the war. Bolivia, who also rejected its formula, has been tacitly exempted from all responsibility and has incurred no reproach, the whole blame for the breakdown of the negotiations being placed on Paraguay, whom the Commission repeatedly accuses of intransigence. By taking this line and insisting that its formula is the only one capable of putting an end to the war, the Commission has done small service to the cause of peace. Paraguay, which, as a sovereign nation and a Member of the League of Nations, is entitled to respect and must not allow any slur to remain on her good name, wishes to enforce that right and to discharge that duty by explaining why she is obliged to protest against various assertions in the report of May 9th, 1934, and hence to reject it.

Although she is grieved at the unjust way in which her cause has been viewed, she will make the observations which the report calls for from an objective standpoint and with all proper respect for the high international institution to which it was submitted.

I. GEOGRAPHY OF THE CHACO.

The Commission has thought fit to mention the geographical facts which it regards as essential, and accordingly sets forth first the Paraguayan and then the Bolivian view. Neither account is altogether accurate. Opinions as to the extent of Paraguay’s rights have never varied. The maps and geographical texts referred to by the Commission have never had any official character, and the statements of M. Caballero de Bedoya were made simply for the Commission’s information. The maps which place Paraguay’s boundaries beyond parallel 160 30' merely do so in accordance with a tradition which is centuries old. The 17th and 18th century maps in the possession of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which will be found in the annex, will show the League Council how baseless are the Commission’s assertions regarding the antiquity of Paraguay’s claims to the northern part of the Chaco. During the colonial period, Paraguay’s possessions, authorised by titles from the Spanish Crown, extended beyond the Rio Negro or Bahia Negra, in which vicinity Governor Irala established Puerto de los Reyes in 1543. Those boundaries, which were left unsettled for a long period, reached as far as the Amazon region, as is proved by an enormous quantity of documentary evidence and maps. When the Treaty between Spain and Portugal was signed in 1777, the northern frontier of Paraguay was fixed at the River Jaurû, a name which then appeared for the first time in colonial political geography. From that time onwards, the frontier remained unchanged ; it was known to and respected by the Spanish rulers, and was maintained after the Declaration of Independence, as is proved by numerous documents signed by the Dictator of Paraguay, Dr. José Rodriguez de Francia. The western bank of the river, from the Rio Negro as far as the Jauni, having been occupied by the Portuguese, the Governments at Asuncion made several attempts to recover this bank prior to 1811, and the same claim was mentioned in Paraguay’s declaration of war on Brazil in 1864. In the dispute with Bolivia, Paraguay maintained these same rights, as is proved, among many other documents, by the note from Chancellor Cancio Flecha of January 8th, 1902, and the memorandum from the Paraguayan delegation to the Washington Conference regarding a pact of non-aggression, dated January 18th, 1932. The views of the Paraguayan nation as to its northern boundaries have not changed : the same views are held to-day as were held by Governor Lâzaro de Ribera in 1803 and by Dictator Francia during his rule, which lasted from 1814 to 1840.

Although the Commission admits that Bolivia’s tendency has been to reduce the boundaries of the Chaco as far as possible to the angle formed by the Rivers Paraguay and Pilcomayo, it appears to ignore the innumerable variants of the Bolivian official view, never definite, as to the frontiers of the territory claimed. To confine ourselves to a recent period, we would point out that, from 1928 to to-day, Bolivian diplomatic allegations have changed no fewer than six times. At the Buenos Aires conference held in that year, those frontiers were longitude 59° and latitude 22°; in 1931, they were the median line of the 1879, 1888, and 1894 Treaties ; at the 1932 Washington Conference, they were the Rio Verde; in the reply to the Mendoza proposals (February 1933), they were latitude 21° and longitude 590 55'; in the reply to Chancellor Mello Franco’s proposals (September 1933), they were the parallel running 25 km. south of Bahia Negra and longitude 61°. Finally, it appears that the Bolivian delegation proposed to the Commission a line different from any of the above.

The Commission endeavours to draw inferences unfavourable to Paraguay from the discre­ pancies it has found to exist between certain modern texts and maps of an unofficial character. On the other hand, it appears to attach no importance to the divergencies between the Bolivian official allegations as to the boundaries of the territory claimed, although the most superficial analysis would show that this uncertainty affords the best proof of the vagueness of the titles put forward. — 3 —

The Chaco is a geographical and historical unit. It has always had natural arcifinious boundaries. To attempt to delimit it by straight lines would be absurd and nonsensical. Admittedly, these natural boundaries are indefinite and confusion exists as to their limits. The exact determination of those frontiers which have, up to the present, remained uncertain, constitutes the essence of the dispute between Paraguay and Bolivia. The Chaco is not the “ green hell ” described by certain writers, thanks to the efforts made by P araguay. The possession exercised by Paraguay is not only de facto, but also de jure, being based on titles, an arbitral award, and recognition by neighbouring countries. As a result of this possession, large-scale development works have been undertaken which are the just pride of the Paraguayan nation, since they afford indisputable proof of its civilising abilities. The description in the Commission’s report of the zone exploited by Paraguay is incomplete and presents but a pallid reflection of the truth. It mentions only Villa Hayes, Puerto Emiliano, Puerto Cooper, Puerto Pinasco, Puerto Casado, Puerto Sastre, Puerto Guarany, Fuerte Olimpo, and Bahia Negra, leaving out Monte Lindo, Palma Chica, Puerto Mihanovich, Pedernal, Buena Vista, Puerto Celina, Puerto Colon, Puerto Comparada, Puerto Diana, Puerto Esperanza, Puerto General Diaz, Puerto Leda, Puerto Max, Puerto Maria, Puerto Victoria, and others of lesser importance. In the Commission’s eyes, the railways of Puerto Casado and Puerto Pinasco are the only ones in existence ; it has ignored the following railways, which are also in operation :

K ilom etres Puerto M ih a n o v ic h ...... 30 Puerto Sastre ...... 76 Palma C h ic a ...... 28 Puerto G a l i l e o ...... 15 Puerto G u a r a n y ...... 77

The Commission’s report does not lay sufficient stress on the importance of the Mennonite colonisation, which was one of the most considerable efforts at colonisation ever made in America. To the list of riparian possessions could be added that of the flourishing colonies in the central Chaco, chief of which are the following : Bergthal, Neualange, Waldheim Camabarai, Laubenheim Cambarai, Lindenau, Weindelfeld, Gnadenfeld, Bergfeld, Reinland, Osterwick, Chortitz, Schoenthal, Silberfeld, Fernheim, Filadelfia, and seventeen other villages. The Mennonite colonies possess elementary and secondary schools, industrial plants, newspapers, churches and hospitals, and, notwithstanding the war, are actively engaged in agriculture. The Paraguayan effort has not taken the form of executing foreign capitalists’ plans under the protection of the Paraguayan army. Industry, agriculture, and stock-breeding were begun long before military garrisons were established in the Chaco. The first plans for civilian colonisation date back to the colonial period. The Governments of Francia and the Lôpez did not neglect this aspect of national progress, and after the war of 1865-870, Paraguay was able to recover her lost wealth by utilising the immense resources of the Chaco. The existence of foreign capital does not detract from, but rather enhances, the value of Paraguayan action, because it is a proof of confidence and faith in the destiny of the nation. Nearly all the American peoples owe their greatness to foreign assistance. Important capitalists decided to invest their money in the Chaco, after they had ascertained that Paraguay’s titles to the territory were unassailable. The conflict with Bolivia is older than the present industries. Business men examined Paraguay’s titles before risking their capital. Paraguayan and foreign lawyers, after studying the antecedents of the dispute, expressed the opinion that Puerto Pinasco, Puerto Casado, Puerto Sastre, etc., could never be excluded from Paraguayan sovereignty. The territorial acquisitions were made in pursuance of laws which were given full publicity, and against which Bolivia, although she was cognisant of them, made no protest. The immense transformation effected in the Chaco represents the joint achievement of Paraguayan labour and foreign capital. Without Paraguayan labour, the Chaco to-day would be an inhospitable desert. The work of the estancias, factories, and workshops is not done by Indians; it is entrusted, not to slaves, but to free, self-respecting individuals. Before the war, 50,000 white Paraguayans were engaged in industry and stock-breeding in the western region. On the other hand, there is no trace of Bolivian civilisation in the whole of the vast territory of the Chaco. If the Commission had visited the Bolivian front, it would have seen for itself the absence of any attempt at civilisation. The Paraguayan army, which occupied this zone during its advance, found no trace of civilian occupation. The small groups of people living in the military posts disappeared with the troops, on whom they were dependent for their livelihood. The Argentine Government, when closing the frontiers, rightly stated in its note of June 7th, 1933, to which the Commission refers, that, in the part of the Chaco Boreal on the other side of the River Pilcomayo, there was no civilian population with whom trade could be carried on. If the Commission had visited those sectors of the Chaco which are occupied by Bolivia, it would have confirmed the accuracy of the statements made by Father Murillo, the Bolivian author whom it quotes, when he said that “ the ethnography of the Chaco is a dark page in Bolivian history ” and that the administrative plan of the Republic of Bolivia “ left to the caprice of the future two measures of great importance—the occupation of the territories inhabited by the savage tribes, and the encouragement of immigration for the colonisation of those territories — 4 —

Such a visit would have given the Commissioners an idea of the contrast between the civilising abilities of the two nations. They would have noticed the enormous difference between the flourishing zone owned by Paraguay and the districts usurped by Bolivia, which difference reflects the capacity for progress of the two countries. The inability of Bolivia to civilise the Chaco was long ago foreseen. The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Carlos Tejedor, gave it as his reason for refusing, in 1872, to grant Bolivia any ultimate share in the division of Paraguayan territory by the allies after the war of 1865-70. “ As regards the Chaco,” said the Argentine Chancellor, “ it was obvious that neither Bolivia nor the Argentine Republic had any clear and indisputable titles to it; that Villa Occidental was a Paraguayan township established with the knowledge and permission of the Bolivian Government ; that the Argentine Republic would agree to let Bolivia have it were it not for the fact that this Republic was obviously incapable of keeping her flag flying on the banks of the Paraguay ; that, as there was no hope of Bolivia’s being able to conquer the Chaco from the savages or to populate or colonise it, he could not agree, in the interests of civilisation and progress in South America, to recognise a right, the only result of which would be to perpetuate barbarism and a wilderness in the heart of South America, to the detriment of the prosperity and development of this part of the continent.” For Bolivia’s inability to civilise the Chaco there can be no remedy. The laws of geography cannot be evaded. For Bolivia, the Chaco is a distant country. It means nothing to her. The distances, the differences in climate and topography are obstacles that the people of the plateau will never be able to overcome. Bolivia excuses her military disasters by the remoteness of her bases. That is a confession. Twenty-five years of warlike preparation and two years of war have not enabled her to break down the walls that geography has erected between those two distinct and dissimilar regions. Geography is on the side of Paraguay, no less than the royal charters. The presence of Paraguay in the Chaco is necessary on grounds of humanity. Her absence would imply the return to barbarism of a territory which has been laboriously won for civilisation. Paraguayan sovereignty over the Chaco is essential, moreover, to her very existence. In the Chaco lie the greatest riches of Paraguay, her chief industries, more than half her railways, a quarter of the sources of her export trade, a third of her live-stock, and all of these constitute the bases of her existence as a free and sovereign nation. Apart from this, the territorial basis of her security calls for the removal of her adversary from the river-bank and its hinterland. These are vital conditions of her security and sovereignty.

II. THE HISTORY OF THE CHACO DISPUTE.

It will be noted that the account of the dispute given by the Commission makes no reference to the titles adduced by the parties concerning the substantive question. This omission contrasts strikingly with the importance that the same Commission attaches to the settlement of the dispute as a basis for the consolidation of peace. The chapter devoted to the account of the dispute merely gives the history of the diplomatic negotiations between Paraguay and Bolivia concerning the determination of the frontiers. This account is incomplete, and is compiled from documents of exclusively Bolivian origin. The one-sidedness of this information explains the fragmentary way in which the facts are recorded, and the inaccuracy of certain references. This is not the time to make a complete recon­ struction of the diplomatic history of the dispute. We nevertheless think it necessary to amplify or clarify some of the information embodied in the report, in order to rectify any misconceptions based on the incomplete account given in Chapter II. At the beginning of her independent existence, Bolivia did not include the Chaco amongst her component territories. This is proved by her Act of Independence, her first Constitution, her first official map, and her first law on electoral constituencies. Paraguay, on the other hand, on ratifying her emancipation in the year 1842, informed Bolivia of her firm decision to continue to exercise her jurisdiction over the Chaco. On June 17th, 1843, the Bolivian National Constituent Convention passed a decree recognising the independence and sovereignty of Paraguay throughout her territory, which included the Chaco, in accordance with the clear and frank declaration made by the Paraguayan Government and published in the Bolivian capital. At the same time, Brazil recognised Paraguay’s sovereign rights over the River Paraguay and, in the 1859 Protocol, declared that there was no dispute whatsoever concerning the dominion exercised by Paraguay in the Chaco. The Argentine Republic, for its part, when recognising the independence of Paraguay, stated in 1852 that " the River Paraguay shall belong, from bank to bank, in full sovereignty to the Republic of Paraguay, down to its confluence with the Paranâ ”, At the beginning of her independent existence, Paraguay’s dominion over the Chaco was recognised, as has been shown, by her three neighbours, including Bolivia. This recognition was soon followed by that of others—the United States (1853 and 1859), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (1855), France (1855 and 1862), Sardinia (1855), and Prussia (i860) all of whom negotiated with Paraguay as the exclusive sovereign over the River Paraguay and its tributaries, without any intervention or protest on the part of Bolivia.1

1 For the legal effect of these instruments, see the statement by the Paraguayan delegation. May 17th, 193 4 (document C./7gth Session/P.-V.3(i), page 13). Contemporaneously with these first efforts at international consolidation made by Paraguay after the long period of isolation to which she had been subjected by the dictator Francia (1814- 1840), Bolivia opened negotiations for the determination of her frontiers with neighbouring countries, m aking her frontiers with Brazil start from beyond Bahia Negra, and with the Argentine from the intersection of parallel 22° with the River Pilcomayo. At the same time, she concluded with Spain a treaty for the recognition of her independence, and in that treaty mentioned the constituent parts of her political structure, but did not include the Chaco. The Treaty of 1852 with the Argentine led to the Benavente protest, which gave expression for the first time to Bolivian pretensions to part of the Chaco and claimed the region situated to the north of parallel 220. It is not true to say that M. Benavente acted without instructions from the La Paz Government. The contrary is shown to be the case by the memorandum of 1855 from the Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which that protest is noted and approved. Although the protest was not directed against her, Paraguay made a public statement of her disagreement. The Empire of Brazil also considered that this sudden appearance of claims on the part of Bolivia was unjustified. The Decree of 1853, converted into law in 1855, whereby Bolivia declared various ports situated in the Chaco open to navigation, remained without effect, and was the subject in due course of a protest by the Paraguayan Government, in a note dated June 12th, 1854. The Para­ guayan protest was accepted by Bolivia, who did not press her claim, and some time later the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked leave of the Paraguayan Government for the first diplomatic mission sent to Asuncion to sail on the River Pilcomayo—on whose banks was one of the ports mentioned in the Belzü decree—on its journey to the Paraguayan capital (1857). Paraguay granted permission with a statement that, " as regards navigation on the rivers, the Government of the Republic . . . asks only that its rights be recognised and respected This first mission consisted of M. Aniceto Arce, who arrived in 1863 and, without protest, received from President Lopez a promise that every effort should be made with a view to the exploration and navigation of the Pilcomayo, and the construction of a railway across the Chaco should such navigation prove impracticable. Then came the war against the Triple Alliance, and the fact that the allies, in the Treaty of Alliance, assigned the Chaco to themselves in their division of the territories of Paraguay, reveals the view entertained by Brazil, the Argentine and Uruguay concerning the sovereignty that was then being exercised to the west of the river. Having embarked on a warlike undertaking, those countries naturally would not wish to create difficulties for themselves, and perhaps to make a further enemy, by making use of territories which they considered foreign to the country against which they were waging war. The reservations which they made later, in connection with the Treaty of Alliance, in favour of Bolivia’s claims, are for that very reason of no legal force and were merely the result of the circumstances of the time. They are very easily understood if it is remembered that Bolivia was threatening to side with Paraguay. The fact that, when the war was ended, the Argentine Republic accepted President Hayes’s award without availing herself of the rights deriving from the victory and the Treaty of Alliance, and without allowing Bolivia to intervene in the negotiations, shows that the victory won in the war was not sufficient to shake the profound conviction of the Argentine concerning the rights of Paraguay, which had been neither destroyed nor diminished by her defeat. The treaties of the 19th century were signed in a spirit of friendship and on the basis of concessions by Paraguay. The Soler-Pinilla Agreement of 1907 already recognises a de facto situation created by the first Bolivian military advances into territory which, until a year previously, had been publicly recognised as the undisputed and exclusive possession of Paraguay. Both the interpretations given to the status quo agreed upon in 1907 are equally unfavourable to Bolivia. This explains why, at the Buenos Aires Conferences, Bolivia definitely refused to submit to arbitration the serious situation created by the breach of the modus vivendi. If, as Paraguay desired, the status quo of 1907, the legal existence of which gave rise to no objections up to the time when war was declared, had been re-established in the territory, or if Bolivia had accepted the demilitarisation proposal put forward by the Argentine, the present conflict would not have occurred. Paraguay’s insistence that security clauses should be agreed upon prior to any negotiations, or that the status quo of 1907, which implied a genuine pact of non-aggression and demilitarisation, should be restored, has been amply justified by events. The Argentine Government’s suggestion of December 13th, 1927, which the Commission mentions conjointly with the Bolivian explanation, does not in any sense mean that Paraguay refused arbitration. In the minutes of May 18th, 1928, the Paraguayan delegation made the following statement on this particular point : “ that, though Point 1 of the Argentine suggestion states * that Paraguay should consent to immediate arbitration on the substantive question ’, this does not mean that Paraguay has at any time refused arbitration on any question . . . It merely means that Paraguay abandons her claim concerning the priority of the modus vivendi and agrees to consider the question of arbitration at the same time as the modus vivendi.” In quoting the Argentine suggestion with the Bolivian interpretation but without the Paraguayan statement, the Commission has acted in a biased manner. Paraguay could not win acceptance for her view as to the necessity for settling the modus vivendi in the Chaco. The incidents of 1928 were merely the consequence of the situation created by Bolivia’s violation of the status quo of 1907. The Washington Commission of Enquiry could not endorse Bolivia’s attitude, because, in accordance with the Protocol of January 3rd, 1929, it was concerned only with “ existing agreements ”. This condition, which Bolivia had imposed for the acceptance of mediation, made it impossible to enquire into the legal situation that had been violated, and resulted in the enquiry's being confined to the Vanguardia incident. — 6 —

It was on that occasion that Bolivia repudiated her own signature to the Gondra Convention,1 and that the Montevideo Permanent Committee gave her the following prophetic reminder: “ The strong one of to-day may be the weak one of to-morrow, and it is in the interest of all to have timely resort to legal means the use of which may prevent tremendous and irreparable damage On the same occasion, the Chilian Government informed Bolivia that it viewed with the greatest concern her “ bellicose attitude This bellicose attitude subsequently became more and more pronounced. Though, in 1928, Bolivia was unable to make war, for the reasons which the ex-Chancellor Elijo has stated, she was able to do so in 1932, while the Conference for the consideration of a non-aggression pact was in session at Washington. At that Conference, the Commission of Neutrals proposed a non-aggression pact for the consideration of the parties. The study of this pact was interrupted by the Pitiantuta incident. Bolivia replied to the peaceful proposal of the Washington Commission by starting hostilities. The Pitiantuta aggression, which was admitted by President Salamanca himself in his message to Congress on August 6th, 1933, might have been submitted to a procedure of investigation. Paraguay accepted this, but Bolivia refused. Similarly, Bolivia rejected all the proposals for pacification that were submitted at that time by the Commission of Neutrals, just as she angrily protested against the historic Pan-American Declaration of August 3rd. Upon her also falls the sole responsibility for the breakdown of the two efforts at mediation made by the Argentine, Brazil, Chile and Peru, which might have prevented war while there was yet time. The Commission’s report does not give the note of April 22nd, 1933, in which the Chilian Foreign Office drew the Bolivian Government’s attention to the “ direct responsibility ” it was assuming for the breakdown of the Mendoza mediation, or the note of the same date from the Argentine Government, which concluded with the same statement addressed to Bolivia. Nor is there any reference in the report sufficiently illustrative of the contents of the notes of May 8th, by which those same Foreign Offices brought their efforts to an end, and which constitute an open condemnation of Bolivia’s stubbornness. In the consideration given to the documentation produced in the second mediation of the Argentine, Brazil, Chile and Peru, under the direction of Brazil, the report does not make it clear that the only formal and official proposal was that of August 25th, and the Commission regards as an acceptance the Bolivian reply to the personal suggestion of Chancellor Mello Franco, whereas a perusal of the memorandum of September 5th shows that the Bolivian Government was far from accepting the Brazilian Chancellor’s formula. The Commission’s report passes over the communication of the formula of August 25th—the only one which was accepted by the four mediating countries—and makes no reference at all to the telegram of September 27th, in which M. Mello Franco stated that “ only a definite decision by Bolivia such as would help to restore confidence in the success of mediation could provide a way out of the situation at which we are arriving in our efforts at mediatory action. No conditional acceptance of the proposal of August 25th in which the Bolivian Government made any reservations or restrictions concerning the three main bases can now prevent the breakdown of mediation ”.2 The Commission’s version of the development of the dispute up to the time when it was placed in its hands is therefore, as has been shown, incomplete from every point of view.

III. THE COMMISSION’S TERMS OF REFERENCE.

(a) M ethod by which the Negotiations w ere to be conducted.

By the report of May 20th, the Commission was instructed, in the first place, to negotiate an arrangement for the cessation of hostilities and, secondly, to prepare an arbitration agreement. The Bolivian thesis that the negotiations regarding arbitration should have priority was rejected, the Council accepting the method suggested by Paraguay, which was the only one in conformity with the letter and spirit of the League Covenant.

1 Let us briefly recall what occurred on this occasion. Paraguay asked that the Commission of Enquiry provided for in the Gondra Convention (December 7th, 1928) should be convened, and for this purpose applied to the Permanent Committee of Diplomats which had been set up at Montevideo in accordance with that Convention. Bolivia refused to send a representative, on this, among other grounds, that the Bolivian Government had never ratified its accession to the Gondra Convention, though this certainly was not at all necessary, as is shown below. In point of fact, with reference to “ the procedure of accession subject to ratification ”, which Bolivia claimed to introduce into international practice, the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations, at its eighth session, had previously (September 23rd, 1927) resolved as follows, on a report by M. Motta: “ If a State gives its accession, it should know that, if it does not expressly mention that this accession is subject to ratification, it shall be deemed to have undertaken a final obligation. I f it desires to prevent this consequence, it must expressly declare at the time o f accession that the accession is given subject to ratification. It should further be remarked that, in her note of accession to the Gondra Convention, addressed to the Chilian Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 31st, 1928— i.e., subsequently to the above-mentioned resolution of the eighth s e s s io n of the Assembly of the League of Nations,—Bolivia did not expressly state that her accession was given subject to ratification. Moreover, it was generally believed in America that Bolivia was a signatory of the Gondra Convention. Indeed, Brazil, acting on that belief, recognised Bolivia by special decree as a co-signatory of that Convention, of which Brazil was also a signatory, after taking note of her accession. 2 See also the note dated February 6th, 1930, from the Paraguayan delegation to the League of Nations (document C.94.1934.VII). — 7 —

This is apparent from the text of the report of May 20th, which states that the procedure for the establishment of peace connoted :

" 1. The cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal by Paraguay of the declaration of a state of war with Bolivia ; “ 2. The establishment of an arbitration agreement.”

This same report stated that the Council’s first task would be to negotiate, if desirable, any arrangement calculated to promote the execution of the obligation to cease hostilities. In case the wording of the report is not thought to be sufficiently clear, we may refer to the statements made by various delegates who spoke at the Council meeting at which the report was approved. The President of the Council, Count Piola-Caselli, remarked on that occasion : " A procedure is proposed with the objects, first, of implementing the cessation of hostilities if accepted by the two parties, and, secondly, of establishing, by means of an arbitration agreement,tthe bases of the conciliation procedure.” Mr. Lester, Chairman of the Committee of Three, observed : “ I think it is quite clear that the first duty of the Council in this case is to endeavour to stop the fighting and, secondly, to find a pacific means of settling the dispute”. According to the letter and spirit of the report of May 20th, the first thing to be done was to endeavour to bring about the cessation of hostilities, and then to consider the substance of the question. The report of May 20th was not annulled by any subsequent decision. Nor was it set aside by the report of July 3rd, which was inspired by the desire to overcome Bolivian opposition. It was laid down in this latter report that “ the only practical solution would be for the Commission to discharge its functions, taken as a whole, as best it could, having regard to the situation it found on its arrival, with a view to bringing about a speedy and permanent settlement of the dispute”. In the Council’s opinion, this was “ entirely consistent with the terms of the report of May 20th”. It was merely provided that the Commission should be free to act—in the spirit of the report of May 20th—as best it could and that the parties should have the right freely to maintain their views. The Chairman of the Committee of Three stated that “ the acceptance by the Bolivian Government of the despatch of the Commission as provided in the report submitted to the Council on May 20th last does not imply that that Government abandons its standpoint”. This cannot be taken to mean that the Committee of Three or the Council accepted the Bolivian standpoint; all the Chairman says is that Bolivia is not deprived of the right of setting forth her allegations. The report of July 3rd, in laying down new guiding principles, did so entirely in accordance with the terms of the above-mentioned report. Neither the text nor the antecedents of that report afford any evidence that the Council had adopted the view—rejected on May 20th—that the negotiations should be simultaneous. The only reference to this contention is the mention of a purely unilateral declaration on the part of Bolivia. The Commission was to discharge its functions “ as best it could, having regard to the situation it found on its arrival The Commission itself states in its report that its terms of reference “ were laid down in the report of May 20th and amplified by the report of July 3rd”. It was agreed that negotiations should be instituted at Geneva while the Commission was proceeding to the scene of hostilities, but those were the only simultaneous procedures expressly agreed to. This view was consistently maintained by Paraguay, as was expressly mentioned by her delegate to the Council when he accepted the report of July 3rd. " It is understood, however," Dr. Caballero de Bedoya observed, “ that these negotiations will be essentially provisional in character and cannot in any event be regarded as an admission in advance that the arbitration agreement must be framed before the cessation of hostilities or, again, as an acceptance of the view that the two procedures should be simultaneous." This statement was not disputed by any Member of the Council, and the Commission itself points out that, after the adoption of the last-mentioned report, “ the Paraguayan Government stated on several occasions that it had not abandoned its view that the final cessation of hostilities should have priority over the negotiations on the establishment of an arbitration agreement”. The situation created by the report of July 3rd was as follows :

1. The Council maintained its approval of the stipulations laid down in the report of May 20th, which provided that the cessation of hostilities should precede the arbitration agreement. 2. The Commission of Enquiry was authorised to act as best it could with a view to bringing about a settlement of the dispute. 3. The two countries were free to maintain their views, both on the substantive question and on the method by which the negotiations were to be conducted.

Although the previous cessation of hostilities was not expressly stipulated, that was the intention of the document, as is proved by the statement made by M. Massigli, the delegate of France, when approving the report of July 3rd : “ I will not conceal from you ”, he said, that my Government would have been better satisfied had it been possible to lay before the Council proposals in which it was explicitly stated that the cessation of hostilities is an indispensable preliminary any procedure of pacific settlement. As a general rule, it is obviously that principle one that the Council has asserted on many occasions-—which must prevail.” Further evidence is afforded by the declaration of Mr. Lester, Chairman of the Chaco Committee, who, on the same occasion, pointed out that “ the Committee of Three has been constantly occupied with the necessity for obtaining a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible moment. We have been conscious that, while these long discussions have been going on, there has been loss of life daily in the Chaco in this conflict between two Members of the League of Nations. It seemed to us that the way to obtain a cessation of hostilities in these circumstances was at the earliest possible moment to get a Commission on the spot.” This was also the view expressed by the Paraguayan delegate to the League, who, on various occasions, shortly after the approval of the report of July 3rd, stated that, in his Government’s opinion, the chief thing was to endeavour to bring about the cessation of hostilities. On July 6th, Dr. Caballero de Bedoya informed the Council that, “ at the present time, it can therefore only be hoped that the Commission will start as soon as possible for the Chaco and will immediately proceed to bring about the cessation of hostilities, a measure which must precede the negotiations for the establishment of an arbitration agreement”. He expressed the same view on July 10th : “ The cessation of hostilities, accompanied by the safeguards that we have specified elsewhere, is an indispensable prelude to any procedure of pacific settlement. The Council cannot but affirm once again the fundamental principle of the preliminary cessation of hostilities, a principle which it has frequently asserted in other circumstances.” On July 12th, he stated that “ Paraguay considers that no useful conversations can take place without the cessation of hostilities, accompanied by measures of security”. None of these statements was disputed. The Chaco Committee shared the view expressed by the Paraguayan delegate, as can be seen from the following episode. Paraguay had stated that it would be useless to continue the Geneva conversations while a new offensive was being launched by Bolivia, as was then the case. M. Castillo Najera, asking the Bolivian delegation on July 6th for information as to this offensive, pointed out that, “ if fresh operations take place in the Chaco, the atmosphere in which the conversations have been conducted might be profoundly changed”. He reminded that delegation that, in the report of July 3rd, it was stated that “ the Committee was encouraged to prosecute its efforts by the assurances it received from the representatives of the two Governments, both of which are anxious for a cessation of hostilities and a final settlement of the conflict, ” and in conclusion he pointed out to the Bolivian delegation that “ it would obviously be difficult to urge either of the parties to continue conversations at Geneva regarding the establishment of an agreement if the party in question thought that such conversations had become impossible on account of the fresh outbreak of military operations”. On July 14th, the Chairman of the Committee cabled to the Paraguayan Government in the following terms : " Committee is convinced that speediest possible cessation of hostilities is essential. With this very object Council adopted with assent of both parties plan of which essential feature is immediate despatch Commission”. On the same date, the Chairman of the Committee wrote as follows to the Bolivian delegation : “ We need not remind you of the importance that the Council attaches to the speediest possible cessation of hostilities. It was with that very object that it adopted, with the assent of the two parties, a plan of which the essential feature is the immediate despatch of a Commission to the spot”. The cable to the Paraguayan chancellor and the note to the Bolivian delegation suggested that the necessary steps should be taken to ensure that both armies refrained from any but purely defensive measures. As the Bolivian delegation stated in its reply, the Committee was asking for what really amounted to a " tacit suspension of hostilities ”. All this would be unintelligible if the report of July 3rd had actually departed from the m ethod laid down in the report of May 20th and had stipulated that the procedures should be simultaneous. Let us now examine the Commission’s attitude towards this essential aspect of the problem. A t no tim e did the Commission endeavour to put a stop to the fighting prior to any negotiations. It considered that hostilities could continue while it was pursuing its labours and, during its stay at Montevideo and Asuncion, it made no proposal for an armistice or the cessation of hostilities. In this connection, its only useful action was to secure an extension of the truce granted by Paraguay after her December victory. It made its first proposal—that the matter should be submitted to arbitration, no mention being made of measures of security—from La Paz on December 14th. The Commission allowed itself to be influenced by Bolivia’s decision, which it believed to be unshakable, not to consent to the cessation of hostilities until the bases of the substantive agreem ent had been fixed. As a matter of fact, Bolivia’s attitude was by no means definite and did not represent a firm conviction. While, from the very first day of the conflict, Paraguay maintained that it was absolutely essential for hostilities to cease before the substance of the dispute was examined, Bolivia’s attitude towards the method of the negotiations was not the same at first as it was later, when it made such an impression on the Commission. Indeed, on August 4th, 1932, Dr. Julio A. Gutierrez, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had informed the Commission of Neutrals that : “ We realise that, in order to discuss a final settlement, it is necessary to prevent further acts of hostility. Consequently, in the interests of peace, we are prepared to agree to a suspension of hostilities which may make it possible to consider the substance of the Chaco question.” Since, in the course of its lengthy report, the Commission takes pleasure in repeatedly reminding Paraguay of views expressed on former occasions, it might have reminded Bolivia, in the interests of the restoration of peace, of the opinion expressed by her spokesman in August 1932, which coincides with the reasons given by the League Council for its approval of the reports of May 20th and July 3rd, 1933- — 9 —

But the Commission did not do so; indeed, it openly accepted the Bolivian thesis in its extreme form, even ignoring the principle of simultaneous procedures which Bolivia had accepted. The draft treaty of February 22nd concedes much more to Bolivia than she had stated in the report of July 3rd that she would accept. Simultaneous procedures are practically eliminated, and the signature of the arbitration agreement is given priority over the cessation of hostilities. According to the Commission’s plan, the cessation of the fighting and the execution of the measures of security are subject to ratification in accordance with the laws of both countries. It is provided that hostilities shall cease only 24 hours after the entry into force of the treaty. As, however, the coming into operation of the latter would depend on ratification, the war would go on during the whole of the period—the length of which cannot be foreseen—that would elapse between the signature of the treaty and its sanctioning by the Parliaments. We are entitled to assert that, in taking this view of the question of the cessation of hostilities and including the above-mentioned article in its draft, the Commission has departed from the spirit and the letter of its mandate.1

(6) E n q u i r y i n t o t h e Q u e s t i o n o f R esponsibility .

The report of May 20th provided that " the Commission will be at the Council’s disposal and will keep it informed of the course of its activities. The Commission, at the Council’s request, will proceed to make an enquiry on all the circumstances of the dispute, including the part which the two parties have taken therein, and will report to the Council to enable this latter to fulfil the duties imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations ”. When the report was discussed in the Council, the Paraguayan delegate proposed that the article in question should be drawn up as follows : “ The Commission, which will be at the Council’s disposal, will keep it informed of the course of its activities, will proceed to make an enquiry on all the circumstances of the dispute, including the part which the two parties have taken therein, and mil report to the Council to enable the latter to fulfil the duties imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations ”. The object of this Paraguayan amendment was to make the enquiry into the question of the responsibility for the war compulsory instead of optional. But M. Salvador de Madariaga, delegate of Spain and a member of the Committee of Three, expressed the following opinion : “ As regards the Paraguayan representative’s amendment of form, it does not seem to me to be an important one. If, as we believe, you are going to reach an agreement on arbitration, it will be more prudent and wiser not to seek the author of aggression. It is only expedient to do so in cases which cannot be settled otherwise. If you are in agreement on arbitration, why seek who is responsible ? If we cannot achieve the cessation of hostilities, it will then be necessary to determine the aggressor. This will raise the question of the application of the Covenant, and you will be able to invoke all the articles you like, including Article 16. ” Mr. Lester, in turn, said : “ If the effort to solve the dispute by pacific means fails, it will then remain to establish which party is the aggressor ’’. The President of the Council, Count Piola-Caselli, observed : “ The question of the application of Article 16 can be held over, because it provides for sanctions, and that assumes that the responsibility has been determined, whereas we have strong hopes of being able to achieve conciliation ”, In view of M. de Madariaga’s explanations, the Paraguayan delegate did not press his amendment. The report of July 3rd stated, with regard to investigations, that “ the Commission would also, no doubt, have to take into consideration the situation it discovered on its arrival when judging of the expediency of an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute, including the action of the two contending parties—the Council having reserved the right, in the report of May 20th, to require it to make such an enquiry. Both parties have stated that they regard the enquiry as desirable. It would be the duty of the Commission, which has to keep the Council informed of its progress, to subm it its view s on this point as soon as it thinks it possible to do so ”. The opinion which, in accordance with the report of May 20th, confirmed by that of July 3rd, the Chaco Commission was to submit to the Council on this point was sent on March 10th, two days before it decided to conclude its labours. Without waiting for the Council’s decision the Commission sailed on March 15th. This opinion was a negative one. The Commission did not consider that such an enquiry was either necessary or expedient. The Commission has skilfully managed to shield Bolivia so that, after the war is over, she will not be stigmatised as the country that provoked it and failed in its design of conquest. The Commission’s draft aroused public indignation in Paraguay, especially on account of 'ts complete omission of the matter of investigation. Paraguay is a country which is anxious to °btain credit for the correctness of her procedure and the loyalty with which she has carried out the contractual obligations which bear her signature, and also the rules which, though not embodied ■n any treaty, are universally accepted in international law. As a signatory of the League Covenant and the Paris Pact, by which she accepted the obligation not to resort to war, Paraguay desires to prove to the whole world that she has fulfilled that sacred duty. For that reason she has consistently urged that an enquiry should be held into the origin of the conflict, and that the aggressor should be determined. Paraguay cannot agree to any compromise on this point. She is willing to settle outstanding questions with Bolivia, to renew diplomatic relations, and to establish a system of

1 See also the Paraguayan delegation’s statements of May 17th (document C./79th Session/P.V.3(i), page 3) and lIay 3ist, 1934 (document C./8oth Session (Extr.)/P.V.2(i), page 9). — IO --

co-operation, but she cannot allow the slightest shadow of suspicion to remain as to her conduct. She does not wish for the moral humiliation of her opponent or to lay claim to all the reparation to which she is entitled for the immense economic damage she has suffered through this war, but she does urge that an enquiry into her conduct should be made by the international organisations and that they should decide whether she has or has not been guilty of so great a crime. Paraguay is defending an ideal that is rooted in the conscience of all civilised countries. At the present day, it is not in the moral interests of the continent, or of the world as a whole, that a war should .be brought to an end without its being decided who is the transgressor of so many instruments which declare that any resort to force is illegal. The desire to term inate a conflict by legal means cannot justify the decision to ignore the causes of and the responsibility for that conflict. The fixing of responsibility might perhaps be waived by direct agreement between the parties ; but an institution like the League of Nations, whose fundamental principle is the repudiation of war and whose duty it is to respect treaties such as the Paris Pact, cannot allow the aggressor to be treated on the same footing as the party attacked. After attempts at conciliation had failed, it was clearly the League’s duty to carry out the enquiry; for otherwise the spirit and the letter of the Covenant could not be applied, since the object of the Covenant is to maintain the peace of the world through the fulfilment of international obligations and to punish those who have recourse to measures declared illegal. Paraguay from the very first demanded that the facts should be investigated and reiterated her demand whenever occasion arose. The Commission of Enquiry is inclined to establish a connection between Paraguay’s non-acceptance of its proposals of February 22nd and the act of preparing for and provoking the war. In its opinion, the responsibility for the continuance of the fighting at a given moment is almost graver than the responsibility for the actual outbreak of hostilities. The Commission implicitly imputes that responsibility to Paraguay, forgetting that Bolivia also rejected the February formula. Moreover, the Commission did not stop to consider that, if the rejection of its proposals was a serious matter, the rejection of the previous proposals, such as those of Mendoza and Rio de Janeiro, was no less serious. In order to determine the responsibility for the continuance of the war, it would first of all be necessary to ascertain how it originated—that is to say, at what moment that responsibility arose. The Commission may consider that Paraguay can be censured for rejecting its formula ; but Paraguay considers that the rejection of the Mendoza and Rio de Janeiro proposals, which might have put a stop to the war when there was yet time, involves a still greater responsibility. Nevertheless, the League of Nations, which was fully cognisant of both those efforts at mediation on the part of the neighbouring countries, made no statement as to the responsibility which might be incurred by the country whose attitude led to the breakdown of the negotiations in each case. This applies more especially to the formula of August 25th, because the League’s Commission was given a full account of the progress of these negotiations by the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Commission, to which the relevant documents had been communicated, did not think it necessary to ascertain which party was responsible for the repeated breakdown of negotiations. Neither from a legal nor from a moral standpoint can the act of provoking a war be compared with the act of refusing to put an end to it in certain circumstances. No country has the right to resort to war. War has been outlawed. International instruments condemn the aggressor—that is to say, the party responsible for a war, whether it had or had not any reason for provoking it. But there is not a single article in any treaty which censures a country for not accepting, during a war, a proposal for its settlement. It is the sovereign right of a country to accept or reject peace formulae submitted by foreign mediators. It has never occurred to any one that the responsibility for the war itself might derive from that attitude. There is not a single article in the Treaty of Versailles that censures the Allied Powers for refusing the numerous mediatory proposals made by neutrals. It is the right and duty of a country—especially if it has been attacked—to reject any proposals which do not secure it from further aggression or which infringe its rights and interests. To condemn it on this account, or to treat it on the same footing as the aggressor, is to establish a rule which may have very serious consequences. It would create a lamentable precedent for weak countries. Strong nations would be free to attack and crush weak countries, and would be exonerated from all responsibility, provided only that they accepted proposals for a settlement. Let us suppose that some powerful European country wishes to destroy Switzerland in order to further its military plans. Once it has attained its objective, it will be perfectly prepared to accept any proposal, however unfavourable, since by so doing it would be exonerated from all blame and responsibility for an act which, although reprehensible, affords it, in the hypothetical case we are considering, decisive military advantages; whereas, if that proposal were rejected by Switzerland, the latter would incur the sole responsibility for her own annihilation. Could there be any greater moral heresy, any more absurd legal doctrine ? The Commission asserts that Paraguay agreed with it that the enquiry was inexpedient. Nothing could be more untrue. W e have already seen that the Paraguayan delegation, when accepting the report of May 20th, proposed that the enquiry should be compulsory instead 01 optional. O n June 6th, the Paraguayan Government mentioned the following among other conditions for the establishment of peace: “ (4) A n enquiry by the League of Nations to determ ine which of the two countries has been the cause of the outbreak and continuance of the war, and to fix the responsibilities. The Government of Paraguay is anxious to give ample proof to its own people and other nations that it could not honourably avoid this war. ” O n June 16th, the delegate of Paraguay informed the Council that " Paraguay insists upon th e importance of an investigation, to be carried out by the League of Nations, in o rd er to determine the responsibility — II — for the dispute. ” On the arrival of the Special Commission at Montevideo, Dr. Venancio B. Galeano, the Paraguayan Government’s assessor, stated on November 6th that “ Paraguay also demands an investigation to determine the origin of and the responsibility for the war. Paraguay is a member of the international community and has signed the League Covenant and the Paris Pact. It is inconceivable that the crime of provoking this war should go unpunished. The international legal system would be seriously impaired if no sanction, even of a moral nature, were imposed on the parties who, in the heart of America, let loose the horrors of a ruthless war. The League of Nations, through its Commission of Enquiry, will merely be carrying out its statutory obligations if, as Paraguay hopes, it decides to investigate the origin of the dispute with a view to determining the responsibility and applying the appropriate sanctions.” Bolivia’s attitude towards the investigation into the origin of the war is not what the Commission believes it to be. Bolivia had already informed the Commission of Neutrals that she was “not interested in investigations”. On October 12th, the Bolivian delegate informed the Council that his country considered “ that, in the present circumstances, such an enquiry w ould be far from conducive to the discovery of a pacific solution.” On November 4th, when the Commission of Enquiry was already in America, the La Paz Chancellery issued the following statement :

“ 4. Bolivia does not and will not agree to any functions of a judicial character which the Commission might endeavour to exercise either on its own initiative or on the instructions of the League. Such functions would affect the sovereignty and independence of the nations and would only complicate the international situation and still further embitter the present dispute.”

To what functions of a judicial character can Bolivia have been referring ? Certainly not to arbitration, as it was never for a moment contemplated to entrust functions of that kind to the Commission. Besides, how could arbitration “ complicate the international situation and still further embitter the present dispute ” ? Bolivia was obviously referring to the investigation into the origins of the war when she refused to allow the Commission to exercise any kind of judicial functions "either on its own initiative or on the instructions of the League.” The same idea is expressed in the Bolivian counter-proposal of February 17th, which provided that the Hague Court should settle the dispute “ without going into other points not included in the arbitration agreement It should be noted that the same arguments advanced by Bolivia for the purpose of evading the enquiry are put forward by the Commission to excuse its failure to hold it. The Commission endeavours to establish a common responsibility— “ the responsibility of two countries which have gone to war over a dispute embittered by the passage of time, instead of submitting the question in a genuine desire for settlement to the League of Nations, of which they are both Members, and thus acting in the spirit of the Covenant by which they are bound.” The Commission appears to forget that, on August 1st, 1932, when hostilities had barely begun, the Paraguayan Government sent to the Council an appeal, the first part of which read as follows : “ As an active Member of your great and noble international institution, I bring to Your Excellency’s knowledge the unheard of outrage committed by the Bolivian Government in conducting military hostilities against my country without previously asking for explanations or declaring war.” If the League Council did not intervene at that time, it was not on account of the Paraguayan Government’s opposition. In his telegram of September 27th to the two countries, the President of the Council stated : “ Council observes that certain American Republics are doing their best assist parties in reaching amicable settlem ent. It welcomes and supports these endeavours and earnestly requests the two Governments to accept them and put immediate stop military action and preparation. Such decision by the two Governments will constitute honourable and effective fulfilment of the engagements which they have undertaken towards all other Members League. ” The Commission states that it was reluctant to include in its draft treaty a clause regarding the investigation of responsibility for the war because the execution of such a clause “ could not fail to stir up controversies as to the past that would prevent the creation of a peaceful atmosphere.” If it had really been the Commission’s intention to avoid introducing “ a new cause of discord ”, it would have drawn up its report in a different tone and would not have made assertions which may serve in future to embitter still further a situation “ already clouded by mutual misunderstanding and hatred.” In Paraguay, at all events, the Commission’s report has left an impression of injustice in the public mind which it will be difficult to eradicate. The La Paz Press has seized 011 the accusations against Paraguay which the report contains in order to stir up feelings of hatred in the Bolivian people. The Commission, whose amour propre appears to have been wounded, has not been able to control its feelings and has done harm, which it possibly did not anticipate, to the cause of peace. Its report may actually be regarded as one more factor of disturbance added to the many other factors which are embittering the conflict. As a matter of fact, the Commission was unable to decide what would be the proper time for the investigation. Whereas in one part of its report it considers that “ the question of an enquiry should only be considered if the restoration of peace appears to be impossible ”, in another it states that, “ as long as hostilities are in progress and honourable and just peace proposals fail to secure consideration, it would be a tragic error to go to the trouble of sifting the records Assuming, however, that “ no enquiry into the question of responsibility for the conflict as long as there is any possibility of a peaceful settlement ” represents the Commission’s honest opinion, how was it that it forgot to carry out the enquiry when both countries rejected its draft of February 22nd, which, in M. Alvarez del Vayo’s own words, represented “both the final proposal °f the Commission over which he had presided and its last effort at pacification ” ? — 12 —

Neither should it be forgotten that, when the armistice expired and the Commission considered that “ its efforts at conciliation were drawing to a close ”, it did not even then feel called upon to open the enquiry. The Commission, in setting forth its views as to what the enquiry should be in the event of its becoming necessary, accepts the Bolivian contention that the investigation should be confined to the period starting from the negotiations for a pact of non-aggression or the 1928 incidents. This is what it means by stating that the enquiry should be as “ thorough ” as possible. The Paraguayan Government never proposed that the enquiry should be restricted to the period at which the first military incidents took place, in June 1932. It maintained that the Pitiantuta aggression was merely the last link in a long chain. In examining the question, it is necessary to go back at least to 1907, the year in which the first Pact for the maintenance of the status quo was signed. The memorandum which the Paraguayan delegation handed to the Commission on March 8th, and the existence of which the Commission appears to ignore, clearly sets forth the Paraguayan view of the manner in which the problem of responsibility should be handled. The investigation should be thorough—much more thorough than the Commission desires. It should be pointed out that, without meaning to do so, the Commission has already furnished valuable material for a judgment in this matter of the investigation, which is bound to come. The evidence of Bolivia’s guilt is so glaring that, notwithstanding the Commission’s skilful efforts to conceal it, it is apparent from the bare statement of the facts. Although, in other chapters of its report, the Commission endeavours to find excuses for not holding the enquiry by stressing the difficulty of clearing up the matter, in the account of its investigations, it lets slip certain comments which fully justify Paraguay’s conduct and condemn the Bolivian aggression, which shows how easy it would have been for it to clear up the question of responsibilities. “ The Bolivian army ”, the report states, “ which was originally larger than the Paraguayan army, consists for the most part of Indian soldiers under trained officers. It has successively been commanded by native Bolivian generals, by a naturalised Bolivian commander, and then again by native Bolivians. Although it had more arms and material than its adversary, the distance from its bases of operation, quite apart from other considerations, limited this army’s advance in the Chaco to the neighbourhood of longitude 6o°. The Paraguayan army, which was very small and had very few arms and little material, was formed during the period of operations by the enlistment of a number of untrained volunteers, who improved day by day under the direction of native-born officers, who also received their training on the battlefield. Thanks to its endurance and gallantry, and to its officers, it succeeded at the outset in holding up the Bolivian army ”. It is hard to believe that those words were written by the persons who, in another part of the same report, said that they could not imagine “ how the aggressor was to be determined Nor would it ever be thought that the opinion as to the inadvisability of the enquiry into the question of responsibility was expressed by the same persons who drew up the provisions in the draft treaty referring to the Hayes zone. Since the Commission admits that the zone in question was “ adjudicated ” to Paraguay under President Hayes’ award, since it recognises that, “ in the eyes of the population of Asuncion and Concepcion, the Hayes zone is the opposite bank of the river, which has been in Paraguayan hands for a long time past, and which was assigned to Paraguay by an arbitral award ”, and since it endorses President Ayala’s statement that “ Bolivia, in setting foot in a territory which she could not occupy, committed a veritable act of conquest ”, and that “ a State which enters territory awarded to another State by arbitration commits an act of violence and conquest ”, how can it fail to draw the obvious conclusion that Bolivia was responsible for entering that territory on a war footing ? If Bolivia thought that she was entitled not to recognise President Hayes’ award this did not mean that she had the right to disturb by armed force the possession which that award declared to be legitimate and just. Even had Paraguay agreed to a further discussion as to who had the best right to the zone situated south of the Rio Verde, Bolivia would not have been entitled to invade that territory. The region in dispute was assigned to Paraguay by the award of 1878, under which it was handed over to her by the Argentine Republic, and was at once occupied b y her. Paraguay’s former possession, which had been temporarily disturbed by the military occupation of the allies, was thus re-established. The award restored a de facto situation and confirmed a de jure situation—namely, occupation and the right of occupation. Even assuming that, on the principle of res inter alios acta, Bolivia was entitled to deny the legal validity of the award, could she at the same time disturb the de facto situation sanctioned by that award ? Apar* from any legal considerations, and assum ing that the award merely established a provisional situation which, in order to become final, needed to be confirmed by a further decision to which Bolivia should be a party, could that country, pending the new award, disturb, of its own accord, the de facto situation resulting from the adjudication of the territory to Paraguay ? There can be only one answer to this question. If Bolivia was unwilling to recognise the legal validity of President Hayes’ award, she could not on that sole account disturb the situation which it had created. The award assigned possession of the territory to Paraguay, thus legalising a state of sovereignty which, even if it were regard ed as provisional or de facto, could not be disturbed by Bolivia or any other country. By invading the territory south of the Rio Verde, Bolivia committed an act of aggression and obvious infringements of Articles 10 and 12 of the Covenant. Since it admits the validity of President Hayes’ award, the League of Nations Commission is bound to recognise the logical and natural consequence— n am ely, that Bolivia was guilty of the armed invasion of the territory assigned to Paraguay. This guilt — 13 — becomes still greater if it is borne in mind that the Bolivian invasion disturbed not only a de fado situation, but also a final and irrevocable de jure situation sanctioned by President Hayes’ award. The Commission’s findings as regards the military preparations of both countries on the o u tb re a k of the conflict, its admission that the Hayes zone legally belongs to Paraguay and that Bolivia invaded this region, constitute irrefutable proofs, brought by the Commission itself, of Bolivia’s guilt. Not all the dialectical efforts made by the Commission in its report to obliterate the evidence of Bolivian guilt or to establish a sort of joint responsibility which would also fall on Paraguay are sufficient to refute this evidence. Despite itself, the Commission has condemned Bolivia.

IV. THE RECOGNITION OF THE COMMISSION BY BOLIVIA.

In our opinion, there is one point that has not been sufficiently cleared up by the Commission —namely, the conditions laid down by Bolivia for recognising it. It will be remembered that, after the reports of May 20th and July 3rd had been approved (Bolivia herself voting in favour), Bolivia established a series of absolute conditions for her recognition of the Commission. This uncompromising attitude was maintained until the Bolivian delegation was constituted, some days after the Commission’s arrival at Montevideo. On October 12th, when the Commission of Enquiry was about to sail, the Bolivian delegation made the following declarations to the League Secretariat : “ On the eve of the departure of the Commission appointed by the Council, my Government instructs me, in order to enable the Commission to avoid certain rocks upon which many noble efforts have come to shipwreck, to request the Committee of Three to consider the following points: “ 1. Inasmuch as the resolution of July 3rd retains all its force, as may be seen from the resolution of August 3rd, the Commission’s action in execution of the mandate it has received can only develop if the establishment of the arbitration agreement is simultaneous with the suspension of hostilities. Granted this, it is logical that the Commission should endeavour to find and propose, so far as possible, the bases of an arbitration or a substantive settlement between the belligerents. “ 2. In the event—unlikely, as we believe—of these efforts failing to attain their aim, it would be highly desirable that, after thorough investigation, the Commission should be able to submit to the Council a report on the determination of the territory to be arbitrated upon. Such a report would constitute an advisory opinion which would make it easier for the matter to be arbitrated upon to be determined and delimited with a full knowledge of the facts, under the auspices of the Council. “ 3. As to the enquiry into the responsibility for the war, my Government, far from seeking to evade it, is convinced that it will in due course become necessary. My Government considers, however, that in the present circumstances such an enquiry would be far from conducive to the discovery of a pacific solution.”

The note concludes as follows : “ My Government is convinced that the explanations and suggestions that I have put forward above in its name will be favourably received by the Committee of Three and that the Commission will bear them in mind in carrying out its task. Otherwise my Government, to its very great regret, would regard the Commission’s journey as one more barren effort that would merely prolong a state of affairs which my Government more than anybody else wishes to see brought to an end by a just, worthy and peaceful settlement."

On October 16th, the Secretariat acknowledged receipt of this Bolivian note, stating that, after careful consideration, it had been brought to the notice of the members of the Commission. On October 19th, the Bolivian delegation expressed its disapproval of this decision : “ My Government, which, as I have so often had the honour to state, attaches the utmost importance to the elimination of the slightest misunderstanding which might render ineffective the work of the Commission, while leaving indefinite certain fundamental aspects of the problem, has been much disconcerted and distressed to find that its request has not been granted. “ It is with even more regret that my Government under these conditions has to inform you that, so long as the powers of the Commission have not been properly defined, it will be compelled to ignore its labours."

The Committee of Three deliberated upon this new threat, formulated by Bolivia when the Commission was already on jthe point of reaching America. On October 27th, it sent a letter to the Bolivian delegation explaining its reasons for communicating the note of October 12th to the Commission : “ The Committee wishes to point out that, in accordance with the report adopted by the Council on July 3rd, the Commission should discharge its functions ‘ taken as a whole as best it could, having regard to the situation it found on its arrival, with a view to bringing about a speedy and permanent settlement of the dispute ’. The Commission is therefore competent, — I4 —

as regards all the points outlined in your letter, to take such measures or make any report or recommendation to the Council which it might consider useful for the execution of the functions entrusted to it or with a view to furnishing a possible basis for subsequent action by the Council. “ It was for this reason that the Committee decided to submit your letter of October 12th to the Commission for examination.”

The Committee then went on to express its surprise that Bolivia should have threatened to ignore the Commission’s labours, inasmuch as the report of July 3rd and the subsequent reports had received Bolivia’s approval, and no change had been “ made or proposed in the terms of reference thus defined ”. It concluded with this categorical statement : “ The Committee is loth to believe that the Bolivian Government now proposes to act in a manner completely at variance with the procedure which it has formally and repeatedly accepted.” The Committee of Three considered the Chaco Commission competent to deal with Bolivia’s request, but felt that to accept the new Bolivian standpoint would be tantamount to acting " in a manner completely at variance with the procedure ” already adopted. On October 29th, the Chairman of the Committee cabled to the Bolivian Government requesting it to appoint a representative on the Commission. On October 31st, the Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied : “ With reference to your telegram of yesterday, the Bolivian Government will accredit its representative to the Commission as soon as the Council has given a decision in accordance with the points of view set forth in our delegation’s note of October 12th. Meanwhile, Bolivia will maintain at Montevideo an observer who will have no official relations with the Commission.” On November 1st, the Bolivian delegate to the Council again stated that, as long as its point of view was not accepted, his Government might be “ prevented from co-operating as it wishes to do in the work of the Commission.” On November 4th, when the Bolivian Legation at Montevideo made the following declarations to the Special Commission which had arrived a few days earlier, the Chancellory at La Paz communicated their text to the Chairman of the Committee of Three :

“ First : Bolivia has already stated and repeats her willingness to submit the present dispute with Paraguay to the League of Nations for consideration, provided the purpose of the League is merely to re-establish peace either by a suitable compromise or by arbitration and that in any case methods of procedure are adopted which are compatible with due respect for the principle of national sovereignty.

" Secondly : Bolivia has made repeated suggestions to the Council in this sense since the League first intervened in May of this year. On the last occasion, on October 7th, we proposed that the Commission should deal with two points : “ (1) It should seek a direct solution of the dispute, and “ (2) If such an arrangement was not feasible, it should study the possibility of determining the zone to be arbitrated upon.

“ Thirdly: Provided the functions of the Commission are kept within these limits, the Government of Bolivia will take part therein and will appoint its representatives for this purpose.

“ Fourthly: Bolivia does not and will not agree to any functions of a judicial ch aracter which the Commission might endeavour to exercise either on its own initiative or on the instructions of the League. Such functions would seriously affect the sovereignty and independence of the nations and would only complicate the international situation and still further embitter the present dispute.

" Fifthly: Bolivia will only be able to take part in peace discussions based on respect for the freedom of the individual peoples under the friendly guidance of the League of Nations. In order to decide on her attitude, she would be glad to know the instructions given to the Commission and its immediate programme of work.”

The gravity of this declaration was plain. The matter at issue, in Bolivia’s eyes, was not merely the recognition of the Commission, but the very authority of the League. Bolivia stated that she was prepared " to submit the present dispute with Paraguay to the League of Nations . . . provided the purpose of the League is merely to re-establish peace ", and peace was to be re-established by the method defined by her on October 12th. To the conditions involved in that method, she added a further condition—namely, that the Commission should in no case exercise any functions of a judicial character. She would recognise the League’s intervention only if its Special Commission carefully refrained from conducting any kind of enquiry with a view to establishing the responsibility for the war. In her note of October 12th, Bolivia had confined herself to drawing attention to the difficulties that such an investigation, in existing circumstances, would involve for the cause of peace. She was now no longer expressing a mere opinion, but laying down a fundamental condition for her recognition of the League’s authority. The note of October 12th, amplified by that of November 4th, stated the conditions which Bolivia required if she was to recognise the Commission : (1) The Commission was to endeavour first and foremost to establish an agreement with a view to arbitration ; — 15 —

(2) The Commission was to regard the conflict as a territorial question ; (3) The Commission was to refrain from investigating the origins of the war. We do not find, in any document proceeding from the Commission, that the latter accepted Bolivia’s conditions. The reply of the President of the Commission, M. Alvarez del Vayo, to the note of November 4th, merely gives Bolivia “ the assurance that it intends to carry out the mission entrusted to it by the Council of the League of Nations with scrupulous respect for the principle of the national sovereignty of Bolivia and Paraguay within the framework of the Covenant of the League.” So far from accepting Bolivia’s demands, he rejects them, or at any rate raises objections. Moreover, when, on November 9th, the Bolivian Legation at length announced its intention of recognising the Commission, it did so in these explicit terms, to which no reservations were at any time attached : “ Bolivia will appoint her representative on the Commission in order that he may take part in its proceedings in accordance with the communication made to the Committee of Three on October 31st.” As we have seen, the note of October 31st to the Committee of Three said: “ The Bolivian Government will accredit its representative to the Commission as soon as the Council has given a decision in accordance with the points of view set forth in our delegation’s note of October 12th.” The Council gave no such decision, because the Committee of the Council declared that the Commission was fully competent to deal with Bolivia’s request : “ The Commission is . . . competent, as regards all the points outlined in your letter (of October 12th), to take such measures or make any report or recommendation to the Council which it might consider userai . . . or with a view to furnishing a possible basis for subsequent action by the Council.” Did Bolivia accredit her representative to the Commission because the latter had pronounced in favour of her point of view as stated in her note of October 31st ? Was that what really happened ? An analysis of the documents and the logic of events seem to confirm this. How else can Bolivia’s sudden appeasement be explained ? Anyone who is familiar with the history of this conflict will have observed with what uncompromising obstinacy Bolivia defends her diplomatic positions. A country that was sufficiently determined to say to the Council that it considered it “ highly important to ensure that the Bolivian Government should not at any time find itself compelled to reject a proposal made by the Council ” could not so purely and simply resign itself to recognise the Commission, after it had so frankly announced its demands, on the basis of a mere statement that “ national sovereignties would be respected ”. Was there a previous understanding between the Commission and the Bolivian Government on points of essential importance ? Paraguay desires merely to observe that both the draft treaty of February 22nd and the foundations on which it is based seem to adhere faithfully to the views expressed by Bolivia on October 12th and November 4th. Those views appear to have been substantially adopted by the Commission on all the points connected with the enquiry into responsibilities, the omission of which from the draft of February 22nd is defended in the Commission’s report by the same arguments which Bolivia used in demanding its absolute exclusion.

V. THE FULL ARBITRATION PROPOSED IN DECEMBER.

The Commission asserts that the proposals communicated to Asuncion from La Paz contained th e substantive solutions essential to peace. Let us quote the text of the telegram transmitted to th e President of the Republic on December 14th by the British Chargé d’Affaires1: “ The League of Nations Commission of Enquiry is considering a formula according to which the Chaco dispute would be brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice. Bolivia and Paraguay would submit their titles to the Court unilaterally and separately. Bolivia would accept in virtue of her unreserved accession to the Optional Clause. The two Governments would announce their full concurrence in the declaration of the American Republics, dated August 3rd, 1932. “ The Commission’s impression is that Bolivia will not be able to accept the foregoing proposal unless Paraguay confirms the fact that she will ask the Hague Court only for the boundaries of the Chaco which she has several times described—in particular, in the letter from her representative at Geneva, dated June 6th, 1933, published in the Official Journal of the League of Nations, page 780. “ The Commission would be glad to receive confirmation of these boundaries by telegram from the Paraguayan Government and subsequently in writing. ” This document does not contain the general lines of a settlement. It merely announces that th e Commission was studying a formula according to which the dispute would be submitted to the Court. Similarly, the Commission announces that Bolivia would accept the future formula only if Paraguay would agree to limit her territorial claims, and asks the Asuncion Government to confirm that renunciation by telegram and by letter. This is practical evidence that the Commission did not communicate the general lines of an agreement. Acceptance by Bolivia, according to the Commission’s statement, was conditional on certain renunciations to be made by Paraguay. Accordingly, as Paraguay did not agree to those renunciations, it must be assumed that the Bolivian acceptance did not take place. Nevertheless, the Commission allows it to be understood that Bolivia approved 'ts proposals of December. The La Paz Chancellory, too, has on various occasions asserted that it accepted those proposals. But what did Bolivia actually accept ? We were unable to ascertain this at the time. The suggestion submitted by the Commission to Paraguay could not have been more vague and indefinite.

1 See document C.154.M.64.1934.VII (report of the Chaco Commission), page 37. — i 6 —

The message of December 14th contained merely a suggestion that Paraguay should unilaterally and separately submit her titles to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The message of the same month contained the following phrase : “ If Paraguay accepts the arbitration of the whole matter by the Court, as explained in the Commission’s recent telegram.” It was therefore the arbitration of the whole matter that was intended. But of what did “ the whole matter ” consist ? There was an immediate and obvious contradiction between this idea and the demand that Paraguay should limit her claims. The insistence on securing confirmation of the limits of the Chaco, which had been mentioned solely for information by the Paraguayan delegate at Geneva, led to the supposition that “ the whole matter ” which was to be subject to arbitration referred to the territory. This was neither the formula nor the idea put forward by Paraguay. The “ whole matter " on which Paraguay had previously accepted arbitration referred to all the arbitrable questions connected with the Chaco dispute. This idea was confirmed in the Act of Mendoza (known as the Act of successive arbitrations) and the Act of Rio de Janeiro, both of which Bolivia rejected. The Commission's messages from La Paz, however, did not at that time support the view that the “ whole matter ” on which arbitration was proposed referred to the territory. It was, indeed, to prevent any misunderstanding that Paraguay suggested that a Conference should be held in a neutral country. Her delegate, Dr. Zubizarreta, asked at the first meeting for information as to what the Commission meant by " the whole matter ”, and the President, M. Alvarez del Vayo, at once stated that the arbitration of the whole matter which was proposed was the arbitration that Paraguay had previously accepted. Let us quote a few paragraphs taken from the verbatim record of the conversation between M. Alvarez del Vayo and M. Zubizarreta. “ The P r e sid en t . ■— . . . But I should like to emphasise this point : whether a solution is reached or not, the Commission has taken as its starting-point the idea of full arbitration which has always been put forward by the Paraguayan Government. I desired at the outset to make this statement because this constitutes and always will constitute a cardinal point in our attitude . . . “ Dr. Zubizarreta. — As I said before, my Government desires certain explanations concerning the plan drawn up by the Commission, and that without prejudice to its right to state its own point of view and to submit its own proposals. The first explanation I would venture to ask for relates to the arbitration of the whole matter, which the Commission proposed and still proposes. What does the Commission mean by ‘ arbitration of the whole matter ’ ? “ The P r e sid en t . — That is quite simple—that each country should submit to the Hague Court all matters connected with the Chaco dispute.” The “ whole matter ” thus understood was, indeed, what the Paraguayan Government had maintained. Let us now see whether this was the “ arbitration of the whole matter " which the Commission proposed to the Bolivian Government. In the Bolivian reply to the draft treaty we read: “ The League of Nations Commission proposed to the Bolivian Government the resort to legal arbitration by the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague to define the sovereignty of the two contending countries over the territory included within the maximum claims already put forward by the belligerents and in conformity with the principles proclaimed by the American nations in the document of August 3rd. The Bolivian Government accepted this proposal. ” Such a view of the arbitration of the whole matter which was suggested in December was certainly not compatible with the explanation given to Paraguay. As the Commission did not feel called upon to rectify in any way the concluding statement made by Bolivia, it is to be supposed that it suggested to Bolivia an arbitration which was entirely different from that which it had described to Paraguay. This reveals a certain dualism which was not likely to lead to success. Whilst Paraguay was informed that the arbitration of the whole matter proposed was the arbitration that had been urged by the Paraguayan Government, being the arbitration of “ all matters connected with the Chaco dispute ", the arbitration proposed to Bolivia was " full " only in the sense that it covered the whole of the territory of the Chaco, in accordance with the Bolivian view that the dispute is territorial in character. It is difficult to understand the Commission’s aims in adopting this procedure. Even if Paraguay had accepted the arbitration of the whole matter as proposed to her, no agreement would have been possible. Any agreement would have rested on a false basis—on an understanding that did not exist, since the two very different interpretations of “ arbitration of the whole matter ” still remained.

VI. THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY SUGGESTED IN DECEMBER.

The conditions of security were proposed to us in the message transmitted through the British Legation at Asuncion, which read as follows : “ The Commission has been studying conditions of security, and, after having been in communication with the Bolivian Government and military authorities, I am now able to state that, if Paraguay accepts the arbitration of the whole matter by the Court, as explained — i 7 —

in the Commission’s recent telegram, Bolivia will not place any obstacle in the way of the acceptance of extensive security measures, including : “ (i) The complete withdrawal of all troops in the Chaco within a short space of time; “ (2) Rapid demobilisation ; “ (3) A drastic reduction in the forces ; “ (4) International supervision of the foregoing measures.

“ Details will naturally have to be settled at a conference of delegates of both countries under the auspices of the Commission. If Paraguay gives a satisfactory reply regarding arbitration, the Commission will be able next week to convene the plenipotentiaries of both countries in a neutral city in the northern part of the Argentine for the purpose of studying and signing an agreement to be urgently ratified by both countries. ”

The guarantees of security which Bolivia accepted were subject to the following conditions: (1) that Paraguay should accept arbitration of the whole matter by the Court; (2) that she should abandon her rights to the north of Bahia Negra. The arbitration of the whole matter by the Court was a confused idea full of enigmas, as has been shown. Bolivia rejected the formula of successive arbitrations (Mendoza formula) and the formula of arbitration on the whole question of the Chaco (Rio de Janeiro formula). What was the value of the arbitration of the whole matter which was now accepted ? The cessation of hostilities demanded by the Commission in December was to be a consequence of the previous renunciation by Paraguay of part of her rights. To call on Paraguay to make this sacrifice of her rights on the altar of peace whilst Bolivia was extending her claims to their maximum limits was an incomprehensible demand. Paraguay opposed the bases of security proposed by the Commission, because they did not take account of the positions occupied by the belligerent forces in the theatre of war. In so doing, she was merely maintaining a point of view that had been traditionally approved by Bolivia. On August 4th, 1932, the Bolivian Chancellory intimated to the Commission of Neutrals that “ any armistice must by its very nature be based on the state of affairs existing at the time of the agreement Attention should be drawn to the special circumstance that the first conditions of security suggested by the Commission were studied with the Bolivian military authorities at a time when, under Paraguayan pressure, the Bolivian army was beginning a withdrawal, which corresponded to that proposed by the Commission. The conditions of security which were proposed by Paraguay to the Commission of Neutrals and which were embodied in the Act of Mendoza were in accordance with the military situation, which remained more or less stable until December 1933. To call on the Paraguayan forces, after the battle of Zenteno, to withdraw as far as the River Paraguay was obviously unfair.

VII. THE ARMISTICE PROPOSED BY PARAGUAY.

The Commission describes the armistice proposed by the Paraguayan Government as unexpected. It was so for the Commission, because at no time did it seriously propose a cessation of hostilities, as it was its duty to do. While it was at Montevideo and Asuncion, the Commission made no formal suggestion in that sense. It started its work when hostilities were being actively pursued and it found nothing inconsistent in that state of affairs. All this did not, however, prevent the Commission from adopting an entirely different attitude as soon as Paraguay refused to prolong, for the second time, the armistice which she had granted on purely humanitarian grounds. The President of the Commission employed every possible means of pressure, which the Paraguayan Government resisted in the legitimate defence of its sacred interests. On January 7th, 1934, the Commission reminded both countries that “ if hostilities are resumed, its work for conciliation will end and all prospect of restoration of peace will be definitely delayed Five days later, the Commission sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations an account of the situation in its main lines, and concluded by saying : “ The Commission, which, in the atmosphere created by the armistice, might hope to reconcile the parties, considered that the continuance of its negotiations was incompatible with the resumption of hostilities, and intimated this to the two Governments. As the Council’s mandatory, the Commission leaves the Council to judge of a situation of which it has indicated the essential elements, and it awaits • . . the result of the Council’s deliberations.” On January 17th, the Committee of Three requested the Commission to continue its " invaluable work The Commission replied on the same day, reiterating its view that it was bound to suspend official efforts at conciliation pending the Council’s decision. At the same time, the Commission announced to the Press that it was starting to draft its report to the Council. The Council’s decision was taken on January 20th. The Council implicitly disapproved the Commission’s attitude. “ The Commission considers,” says the report adopted, “ that, failing further instructions from the Council, the continuance of negotiations is incompatible with the resumption of hostilities. The Council would call attention to the fact that, when it adopted its report of July 3rd, it was faced by an absolute difference of opinion between the two parties on this very question, and came to the conclusion that the only practical solution would be for the — i8 —

Commission to discharge its functions, taken as a whole, as best it could, having regard to the situation on the spot, with a view to bringing about a speedy and permanent settlement of the dispute. ” The Paraguayan delegation had reminded the Commission of the same fact. The Commission justified its attitude on this point in the following words: “ Anyone arguing to the contrary would be hard put to it to convince us that the Commission’s position is the same after as before the resumption of hostilities. This much is certain : the Commission has worked for peace at a time of open warfare, in the very midst of war, and it is precisely because it has seen the war at first hand that it has been convinced of its absolute futility and has strengthened its resolution to put an end to it. The proposal of December 18th, however, its acceptance, and the very different atmosphere that it created, lead the Commission to think that only in such an atmosphere can it now work effectively and worthily.” The “ different atmosphere ” mentioned by the Commission must surely refer to the tension that developed at Montevideo on account of Bolivia’s repeated accusations against Paraguay of having violated the armistice. The armistice did not create an atmosphere favourable to peace; it furnished fresh causes of strife. The Commission itself says in its report : “ In spite of the inter­ vention of the Commission, the appeals which it at once addressed to the two Governments and the explanations which it requested and which were received from the Governments, the differences with regard to the violation of the armistice created an atmosphere of tension unfavourable to peace negotiations.” Paraguay was therefore right in refusing to prolong the armistice if conditions were not created that would make further clashes impossible. The Paraguayan Government proposed the armistice on grounds of humanity—the need for coming to the assistance of the thousands of Bolivian soldiers wounded, exhausted, sick, lost in the forests, who had been abandoned by the enemy army in its flight, and whose lives were saved. Having discharged this duty and seen the absolute impossibility of reaching an agreement in any prescribed space of time on the complex substantive questions, it had no reason for prolonging an armistice which exclusively served Bolivian interests. Bolivia, indeed, thanks to the truce, was able to rescue large forces from disaster, to fortify herself on a well-prepared line, to accumulate new contingents, to reorganise her transport system, to complete the mobilisation of new reserves, to enrol troops, to acquire war material, and to carry out financial operations. The Commission represents Paraguay as being responsible for the failure to prolong the armistice. It is not certain that the Bolivian Government would have accepted any prolongation. On the contrary, in the communication from the Bolivian delegate to the Council on January 13th, the following occurs : “ My Government feels bound to warn the Council, and hence the Commission, of the danger to the cause of peace of regarding as a fundamental question a mere extension of the armistice without the speedy establishment of the arbitration agreement. "

VIII. THE REPORT OF JANUARY 20TH, 1934.

On January 12th, the Commission, describing the state of negotiations, informed the Council that it had made certain proposals to the two parties regarding : (1) A settlement of the substantive legal question; (2) A system of security affecting the military situation of the parties ; (3) An endeavour to devise measures which might improve the communications of the two countries with abroad.

After narrating its fruitless endeavours to secure a second extension of the armistice, the Commission terminated its report as follows : “ The Commission . . . considered that the continuance of its negotiations was incompatible with the resumption of hostilities, and intimated this to the two Governments. As the Council’s mandatory, the Commission leaves the Council to judge of a situation of which it has indicated the essential elements, and it awaits . . . the result of the Council’s deliberations. ” Having considered the report of January 12th, the Council came to a decision on the 20th. Its report of that date contains not a single word that could be taken to signify any restriction or modification of the earlier mandates. Indeed, reference is made to the report of July 3rd for the purpose of demonstrating that hostilities are compatible with negotiations, contrary to the opinion of the Commission, after Paraguay’s refusal to prolong the armistice. The Commission, in its report, suggested that arbitration was the sole procedure for the settlement of the dispute. The Council thought otherwise and, while inviting the Commission to continue its activities, laid down the following principles for the settlement of substantive points :

“ The Council . . . considers that arbitration, whatever may be its form, is one of the best ways of arriving at a settlement of the dispute. In the present circumstances, however, the Commission’s mandate cannot be thus limited; it will have, in particular, authority to consider every method for reaching an agreement, including, for instance, the c o n c lu sio n of an armistice presenting sufficient guarantees to enable a solution to be reached as soon as possible of the questions referred to in Nos. 1 and 3 of the proposals mentioned in the Commission’s telegram of January 12th." — 19 —

Referring more especially to the substantive question, the Council said: “ With regard to the substantive settlement, the Council considers that it is competent to the Commission to try every means of reaching a settlement : judicial settlement, arbitral settlement, or direct settlement, aided, if necessary, by good offices, the essential aim being to arrive at a solution which will ensure peace and good relations between the parties.” An examination of the Commission’s subsequent action reveals that the Council’s suggestions were not followed. The Commission did not by any means study in conjunction with the parties “ all the aspects of the problem and the practical possibilities of reaching a solution it rejected the Paraguayan proposal of February 7th, which suggested an armistice accompanied by safeguards with a view to the subsequent discussion of the substantive question ; and in its final proposal of February 22nd, it stated that it regarded arbitration as the only procedure whereby a settlement of the dispute could be arrived at.

IX. THE PARAGUAYAN PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 7TH, 1934.

The Council suggested to the Commission on January 20th a method which might consist in the conclusion of an armistice with adequate safeguards, in order to bring about a settlement of the substantive questions as quickly as possible. This was likewise the intention of the Paraguayan proposal of February 7th, which is criticised by the Commission. The general lines of this proposal are as follows :

“I. “ (a) The Bolivian troops shall evacuate the Chaco and shall withdraw to Villa Montes and Roboré ; (b) the Paraguayan troops shall withdraw to the termini of the existing railways in the Chaco ; Bahia Negra shall also be occupied by Paraguayan troops ; (c) the Chaco shall be policed by Paraguay exclusively ; (d) both countries shall proceed to demobilise their armies, demobilisation to begin on . . . and to be completed by . . . Demobilisation shall be taken to mean the return of the soldiers to their homes ; (e) the peace effectives of the two armies shall be reduced to . . . This obligation shall hold good for a period of . . . ; (/) both countries shall undertake not to acquire any arms or other war material during a period of . . . This obligation shall be subject to supervision by the League of Nations.

“II.

“ Paraguay and Bolivia shall undertake to settle the question of boundaries by legal arbitration. When the Treaty of Peace has been approved or ratified by the Parliaments of the two countries, the High Contracting Parties shall negotiate an Arbitration Agreement defining the specific subject-matter of the controversy, the procedure to be followed, the manner in which the arbitration shall take place, and all other points connected with the Arbitration Agreement. “ III.

“ The tribunal agreed upon by the parties shall undertake an enquiry into the responsibility for the present war, and shall pronounce appropriate penalties.

" IV.

“ Prisoners of war shall be exchanged after the approval or ratification of the Treaty of Peace by the Congresses or Parliaments of the two countries.

“V.

“ The measures of security referred to in Chapter I, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (/), shall be put into effect immediately the treaty has been signed by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, without awaiting approval by the legislatures.”

By the Paraguayan plan, the problem was simplified and peace could speedily have been made. This is the essential point and is in full conformity with the spirit of the League of Nations and of the multilateral agreements to which Paraguay and Bolivia have acceded. The Commission was able to investigate the insuperable differences between the standpoints of the two countries on questions of substance. The war has aggravated those differences. If, in fifty years of peace, it was not possible to arrive at an agreement on any of the points which form part of this complicated dispute, still less will it be possible while hostilities are actually proceeding, with the spirit of nationalism inflamed by mutual resentment, and with the further complications that have been imparted into the problem by the war. To make the arbitration agreement an essential condition °f the cessation of the war is to agree to the continuance of the war for a long period. The difficulties of the problem demand an appeal to the future. So thought the Council, when it adopted the reports — 2 0 — of May 20th, July 3rd, and January 20th. The Commission, however, thought otherwise, endorsing the Bolivian view. “ The Commission ”, says the report, “ thought it desirable after obtaining the Bolivian delegation’s confirmation on this point, to inform Dr. Zubizarreta in the clearest possible terms that Bolivia would not accept a peace which did not contain definite stipulations for the settlement of the substantive question, and that any new proposal which, as the Bolivian delegation put it, ‘ dodged ’ that question would be doomed in advance to the same failure as other previous attempts.” The Commission’s report does not show that at any time it made a similar statement on its own initiative to the Bolivian delegation, to the effect thay any proposal which " dodged ” the question of the Paraguayan victory would likewise be doomed to failure. No clearer evidence could be desired of the Commission’s partiality. It is on this point that the Commission reveals its attitude towards Paraguay and Bolivia. “ Although the Commission felt, after its interviews at La Paz and its latest conversation with the Bolivian plénipotentiaires, that the Paraguayan proposals were very likely to be rejected at once, it communicated them to the Bolivian delegation with the request that they should be very carefully examined.” The same prejudgment is not to be found in the reference made to the Bolivian counter-proposals, which, for reasons that have not come to light, were conveyed to Paraguay in a fragmentary form. Although the Bolivian proposal contained numerous features which made it a priori completely inacceptable to Paraguay, the Commission thought otherwise. The Paraguayan proposals of February 7th were not the demands of a victorious Power. As the Commission itself admits, they " were based on the standpoint invariably maintained by Asuncion : cessation of hostilities and prevention of any possibility of their resumption by adequate measures of security; and later discussion of the substantive question.” How, then, does the Commission come to assert elsewhere in its report that Paraguay’s bases of peace were merely the consequence of the December victory ? The conditions of security which Paraguay proposed were the same as those she had put forward at the Washington Conferences in 1932, before the outbreak of the armed conflict, with such changes as were entailed by the state of war. According to the draft pact of non-aggression submitted by the Paraguayan delegation on January 18th, 1932, Paraguay was to have the sole right to police the Hayes zone and the rest of the Chaco as far as longitude 6i° 30' west of Greenwich, and Bolivia to the west of longitude 62°. It was agree that Bolivia should police part of the Chaco in consequence of the Agreement of 1907. When war broke out, Paraguay resumed the sole right to police the whole of the Chaco. It is to be noted that, in the Paraguayan draft of January 1932, Paraguay claimed the right to maintain troops throughout the Hayes zone. In the draft of February 7th, Paraguay limited that right, for the sake of peace, to the railway termini. As for the clause regarding consent to arbitration, it was almost identical with that embodied in the Rio de Janeiro formula of August 25th, 1933. While the Paraguayan draft contained merely an undertaking “ to settle the question of boundaries by legal arbitration ”, the Act of Rio de Janeiro likewise expressed only " the intention of submitting the whole question of the Chaco to legal arbitration.” The clause dealing with arbitration, proposed by Paraguay, was of the highest importance and implied a definite advance towards the settlement of the dispute. The acceptance of arbitration by both countries is recorded only in diplomatic instruments, whose validity has lapsed in consequence of the war. Paraguay was anxious to establish that acceptance in a definitive form, by way of a formal convention. The formula of February 7th is evidence that Paraguay does not make the cessation of the war conditional upon the triumph of her just claims in regard to the substantive problem.

X. THE PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY 22ND, 1934.

On February 22nd, the Commission submitted a draft treaty to the parties. It regarded this draft at that time as its last effort to establish peace. In its report, the Commission describes the draft as “ a final attempt at conciliation ” for the purpose of “ reconciling the diametrically opposite views of the parties ’’. Within the time-limit granted for a reply, the Paraguayan delegation stated the reasons for which Paraguay was obliged to reject the draft. The Commission’s defence of its proposals has not invalidated a single one of the arguments put forward by the Paraguayan delegation on March 3rd.

A. T h e C e s s a t io n o f H o s t il it ie s .

According to the plan drawn up by the Commission on February 22nd, hostilities were to cease after the ratification of the treaty by both Congresses. Not only did the Commission agree that the discussion of the arbitration agreement should take place during hostilities, but it regarded it as necessary that hostilities should continue without interruption after the signature of the arbitration treaty for a period of time that might be either long or short, but which could not be foreseen. What would be the object of hostilities during that period ? — 2 1 —

The Commission does not, in its report, explain this feature of its plan. We venture to think that its intention was to give both countries the security derived from a complete and final settlement of the substantive question, so that they might lay down their arms with absolute tranquillity. If this was the intention, the Commission would be providing a justification for the war, recognising that it had a necessary object, the achievement of which was essential before the war could end. The Commission appears to think that, only with the security conferred by a settlement of the frontier dispute, could the two belligerents be asked to stop the war. There would be an object for the war—the radical solution of all the questions involved. For this view there can be no justification, since it is contrary both to the letter and to the spirit of the conventional agreements which prohibit war as an instrument of international policy. Indeed,if the Commission had really intended to establish the principle that the war should not cease until the questions by which the two nations are divided had been finally settled, it would be impossible to explain why the cessation of the conflict was fixed for the moment of the parliamentary ratification of the peace treaty. According to this view, which the Commission seems to maintain, the conflict would have to continue until the arbitrator had given a decision on the questions in dispute and until all differences had been settled. Only then would all the causes of the conflict have been removed and, accordingly, only then would the parties be able to lay down their arms. The ratification of the arbitration treaty by the Parliaments does not, in itself, constitute any guarantee of the final settlement. History abounds with examples of arbitrations which were accepted, and even carried out, but which provided no fundamental solution for the differences under discussion. To establish the principle that war should cease only when the differences that gave rise to it have entirely disappeared is to lay down a dangerous rule. The Commission’s draft makes the cessation of the conflict dependent on the legislative approval of the peace treaty, and thereby runs counter to legal principles that are universally accepted, while at the same time introducing a disturbing factor into the solution of the conflict. It is well known that such ratification entails a more or less lengthy procedure. As regards Paraguay it should be stated that Congress would discuss the matter at length, since, under our political system, it enjoys full liberty. In view of the importance of the matter, it would be impossible to recommend any hasty consideration. The Executive would therefore not be prepared to exert any pressure whatsoever that would constitute a violation of the constitutional principles of the liberty and equality of the public powers. The deliberation might be, and certainly would be of the length called for by the gravity of the questions dealt with in a treaty of this kind. We venture to think that the same would happen in Bolivia, where the same democratic system prevails as in Paraguay. Meanwhile, the conflict would be going on savagely, and there would be the amazing situation, unprecedented in the history of the world, of a peace treaty’s being discussed while the armies were continuing the war. Such a situation would not only be anomalous, but would offer enormous practical dangers. Any military success would lead to a change in the attitude of the victorious party. It would not be surprising if Bolivia, during the treaty procedure, feeling herself sufficiently strong, endeavoured to win some triumph which would enable her to increase her demands. We have reason to distrust the good faith of Bolivia. We know how she has respected her agreements, and we cannot forget that the attack on Pitiantuta was launched while the two countries were negotiating a pact of non-aggression at Washington. A procedure which abandoned the fate of a peace treaty to the hazards of war would be inconceivable. It would be repugnant to our conscience to continue fighting at the front, to continue sacrificing our youth and treasure, after having signed a peace treaty. Yet we should be bound to do it, with the object of maintaining and, if possible, improving the position of the army in view of the possibility that the treaty might not be ratified. Thus, a diplomatic instrument which was intended to put an end to war might perhaps become an incentive to intensify it. The Commission itself recognises the great dangers involved in any kind of peaceful deliberations so long as hostilities have not ceased. “ So long ”, it says in its report, “ as the preference for one form or another of pacific settlement depends on the number of miles that one army has advanced or retired, any negotiation is liable to be suspended or broken off according as operations may develop.” This is the view that Paraguay has always maintained. “ How, indeed, can it be thought ”, asked the Paraguayan delegate at the Council meeting on August 3rd, “ that two parties could usefully enter into direct negotiations when their respective causes continue to depend on the hazard of battle ? Will not these negotiations inevitably be influenced by military success or failure ? ” On moral grounds, Paraguay previously refused to agree to the cessation of hostilities simultaneously with the signature of the arbitration agreement. She demanded that a system of security should first be devised and the war brought to an end before the discussion of the substantive question was started. She had all the more reason to reject a procedure which allowed of the possibility of an indefinite continuation of hostilities after an agreement had been reached on the substantive question. The position taken up by Paraguay on this matter is firm and will not change, for she feels herself supported by the legal conscience of the world. Moreover, her attitude is practical proof of the fact that she does not seek to impose her claims 011 Bolivia by war. To bring the conflict to an end, she does not ask for the recognition of her just claims, but only for the creation of conditions of security which will prevent the resumption of the war. She is prepared to end the conflict this very day, even though she may not have secured the acceptance by her adversary of any of her claims. Paraguay considers w a r in itself as a thing for which there is no justification, and she seeks its immediate cessation, together with measures that will make its resumption impossible. She is not prepared to admit that recognition should be given to any war aims, that war should be legalised — 2 2 — or justified by the establishment of the principle that it should cease only when those aims have been achieved. In adopting this unshakable position, Paraguay takes her stand on the great doctrines embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. By recognising a right to continue war until the questions that led to it have been settled, the Commission has done serious harm to the cause of world peace. It has attempted to legalise war and has established a precedent that may have serious consequences for the whole body of civilised nations.

B. T h e S u b s t a n t iv e Q u e s t io n . (a) Its Characteristics. We have seen that, when the Commission issued its first arbitration proposals in December, it did so in a manner which did not allow Paraguay to perceive its preference for the Bolivian contention as regards the substantive question. In its formula of February 22nd, this preference is no longer disguised. Faced with the two contentions (the Paraguayan, which described the dispute as a simple boundary question, and the Bolivian, which regarded it as a territorial question), the Commission clearly inclined towards the. latter. According to the Commission's draft, the dispute is a controversy over the better right to a certain territory. That it is described as a frontier question is of no account. In the formula, the Chaco is divided into clearly defined zones, two of which are to be excluded from the judgment, while the third is to be submitted to arbitration. “ The Commission thought it advisable ”, says the report, “ to exclude two areas from the arbitration, one being the area in the southern Chaco, north of the main branch of the Pilcomayo, which President Hayes assigned to Paraguay in the arbitration between the Argentine and Paraguay after the war of 1865-1870, and the other the area to the north of Bahia Negra, in which Brazil and Bolivia delimited their frontier by the Treaty of Petropolis According to the traditional Paraguayan thesis, the question is one, not of zones, but of boundaries. The arbitrator will not be called upon to determine who has the better right to a certain territory, but what are the boundaries between Paraguay and Bolivia, west of the River Paraguay. Paraguay has consistently maintained this view from the very beginning of the dispute with Bolivia, as is proved by all the documents in her Chancellory. The Commission must have been aware of the Paraguayan definition of the Chaco dispute, and of Bolivia’s opposite contention that the dispute relates to a territorial claim. To decide in favour of the Bolivian contention was actually to prejudge the question. Nevertheless, the Commission regarded Bolivia’s arguments as valid, although it stated in its report that, if arbitration “ is to be acceptable to both parties, it cannot be tied to the wording of an arbitration agreement in which the settlement of the question might seem to be prejudged ”. The Commission would have performed a praiseworthy task if it had examined the diplomatic antecedents of the Chaco question. In that case, it might perhaps have omitted its proposal to submit to arbitration the whole of the Chaco from the Rio Verde northwards. In none of the treaties negotiated between Bolivia and Paraguay do Bolivia's claims extend as far as the Rio Verde. According to the last Treaty, that of 1907, the disputed area is that situated north of latitude 20° 30'. What is the reason for this generosity ? The Chaco zone north of the Rio Verde, where the large industrial establishments are situated, was never officially claimed by Bolivia until she embarked upon her predatory enterprise. The Commission has been good enough to approve Bolivia’s war aims after that country had failed in her design. Paraguay cannot accept Bolivia’s definition of the dispute, not only because this would mean that she was yielding to force, but also because she would thereby assist her adversary to exculpate itself from the guilt of provoking this war. In point of fact, the Bolivians have formulated a new doctrine which, although false, has found unexpected support from the very spokesmen of the League. This doctrine is that aggression in a disputed territory is not aggression. The doctrine that if a territory is in dispute it is impossible to determine the guilty party, in the event of armed collisions’ taking place, was recently expounded by Dr. Miguel Mercado Moreira, the Bolivian Chancellory’s assessor, in an attempt to exonerate his country from all responsibility, since President Salamanca himself had admitted that Bolivia had been guilty of aggression. The Commission accepted the argument, without stopping to consider how dangerous a precedent it would be for international peace if it were admitted that a country can invade neighbouring territory with impunity provided it declares that territory to be in dispute. “ In this dispute ”, says the Commission, “ each party claims ownership of the Chaco and therefore maintains that it is waging a defensive war in its own territory. How is the aggressor to be determined in such a conflict ? ” In the Commission’s opinion, therefore, the act of aggression does not determine the guilty party when the territory in which it took place is under discussion and there are no fixed frontiers. One would never have believed it possible that such a view could have prevailed, but the fact that it has been adopted by the Commission, which has conferred upon it a legal character it did not previously possess, compels Paraguay to re-affirm the contention she has always maintained, that the Chaco is not in dispute. To admit that the Chaco is in dispute is to prejudge in favour of Bolivia, not only the substance of the dispute, but also the question of her responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Paraguay has at all times maintained that the Chaco is not in dispute. This contention certainly did not originate after the battle of Zenteno. Bolivia’s first claim to this territory was confined to latitudes 20°, 210, and 220 (Benavente Protest of 1852). The official spokesman of the Paraguayan Government refuted this groundless — 23 — claim. " The Chargé d’Affaires asserts that Bolivia is a riparian State on the western bank of the Paraguay between latitudes 20°, 21°, and 220—that is to say, from Coimbra to a point opposite the Rio Apa. A mere assertion, however, is not sufficient, and we do not know where Bolivia will go with her proofs in order to become a riparian State on the Paraguay when she is hundreds of leagues aw ay on the other side of the Cordillera. W ill she be good enough to tell us who gave her the Gran Chaco and the right bank of the Paraguay ? The Republic of that name always owned the Chaco prior to the establishment of the Buenos Aires Government in 1620 and since then she has leigitimately owned the whole of the territory which was not expressly taken from her, so that we require and demand proof of Bolivia’s alleged right and of the transfer of ownership ”. He added that, “ in the interior of the Chaco, the boundary between the Republics of Paraguay and Bolivia has not been delimited ". For a long time, Bolivia respected Paraguayan sovereignty. Her first claims to a part of the Chaco were put forward as a result of the draft treaties which made it appear that a certain part of the littoral was in dispute. As a matter of fact, those treaties confirmed Paraguay’s rights. Generous concessions were made in them to Bolivia, after she had lost her territory on the Pacific coast, with a view to promoting trade, which, however, proved to be impracticable. As they were not ratified by Paraguay, those draft treaties confirmed the nation’s profound conviction that the Chaco was not in dispute. This was clearly stated by M. Juan Crisôstomo Centurion, Paraguay’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his note of November 3rd, 1888, in reply to the first official claim which Bolivia had made to Paraguay, after Paraguayan jurisdiction over the western bank of her river had been recognised without interruption for more than three centuries. This note, which is addressed to M. Claudio Pinilla, the Bolivian Chargé d’Affaires, contains the following passage : “ You also assert that Bolivia’s right has been recognised on various occasions by the mere admission of the fact that a territorial dispute exists, and notably, you state, by the drawing up of friendly agreements to settle that dispute by a compromise. It is true that Paraguay, inspired by fraternal sentiments towards the Bolivian people, whom she saw confined within their boundaries without any outlet, and also with a view to the future development of the economic interests of both countries by means of trade, willingly agreed to conclude pacts ad referendum, in a spirit of friendship, good faith and fraternity, all discussion of her rights of ownership and dominion being completely eliminated. But those pacts are not binding until they have been ratified or confirmed by the legislatures of both Republics. Any dispute necessarily presupposes a demand or claim. In this connection, no claim has been or could have been made by Bolivia to the River Paraguay, so that what you call a territorial question must relate to the borders or farthest extremity of the Chaco, where the boundary of both States is indefinite, and it could only mean the determina­ tion of the dividing line between the dominions of the two Republics in that vast territory. ” This was also clearly explained by the Paraguayan Chancellory to the Bolivian Chancellory in its note of January 8th, 1902 : “ My Government is most anxious to persuade your Government, in a friendly spirit, of its lack of information as to the historical facts and Paraguay’s indisputable titles to the territory of the Chaco Boreal included between the River Paraguay and the River Parapiti, the River Pilcomayo and the southern boundary of Chiquitos; and it ventures to hope that it will shortly be able to convince you that the uti possidetis of this Republic, from the Pilcomayo to Bahia Negra, is indisputable, and that the places in dispute are situated north of Bahia Negra, towards the southern boundary of Chiquitos, in the vicinity of the Santo Corazôn Mines or the territory adjacent to the old Xarayes Lake and the lake near the sources of the Parapiti and the Pilcomayo, and the mountains of the old Province of Upper Peru, where the Chaco Boréals ends—that is to say, the other side of the River Parapiti Paraguay’s conviction has thus remained unchanged. The national view that the Chaco is not in dispute has been steadfastly maintained throughout all the vicissitudes of Paraguay’s existence and is not the result of her recent military successes.

(b) The Hayes Zone. It should be noted that the explanation of the exclusion of the Hayes zone is given in less convincing terms than the defence of the clause regarding the withdrawal of the reservations to the Treaty of Petropolis. The Hayes zone is eliminated, not because this is a legal necessity, but as a concession to Paraguayan opposition. “ If President Hayes’ award were no longer challenged, Paraguay would perhaps find it less difficult to accept arbitration for the rest of the Chaco, regarding which there has been no arbitral decision.” The Commission bases its explanation of the exclusion of the Hayes zone on two arguments : that it is situated opposite Concepcion and Asuncion and that its exclusion might allay Paraguay’s “ resentment ” of Bolivia’s invasion. Hence, although there are so many moral and legal grounds on which the proposal could be based, the least important ones have been chosen. Instead of pointing out that Bolivia explicitly and implicitly recognised the Hayes award, the Commission assumes the existence of reservations which were never made, and presents its arguments in such a way as not to prejudice any subsequent Bolivian allegations. The clause relating to the Hayes zone is defended in a half-hearted manner that affords a marked contrast to the strong and earnest tone in which the necessity for Paraguay to renounce her claims to the north of the Rio Negro is urged ; to this latter end the Commission has used all the arguments it could find in its desire to restrict Paraguay’s rights, and has made capricious statements such as those analysed in the relevant chapter. — 24 —

While the Commission’s explanation of the clause relating to the Hayes zone cannot prejudice Bolivia’s legal position, the necessity for excluding the northern zone from arbitration is demonstrated in a manner which may prove detrimental to the future demonstration of Paraguay’s rights. This constitutes a prejudgment of the question, which the Commission had no right to make. It would have acted more logically if, in advocating that the Hayes zone should be excluded, it had shown the same warmth and enthusiasm and made use of the same dialectical resources as it displays in regard to the northern region. There would then have been no prejudgment, since President Hayes’ award creates in the territory south of the Rio Verde a legal situation which does not exist in regard to the territory north of the Rio Negro. The award of the President of the United States, Mr. Rutherford Hayes, has a twofold value as confirmation of Paraguay’s rights : that attaching to it as an international judgment and that of the titles submitted to the arbitrator. In this award, the President of the United States, after having " duly considered ” the memoirs, documents, titles, maps, quotations, references, and all the antecedents which the parties judged favourable to their rights, stated : “ I do hereby determine that the said Republic of Paraguay is legally and justly entitled to the said territory between the Pilcomayo and the Verde Rivers, and to the Villa Occidental, situated therein, and I therefore do hereby award to the said Republic of Paraguay the territory on the western bank of the river of that name, between the Rio Verde and the main branch of the Pilcomayo, including Villa Occidental After the award had been rendered, Bolivia made no reservation in regard to it. She submitted no documents in the nature of an appeal or an action. Neither in the Asuncion Chancellory, nor in that of Buenos Aires, nor in the State Department of the United States, can a single document be found proving that Bolivia protested against the award, which was made widely known. Her silence can be regarded as consent. Not only did she show by her inaction that she respected the award, but she also accepted it publicly through her First Magistrate, General Hilariôn Daza, three m onths after the award was rendered. In his “ Proclamation to the Nation ” of February 26th, 1879, President Daza, protesting against the occupation of Antofagasta by Chile, emphasised the fact that this had occurred “ a few days after the territorial questions connected with the Plata War between the Argentine Confederation and the Republic of Paraguay had been settled by an arbitral award.” We do not know what can be the document which, according to the report, Bolivia possesses to prove that her rights were not affected by President Hayes’ arbitral award. The President of the United States refused to allow any intervention on the part of Bolivia. Shortly before the award was rendered, the La Paz Chancellory sent a circular letter to the American Governments asserting Bolivia’s right to intervene in the arbitral proceedings. This memorandum, signed by the Minister Del Carpio, is dated April 18th, 1878, and states that the Bolivian Government, “ while it fully appreciates the qualities of uprightness and rectitude which President Hayes possesses in the highest degree, is justified in hoping that, in view of Bolivia’s opportune claim, and perceiving that the titles which support it are irrefutable, as, with his great perspicacity, he cannot fail to do, he will examine the data submitted and possibly suspend his award to avoid the risk of its being declared null and void to-morrow by the third Power concerned —namely, Bolivia ”. This claim is not a request to be allowed to intervene, as it is called in the actual memorandum. It is not an action against the award, which had not then been rendered, but an action to suspend judgment so that “ Bolivia may be heard and invited to become a party to the arbitration agreement, which she would be very glad to do ”. In spite of its restricted scope, the arbitrator rejected the Bolivian claim. The President, as the Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, observes in his note of September 6th, 1878, “ conceives that he cannot properly allow his judgment upon the subject to be controlled or influenced by the memorandum referred to ”. In conclusion, he added that he “ ardently hoped that, whatever that judgment may be, it will be acquiesced in by all the parties interested, including Bolivia herself ”. All the Bolivian negotiators, during a period covering nearly half-a-century, implicitly recognised the validity of the Hayes award, since the zone to which the American President’s decision related was excluded from their country’s claims. The Decoud-Qui jarro, Aceval-Tamayo, Benitez-Ichazo, and Soler-Pinilla Treaties respected Paraguay’s ownership of the Hayes zone, except for some slight encroachments in the extreme west of the triangle, due to ignorance of the exact course of the Rio Verde. The Decoud-Qui j arro Treaty, which was signed in the year following the award, is the most definite of them all. In this agreement, which was approved by the Bolivian Congress and by a Constituent Convention, that country “recognised” Paraguay’s ownership of the territory starting from latitude 22°, and Paraguay “renounced” in favour of Bolivia the remainder of the Chaco. We fail to see how or on what legal grounds Bolivia could rely on “ prescription ” against the Hayes award. On the contrary, it is Paraguay that has every right to bring forward the plea of prescription against these tardy claims to the Hayes zone, in view of Bolivia’s both tacit and open recognition, for nearly fifty years, of the indisputable validity of the award. The repudiation of the Hayes award came very late, when Bolivia first began to entertain schemes of conquest. Access to the River Paraguay through the northern part of the Chaco presented difficulties for the Bolivian army which did not exist in the south. The La Paz General Staff based its plans on the utilisation of the easy Pilcomayo route. Military necessity led to its armed penetration into that zone, where the chief Bolivian posts were established. It was in that zone that, according to General Kundt’s plans, the Bolivian army was to overcome — 25 —

Paraguayan resistance, seize the colonised region, and appear on the River Paraguay at the level of Puerto Casado. In order to carry out this plan, it was necessary to repudiate the legal validity of the Hayes award, and this is the task which Bolivian diplomacy has set itself during the last few years. The recognition as in the draft Treaty, of the existence of certain Bolivian reservations to the Hayes award, wrould, even if they were invalidated, and although they are established on a non-existent basis, constitute a confirmation of Bolivia’s claims and a justification of her policy of aggression. What Bolivia must do is to recognise clearly and plainly that the territory awarded by President Hayes belongs to Paraguay. If the League Commission had insisted on that recognition, it would have done a service to the cause of arbitration. The prestige of arbitration as an institution will continue to be seriously impaired so long as Bolivia’s repudiation of President Hayes’ award, as shown by her resort to armed force, persists.

C. T h e N o r t h e r n Z o n e .

Without pausing to consider the genuineness of the need for an outlet on the River Paraguay, the Commission concedes it, and bases thereon the demand for the preliminary exclusion of an extensive strip of territory in favour of Bolivia. The theory of necessity is of very doubtful legal justification. Its admission would entail incalculable upheavals in international life. If the Commission recognises that Bolivia has a right to satisfy her needs, real or supposed, there is no reason for denying the same right to Paraguay. The Commission was able to see for itself, on the spot, what the Chaco Boreal, and especially the littoral, means to our country. It inspected its industries, railways, ports, colonies and ranches. It was able to see that the Chaco contains almost half the whole economic wealth of the nation. If she lost the Chaco, Paraguay would lose one of the roots of her existence. This is not a question of need ful expansion, but a vital necessity. With it is bound up the very existence of the nation. In 1872, the Brazilian diplomat, Baron de Cotegipe, said that the Chaco “ is for the Paraguayans a question of internal and external security, of independence—in short, a question of life and death ”. And when the arbitral discussion with the Argentine Republic was being conducted before the President of the United States in 1878, the Paraguayan plenipotentiary, M. Benjamin Aceval, urged that “ if that territory should be ceded to the Argentine Republic, Paraguay will never be able to recover, she will see her national autonomy threatened from day to day and will end by losing her independence ” ; and he added finally that the Chaco * is as indispensable to her national life as is the air to living creatures ”. On the ground of the need for self-preservation, the Commission might just as well have proposed the exclusion of the whole Chaco, or at all events of its littoral, in favour of Paraguay. The introduction of this new factor of necessity into the dispute could only make it more complicated. Its admission, moreover, is contrary to the opinion expressed by the Commission that “ the Chaco question will only be settled by a delimitation of this disputed frontier ” between Paraguay and Bolivia. In referring to the necessity for Paraguay’s abandoning her claims to the region north of Bahia Negra, the Commission confesses that one of the bases for the settlement of the dispute consists in curing Bolivia of her obsession concerning an outlet on the river. In other words, the frontier question is only part of the problem. Its solution, therefore, would not necessarily settle the dispute. Even supposing that Paraguay were to admit that the whole Chaco was in dispute, and that the result of arbitration confirmed her in her possession, the causes of the war would still remain. The alleged “ imprisonment ” of Bolivia would not be ended, and she would in that case be entitled to continue to follow the “ policy of despair ” which the Commission finds to be justified. There would seem to be no doubt that Bolivia will be cured of her “ feeling of suffocation " only if she is awarded the littoral to the south of Bahia Negra, since the occupation of ports to the north, which the Commission found to be suitable for use, has not provided any relief from that obsession. The only arbitration, therefore, that could settle the dispute would be one favourable to Bolivia. And because Paraguay is sure that any tribunal would decide in her favour, even if the whole Chaco were admitted to be in dispute, she considers that arbitration would not remove all the causes of conflict. To cure Bolivia of her obsession, the judge would have to give a decision contrary to the rights of the case, thus abandoning his position as arbitrator in order to perform an act of spoliation disguised under the name of judgment. The truth is that Bolivia’s alleged need of access to the River Paraguay does not exist. The Commission confirmed the fact that modern ports could be established on the littoral occupied by Bolivia. “ The carrying through of this undertaking ”, it says, “ depends entirely on the funds available, for the project presents no insuperable practical difficulty for the present-day engineer If the eastern regions of Bolivia had really felt the need that is given as the reason for the “ policy of despair ”, she could, for less than what that policy is costing her, have met that need by constructing the best-equipped ports in South America. Moreover, it has not been proved that to the south of the ports occupied by Bolivia others can be found capable of being used by the eastern departments on an economic basis. Between Bahia Negra and Santa Cruz, there are natural obstacles—marshes, deserts and mountains which do not occur between Puerto Suarez and Santa Cruz, and which have constituted a natural — 2 0 — defence in the present war. The technical difficulties to be overcome there, owing to the floods, are much greater than those that have to be faced in the north. The further one goes down thé river, the more remote become the possibilities of economic utilisation of the ports by Bolivia. The award of the whole Chaco to Bolivia would not be effective in meeting any real need, even if one existed. It would, indeed, satisfy a craving, a psychological need, artificially fostered in the consciousness of Bolivia in order to provide a popular foundation for the bellicose policy of those in charge of her Government. This obsession will persist as a danger to Paraguay until solid and effective de facto guarantees are established such as Paraguay justly demands as a condition of her existence and security. Only on grounds of necessity could the Commission propose the exclusion of the northern zone in favour of Bolivia. It could have had no legal reason in view. There could be no equivalence or offset as between that region and the Hayes zone. No arbitral award has confirmed any Bolivian rights to the north of the Rio Negro. The compensation which it is apparently desired to provide for the recognition of the Hayes zone as belonging to Paraguay is unjust. The Commission insists on giving an irrevocable character to the statement of the boundaries of the Chaco made by the Paraguayan delegate in his letter of June 6th, 1933. That letter was transmitted solely for purposes of information, as Dr. Caballero de Bedoya made clear in his letter of June 16th, and could not be taken as justifying an arbitrary limitation of the claims of Paraguay.1 The boundary by Bahia Negra is on the littoral. The region to the north, as far as the Jaurü, is, in fact, the one covered by the reservations made by Paraguay to the Treaty of Petropolis. The Commission says that “ this is the area which is shown on recent Paraguayan maps as belonging to Paraguay, inconsistently with the claims wrhich fix the Rio Negro and the River Otuquis as the northern boundaries of the Chaco.” Diplomatic and colonial records and maps conclusively refute the assertion that the Jaurü area is shown as Paraguayan only on recent maps. The Commission itself acknowledges the existence of the reservations of 1903, and the statement just quoted is inconsistent with the relevant clause in its draft treaty. Her rights as far as the Jaurü have always been maintained by Paraguay. The latest declaration on this matter, before the war, was that made by the Paraguayan delegation, on January 18th, 1932, before the Commission of Neutrals at the Conference concerning the pact of non-aggression. The conviction that the national rights extend as far as the Jaurü is as old as the life of the nation. It is older than the dispute with Bolivia. To quote only a few precedents, let us recall how Dr. José Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia maintained these claims with constant persistency. In 1821, the dictator de Francia wrote to the Commandant of Concepcion : “ Moreover, you did well to send away, without granting them permission, those who came in the boat on the pretext that they wanted to make salt ; not only because that was an obvious pretence, but also because the salt-pans in question are our property, as is all the Chaco as far as the Jaurü.” In 1829, the dictator de Francia gave the Commandant of Itapüa instructions as to what to say to an emissary of the Brazilian Empire : “ As regards boundaries, which is the second point, you need only repeat what has been said on other occasions, and what the Envoy must know— namely, that as regards the eastern side of the River Paraguay, the boundary should be given as the Rio Blanco, which flows in a short distance above our Fort Olimpo, and as regards the western bank over the boundary is the River Jaurü, which has always been recognised and acknowledged as such.” In 1834, the same dictator wrote to the Commandant of Fort Borbôn : “ . . . The dividing boundary on the western bank of the River Paraguay, as fixed in time past between the Courts of Spain and Portugal, is the River Jaurü, which much higher up, near Matto Grosso, flows into the said River Paraguay, and, accordingly, the Fort of Coimbra, the township of Albuquerque, and others which the Portuguese previously established on the said western bank, belong to the Republic of Paraguay.” In 1840, the dictator repeated to the Commandant of Borbôn his statement that " the divisional line or boundary already recognised and established in time past by the Courts of Spain and Portugal was the River Jaurü.” Can it be said, after all this, that the extension of Paraguay’s claims as far as the River Jaurü was merely the result of the victory of Zenteno or of present-day maps ? Paraguay started her life as a republic with a profound conviction o f these rights, and they are proved in the colonial uti possidetis by innumerable documents, of which we shall quote only one. This is a statement of the boundaries of the Province of Paraguay made by the Spanish Governor, Don Lâzaro de Ribera, in 1803, eight years before the independence, for the “ Foreigner’s Guide to the Viceroyship of the Rio de la Plata ”, an official publication : “ This province extends to the north along the eastern bank of the said river as far as the river called Corrientes, which flows into the River Paraguay at latitude 22° 4' 35 and to the west of the said River Paraguay as far as the mouth of the Jaurü, at latitude 160 34' 22

It should be pointed out that only ignorance of colonial history could lead anyone to describe the Paraguayan claim to the enjoyment of her rights as far as the Jaurü as a fortuitous result of her victory.

1 See also the statement by the Paraguayan delegation on May 17th, 1934 (docum ent C./jgth Session/P.V .st1)» page 5). We have here merely a diplomatic stratagem on the part of Bolivia. — 27 —

We are bound to say that, to the north of Bahia Negra, there is a situation which the Com­ mission has failed to grasp. Paraguay maintains her claims over the littoral only as far as Bahia Negra. The littoral, from Bahia Negra to the Jauni, is under the sovereignty of Brazil, as Paraguay has admitted and recognised in various treaties. Paraguayan claims from the Rio Negro to the Jauni relate to the interior and not to the littoral.

D . P o l ic in g o f t h e C h a c o .

In its draft treaty, the Commission assigns to Bolivia police rights over a part of the Chaco. Police supervision is justified where there are interests to be protected. In the zones to be guarded by Bolivia there is not the slightest trace of a civilian settlement. What, then, is the Bolivian police going to guard ? The Commission did not visit those regions. But it has been able, it states, to ascertain the great difference between Paraguayan possession and Bolivian occupation. According to the report, the Bolivian occupation along the Pilcomayo has been “ purely military.” “ There can be no comparison ”, it states, “ between the development of the left bank of the Pilcomayo, a river which is incapable of carrying any important traffic, and the development of the right bank of the River Paraguay.” The excuse is not a valid one. The right bank of the Pilcomayo, which belongs to the Argentine, is prosperous and has a large civilian population. Although the Commission would have acted more wisely if it had itself visited the Bolivian zone, the testimony it adduces clearly shows the absence of any Bolivian civilian possessions in the Pilcomayo region. This testimony includes that of the Argentine Government, which, in its note of June 7th, 1933, stated that north of the Pilcomayo there is no civilian population with whom trade could be carried on. According to the transcription of this note in the report: “ Puerto Irogoyen merely provides a possibility of communication with desert areas situated north of the Pilcomayo frontier which have been occupied incidentally by the passage or the presence of an army. ” The other testimony is that of Bolivian authors, who, as the Commission states, themselves recognise that the ethnography of the Chaco is “ a dark page in our national history”. These words quoted by the Commission from the contemporary Bolivian author, Father Julio Murillo, are plain enough. It is quite obvious, therefore, that, at the present time, the regions which the Commission proposes should be supervised by Bolivia do not need to be policed by that country. For reasons which are readily comprehensible, police rights should be exercised exclusively by Paraguay. Our country has enormous interests in the Chaco, which it is its duty to protect. The police system proposed would give rise to further conflicts. Paraguay is anxious to avoid any grounds for protests, accusations and irritation between two countries which desire peace. The mere authority of the Hague Court would not be sufficient to prevent these clashes, which would disturb the course of the arbitration proceedings at every moment. When our country spontaneously offered an armistice, the Bolivian Government took advantage of this to fortify its position, to increase its effectives and war material and to spread in all parts of the world suspicion of our loyalty. If the regime proposed by the Commission is established, these acts which disturb the peace will be repeated. Since Bolivia has no interests to protect, the presence of her police in a part of the Chaco can have no other object than to enable her to maintain forces in that territory. Police duties should be entrusted to the party that has interests to protect.

E. D istribution o f t h e T r o o p s .

The Commission fails to explain satisfactorily the distribution of the military forces of both countries proposed in its draft. This distribution is unfair to Paraguay, which is required to withdraw for a much greater distance than Bolivia. It is true that Paraguay previously agreed that the Bolivians should withdraw to Villa Montes and Roboré, while her own troops would withdraw to the River Paraguay; but at that time the line separating the armies ran more or less along meridian 60° (Greenwich). At the time the Commission made its proposal, that line, as a result of the Paraguayan advance, ran westward as far as 6i° 30' (Greenwich). In the circumstances prevailing at the time, the withdrawal accepted after the Mendoza proposal was fair to both countries, since it involved their retreat for equal distances. After the military incidents in December, it implied the non-recognition of the situation they had created in the Chaco, which was unfair. The proposal takes no account of the position of the belligerents in the field. There might never have been any Bolivian aggression nor any sanguinary battles with the loss of thousands of lives in the Chaco ; Bolivia might never have been checked first in her attempts at conquest and then repulsed almost to the confines of the invaded territory. The fact of the war and its results, even though they may not be definitive, cannot be ignored. It would be contrary to the rules of historical logic for a victorious p>eople to submit to conditions of this kind. A people like the Paraguayans, who were unjustly attacked and whose sacrifices and efforts were finally crowned by the defeat of the invader, cannot stifle their feelings so easily and agree to disregard the heroism of their army. The Commission has treated the peoples as cold abstract entities, incapable of feeling or suffering. It has forgotten its own words, pronounced as a prelude to its action in America. — 28 —

Hardly had it reached Montevideo when it made the following statement, which Paraguay has not forgotten : " In the eyes of the Commission, the two belligerent countries are Members of the League, with equal rights to be heard, and are entitled to expect from it a constant endeavour to grasp their anxieties and their sacrifices. The high spirit of patriotism which animates both countries arouses the Commission’s profound esteem and respect. Both peoples are looked upon by the Commission, not as cold legal entities, but as human agglomerations which have undergone a severe trial of pain and blood.”

XI. CONCLUSIONS.

The prejudiced point of view of the authors of the report is perfectly plain. The whole document reveals anxiety to criticise Paraguay and to excuse Bolivia. The impartiality of judgment and the accuracy of conception which might be expected from a Commission of such high authority are not observed. The desire to blame Paraguay for the breakdown of the negotiations appears in every line. Even in the purely informative chapters, such as that dealing with “ Geographical Facts Concerning the Chaco ”, the Commission endeavours to lay stress upon what it regards as contradictions and inconsistencies in Paraguay’s conduct. The conduct of Bolivia, on the other hand, is sifted by no criticism whatever. No reference is even made to the manner in which that country attempted to ignore the Commission’s existence. Time after time it is sought to show that the military events of December influenced Paraguay’s attitude so that she took up a completely uncompro­ mising position and discarded her earlier standpoints. Nothing could be more untrue, and no suggestion could be more irritating to our country. This judgment casts grave doubt upon the Commission’s impartiality. It appears to have been influenced in the highest degree by amour propre in attributing to Paraguay an attitude such as might bring her into international contempt. The truth is that, both before and after the December victory, Paraguay upheld the same views as she had maintained prior to the war. Those views may be thus summarised : security first, and arbitration afterwards. The Commission itself is forced to admit that Paraguay’s position remained unaltered so long as it was conducting the negotiations. The Paraguayan assessor, Dr. Venancio B. Galeano, expressed those views at Montevideo. The President of the Republic expressed the same views to the Commission when it visited Asuncion. When replying to the December propo­ sals, the Paraguayan Chancellory, on December 15th—four days after Campo Via—re-stated with emphasis the declarations made to the Commission during its visit to Asuncion. The proposals of February 7th were merely a specific statement of Paraguay’s unalterable thesis. The Commis­ sion’s own report admits this, when it says that those proposals “ were based on the standpoint invariably maintained by Asuncion : cessation of hostilities and prevention of any possibility of their resumption by adequate measures of security ; and later discussion of the substantive question ”. Nor does the view that the extent of the Chaco is not in dispute date from after the victory of Campo Via. The Commission had already seen numerous diplomatic documents which bear this out. It is superfluous to recall the inexorable refusal of Paraguayan diplomacy to agree to any re-opening of the question of the Hayes award. As to the littoral, Paraguay’s determination to place it beyond discussion has never varied in the course of time. When it rejected the first official Bolivian claim to the River Paraguay, on November 3rd, 1888, the Paraguayan Chancellory said: “ Paraguay’s refusal to admit or recognise any claim to possession of or dominion over the right bank of the river is founded upon the indisputable fact that she has maintained her possession of that territory from the earliest times of the conquest and has continually exercised true sovereignty thereover—a fact which cannot be invalidated by the illustration given by Your Excellency. . . . Bolivia’s claim, only lately put forward by Your Excellency, to extend her right or dominion to the River Paraguay will always remain an innovation denied by the international relations between the two countries. . . In 1888, Paraguay adduced firm legal grounds for refusing to enter into any discussion as to the sovereignty over the river. To-day, in consequence of the Bolivian aggression, those grounds have been reinforced by others of no less force, inasmuch as they affect the present and future security of Paraguay. The littoral is the guarantee of our tranquillity, the pledge of our future peace. This was known to the Com­ mission before Campo Via. The Paraguayan assessor, Dr. Galeano, in the statements which he made to the Commission on behalf of the Government as soon as the Commission reached Monte­ video, called attention to Paraguay’s reasons for maintaining her dominion over the littoral undisputed. “ That we are unwilling to abandon our possession of the River Paraguay,” he said, “ is due to the fact that that dominion is a factor of vital importance, not merely for the safety of the Chaco, but also for the tranquillity of the remainder of the territory of Paraguay, confronted as it is by such a poor, yet restless, ambitious and audacious nation as Bolivia. If we were to lose our littoral to-morrow, how could we be secured against any fresh imperialistic designs on Bolivia’s part ? ” Was Paraguay, not having been defeated in battle, to abandon views that were based on the strictest justice and equity ? It may be urged that victory creates no rights. Paraguay has accepted the doctrine of August 3rd. But if victory creates no new rights for the victor, it does not weaken the rights that he already possesses. Yet the Commission seems to maintain the curious view that the victory of Campo Via imposed upon Paraguay an obligation to abandon her traditional claims. In one — 29 — passage of its report, it says that Paraguay “ had been more energetically maintaining, since her victory, the view already expressed to the Commission in November Did the Commission expect Paraguay to maintain it less energetically ? " After the December victory, Paraguay’s reluctance to submit to arbitration not merely the zone that had been assigned to her by President Hayes’ award, but also the rest of the right bank of the River Paraguay as far as Bahia Negra and the extensive hinterland she had occupied, had become marked ”, says the Commission, alluding to the refusal to submit to arbitration what Paraguay had never agreed to discuss. In other words, the Commission’s view was that victory conferred upon the vanquished rights which it had never recognised as belonging to the victor. The Commission is here proclaiming a new principle. It is conferring the rights of victory upon the vanquished. This new doctrine m ight be called the doctrine of the Rights of Defeat. In the Commission’s eyes, it was always Paraguay who was to surrender her rights. When M. Alvarez del Vayo and M. Vigier returned to Buenos Aires in January from their brief visit to Asuncion, they returned “ with the conviction that it was for the moment impossible to effect any rapprochement between the standpoints of the two Governments in regard to the settlement of the substantive question ”. Since it was Paraguay and not Bolivia who had to yield, the Commission finds that peace was put " entirely out of the question ” by the fact that, after Campo Via, the Government “ maintained unaltered the view which it had already stated to the Council and to the Commission ”. That view, which was in no sense new or subsequent to the victory, was that “ priority must be given to the final cessation of hostilities accompanied by such safeguards as would prevent their resumption ”. To maintain this demand was, in the Commission’s view, to put peace “ entirely out of the question ” ! So thought the Commission, although it repeatedly asserted that its “ ultimate aim and supreme desire ” was to make peace. The truth of the matter is that the Commission forgot that essential aim and contravened the clear intention of its terms of reference and of the League Covenant. It involved itself, as Bolivia desired it to do, in the complicated question of substance, instead of securing the cessation of the bloody conflict, as its duty dictated. It desired, as Bolivia also desired, to find a solution, while fighting was proceeding, for a question that it had not been possible to settle in fifty years of diplomatic negotiations. It defined that question, as Bolivia defined it, as a territorial question. Moreover, as Bolivia desired, it regarded that question as the only one in dispute between the two peoples. It believed that the settlement of a question which it prejudged from the standpoint of one of the parties would solve all the differences that have to-day brought two devoted peoples face to face on the battlefield. It paid no attention to the political aspects of the problem. It failed to realise that only a very small part of the dispute could be dealt with by arbitration. Above all, it endeavoured to turn its back upon a bloody reality. It was unwilling to realise the existence of a war and of an aggressor, and the consequences that that involved. Regardless of all morality, it placed the country that has faithfully discharged its international obligations on a footing of complete equality with the country that has violated them. It was unwilling to decide which was the guilty party and to demand punishment. It was unwilling to open its eyes to facts. Those facts are that a people which has been attacked because it would not yield to the dishonourable demands of a more powerful adversary has conquered, after sanguinary and unprecedented sacrifices and acts of heroism, and asks, as the fruit of its victory, no more than peace and tranquillity. We should like to believe that the Commission has been swayed by conflicting impulses. It has heard from the rulers of Bolivia of her immense and inexhaustible riches, her enormous superiority in population, and her potential offensive power, and has decided to advise Paraguay to sacrifice her rights and her security in order to obtain a peace that the existing instruments cannot provide. But the very reason for which Paraguay accepted the unequal struggle was in order not to make a definitive surrender of her rights. Whether they had been made before Campo Via or before the war, the Commission’s proposals would have been rejected in either case. In a word, whatever may be the judgment of the Council of the League on the report of the Chaco Commission, Paraguay is obliged to reject it, and to reject any future proposal that might be based on the conclusions of that report or on the draft treaties suggested by the Commission, for the practical and legal reasons hereinbefore set forth. The Commission’s report has aroused in the people and Government of Paraguay a sense of terrible and unmerited injustice. ANNEX.

The Secretary-General has received, together with the Spanish text of the memorandum, an atlas prepared by the Paraguayan Government entitled “ Jusqu’au Jaurü This atlas, which is at the disposal of any Member of the League which may desire to consult it, contains a certified reproduction of nineteen maps published between 1656 and 1812. The Paraguayan Government has attached a note in Spanish to each of these maps. A translation of these notes is given below :

\T ranslation.\ M a p N o . i (Sanson d’Abbeville, 1656).

Peru and the course of the River Amazon from its source to the sea. Taken from various authors and memoirs. By N. Sanson d'Abbeville, Geographer-in-Ordinary to the King. Published in Paris by Pierre Mariette, rue St. Jacques à l’Esperance. With royal privilege for twenty years, 1656. This map was engraved by Johannes Somer. The territory of Paraguay, which is surrounded by a pink line, is shown as extending northwards to beyond latitude 150 (nearly to 120) and including the whole of the Chaco. As in other maps by the same author, the western part, between the latitudes of Bahia Negra and the Jauni, shows the geographical position of various tribes which, according to the records, had always lived in the Province of Paraguay. Peru is divided in this map into Upper and Lower Peru. Upper Peru and the Charcas District are surrounded by a green line passing slightly to the east of Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua, at which point it comes nearest to the River Paraguay. It should be noted that Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua, known to-day as San José de Chiquitos, is about sixty leagues away from that river.

M a p N o . 2 (Sanson d'Abbeville, 1656).

N. Sanson d’Abbeville, Geographer to the King, was one of the most celebrated French geographers. This able cartographer made many maps of different countries and continents, among them one of South America which was made in 1656 (No. 2). In this map, the boundaries of Paraguay are shown in yellowish-green. Northwards, the frontier extends beyond latitude 15° On the west, the boundaries of the Chaco, the whole of which comes within Paraguayan territory, extend as far as the outskirts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua. The territory of Upper Peru is shown in orange. Among the native tribes whose geographical position is shown in this map and which actually lived in the Province of Paraguay, the following may be mentioned: the Gorgotoques, the Zapitalaguares, the Moconios, the Tamamacocis, etc., who lived in the region between Bahia Negra and the Jaurü. Like the majority of the colonial maps, this map does not show the River Jaurü, which only began to be known as a result of the treaty between Spain and Portugal in which it was fixed as the boundary between the possessions of the two Crowns in that part of the continent.

M a p No. 3 (N. Sanson, 1659).

South America, by N. Sanson, Geographer-in-Ordinary to the King. Revised and am ended in several places, according to the most recent data, by G. Sanson, Geographer-in-Ordinary to the King. Published in Paris by the author, at the galleries of the Louvre, with His Majesty’s privilege for twenty years, 1659. Paraguay is shown in this map surrounded by a yellow line. The Chaco, which is made to stretch as far as the outskirts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua, comes entirely within Paraguayan territory. On the north the boundaries of the province extend beyond the X arayes— i.e., beyond latitude 150 south. The Charcas District is surrounded by a pink line, and the point at which it is nearest to the River Paraguay is in the vicinity of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, wrhere it borders on Paraguay. As stated by the author, this map is a revised and amended edition of other earlier maps. None of the corrections it embodies, however, affected the boundaries of the Province of Paraguay- — 31 —

Map N o. 4 (P. Duval, 1679).

Peru, Chile, Magallanes, La Plata and Brazil. By P. Duval. Geographer-in-Ordinary to the King, 1679. In this map, the whole of the Chaco is shown to be within Paraguayan territory, which is surrounded by a green line. The word “ Paraguay ” runs across the Chaco, and the geographical position of various tribes which had always lived in the Province is shown in the region between the latitudes of Bahia Negra and the Jaurü. On the north, the boundaries of Paraguay reach as far as latitude 130 south, and on the west to the outskirts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua. The province of Upper Peru and Charcas is surrounded by a pink line. On one side of the map there is a brief description of the colonial provinces. With reference to Paraguay, it states that “ P a raguay consists of T ucumân, which comprises Santiago del Estero, Cordoba, THE CHACO, Trapalanda, Quirandies, and La P lata where there are several towns: Asuncion, Santa Fé, S. Spiritu, Buenos Aires, Ciudad Real de Ontiveros and Tayoba, Parana, Uruguay.” The Charcas district is shown to consist of Potosi, La Plata and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Map No. 5 (Hubert Jaillot, 1679).

South America. Divided into its principal parts, showing the various States, etc. Presented to Monseigneur le Dauphin by Hubert Jaillot, 1679. This is one of the best maps of the time. In making it, the author consulted all the data available in the Academy of Science and the best m aps then in existence. The boundaries of Paraguay extend further north than the Xarayes, on both sides of the River Paraguay. The whole of the Chaco comes within the territory of the Province. On the other hand, Upper Peru extends only as far as Santa Cruz la Vieja, as in nearly all the colonial maps. According to this map, the whole of the northern part of the Chaco comes within the district of Villa Real de Concepcion, and the south within that of Asuncion. In Upper Peru, the district of Santa Cruz de la Sierra is clearly marked by a green line, so that the townships of Santa Cruz la Antigua, Santa Cruz la Nueva, Jesüs Maria de los Montes, and Chilôn come within the jurisdiction of that town.

Map N o. 6 (P. Coronelli, 1689).

South America, “ drawn on the basis of the latest memoirs and dedicated to M. Jacques Colombo, Secretary of the Most Serene Republic of Venice, by Father Coronelli, cosmographer to the Most Serene Republic of Venice Published at Paris by I. B. Nolin, on the Quay de l’Horloge du Palais, near the rue de Harlav, at the sign of the place des Victoires, with Royal privilege, 1689. Father Vicente Coronelli was one of the most celebrated cosmographers of his time. On matters connected with geography and cartography his opinion was always final. This is proved by a large number of documents in the archives of the Venetian Republic. In the archives of the Terra Senate (H.1053), December 16th, 1684, there is a decree ordering the reformers of Paduan studies to base their work on the studies of Father Moro and Father Coronelli. Ibid. (H.1056), March 3rd, 1685. It was decreed that Father Coronelli’s proposals should he examined. The relevant documents show that the opinion of all those who examined his proposals was favourable. Ibid. (H. 1056). Decree of March 22nd, 1685, appointing Father Coronelli cosmographer to the Republic, with a salary of 400 florins. Ibid. (H.1107). Decree of the Senate appointing Father Coronelli reader in cosmography at the " Procuratia " at a salary of 200 ducats a year. Among the documents of the reformers of the Paduan studies is a collection of tables drawn up by Father Coronelli. In addition to the maps to which reference has been made, Father Coronelli made several Magnificent globes, two of which were ordered by the Bey of Tunis on May 6th, 1699, but do not appear to have reached their destination owing to the death of the Bey. In 1700, Father Coronelli was made Superior of the Order of Friars Minor. One of the globes made by Father Coronelli was for a long time in the hall of the Grand Council of the Most Serene Republic of Venice. It is now in the Sala del Pioveno, and on this Slobe, as on the attached map, the boundaries of Paraguay extend further north than latitude 150. In the map, Paraguayan territory is surrounded by a yellow line, the whole of the Chaco being included therein. — 32 —

Upper Peru is surrounded by a pink line, and its territory, like that of Charcas, extends only as far as Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua. We have enumerated in some detail the offices held by the author of this map in order to show that he was an authority on the matter.

Map N o. 7 (P. Vunder, early 18th century).

South America, based on the observations of the members of the Royal Academy of Science, etc. With additions. Published at Leyden by Pierre Vander A. A. Cum privilegio. This map clearly shows the boundaries of the colonial provinces of South America. Paraguay and the Rio de la Plata are coloured pink. On the north, the boundaries of Paraguay reach beyond the Xarayes and—on both sides of the River Paraguay—beyond latitude 150. The River Jaurü, which in this region served as boundary between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions, is known to be situated at approximately latitude 160 30' south. On the other hand, the boundary of Upper Peru, which includes the Charcas District and is coloured yellow in this map, does not comprise any part of the Chaco and does not extend beyond the outskirts of Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua, which stood on the site now occupied by San José de Chiquitos. The word “ Chaco ” is printed to the east of Chiquitos, on a level with the Xarayes.

Ma p N o. 8 (N. Visscher, about 1700).

“ Novissima et Accuratissima totius Americae descriptio ”, by N. Visscher (about 1700). This map carries the boundaries of Paraguay as far as latitude 130 south, approximately, and shows the Puerto de los Reyes, which was situated at about 180, and which Governor Irala ordered to be re-populated. Unfortunately, Nuflo de Chavez disobeyed these orders and, instead of settling there, he established Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which he afterwards succeeded in separating from the province of Paraguay. We shall have an opportunity, when describing Azara’s map of 1809, to reproduce this scientist’s opinion of Chavez’s conduct. As already stated, the majority of the colonial maps do not show the River Jaurü. The boundaries of the Province of Paraguay were much further north, but, owing to the continual encroachments of the Portuguese, the Crown of Spain finally accepted this river, which is situated at about latitude 160 30' south, as the boundary between the possessions of the two countries. This was the reason why the legal boundaries of the Province of Paraguay, on the north, which had been extended in the direction of Amazon, did not pass beyond that river.

Map N o. 9 (Guillaume de I’Isle, 1700).

This map is by one of the most celebrated of the many cartographers who worked at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries. Educated under the direction of his father, who had also been a cartographer, he made his first maps and globes at a very early age. He was only 27 when he was appointed a Member of the Royal Academy of Science of Paris, and Geographer to the King. He died at the age of 52, leaving an enormous collection of maps. Professor Konrad Krestchner says of this author: “ In many ways he attained perfection. Moreover, his maps are very clearly drawn. . . . He showed great common sense, leaving blank those countries which had not yet been directly explored, instead of filling in these spaces according to his fancy. Again, doubtful contours were shown by de l’lsle as such, by means of broken lines. The text of his maps was based on the scrupulous study of all the sources and data available.” The attached map by this author clearly shows that Paraguay w en t beyond latitude 150 and extended westwards nearly as far as Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Vieja. This author places the Chaco east of Chiquitos. Peru is shown divided into the districts of Charcas and Lima. The Charcas District reaches barely as far as Santa Cruz de la Sierra la Antigua. According to de l’lsle, Paraguay extended considerably further north than the River Jaurü, which was the boundary subsequently fixed for their American dominions by the sovereigns of Spain and Portugal. — 33 —

Map N o. io ( Guillaume de l’Isle, after 1705).

This map by Guillaume de l’lsle, printed in Amsterdam by R. and J. Ottens, after 1705, affords further proof that all the geographers and cartographers of the time considered that the boundary of Paraguay extended much further north than Bahia Negra. Various corrections have been made in this map of de 1’Isle’s as compared with his previous maps, but the boundaries of Paraguay have not been changed in the smallest particular.

M a p N o. i i (J. B. Homann, 18th century).

“ Totius Americae septentrionalis et meridionalis novissima repraesentatio quam ex singulis recentium Geographorum Tabulis collecta luci publicae accommodavit Johannes Baptista Homann, Sac. Ces. Maj. Geog. e Reg. Boruss. Societ. Scientiarum membrum. Norimbergae. Cum frivilegio Sac. Caes. Maiestatis.” In this map, which was made at the beginning of the 18th century, the district of Upper Peru and Charcas ends only a little to the east of the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, while the territory of the Province which is now the Republic of Paraguay extends northwards nearly as far as latitude 12° and westwards as far as the boundaries of Upper Peru, near Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Map N o. 12 (M. Seutter, after 1705).

The Map of Math. Seutter, Geographer to the Emperor, of Augsburg. This map is later than 1705. The boundaries of Paraguay are shown as extending further north than latitude 150. The old Puerto de los Reyes, which, as is known, was established by Paraguay on the Gaiba lagoon, is also shown. The district of the Audiencia de Charcas reaches only as far as the old city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which was situated in the vicinity of the present town of San José de Chiquitos. This map is fairly complete, having regard to the geographical knowledge possessed at the time, and shows that the geographers of all times and all countries, were fully cognisant of the boundaries of the American provinces.

M a p N o . 13 (Robert de Vaugondy, 1750).

South America, drawn on the basis of the most recent memoirs and of astronomical observations, by M. Robert de Vaugondy, son of M. Robert, Geographer-in-Ordinary to the King. Cum privilegio. 1750. This map shows that Paraguayan territory extends beyond 150 and westwards to the neighbourhood of the old city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. The whole of the Chaco Boreal is included within the boundaries of the province and runs northwards to beyond the River Jaurü, which is situated at 160 30'. Upper Peru and the Charcas District are surrounded by a pink line, and the eastern part barely reaches Santa Cruz la Antigua. This map affords further proof of the uniformity which existed during the colonial period in fixing the boundaries of the various American colonies, owing to the fact that the cartographers took careful note of the official decrees of the monarchs and bore them in mind when making their maps.

M a p s N os. 14 a n d 15 (M . Bonne, 1779 and 1782).

Between 1779 and 1782, M. Bonne, hydrographer to the French Navy, made a large number of maps of various parts of the world, many of which are included in the “ Atlas portatif à l’usage des collèges, par M. l’Abbé Grenet, professeur du Collège de Lisieux Among the maps by this author, two are of great importance from the point of view of the boundary question between Paraguay and Bolivia. One is the “ Map of Peru, including the Audiencias of Quito, Lima and La Plata, drawn and verified by astronomical observations by M. Bonne, Master of Mathematics. At Paris, etc. ” In this map, the territory of the Audiencia of Charcas, to which Bolivia claims to be the successor, reaches barely as far as the River Parapiti. The other, entitled “ Map of Paraguay and parts of the adjacent territories ”, places the boundary of Paraguay as far north as the Mandioré lagoon, which, in this map, is erroneously shown at about latitude 20°, whereas it is actually situated at about 180. — 34 —

These errors in latitude as regards Chiquitos and the northern part of the River Paraguay were frequently made in the colony. In the majority of maps made at this time, the townships of Chiquitos were always placed two or more degrees further south than their actual position, and were thus shown between the Pilcomayo and the Paraguay. This gave rise to confusions, such as that which occurred in connection with the Royal Decree of 1743, which it is now sought to turn to account by pretending that the Spanish monarch said things which he never even thought of.

Map N o. 16 (A. Zatta, 1785).

Map No. 16 is of Venetian origin. Its author, Antonio Zatta and his son, were cartographers who followed in the footsteps of Father Vicente Coronelli. This map is mainly of Paraguay. It is entitled : “ Paraguay and Part of the Adjacent Territories. Venice, 1785, Published by Antonio Zatta and Sons. With privilege of the Most Excellent Senate.” Paraguayan territory extends on both sides of the river nearly as far as latitude 15° south. The whole of the Chaco comes within Paraguayan territory. Although this map contains various errors which one would hardly expect to find, in view of the advanced stage of geographical knowledge at the time, it nevertheless shows that geographers of all countries took the view that the Chaco, for a distance much further north than Bahia Negra, belonged to what was then the Province of Paraguay.

Map No. 17 (Thaddeus Haenke, 1779).

Haenke’s map affords further proof, of Upper Peruvian origin, that Chiquitos did not extend as far as the River Paraguay. Thaddeus Haenke was born at Treblitz on October 5th, 1761. He began his studies in the seminary of Prague, from which he went on to Vienna University, where he distinguished himself by his scientific ability. In 1788, the Spanish Government decided to send a scientific expedition to America and Oceania, under Captain Alejandro Malaspina, of the Navy. Charles IV of Spain accordingly requested the University of Vienna to send him a good naturalist, and the choice fell on Haenke. In 1795, the latter settled on the outskirts of Cochabamba, where he established his fine estate of Elicona and took advantage of the twenty years which he spent in the country to explore it to its farthest limits. He left many written works, among which the following are worthy of mention : “ Description of the Kingdom of Peru ”, “ Description of the Kingdom of Chile ”, “ Report on the Maranon and its Tributaries ", “ Observations on the Volcano of Arequipa ”, “ Description of the Mountains of Indios Yucaraes ”, and various works on the “ molle ” or capsicum of Bolivia and on a camphor shrub. He was the author of an itinerary from Oruro to Jujuy, plans of Chulumani and Omasuyos, and the plan of the “ Intendencia ” of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, drawn by order of the Governor Intendente don Francisco de Viedma. This map was accompanied by a lengthy work, which is now in Lima, entitled : “ Report on the Navigable Rivers flowing into the Maranon, by His Majesty’s Naturalist, Don Thaddeus Haenke, Member of the Vienna and Prague Academies, submitted to the Governor Intendente of Cochabamba, don Francisco de Viedma.” This report states : “ The attached plans show the most important geographical features, particularly No. 1, which is of the new ‘ Intendencia ’ of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, which Your Excellency proposes to establish.” The report concludes with the following words, which leave no room for doubt as to its official character : “ This is all the information I have to give to Your Excellency on this serious and important matter, in pursuance of the mission you were good enough to entrust to me on March ist last.” (1799). In this map Chiquitos is surrounded by a blue line and does not reach as far as the River Paraguay on the east. The most southerly part reaches only as far as approximately 180 40'; that is to say, this district did not include the Chaco. The district of Santa Cruz reaches only as far as the place where the Parapiti should be shown, and is clearly delimited by a red line. Neither does the District of the Cordillera, now the Bolivian province of the same name, include the Chaco, and it only runs as far as the source of the Parapiti in the Chiriguana region, which is not under discussion.

Map No. 18 (Azara, 1809).

Azara’s maps are favourable to Paraguay, contrary to the assertions of the Bolivian jurists, and confirm the statements made by that author on more than one occasion. In defending Bolivia’s rights, Dr. Ricardo Mujia states that Azara’s authority is unimpeachable, since that distinguished scientist “ knew every inch of Paraguay and had surveyed the whole territory ”, Azara’s own words will show Bolivia that the Chaco belonged to Paraguay. Let us examine Azara’s final words, written in 1806, four years before the uti possidetis that formed the basis of the territorial rights of the “ Intendencias ” which became republics independent of the mother-country. Azara’s work entitled “ Description and History of Paraguay ” , published after the author’s death by his nephew, the Marquis of Nibbiano, clears up the matter. On page 291, he writes as follows :

“ In order to make my subsequent observations more intelligible, I should like to point out that, at first, the whole of the territory I am describing, and much more, was under one and the same Government, with a single bishop, both having their seat at Asuncion del Paraguay. “ Before very long, however, the province of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Moxos and Chiquitos broke away, and the Portuguese seized the island of Santa Catalina and the province of La Cananea, Vera, San Pablo and Guayrâ, all of which belonged to the same Government. “ Two provinces were formed in 1620 out of the remaining territory : Paraguay and Buenos Aires, whose boundaries, which for a long time were left unsettled, were fixed along the course of the River Parana. The Chaco portion still remained unallotted. Paraguay lost a great deal of territory, as the Portuguese seized the provinces of Xerez and Cuyabâ and subsequently Matto Grosso.”

These are the words of Azara—and his last words. Bolivia cannot dispute the authority of these statements, as we have already seen the high opinion the author of the “ Bolivian Contention ” has of Azara. Again, Azara, contrary to the assertions of the Bolivian jurists, did not consider that the western boundary of Paraguay was the river of that name, and admits that the final boundary between Paraguay and Buenos Aires in the Chaco region had not yet been fixed ; which means that part of that region belonged to Paraguay and the remainder to Buenos Aires. As can be seen, Azara’s opinion is wholly unfavourable to our neighbours. Let us now examine other evidence from the same authority. On April 30th, 1793, he wrote a letter to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires dealing with the demarcation of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions. This letter contains the following passage :

" Your Excellency will also see that two roads are shown on the map as connecting this province with that of Chiquitos : the road starting from the Sierra de San Fernando, a little beyond the township of Albuquerque, is the road taken by Juan de Ayolas, by which he reached Peru."

Consequently, Azara, in speaking of a road to connect this province with Chiquitos, states that it begins north of Albuquerque. This statement, which he made in April 1793, was confirmed by his note of September 19th of that year, addressed, like the previous one, to the Viceroy of Buenos Aires. The relevant passage in this note reads as follows ; “ After this has been done (a township established on the land which belonged to Santo Corazôn) and another established at the mouth of the Apa, or at all events after steps have been taken to make the township a Paraguayan one, I. should, after a careful survey has been made, order another township to be established near the River Paraguay at about latitude 18°, which is the site chosen by Domingo Martinez de Irala, where he ordered Nuflo de Chavez to establish a township so that Paraguay’s communications with Chiquitos and Peru might be secured. Chavez disobeyed these orders and with the men placed at his disposal by Irala for the purpose of establishing that township he founded the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. This township would provide us with a second line of communication with Chiquitos, would enable us to prospect the gold and diamond mines which, as I informed you on April 30th, I believe to exist near San Fernando, and, lastly, would keep a close watch over the Portuguese and see that they remained within their own boundaries; it would also give us an opportunity of sharing in the Portuguese mines, and even of possessing them later.” The very work on which it is sought to base the defence of the Bolivian contention contains the following observations (paragraph 507, with reference to the Cuyabâ mines) :

“ I do not know what is the yield of these mines or who is working them, but I have no doubt that, like everything else the Portuguese possess, they are well equipped. “ In any case, 500 Paraguayans, under an able leader like Moneda or Pinedo, would be able to destroy all the abovementioned settlements. They could sail up the River Paraguay as far as the mouth of the Jaurü, and thence proceed by land, attacking the said settlements one by one. The latter, which are full of slaves who are oppressed by their lazy owners, would fall of themselves."

Was Azara not aware that Chiquitos was only a stone's throw away from Cuyabâ, as compared with Paraguay’s present boundary ? Of course he was. — 36 —

Why then did he consider that 500 Paraguayans, and not 500 Chiquitanos, should be sent to defeat the Portuguese in those regions ? Because, as he knew every inch of this province, having lived there for several years, and had surveyed it and explored its archives, he was aware that those regions legally belonged to it and were within its boundaries. These, however, are not the only statements made by Azara that support Paraguay’s contention. The chief piece of evidence is to be found in No. 525 of his above-mentioned Geography:

“ Supposing that the minerals in question are not to be found in the San Fernando ranges, this (this) province can quite easily obtain a share of those of Matto Grosso, the Sierra del Paraguay and Cuyabâ. “ For this purpose, it would be sufficient to establish a township near the banks of the River Paraguay, opposite the mouth of the River Mbotetey or further north. ”

Look at the position of the River Mbotetey on Azara’s map, and imagine where the Paraguayan township in question would have had to be established. A township opposite that river or further north would have had to be situated north of Bahia Negra, in the territory seized by the Portuguese from the Province of Paraguay. If he had considered that the Chaco did not belong to Paraguay, how could Azara have proposed the establishment of a Paraguayan township in the extreme north of the Chaco ? Later on, Azara refers to the trade that could be done by the city to be established opposite the Mbotetey or further north, and states :

“ The chief article of trade would be salt, which is not found in any part of Brazil, but exists in Paraguay. This article could be sold very profitably by the Paraguayans at a lower price than it is being sold to-day by the (Portuguese) Sovereign. “ In addition to the above-mentioned advantages, others would be obtainable, because this township (i.e., the one to be established opposite the Mbotetey), if properly developed, might in due course attack the said Portuguese settlements (Coimbra and Albuquerque), or in any case take away their trade, and thus deprive their Sovereign of the profit he makes out of them. At such a distance, he would not be able to maintain them except at great expense, especially as the greater part of the inhabitants are negro slaves, who, like flies, would escape from their owners in order to find freedom with us. . . . “ The establishment of this township would also make it possible for us to open the shortest road to Chiquitos. . . . “ I doubt whether the Madrid Court could devise a plan that would cause more uneasiness to the Court of Lisbon than that of establishing such a township, which would be strengthened imperceptibly, because the Paraguayans would gradually populate the intermediate territory. This has recently occurred as the result of the mere establishment of Concepcion by Pinedo, not an inch of land remaining unpopulated between that town and Manduvirâ. The enormous distance between them can be seen on the attached map. ”

Bolivia cannot say that Azara’s statements are opposed to the Paraguayan contention. Azara clearly states that the township was not to be established in Chiquitos, but that it was from this township that a shorter road to that province was to be opened, and he adds that the • intermediate territory would be populated by the Paraguayans, and not by the Chiquitanos. As if this was not enough, Azara further states, in No. 570 of his above-mentioned Geography, that: “ They (ridges of hills containing saltpetre) are to be found in abundance in the Chaco, but there are none in Curupaity and in the eastern part of this province. ”

This implies that the Chaco forms the western part of this province. According to Azara’s final pronouncement, the boundaries of the Province of Paraguay re a ch ed as far as the foothills of the Andes. Azara’s final pronouncement is sufficiently conclusive to settle the boundary question with Bolivia, in view of the value which that country attaches to his authority, according to Dr. Ricardo Mujia.

The following extract is taken from Chapter I of the “ Historical Description of Paraguay and the Rio de la Plata ”, published after Azara’s death by his nephew and heir, the Marquis of Nibbiano : " We will take as boundaries latitudes 16° and 53° ; as the western limit the most easterly slopes of the chain of the Andes, between the above-mentioned latitudes; and as the eastern limit the Patagonian coast as far as the Rio de la Plata, continuing thereafter along the Brazilian frontier as far as 22°, and thence northwards as far as 160 ”.

Those were Azara’s last words on the subject. How could Azara have said at an earlier date that the River Paraguay could be r e g a r d e d as the western boundary of Paraguay ? — 37 —

Simply because he wrote that description of the province in a hurry. . . But let us see what he says himself in his letter to his publisher, Walkenaer: " In my preface you will find all the necessary particulars of my public life and works. But since you wish to know how much of what M. Moreau Saint-Mery has said of me is true, I would add that all the works he enumerates refer to the maps I have sent you, to my animals and birds, and to the description which is to be printed. " He refers to another historical, political, physical and geographical description of the province of Paraguay which he had begun to translate ; but take no notice of this, because that description is included in the one which is to be published, and because I wrote it in a hurry when I had not the knowledge which I possess to-day, and simply to meet the request of the M unicipality of Asuncion. ”

This letter is dated December ist, 1805. It would be impossible to find a more categorical disavowal. Nevertheless, Bolivia, through her jurists, states that Azara supports her claim and that the Chaco is not marked on the map which he presented to the Corporation of Asuncion. It is true that the Chaco is not shown on that map ; neither does it appear in various maps of the Republic to be found there ; but the idea that Paraguay is not the owner of the Chaco never passed for a moment through their authors’ minds. Azara also gives his final opinion in the letter which he sent to this publisher on August 29th, 1805. He observes : “ As regards the special maps and plans, you will receive four, one of South America and the others relating to my travels. I consider that these four plans or maps are better than the one you have, which is on too small a scale. Consequently, an atlas can be made by adding the maps I shall send you very shortly, which have been printed here. These maps are undoubtedly the best in existence.”

In the map of Paraguay included in Azara’s magnificent atlas published at Paris in 1809, the whole of the Chaco, from the Bermejo to the Jaurü, is assigned to that province. This, then, is Azara’s last word, written at a time when, on his own admission, he possessed knowledge which he had not possessed when he dealt with the matter at an earlier date. It is the final testimony of the renowned scientist, who spent the best years of his life in Paraguay studying the natural sciences and verifying many geographical points by astronomical observation, with a view to collecting data which would enable him to make an accurate map of the province. He afterwards rendered service to his sovereign as chief of one of the parties of surveyors appointed to fix the boundary between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions.

Map N o. 19 (Delamarche, 1812).

Universal Atlas, by Robert the |Geographer and Robert de Vaugondy, his son, also a geographer, based on the map of the French Empire, with corrections and additions, and divided into departments, by C. F. Delamarche, Geographer, their successor. From this atlas we have taken the “ Map of the World drawn up according to new astronomical observations by M. Robert de Vaugondy, Geographer, 1812 ” (Map 17). In this map of the world, the boundaries of Paraguay extend beyond latitude 150 south and westwards nearly to Santa Cruz de la Sierra. As in all the colonial maps, the limits of Upper Peru barely extend beyond the above-mentioned city.