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Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies

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Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies Militär und Sozialwissenschaften 30 Hans Born/Marina Caparini/Philipp Fluri (Eds.) Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1 Militär und Sozialwissenschaften herausgegeben vom Arbeitskreis Militär und Sozialwissenschaften (AMS) und von Chance Schweiz – Arbeitskreis für Sicherheitsfragen Band 30 2 Hans Born/Marina Caparini/Philipp Fluri (Eds.) Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies Proceedings of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Workshops at the 4th International Security Forum, Geneva, November 15–17, 2000 Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 3 Contents Preface Theodor H. Winkler Acknowledgments Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control and Reform of the Security Sector Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri Part I: Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform Introduction Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri 1 Mapping the Landscape: The State of Security Sector Reform in the New Millennium Christopher Smith 2 West Looking East: Civil-Military Relations Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe Anthony Forster 3 East Looking West: Security Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: the Work of Civilians and the Military Jan Arveds Trapans Part II: Parliamentary Oversight of the Armed Forces Introduction Hans Born 4 Recipients’ Views on Interparliamentary Assistance: A Short Report on the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Georgia – Three Case Studies Hans Born 5 Parliamentary Control of the Armed Forces in the Czech Republic Marie Vlachova 6 The Role of the Argentine Parliament in the Democratic Control of the Military (1984–2000): Lessons Learned and New Challenges Luis Eduardo Tibiletti Part III: Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe Introduction Marina Caparini 7 Promoting Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons Learned and Future Research Agendas Tim Edmunds 8 The Persistent Problem of Civil-Military Relations in East and Central Europe: A Briefing Note on Democratic Control of Armed Forces David J. Betz 9 Problems of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe Janos Matus 10 Civil-Military Relations Theory in the Post-Communist World: The Role of Religion Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker 4 11 Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces in Slovenia Marjan Malesic and Ljubica Jelusic Part IV: Lessons Learned and Upcoming Research Issues Introduction Hans Born 12 Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Renaissance of an Old Issue? Karl W. Haltiner 13 Models of Democratic Control of the Armed Forces: A Multi-Country Study Comparing ‘Good Practices’ of Democratic Control Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Karl Haltiner 14 Measuring the Civil-Military Complex: Tools and Some Empirical Evidence Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann 15 Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Lessons Learned and Upcoming Research Issues. CESS’ Briefing Note Peter Volten and Magriet Drent 16 A New Defence Environment – Consequences for Political-Military Relations Anna Bolin 17 Lessons Learned and Upcoming Research Issues in Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform Marina Caparini Conclusion Hans Born and Philipp Fluri Note On Contributors The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 5 Preface The International Security Forum (ISF) is designed as a forum for discussing ways to increase communication and coopera- tion between institutions engaged in research related to international security in Europe and North America. Over the years, the ISF has brought together hundreds of researchers, academics, civil servants, military officers and media representatives from some 50 countries. Due to the success of the ISF, the Swiss government, more particularly the Swiss Federal Depart- ment of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, continue to support the biennial ISF conference, which is alternately organised in Geneva and Zurich. The 4th ISF conference in Geneva, November 15–17, 2000, brought together about 600 high-level civil servants, diplo- mats, military officers, academics and representatives of non-governmental organisations from the Euro-Atlantic area. The conference succeeded in creating a platform for discussion and exchange on current security issues. The conference promoted practical cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic Partnerhsip Council (EAPC) member states and beyond and identified future key issues and trends in international security. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was one of the three principal organisers of the 4th ISF, along with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitar- ian Demining (GICHD). Just previously, in October 2000, DCAF was inaugurated by Federal Councillor Adolf Ogi, the then Swiss President, who expressed the wish of Switzerland and 30 other countries, to support and underline the goal of promoting democratic civil-military relations. In its short existence, DCAF has supported and initiated over a hundred seminars, publications and projects, among others, an international project to advise President Kostunica of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on future security sector reform. This publication includes the proceedings and presented papers of the various DCAF-sessions at the 4th ISF. The publi- cation reflects the debates and foci of attention of the DCAF-sessions: security sector reform, parliamentary oversight of the security sector, research on civil-military relations as well as lessons learned and recommendations for future democra- tisation of civil-military relations. Via this and future publications DCAF remains committed to foster an international and multidisciplinary dialogue that will identify future key issues and trends in good governance and security sector reform. Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler Director DCAF, Geneva Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank all the authors of this edited volume for their research and excellent contributions. In addition, we wish to express our sincere thanks to Marlene Urscheler from DCAF in Geneva, who assisted in putting this volume together. We are also grateful to Martin Noble (of Martin Noble Editorial, Oxford, United Kingdom), who dili- gently reviewed the contributions of non-English speaking authors. Last but not least, we would like to thank Dr. Paul Klein, Research Director at SOWI I in Strausberg (Germany) and editor of the Military and Social Sciences Series of the NOMOS publishing house. The views and opinions expressed (unless otherwise declared) are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Geneva, July 2002 Hans Born, Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri 7 Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control and Reform of the Security Sector Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri 1 From Civil-Military Relations to Security Sector Reform When the Fourth International Security Forum was held in November 2000, the idea of security sector reform (SSR) was just beginning to spread through those policy and academic communities that deal with democratisation, development, defence and foreign assistance. The emergence of the concept suggested the growing acceptance of a broader definition of security than the traditional definition focused on military security of the state. According to this broader definition, security has non-military elements as well, and the object of security is not only the state, but importantly includes indi- viduals and society more widely. Security sector reform expands the scope of security to include “public security”, or the safety of the individual from threats of crime, disorder and violence. Because security sector reform is focused on the use of public resources to provide security for citizens, there is a necessary focus on state (often executive) institutions and public policy. Such institutions include military forces, policing structures, paramilitary forces, intelligence agencies, border management services, the judicial system and penal institutions, as well as the state bureaucratic structures that exist to formulate policy and manage these institutions. SSR accordingly recommends a holistic approach to reforming state structures responsible for providing security. Although the policy and academic communities promoting the security sector reform concept endorse a holistic approach, serious practical obstacles exist in achieving a comprehensive and integrated understanding of the enormously complex public policy domains relevant to security, and the multi-sectoral reform requirements that would inhere in a democratising state. Security sector reform also has a very significant emphasis on good governance, characterised by the World Bank as encompassing the rule of law, predictable, transparent and open policy-making, a professional bureaucracy that serves the public good, and a vibrant civil society that actively engages in public affairs. Good governance when applied to the security sector means the effective, efficient, participatory, accountable and transparent functioning of state institutions that have a monopoly of legitimate use of coercion. Security sector reform represents the evolution and rapprochement of two distinct policy and academic communities concerned
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