DOCSLIB.ORG

Greece's Painful Political Transition

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Greece's Painful Political Transition INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS Greece’s Painful Political Transition Analysis of the Upcoming National Elections NICK MALKOUTZIS May 2012 The 6 May general elections in Greece promise to be like no other in the country’s recent history. Since 1974, the country has been governed almost exclusively by centre-left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy, which have usually gathered more than 80 percent of the vote. However, opinion polls indicate this could be halved on May 6 and neither party will be able to form a government on its own. The sharp decline in the two parties’ popularity is a result of the damaging impact of the crisis, the unpopularity of some of the measures agreed with the European Union and International Monetary Fund and a disenchantment with the established political system. Greece’s parties have split into two broad camps: those who are willing to adhere to the EU-IMF loan agreement, or Memorandum, and those who oppose it and want it changed or scrapped. The options for coalition agreements after 6 May are limited since few parties are willing to cooperate with New Democracy and PASOK as that would entail implementing further austerity. Beyond the EU-IMF memorandum, other crisis-related issues such as growth and jobs, immigration and social cohesion have prominent positions on the electoral agenda. After five years of recession and two years of tough austerity, Greek society is in a state of flux. This has generated a sense of doubt that is reflected in the uncertainty about what will emerge from the period of political transition that Greece is going through. Nick Malkoutzis | GreeCe’S Painful Political Transition Content 1. The Last Days of the Political Old Guard. 3 2. A fragmented Political Scene. 5 2.1 The Pro-Memorandum camp . 6 2.2 Memorandum Moderates. 8 2.3 The Anti-Memorandum Camp on the Left . 8 2.4 The Anti-Memorandum Camp on the Right . 9 2.5 Smaller Parties and the Winning Threshold. 10 3. Elections through the Prism of the Crisis . 11 4. Dominant election Themes. 12 4.1 Austerity . 12 4.2 Growth and Jobs . 13 4.3 Other Issues . 16 5. Protest and Participation . 20 6. A Difficult and Uncertain Transition . 22 1 Nick Malkoutzis | GreeCe’S Painful Political Transition 1. The Last Days of the Political Old Guard Table 1 The parliamentary elections due to take place in Greece Year PASOK % New Both Democracy % parties % on 6 May promise to be a watershed in the country’s political history. For only the second time since the mid- 1974 13.58 54.37 67.95 1970s, it is highly unlikely that either the centre-left 1977 25.34 41.84 67.18 PASOK or the centre-right New Democracy will be able 1981 48.07 35.88 83.95 to gather enough support to form a government on its 1985 45.82 40.84 86.66 own. 1989 39.13 44.28 83.41 (June) Since last year, opinion polls have been showing a rise 1989 40.67 46.19 86.86 in the popularity of the three left-wing parties: the dog- (November) matic Communist Party (KKE), the hard-left Coalition of 1990 38.61 46.89 85.50 the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the more moderate Dem- ocratic Left. A new party, Social Pact, was formed this 1993 46.88 39.30 86.18 March by MPs ousted from PASOK: it might also draw 1996 41.49 38.12 79.61 some PASOK supporters. 2000 43.79 42.73 86.52 2004 40.55 45.36 85.91 On the right, New Democracy faces a threat from the 2007 38.10 41.84 79.94 nationalists of the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the newly-formed Independent Greeks, which was also 2009 43.92 33.48 77.40 set up by deputies forced out of the conservative party. Beyond that, a number of smaller parties, including the Over the past four decades, PASOK and New Democracy neo-fascist Chrysi Avgi and the Ecologist Greens appear have built an economic model based largely around the to be on the cusp of entering Parliament. public sector and a prevalent patron–client relationship between the parties and voters, either on an individual Greece is witnessing the end of the era in which just two level or as professional groups or unions. parties took turns in running the country. Spending on civil servants’ salaries, public procurements PASOK and New Democracy have dominated Greek poli- and social benefits grew steadily from the early 1980s tics since the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, and formed the basis of interaction between politicians garnering more than 80 per cent of the vote at most of these two parties and the public. Through hirings in elections. Barring an unsuccessful five-month coalition the public sector and constant legislative interventions between ND and leftists in 1989, these two parties have often aimed at favouring particular groups, PASOK and shaped Greece over the past 38 years. Recent surveys New Democracy extended Greece’s labyrinthine bureau- suggest that support for both parties could sink to record cracy. This benefited a number of professional sectors, low levels at the upcoming elections. A survey by one of such as notaries, lawyers, civil engineers and account- Greece’s leading polling companies, Public Issue, pub- ants, who gained guaranteed work and income as their lished on 20 April,1 indicated that combined support for services were required for even the most basic operations the two parties might struggle to reach even 40 per cent. in the private sector. Both parties also pandered to trade unions and other professional groups in the private sector and shied away from serious structural reforms, such as an overhaul of Greece’s pension system or the liberalisation of closed professions. Furthermore, PASOK and New Democracy took advantage of the lack of transparency with regard 1. Public Issue: »Political Barometer Number 104, First Half of April to party funding and an absence of political accountabil- 2012«, available at: http://www.publicissue.gr/2002/varometro-apr- 2012-3o-ektakto-kyma/. ity – characterised by a law that grants MPs and ministers 3 Nick Malkoutzis | GreeCe’S Painful Political Transition immunity from prosecution – to develop questionable nomic, political and social flux that the upcoming elec- and sometimes corrupt relationships with private com- tions will take place. panies and businessmen. With the two main parties finding it hard to attract com- The course of Greek politics over the past four decades bined support of about 40 per cent, Greece is on track has largely been defined by what Stavros Lygeros, author for the sort of election result that it has not seen in more of the book From Kleptocracy to Bankruptcy, refers to as than six decades, as Yiannis Mavris, the CEO of Public the »unwritten social contract«. In other words, many Issue,2 explains. voters were willing to turn a blind eye to waste and cor- ruption in the public sector and broader inefficiencies, »In Greek political history, such low percentages for the such as tax evasion, in the private sector as long as the two main parties were last recorded 62 years ago during politicians responsible rewarded them with civil service the first post-civil war elections, held in 1950,« he wrote jobs, public procurement contracts or social benefits or in a recent analysis. »Today’s fragmentation of the politi- by leaving alone the profitable enclaves created by some cal powers can take on such ideological and political pro- professional groups. portions that it will be similar to the fragmentation of the 1950 elections. Then, it was the result of Nazi occupation However, the economic and social devastation wreaked and the Civil War; today it will be the political and elec- by the economic crisis over the past few years has shat- toral result of implementing the EU-IMF Memorandum.« tered the social contract that Lygeros describes. The lack of public money and the pressure for structural reforms The signing of the first memorandum in May 2010 and applied by the »troika« comprising the International the second agreement in February 2012 are landmarks Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the Eu- because they defined the way Greece will tackle its eco- ropean Commission, however, mean that Greek politi- nomic crisis, the country’s position in the EU and the rela- cians have lost their traditional policy tools. Meanwhile, tions between the parties and the electorate. While the there is a growing realisation among many in Greece of past few years have brought unprecedented turbulence the damage the country has suffered as a result of the to Greece’s relations with its European partners, this unquestioning support that New Democracy and PASOK hardly compares to the political and social unrest experi- have enjoyed since the 1970s. enced within the country. The final factor that has undermined support for the In May 2010, a wedge was driven deep into Greek pol- two main parties is the unpopularity of the measures itics. The PASOK government drew support only from adopted, first by PASOK and then by the coalition gov- LAOS in its decision to sign the Memorandum. New De- ernment as part of the two bailouts Greece has agreed mocracy’s decision to oppose the agreement saw the cre- with the Eurozone and the IMF. While support for struc- ation of an anti-Memorandum camp with roots in the tural reforms remains strong, the deepening recession political mainstream, not just on the hard left or right. Greece has been suffering since 2008 has eroded peo- As a consequence, the political debate over the past two ple’s confidence.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • First Thoughts on the 25 January 2015 Election in Greece
    GPSG Pamphlet No 4 First thoughts on the 25 January 2015 election in Greece Edited by Roman Gerodimos Copy editing: Patty Dohle Roman Gerodimos Pamphlet design: Ana Alania Cover photo: The Zappeion Hall, by Panoramas on Flickr Inside photos: Jenny Tolou Eveline Konstantinidis – Ziegler Spyros Papaspyropoulos (Flickr) Ana Alania Roman Gerodimos Published with the support of the Politics & Media Research Group, Bournemouth University Selection and editorial matter © Roman Gerodimos for the Greek Politics Specialist Group 2015 All remaining articles © respective authors 2015 All photos used with permission or under a Creative Commons licence Published on 2 February 2015 by the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) www.gpsg.org.uk Editorial | Roman Gerodimos Continuing a tradition that started in 2012, a couple of weeks ago the Greek Politics Specialist Group (GPSG) invited short commentaries from its members, affiliates and the broader academ- ic community, as a first ‘rapid’ reaction to the election results. The scale of the response was humbling and posed an editorial dilemma, namely whether the pamphlet should be limited to a small number of indicative perspectives, perhaps favouring more established voices, or whether it should capture the full range of viewpoints. As two of the founding principles and core aims of the GPSG are to act as a forum for the free exchange of ideas and also to give voice to younger and emerging scholars, it was decided that all contributions that met our editorial standards of factual accuracy and timely
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Syriza: an Interview with Aristides Baltas
    THE RISE OF SYRIZA: AN INTERVIEW WITH ARISTIDES BALTAS This interview with Aristides Baltas, the eminent Greek philosopher who was one of the founders of Syriza and is currently a coordinator of its policy planning committee, was conducted by Leo Panitch with the help of Michalis Spourdalakis in Athens on 29 May 2012, three weeks after Syriza came a close second in the first Greek election of 6 May, and just three days before the party’s platform was to be revealed for the second election of 17 June. Leo Panitch (LP): Can we begin with the question of what is distinctive about Syriza in terms of socialist strategy today? Aristides Baltas (AB): I think that independently of everything else, what’s happening in Greece does have a bearing on socialist strategy, which is not possible to discuss during the electoral campaign, but which will present issues that we’re going to face after the elections, no matter how the elections turn out. We haven’t had the opportunity to discuss this, because we are doing so many diverse things that we look like a chicken running around with its head cut off. But this is precisely why I first want to step back to 2008, when through an interesting procedure, Synaspismos, the main party in the Syriza coalition, formulated the main elements of the programme in a book of over 300 pages. The polls were showing that Syriza was growing in popularity (indeed we reached over 15 per cent in voting intentions that year), and there was a big pressure on us at that time, as we kept hearing: ‘you don’t have a programme; we don’t know who you are; we don’t know what you’re saying’.
    [Show full text]
  • Download/Print the Study in PDF Format
    GENERAL ELECTION IN GREECE 7th July 2019 European New Democracy is the favourite in the Elections monitor Greek general election of 7th July Corinne Deloy On 26th May, just a few hours after the announcement of the results of the European, regional and local elections held in Greece, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras (Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA), whose party came second to the main opposition party, New Analysis Democracy (ND), declared: “I cannot ignore this result. It is for the people to decide and I am therefore going to request the organisation of an early general election”. Organisation of an early general election (3 months’ early) surprised some observers of Greek political life who thought that the head of government would call on compatriots to vote as late as possible to allow the country’s position to improve as much as possible. New Democracy won in the European elections with 33.12% of the vote, ahead of SYRIZA, with 23.76%. The Movement for Change (Kinima allagis, KINAL), the left-wing opposition party which includes the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the Social Democrats Movement (KIDISO), the River (To Potami) and the Democratic Left (DIMAR), collected 7.72% of the vote and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), 5.35%. Alexis Tsipras had made these elections a referendum Costas Bakoyannis (ND), the new mayor of Athens, on the action of his government. “We are not voting belongs to a political dynasty: he is the son of Dora for a new government, but it is clear that this vote is Bakoyannis, former Minister of Culture (1992-1993) not without consequence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Greek New Right and the Eve of Conservative Populism
    The Visio Journal ● Volume 4 ● 2019 The Greek New Right and the Eve of Conservative Populism By Athanasios Grammenos* The economic crisis in the Eurozone and its dire consequences for Greece terminated the post-1974 political consensus, which was based on a pro-European and democratic concord. The collapse of the social-democratic Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in 2012 allowed space for the radical Left to become the new pole of the political system. To this advancement, the conservatives, being the other pole, responded with a prompt enlargement attempt to the populist right-wing, engulfing several elements of the New Right. This new political order had had evident effects on the party’s social and economic agenda, escalating the political debate at the expense of established liberal principles. While in opposition (2015-2019), New Democracy (ND), member of the European Peo- ple’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, voted against a series of liberal bills (gender issues, separation of Church and State, the Macedonian issue, etc.) giving out positions with authoritarian and populist essence. The purpose of this paper is to focus on the rise of the New Right in Greece (2012-2019) in both rhetoric and practice, and its consequences for law institutions, human rights and foreign affairs. It is argued that ND, currently holding office, has been occupied by deeply conservative elements as a response to the rise of the radical Left, adopting occasionally ultra-conservative positions in a wide range of social issues. Although the case of Greece is unlike to those in other European countries, nevertheless, to the extent to which the preservation of traditional hierarchies come into question, the political platform of the Greek New Right, which has embedded authoritarian attitudes cultivating an anti-liberal sub-culture to the party’s voters, is in accordance with several European conservative movements like in Hungary, Austria or Czechia.
    [Show full text]
  • AHEPA Steamed About White House GID Event NYC Mayor Holds Greek
    O C V ΓΡΑΦΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ Bringing the news ΤΟΥ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ to generations of ΑΠΟ ΤΟ 1915 The National Herald Greek Americans A WEEKLY GREEK AMERICAN PUBLICATION c v www.thenationalherald.com VOL. 12, ISSUE 599 April 4, 2009 $1.25 GREECE: 1.75 EURO AHEPA Steamed About White House GID Event Ike Gulas Sends Letter to Obama Criticizing “Gatekeepers,” Andy Athens Issues Response By Evan C. Lambrou Special to The National Herald NEW YORK – Most Greek Ameri- cans would agree that the annual White House ceremony commemo- rating Greek Independence Day is a very special event. Community leaders emphasize that it is an hon- or for the President of the United States to issue a proclamation rec- ognizing the significance of Greek Independence Day each year, and to be able to meet with him at the White House on that day. But while there is consensus about those things, there is also sharp disagreement about the way the event has been handled over the years. Some people feel exclud- ed. Case in point: AHEPA, the coun- try’s oldest and largest civic organi- zation of Hellenic heritage, typical- ly sends a contingent of at least five each year, and often up to 8-12. It did not get to seat as many people at this year’s event, held in the East Room of the White House just last AHEPA President Ike Gulas New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg addresses the audience during a reception he hosted at Gracie Mansion in New York City for the 188th an- week. niversary of Greek Independence on Monday, March 30, 2009.
    [Show full text]
  • AS AMENDED (Ja 0/%-1L~ ., ~. .~ __ Nli"7Ta.': 5'ECRET 2
    6016 TH E WH ITE HOUS E WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: President's Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis of Greece (U) PARTICIPANTS: The President John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary Michael Sotirhos, U.S. Ambassador to Greece James F. Dobbins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs David C. Gompert, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs David Ransom, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, Department of State Nicholas Burns, Director for Soviet and European Affairs (Notetaker) Interpreter Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, Foreign Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Minister of Defense Dora Kakoyianni, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister Efthimios Christodoulou, Alternate Minister of Economy Christos Zacharakis, Ambassador to the U.S. Constantine Liberopoulos, MFA Director­ General of Political Affairs Emmanuel Ghikas, MFA Director for Cyprus and Turkey Lucas Tsilas, Director of the Prime Minister's Diplomatic Office Interpreter DATE, TIME Ju 1 y 18, 1991; 5: 00 p. m . - 6: 00 p. m . AND PLACE: Prime Minister's Office, Athens, Greece Prime Minister Mitsotakis: Thank you very much for your visit, Mr. President. It is very important and very effective for moving forward with our relationship. This is a good opportunity to exchange views on the most important issues. In the time lefL to us, we would like to ask our Minister of Economics to give you a brief picture of our economy. (U) DECLASSIFIED SECRET PER E=O. 12958, Declassify on: OADR AS AMENDED (jA 0/%-1l~ ., ~._.~ __ nLi"7ta.': 5'ECRET 2 Minister Christodoulou: Allow me to outline the problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Gender Stereotypes and Media Bias in Women's
    Gender Stereotypes and Media Bias in Women’s Campaigns for Executive Office: The 2009 Campaign of Dora Bakoyannis for the Leadership of Nea Dimokratia in Greece by Stefanos Oikonomou B.A. in Communications and Media Studies, February 2010, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens A Thesis submitted to The Faculty of College of Professional Studies of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Professional Studies August 31, 2014 Thesis directed by Michael Cornfield Associate Professor of Political Management Acknowledgments I would like to thank my parents, Stella Triantafullopoulou and Kostas Oikonomou, to whom this work is dedicated, for their continuous love, support, and encouragement and for helping me realize my dreams. I would also like to thank Chrysanthi Hatzimasoura and Philip Soucacos, for their unyielding friendship, without whom this work would have never been completed. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Michael Cornfield for his insights and for helping me cross the finish line; Professor David Ettinger for his guidance during the first stage of this research and for helping me adjust its scope; and the Director of Academic Administration at The Graduate School of Political Management, Suzanne Farrand, for her tremendous generosity and understanding throughout this process. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………..ii List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………….vi List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………….vii
    [Show full text]
  • Negotiating Im/Politeness Via Humor in the Greek Parliament Marianthi Georgalidou University of the Aegean [email protected]
    Georgalidou, Marian. Negotiating Im/politeness via Humor in the Greek Parlament Estudios de Lingüística del Español 43 (2021), pp. 99-121 Negotiating Im/politeness via Humor in the Greek Parliament Marianthi Georgalidou University of the Aegean [email protected] Resumen El objetivo de este estudio es examinar la manera en la que el humor sirve como medio de negociación des/cortés en el discurso de los parlamentarios griegos. (Harris 2001; Morreall 2005; Bippus 2007; Tsakona and Popa 2011; Georgalidou 2011). El humor ha sido abordado como una estrategia de cortesía positiva, en el sentido de mitigar el ataque directo a personas, situaciones o ideas y sirve como medio de crítica indirecta (Haugh 2016). No obstante, el humor -y la ironía- en el disrcurso parlamentario se usa para lanzar ataques contra adversarios y sirve como un medio de construcción de identidades políticas perjudiciales para los adversarios políticos (Tsakona 2011; Nuolijärvi and Tiittula 2011). En el contexto de la crisis económica que atravesó Grecia, el presente estudio basado en datos recopilados de las Actas de las Sesiones Plenarias del Parlamento Helénico durante un período de 10 años (2009-2019), analiza la relación entre el humor y la agresión verbal en el discurso político griego. Las cuestiones abordadas conciernen al humor como modo de comunicación en casos de conflictos que superan los límites de la rivalidad política en el discurso parlamentario (Corranza-Marquez 2010; Georgalidou 2016; Frantzi, Georgalidou and Giakoumakis 2019). La aproximación analítica es émica, basada en el análisis de unidades discursivas como acciones sociales. Por tanto, se analizan episodios de discurso parlamentario agresivo por la organización secuencial de interacción humorística.
    [Show full text]
  • State Transformation and the European Integration Project Lessons from the Financial Crisis and the Greek Paradigm Evangelos Venizelos No
    State Transformation and the European Integration Project Lessons from the financial crisis and the Greek paradigm Evangelos Venizelos No. 130/February 2016 Abstract The financial crisis that erupted in the eurozone not only affected the EU’s financial governance mechanisms, but also the very nature of state sovereignty and balances in the relations of member states; thus, the actual inequalities between the member states hidden behind their institutional equality have deteriorated. This transformation is recorded in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the member states’ constitutional courts, particularly in those at the heart of the crisis, with Greece as the most prominent example. It is the issue of public debt (sovereign debt) of the EU member states that particularly reflects the influence of the crisis on state sovereignty as well as the intensely transnational (intergovernmental) character of European integration, which under these circumstances takes the form of a continuous, tough negotiation. The historical connection between public debt (sovereign debt) and state sovereignty has re-emerged because of the financial crisis. This development has affected not only the European institutions, but also, at the member state level, the actual institutional content of the rule of law (especially judicial review) and the welfare state in its essence, as the great social and political acquis of 20th century Europe. From this perspective, the way that the Greek courts have dealt with the gradual waves of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms from 2010 to 2015 is characteristic. The effect of the financial crisis on the sovereignty of the member states and on the pace of European integration also has an impact on European foreign and security policy, and the correlations between the political forces at both the national and European level, thus producing even more intense pressures on European social democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Königs-Und Fürstenhäuser Aktuelle Staatsführungen DYNASTIEN
    GESCHICHTE und politische Bildung STAATSOBERHÄUPTER (bis 2019) Dynastien Bedeutende Herrscher und Regierungschefs europ.Staaten seit dem Mittelalter Königs-und Fürstenhäuser Aktuelle Staatsführungen DYNASTIEN Römisches Reich Hl. Römisches Reich Fränkisches Reich Bayern Preussen Frankreich Spanien Portugal Belgien Liechtenstein Luxemburg Monaco Niederlande Italien Großbritannien Dänemark Norwegen Schweden Österreich Polen Tschechien Ungarn Bulgarien Rumänien Serbien Kroatien Griechenland Russland Türkei Vorderer Orient Mittel-und Ostasien DYNASTIEN und ihre Begründer RÖMISCHES REICH 489- 1 v.Chr Julier Altrömisches Patriziergeschlecht aus Alba Longa, Stammvater Iulus, Gaius Iulius Caesar Julisch-claudische Dynastie: Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero 69- 96 n.Ch Flavier Röm. Herrschergeschlecht aus Latium drei römische Kaiser: Vespasian, Titus, Domitian 96- 180 Adoptivkaiser u. Antonionische Dynastie Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus Pius, Mark Aurel, Commodus 193- 235 Severer Aus Nordafrika stammend Septimius Severus, Caracalla, Macrinus, Elagabal, Severus Alexander 293- 364 Constantiner (2.flavische Dynastie) Begründer: Constantius Chlorus Constantinus I., Konstantin I. der Große u.a. 364- 392 Valentinianische Dynastie Valentinian I., Valens, Gratian, Valentinian II. 379- 457 Theodosianische Dynastie Theodosius I.der Große, Honorius, Valentinian III.... 457- 515 Thrakische Dynastie Leo I., Majorian, Anthemius, Leo II., Julius Nepos, Zeno, Anastasius I. 518- 610 Justinianische Dynastie Justin I.,Justinian I.,Justin II.,Tiberios
    [Show full text]
  • Codebook Indiveu – Party Preferences
    Codebook InDivEU – party preferences European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies December 2020 Introduction The “InDivEU – party preferences” dataset provides data on the positions of more than 400 parties from 28 countries1 on questions of (differentiated) European integration. The dataset comprises a selection of party positions taken from two existing datasets: (1) The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File The EU Profiler/euandi Trend File contains party positions for three rounds of European Parliament elections (2009, 2014, and 2019). Party positions were determined in an iterative process of party self-placement and expert judgement. For more information: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/65944 (2) The Chapel Hill Expert Survey The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains party positions for the national elections most closely corresponding the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, 2019. Party positions were determined by expert judgement. For more information: https://www.chesdata.eu/ Three additional party positions, related to DI-specific questions, are included in the dataset. These positions were determined by experts involved in the 2019 edition of euandi after the elections took place. The inclusion of party positions in the “InDivEU – party preferences” is limited to the following issues: - General questions about the EU - Questions about EU policy - Questions about differentiated integration - Questions about party ideology 1 This includes all 27 member states of the European Union in 2020, plus the United Kingdom. How to Cite When using the ‘InDivEU – Party Preferences’ dataset, please cite all of the following three articles: 1. Reiljan, Andres, Frederico Ferreira da Silva, Lorenzo Cicchi, Diego Garzia, Alexander H.
    [Show full text]
  • Greece and the Case of the 2012
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
    [Show full text]