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CONCURRENT SESSION PAPERS What Is Mind? : A Neuropsychological Perspective Thomas.M.V* *PG Student (MSc Clinical & Counseling Psychology), School of Behavioral Sciences, Kannur University, Kannur, Kerala, India. Phone: 91496 2524638 Mobile: 919447540351 E-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT We commonly call mind is a range of functions carried out by the brain. The action of the brain underlie all behavior not only relatively simple motor behavior such as walking, and eating but, all the complex cognitive actions that we associate with specifically human behavior such as thinking, speaking and creating work of art. The neuropsychological aspect of mind begins with brain- behavior relationship. Charles Darwin put forward the Materialistic theory of behavior. The development of language is an example. Language is a cognitive behavior which can be explained on the basis of neural science. The different theories explain how the language has been developed in animals including human beings. The need for effective communication between the same species and the search for food led to non-verbal language which later led to verbal language. The verbal communication made the life easier. Certain areas in the brain are responsible for the language process. This means that the cognitive behavior (language) is a product of brain. Hence we can say that the mind is a product of brain activity. And a new model to define the mind is also been presented by the author. Keywords: Mind; Dualism; Materialism; Neuropsychology; Cognitive behavior; Language; Cerebral Mental Field; Electro-Magnetic Field. INTRODUCTION were several principles put forwarded to discuss this idea. Many philosophers and scientists studied the matter from From the time immemorial, the human thoughts have been in different perspectives. search of the concept of mind. The mind-body relation, the existence of mind and its activities were still inviting attention Aristotle (384-322BC) describes object as combination of form from different perspectives. Ancient philosophers were able and matter. He argues that there are many cases where the to express their views on the context. Modern researches form of the object is what’s essential to being such an object, revealed more scientific idea about the concept. Above all our while matter is not. Aristotle used the term “psyche”, which is rich Indian tradition, based on Vedas and Upanishads described responsible for life. He said that the non-material psyche mind on more acceptable and comprehensible way. In governs our behavior and based on this concept the idea was Kathopanishadu it was stated as, known as “Mentalism”. (Beakely, B and Ludlow, P. 2006). “Atmanam radhinam vidhi, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) describes that the mind and body Sareeram radhameva thu, are different sorts of things, made of different substances. It is referred to as Cartesian Dualism. The body, in its intrinsic nature Budhim thu saradhim vidhi, exactly like every other material object, being an essentially Manah pragrahameva cha” extended thing (in Latin res extensa), extended in space that is to say, and defined by such properties as length, depth, height, -Kathopanishadu, lesson-1, valli-3. (Prasad.M.N, 2003) mass, motion and spatial location. On the contrary, mind is The conscious principle within is the lord of the chariot. The essentially a thinking thing (res cogitans), devoid of shape, mass, body is the chariot, the intellect is the charioteer or driver, the location in space or any other physical property and governed mind is the reins, the senses are the horses, the objects of the by reason rather than mechanical causation. (Beakely, B and senses are the roads. So the charioteer (intellect-brain) controls Ludlow, P. 2006). the (reins-mind) paths where we have to go. John Locke (1623-1704) said that our knowledge is limited PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES both by our imperfect evidence and by the limited ideas; we use to understand this evidence. He was totally against The concept of mind primarily debates on two issues: (1) Is Cartesian Dualism. (Beakely, B and Ludlow, P. 2006). mind an immaterial thing? (2) Is mind is just the brain? There 160 Seminar on Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Jan 2010 Thomas.M.V :What Is Mind? : A Neuropsychological Perspective George Berkeley (1685-1753) said that this is a form of Monism- unknown ancestor. In Darwin’s terms all living things are said the view that everything in the universe is made of the same to have a common descent. As the descendents of original substance. Berkeley argues that, what we perceive- our entire organism spilled into various habitats over million of years, concept of an apple, for instance, involves just the qualities of they developed different structural and behavioral adaptations the apple that we see, taste, touch etc. So the apple is nothing that made them suited for specific ways of life. But at the same more than a group of sensory qualities and he said mind is a time they retained many similar traits that reveal their cluster of sensations. (Beakely, B and Ludlow, P. 2006). relatedness to each other. Brain cells are having such characteristic common to animal species. Consequently all Julien Offray De La Mettrie (1709-1751) argues that, this is a brain cells that living organism possesses are descendents of form of ‘Monism’ that claims that everything in the universe is that first brain cell (Kolb, B and Whishaw.I.Q. 2001). made of matter. On the basis of some studies he concludes that everything in the universe –including human mind- is Life is evolved to multi cellular body from unicellular structure. made up of a single physical substance. (Beakely, B and Ludlow, The behavior of unicellular structures were as limited as they P. 2006). had only little amount of neural tissues. Reproduction was a behavior that subjected to dramatic change from unicellular Auguste Comte (1798-1857) presents a model of the scientific animal to multi cellular animal. The unicellular organism knowledge, surprisingly; psychology has no place in this model, reproduced by simple techniques such as binary fission and since Comte thinks psychology is far too unscientific to survive the method was called asexual reproduction. When the the march of progress. Traditional philosophical psychology, amount of neural tissue increased proportionally with the he argues, focuses at best only on the intellectual features of body size, the behavior also changed. They have developed the normal humans, thereby neglecting data available from another way of reproduction- the sexual reproduction. Their studies of emotions and mental illness, and comparative studies thinking pattern (cognitive behavior) and mental activity also of animals. As a result of this detachment from data, the changed. The multi cellular animals possess a broader mind traditional picture of the mind is populated with objects. than the unicellular animals with the well developed neural (Beakely, B and Ludlow, P. 2006). tissue-The Brain. John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) opposed the ideas of Comte, by While considering the neuropsychological view of mind, Sir providing a methodological argument that psychology will John Carew Eccles (1903-1997) was an important figure who remain valuable as a separate science. The brain is so complex tried to explain the “mind-body problem”. He explained mind and so poorly understood. If we believe that mental states are on the basis of the mechanisms of synaptic transmission and the brain states, we need further study about the mental functional controls with in the central nervous system. His regularities independently of brain research. (Beakely, B and contribution was mostly on the philosophical level. The Eccles’s Ludlow, P. 2006). model of mind was presented with out any experimental William James (1842-1910) said that, everything is made of evidence or experimental designs for testing. A mental field the same substance (experience), but since that substance model was proposed by Hiroomi Umezawa (Umezava 1993) makes up both the mental and physical equally, it is no more which is termed as “Quantum Field Theory”. In the one than other. (Beakely, B and Ludlow, P. 2006). These are interpretation of quantum theory by Nils Bohr (1885-1962), some of the important philosophical views, and we are now mind and matter are two aspects one undivided process. Based going to discuss the neuropsychological views of mind. on this idea David Bohm (1917-1992) formulated another theory, but this also does not solve the problem of how neural NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE activity can be directly related to the subjective, non-physical aspect of mind (Bohr and Factor, 1985). By the middle of 19th century another theory of the brain and behavior were emerging. This theory was the modern The subjective experience involves an integrative property. perception of materialism- the idea that rational behavior can Billions of neuronal action produces the actual experience of be fully explained by the working of the brain and the rest of a unified one. This is termed “binding phenomenon”. Wolf the nervous system. The perspective had its root in the Singer and colleagues claimed that a synchronization of evolutionary theories of Alfred Russell Wallace and Charles rhythmic electrical potentials between different areas of the Darwin. brain might be involved in binding (Gray and Singer, 1989). Eccles realized that some sort of field would have account for Wallace and Darwin independently arrived at the same the integrative aspects of mind. For the elements in the brain conclusion that all living things are related. Darwin elaborated that give rise to the field are the organized bundles of neurons, on the topic in his book titled “On the Origin of Species by or the “psychons” (Eccles, 1994). The American neurosurgeon, means of Natural Selection” in 1859. Darwin believed that all Benjamin Libet, proposed another theory known as the organisms, both living and extinct are descended from some Seminar on Mind, Brain and Consciousness, Jan 2010 161 Thomas.M.V :What Is Mind? : A Neuropsychological Perspective “Cerebral Mental Field” or CMF which is potentially testable new model by which it can be easily understood.
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