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The Islamic Modernism of Ali Shariati in Religion Vs. Religion

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The Islamic Modernism of Ali Shariati in Religion Vs. Religion chapter 15 Musulman-e Marksisti: The Islamic Modernism of Ali Shariati in Religion vs. Religion Bader Mousa Al-Saif During the second half of the twentieth century, the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati advocated an Islamic modernism based on the ideals of Shiite Islam and Marxism. While such a pairing may seem paradoxical, Shariati finds no contradiction between his Shiite faith and Marxist principles. They are two sides of the same coin for Shariati, reinforcing one another and marking an in- tellectual break from the pioneers of Islamic modernism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Ervand Abrahamian rightly notes that ‘there is not one Shariati but three separate Shariatis: the sociologist … the devout believer … [and] the public speaker.’1 Yet these three separate Shariatis blend into one when Shariati pro- motes his version of Islamic modernism. Shariati’s Religion vs. Religion vividly articulates this fusion. Shariati was addressing a Husayniyah audience in 1970 when he delivered the two lectures that became the backbone of Religion vs. Religion.2 Both Shiite and socialist themes saturate the lectures in support of one another, thereby advancing Shariati’s theme that ‘true socialism is true [Shiite] Islam and true [Shiite] Islam is true socialism.’3 In this study, I first explain how Shariati is different from other Muslim modernists through his conceptualization of religion and his adoption of select Marxist principles. Second, I will analyze Shariati’s attachment to Shiʾism by identifying and study- ing his eight explicit references to Shiʿism in Religion vs. Religion. Finally, I will argue that the main tenets of Shiʿism are not fully portrayed in Shariati’s eight references to Shiite thought but, instead are portrayed through his abundant use of Marxist motifs, which mainly revolve around action, revolution, class, and the oppressed. By analyzing both Marxist/socialist and Shiite references in Religion vs. Religion, we shall appreciate the inescapable interconnectivity between both elements in Shariati’s thought. 1 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 24. 2 Ali Shariati, Religion vs. Religion. Translated by Laleh Bakhtiar. Chicago: abc International Group, 2010), 12. 3 Ibid., 6. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi �0.��63/978900435373�_0�6 <UN> 272 Al-Saif Just as elements of Marxism and Shiite Islam define Shariati’s modernism, they set him apart from his predecessors. Early Muslim modernists shared Shariati’s goal of proving Islam’s compatibility with the modern world. Like Shariati, they were equally influenced by foreign, non-Muslim concepts. How- ever, early Muslim modernists were not confronted with socialism. Thus, it was not part of their ethos or frame of reference. Instead, the Egyptian scholar, Muhammad ʿAbduh, for instance, sought to prove that Islam is compatible with reason, while the South Asian modernist Ahmad Khan stressed the af- finity of Islam with nature.4 Similarly, Shariati was convinced that Islam was not only compatible with socialism, but that Islam was its true originator – through the Muslim figure of Abu Dhār: According to Ervand Abrahamian, ʿ[Shariati’s] Abu Dhār: The God Worshipping Socialist … argued that Abu Dhār had been the forerunner of socialism in world history.’5 More importantly, Shariati was further set apart from earlier modernists through his conceptualization of religion as demonstrated by his Shiite faith. Shariati divested himself from Islamic history and its institutions, whether it was past empires, legal schools or juristic consensus and taqlīd (imitation).6 Shariati’s Shiite identity liberated him. To him, it is a religion of monothe- ism. It is a way of life and a means towards a higher truth that is based on the Qurʾān and was applied for ten years by Prophet Muhammad in Medina.7 Ever since the death of the Prophet and the usurpation of power from his cousin Ali, the seemingly monotheistic religious communities have been practicing a second form of religion: the religion of “hidden multi-theism,” which promotes injustice and oppression.8 Therefore, Shariati did not have to accustom himself to past traditions and theories, as ʿAbduh did, nor did he have to excuse himself due to a lack of knowledge of past Islamic juridical fields, as Khan did.9 Shariati was also different from other non-Arab Muslim modernists like the Southeast Asians, who (1) perceive religious ‘authority lying in the Arab world’ and, (2) looked up to ʿAbduh and other early Muslim modernists.10 According to Charles Kurzman, such ʿAbduh scholars include 4 Charles Kurzman, ed. Modernist Islam 1840–1940: A Sourcebook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50–60, 296. 5 Abrahamian, A History, 143. 6 Shariati, Religion vs. Religion, 46–47, 67. 7 Ibid., 55, 79. 8 Ibid., 41–43, 47. 9 Kurzman, Modernist Islam, 291, 301. 10 Peter Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses. ( Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 209. <UN>.
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