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NATO Handbook 1965

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NATO Handbook 1965 the THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION TWELFTH EDITION MAY 1965 T he N orth Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April, 1949. It proclaims in its preamble the determination o f m em be r governments “to s afegu ard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”. As well as constituting a defensive military alliance - the Parties consider an armed attack against one or more of them as an attack against them all - the Treaty also aims at developing political, economic, social and cultural co-operation between member countries. The fifteen member countries of n a t o are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portiigal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The seat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( n a t o ) is in Paris. PRINTED IN T H F . NETHERLANDS BOSCH, UTRECHT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION INFORMATION SERVICE PARIS (XVI) 1965 TABLE OF CONTENT S Chapter i w h y t h e t r e a t y w a s s i g n e d ................ 5 Chapter n w h a t t h e t r e a t y s a y s ............................... 9 Chapter in the atlantic alliance f r om 1949 t o 1965 .............................................................. 15 Chapter iv t h e p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e of t h e organization .........................................................20 Chapter v n a t o ’s a c t iv it ie s a n d achievements 38 Appendic es 1. History of the A lliance .................................................. 59 2. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.......................75 3. Analysis of the terms of the Paris Agreements ............... 75 4. Summary of the Report of the Committee of Three on non-military co-operation in n a t o .................................. 76 5. Texts of the Declaration and Communiqué of the December, 1957, Ministerial Meeting (Heads of Government)......................................................................80 6. List of Chairmen of the North Atlantic Council .... 86 7. List of Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council and of n a t o senior civil and military officials . 86 8. Abbreviations..................................................................... 88 Charts 1. n a t o Civil and Military Organization ........................... 90 2. Principal Committees of the Council ...............................91 3. n a t o International Staff/Secretariat............................... 92 4. The Military Organization of n a t o ...............................93 5 . Allied Command Europe.................................................. 94 6. Allied Command A tlan tic .............................................. 95 7. Allied Command C h an n el .............................................. 96 CHAPTER I Why the Treaty was Signed When the Second World War came to an end the Western de­ mocracies hoped that they were entering on a period of sec urity. They demobilised almost all their armed forces, and for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of international dis­ putes, pinned their faith in the newly created United Nations Organization and in a spirit of understanding among the great powers. Such hopes were rapidly doomed to disappointment by the policy of the Soviet Union. Having taken over the Baltic countries and parts of Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the USSR set about extending its rule still further. As early as 1945 the Soviet Union had stirred up civil war in Greece, giving active aid to the Communist rebels. It brought pressure to bear on Turkey in order to obtain territorial con­ cessions and bases in the Straits, and on Iran in order to maintain Soviet troops in the north of that country. In 1947, thanks to Soviet support, the Communist parties seized power in Hungary, Bulgaria, Ruma nia and Poland - and this in spite of the fact that they were minority parties in each country. In February 1948, it was Czechoslovakia’s turn. In June 1948, by means of blockade, the USSR sought to force the Western powers into abandoning their rights in Berlin. In October 1947 the creation of the Cominform, which was in effect the resurrection of the Comintern which had been dis­ solved during the war, clearly underlined the Soviet intention of pursuing this expansionist policy. In the communiqué published on this occasion, the Soviet leaders openly admitted that the aim and object of the Cominform was to fight and destroy the political systems of the West. Finally, the solidarity of the Communist bloc was cemented by the creation of a network of alliances made up of 23 bilateral treaties. [5] All these circumstances brought about a striking lack of balance in Europe. On the one hand there was the USSR backed by colossal military forces (200 divisions) and its com­ pliant satellites; on the other, the European democracies, dis­ armed for all the world to see, enfeebled by economic difficulties, frequently further undermined by the actions of their Com­ munist Parties and with no political or military alliance to bind them together. Dangerous enough in itself, such a situation could not but encourage the USSR to further expansion whilst creating an atmosphere of discouragement and loss of self-confidence among the countries of the West. It was a matter of urgency for the West to re-create conditions of peace and security. The maintenance of peace and security is, in principle, the task of the United Nations. But the five permanent members of the Security Council are allowed a right of veto, and by abuse of this right, the Soviet Union rendered the Council powerless. Thus it was that all attempts to put in hand the essential elements of a policy leading to world security, such as the control of atomic energy, the reduction of armaments and the creation of an inter­ national force came to nought. By 1949 no less than 30 Soviet vetos had served to undermine the hopes which the free peoples of the world had placed in the United Nations as an organization which could promote world order based on the rule of law. Faced with this failure, at least temporary, of the United Na­ tions, the Western countries had no other means of ensuring their security than to unite together for their common defence. Such was the object of the Treaty signed in Brussels on the 17th of March 1948 by the United Kingdom, Franc e and the three Benelux countries, these five nations thereby contracting a defen­ sive alliance and undertaking to build up a common defence system to combat possible aggression. A joint military organization for common defence was set up under the direction of Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, who installed his Headquarters at Fontainebleau. However, the aims of the signatories of the Brussels Treaty were not of a purely [6] military nature, for they also undertook to “strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united”. The Brussels alliance was only the first step towards the de­ fensive organization of the Western world. The means at the disposal of the five signatory countries were clearly insufficient to ensure an effective defence. In view of the strength of the Soviet Union, the balance could only be restored in favour of the West by an alliance of the free countries of Europe with the two North American powers, the United States and Canada. Only the strength of America, founded on an immense industrial potential and possession of the atomic arm, could redress the overwhelming imbalance of power. After the war, the United States had been quick to appreciate the vast responsibilities which it would be called upon to shoul­ der as the result of the new international situation. In 1947 its aid to Greece and Turkey had largely contributed to the resistance with which these two countries were able to meet the Com­ munist threat. The Marshall Plan - in which the Soviet Union refused to participate - had contributed in a decisive manner to the economic recovery, and the very day on which the Treaty of Brussels was signed, the Government in Washington promised to support the signatories in the efforts they would undertake to ensure their defence. The situation demanded more than this, however. The full participation of the United States in a common defence system implied an actual alliance; but the conclusion of an alliance with European countries in times of peace represented a complete re­ versal of United States policy. Ever since George Washington’s Farewell Address, any political ties between the United States and European countries had traditionally been rejected, and this principle was still deeply engrained in the minds of the American people. The United States Senate, guardian of the country’s traditional policy, was fully alive to the needs of the new situa­ tion, and on the 11th of June, 1948, by 64 votes to 4, adopted a resolution proposed by Senator Vandenberg which authorised the Government to associate itself with such mutual defence [7] agreements as could contribute to the security of the United States. This important decision opened the way for the negotiation of an alliance. Beginning in July, discussions took place between the five partners of the Brussels Treaty, the United States and Canada. Italy, Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal were subsequently invited to take part in the negotiations, and on the 4th of April, 1949, the representatives of these twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. [8] CHAPTER II What the Treaty Says The text of the Treaty is so short and so clear as to need little or nothing in the way of explanatory comment. Worthy of special note, howe ver, is the emphasis which those who drew up the Treaty have placed on its conformity with both the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.
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