Civilian Control in Carceral Space: a Case Study of the Krasnoiarsk Public Oversight

Civilian Control in Carceral Space: A Case Study of the Krasnoiarsk Public Oversight

Commission

Master’s Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the

Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Brenden Thomas Wood, B.A.

Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies

The Ohio State University

2019

Thesis Committee:

Doctor Jennifer Suchland, Adviser

Doctor John Quigley

Brenden Thomas Wood

2019

Abstract

The purpose of my thesis is to discuss the importance of studying the work of the

Public Oversight Commission of the Russian Federation in the context of prisoner rights. My thesis focuses on a case study of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight

Commission as an effective mechanism of developing greater transparency and accountability in carceral space. The Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission demonstrates that a

Commission can operate effectively within the societal constraints placed on civil society by the federal government. I particularly focus on the proactive behavior of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission and how its members effectively pursue prisoner rights reform. I discuss the importance of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission as a positive model for other Public Oversight Commissions, as it demonstrates that a Commission can maintain a high degree of relevance by being proactive rather than reactive.

Dedication

To my wonderful family and adviser.

iii

Vita

June 2012……………………………………….Erskine Academy

May 2016……………………………………….B.A. Russian Language and Literature,

University of Vermont

August 2017 to Present……………………….M.A. Slavic and East European Studies,

The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Slavic and East European Studies

Table of Contents

Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………... ii

Dedication.……………………………………………………………………………………. iii

Vita…………………………………………………………………………………………..… iv

Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………… 1

Background: The Need to Reform …………………………………………………………... 6

The Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation……………………………………………. 19

The Public Oversight Commissions………………………………………………...……… 33

Case Study: Public Oversight Commission of Krasnoiarsk Krai………………………... 48

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………. 74

References…………………………………………………………………………………….. 81

Appendix A: Laws, Projects, and Initiatives …………………………………………...… 95

Appendix B: Reports…….………………………………………………………………...… 97

Introduction

In Russia today civil society is filtered through the Civic Chamber. The Chamber is a quasi-civic organization that the Kremlin instituted to facilitate greater civilian participation in civil society and the government. Labeled as a puppet organization of the Kremlin, the Chamber has been criticized for its complicity with the tightening of control on civil society. However, the Chamber demonstrates an effective approach to organizations dedicated to prison reform and has effectively facilitated the work of the

Public Oversight Commissions. The Public Oversight Commissions are organizations that the Civic Chamber supervises. A federal law in 2008 created the Commissions in order to increase civilian access to the penitentiary system. These Commissions are composed of volunteer members across the federal subjects dedicated to touring penal institutions and organizing events and activities with inmates, penitentiary personnel, and the constituents of each respective federal subject. The Commission of Krasnoiarsk

Krai in particular is a model for an effective Commission, functioning to an extent as an arm of the Civic Chamber while maintaining a high level of autonomy.

Krasnoiarsk Krai’s Commission is a positive, active example that differs from the passive tendencies of other Public Oversight Commissions. Due to its proactive engagement with the regional penal authorities and civic groups, the Krai’s Commission has shown that it is possible to actively pursue greater access to penal institutions, even when faced with uncooperative penal authorities spread across a vast network of correctional institutions. I will examine the reasons for this success, which are connected

particularly to the proactive nature of the Commission, and other factors inherent to the

geographic space of Krasnoiarsk Krai. Ultimately, the Commission gains a sense of relevancy in the Krai from its proactive behavior, as its impact is visible and tangible. These factors are vital to the success of the Commission in developing greater transparency in the penal institutions of Krasnoiarsk Krai. The Krasnoiarsk Krai

Commission is a model for a successful penal rights organization operating in a vast and complex social and political environment. The Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission ultimately is a positive example for other Public Oversight Commissions across the Russian

Federation.

It is important to study the Kransoiarsk Krai Commission because it shows a high

level of success engaging with the local and national authorities, and has also tapped into

international support mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights. Most

important to its success has been the consistent, proactive efforts of the Commission

members in their activities, which have influenced other penal, government, and civic

organizations in Krasnoiarsk Krai to publicize their engagement with the

Commission. The Commission sets itself apart because it is itself an accessible and

helpful institution. Not only does it publish about its work, but the Commission is

responsive to inquiries and proposals from local, national, and

international organizations and individuals. It demonstrates that the Commission

members hold themselves accountable for their efforts to increase transparency and

reciprocity between civil society and the penal authorities.

Civic organizations lack the institutional agency that is characteristic in non- authoritarian societies. However, I will discuss the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission’s effective function within the societal constraints that it faces. Accountability is essential to creating greater transparency in carceral space and is the most critical issue facing the

Commission. However, it is a difficult issue in Russia, and is no less ambiguous when addressing carceral space. Ideally, the Commission members would be able to hold the penal authorities responsible for their actions and force prompt, positive responses. However, this is not the case, due in large part to institutional practices that seem to be trapped in carceral space (Pallot, 2015). I therefore consider the work of the

Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission in regard to accountability with a level of nuance, where I view their efforts to uncover and publish violations the penal authorities commit as part of a positive effort to make these issues visible. It is unclear how exactly the authorities respond internally, so I consider the Commission members’ efforts positively within the constraints that the federal government imposes.

Several scholars, such as Laura Piacentini, Elena Katz, and Judith Pallot, have argued that geography creates an isolating environment, which consequently causes penal spaces to develop in a variety of different, often negative, ways (Katz and

Piacentini, 2017; Pallot, 2015). Both issues involve geography and its effects on transparency. Geographic size and distance affect visibility into carceral space, as they influence the effectiveness of each Oversight Commission, and thus each Commission’s ability to work with the regional correctional authorities. I must establish that geography

has both a positive and negative impact on the Commissions, as well as on all actors

across the different federal subjects. Negatively, the geographic size of Russia and many of its subjects is often a major, logistical obstacle because it makes the transport of people and resources difficult due to distance and the subsequent isolation of many regions and institutions. In the context of carceral reform and the Commissions, this isolation can

have a further negative effect, because it isolates penal institutions into “penal fiefdoms,”

where these institutions are closed and inaccessible (Pallot, 2015). However, this isolation also has a positive impact because it allows other regional actors, such as the Public

Oversight Commissions, to develop without interference from the federal government. For my thesis, I consider how geographic distance from Moscow and the size of Krasnoiarsk Krai has isolated the Krai and the social and political actors within it, thus allowing them to develop in a positive way.

The Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission is situated in a favorable geographic space for

activism, a space which developed in the penal context as a result of its size, distance

from Moscow, and the extensive penal system and legacy inherited from the Soviet

Union. The Commission has enjoyed favorable winds, as the local civil society and

government are inclined to support the Commission, and are supportive of efforts to

clean up the extensive penal system and its associated legacy. As part of the national

Public Oversight Commission initiative, the Oversight Commissions provide the Civic

Chamber with feedback on the conditions across a geographically diverse array of federal

subjects. The Chamber can then discuss and analyze this feedback in its own forum. The

Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight Commission is one of the few to consistently publicize

its efforts to monitor activities in the penitentiary system, making it a prime example for

further study.

My paper is broken into four primary sections. The first is an introduction to the

environment surrounding human rights and public activism in carceral space in Russia

following the collapse of the Soviet Union. I then discuss the structure, role, and controversies of the Civic Chamber. In the third section I discuss the structure and role

of the Public Oversight Commissions. The final section is a case study of the Krasnoiarsk

Krai Public Oversight Commission in which I analyze how the proactive behavior of the

Commission is a positive example for the entire Public Oversight Commission project.

Background: The Need to Reform

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the newly formed Russian

Federation searching for a new identity. Russia sought to fill the void left by the Soviet project on all levels of the economy, politics, and society. With a new constitution, a capitalist economy, and the collapse of Soviet authority, it seemed as if Russia was on track to realize itself as a member of the liberal-capitalist global community. Regardless

of the seemingly bright “capitalist,” future, Russia had inherited an institutional and

societal legacy that stretched back to the Tsarist days. Therefore, as Russia sought to

redefine itself on the political, societal, and economic levels, it encountered the not-so-

empty shells of a widespread institutional legacy. A distinct lack of transparency

characterized part of the legacy of the lack transparency in government institutions,

making the leap to an open, democratic society difficult. Accountability between society

and the state had not prior been required, let alone expected. The top-down nature of

state-society relations made it so that the state alone controlled institutional access and

civic involvement, which meant that the state alone held itself and its people

accountable.

One of the vastest and least transparent of these inherited institutions was the then

Central Administration of the Execution of Punishments, or GUIN (Glavnoe upravlenie

ispolneniia nakazanii), the precursor of today’s Federal Correctional Service, which is

called FSIN (Federal’naia sluzhba ispolneniia nakazanii). GUIN was operated by the

Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the MVD (Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del), and had been

inherited from the MVD of the Soviet Union (“Istoriia UIS Rossii,” 2018). GUIN was in charge of the notorious GULAG, and inherited the enormous responsibility of administrating the massive former Soviet prison system. Russia inherited the physical and bureaucratic bulk of the Soviet system, and the administration immediately met with the logistical difficulty of maintaining a system that had just lost its identity.

The wild condition of Russian society in the 1990’s is well known, but few

institutions became as intimately acquainted with them as did GUIN. Inga

Mikhailovskaia noted that the political and social crises of the first half of the 1990’s made

statistics unreliable and open for interpretation, but it is widely accepted that the situation

involving crime worsened in the 1990’s. Russia saw almost a 150% increase in reported

crimes, which were often associated with the opening of a market style economy

(Mikhailovskaia, 1994). There was a subsequent increase in “mercenary” style murders,

armed assault, and robbery (Kuznetsova, 1994).

The explosion in crime quickly overwhelmed the already strained correctional

service, confronting an undersized and underfunded institution with acute

overcrowding. In a 1993 interview with G.N. Oreshchkin, the head of the Butyrka Prison in Moscow, Oreshchkin discussed the issues plaguing Butyrka. Oreshchkin was

concerned with disease and overcrowding, as well as the lack of funding provided to the

prison administration for basic supplies such as food and medicine. He discussed how

cells meant for 30 men were packed with 110 inmates, and he stated that his prison was

so far in debt that a bakery would not even honor a contract with a delivery. When asked

why he did not refuse more prisoners, he responded that Butyrka was not a hotel, bluntly

stating that the law required that he admit prisoners when they were sent to him

(Oreshkin, 1994). The Butyrka situation was characteristic of the entire criminal justice

system. In the early and mid-90's the courts and prosecutors became backlogged with the

breakdown of the rule of law, while the correctional and law enforcement agencies were

increasingly plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and corruption. Just like the

correctional system, the courts had inherited the framework of the Soviet legal system,

which is similar to the Roman-style procuratorial system. Consequently, issues in

judicial transparency persisted into the 1990’s, as the prosecutor, courts, and law

enforcement retained many of the links inherited from the Soviet time, casting doubt on

their independence from one another. Pay also remained low, adding extra strain to the

overworked legal system and contributing to the perpetration of corruption (Kurkichiian,

2018).

Federal institutions additionally struggled to cope with the loss of centralization

as Yeltsin moved the government toward a federalist system. Centralization was a

characteristic fundamental to Soviet authority. The move to federalism will not be

evaluated at this time, but rather I consider it as a dynamic in the development of penal

institutions and regional civil societies. As far as the penal institutions themselves are concerned, what manifested itself was the simultaneous departure from, and adherence to, the legacy of centralization. Russia’s move to federalism under Yeltsin relaxed the complete grip that Soviet authority had held on society, but it left a void that needed to be filled. According to Andreas Heinemann-Gruden, Yeltsin’s Presidential Federalism

became a system that benefitted charismatic leaders, weak political parties, and

clientelism across the newly formed federal subjects (Heinemann-Gruder, 2002).

Federalism caused the different federal subjects to follow a variety of different

developmental trajectories due largely to the political and economic conditions of that

region. The question of geography would prove to be one of the persevering problems for the penitentiary system throughout the 1990’s and to the modern day. Judith Pallot has written extensively on the issue of geography in carceral spaces, and how geographic isolation is fundamental to punishment in Russian prison spaces. She analyzes the practices of the Russian authorities involving transport and isolation. Pallot discusses how the authorities send prisoners to remote penal institutions in order to intensify the punishment which creates a feeling of “placelessness,” and detachment for the inmates

(Pallot, 2015). Placelessness plays into the issue of transparency. The remoteness of many of these prisons reduces the visibility into these spaces for relatives and friends since it isolates prisoners from visitors and correspondences. At the same time, distance insulates prison administrations across the “penal arc,” from Moscow's central authority and federal directives (Pallot, 2015).

Consequently, penal institutions begin to more strongly develop into what Pallot

defines as “penal fiefdoms,” where the penal authorities of the Russian subjects do not

adhere to any fixed, federal program, relying instead on their own methods, experiences,

or consciences (Pallot, 2015). Corrective labor and systematic violence were characteristic

methods of reform for individuals in carceral space harking back to the Stalin era

(Holquist, 2003). Penal institutions continued to heavily rely on these practices, as the air

of uncertainty in the face of the collapse of centralized Communist authority hung heavy

over Russia in the 1990’s (McAuley, 2016). Although there was a departure from the

application of a centralized reform program in the penitentiary system, the penal

authorities continued to apply the same techniques, typically exacerbating the daunting

issues facing the criminal justice system and society in general. The persistence and worsening of these issues into the 1990’s lead to a call for a complete overhaul of the floundering criminal justice system, where civic groups began to increasingly push for widespread and systematic reforms (Abramkin, 1997). As government institutions wrestled with redefining themselves, civil society also sought to define itself in the newly open Russia.

Civil society began to germinate in the mid-to-late 1980’s, shortly after

Gorbachev's Perestroika and Glasnost’ policies (McAuley, 2016). Civic groups, although increasingly popular and active, were often unorganized and fluid. They engaged in a wide variety of activities, ranging from the war in Chechnya, fighting corruption, to human rights in prisons (McAuley, 2016). Despite the lack of civic activism during the

Soviet period, civil society was engaged and vibrant in Russia in the 1990’s.

Groups related to human rights in prisons were at the forefront of Russian civil

society, not only as one of the earliest organized groups, but also because of their

effectiveness. Leading this movement was Valerii Abramkin, who in 1988 founded

Prison and Liberty, (Tiur’ma i Volia), what today is known as the Moscow Center for

Prison Reform (McAuley, 2016). Abramkin was a former political prisoner and was

instrumental in the reforms which lead to improvements in conditions in the general

population and remand centers, known as SIZO (sledstvennyj izoliator). He believed that the fundamental issue was in the criminal code and legal process. He thought that the

courts rendered unnecessary strain on the penitentiary system due to their arbitrary

nature, along with the ambiguous nature of their interpretations of the criminal code

(Abramkin, 2007). Additionally, Abramkin recognized that the GULAG legacy remained heavily prevalent, and the pattern of Soviet practices would require systematic reform to break (Abramkin, 2007).

In the subsequent sections of my thesis, I will focus primarily on groups dedicated

to prisoner rights. The Public Oversight Commissions focus on building greater

transparency on their behalf by advocating for prisoner agency and dignity. These issues

pertain to interactions between prisoners and prison personnel, access to medical care,

and the maintenance of a safe environment. These fit into the larger issue of prison

reform. Prison reform is relevant to changes on the institutional level, such as with the

criminal code and legal process as advocated by Abramkin, institutional attitudes

discussed in the Case Study section, and to the variations in reform programs discussed

by Laura Piacentini and Elena Katz (Katz and Piacentini, 2017). Prisoner rights fit into

this broader context of penal reform, as sustained improvements contribute to wider

changes and improvements to institutional practices.

What made the efforts of prisoner rights activists different from the efforts of other

human rights activists was, and still is, that they recognize that they needed to cooperate

with the government in order to realize reform. The biggest factor contributing to their

success was that the government positively related to their efforts, which allowed the

government and prisoner rights groups to develop a reasonably effective working

relationship. Mary McAuley discusses how the relationship between civil society and

the government can be broken into four different frames: confrontation, where the state

and civil society are enemies; cooperation, where they recognize each other’s agency;

petitioning, where the NGO is subservient to the government; and collaboration, which

means that the NGO is willing to follow the government’s guidelines (McAuley,

2016). With Russian civic groups, they typically fall into the fourth, collaborative frame

because existing civic groups are forced to adhere to any government guidelines and

work in some capacity with the authorities. With prisoner rights activists, however, they have found themselves often working within the second frame, where the government and the organization share a mutual goal and acknowledge each other’s agency.

Abramkin was instrumental in orchestrating collaborative projects with the

federal government, and he established himself early on as a reliable advocate for the

government and civic groups alike. In 1992, he organized the Conference on Prison

Reform in Former Totalitarian Countries in Moscow. A series of recommendations on

improving SIZO units, access to medical care, and protecting prisoner’s rights were

published at the conference, and were soon thereafter brought to the attention of the

government (Monahan, 1993). These recommendations were brought to the attention of

President Yeltsin when he formed the Presidential Council on Human Rights in 1993

(McAuley, 2016). A scathing report by the Russian Human Right’s Commission on prison

conditions in 1996 publicly exposed the horrors of the conditions in the prisons and

12 remand centers, which thus directly confronted the President and his administration with the issues facing the criminal justice and penitentiary systems (McAuley, 2016).

President Yeltsin desired to integrate Russia into the European community and the Council of Europe, and he recognized the necessity of reforming the criminal justice system (Blocker, 1997). Accession to the Council required that Russia consolidate the

SIZO and general prison populations into a single unit under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, and to meet other standards set by the Council of Europe (McAuley, 2016). It also required that Russia suspend the death penalty, which was done 1996 (Blocker,

1997). As it became publicly clear that Yeltsin intended to bring Russia into the Council of Europe, the expertise and activism of Abramkin and other prisoner rights activists, such as Lev Ponomarev and Valerii Borshchev, increased in importance. Russia’s entrance into the Council of Europe in 1996 was a major step toward realizing systematic penal reform (“Council of Europe and Russian Federation,” 2018). The greatest victory for prisoner rights activists came in 1998, when Russia ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (“Council of Europe: Russia Ratifies European Convention on Human

Rights,” 1998). Ratification of the Convention gave Russian citizens access to the

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is a complaint mechanism for individuals to file claims on violations of their human rights. The ECHR complaint mechanism has been invaluable to prisoners and prisoner rights activists, and will be discussed further during the case study section.

As civil society began to better organize itself in the early 2000’s, so too did the government begin to coalesce into something far more authoritative under the leadership

of Vladimir Putin. Much to the dismay of domestic activists, and international donors

and governments, Putin’s Russia saw the reassertion of a type of top-down influence

reminiscent of the Soviet era. The fragile accountability between society and the

government which had developed in the early post-Soviet years was compromised

following Putin’s restructuring of the federal system (Petrov and Slider, 2016). At the

same time, increasing government control of the media limited the agency of activists

across Russia(Lipman, 2016).

Unlike other activist groups, however, the prisoner rights movements did not

completely lose momentum, and continued to operate in both the collaborative and

cooperative frames discussed by McAuley. Abramkin became a member of the

President’s first Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights (Sovet

pri Prezidente RF po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka) under President

Yeltsin (”Iz Istorii Tsentra”).1 Recognizing the value of Abramkin’s expertise and

importance in the field, President Putin appointed Abramkin as his expert on issues

relating to penal reform (McAuley, 2016). Putin considered carceral reform of great

importance, and he pursued criminal and legal reform in his first term with an almost

“missionary,” zeal (Piacentini and Slade, 2015). According to Prison and Liberty, the

prison population peaked in 2000 at 1,063,000 persons, putting the rate of incarceration

at over 700 persons per 100,000 (”Iz Istorii Tsentra”). The issue of overcrowding caught

the eye of Putin when he was still serving as prime minister, prompting the government

to pass a bill dedicated to reducing the prison population by at least one third

(Lambroschini, 2000). According to the Moscow Center for Prison Reform, President

Putin’s response was the result of a widespread governmental and societal

acknowledgement of the consequences of the disorder of the 1990’s. Putin has been

greatly concerned with disorder in society throughout the years, and he prompted the

government in his first term to institute a new series of laws restructuring the legal and

penitentiary systems (”Iz Istorii Tsentra”).

The Putin government facilitated a series of reforms of the penal code in the early

2000’s, the most important being the shortening of prison sentences (”Iz Istorii

Tsentra”). Abramkin and other activists had been targeting the issue of sentencing, and

scored a major early victory with the Putin administration when this law was passed

(Izvestiia, 2002). At the same time, Putin signed a series of mass amnesties, which the

Sentencing Project, an American advocacy group, speculates saw an estimated 300,000

prisoners or more released between 2000 and 2004 (The Sentencing Project). On a procedural level, a 2002 law was passed requiring police to obtain warrants from a judge before they conducted investigations (Hendley, 2016). Ultimately, the reforms of Putin’s first term culminated in Decree 314 of 2004, which realigned the components of the penitentiary service into what is today known as the Federal Correctional Service (Ukaz

No. 314, 2004). These reforms most effected Russian institutions, and did not touch

specifically on prisoner rights. Later initiatives and incidents dealt with this issue, which shall be discussed in greater detail in the sections on the Public Oversight Commissions.

It can only be speculated that the efforts of the activists were the reason for these

reforms. Correlation is not causation, and the reform initiatives and resulting changes ultimately came from the authority of the government. However, Abramkin’s reputation

in civil society and the government, as well as his, Ponomarev’s, and Borshchev’s access

to the Putin government, indicate that their input and expertise were considered. During the friendlier years of the Yeltsin presidency, Abramkin and some of his more experienced colleagues recognized that in order to achieve any reform or increased protection of prisoner rights, connections with the government were essential (McAuley,

2016). Their ability to maintain these connections would be essential in the years to come, and will be discussed in the later sections on the Civic Chamber and the Public Oversight

Commissions.

Putin made his initial mark on his first term by tightening his grip on civil society,

which he accomplished by strengthening federal authority. Putin realigned the regional

authorities through his federal reforms, which weakened the federalist system that had

operated under Yeltsin. Additionally, a 2001 conference of civic groups in Moscow

attended by Putin and other officials sent the message that the government appeared to

have no qualms redirecting civil society either (Alexander, 2004). At this very conference,

McAuley wrote about how Putin, somewhat taken aback by the number of petitions he was receiving from civic organizations, smugly remarked on how it was puzzling that a real civil society would be so reliant on the government and would need to directly petition its leader (McAuley, 2016).

However, the regional prison administrations were not whipped into a

centralized, systematic federal program. The direct involvement of the federal government is limited, and regional penitentiary authorities are left largely to their own devices. Regarding prison conditions and operations, there has remained a high level of

16 autonomy in penal practices in the federal subjects, where the different subjects provide varying conditions, and apply a wide range of methods of punishment. The differences in technique and quality of conditions are connected with the idea of the penal fiefdom discussed by Pallot, allowing the regional subjects to follow different trajectories.

Meanwhile, the federal penal authorities in Moscow provide the regional penal authorities with a steady supply of inmates, as the authorities continue to ship prisoners across the country (Pallot, 2015). The case study section demonstrates that the local FSIN administration of Krasnoiarsk Krai has followed the trend of developing its own unique tendencies. However, its trajectory has been largely influenced by other regional actors, such as the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight Commission. FSIN of Krasnoiarsk Krai found a relatively high level of success in cooperating with civic society and in implementing projects aimed at improving conditions in carceral space, due in large part to the efforts of the regional prisoner rights activists.

One of the last foundational phases of the federal realignments characteristic of

Putin’s early years came in 2005, when the government passed a law creating the Civic

Chamber of the Russian Federation (Zakon No. 32-F3, 2005). The government created the Civic Chamber in order to act as an intermediary between the government and civil society by fielding petitions, recommendations, and complaints from civil society which were to be communicated to the government. Criticized internally and internationally, the Civic Chamber is often viewed as being a puppet organization of the Kremlin, an institution with a voice but no real teeth. It is true that its power is limited, but it was never intended to function as a mechanism of change. Rather, it must be viewed as a

mechanism of voice. The issues of transparency and accountability have been the heart

of concern for critics and activists, especially regarding carceral space. In the subsequent section, I examine the role of the Civic Chamber. Its role as a complaint mechanism and forum indicate that the Chamber serves a valuable role in developing greater transparency in carceral space, due in particular to its supervisory role for the Public

Oversight Commissions.

The Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation

In the context of this paper, I am considering the Civic Chamber with a nuanced

approach. I cannot compare the Chamber exactly with western, civic organizations, nor

with the federal institutions designed to protect the rights of citizens. The Chamber is a

uniquely Russian manifestation, and therefore must I must consider it as such. As human rights activist Igor Averkiev remarked in 1995, it is counterproductive to try to implement

American-style civil, political, and human rights, stating that they ultimately are an obstacle to the overall development of human rights in Russia (McAuley, 2016). Averkiev is by no means making a cultural relativist defense, but rather is suggesting a perspective that requires that human rights and the process of their development be considered from an inside point of view. That is, activists must consider and apply western perceptions and practices, but they cannot be viewed as a cookie-cutter solution that can be readily fit to the Russian case. Russia is a quasi-Democracy, with the Russian authorities themselves classifying Russia as a ”sovereign democracy.” From their point of view,

Russia’s sovereignty protects and advances itself externally, allowing Russia to pursue its own vision of democracy internally (Sakwa, 2012). Therefore, the Chamber and its deeds need to be considered within this frame. It is inappropriate champion the Chamber as a bastion for the defense of civil society, but it is similarly inappropriate to dismiss the

Chamber as a mere shadow of the Kremlin bent on controlling civil society.

In this section, I discuss the formation of the Chamber, its general role, and I

conclude with a discussion of its primarily positive relationship with the Public Oversight

Commissions. I am not examining the Chamber’s role in the application process to serve as a volunteer on the Public Oversight Commissions, but I instead focus on the function that the Chamber performs as a forum for consideration and discussion of the

Commissions’ work. The Chamber fulfills an important role as a unifying force for the

Commissions due to its relationship and function with the federal government. It

provides a forum to collect the information from the Commissions, thus making their

work in penal institutions more visible. Due to its supervisory relationship with the

Commissions, the Chamber reduces some of the disconnect created by geographic size

and distance. As I discuss, the Chamber ultimately supports the role of the Commissions

by not overstepping its authority and meddling in their affairs.

The Civic Chamber (Obshchestvennaia palata) was created in order to strengthen the

relationship between the federal government and civil society. Vladimir Sukrov created

the Chamber in a 2005 initiative, when he was serving as the deputy head of the

President’s administration overseeing internal affairs. The : to attract citizens to participate in civil society; to coordinate and facilitate public initiatives; to provide expertise on issues of rights and freedoms; the realization of government laws and initiatives; the creation of recommendations for government projects and initiatives; sharing of information and methods; to attract citizens to pose questions and concerns to the Chamber and to the government; and the realization of international standards of rights and freedoms in Russian Society (Zakon No. 32-F3, 2005). The Civic Chamber is

composed of 168 members from three different groups: the president selects 40 members;

these 40 appointees select 43 members with reputations for their work in different strata

of civil society; the 83 members from the first two groups select the final 85 members from

the 85 local Civic Chambers of the Federal Subjects. The federal Chamber facilitates the

local Chambers, which are meant to function in the same capacity as the federal chamber,

only on the local level (“O Palate,” 2013). I do not consider the broader context of the

Civic Chamber, and I focus only on its relationship with the Public Oversight

Commissions. As far as prisoner rights are concerned, the Chamber members have

demonstrated a relatively high level of engagement with prisoner rights groups and

activists which I further discuss in the coming sections (Mukhametshina, 2016).

One of the duties of the Chamber is to produce an annual report on the conditions of civil society in Russia (Zakon No. 32-F3, 2005). The reports evaluate the state of civil

society in Russia by considering: the dynamics of civil society; the structure of civil

society, including its initiatives, institutions, and actions; the government and its

interactions with civil society; and the direction of the development of civil society. In general, the reports give an overview of civil society and a general feel for the issues that the Chamber considers to be important. The reports tend to be vague, and do not go into explicit detail. That is, they normally explain the ”who, what, and where,“ but more or less do not address the ”how or why.“ In spite of their vague nature, a lot can be gleaned from the reports about the activities of the Chamber and the initiatives it supports. The

content of these reports is discussed later, when I evaluate the effectiveness of the

Chamber in supporting the work of the Commissions.

The Civic Chamber itself has no enforcement mechanism provisioned in its

constituting documents. Essentially, the Chamber cannot engage any mechanism to

actually compel the government to act. Russian and western academics, lawyers, and

activists have extensively criticized the Chamber. In the journal Legal Sciences

(Iuridicheskaia Nauka), Natal’ia Kuleshova notes its lack of “constitutional reinforcement,”

laments the vagueness of its reports, and bluntly criticizes its “objective lack of guilt,” in

regard to the conditions of the country as a whole (Kuleshova, 2011). Her criticism is not

wrong in that the Chamber can boast of few, concrete outcomes from its work. Kuleshova

made these statements in 2011, six years after the inception of the Civic Chamber, and thus after the Chamber made its first reports on the conditions of Russian civil society. In order to glean information on the work of the Chamber, the reports need to be read fluidly and with attention to trends, as they are indicative of the changing and persisting interests of the Chamber and Federal government in the realm of civil society.

The Chamber’s objectivity also is constantly called into question due to how its

members are appointed. The president himself and his administration appoint the first

40 members. These 40 members are in large part responsible for selecting the remaining

128 members. Nikolai Kolssikov, a political scientist, remarked that the entire structure

is the mark of a “corporate,” state, where the members of the institution provide vague

feedback on different people and events within civil society (Kozlov and Zotova,

2018). Another of the major criticisms of the Chamber is that it is little more than a

symbolic body, something that has the veneer of a democratic institution, but none of the

actual substance. James Richter explains that if control is too strict, citizens will become

apathetic, which will force the government to overexert its authority to control society,

while if control is too loose, the government will lose its monopoly on

authority. According to Richter, Putin and the Russian state want civil society to play a harmonious role with the state. That is, citizens and civic groups can pursue their individual interests, so long as they are not of detriment to the state (Richter, 2009).

The Civic Chamber is reminiscent of the Soviet-era People’s Control

Committee. Consisting of so-called citizen inspectors, the Control Committee was an

attempt by the Soviet government to bureaucratize civil society in order to more

efficiently mobilize the population for the government’s projects and goals. Jan Adams

discusses how the Committee was meant to guide citizens’ activities for the purpose of

realizing the government’s goals in a setting where opposition and independent

institutions were not allowed (Adams, 1977). As Richter has explained, the Civic

Chamber is a closed forum that is similarly supposed to filter citizens’ activities and

complaints. Adams also discusses how creating such an institution was dangerous, as it

eliminated a concrete opposition and thus placed the blame for civic failures and

shortcomings solely on the Committee (Adams, 1977). Today, the Chamber and its

affiliated organizations run the same risk. In the sections dedicated to the Public

Oversight Commissions, I will examine how continued rights violations in the penal

system have the capacity to adversely affect the image of the Public Oversight

Commission project, thus negatively reflecting the government’s own efforts.

As such under Putin, the vicissitudes of Russian civil society have been numerous,

especially after a 2012 law was passed requiring all nongovernment organizations (NGO)

to register as foreign agents in the event that they were receiving funding from abroad

(Zakon No. 121-F3, 2012). Nevertheless, citizens are still able to pursue a reasonably wide

23 range of civic activities and projects that are not threatening to the state. It is in this capacity that the Civic Chamber finds its positive function: to act as an intermediary between civil society and the government. Richter discusses how civil society will function ideally as a self-limiting body, where it will monitor itself, educate its members, and direct any concerns congruous with government goals through the proper channels

(Richter, 2009). In this sense, self-limiting means that it will largely moderate itself. The

Civic Chamber is thus a type of feedback loop for both civil society and the government, which is where the Chamber performs its role supervising and publicizing the work of the Public Oversight Commissions for where prisoner rights are concerned.

The Chamber’s biggest role is to monitor civil society, but not necessarily as a police mechanism. As already noted, any capacity for authority was conspicuously left out of the constituting documents, which limited the Chamber to its role as an educational, monitoring, and feedback mechanism. In the capacity of education, the

Chamber is meant to provide expertise for both citizens and the government on various social issues. Of the 168 members, 43 are selected for their merit, reputation, and expertise on various civil issues. Additionally, the 85 members selected from the regional

Chambers also are supposed to have exhibited expertise on civic issues. For example, they selected Valerii Vasil’ev from the General Assembly of Krasnoiarsk Krai for his experience in public service and his expertise on human rights (Krasnoiarskii krai grazhdanskoe obshchestvo, 2011). The Civic Chamber then forms working groups composed of these experts which address issues of concern for the Chamber and government. The groups and members perform their educational and monitoring

functions simultaneously by creating initiatives, holding round table discussions, and

responding to written petitions and complaints.

Richter discusses how the issues of concern for the working groups along with the

Chambers projects and initiatives typically reflect the interests of the government. Thus,

the active role that Abramkin and other prison activists were able to play during the

Yeltsin years, along with their continued access to audiences with government officials,

has proven to be vital to the realization of the Public Oversight Commission

initiative. There is no doubt that the individual successes and expertise of prisoner rights

activists can be attributed to this success, but it is important to recognize that prison

conditions are of concern to the government, which recognizes the damaging effect that

overcrowding, disease, and publicity about these conditions render collectively on society and the state.

Therefore, it cannot be surprising that the Civic Chamber has a working group

dedicated to prisoner rights. The Chamber is attentive to prison conditions and prisoner

rights, and its activity in the field is quite vibrant. However, its activity goes beyond the

“vague,” reports and “objective,” indifference criticized by Kuleshova, as the Chamber

advocates for rights in carceral space and functions to a degree as an accountability

mechanism between society and the state in a quasi-democracy. The Chamber plays a provides a channel for citizens’ concerns and the work of the Public Oversight

Commissions, which makes their work more visible.

One of the Chamber’s most important functions is to serve as a complaint

mechanism to which citizens may direct questions, petitions, and complaints. According

25 to Federal Law No. 59-F3 from 2006, citizens can direct their petitions to any government institutions or organizations (Zakon No. 59-F3, 2017). Citizens can direct complaints directly to the relevant institutions, or, as Richter accurately suspects, the government would prefer they be directed to the Civic Chamber as a way to filter the useful complaints and ideas, as well as filter the potentially destabilizing ones. Although meant as an intermediary between society and the government, the Civic Chamber is most certainly a federal institution, although lacking the authority to enforce its decisions. However, the lack of federal authority legitimizes the Chamber as a mechanism of civil society, as civic organizations do not derive their authority directly from the government. The Chamber derives its structure from the state, but it receives no federal authority, making it like civic organizations, and thus a truly quasi-civic structure in a quasi-democratic state.

The Chamber provides a forum for discussion, and it is even possible to say that the Chamber creates a sort of ”visibility,” forum for the work of the Public Oversight

Commissions. Analysis of the Chambers reports for information on the complaint procedures is quite revealing. In the reports, the Chamber publishes how many complaints it receives every year. For the most part, each year there has been an increase in the number of complaints received (Doklad za 2017 god, 2017). It has also increased the possible avenues to which complaints and petitions can be filed, such as by improving web access in the form of an online portal in 2015 (Doklad za 2016 god, 2016). In addition to the written and online report mechanisms, the federal and regional chambers have increased the implementation of ”hot-lines,” (Doklad za 2015 god, 2015). The reports do

not consistently give a breakdown of the content of the reports, that is, they do not give

details or numbers on to whom or about what the complaints are being

directed. However, the topics discussed reveal issues that the Chamber considers

important. The Chamber itself cites the lack of reciprocity between the government and

civic organizations as a major problem. For example, when discussing ecological issues

in the 2012 report, the Chamber discussed that conflict tends to arise because

organizations and individuals do not receive any sort of response from the government

(Doklad za 2012 god, 2012). Although many reports are vague and have a tendency to

publish facts on the issue rather than facts supporting a solution, they provide valuable

insight into how the Chamber is fielding complaints, and about which issues seem to be

of the greatest relevance to the Chamber.

In order to address the issues highlighted in the annual reports, the Civic Chamber

facilitates discussions on topics related to these issues. One forum topic is “Zero

Readings (Nulevye chteniia),” which is a project designed to provide expertise through

analysis and debate of government legislation and projects (Polozhenie o poriadke, 2008).

At the Zero Readings, experts from the Chamber engage in discussions on new legislation

in order to address the issues that the Chamber’s experts have with the legislation. The

Civic Chamber also frequently will organize public, round table discussions in conjunction with the experts in charge of the working groups ("Napravleniia deiatel'nosti"). Arguably, it is reasonable to dismiss these publications as being insubstantial, as they tend to only discuss the issues rather than explain any outcomes or solutions. However, as Iuliia Gnusareva discusses in a 2009 article in the journal Vlast‘,

27 the Chamber’s ability to compile complaints, publish reports, and direct dialogue about the concerns of Russian society makes these issues more visible, and prevents them simply from just being ”put in the president’s pocket,” (Gnusareva, 2009.)

In the case of the relationship between the government, society, and carceral space, complaint institutions are of great importance. The Civic Chamber's working group dedicated to advocating for prisoner’s rights and conditions in the penitentiary system organizes forums for discussion, helps to direct prison reform initiatives, and addresses the concerns of inmates and their families. Prisoners’ rights are violated because there is a lack of reciprocity with the authorities, and their concerns and complaints are regularly left unaddressed. Mara Pokiakova addressed issues relating to complaint accountability in the 2007 meeting with Putin and other prisoner rights activists. Accountability was one of the primary reasons that these activists were demanding that working groups be created to have increased access to these procedures in penal institutions (Vestnik 2-3,

2007). One of the major concerns for inmates directing complaints directly through the penitentiary service is the lack of anonymity (Zhaloby, 2010). Inmates in both the general population and SIZO units file a substantial number of the petitions to be directed to the

Chamber (Doklad za 2015 god, 2015).2 The Chamber does not consistently mention the exact figures regarding inmate complaints in its reports. However, the Public Oversight

Commissions discuss the nature of the complaints is discussed in their reports and publications, an initiative of the Civic Chamber that is one of the most effective aspects of the complaint mechanisms falling under its umbrella.

The Chamber was viewed skeptically from the beginning, as critics doubted that

its ability to only comment on legislation and make recommendations on projects would

prompt any action. Indeed, the Chamber seems to have a tendency to make rather

grandiose statements, calling for greater civilian involvement and control across civil

society. One such example is the aforementioned “Zero-Readings,” forum. The project frequently publishes on the Civic Chamber’s website, but has very little tangible to show for their criticisms and recommendations (“Novosti,” 2018). Kuleshova argues that such projects weaken the Chamber’s position, arguing that they make the Chamber seem hollow and ineffective, and thus delegitimize the recommendations and criticisms that the Chamber publishes (Kuleshova, 2011). However, the Chamber shows that it has the capacity to at least influence the direction of some legislation in the Duma on certain issues.

One such initiative was the creation of the Public Oversight Commissions in

2008. The legislation to create these commissions had been proposed in 2000, but had

languished on the floor of the Duma, remaining more or less untouched after 2003

(Zakonoproekt No. 11807-03, 2008). According to McAuley, it was upon the initiative of

the Civic Chamber that the legislation was revived in the Duma in 2007, as the Chamber directed a petition to the government regarding the revival of the bill on increasing transparency and public control in carceral spaces (McAuley, 2016). That same year, the

President consulted with Abramkin, his expert on prisons on the President’s Council,

where Abramkin, Borshchev, and other experts on prisoner rights gave a presentation to

President Putin. During the course of the discussion following the presentation,

Abramkin bluntly stated that the problem in the prison system was not “closedness

(zakrytost‘)“, but ”impermeability (nepronitsaemost‘),“ emphasizing the need for greater

transparency and civilian access to prison spaces (Vestnik 2-3, 2007). Another activist at

the meeting, Mara Poliakova, articulated the idea of forming some sort of civilian

oversight commission, which would be able to access and survey penal institutions

(Vestnik 2-3, 2007). When the activists expressed the need to address existing legislation

to create these commissions, President Putin appeared to be receptive to the idea, stating

in regard to the legislation: ”We will definitely return to this, (My vernemsia k étomu

obiaztel'no),” (Vestnik 2-3, 2007).

In 2008, the Duma passed federal law No. 76- F3, “About public control for the provision of human rights in carceral spaces and about aid to those located in carceral spaces,” which was then signed into law by President Medvedev on June 10 (Zakon No.

76-F3, 2008). It is important to note the date of the passage of this law, as it can be dismissed at first as a reaction to the disastrous Magnitskii Affair. However, the law entered into force in 2008, almost six months before Sergei Magnitskii tragically died in the Butyrka prison, a SIZO unit in Moscow infamous for its harsh conditions and long list of notable inmates (Pan, 2009). Although their connection is not connected with the

Magnitskii Affair, the then-fledgling Public Oversight Commissions would come to influence President Medvedev and the government in the aftermath, all of which is discussed in the following section on the Commissions.

The Public Oversight Commissions provide a unique example of how the Civic

Chamber can be an effective institution. The Chamber plays a supervisory role, and has

very little control over the actions of the Commissions, especially when considering the

level of vertical control in other federal institutions. Here the Chamber receives and

provides feedback as an accountability mechanism. More importantly, it helps to

facilitate greater transparency because it provides a forum for dialogue and critique, as

well as a channel to pressure the government, albeit a limited one. Collecting the work of the Commissions is essential due to the breadth of the activity that the Commissions can accomplish. The Commissions work with the Federal Correctional Service, the local courts, the Procuracy, and local civic organizations and activists, which is an essential factor in developing accountability across the different strata of the state. The Chamber

here functions as the unifying body for a system of regional penal reform actors, playing

a role as one of the few sources of feedback for a penitentiary system that has been

characterized by geographic variability. As Gnusareva noted, the Chamber’s forum for dialogue prevents concerns from being brushed aside, which is a legitimating factor for an institution in a quasi-democracy. In this regard, it functions as an accountability tool and promotes transparency into the historically closed penitentiary system, an institution which has struggled with reform and shaking off the penal practices and traditions inherited from a totalitarian state.

The primary issues pertaining to prisoner rights are related to geography and

transparency. Essentially, how do isolating, geographic factors connected to the distance

and the size of the geographic space influence visibility into the multitude of different

penal institutions spread across the Russian Federation? More specifically, what factors

in a given geographic space affect the practices of the different actors involved in the

penitentiary system? The Civic Chamber is a unifying force. As will be discussed in the

subsequent sections, the Chamber oversees the Public Oversight Commissions. Each

Commission serves a different federal subject, each possessing political and social forces that are unique to that subject. As such, the Commissions will develop differently in response to these different actors, varying their effectiveness and interactions. The Civic

Chamber is the unifying force because it receives feedback from the different

Commissions and is able to incorporate this feedback into its own working groups and reports. The Chamber is essentially the only accountability mechanism for these

Commissions, due to the Chamber’s position as a bridge between civil society and the government. Richter discusses how the Chamber ideally maintains civil society by filtering the desirable feedback to the Kremlin. The Chamber thus is the mechanism that collects and synthesizes the feedback from a diverse array of penal institutions and

Commissions.

The Public Oversight Commissions

The Civic Chamber supervises the Public Oversight Commissions

(Obshchestvennaia Nabliudatel'naia Komissiia), or ONK’s. For the purpose of my thesis, I

discuss how the work of the Commissions positively impacts transparency in carceral

space. Due to the geographic size of Russia, regional, geographic factors weigh heavily

on the ability of the local Commissions to gain access to prisons and develop a working

relationship with the regional FSIN authorities. As such, the work and success of the

Commissions of Russia’s different federal subjects are varied. It is here that the Civic

Chamber provides a single platform for issues collected by the Commissions of the

different federal subjects. As the liaison between the government and civil society, the

Chamber plays an integral role in the compilation and publication of the work of the

Commissions, and provides feedback for the Commissions, FSIN, and the federal

government.

These are not the same Oversight Commissions that monitor elections, and are

strictly limited to monitoring in penal institutions. In order to form a Commission, citizens of each federal subject of the Russian Federation must individually apply to the

Civic Chamber to become a member of that subject’s Public Oversight Commission. The

Chamber is responsible for reviewing and approving member applications, thus

functioning here as an oversight body. Each Commission is composed of five to forty

members, and each member serves a three-year term. Members must reapply at the end

of their terms if they wish to continue to serve. Membership is voluntary with no

monetary compensation. I reiterate that I am not discussing the objectivity of the

application process in-depth, and I am focusing on the importance of the work of the

Commissions themselves.

The duties of the members include: performing regular visits of penal institutions;

preparing and fielding questions; the formation and realization of solutions for problems

encountered in these institutions; and other necessary duties that are in accordance with

the law (Zakon No. 76-F3, 2008). Once selected, the members of the ONK’s must

coordinate regular visits to penal institutions with the administrations of the local Federal

Correctional Service. The Federal Correctional Service is composed of the following

penal institutions: correctional colonies (ispravitel'nye kolonii), juvenile colonies

(vospitatel'nye kolonii), remand centers (sledstvennye izoliatory, or pre-trial detention),

prisons (tiur'my), probation (ugolovno-ispolnitel'nye inspektsii), settlement colonies (kolonii-

poseleniia), correctional medical institutions (lechebno-ispravitel'nye uchrezhdeniia), and preventative medical institutions (lechebno-profilakticheskie uchrezhdeniia) ("Strukturnye podrazdeleniia FSIN Rossii," 2018).

As the Commissions have developed, scholars Mikhail Cherviakov, Armen

Patrosian, and Roman Titiberiia have broken the interactions between the prison

administrations and civic groups (Oversight Commissions largely) into two levels. The first is on the coordination of their positions on issues, perspectives on life in carceral space, accountability, and the interactions in general between civic society and the prison administration. The second level relates to the joint and independent actions of the individual personnel (Cherviakov, Patrosian, and Titiberiia, 2017). Essentially, the goal

of the Oversight Commissions is to educate prison administrations on the importance of

developing normative practices to protect prisoner rights and benefit the entire penal

institution. These normative practices ought to inculcate in the inmates and personnel

the value of maintaining prisoner rights and positive conditions in carceral

space. Acceptance of these new norms will make the value of human rights a quality

more inherent to the penitentiary system. As is discussed in this section and the case study, the greatest obstacle to improving prisoner rights remains transparency. It is difficult to make FSIN and associated federal institutions accountable for their violations of prisoner rights when these institutions continue to use inherited practices that are normative to a closed institution.

With the exception of the application process to form the Commissions, it is

important to note that the Public Oversight Commissions operate almost entirely

independently of the Civic Chamber. The Chamber has not been an obstacle to prisoner

rights for the most part. However, activists and other members of civil society were, and

still are, rightfully wary of the objectivity of the Chamber, due in large part to the

President’s role in appointing members. Initially, it was feared that the Civic Chamber’s

involvement in the application process was going to compromise the validity of the

Commissions, as the Chamber would be able to exert too much influence on the selection

of members. In a 2009 article, Valerii Borshchev expressed the initial fears of the activist

community:

When they changed the law about the Oversight Commissions and introduced the

provision about how the Civic Chamber forms them, we were a little alarmed that those

people will enter, and experienced activists cannot enter [the Commissions]. However,

luckily, our fears did not come true, and their [the Commisions’] formation procedure

was completely normal (Vestnik 2-3, 2009).

There also was fear that the ONK’s would just become an arm of the Civic

Chamber with little to no ability to function. Borshchev expressed concern that Mariia

Kannabikh would try to control and direct the Commissions since they were related to the Civic Chamber’s working group on prisoner rights over which she presided. His concern was that this would compromise the legitimacy of the Commissions, as they were meant to be independent, public organizations (Vestnik 2-3, 2009).

The greatest doubts about the independence of the Commissions and their

relationship with the Chamber were quickly assuaged. Shortly after Federal Law No. 76-

F3 entered into force in 2008, the Russian Federation was confronted with the well-

publicized Magnitskii Affair, putting the newly formed Public Oversight Commissions

to the test. A few short weeks after Sergei Magnitskii died waiting for medical aid in

Butyrka Prison, the fledgling Public Oversight Commission of the City of Moscow

published several, well-researched and quite scathing reports on the ghastly conditions

which led to Magnitskii’s premature death.

Utilizing its right to visit penal institutions, the City of Moscow ONK conducted

its own investigation of the prison conditions to which Magnitskii was subjected during

his incarceration. Magnitskii was diagnosed with pancreatitis in his first few months of

incarceration at the beginning of 2009, but was denied treatment and was subsequently

transferred to a different facility (Butyrka). In November of that year, when the illness

became acute, he was again denied treatment. Locked in his cell, he died awaiting treatment at the age of 37 (“Litigation Magnitsky v. Russia,” 2014). Throughout the report, the ONK discusses the neglect perpetrated by prison personnel, the poor conditions provided, and the distinct lack of access to medical aid. In the conclusion of the report, the ONK states that the conditions in Butyrka could be classified as torturous

(“Litigation Magnitsky v. Russia,” 2014).

The Commission went so far as to conduct its own investigation interviewing

family members and the prison officials involved, due in large part to the fact that the

ONK and Magnitskii’s family were skeptical that FSIN or the prosecutor would conduct

a thorough, unbiased investigation on their own (Novaia Gazeta, 2011). The ONK

published a report from Magnitskii’s mother, Natal’ia Magnitskaia, detailing the

conditions leading to Magnitskii’s death. In the report, Magnitskaia cites multiple

examples of negligence and cruel and inhumane treatment which include: continued

psychological and physical pressure (beatings) on Magnitskij, how an inexperienced

coroner carelessly performed the autopsy, how Magnitskij and co-workers at Hermitage

Investment received threats, and that the Prosecutor and FSIN neglectfully investigated,

or outright refused to investigate, prison personnel (Novaia Gazeta, 2011). In an interview

with Ivan Prokopenko, the prison official in-charge of Magnitskii‘s incarceration at the

time of his death, Prokopenko flatly stated that he did not consider Magnitskii sick

because inmates frequently ”fake” illnesses in order to be moved to an institution with

better conditions (Obshchestvennaia nabliudatel'naia komissiia G. Moskvy, 2009).

The details of the report alarmed the Russian public, the government, and the

international community, prompting newly elected president Dmitrii Medvedev to react

in the wake of the tragedy at the end of 2009. In the immediate weeks following the City of Moscow ONK’s publications, Medvedev fired four leading FSIN officials: Vladimir

Davydov and Petr Pasmokov of Moscow FSIN, the head of FSIN in St. Petersburg and

Leningrad Oblast’ Vladimir Malenchuk, and the director of SIZO units for the entire country, Valerii Teliukha ("Vysokie chini FSIN uvoleny posle smerti Magnitskogo,"

2009). Soon thereafter, Medvedev had also fired the deputy director of FSIN, Aleksandr

Piskonov ("Prezident Rossii uvolil zamglavy FSIN," 2009). Medvedev’s actions and

commitment to prison reform went beyond his immediate, reactionary response at the

end of 2009. In 2010, amid a tumultuous international response only a year removed

from the tragedy of Magnitskii’s death, Medvedev put forward an initiative known as

the ”Conception,” aimed at completely overhauling the federal correctional service. The

aim of the Conception is to better conditions and establish normative practices across the

entire penitentiary system. Its primary purpose is to bring institutional practices and

behaviors up the standards laid out by the Russian government and European states in

the Council of Europe, and is supposed to improve the prestige and reputation of FSIN

internally and abroad (Rasporiazhenie No. 1772 R, 2010).

Judith Pallot discusses the Conception, noting it as an effort by President

Medvedev to move the Russian penitentiary system in a new direction. Instead of

focusing on punishment, the Conception was meant to focus instead on

rehabilitation. Pallot notes that the Conception was a reactive measure that came during a time when Russia was under intense international scrutiny, which makes the impact of the City of Moscow ONK report questionable. However, Pallot also remarks that the

Conception initiative can be associated with a reasonable degree of interest from

Medvedev himself (Pallot, 2015). Therefore, the work of the City of Moscow ONK cannot

be dismissed, but rather must be viewed as a factor involved in the government’s

decision. The ONK of the City of Moscow demonstrated that the Public Oversight

Commission project could effectively investigate prison conditions and gather valuable,

unbiased research from their visits. It is important to remember that the Commissions

were formed before the Magnitskii debacle, and the fact that an ONK was able to access

and report on the previously almost impenetrable penitentiary system is a landmark

moment in terms of penal activism in Russia.

Medvedev and other leading officials in the criminal justice system, such as

Aleksandr Reimer, the then director of FSIN, and Minister of Justice Aleksandr

Konovalev, all acknowledged the earnest need to move the correctional system in a new

direction. All three remarked on how the Soviet legacy plagued the penitentiary system,

and the Conception aimed to move toward building reform prisons (tiur’my), rather than

maintain the infamous system of labor colonies. Medvedev demonstrated a strong interest in improving prison conditions through the breadth of his 2009 response. However, it is undeniable that the Conception was in large part introduced in order to quell growing, international animosity (Pallot, 2015). Unfortunately, Vladimir

Putin replaced Alexander Reimer with Genadii Kornienko as the new head of FSIN in

2012 (”Direktor FSIN Rossii,” 2018). Coupled with corruption and a lack of funds, the

Conception has remained mostly on the backburner since losing the wind in its sails after the departure of the Medvedev administration in 2012 (Pallot, 2015).

Nevertheless, the Public Oversight Commissions persisted, and in fact have

spread to almost every subject of the Russian Federation (Doklad za 2017 god, 2017).3 The

work of the ONK’s with the penitentiary service, Civic Chamber, and federal government

has coalesced into a perplexing phenomenon, and one that would greatly satisfy Winston

Churchill in its nature. It has taken 13 years for the ONK‘s to have become almost universal, and the sluggish nature of their regional implementation can be attributed to two primary reasons: confusion and geography. Widespread confusion about what

exactly the Commissions are supposed to do and how they are supposed to ”oversee,”

penal institutions has persisted since 2008. Geography affects the ONK’s in both overt and underlying ways. Overtly, it affects the ONK’s access to penal institutions and their ability to cooperate with civic and federal institutions. At the same time, there is an underlying legacy between the ONK’s, the central government in Moscow, and the widespread, but isolated penal ”islands” of what Solzhenitsyn calls the archipelago

(Solzhenitsyn and Willetts, 1978). These two factors in the context of these penal islands have greatly impacted the development of the Oversight Commissions over the past decade and a half. As a positive result, the Commissions have developed a largely cooperative relationship with the Civic Chamber, which also reflects how prisoner rights activists have been able to overall maintain a positive relationship with the federal

40 government. The relationship with the Civic Chamber has been supportive and cooperative, and the Chamber presides over their work and publicizes their activities as a feedback mechanism. Although the Chamber is directly involved with the application process, the ONK’s have had the opportunity to develop independently. These different developmental trajectories have resulted in a variety of unique results due to the nature of the application process. Only citizens of a federal subject can serve as members of that subject’s Commission, meaning that the social and political climate in that geographic space render great influence on the activity of each Commission. As discussed earlier, in spite of the general weakening of the federalist state in Russia, penal institutions have remained remarkably resistant to the pressure of centralization, which has contributed to the complex geographic issues facing the Commissions.

The issue of confusion is a persisting issue to this day, and it has resulted in the

ONK’s forming at different times and adopting different approaches. Immediately in

2009, the year after the Commissions were formed in 2008, there was confusion in both the Civic Chamber and the fledgling Commissions themselves about the extent of their authority. Borshchev commented on the general confusion, and cited the possibility of interference from the Civic Chamber as a primary concern for Commission members

(Vestnik 2-3, 2009). However, the Chamber has largely played a supporting role for the

ONK’s, in spite of the delays in forming the Commissions caused by the Chamber’s review of the applications. The relationship with the Civic Chamber can be called productive, especially when considering the tenuous spot which the Chamber occupies between society and the state, and the inability of the Commissions to exercise any

authority beyond pressure and dialogue. Their relationship is by no means perfect, but they have managed to function relatively cooperatively.

For example, the 2013 annual report from the Civic Chamber frankly criticized the

lack of transparency of the Commissions, requesting that they produce more detailed

reports and make the information they collect more accessible (Doklad za 2013 god,

2013). However, the Chamber also addresses the concerns of the ONK’s themselves,

acknowledging the challenges and ambiguities that they face in performing their duties.

One of these ambiguities stems from funding: how are the Commissions supposed to

function effectively without financial support? A publication on the official page of the

Public Oversight Commissions addressed this as one of the most vexing problems

involved with the ONK’s, stating that it was difficult to retain effective and motivated

members when these members often do not receive any sort of funding ("Obeshchannoi

podderzhki ONK ne proizoshloo: analitika pobeditelei pervogo konkursa

Prezidentskogo grant operatora," 2017). The Civic Chamber has also commented on this

issue, acknowledging in the 2013 annual report that the Commissions are severely limited

by their lack of financial support (Doklad za 2013 god, 2013).

The Russian government holds a domestic grant competition called the

Presidential Grant Fund (Fond prezidentskikh grantov) (Doklad za 2017 god, 2017). The grant

competition is open to civic organizations so long as they do not have direct sponsorship

from the government or a real or perceived political agenda (“Chastye voprosy: Kto NE

mozhet byt’ uchastnikami konkursa?,” 2019). Eligible applicants must submit an

application and a proposed project with a budget to a committee that is appointed by the

office of the president. Once the application is submitted in full to the annual grant

competition, the committee decides whether to award the organization the grant (Ustav

Fonda, 2018). The Commissions are eligible organizations, but they can only apply for

grants to fund specific projects and initiatives. The Presidential Grant competition is

therefore an opportunity to acquire funding, but the specific nature of the applications

severely limits to what the Commissions can apply the funding. They can only apply the

grant to projects with specific goals, and thus they cannot use these rewards to

compensate members or pay for travel and site visit expenses (Ustav Fonda, 2018).

Therefore, the competition is an unreliable resource for funding.

Federal Law No. 76-F3 gives a thorough explanation as to how the Commissions

are to be formed, but it does not outline clear limitations on what the Commissions can

and cannot do. Thus, depending on the motivation of the members and the political and

societal climate in which a Commission finds itself, some Commissions have developed

into very effective and open organizations, while the status of others is more

ambiguous. The ambiguous Commissions are classified as such because I cannot glean a

reasonable level of understanding on their activity or effectiveness. This is because they

rarely or vaguely publish, or are located in a climate that is similarly opaque. In these cases, the local correctional authorities, government and civic organizations similarly do not publish detailed information on their activities. Harking again to the 2013 annual report, the Civic Chamber has cited this opaqueness as a widespread issue with the

ONK’s, and has requested that all Commissions provide more detailed annual reports

(Doklad za 2013 god, 2013). Therefore, it is inappropriate to label them as being ineffective.

It is possible that they are ineffective or that their information is simply

inaccessible. However, I cannot comment definitively on their activity without the ability

to verify this information. I thus do not examine these ambiguous Commissions, and

instead focus on the activity of a particularly proactive and well publicized ONK in

Krasnoiarsk Krai.

Reporting has been a persisting issue on the count of both FSIN and the ONK’s,

and it is here that the Chamber has played a valuable role pressuring the Commissions

on the local level, and FSIN on the national level. Just as in the 2013 report, the Civic

Chamber criticized both the Commissions and FSIN in its 2014 report, stating that FSIN

needs to make statistics more accessible to the public, and that the ONK’s ought to spend

more time collecting this information during their visits in order to publish it themselves

(Doklad za 2014 god, 2014). Although the actual publication of reports is an issue pertinent to the ONK’s as well, it is acknowledged that FSIN too struggles with openness, even though Federal Law No. 76-F3 mandates that FSIN maintain an open and cooperative

relationship with the Commissions.

There has been increasing pressure on FSIN to adopt less obstructive behavior

with the Commissions, but this has sadly been a persisting battle across the federal

subjects. One area in particular has been with a provision in article 16 of Federal Law

No. 76-F3, which gives ONK members the right to use recorders and cameras during their visits (No. 76-F3, 2008). Very recently, Mariia Kannabikh, the Civic Chamber member in charge of the working group on prisoner rights, took an accusatory tone with Anatolii

Rudyi, the official representing FSIN at a forum held by the Chamber. Kannabikh stated

44 that the oppositional attitude of FSIN was interfering with the ability of ONK members to make prison visits, as FSIN personnel are consistently interfering with ONK members when they are using their recording devices ("«ONK i FSIN ne dolzhny protivopostavliat'sia drug drugu» - Anatolii Rudyi," 2018). On a higher level, Tat’iana

Moskal’kova, Russia’s high commissioner on human rights, openly criticized a clause in

Federal Law No. 76-F3 before the Duma, which allowed FSIN officials to always be present when ONK members were recording or videotaping. Kannabikh believes that the presence of FSIN personnel prevents the real truth from being shared ("Moskal'kova schitaet, chto popravki v zakon ob ONK nuzhdaiutsia v raz''iasnenii," 2018).

With almost eerie timing in summer 2018, Irina Biriukova, a lawyer for Public

Verdict, released video footage from Correctional Colony 1 in Iaroslavl’, showing 18 guards taking turns beating inmate, Evgenii Makarov, with clubs. The release of the footage prompted responses across Russia and the international community, where civic organizations and government affiliates are demanding greater visibility into the Russian penal system. Public Verdict is an organization in Russia dedicated to protecting victims suffering from violent crimes and human rights violations at the hands of personnel from corrections and law enforcement (“O Fonde,” 2019). These demands are almost precisely congruent with the demands of the Civic Chamber and the Public Oversight

Commissions regarding transparency ("Pod trebovaniem rassledovat' pytki v iaroslavskoi IK-1 za sutki podpisalis' pochtii 50 tysiach chelovek," 2018). The investigation by the Procuracy into the Makarov Affair has not yet yielded any results, and thus far 14 of the 18 guards shown in the video have only been fined, causing prisoner

rights activists dissatisfied with these light punishments to forward the case to the

European Court of Human Rights (“Nachal’nik UFSIN po Iaroslavskoi oblasti slozhil

polnomochiia: kto zanial ego mesta,” 2019).

The Procuracy is conducting a slow and vague investigation, which is part of a broader federal trend. Federal agencies responsible for conducting internal

investigations tend to produce vague and inconclusive results, similar to the criticisms

the ONK of the city of Moscow cited during the Magnitskii investigation. In a similar vein, FSIN too remains vague and at odds with efforts to make the correctional system less opaque. The increasing exposure of institutional violence and abuse is not causing

FSIN to take a more proactive position in correcting these practices. It instead prefers not to acknowledge the institutional nature of the crimes, and attributes the growing publication of these abuses to decreasing fear across the prison population. As part of a recent decision to fire the head of IK-14 after a system of slave-like labor was exposed at an all-woman’s prison, the deputy director of FSIN Valerii Maksimenko stated that the corrections service has never been so open, thanks largely to a FSIN initiative to install more surveillance cameras (Coalson, 2019). Instead of accepting responsibility and pledging to address the perpetrators and broader institutional issues, FSIN remains vague and unwilling to address issues that risk exposing institutional weaknesses and shortcomings.

The lack of concrete guidance and the varying attitudes of regional FSIN

departments cause the ONK’s to develop in a variety of ways after their formation,

following a trial by error procedure as they have established themselves within the

geographic space they occupy. The influence of geography is extremely important in this

regard, as it establishes a physical and spatial context hinging on the geographic size of

the subject, the number and spacing of the penal institutions in that subject, the distance

of that federal subject from Moscow, and the behaviors of the citizens and organizations

within that subject. Hiding below the surface, there is the effect of the legacy of the

penitentiary system inherited from the Soviet Union. The geographic factors here are of

great importance in the context of an ONK’s ability to execute its duties within the space

of its federal subject, as this ability is affected by the aforementioned penal legacy. In this same vein, the ONK’s ability to perform its duties has an effect on its relationship with other institutional actors, such as with its federal interlocutor the Civic Chamber, the local

FSIN administration, and local government and community. In the case of the ONK’s, a favorable geographic climate with high levels of civic engagement have had positive effect on the effectiveness of the ONK’s, which is discussed in the following section.

Case Study: Public Oversight Commission of Krasnoiarsk Krai

I selected the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight Commission because it is a model

for other Commissions due to the positive, tangible impact of its work. That is, the

Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission exhibits agency within the constraints that limit the

autonomy of civic organizations. Here I am considering the positive impact of a Public

Oversight Commission whose members operate proactively rather than reactively. It is

important to consider this exceptional case because we need to understand what factors

influence the effectiveness of the Commissions, and it will force us to consider what

makes an effective commission: are the successes of the Krasnoiarsk Krai case isolated

and non-transferrable, or can some aspects of the ONK’s behavior and success be applied

to improve other Commissions in the Russian Federation? As I consider the case of

Krasnoiarsk Krai, I am examining specifically the importance of how the Krasnoiarsk

Krai Commission has been proactive and forward thinking in its activities. In particular,

I consider how the Commission has been effective in its advocacy for greater

transparency in carceral space within Krasnoiarsk Krai. My analysis of the positive

impact of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission can be of use in future comparisons with

other Commissions, and when addressing questions about the effectiveness and worth

of the Public Oversight Commission project as a whole. The Krasnoiarsk Krai

Commission has little ability to pressure the government with anything other than

dialogue due to the limits that the federal government places on civil society. I examine

the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission because it shows that it can operate with a high degree

of agency even within these limits.

One of the primary reasons that I selected the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission is that

its members are consistent and motivated. The Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight

Commission exhibits extraordinary agency and the Fund «V zashchitu prav

zakliuchennykh,» deems its members as some of the most proactive and effective

(Vestnik 3-4, 2018). The case study demonstrates that despite apathetic, or obstinate,

federal authorities in Moscow, the regional Public Oversight Commissions can effectively

promote greater visibility into carceral space. Through my case study, I do not intend to

demonstrate that the Krasnoiarsk Krai case is a definitive model for the work of the Public

Oversight Commissions, nor that it is meant to be understood to show that the Krai’s

Commission functions perfectly and has established complete reciprocity between the

penal authorities and civil society. Rather, my analysis of the Commission is meant to show that consistently applied pressure and effort to increase transparency and build more efficient relationships between FSIN, the local government, and civic organizations can be accomplished within the constraints of a sociopolitical environment with strict controls placed on civil society. The Commission can be a useful mechanism for penal reform within the forum that the Civic Chamber and government facilitate. As I demonstrate in this section, the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK operates an effective advocacy network, using its position within the Krai to draw support from local organizations, its national connection to the Civic Chamber, and international access to the ECHR to effectively pressure the penal authorities.

I additionally chose the Public Oversight Commission of Krasnoiarsk Krai because

of the impact of the penal legacy inherited from the Soviet Union. The Krasnoiarsk Krai

ONK distinguishes itself from many other Commissions across Russia through its

proactiveness in dealing with this penal legacy. The ONK has developed proactive behavior in connection with a geographically isolated environment that has a strong civic tradition and favorable conditions for cooperation and reform (McAuley,

2016). Krasnoiarsk Krai has a tradition of penal activism, and Valerii Borshchev cited the

Krai in the 2007 meeting with President Putin before the creation of the Commissions, and he lauded Krasnoiarsk Krai as one of the few regions where penal conditions were improving rather than regressing (Vestnik 2-3, 2007). The local Commission has capitalized on its position, enjoying high levels of engagement with the community and a reasonable level of cooperation with local authorities such as with the regional FSIN and Krasnoiarsk Krai Procuracy.

Located in the Siberian Federal district in the heart of Siberia, Krasnoiarsk Krai is

the second largest subject of the Russian Federation, sitting at 2,366,797 square kilometers

("Sovremennyi Krasnoiarsk krai,” 2018). Its size would make it the 11th largest country in

the world after Algeria (“Largest Countries in the World (by land area)”). It is not surprising then that the greatest number of penal institutions in any federal subject are located in Krasnoiarsk Krai. There are 42 penal institutions consisting of: 13 settlement colonies, four general regime colonies, 11 strict regime colonies, one special regime colony, two prisons, three penal hospitals, one preventative care facility, one juvenile colony ("Ispravitel'nye uchrezhdeniia," 2018) and six SIZO units ( "Sledstvennye

Izoliatory," 2018). The large number of penal institutions today in Krasnoiarsk Krai is not a random, chance occurrence, but stems from the Soviet penal legacy in the region.

Kseniia Averkieva discusses the relationship between geography and the correctional facilities in a 2014 article, analyzing the organization and distribution of these institutions. She attributes the large number of penal institutions to resource development projects, which are a legacy of the Soviet penitentiary system (Averkieva,

2014). Resource development projects, such as forestry, were of vital importance to the

Soviet prison-industrial project, as noted by Solzhnetsyn in The Gulag

Archipelago. (Solzhenitsyn and Willetts, 1978). Forestry is prevalent in Krasnoiarsk Krai and the penal authorities used it as a means of correctional labor to ”reform,” subversive, criminal behavior during the Soviet period. Many regional prisons, including those in

Krasnoiarsk Krai, have continued to rely heavily on labor as a method to reform inmates, although not to the extreme that was common during the Soviet era (Piacentini,

2004). Averkieva also addresses the issue of geography and how it harshens punishments. She argues that the remote location of many of the penal institutions isolates prisoners and limits access to basic living essentials (Averkieva, 2014). She likewise discusses the economic phenomenon associated with penal institutions. The local population in remote, sparsely populated territories is dependent on penal institutions for work, as the manual labor jobs which would otherwise be filled primarily by local males are filled by prisoners, forcing men to work as guards and other prison staff, while women fill other auxiliary roles (Averkieva, 2014). Krasnoiarsk Krai, being massive in size and of sparse population, has inherited this practice, and the correctional

institutions continue to rely heavily on labor as a way to both reform and occupy

prisoners. However, due in large part to the cohesive efforts of the Public Oversight

Commission with local organizations and the regional authorities, prison practices, conditions, and attitudes have not continued to perpetuate in nearly the same, exploitative pattern characteristic of the Soviet period.

Civil society in Krasnoiarsk Krai has garnered high levels of civic interest and

activism. In 2017, the head of the Fund for Presidential Grants, Il’ia Chukalin,

commended Krasnoiarsk Krai for its high level of civic activity, and he cited the Krai as

a model for all of Russia’s federal subjects (Nagornykh, 2017). In addition to the ONK,

the administration of the local government, a reasonably cooperative prosecutor, and a

responsive administration in the local FSIN, there are a variety of grassroots

organizations and initiatives in Krasnoiarsk Krai which are dedicated to reforming

criminal procedure and improving conditions for inmates. Through these efforts to build more cooperative relationships between different social and political groups, Krasnoiarsk

Krai has seen slow, but steady, improvement in practices related to the penal legacy.

What gives substance to much of the work of the ONK is the support of the

General Assembly, the representative body in the local government of Krasnoiarsk

Krai. The Assembly plays a valuable supporting role, publicizing the work of the ONK on its website. Importantly, the Assembly provides funding of 170,000 rubles per year

for the Oversight Commission to organize events and projects. Recall that the Public

Oversight Commissions do not receive any funding from the federal budget, which

greatly limits the Commissions’ ability to engage beyond the free-of-charge penal site

visits. Even though this sum is quite minimal, it nevertheless is an important symbolic

gesture which demonstrates that the Assembly considers the ONK’s work valuable to the

entire region. The Commission has been able to use the cooperative relationship it has

cultivated with the Assembly to its advantage. As the official civic body in the region

connected to the federal Civic Chamber, the Assembly is responsible for the development

of the relationship between civil society and the government. It therefore plays an

essential role in the efforts of the Commission in coordinating activities with the

government and penal authorities on the initiatives of regional civic groups (“Vlast’ i

obshchestvo,” 2018).

Civic groups and the ONK are able to engage effectively with the most pressing

issues on the prison reform spectrum. They do not focus exclusively on improving the

physical conditions in carceral space, but also work to improve the entire legal and penal

process for inmates. The Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK, as Abramkin recommends, advocates for prisoners during the legal process. Many prisoners do not get representation in court because they cannot afford to hire an advocate for themselves. The courts are not obligated to provide an attorney, and defendants can only have legally certified individuals represent them (Zhaloby, 2010). The ONK and other local activists recognize the compromising situation in which detainees and inmates are thus placed, and work to provide legal assistance. One legal assistance project is called “Free Legal Assistance to

Prisoners in the Penitentiary Institutions of Krasnoiarsk Krai.” The project is a recipient of grant funding from the 2017 Presidential Grant Competition. The Regional Council of the Public Oversight Commission organizes the project, and received 989,150 rubles. The

project goal is for the Council as well as faculty and upper level legal students from the

Legal Institute of Krasnoiarsk State Agricultural University to provide legal consultation

and assistance to over 600 inmates free of charge. The ONK supports the project,

facilitates the meetings with the inmates, and provides additional assistance and

expertise when needed ("Proekty: Besplatnaia juridicheskaia pomoshch' osuzhdennym

v penitenciarnykh uchrezhdeniiakh Krasnoiarskogo kraia," 2018).

One of the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK’s attributes that makes it so effective is that it

actively seeks to strengthen relationships not only with FSIN, but also with civil society

and the government. The members of the Commission recognize the importance of

developing sustainable, long-term goals within the Krai. In a 2014-2015 project Russian

office of Transparency International (TI) conducted, the TI office considered the lack of

accountability on the part of NGO’s to be one of the issues which weakened civic groups’

demands of greater accountability from the government. The report closely considered

the cases of the Presidential Grant recipients, who often failed to provide the requested

financial reports, as well as the presentations on the outcomes of their projects (Doklad

Tsentra, 2014). In the Russian case, this behavior by NGO’s could rightfully be seen as a

self-defense mechanism, especially given the developments in civil society since the

return of the Putin administration in 2012 (Zakon No. 121-F3, 2012).

In contrast to the trend, the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight Commission plays

a valuable role in promoting visibility between society and the government. Namely, the

Commission shows that its members are accessible and engaged. The Krasnoiarsk Krai

ONK provides a detailed annual report, communicating its activity for the past year, and

comments on areas that it can improve itself via its work and relationship with other

organizations, be they federal or civil. One of the most revealing aspects about the

dedication of the Commission published in the reports is a detailed breakdown of the

number of site visits conducted by each ONK member. (OTChET, 2018). The charts detail

each individual member and the sites that they visited, showing that the ONK is

reviewing the work of its members and holds them individually accountable for their

findings from each site visit. Thus, the Commission can connect problems cited at different FSIN sites to the Commission members on an individual level. The Civic

Chamber then publishes about the activities of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission on its website, and provides feedback for the Commissions in its annual reports, thus publicizing the work of the Commission and its members on the national level.

It may seem a small thing, but the fact that the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public Oversight

Commission has an easily accessible annual report is an important gesture in building

accountability. Federal Law No. 76-F3 does not stipulate that the Commissions need to

publish annual reports (Zakon No.76-F3, 2008). As discussed in the above section, the

Civic Chamber cites accountability on the part of the regional Commissions as an issue in its own annual reports. The Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK demonstrates that the Commission accepts the responsibility to publish an official report, thus making itself and its members responsible for both the successes and shortcomings of the Commission.

The ONK has managed to cultivate a rather successful relationship with the local

authorities, such as the office of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Procurator (Prokuratura

Krasnoiarskogo Kraia). The ONK’s success appears to be related to the penal legacy in

Krasnoiarsk Krai and a broader, positive public attitude. Stemming from this legacy are issues like recidivism that have a negative impact on the entire Krai. These issues have garnered wide community and institutional attention. The ONK has found success in its work with FSIN due in large part to its relationship with the procurator. The work between the Commission and the procurator goes beyond periodic cooperation, and has seemingly become a systematic working relationship, where they share information, expertise, and conduct joint projects and initiatives. In the Commission’s report on its activity from 25 June, 2015 – 15 January, 2018, the ONK states that there is a lack of cooperation in its relationship with FSIN, and it was not until the Office of the Procurator intervened that this relationship changed (OTChET, 2018). In 2017, the ONK and the procurator agreed to continue their work together. There is a level of cooperation between the ONK and the office of the prosecutor, as the ONK will collect information and turn it over to the prosecutor’s office for investigation (“Proverkoi v IK-31

Krasnoiarskogo kraia zanimalas’ General’naia prokuratura.” 2017). Their collaborative efforts have also resulted in the realization of these meetings with the community, prisoners, and FSIN personnel, as well as regular, joint visits to the 42 penal institutions across Krasnoiarsk. Uncharacteristically, the prosecutor and their representatives at the event engage with the inmates and their relatives, and even accept written petitions directly, as was the case at a meeting in May, 2018 ("Prokuratora sovmestno s predstaviteliami obshchestvennosti proverila sobliudanie prav osuzhdennykh v ispravitel'noj kolonii No. 31," 2018).

In the report from the Hungarian Helsinki Committee on complaint mechanisms,

the Committee cites that discrepancies in the complaint procedure are some of the most

glaring violations of prisoner rights. Inmates typically must direct their complaints via

FSIN officials, compromising their anonymity and knowledge of whether the complaints

are directed through the proper channels (Zhaloby, 2010). Although this does not solve

the problem of anonymity, the procurator effectively cuts out the middle-man by directly accepting the complaints in front of the Commission members, which at minimum increases the level of personal accountability between the inmate, prosecutor, and FSIN personnel.

The relationship with the procurator is not perfect, and the ONK still has issues

with FSIN. Valerii Borshchev points out that there is a tendency for violators of prisoner

rights to only receive a reprimand from FSIN and other federal agencies responsible for

investigating internal rights’ violations. The Procuracy seemingly avoids criminal

investigations against offenders, preferring to reprimand or fine the offenders (Trifonova,

2018). The ONK is involved in the investigation to an extent, bringing the violations to

the attention of the authorities and contributing their expertise when

requested. The Kransoiarsk Office of the Procurator acknowledges the violations in prison conditions, but has a tendency to find violations made against the inmates by

prison personnel to be insubstantial

("O rezul'tatakh vzaimodeistviia i sotrudnichestva Krasnoiarskoi prokuratury po nadzo ru za sobliudeniem zakonov v ispravitel'nykh uchrezhdeniiakh i obshchestvennoi nabli

udatel'noi komissiei po kontroliu za obespecheniem prav cheloveka v mestakh prinudit

el'nogo soderzhaniia i sodeistvii litsam, nakhodiashchimsia v mestakh prinuditel'nogo s

oderzhaniia po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu," 2018).

Even though the ONK will contribute information and expertise to the

procurator’s investigations as mentioned above, the ONK maintains a critical eye on the

work of the procurator. One such example comes from Correctional Colony 31

in Krasnoiarsk Krai, where the ONK compiled a multitude of complaints from over 50 inmates that cited employee rights violations. The procurator’s report on its investigation

stated that it did not find any substantive evidence to support these complaints

(Kosachaeva, 2018). Regarding the violations it found to the conditions in the facility, the

procurator's office vaguely stated that it was preparing a response addressing these

violations

("Zamestitelem prokurora kraia provereny usolviia soderzhaniia osuzhdennykh v FKU

IK-31 GUFSIN Rossii po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu," 2017).

The tendency toward vague investigations reinforces the importance of the

Commissions and other prisoner rights activists because they are able to pursue these

issues even if the federal authorities are uncooperative. As a member of the Council of

Europe and a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights, Russian citizens

have access to the European Court of Human Rights. Since citizens and civic

organizations cannot hold the federal government accountable themselves, they have

become increasingly reliant on their access to the ECHR as an individual complaint

mechanism (Annual Report, 2019). Members of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission have

supported and forwarded the cases of individuals suffering from rights violations in

Krasnoiarsk Krai’s penal institutions to the ECHR. One example is the case of Sergei

Kozin, who was not given adequate medical attention or aid following surgery in IK-7 in

Krasnoiarsk Krai. He was left in his cell unable to move, receiving no help to the restroom

or showers to clean himself. His case was forwarded to the ECHR by Vitkoriia Brester of the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK because of FSIN’s continued failure to provide Kozin with adequate medical aid (“V Krasnoiarske s vos’moi popytki udalos’ osvobodit’ iz kolonii onkobol’nogo invalida,” 2018). Russian citizens’ increasing reliance on the ECHR reflects that Russia is responsive to pressure from the ECHR to a degree. Kathryn Hendley notes

that so long as the Court’s decisions do not request institutional changes and

restructuring, the Russian government is typically compliant and will pay compensation

to the victims (Hendley, 2016). The Commission members adeptly tap into international

institutions to help forward their mission, making the expertise and professional

networks of the members of vital importance to the broader Public Oversight

Commission project within the krai and Russia.

McAuley writes about how Igor’ Kaliapin would use the domestic courts in order

to pressure the police to properly conduct investigations, discussing that, although

corrupt, the courts and other related government organs seem to have the most ability to

function independently of the federal executive, even if they required some illicit

nudging (McAuley, 2016). It is not clear exactly how the Krasnoiarsk Krai Public

Oversight Commission has managed to garner the support of the Office of the Procurator,

but it seems as if they have nevertheless found success in their dealings with FSIN by

engaging the support and pressure of the prosecutor. Their success in this regard has

strengthened their influence, giving merit to their work and bolstering the perception of

their value in Krasnoiarsk Krai. The Commission also recognizes the influence of the

ECHR, and is attempting to use the European courts as a way to more directly hold the

federal authorities accountable.

Success with the prosecutor has enhanced the Commission’s ability to work with

FSIN itself. The Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN department is frequently cited for violations of prisoner rights, and has been criticized by Za zashchitu prav zakliuchennykh for the frequency of beatings (Ponamarev, 2012). The human rights’ ombudsman of Krasnoiarsk krai also cited FSIN of Krasnoiarsk Krai, whose 2017 annual report showed that FSIN receives the largest number of human rights complaints of any governmental institution in Krasnoiarsk Krai

("Doklad o problemakh realizatsii konstitutsionnykh prav i svobod grazhdan na territor ii krasnoiarskogo kraia v 2017 godu," 2018). In a perverse way, however, this can be viewed positively because it demonstrates that there is visibility into penal institutions in the Krai. Positively, the complaints from inmates are being received by both federal and civic organizations, and these complaints are published and not falling on deaf ears. There are still discrepancies with accountability, as the ONK and prisoner rights activists noted regarding the investigations by the Office of the Procurator, but the growing number of complaints lodged with the Krasnoiarsk Krai Ombudsman and the

ECHR show that Russian citizens are becoming increasingly aware of their access to human rights mechanisms.

Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN has been forced to address many of these issues due in large

part to the criticism connected with the thoroughness of the investigations into prisoner

rights’ violations. What is unique to Krasnoiarsk Krai is the ability of the ONK to

coordinate its pressure on FSIN with other regional and federal actors, demonstrating the

importance of the ONK in influencing accountability in the space of the krai. In

September of 2018, footage of prison personnel roughing-up inmates in IK-43 in

Krasnoiarsk Krai was released to Gulag.net, a prisoner rights forum (“V Krasnoiarske rassleduiut ugolovnoe delo po faktu pytok v FKU OIU-26 OUXD (EPKT IK-43) GUFSIN po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu,” 2018). Associated networks, in this case Gulag.net, connect these events with the ONK. The fact that this footage is directed to the Krasnoiarsk Krai

ONK means that the ONK is recognized as an active and effective mechanism of civilian control and engagement in penal institutions.

Another example addresses access to adequate medical care and the prevalence of

contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and HIV, both of which are common problems

across the Russian penal system ("Chislo zakl'uchennyx v Rossii k nachalu 2017 goda

dostiglo istoricheskogo minimuma," 2017). Understanding the danger of disease in

enclosed spaces, FSIN of Krasnoiarsk Krai has made efforts to address this over the past

several years. In 2015, Za zashchitu prav zakliuchennykh commended Krasnoiarsk Krai

FSIN for its proactive efforts to improve and open medical facilities (Vestnik 1-2, 2015).

However, these efforts were not unsolicited and simply a testament to the

benevolence of FSIN of Krasnoiarsk Krai. Although greatly improved, access to adequate medical care is still not universal, and there have been multiple layers of pressure applied

to Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN to change this. According to Za zashchitu prav

zakliuchennykh, the majority of the complaints directed to the Kraskoiarsk Commission

regard violations to inmates’ right of access to medical aid (Vestnik 3-4, 2018). In the same

year, the report from the Krasnoiarsk Krai human rights’ Ombudsman expressed concern

about how FSIN will address the demands of an often-sick population, where 90% of newly admitted inmates require medical attention upon admittance to penal institutions in Krasnoiarsk Krai (Doklad v 2017 godu, 2018). On an even greater level, the federal government recognizes the continued danger of disease and inadequate medical care in the penitentiary system, noting it in the Conception as a problem of grave concern

(Rasporiazhenie No. 1772 R, 2010). The government demonstrates its interest in improving prison conditions by providing funding for construction and improvement of medical facilities. Indeed, the World Health Organization praised the Russian government for its systematic and sustained efforts since the 1990’s to combat tuberculosis (World Health Organization, 2014). Seizing upon the tangible pressure from the federal government, the ONK has been able to coordinate round table discussions with the human rights ombudsman, the Krasnoiarsk Krai Office of the Procurator, local civic groups, and FSIN, creating a forum where FSIN can be directly confronted and questioned on its efforts to improve medical access (Doklad o problemakh realizacii konstitutsionnykh prav i svobod grazhdan na territorii Krasnoiarskogo kraia v 2017 godu, 2018).

The Oversight Commission has similarly coordinated multiple layers of pressure

on recidivism. Krasnoiarsk Krai has struggled with recidivism for several decades, with

one 2012 study from Siberian State University showing the rate of recidivism around 50

percent (Slepukha, 2015). The federal government likewise expressed interest in fighting

the continuing issue of recidivism (Rasporiazhenie No. 1772 R, 2010). Unlike with

fighting disease in prisons, the government's efforts to develop programs to combat recidivism are more rhetorical, and the federal authorities for the most part leave the federal subjects and regional FSIN administrations to address the issue on their own. Here again, the ONK is in a favorable geographic environment to evoke

change. The local government in Krasnoiarsk Krai setup a rehabilitation center in 1994

in coordination with FSIN and the local resettlement colony aimed at providing support

and job training to former inmates (“Istoriia“). Today the center continues to receive

funding directly from the local government’s budget, and has been a valuable resource

for former inmates and local activists (Kollektivnyi dogovor kraevogo gosudarstvennogo biudzhetnogo uchrezhdeniia sotsial'nogo obsluzhivaniia «Krasnoiarskii tsentr sotsial'noi adaptatsii lits, osvobozhdennykh iz mest lisheniia svobody», 2018). The Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK is well situated to play a supporting role in the current efforts, giving it the opportunity to simultaneously and proactively address the process as well.

The ONK once again functions as organizer, facilitating events and efforts between

FSIN, the local government, and the Krasnoiarsk Krai General Assembly to combat

recidivism. The Oversight Commission here functions as a valuable liaison between

FSIN, the General Assembly, and the general public, due to the access that Commission

members possess to penal institutions. A former member of the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK

and current Krasnoiarsk Krai representative to the Civic Chamber, Valerii

Vasil’ev, coordinated an event at which FSIN official Nikolai Vasil’ev expressed that it

was difficult to provide practical job training for inmates when the equipment FSIN

possessed was obsolete or broken. He also expressed concern about living conditions, but believes that a part of the solution to this problem can be realized by improving work conditions ("Valerii Vasil'ev vruchil mandaty chlenam novogo sostava ONK po

Krasnoiarskomu kraiu," 2018). FSIN is taking on projects aimed at improving the work environment, and has to some extent managed to simultaneously improve living conditions and working conditions by providing job training in coordination with the local community. According to a publication on the Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN website, over

1000 inmates received job training when participating in construction projects in the city of Krasnoiarsk in 2017. Inmates built housing complexes as well as performed repairs and additions to prison facilities. According to article, prisoners earned 515 rubles per day, and the prison administration hopes that more inmates will be able to benefit from the projects in the coming years ("Bolee 80 osuzhdennykh v Krasnoiarskom krae trudiatsia segodnia na stroitel'nykh ob''ektakh ugolovno-ispolnitel'noi sistemy," 2018).

FSIN has also made adept use of the settlement colonies (KP) that it inherited from

the Soviet era. It has found success putting low-risk inmates in settlement colonies

instead of correctional colonies, finding that inmates transition more readily into the

workforce after release. According to an article published in Vestnik, this strategy has

yielded positive results, with rates of recidivism being two times lower for those put in

settlement colonies as opposed to those placed in correctional colonies (Danilov,

2016). FSIN’s inheritance of settlement colonies from the Soviet era make it so the

framework is already in place, allowing local actors, such as the local government, FSIN,

64 and the General Assembly, to engage more readily in effective counter-recidivism measures, thus making the coordinating efforts of the ONK more straightforward. Seeing as much of the infrastructure is already in place and the local community is willing to support and budget for societal adaptation and job training, the

ONK is well placed to address recidivism. However, having infrastructure and support already in place does not mitigate the efforts of the ONK in pressuring FSIN to adopt more rehabilitative practices. Krasnoiarsk Krai’s size poses a challenge to FSIN as much as it does to the ONK, and therefore transporting and maintaining these different facilities is no easy task. This example shows rather that pressure applied in the right places has yielded positive results for the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission and the Krai as a whole. Improvements in recidivist rates also indicate the positive impact of the long- term thinking and planning of the ONK.

It is important to add that favorable circumstances do paint the Commission as a success story simply. The Commission itself is responsible for spearheading projects with truly positive, long term implications. The greatest attribute of the Commission, or rather of the individuals who make up the Commission, is a practical, proactive approach to penal reform. Members recognize that in order to generate sustainable, long-term physical and psychological changes in carceral space, they must first address the process which perpetuates the counterproductive, penal practices inherited from the past. They recognize that they must reform the attitudes of all individuals in carceral space in order to change these practices.

There are two main factors which primarily cause continued violations of prisoner

rights: institutionalized practices, and a lack of psychological training. By no means are

prison personnel not responsible for their actions, but many of the violations are

preventable and the result of a lack of training and empathy. A psychological study in

which Natal’ia Luk'ianchenko analyzed the results from prison guards who took Leary

Interpersonal Tests demonstrated that prison guards were prone to authoritative

behavior, and were dependent and subordinate in their attitudes. These tendencies are

connected to the environment within penal institutions, and make them susceptible to

the prevalence of harmful institutional practices and norms. They were not prone to

altruism, and were largely egoistic, suspicious, and aggressive (Lukiachenko,

2016). Judith Pallot confirms that the prison environment is conducive to such behavior,

discussing how Soviet prison practices remain institutionalized, at times almost

seemingly trapped in penal space (Pallot, 2015). A culture of violence and ambivalence

to inmates are characteristic of the Soviet era, and this persists in carceral space

today. The perseverance of this culture is a key factor in understanding the reasons for

the Magnitskii Affair, the beatings in IK-31, and the recent Makarov Affair.

Recognizing that the environment in Krasnoiarsk Krai penal institutions was

eliciting similar behaviors, the ONK has headed several projects that are designed to

educate prison personnel in order to change their attitude toward their roles and how

they individually relate to prisoners. Iuliia Andreeva, a member of the Krasnoiarsk Krai

ONK and a candidate of Judicial Sciences at the Legal Institute of Krasnoiarsk State

University, has headed an initiative to teach courses to prison personnel that teach an

understanding of reciprocity and accountability. She designed the courses to educate

prison workers on the psychology of interpersonal relations in the legal and penitentiary

systems, as well as on the implications of the cause and effect of their actions. One such

example is a course Andrea taught in the summer of 2018 called “Survey and Analysis of

Court Practices and the Engagement of Criminal Responsibility of the Personnel in UIS

for Crimes against Government Authority and the Interest of Government Service,”

which she designed to teach personnel better self-awareness. The course aimed to give

them an understanding of the consequences of their actions. The course showed that

violating prisoners’ rights was in itself a crime, thus putting the penal authorities and the

courts in a compromised position ("V penitentsiarnykh

uchrezhdeniiakh Krasnoiarskogo kraia realizuetsia proekt po obucheniiu sotrudnikov

GUFSIN Rossii po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu," 2018).4

Other projects are aimed at similarly creating a feeling of mutual respect and

accountability between the authorities and the inmates. At a forum discussion Andrea

proctored, inmates were given the opportunity to sit down with the prison staff and pose

to them questions, which, according to Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN publication, required

concrete responses from the prison personnel

("Obshchestvennaia nabliudatel'naia komissiia Krasnoiarskogo kraia GUFSIN Rossii po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu realizuiut sovmestnye pravosashchitye proekty,"

2018). Andreeva has also aimed at addressing accountability among the authorities themselves through community discussions. She recognizes that the prison staff too have questions on their roles and what constitutes a right violation, and recognizes that prison

personnel need to express their thoughts so that they do not feel as if the Commission is

ignoring their concerns. A discussion held at the Legal Institute of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs focused on the role that police play in fighting corruption among themselves. Andrea discusses how the key to fighting malpractice must begin from the bottom up, meaning that the authorities must learn to be mutually responsible for each

other’s actions

("Chleny ONK i studenty obsudili rol' politsii v profilaktike korruptsii, obespecheniia za

konnosti i vospitaniia grazhdan," 2017).

The behavior of the ONK members in Krasnoiarsk Krai is reminiscent of the

behavior of successful activists, like Ponomarev, Borshchev, and Abramkin, all of whom

recognize that it is essential to establish a sustainable, working relationship with the

authorities. The Commission does not have a perfect relationship with FSIN or the Office

of the Procurator. The procurator is inclined to conduct vague and inconclusive

investigations, which is a persisting nationwide issue. So too are the continued violations of prisoners’ rights by FSIN personnel. Where the Commission members find success in this relationship is in their persistent attention to their duties and active engagement with the community. Most importantly, ONK members persistently seek greater accountability between the prison authorities, the associated community, and inmates.

Above all, sustained, proactive efforts on the part of the ONK is what has

maintained a reasonably steady rate of improvement in prison conditions since the

1990’s. Recidivism has been a persisting issue in Krasnoiarsk Krai, but has been met with

consistent, widespread efforts from the prison administration, local government, and

civic organizations. Since forming in 2008, the Public Oversight Commission has played

a valuable role in these efforts as the lead civic organization involved in carceral reform,

maintaining the engagement of the authorities in the local projects. These efforts have

seen a steady decline in recidivism since 2012, according to the Institute of Contemporary

Societal Problems ("Statistika po osuzhdennym," 2016). Mariia Kannabikh of the Civic

Chamber commended the Krasnoiarsk Krai region as a whole, citing the efforts and work

of rehabilitation organizations across the region (Merkulov, 2017). Kannabikh’s words

show the commitment of members of the Civic Chamber to the Public Oversight

Commission initiative, and further stress the importance of the Commissions’ work

nationally.

Consistent work has yielded sustained results, and subsequently the region has

not encountered some of the public-relation disasters that have befallen other regions. Commissions in other regions have not been as engaged, and have thus suffered from institutional scandals. The recent Makarov Affair in Iaroslavl’ is one such example, where the media got hold of the footage of the beating of Evgenii Makarov. It has prompted a slew of responses from the media and government, including a statement from Mikhail Fedetov, a leading representative on the President’s Council, which criticized the Iaroslavl’ ONK. Fedetov questioned its effectiveness and called for it to begin to play a more active role with FSIN (“Predsedatel' SPCh Mikhail Fedetov i pervyj zamestitel' direktora FSIN Rossii Anatolij Rudyj posetili ispravitel'nye uchrezhdeniia

Iaroslavskoj oblasti,” 2018). Such incidents put the Commissions in a compromised position, as it gives credence to the question: what are the Commissions actually doing?

It is a testimony to the consistency of the ONK members in Krasnoiarsk Krai that instead

of rolling over or turning a blind eye, the Commission continues to ask questions and

demand change, even when the prison authorities adopt an uncooperative attitude, such

as with the investigations into the alleged beatings by prison personnel in IK-31. The release of the footage from the IK-43 beatings did not prompt reactionary waves from

Moscow or abroad, which is due largely to the effectiveness of the Krasnoiarsk Krai

Commission. The ONK has repeatedly cited the allegations of beatings in penal institutions across the Krai, and it is therefore not surprising that the footage and information on these beatings is gradually becoming more widespread. As unfortunate as it is that good often comes as a result of tragedy, such instances do not damage the reputation of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission, but bolster it.

Geography impacts the development of the ONK because of the effects of the

geographic size of Kransoiarsk Krai, as well as the positive and negative effects of

geographic isolation due to Krasnoiarsk Krai’s distance from Moscow. The local

government and civic groups in the space of Krasnoiarsk have been key in allowing the

ONK to develop a relationship with them and FSIN. The federal government’s role is

rather limited, in spite of the powerful central forces that are integral to Putin’s Russia

(Petrov and Slider, 2016). The federal government has been selective in its pressure, and

has only exerted consistent top-down pressure in a few instances, such as with the

nationwide health efforts to combat tuberculosis. In a broader sense, the Krasnoiarsk

Krai case demonstrates the often ambivalent, but reactive, nature of the federal

government to issues in carceral space. The tuberculosis endemic was a nationwide

problem, and the government was obligated to address this issue after the problem had

manifested itself. Regarding the ONK and other local efforts to improve penal

conditions, the government has remained silent, allowing these regional actors to pursue

their own agendas. Geography works both ways, however, and the Krasnoiarsk Krai

ONK encounters geographic issues of its own. In its most recent annual report, the ONK

cited the geographic space that it is supposed to cover as extremely debilitating, as many

of the institutions inherited from the Soviet period are in remote, often inaccessible,

locations, which isolates these institutions from the aid and support the Commission

renders. The report discusses this issue in great depth, detailing when the sites were

visited, who visited the sites, and the geographic distance travelled to reach that site

(OTChET, 2018). Interestingly, the Commission does not cite any factor or organization

as the reason for the difficulty posed by geographic size. Instead, the Commission itself

accepts responsibility to find volunteers who live closer to these institutions.

The Civic Chamber plays an effective role supporting the Krasnoiarsk Krai case

because its part is minimal. In-fact, with the exception that the Chamber is responsible

for reviewing the applications and appointing the members of the Commissions, it plays

an extremely limited role in the actual affairs of the Commissions of Krasnoiarsk Krai or

any of the other federal subjects. The Chamber does not direct the initiatives of the ONK,

nor is it tied to any funding that the ONK receives or uses. In principle, there are not any special interests tying the Chamber to the Commission. Certain individuals, such as

Valerii Vasil’ev, are connected to both the Chamber and the ONK, but that is only because

Vasil’ev earned an appointment to the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation as a

result of his excellent work with the Oversight Commission. There is a connection, but it

is because the Chamber provides a national forum for the Commission and its work

through its working group dedicated to prisoner rights, media publications, and annual

reports. At the same time, these reports and publications spread awareness about the

Public Oversight Commission initiative, and put the Commissions’ efforts more broadly

into the public spectrum. Building public awareness about the conditions in carceral

space is essential to weaken the tradition of “impermeability,” in the penitentiary system

(Vestnik 2-3, 2007).

The Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK as a model is a positive example of how other

Commissions can conduct themselves. My case study provides a framework for the

consideration of the effectiveness of other Commissions. The Krasnoiarsk Krai case

shows that a proactive Commission can play an important role in the level of visibility

into carceral space, and can have a tangible impact on the level of community and

government engagement in the penitentiary system. Moving forward,

the Krasnoiarsk example can be compared with other less successful and less open

Commissions, as it gives an example that it is possible for a Commission to operate

effectively in a geographic space where there is a strong penal legacy, a large number of

penal institutions, and many issues related to incarceration, such as

recidivism. The Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission does not address issues as they appear,

but instead tries to address practices and relationships involved in carceral space in order

to prevent the issues from occurring. It gives substance to the Public Oversight

Commission project, as it forces the skeptics of the project to pause and consider

the Krasnoiarsk Krai case. Here is an example of a Commission that has not erred in the completion of its duties. Its work is visible and well publicized, and civic and

government-related organizations praise the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission for improving conditions in prison space, and preventing any of the regress mentioned by Vestnik as becoming characteristic like it is in other regions in Russia.

Conclusion

The Krasnoiarsk Krai case study demonstrates the positive impact that a proactive

Commission has on the development of greater transparency in the penitentiary system

and greater accountability between the Civic Chamber, Public Oversight Commissions,

and Federal Government. I have established that the government is supportive of prison

reform to a certain degree through such acts as the Conception, the creation of the Public

Oversight Commissions, and the President’s inclusion of leading prisoner rights activists

on the President’s Council, even if it does not head widespread, top-down reform. The

failure to pursue reform itself makes the government’s attitude difficult to define. It would be inappropriate to define it as apathetic. If that were the case, the government would not overtly work with activists or give substance to the Commissions. It is seemingly closer to being inert: it supports the Commissions in that there is a law giving them form, but it does not actively flush the closed, Soviet-era practices out of the penitentiary system. Pallot discusses the isolating effects of geography, which gives form to her so-called penal fiefdoms. In the its inertness, the government leaves the local

FSIN administrations largely to their own devices, which makes them susceptible to the influence of local, political and social actors. By the same token, the government also enables regional actors, such as the ONK’s, local government, and supporting activists, a relatively high degree of maneuverability on the regional level, which is a positive effect of geographic isolation. In the Krasnoiarsk Krai case, a dynamic Commission with capable members has created for itself an effective niche between civil society, the

Chamber, and the regional correctional services. It has thus become one of the most

effective Public Oversight Commissions in the entire Russian Federation. The

Krasnoiarsk Krai FSIN administration has thus far cooperated to a certain degree with

these actors, and has not utterly rejected the influence or pressure of these local

organizations and institutions.

An abundance of penal institutions to visit does not make the work of the

Commission any easier. As the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission itself discusses, the vastness of Krasnoiarsk Krai poses a tremendous, logistic, difficulty to Commission members when they perform site visits. However, this difficulty does not deter the

Commission members. They recognize that the issues connected to geography are all the more reason to perform the site visits. Again, the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK sets itself as an

example, accepting the responsibility to find members who can perform the ONK’s

function in penal institutions, instead of passing blame onto FSIN, a lack of support, or

an historical legacy.

Krasnoiarsk Krai has an extensive network of penal institutions and a deep penal

legacy inherited from the Soviet Union. As a result, there are a large number of penal

institutions and prevalent societal problems, such as recidivism, that are connected to this legacy. In order to combat this legacy, the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission has cultivated a relationship with the local government and civil society into a relatively effective working dynamic with the Krasnoiarsk FSIN. However, the driving force behind this success has been the proactive nature of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission and its individual members, not the pervading negative effects of the Soviet penal legacy. Their

success is the result of consistency and proactive efforts to address institutional

processes. They seek systematic engagement with all levels of the regional public and

government. When the ONK has found the regional and national authorities

uncooperative, it has bypassed domestic accountability outlets such as the Civic Chamber

and Russian courts, for international complaint mechanisms like the European Court of

Human Rights. The necessity to tap into the ECHR alludes to the deep rooted,

institutional nature of the problem. The fact that other domestic accountability

mechanisms like the Procuracy, courts, and even the Civic Chamber are inconsistently

able, or willing, to address issues in the penal system demonstrates the lack of

transparency and accountability in the Russian federalist system.

Prisoner rights activists, the Civic Chamber, and the head of the Committee for

Presidential Grants have commended Kransoiarsk Krai for its success in realizing greater

civic engagement, especially in the realm of transparency in the penitentiary system. It is important to note here that this praise refers to the efforts of civic organizations, such as the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK, not to related, but independent factors, such as geography or an historical legacy. Geography and the penal legacy in the Krasnoiarsk Krai case are indubitably important forces relating to the issues connected with the penal network and legacy that have spilled into the everyday life of Krasnoiarsk Krai. However, they are not the reasons for the success of Krasnoiarsk Krai’s Commission and broader civil society. Correlation is not causation. If anything, the extent to which the geographic isolation of the Krai and its penal legacy have affected everyday life is all the more reason to cite the Commission as a positive example. Faced with the daunting task of generating

greater transparency in a space the size of Algeria, the Commission and its members have

unwaveringly sought to improve visibility and access to penal institutions. What has

really set the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission apart is that it does not only point fingers

and criticize the forces involved with the correctional authorities. It is by no means forgiving or apologetic for the negligence or obstinance of FSIN and the prosecutor, for example. However, it offers solutions and accepts responsibility for these solutions to be realized. Developing greater accountability between the government and civil society is a daunting task in Russia.

When compared to Russia’s other federal subjects, Krasnoiarsk Krai demonstrates

that a limited network of penal institutions, a low level of civic engagement in general,

or an obstinate FSIN are not excuses to inadequately pursue the development of greater

transparency in penal institutions. There is no doubt that support from the local

government is of great help, but that help is connected to the people of the different

federal subjects. Citizens of the respective federal subject in which they reside apply to be members therefore the efforts of the Commission members depends on the local population. It is the responsibility of the people engaged in the Commissions to demonstrate that their work is valuable to the region and its people. When the

Commissions do not actively pursue their work, they diminish the relevancy of the

Commission in that federal subject, which increases the risk of the entire Public Oversight

Commission project of being scratched. Regardless of the level of cooperation they have with the authorities, in order to further the Public Oversight Commission initiative and

continue to realize greater transparency and reform in the penitentiary system,

individual effort on the part of the Commission members is essential.

The Krasnoiarsk Krai case poses an interesting question when evaluating the

effectiveness of the Public Oversight Commissions: to what extent is it the individual

responsibility of the Commissions to engage with the penal authorities in order to

develop greater transparency in carceral space? Or should it be the responsibility of FSIN and the government to engage more with them? The simple answer is that it is the

responsibility of the Commissions and FSIN. However, the solution is not that straight

forward, and therefore must be considered within a Russian-frame, just as was used

when considering the Civic Chamber as a civic organization. There is a necessity for

greater reciprocity between the Russian government and its people, which makes the case

of the Public Oversight Commissions all the more urgent. It is difficult to assess the

extent to which the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission has been able to force the penal

authorities to accept greater responsibility. Accountability between the state and its

people goes both ways, and the Commission’s consistency, annual reports, and work

within Krasnoiarsk Krai is a positive step toward bettering that relationship.

Regardless of the oppressive and obstinate nature of the government, it is essential

for Russian citizens to seize the opportunity to make closed, institutional practices within

the state less opaque. Therefore, the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK provides a model for how

Public Oversight Commissions can operate successfully as a mechanism for transparency

within a framework that is acceptable to the constraints set by the government. All of the

Public Oversight Commissions face similar constraints, as well as the daunting task of

78 changing institutional behaviors in the penitentiary system. As Averkieva, Pallot,

Piacentini, Holquist, and even Dmitrii Medvedev noted, there is a culture characterized by violence and a lack of empathy trapped within carceral space. Changing this institutional culture is dependent upon changing the attitudes within that space, and the

Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission demonstrates that efforts can be made in this capacity, regardless of the often-limiting constraints that the Commissions face.

The Krasnoiarsk Krai case poses interesting questions for further development and analysis. Will the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission continue to be able to function effectively, or will it begin to demonstrate new tendencies as the Commission members begin to change? Additionally, my analysis of the Krasnoiarsk Krai ONK provides the possibility for further comparison with other Commissions, as well as an example for analysis of the impact of a specific civic group within the broader context of penal reform in Russia.

As the analysis here comes to an end, the study has revealed one ominous possibility for the future: a lack of widespread, structural reform is going to see conditions within prisons, and more broadly in civil society, continue to largely stagnate or decline. The Krasnoiarsk Krai region is a shining example, a federal subject where civil society has found itself a niche and voice. The Civic Chamber has channeled the successes of the Krasnoiarsk Krai Commission into its forum discussions and annual reports. However, the Chamber and the Public Oversight Commissions in other regions have not found this same success, meaning that information on improving transparency and conditions in the local penal institutions is either inaccessible, or non-existent. It

paints an ominous picture of the future for carceral reform in Russia, as regional activists,

Commissions, and local prison administrations splinter in a multitude of directions. By

the same token, the Civic Chamber’s inability to exercise any sort of pressure on the

government besides dialogue means that that civil society can do very little to pressure

the government within the weighty, societal constraints that it faces. In order to push these actors in the same direction, reform is required from above. The danger is that this reform from the top will uniformly push carceral reform across the federal subjects in the wrong direction.

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Utverzhden v novoj redaktsii resheniem nabliudatel’nogo soveta 31 maia 2018 g. (protokol No. 1), Ustav Fonda- operatora prezidentskikh grantov po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva. Fond prezid entskikh grantov. https://xn--80afcdbalict6afooklqi5o.xn-- p1ai/public/home/about. Accessed 14 Feb., 2019.

“Valerii Abramkin. ‘Neobychnoe pravo v epokhu criminal’nogo vzryva.’ “Izvestiia, 2 August 2002, https://iz.ru/news/265407. Accessed 03 Oct., 2018.

"Valerii Vasil'ev vruchill mandaty chlenam novogo sostava ONK po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu." Grazhdanskaia assambleia Krasnoiarskogo kraia, 31 May, 2018. http://ga.krsk.ru/dela/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6822. Accessed 20 Sept., 2018.

“V Krasnoiarske rassleduiut ugolovnoe delo po faktu pytok v FKU OIU-26 OUXD (EPKT IK-43) GUFSIN po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu.” ONK.rf, 17 Sept., 2018. http://krasnojarskijkraj.onk.su/6576.html. Accessed 19 Jan., 2019.

“V Krasnoiarske s vos’moi popytki udalos’ osvobodit’ iz kolonii onkobol’nogo invalida. ” Novaia Gazeta, 15 Feb., 2018. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/02/15/139529-v- krasnoyarske-s-vosmoy-popytki-udalos-osvobodit-iz-kolonii-onkobolnogo- invalida. Accessed 29 Jan., 2019.

“Vlast’ i obshchestvo.” Obshchestvennaiaa palata Krasnoiarskogo kraia i Grazhdanskai a assambleia Krasnoiarskogo kraia, 2018. http://ga.krsk.ru/vlast-i- obshchestvo/. Accessed 07 Jan., 2018.

Volkov, R.V. “ObshchestvennaiaPalata sub’’ekta kak organ obshchestvennogo kontrolia.” Akt ual’nye Napravleniia gumanitarnykh i sotsial’no-ékonomicheskikh issledovanii, chast’ 1, 2018. 104-107.

"V penitentsiarnykh uchrezhdenijakh Krasnoiarskogo kraia realizuetsia proekt po obucheniiu sotrudnikov GUFSIN Rossii po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu." Grazhdanskaia assambleia Krasnoiarskogo kraia, 15 Jun., 2018. http://ga.krsk.ru/dela/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6957. Accessed 19 Sept., 2018.

"Vysokie chini FSIN uvoleny posle smerti Magnitskogo." BBC Russkaia sluzhba, 11 Dec., 2009. https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2009/12/091211_fsin_magnitsky_ dismissals.shtml. Accessed 12 Oct., 2018.

"Vystupleniia É. Pamfilovoi, T. Morshchakovoi, V. Abramkina, V. Borshcheva na vstreche s Prezidentom RF V. Putinym." Vestnik: Fond «V zashchitu prav i svobod zakliuchennykh,» No. 2-3, 2007. 6-15.

Zhaloby Otsenka mekhanizmov podachi zhalob v tiur'makh stran Tsentral'noj i Vostochnoi Evro py i byvshego Sovetskogo Soiuza. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2010. https://helsinki.hu/wp- content/uploads/Assessing_Prison_Complaints_Mechanisms_in_CEE_and_FSU _Regions_RUS.pdf. Accessed 10 Sept., 2018.

"Zaiavlenie Natal'ia Magnitskoj o smerti syna: Éto ne khalatnost', a ubiistvo." Novaia Gazeta, No. 107, 26 Sept., 2011, pp. 2- 3. https://www.novayagazeta.ru/storage/c/2011/09/26/1317007084_004756_4 4.pdf. Accessed 16 Sept., 2018.

Zakonoproekt No. 11807- 03. Ob obshchestvennom kontrole za obespecheniem prav cheloveka v mestakh prinuditel' nogo soderzhaniia i o sodeistvii litsam, nakhodiashchimsia v mestakh prinuditel'nogo soderzhaniia. Federal'noe Sobranie Rossijskoj Federatsii, Gosudarstvennaia Duma , Oficial'nyj sajt. http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent& RN=11807-3&11. Accessed 08 Oct., 2018.

"Zamestitelem prokurora kraia provereny usolviia soderzhaniia osuzhennykh v FKU IK-31 GUFSIN Rossii po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu." Prokuratura Krasnoiarskogo kraia, 16 Aug., 2017. http://www.krasproc.ru/news/krsk/16112-zamestitelem-prokurora- kraya-provereny-usloviya-soderzhaniya-osuzhdennykh-v-fku~. Accessed 17 Oct., 2018.

Appendix A: Laws, Projects, and Initiatives

These are abbreviations used for the federal laws, projects, and initiatives of the Russian Federation referenced in my thesis:

Zakon No. 32-F3

Federal'nyi zakon ot 4 aprelia 2005 g. No. 32- F3, Ob obshchestvennoi palate Rossiiskoi Federatsii. https://www.oprf.ru/about/13 91/law/418/. Accessed 03 Oct., 2018.

Zakon No. 59-F3

Federal'nyi zakon ot 02 fevralia 2006 g. No. 59-F3 (red. ot 27.11.2017) O poriadke rassmotreniia obrashchenii grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federat sii, Article 2. Pravo.gov.ru, 2017. http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102106413. Accessed 09 Oct., 2018.

Zakon No. 121-F3

Federal'nyi zakon Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 20 iiulia 2012 g. No. 121- F3. O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossijskoj Federatsiiv chasti r egulirovaniia dejatel'nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsii, vypolniaiushchikh funktsii in ostrannogo agenta. http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;bas e=LAW;n=163972#02573154659297521/. Accessed 05 Oct., 2018.

Zakon No. 76-F3

Federal'nyi zakon ot 10 iiunia 2008 ot g. No. 76- F3. Ob obshchestvennom kontrole za obespecheniem prav cheloveka v mestax prinuditel' nogo soderzhaniia i o sodeistvii litsam, naxodiashchimsia v mestakh prinuditel'nogo sode rzhaniia. https://rg.ru/2008/06/18/prava-cheloveka-dok.html. Accessed 08 Oct., 2018.

Rasporiazhenie No. 1772 R

Rasporiazhenie Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 14 oktiabria 2010 g. No. 1772 R. O kontseptsii razvitiia ugolovno-ispolnitel´noi sistemy Rossiiskoi Federatsii do 2020. Akademiia FSIN Rossii. http://www.apu.fsin.su/service/ok/%D1%81on%D1%81ept.php. Acce ssed 12 Oct., 2018.

Ukaz No. 314

Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 09 Marta 2004 g., No. 314, O sisteme i strukture federal’nykh organov ispolnitel’noi vlasti. http://www. consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=LAW&n=278990&fld=134&ds t=1000000001, 0&rnd=0.7943233466039259#0028789281323241545. Accessed 03 Oct., 2018.

Ustav Fonda

Utverzhden v novoj redaktsii resheniem nabliudatel’nogo soveta 31 maia 2018 g. (protokol No. 1), Ustav Fonda- operatora prezidentskikj grantov po razvitiiu grazhdanskogo obshchestva. Fond prezide ntskikh grantov. https://xn--80afcdbalict6afooklqi5o.xn-- p1ai/public/home/about. Accessed 14 Feb., 2019.

Zakonoproekt No. 11807-03

Zakonoproekt No. 11807- 03. Ob obshchestvennom kontrole za obespecheniem prav cheloveka v mestakh prinuditel ’nogo soderzhaniia i o sodeistvii litsam, nakhodizshchimsia v mestakh prinuditel’nogo sod erzhanija. Federal’noe Sobranie Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Gosudarstvenaia Duma, Of itsial’nyi sait, 2008. http://asozd2.duma.gov.ru/main.nsf/(Spravka)?OpenAgent&RN=11807- 3&11. Accessed 08 Oct., 2018.

Appendix B: Reports

The following is a list of the abbreviations used for the official reports referenced in my thesis filed by the Civic Chamber and other civic organizations:

Annual Report

Annual Report European Court of Human Rights 2018. The European Court of Human Rights, 2019. https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Short_Survey_2018_ENG.pdf. Acc essed 29 Jan., 2019.

Doklad Tsentra

Doklad v 2017 godu

Doklad o problemakh realizacii konstitutsionnykh prav i svobod grazhdan na territorii Krasnoiar skogo kraia v 2017 godu. Upolnomochennyi po pravam cheloveka v Kransoiarskom krae, 2018. https://www.ombudsmankk.ru/media/doc/Doklad_UPCH_2017.pdf. A ccessed 19 Jan., 2019.

Doklad za 2012 god

Doklad za 2013 god

Doklad za 2014 god

Doklad za 2015 god

Doklad za 2016 god

Doklad za 2017 god

OtCHET

OTChET o rabote obshchestvennoi nabliudatel’noi komissii (ONK) Krasnoiarskogo kraia 4 sozyv a v 2017 godu i za ves’ period raboty s 25 iiunia 2015 godu po 15 ianvaria 2018 goda. Obshchestvennaia nabliudatel’naia komissia po osushchestvleniiu obshchestvennogo kontrolia za sobliudemiem prav cheloveka v mestakh prinuditel’nogo soderzhaniia i sodeistviia litsam v mestakh prinuditel’nogo soderzhaniia po Krasnoiarskomu kraiu, 12 Mar., 2018.

Polozhenie o poriadke

Zhaloby

Zhaloby otsenka mekhanismov podachi zhalob v tiur’makh stran Tsentral’noi i Vostochnoi Evrop y i byvshego Sovietskogo Soiuza. Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2010. https://helsinki.hu/wp- content/uploads/Assessing_Prison_Complaints_Mechanisms_in_CEE_and_FSU _Regions_RUS.pdf. Accessed 10 Sept., 2018.