The Labour Movement and the Ontario NDP: The Effect of Long Term Relations on Policy Outcomes by Mark Eo Hawman Department of Political Science
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts
Faculty of Craduate Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontazio October, 1996 National Library Biblioth4que nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographic Services services bibliographiques
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The thesis applies a meso level structural analysis to the actions of a pressure group, the Ontario Federation of Labour. Three variables determine whether the group's actions involved policy participation or advocacy within a policy conununity; the autonomy exercised by the state and its agencies in the policy process, the organizational development of the sectoral interest as detedned by the nature of its membership and its internal structuze, and any relations existing between the interest and the state. The -. long term relationship between the OFL and the New Democratic Party is chronicled to show the differing interests of the two groups, which determined particular policy outcomes under the NDP government. The process involved in two policy networks, the reform of the Labour Relations && and the imposition-of a Social Contract upon public sector employees, is analysed with the objective of demonstrating the organizational development of labour as a pressure group. The autonomy retained by the state primarily determined the outcome, and the relationship between the pressure group and the state only affected the nature of the process involved.
iii Acknowledgment
I wish to convey my thanks to my advisor, Professor Sid Noel, whose insightful cowasats and calming influence made it possible to complete the thesis despite the inevitable obstacles which arose. Thanks are also in order for the entire staff of the Department of Political Science, who helped steer me through the administrative wilderness unharmed. The contributions, both large and small, of family, friends and classmates are too great to properly address, but they all combined to make for an enjoyable year. This work is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Peggy, whose lifelong veneration of higher education greatly influenced the Life's path of her son. Table of Contents
Certificate of Examhation ii Abstract iii Acknowledgment iv Table of contents V
Introduction 1 Methodology and Level of Analysis 3 Labour as a Pressure Group 6 Links Between Labour and the NDP 14 The NDP in Ontario 15 Labour in Ontario Politics 26 The NDP and Labour 30 Labour's Approach to the NDP 35 s- s- 39 The Ontario Reform Process 42 Events in the Process 43 The Actions of the OEZ 48 The Actions of Business Groups 57 ST 65 The Social Contract Negotiations Process 66 The Social Contract Process 67 Labour and the Social Contract 75 The NDP and the Social Con-act 87 summary 90 Conclusion 93
Bibliography 99
Vita 103 September 6, 1990 marked the first tima in Ontario's history that the New Democratic Party (NDP) formed a govexnment. The actions of the NDP govetnmant, and the influence of the labout movement upon it, have yet to be examined adequately. Accounts of this period have been journalistic descriptions of events, with little academic analysis. This thesis is an attempt to apply a political science perspective to the events and consider a number of large questions. Bow are policy outcomes arrived at? How does the state exercise its power to create public policy? What role do pressure groups and political parties occupy in creating public policy, and what effects do their roles have on democracy? Bow do the dynamics of group relations inf hence interaction between government and groups in specific instances? To contribute to our understandings of these larger issues requires utilising a coherent framewosk from which such research can be carried out. The particular example of the relationship between the NDP and labour is suggested as providing further empirical evidence to substantiate the arguments of William Coleman and Grace Skogstad regarding policy communitiesl , and Paul P1oss~s2
1 William 0. Coleman and Gram Skqstad, eds.. P- (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1990). 2 A. Paul Pm.ELpyp PvPm-, (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1992). st* groups. Since the formation of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and its evolution into the NDP in 1961, organized labour groups have been assumed to have significant influence over the party. If the predictions foretelling of the decline of political paxties3 are to be believed, then the prospects of a relationship with a political party should be unappetizing to a preasure group. And yet, even after the strains brought about by the Rae government's Social Contract, Ontario labour continues to place emphasis on its connections with the Ontario NDP. It will be argued elsewhere that the relationship between the HDP and labour in Ontario has never been as harmonious as critics of the party and labour have alleged. The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the argument that the relationship of labour and the Ontario NDP is tangential to the primary activities of labour pressure groups. Further, the motivation of labour to have a connection with the NbP was to allow labour a voice in areas where it traditionally lacked input over policy due to exclusion ftom the sub-govezmment of varioue policy communities. 4 The inclusion or exclusion of labour as a member of the sub-government in various sectors has had a
3 Beginning with obsewations as early as 1965. John Meisel has presented arguments explaining how the previously dominant pasition of Canadian political parties has been usustainable in the face of increased interest group activity. and state bureaucratizatim. See John Meisel, 'Decline of Party in Canada,' in .. in ., Hugh G. Thorbum, ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1996) 225245. 4 A policy community in this mtext refers to m...thatpart of a poWSystem that has axquired a dominant voice in determing government decision in a field of public acthdty." Pross, P- P- 119. The relevant example for this paper is the policy community surrounding the regulation of the workplace through vehicles such as the Labour Rerations Board, or the Workmen's Compensation Board, where the input of labour is sought by the state. ....3 greater influence on labour's activities than its links with the NDP, and was determinative of the relations between labour and the NDP government. The objective of the study is to investigate the employment-relations policy community within Ontario, and compare the actions of labour as an organized interest within the participatory network of the Labour a reforms culminating in Bill 40, and the advocacy network that surrounded the Social Contract negotiations between labour and the provincial government.
Methodology and Level of Aaalysis
The methodology which Coleman and Skogstad utilise to analyse public policy and pressure groups is sectoral or structural in nature, where the focus is upon the meso level of state activity.5 The merits of this approach are that it focuses upon the capabilities of the state and societal actors in a particular sector and the relationships that arise between them. Broader macro theories of the state do not account for the rich variety of relations between eociety and the state which a meso level analysis reveals. As the area of study of the thesis is primarily concerned with labour policy and related areas in Ontario, a sectoral analysis is most appropriate as it allows for a focused examination of a particular area of the state and a particular pressure group.
5 A meonanalysis focuses upon the intermediate level of the subject under study. In the context of the state this refers to a specific sector of the state as opposed to a macro analysis (of very broad scope) or a micro analysis (of very limited scope). .... 4 The structural or institutional approach holds that the pceferences and values of policy actors are shaped fundamentally by their structutal position.6 As such the nature of political institutions promote certain ideologies and constrain the choices of individuals. To appreciate the value systems present within institutions favours analysing the historries of such institutions, and relying upon interviews with institution members. For our purposes this translates into investigating the histories of the NDP, various labour organizations, and certain elements of the bureaucracy. Such research will be approached from the perspective of labour's actions being determined more by the nature of the state apparatus with which it had to interact, rather than any relationship with the political party in government. The framework utilised by a sectoral analysis conceives of the state and those interested in influencing the state as constituting policy communities and policy networks. A policy community includes &... all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share e common policy focus, and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run. "7 Research into policy communities requires considering three variables of state-pressure group relations; the autonomy and capacity of state agencies, the organizational development of sectoral interests, and the relationships or networks that develop between state and .... 5 societal actors. The level of organizational development determines whether a policy actor will assume a role of policy advocacy or policy participation.8 The policy role of an actor is assumed within a policy network, which describes the chatacteristics of the relationships existing between the actors who form around an issue of importance to a par+icular policy community. Coleman and Skogstad suggest that a focus upon the structural properties of state agencies and organized interests is mast useful when studying networks, and that the key properties to be mindful of are the autonomy and coordinating capacity of the state3 A typology for policy networks is suggested. The most relevant for our purposes are pressure pluralism, 10 where groups asaume a primarily advocacy role with state agencies remaining autonomous, and closed corporatism, where state decision making capacity is concentrated and coordinated through a single agency and otganized interests play a prominent role. The thesis therefore will focus upon the policy community of employment relations within Ontatio. To understand the networks between labour and the state will necessitate investigating the organizational development of labour as a pressure group, and how this was affected by the
8 Ibid., 20. 9 Ibid., 26. 10 Terms such as pluralism and corporatism refer to the larger mvimnment of pressure group and state relations. Pluralists conceive of the area as a competition betwen organized interests for the attention of decision makers, and the approach of mast observers is that such competition is positive and reflects a democratic ordering of the state, as every interest has the ability to influence the state. Corporatism views group relations with the state to be a partnership, where the state delegates authority to varying degrees to such groups as can demonstrate their effectiveness in achieving state goals. Elements of both models can be discerned in the Ontario political system. ....6 autonomy and capacity of relevant state agencies. The relationship between labour and the NDP government was only one variable affecting the autonomy and capacity of the state, and the organizational capacity of labour and other actors within the relevant policy community had a determining impact upon labour's policy role. The networks which existed during the passage of Bill 40 and the Social Contract provided for a policy participation and policy advocacy role respectively, as they reflected the level of state autonomy retained by the NDP in each instance.
Labour as a Pressure Group
It would be difficult to exclude labour organizations from the typology of Canadian pressure groups.11 As mandated under the regulatoty regime of labour legislation in Ontario, unions represent the interests of workers in various bargaining units where a majority of workers have elected to be represented by a union in their dealings with their employers. The primary responsibility of unions is therefore to achieve the best results for union members in the employment context. But without unions exerting political pressure the very regime under which unions conduct operations would bear little resemblance to the present situation. The history of labour in Ontario, and Canada generally,
11 This assumes are applies the definition that pressure groups '...are organizations whose members act together.. to influence public policy in order to promote their common interestn Pros, WUDPo-d Pwic PoliEyI 3. ....7 has always involved the exercise of political power. Due to the active resistance to union organizing drives by business and governments, labour often relied upon strikes to obtain recognition by government. This typically involved strikes for the purpose of imposing economic hardship upon employers and other businesses, who would then apply political pressure on the government of the day. By demnettating their ability to lead workers collectively, union leaders established their credibility in their disputes with employers and government. As union memberships increased with the rise of manufacturing industries12 unions began to band together into various affiliations to offset the economic power of employers' associations. As these union organizations became more sophisticated and membership increased, the political impact which they could wield also increased. At ptesent the umbrella organization for labou~,the Ontario Federation of
Labour (OFL), represents over 800 000 workers. 13 The OFL demonstrates the four characteristics of a pressure group.14 It attempts to influence government through a variety of means intended to exert political pressure, its strategies are determined by its organizational att~ibutes,its level of organization allows for the articulation and aggregation of workers' common interests, and its mandate is only to represent the members of the Om.
12 The connection between the two factors is that it is much easier to organize a unkn where there are large numbers of workers in the same place, particularfy when these workers possess same skill and are not easily replaceable in the event of a strike. 13 Thomas Walkom, m:The R&I and Fql& of ttre NDP. (Toronto: Key Porter Boob, 1994). 122. .. '4 Pmss, Poliu 34. .... 8 The stzucture of the OFL was derived in large part from state activity. The government of Ontario elected to create the Ontario Labom Relations Board to oversee the operation of the Labour Relations Act, the regulatory regime for collective bargaining between unions and employers in the province. It was intended to serve as a means to depoliticise labour relations and provide stability in the area, by producing labour policy through the direct participation of both employers and labour. The desire was to give labour policy legitimacy, based on the recognition that greater public involvement in policy would lend the agency public support. 1s The OFL was designed to avticulate the interests of labour, and as any interest system must, it needed to "...be oriented toward the maxianisation of access to governmental structure and, therefore be adapted to this structure. -"I6 Labour wished to exert influence over issues relating to collective bargaining (as well ae other areas) but the form of any such organization intended to achieve such a purpose was not explicit. With the creation of the Labour Relations Board, the OFL was designed to have the authority to bind its affiliated unions, to be achieved with a centralised leadership with a professional staff. The function of the OFL is to deal with the Ministry of Labour and employersg associations on an almost daily basis. It is due to this expertise that the OPL has the legitimacy to speak for its members. Through its continuous contact with the other actors in the employment relations field, the OFL .... 9 operates by incrgmental negotiation and discussion. Whereas individual collective bargaining might be a bitter struggle, group politics was intended to be an uexercise in mutual acc~~dation.~~~The desire of the state was for stability, and the OPL was designed to be able to satisfy this 'state concern. The problem for labour is that the OFL possesses weak associational characteristics. In analpsing the institutionalisation process in organized labour, David Kwavnick argues labour8$ efforts to influence public policy are limited by the fact that the most- important of any organization's goals is "...the preservation and continued growth of the organization itself and the continuation of the leaders in their position of leadership."lB As such, resources and energies which could be applied to attain specific policy outcomes are instead consumad within the organization itself. To exacerbate the weakness of labour affiliations the so-called "bread and buttera issues of wages, working conditions, seniority, and job security ate handled by the unions which are past of any affiliation.19 The particular union and its leadership will therefore be viewed by the union membership as having a greater impact upon theiz: welfare than an organization such as the OFL. Interestingly, the regulatory regime established under the Labour pelat- BEf imposes a specific duty upon unions to
17 0avid Kwavnidc, Labourwe P- (Montreal: McGilEQueen's University Press, t W2),3. 18 Ibid., 2, 19 Ibid., 61. .... 10 represent their bargaining units' best intereats,20 a duty which is imposed upon them by the state. The weak characteristics of the OFL are thetefore in no small part attributable to the institutional structure which the state dictates. Lastly, the ability of the OFL to determine common policy objectives fot its member unions are affected by the disparity of concezns within the labour movement. The OFL contains unions representing both private and public sector workers, whose interests often conflict. An example would be the Social Contract, where private sector workers, as taxpayers, had an interest in lower government spending, while public sector workers were adversely affected by such measures. These tensions often prevent the OFL from exhibiting the consensus necessary for pressure groups to have maximum ef feet. Other problems which labour must overcome to have influence over public policy relate to questions of legitimacy. In situations where labour has not unionized a majority of workers in an industry, it become difficult to speak for that industry.21 This concern applies even more so when labout tries to speak for the entire working class, when in fact the numbers of unionized workers as a percentage of the work force ate small.22 The conclusion of many observers
. . 21 Alan R. Ball and Frances Millard, PP(London: Macmillan, 1986), 97. 22 [bid., 117. As of 1985. 1.3 million of Ontario's 4.8 million workers wre unionized, representing 27 per cent of the labour force. Of the 1.3 million unionized worken, only 800 000 are members of unions affiliated with the OFL. Rand Dyck, The Socio-Economic Setting of Ontario Politics," in e . . af Om.4th Ed ., Graham Whilte, ed., (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), 32. .... 11 is that unions ate indeed significant political actors due to sheer numbers, finances and organization, but to a much less degree than the public's perception, and even less then their constituency seems to wattant.23 Despite representing a sizable pezcentage of the province's voters, labour is only a member of the sub-government in the employment area. Business concerns in contrast, are members of the sub- government in ateas other than employment, such as public finance and broad economic policy, even though their constituency is limited to shareholders in their enterprises. The weak associational characteristics of labour appear most readily in those policy conrmunities where labour is a member of the attentive public rather than the sub- govenunent. An example would be the policy community which exists in Ontario politics in matters of public expenditure and deficit control. Such broad economic issues are clearly of interest to all Ontarians, but particularly to public servants and the unions which represent them. In this area of public policy labour has not been able to achieve a relationship with government and the financial community to allow for meaningful paxticipation in the policy process. By maintaining a perpetual policy review process rather than a participatory role labour exhibits the primary chatactetistic of an attentive public. 24 This can be contrasted with labour's role in the employment relations policy community. Government and its agencies actively solicit labour's opinion
23 Ball and Millard, wePp.. . I * 126. 24 A. Paul Pross, Zanadian Pressure Groups: Talking Chameleons," in Pressure Jeremy J. Richardson, ed., (Toronto: Oxford University Press, l9Q3),lSS. ....I2 on those issues with which it is considered to have expertise (or where labour acquiescence is neceesaty for labour stability). Such areas include pensions, occupational health and safety, worker's compensation, collective bargaining, pay and employment equity, and employment standards. The variety of agencies, boards and commissions which exist to create and implement policy in these areas expect, and in essence require, labour participation. It would be proper to describe such labour involvement as exemplifying the activities of a member of the sub-govetnment. As such the preferred approach of labour in these fields is for quiet consultation and incremental negotiation. It is only when "bread and butterw issues come to the fore that the unions comprising the labour movement are likely to engage in more confrontational and drastic measures to persuade government. The conclusion is that the labour movement's organization allows for it to be approached by government as a credible member of the sub-government on employment issues, but this degree of influence is by no means guaranteed, nor does it translate to influence in other policy areas. If labour is a pressure group with influence in its primary policy area the question remains as to why labour has always maintained ties with the Ontario NDP (and its predecessor the CCF ) , and what this relationship off era to labour that it could not attain on its own. Further, since there has only been one NDP administration in Ontario's history, labour has had to develop relations with both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties. Any linkages with a .... 13 political competitot could therefore lead the other parties to be suspicious of labour. It will be argued that labour's relationship with the NDP, while not close; exists for the purposes of maintaining a constant policy advocacy outlet. Engaging a political party to represent its interests, while diversifying labour's ability to exert political pressure, does not significantly affect labour's primary activities of securing material benefits fot its membership. Links Between Laboul: and the mP
The 1990 election victory of the NDP was cause for applause from organized labout, a long tima supporter of the NDP in the province. As subsequent events would illustrate, this approbation would be dampened by various disappointments. After an examination of the relationship between labour and the NDP, the mutual frustl=ations in the aftermath of the NDP0s time in office can be better understood. A useful starting point in considering the relationship is to investigate why labous and the NDP came to affiliate with each other to begin with. what were the expectations of labour, and of the patty? What type of political paxty was the NDP, and what othet parties existed at the time of its creation? What was the nature of the early association and how did it change over time? By considering the NDP as a political puty and the history of labour in Ontario, the linkages between the two groups will become evident. It will be argued that both the principles and structure of the NDP had to be altered for the party to approach electoral success in Ontario. A significant factor in this development was the role played by the labour movement within the party. Initially both the party and labour sought to retain as much independence from the other as possible. From the beginning the relationship between the two was ..,.I5 characterised by conflict and suspicion, rather than trust and unquestioned support. The reasons the relationship evolved in this manner are, first, the nature of Ontario's political environment; second, its specific political structures and the effect these have on social democratic parties; and third, the patticular nature of the labour movement and its ideological and institutional evolution. The relationship between labour and the NDP was never as close as some obserrvers of the party have suggested, and the disappointments experienced by labour during the NDP's time in government demonstrate this.
The NDP in Ontario
The nature of the Ontario NDP and its attempts to achieve electoral success must be examined in the context of the political environment in which it opetates. A general observation is that Ontario has rarely been a centre for radical political debate. The political strategy of successful Ontario governments was long aasumed to be "[do] nothing until you have to, and then only as little as you can get away with."l This was made possible by an electorate that traditionally has resisted significant changes to the structuring of government and society. Jonathan )tanthorpets argument to explain the unmatched electoral success of the Progressive Conservatives (PCs) , is simply that, the party remained in step with the people's desires, which were for a
1 Jonathan Manthorpe. P-e TQdea (Toronto: Maanillan, 1974) 8. .... 16 low degree of risk in any changes introduced by govemment.2 Manthorpe also concludes that underlying the PCs success was the lack of reaeonable alternatives presented by their opponents in politics, the Libetals and the NDP. To put it mote bluntly, as Manthorpe does, the PC8 have had 'the gift of their opponentsg folly. "3 The implication is that the tactics historically employed by the Liberals and the NDP, and the overall massage conveyed by these pasties to voters, disregarded the conservative nature of the Ontario electorate. Manthorpe, however, was writing in the early 1970s. Obviously, this was not true in the 1985, 1987, and 1990 elections when the Liberals and NDP were able to keep the PCs out of government. Yet the perception that the NDP was historically an unpalatable choice fox Ontario voters must be investigated if the relationship between labour and the paxty is to be understood. Ontario politics reflect the matetial prosperity of the province. Ontario has been blessed with substantial natural resources, large amounts of fertile arable land, and a geography which provides ready acceas to the world's largest economic market. These attributes have allowed Ontario to prosper as the nature of its economy shifted from agricultural to industrial production, and again zecently towaxds the information and service economy. As a result, there have been few instances of Ontarians pressing for radical redistributions of income or influence, as it was assumed anyone could attain an acceptable level of affluence
2 Ibid., 7. 3 lbid., 10. .... 17 if one pursued the opportunities available within the province. Yet, as with all economies, Ontario's has been subject to periods of precipitous peaks and valleys of economic growth.4 These fluctuations have had a significant impact on the fortunes of the NDP in the province. Generally, the NDP8s political fortunes have improved in poor economic situations. In its very beginnings the CCFrs growth in Ontario dovetailed with the severity of the Depression.5 But in overall terms, the economy of Ontario has seen a steady growth in prosperity. It is within this context of voters largely satisfied with the products of market economies that the CCF/NDP has had to function as a social democratic party. The CCF was formed in 1932 at a meeting of Western Canadian labour, farmers8, and socialist elexnents.6 The CCF began in Ontatio by appealing to the natal vote which was at the time represented by the United Farmers of Ontario.' This suppozt was not as forthcoming as had been the case with the rural vote in the Western provinces, aa the experiences of Ontario farmars were different, in that the impact of the Depression was not as severe. As such, Ontario farmers were therefore more willing to support the existing power structure, to which the CCF was oppo8ed.e So despite
4 As an example, in the pcNkd betmeen 1919 and 1939, the rough time frame in which the CCF evolved, Ontar& experienced tM, depressions, a major boom perkd, and a parbedrecovery. Robert Bothwell, A of af (Edmonton: Hut@ Publishers Ltd., 1986) 120. . . 5 Gerald L Captan, (roconto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., t973), 19- 6 Gad Homwitz, Canadian in Ppljl/Eg,. . (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1968), 62. 7 Caplan, The Dilemma of 10. 8 Ibid- .... 18 beginning as a federation of labout, socialist clubs, and farmers, the rural element of the CCF quickly evapotated. The party in Ontario was therefore composed almost entirely of representatives of labour and CCF Clubs, the latter being groups intended to attract professionals from urban areas who could identify with the CCF's goals. The goals of the CCF, for both Ontario and elsewhere, were first stated in the Regina Manifesto of 1933. This document was an unequivocal statement of socialist principles. We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inhezent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based upon economic equality will be possible...... We believe that these evils can be removed only in a planned and socialieed economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are awned, controlled and operated by the people."g The early conviction of CCF members was that capitalism was %..a cancer which is eating at the heart of our society."lo The CCF therefore became the pazty of choice for those convinced the present system was fundamentally flawed. Such principled attacks on the capitalist system did little to impress the bulk of Ontario votera. Voter approval was crucial, for despite the party's claims of the need for structural changes to both the political and economic systems of the province, the CCF was committed to working for change from within the system. The CCF attempted to structure
9 From the as reprinted in Leo Zakuta, A Pp (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1QW), 160. 10 lbid., 37. .... 19 itself so that there was considerable control from the general membership, to allow for the democratic development of policy. The party stressed this to contrast themselves from their political rivals. This grass roots focus led to the adoption of broad socialist principles to satisfy the concerns of the party's membership, but these principles were not a priority to the electorate at large. Its internal structure aside, the CCF had chosen to be a eonpetitor within the parliamentary party system, and .. .by accepting the fundamental rules of that system, they set the new movement on a course which brought that structure ever closer to the others. "11 The structure in which political parties operate in Ontario is pat+ of the parliamentary system of government inherited from the British tradition. Whichever party attains the greatest number of seats, representing specific geographic areas, forme the government. The parties which choose to contest elections can be analyaed by their membership and structure on a continuum from electoral- professional to mass-bureaucratic forma,l2 or by the strategies parties adopt with constituency representation at one extreme and electoral competition at the other. The framework suggested by Herbert Kitschelt for considering the logics and strategies of left-leaning or eocial democratic parties,l3 applies to the evolution of the CCF/NDP. The
- - 11 lbid., 51. 12 This typology is largely based on the work of M. Duverger, in PBdjB& (New Yarlr: Wiley and Sons, 1963) as cited in Angelo Panebianco, 0- Po- (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 262. 13 Herbert Kitscf~elt,fhe of Partv FQrmBfjPa (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 41. .... 20 CCF/NDP went from being a party concerned with representing a particular constituency in the electorate to becoming a patty focussed upon achieving electoral success, and thereby satisfying as many constituencies of voters as poasible.l4 Kitschelt posits that parties in the early stage of constituency representation are inspired by the ideologies and political practices of the patty's core suppozters.ls In the early stages of the CCF in the 1930's various socialist elements in the party argued that the psrty's role was to disseminate socialist thought to the electorate for the purposes of educating voters on a genuine socialist progtamme. These elements argued that this education must come first and had a higher priority than winning elections, and at this stage the CCF has been described as being a "...crusading movement intecested in socialism first and power second."U In this manner the CCF demonstrated an early reliance on social cleavages and popular ideologies to shape its policies and its organizations, consistent with a party dedicated to satisfying the ideology of its core constituency. The ideological focus of the CCF, with its federated structure, began to undergo changes in keeping with the dsmands of political competition. Kitscbelt's model suggests that despite its early importance to a left party, ideology
14 The evolution of iho CCFNDP could just as easily be shown to exemplify a party's transformation from a mass-bureaucratic to an electorally-pmf88SiOCIal party. For the purposes of understanding the relationship of the CCFMDP with labour, the elecdorakmpetitive variantis most relevant as it better explains the motives for the party's actions while in government. 1 5 Kitschelt. LpoEEs of Pam F- 41. 16 Zakuta, A-~bvementBecalmad. 17. ....21 is outweighed by structural constraints on party behaviour in
detedning a patty's organization and strategy, L7 The CCF began to demonstrate the importance of structure to the party when the Ontario section was diesolved by the party's National Council in 1938, with a new convention of the party convened to reestablish the party.10 The decentralised structure of the party and the considerable membership participation given to the grass roots of the patty were intended to achieve a genuinely democratic movementJ9 The federated structure of the party was also designed to prevent the party from being dominated by any particular group. The result was that these were in effect three separate parties contained within the CCF before its digsolution and recasting; each of the farmers8, labour, and socialist clubs elements of the party had their own spokespersons, interests and interpretations of socialism.2o This created confusion in determining the party * a direction, with a corresponding lack of credibility with the electorate. The reorganization of the party was intended to allow actual control of the CCF to be located in a central council.21 The leadership would therefore be able to determine the party's direction in policy, and it was believed this would improve the party's electoral performance. The CCF was evolving into a party structured similarly .... 22 to its political competitors, with party policy and strategy being established in centralisad decision making bodies. Kitschelt expresses reservations as to charactetising all such transformations as products of a decision to become electorally competitive.22 A better approach in his view is to consider the party dynamics from the perspective of the strategic situation of parties. The televant variables to such an investigation are; the mobiliaation of the cleavage upon which a party is based, the openness of a regime's political institutions to a par+yrs democratic participation, and a patty's position relative to its competitots.23 The evolution of the CCF involves all of these variables. The cleavage upon which the CCF/NDP was formed involves the conception of social classes. Put most simply, society can be conceived of as those who benefit inequitably from capitalism and the political system associated with it, and those who are put at a disadvantage by the system. The party was suffering in the polls until a federal by-election in 1942, when the national leader of the PC8 was defeated by the
CCF candidate. 24 This first taste of electoral victory led the CCF to intensity its efforts for electoral success in the provincial election of 1943, where the patty stood to benefit if it could capitalise upon the problems besetting
22 Kitschelt sees problems with explaining transformations to eleclDRllly armptitive as the result of evolutionary learning on the part of party leders, or arguments of pcNidical entrepreneurship by leaders to achieve personal gratification. Thee are other factors influencing party policy and strategy than electoral consequences in his view, the most compelling being the ability of parties & articulate and aggregate varfous political interests. This broad discussion is found in Kitschelt, ofP- 44-50. 23 Ibid., 55. 24 Zakuta, A Pp55. .., 23 Mitch Hepburn ' s Liberal government 35 The CCF campaigned without reference to its earlier ptomotion of pacifism, a stance unpopular with an electoxate at wax, and without reference to class warfare. As such, the original underlying concern of the membership to address the inequities of capitalism were downplayad. The strategy to focus upon Liberal faults and not a recasting of society resulted in the party being elected to 34 seats from having none beforehand, enabling the party to become the Official Opposition.26 Subsequent elections were contested upon similar bases, yet electoral success of this sort was not as forthcoming. The party chose to further downplay its former socialist bias when it adopted the Winnipeg Declaration of 1956. Rather than call for the eradication of capitalism, the party atgued instead only that, "[pjrivate profit and corporate power must be subordinated to social planning designed to achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living standards for all Canadians." 27 The legitimacy of the capitalist system was no longer at issue, it was just now a question of hw to harness it effectively. As the IDP, the party continued to reject strategies focused upon social cleavages, as demonstrated by the treatment of the Waffle faction within the party. This left- oriented movement of a segment of the membership favoured
25 Along with various pemW excesses, Hepbum sefiaudy divided his party by having his caucus engage in a recorded vote by the Legislature of Ontario expressing regret that the federal government, under fellow Liberal Mackenzie King, was being so mstrahd in its prosecution of the war effort The Liberal party, it is argued, took 30 years to recow in Ontario. from Mmthofpe, me Pa- T&& 16-1 8.
27 Ibid., IS. .... 24 nationalism, anti-Americanism, and public ownership of key industries. Featful of the reaction of the public to such socialist sentiments, the NDP ousted the Waffle at the 1972 provincial council meeting.28 Strategies for altering the capitalist aspects of the economy are no longer the cornerstone of the pasty's program or existence, as the party no longer questions the legitimacy of the market and economic competitiveness, and only focuses upon how to addrese the unequal distribution of benefits in society. Rather than advocate broad systemic change, NDP strategies have focused on specific programs designed to address particular needs of society, such as health care and unemployment insurance. Such programs appeal to the self-interest of voters and are therefore mote conducive to engendering positive electoral support. This transformation is consistent with a party becoming more concerned with strategies designed for electoral success. The openness of the political regime to the NDP has allowed the patty to occupy a place within the political landscape. In a parliamentary system it is possible for third parties to exist and survive. A major focus of the parliamentary system is the legislature, and therefore any party which can elect its membem can have a voice even if it does not fom the government. 29 Further, due to the convention of party discipline, membets of the governing party may not vote against their own party's legislation.
28 George Bring and Wayne Roberts, 0- (oakvilk: Mosaic Press, 1993), 52. ....25 This means a full range of political views cannot be reptesented by just two patties, so that a minority par+y is allowed some space in which to distinguish itself. The parliamentary system did not force the NDP to abandon its socialist past, the party choae to do so, because its original strategies proved unpopular with voters. The NDP chose to vacate its position on the left in favour of moving towards the centre in hopes of attracting liberal minded voters.30 This strategy would allow the pazty to avoid the most inflammatory Liberal and PC propaganda about the petils of its socialist agenda. Instead of being labelled as socialist ideologues, party members could portray themselves as being pragmatic and responsive to voters' concerns. Paxty strategies therefore would be about issues rather than ideology. The party choae to focus upon its electoral performance, for rather than remain a credible party in the province with little chance of forming the government because of its socialist ideology, the party leadership wanted to fom a government. Modifying its strategies increased the likelihood of attaining this goal. The proximity of the NDP to its political competitors has become noticeable over time. Despite attempts by the media to pigeon-hole a party into a symbolic place on the political spectrum, the distinctions between the NDP and its competitors have narrowed considerably. The PCs and the Liberals wete the governments which enacted most of the progressive legislation within the province, not the NDP . The PCs strategy to only implement changes in society when 30 Ibid., 240. ....26 there existed a clear consensus to do so was derived from a desire to maintain electoral dominance, and not out of any deep rooted ideological biaa.31 The PCs success encouraged their competitors to adopt similarly pragmatic platforms. In light of the generally conservative nature of the Ontario electotate discussed above, the NDP has had to adjust its tactics and strategies to countexact the activities of its competitors. As there are mote than just two major patties in Ontario, the WDP cannot attract suppozt by being the major alternative available to voters. Instead the NDP ha8 chosen to compete with the other parties in a more confined political spectrum. The NDO has become a tightly centraliaed and top-heavy party whose focus has shifted from its membership's principled concerns to the practicalities of electoral success. The mPfs strategies are designed with the concerns of the electorate in mind rather than those of the party's own constituents. As a constituent element of the party, this ptoceee has had an effect upon labour and its relationship with the party. The natuxe of this relationship will be better understood after an examination of labour's own evolution in Ontuio.
Labour in Ontario Politics
Unions, the elements of organized labour organizations
31 Under the Hams govemmnt this is no longer the case. Ideology seems to influence his government to a greater degree than perhaps any other PC government since George brew's in the 1940's. .. . .27 in Ontario, predate the NDP. The most prominent unions in the province initially were craft unions who were variants of American Federation of Labour, (APL), unions. The typical AFL union was conservative in outlook and resistant to political action by the labour movement.32 The primary Canadian labour organization in Ontario during the early part of this century was the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) . The TLC had urged its provincial branches to establish and aid labour political parties. Following the First World Was this enthusiasm for political activity disappeared, as its earlier attempts had failed. The TLC retained the formal goal of aiding a labour party, but its leadership had lost faith in political activity3 The AFL was resistant to linkages with political parties from the beginning. The AFL was expressly opposed to socialism, wheteas the TLC never embraced the movement, but it never repudiated it either.34 Horowitz argues that the TLC's reticence to become involved in pakty politics with the CCF was due to the satisfaction of the leadership with their statua, of a significant interest group with relations to the governments of the day.35 At the time of the CCPs entry into Ontario politics the labour movement was dominated by conservative federations of unions, who were either explicitly opposed to political involvement, or at best ambivalent towards it. The TLC and AFL represented the most powerful and
32 Bothwell, of Qltatle 137. 33 Ho~ow~~L, in PPII1ICa, 61. 34 Ibid., 58. 3s Ibid., 63. .... 28 reputable unions of the early 1930~~but they did not speak for the entire labour movement. The Canadian Congress of Labour, (the CCL), were a younger federatiod of unions, with a more activist leadership willing to apply themselves towards realising social change.36 The CCL was the result of the merger of various Committee of Industrial Organizations (CIO) unions expelled from the TLC, with the preexisting All Canadian Congress of Labour.37 The leadetshipe of these unions were dominated by socialists who were closely associated with the leadership of the CCFw With their expulsion from the TLC, these leaders were now fee to develop tighter links with the party. As the CCF's fortunes rose in 1943, the CCL leadership decided to endorse the CCF as labour's party.38 Likewise the party was pleased to develop stronger links with labour elements, with the expectation that such a relationship would deliver a high number of union votes. The endorsement of the CCF by the CCL marked a shift in the importance of the federations in the labout movement and led to the drafting of terms of affiliation for unions and the paxty. The CCL unions which had been expelled from the TLC, were increasing in terms of influence within the province. The 19408 saw great industrial expansion, principally in the sectors inhabited by these CCL unions.39
36 Ibid. . * 37 Caplan, 191. 38 Horowitz, in Politics. 55. 39 The prindpal unions involved were the Steelworkers, the Autoworkers, the Mlmmrkers. and Packinghouse Workers. The 1940's saw their memberships climb sharply as the industries they populated expanded greatty. As such their influence increased, and their endorsement of the CCF had considerable impact. Fmn Caplan, . . 91. ....29 The emergence of the CCL as the most influential labour organization made the TLC less of a relevant voice for labour. The devalued status of the =C made a merger with the CCL attractive, and led to the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) in 1955.40 The creation of the CLC eliminated the confusion as to who could speak for labour. By centtalising the leadership of labour it made communication between the party and labout simpler and more direct. Yet despite the close affinity of the leadership of the CLC with the CCF no great outpouring of support for the party was forthcoming from labout. The CLC eought to remain free to develop contacts with whichever party would form the government. As a result, little electoral benefit was visited upon the party. To sunmatise, the labour movement was largely divided during the first half of the century, preventing labour from aiding the CCF. Many union leaders had close connections with the CCF, due to petsonal relationships and a commitment to CCF goals, yet this did not translate into meaningful support for the party for some tima. What -support tor the CCF which did exist within labour, was less a result of rational decision making to attain particulat objectives than it was the continuation of a relationship that had arisen between two groups who began a8 ineffectual political actors, and came together to provide some degree of support for each other. As influence increased, first of labour and then the party, this comrades in arms relationship continued, but it was never explicitly structured as an alliance intended to
40 Horowit, in Pm168. ....30 provide labour with self-directed gains, or the party with electoral success. The leaders of both labour and the party might have hoped fox the fulfilment of their particular objectives, but they stopped short of structuring a tightly knit partnership designed to do so.
The NDP and Labour
The links between the NDP and labour have remained relatively constant. Such links consist of personnel provided to the party by the labour movement, the contributions of funds from unions, and ditect affiliation by unions with the party.41 There exists the perception that the NDP is controlled by labout, whereas it is an electorally competitive party whose most important telationship is with the electorate. There is no explicit requirement that labour leaders be represented within the party hierarchy; it is simply convention that 20 to 25 per cent of the executive and officers of the party have a union background. 42 Party conventions have also been designed to prevent labour dominance by favouring constituency association members as delegates. 43 As for the financial contributions of unions, despite increasing significantly in election years, they have
41 Archer. Political Choices- d New (Montreal: McGilKllum's Unhremity Press, 1990), 27. 42 Ibid., 28. 43 Ibid, .... 31 been substantially outweighed by private donations.44 Admittedly, the sums donated by labour are significant to the party's functions, and there would be no substitute source for this revenue if it was withheld. Generally, she who pays the piper calls the tune, but with a political party the situation is slightly altered, for a party cannot remain credible and attractive to voters if it is blatantly devoted to satisfying the interests of its most significant donors. The labour movement did not make meaningful contributions to the patty until it became the NDP, by which time there was already a relationship existing between the two-groups from which labour was not ptepared to withdraw. As for affiliations, a minority of unions are affiliated, and a minority of the larger work force is unionised, so this influence is not dominant. In sum, although there is a strong symbolic bond between labour and the NDP because of labour's contributions to the CCP in its formative period and the importance of the rights of the working classes to social democratic ideas, the labour movement is but one of many constituencies. amongst the NDP and does not control the P-Y* The relationship of labour and the party is the result of the nature of each group. Labour is a weakly constructed interest whose priaaq concern is the material interests of its membership. The NDP is a political party whose primary interest is to attain the support of the electorate and
44 lbid.. 35. Archer's pewof analysis is from 1979 to 1986. At no time did union affiliation dues exceed 10 % of annual NOP revenues, with other contributions reaching highs of 18 % in election years. Combined, the average annual figure is in the 20 % range. .. . .32 theref ore political off ice. A number of factots prevented labour from developing closer ties to the NDP. These are: the affiliation practices implemented by the party to prevent labour domination; the international nature of the early labour movement, reflecting the strategies of the American labour movement towards politics, rather than a model appropriate to Ontario; and the clash between labour and party sensibilities in terms of party sttuctute and party strategy. Despite a relationship existing between labout and the party due to a sense of 'established structuresn there was an absence of coordinated action on the part of either labour or the NDP to create a more productive partnership* Further, the attempts which were made to.establish any such enterprise were thwarted by the particular characteristics of the structures of labour and the party* As such, the relationship has not been able to satisfy the primary interests of either labour or the NDP. Labour and the NDP have had difficulty creating a stronget union due to the affiliation procedures implemented by the party. Keith Archer contends that the relationship between the NDP and the labour movement is fundamentally the same as when the party was the CCF,45 largely one of mutual emotional support more than substantive aid. Elis argument is based on the concept that the strength of the relationship between labour and the party is determined by the number of unions who affiliate with the party. The CCF was modelled on the British Labour party: any trade union wishing to affiliate with the party had to accept the party's
45 Ibid., 4. .. . -33 constitution and programmes, union delegates to the party could not be supporters of other political parties, and the union would have to pay per capita monthly nlambarship dues.46
A crucial difference between the NDP and the British Labour party is that only union locals would be allowed to affiliate, while in Britain federations or regional councils could affiliate as well. The consequence is the decision to affiliate takes place within the hundreds of union locals across the province rather than within the meetings of a limited number of union federations, There is therefore a logistical barrier to attaining a substantial degree of union support.47 Without affiliation with the NDP there is also no symbolic cue to union members that there is a meaningful link between labour and the NDP. There is therefore less connection between unionised workers and the party, and less electoral support as a result. In the early stages labour regard for the party was limited, due to a number of factozs: many labour leaders at the time were reticent to be involved in political action;4@a lack of support in the Amarican head offices of international unions active in Ontario prevented most union leaderahips from endorsing the CCF;49 and the fear of CCF leaders to involve themselves with unions led by Cormnunists. Despite the reluctance of the CCF to become a strictly labour party
48 Ibid., 15. 47 TO appreciate th. disincentives to affiliation consider that in the Ontario Federation of Labour there are 800 000 members. Walkom, 122 Of them 800 000 only 200 000 are affiliated with the NDP. Ehring and Roberts, 27. . 48 Homwitr, Canadianin in- 61. 49 Ibid., 235. ... 34 in the British model, labour continued to maintain ties. The explanation lies in the fact that labour at the tima could not rely on its own device8 to achieve desired policy outcomes. At this time few pressure groups could, as political parties were still the undisputed masters of the state apparatus. It was considered a waate of effort to cultivate relations with members of whichever party was in power who were friendly to 1abou~'s interests, as these friends would not be able to circumvent the convention of party discipline present in parliamentary democracies. 50 It was considexed much more productive to develop relations with a party whose very platform and organizational links were based on labour concerns, with the hope that this pepcould form a government. The reluctance of labour to sever ties after repeated NDP electoral failures can be explained by the fact that, by this time, labour had a significant investment in the CCF from which they could not easily withdraw. Labour has never been overjoyed with the way the party has acknowledged its support. The party hae always wanted labour's resources, manpower, and mas8 base, yet there was initial, and continuing, reluctance to fully embrace labour. Gerald Caplan argues that the party initially felt threatened by the pragmatism of the unionists.sl And in response to a public and media belief that the WDP was nothing but labour's errand-runnet, the patty has continually strived to maintain its independence. The party has downplayed the linka with labour in hopes of attracting more ulibetal mindedw voters.
. . 51 Caplan, 96. ..35 The tesult is that labourr has considered itself to be a less than full partner in the relationship.s2 Many labour leaders would agree with the observation that the relationship is not one of hand in glove, rather '[a] more accurate description would show the NDP in big laboutrs back pocket removing bills from labour s wallet, "53
Labour's Approach to the DIDO
If labour has been frustrated with its relationship with the NDP, what rationale exists for maintaining it? The utility of the NDP to labout lies in providing a highly visible platform from which policies favourable to labour can continually be advocated. This relationship does not, however, prevent labour from acting to satisfy its membersr interests independent of the NDP. Recent examples include the Ontario public servantsr strike and the rotating days of protest by labour throughout the province, and labours explicit opposition to the NDP government during the Social Contract negotiations. Although thete is admittedly a high degree of interaction between the NDP and labour, this does not act to prevent labour engaging in the activities of a pressure group, Although the early history of the CCF/NDP reflects a considerable degree of labour influence, this analysis has always been undertaken from the perspective of political parties rathes than preasute groups. It should be remembered
52 Ehring and Roberb, tO.A A\MV 140. 53 Mi.,21. ....36 that labout movements typically do not pursue relations with socialist political parties, but rather these parties approach labour. A nascent social democratic party rarely possesses the organizational support, finances or personnel necessary to be a significant political fotce.54 All of these needs can be met by the labour movement, as the structure of union8 , groups with large memberships required to pay dues to a centraliaed leadetship which stress discipline to union directives, allows for the ready collection of funds and necessary manpower. Labour wvements offer theit aid in the hopes that such a political par+y will come to power and implement policies favouable to labour. The conventional wisdom to explain the rupture between labour and the NDP, is this was a natural product of labour having to deal with the NDP as a government for the first time. But labour had rarely chosen to engage in conflict with either a Liberal or Progresrrive Conserpative government. Labour leadets explicitly acknowledged that they had always been able to obtain progressive labour legislation from ptevioua governments.sS The troubles with the NDP merely illuettate that labour has to maintain independence to be effective in achieving its goals, which are by no means congzuent to those of the NDP. The expectation of participating in policy formaUon and implementation through links to a political patty would appear to be a strategy whose time has passed. The intensive bureaucratisation of the state since the Second Wor=ld Wax and
54 Archer, 7. 55 Patrick Monahan, Pink Pw(Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1995), 96. .. . .37 the increasing sophistication of government policies has given control over policy to buteaucrats and the executive and has ttansformed political parties into pale impersonations of their fomaetly dominant selves. The links which currently exist between the NDP and labours6 do little to restrrict labow's actions as a distinct political preseure group. The ability of political partiee to advocate particular policies has limitations. Because labour is excluded from the sub-government in many areas of public policy, it needs its voice to be carried in a wide array of sectors* attentive publics. The inability of the NDP to satisfy this concern has led labout to seek other means to see its priorities placed on the public agenda. Given the limitations of political parties to influence public policy it is not surprising that the labour movement has begun to consider developing linka with btoad social movements. Perhaps the first extensive experience that many unions active in the labour movement had with coalition politics was during the 1988 federal election (although a federal election, Ontario labour groups were active with other groups within the province). Due to the lack of a credible economic platform within the NDP, many unions looked outside the party to express its opposition to the proposed free trade deal, the central issue of the campaign. Several unions, notably the CAW and USW, collaborated with other
~ASM~O~~~~~-~~~NDP.~III,unionsama~~toeffi~i.~with~party if they agree to bind themselves by the party Constitution and they are not involved with any other political party. Once admitted, Artide IV stipulates that affiliated orgenizatbns must pay 20 cents per member per month. As of 1992 the Ontario NDP had 200 000 affiliated union members who contributed $150 000 per year to the party, and one third of NDP caucus members were members of the trade union movement Ehring and Roberts, 27. ,...38 groups opposed to the trade deal in the Pro-Canada Network3 The inability (or unwillingness) of the NDP to participate in broad-based coalitions led labour to investigate such cooperative efforts. The use of coalitions allows additional opportunities for political participation, as well as integrating and acconrmodating compatible interests. The use of coalitions to influence policy allows the labour movement a greater variety of options to achieve specific policy outcomes. The limitation of labour involving itself with coalitions is that most involve so-called public interest groups, whose policy objectives would benefit both coalition members and non-members alike. Even if prominent trade unionists such as Bob White, present president of the Canadian Labout Congress and past president of the Canadian Auto Worker's union, realise that although the nature of political action is changing to include community and issue
- based organizations,se this does not translate to labour organizations having credibility in these areas. Labour organizations's credibility is based upon being able to offer advice to government on employment related issues and to secute labour peace in the province through creating stable relations with both business and government. Labout does not have significant credibility in policy communities whose focus is the environment, social welfare isaues, or monetary or fiscal policy, at least to the degree necessary to be
57 Ehhg and Roberfs, 220. 58 McLd, n 0. (Toronto: James lorimer and Company, 1994), 117; also Walkom, Rae 145. .... 39 involved in the sub-government. In these communities the labour movement is only able to be part of the attentive public, with the result that its influence extends only to policy advocacy. The legitimacy of the labour movement to speak on issues of broad social relevance will be difficult to establish with many potential coalition xuembets. Labour is generally understood to have the advancement of the interests of its members or potential members as its goal, and not the advancement of the broad interests of members of society at large. It will be difficult for labow ocganizations to allay the concerns of broad-based coalitions about the material motivations of labour. Partnerships with coalitions may provide several positive benefits to labour, but such partnerships will only develop as a result of shared goals over the long-term, and do not provide an immediate alternative to continued links with the NDP.
The essence of the relationship between labout and the NDP in Ontario is one of disappointment. Labour has always expected gratitude for its monetary and personnel contributions to the party. The party has expected the votes of the labour rank and file, votes which the labour leadership could not deliver. As the links which did exist between labour and the patty became mote entrenched, the party became concerned with its image as a mere mouthpiece ....a for labour, and the paxty therefore attempted to establish distance to assert its independence. Such independence was considered crucial to appeal to the liberal-minded voter, whose support the party realised was necessary to achieve electoral success. The paxtyrs choice to focus upon the interests of the electorate rather than the party's constituents is the root cauaa of - labour s diesatisfaction with the NDP. The relationship between the party and labour, though of long standing, has never been as strong as is often alleged, and reflects the differing expectations of the parties involved. These difficulties became evident during the term of the NDP government, yet the roots of this discord were the result of much earlier factors present in the evolution of both the party and labour. The labour movement has a long history of involvement in the employment relations policy process and the sphere of electoral politics. Despite having various links with the NDP party and its leadership, labour has maintained the right to act independently of the party, and at times in opposition to the party itself. This independence stem from labour's recognised role as a member of the sub-government on issues relating to employment. As this is the primary interest of its constituency, and the explicit purpose of the union elements of the labour movement, any linkages with a political paxty ate secondary. These linkages are meant only to enhance the ability of the labour movement to advocate certain policy options. Similarly, the developing relationship between labour and certain broad-based ....41 coalitions is intended only to allow labour a platform for its particular issues. The institutional nature of the labour movement, as affiliations of unions which represent the immediate economic interests of their members, mandates that organizations such as the OPL can only credibly represent those industries and sectors of the economy which choose to affiliate. The state's recognition of labour's tole in the employment policy community is the basis of labour' s credibility and its infhence. Any linkages which labour develops with a political party or a coalition pale in comparison, since inclusion in the sub-goveznment as opposed to the attentive public is the desire of any institutionalized pressure group. Chanter
The Ontario Labour: Relations Act Refana Psocess
The reforms to the Ontario Lptwrw R- Act, (LRA), introduced by the NDP government in 1992 were the culmination of a process that began well over a year eatlier. The introduction of these reforms was seen by many as a crass attempt by the NDP government to rewsrd the contributions of the labour movement to the paxty8s 1990 election victory. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate whether these reforms were simply the result of the close relationship between the labour movement and the NDP or whether other explanations offer more insight. The question to be asked is whether: the activities of the labour movement offer evidence to support the claim that labouz: is a member of the sub- government of employment relations, and whether this membership was determinative of labourts ability to participate in policy formation. By contrast, the activities of business concerns and associations in the province evidenced an unpreparedness which limited their efforts to policy advocacy. The policy involvement of each group will be examined thxough a consideration of three variables: the autonomy of relevant state agencies, the organizational development of each sectoral interest, and the relations existing between the state and each actor. Events in the Process
To better analyse the Ontario employment relations policy community during this period, a description of what transpired would be helpful. The chronology of events begins with the 1990 election campaign and culminates with the enactment of the reforms contained in Bill 40 on January 1, 1993. During this period the activities of the NDP government, labour and the business community are of interest. Throughout the election campaign of 1990 there was no mention made of any possibility of reforming the LRA. The election platform of the NDP, A- for Peom,l had no specific heading outlining NDP proposals for laboul: law reform. In the broader context of employment relations there weze proposals concerning better severance ptotections for displaced workers, an increase to the minimum wage, and the - introduction of employment and pay equity. The was of more concern to the election strategy of the NDP than the LRA. It has been argued that such an absence reflected the priorities of the OFL at the time; namely, to address the impact of economic restructuting on Ontario union nrembers as the result of the recession.2 However, to conclude that the LRA was not an issue of concern to the NDP due to the absence of discussion of the subject in party literature possibly misconsttuee the purpose of the NDPts election platform. It was not intended to be an
1 far Peable. Ontario New Democratic Party, 1990. 2 Monahan. 95. ....44 encyclopaedic compilation of the patty's intentions but rather a sampling of those priorities considerred to be of interest to the electorate. The issue of labour law reform was not a 'hota election issue in 1990, aa the campaign revolved almost exclusively upon the credibility of the Ontario Liberals, and Premier David Peterson specifically. The omission of labour reform from party literature cannot be interpreted as indicating that the OFL had already secured NDP compliance on the issue, merely that it was not a crucial election issue at the time. The Throne Speech of the NDP government in the fall of 1990 also failed to mention the reform of the LRA as a priority. Considering that such an opportunity is normally taken by a new government to indicate its direction in principle and its legislative priorities, this is of more import. The speech only mentioned the government's intention to improve the rights of workers to organize themeelves.3 An investigation of the underlying context of NDP thinking in the area, and the efforts of the OFL to alter this state of affairs, is therefore necessary. The NDP began its mandate by trying to consider the interests of the ptovince's business ccmununity. However, the actions of both the NDP and business reflected their relative ignorance of each other. The two groups had few shared experiences upon which to build understanding and trust. In attempts to allay business fears about the IDP, Premier Rae and Treasurer Floyd Laughren made themaelves available to business leaders and associations. The common theme of Rae's
3 Ibid., 98. ...A5 statement8 was for govetnment and business to work together to achieve mutually desired goals. Despite reservations, business was initially cheered by the government's decisions in October and November of 1990 to forgive the debts of Varity Corporation ( formetly Masaey Ferguson) owed to the provincial government, in spite of its relocation outside of Ontario, and to not impede the purchase of Consumet'a Gas by British Gas.4 This e~lyperiod of optimism was not to last, and the lingezing sense of distrust of NDP intentions by business would resrvface during the &RA reform process. A narrow amendment to streamline certifications of unions mentioned in the Throne Speech was intended to be inttoduced to the Legislature in December of 1990. The Minister of Labour, Bob Mackenzie, was unable to introduce the bill before the House recessed for the Christmas break.5 This development reinforced the suspicions of the OFL that the provincial bureaucracy was attempting to stall any plans for labour reform. The OFL therefore intensified its lobbying of the government to adopt legislation it coneidered necessary to its interests. Not long after, in Match of 1991, Mackenzie appointed a conunittee of employment relations experts independent of the government, undet commissioner Kevin Burkett, to report on 30 broad issues of labour law reform.6 This committee was composed of three members who had previously represented the interests of management and three who had represented labour, for a total of six members, plus
4 Walkom, pse 164. 5 Monahan. Pink Palace. 98. 6 Ibid., 100. .. . -46 the commissioner. As information regarding the committee circulated, business interests became concerned. The spring and summer of 1991 saw the creation of various umbsella groups of business interests formed to voice their displeasure with the potential refonas. Three groups emerged; Project Economic Growth, claiming to represent 500 Ontario companies, with renowned lobbying firm Kill and Knowlton retained on their behalf; the More Jobs Coalition, representing 85 large corporations such as the Royal Bank of Canada and Southam; and the All Business Coalition, consisting of 42 preexisting business associations, such as the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.7 Of note is the fact that the majority of business activity was undertaken by associations which did not exist prior to the LRA reform process. The three coalitions.also ceased to function after the LRA was amended. Despite commanding significant resources, these groups were not intended to be permanent fixtures in the employment relations policy area, but were instead simply designed to allow various business enterptises a voice in the process of reforming the LRA. Following the submission of the Burkett report to the Minister of Labour on 19 April 1991,a the Ministry made its own recommendations to the Cabinet Committee of Economic and
7 Descriptions of the various groups were obtained from the fomnar,Stnr.22 March 1992.84. 8 Monahan, PPFnl( 103. The Burkett Committee was unable to produce a unified report, so that both management and labour representatives submitted their own group efforts. As will be discussed. the mare influential of the two was that of ?helabour experts, titled ... 's. PamQwkmd P- 1990 - Labour q&IxD in .. . .47 Labour Policy. This report was submitted on August 7, 1991.9 After various Cabinet discussions and input from the civil service the government released a discussion paper in November of 1991, titled -sad Relations. With the release of the report the government urged those with comments and recommendations to appear before government hearings into the issues raised in the document. The hearings into the governmentOs report took place over a five week period in February and March of 1992. At these hearings the OFL appeared to elaborate upon its submission to the government on the relevant islrues.lo Various employers within the province appeazed, as well as the coalitions referred to earlier. In conjunction with their appearances before these hearings, business associations launched an intensive campaign of advertising
highly critical of the government ' s proposals. 11 These ads reflected the strategy of management, namely, to enlist the aid of the public to pressure the government to halt, or at least significantly alter, its reform process. The government, however, pzessed fomvud and on June 4, 1992, introduced its package of reforms to the Legislature, known as Bill 40. As the bill worked its way through the Legislature, various other campaigns were launched by business to give the government pause. A series of ads were
9 Ibid., 115. ..A8 paid for by the Canadian Daily Newspapelrs Association and were run across the province, with inflammatory titles such as "Adding to the violence," and "Say goodbye to your rights."l2 These activities led the government to intxoduce a number of changes to the bill, which were introduced on October 1, 1992. Despite continuing condemnation from the business community, the bill was passed by the NDP majority on November 5, 1992, and was proclaimed as law on January 1, 1993. The aftermath of the enactment of Bill 40 was widespread business resentment of the NDP. Any hopes Premier Rae had to work together with business were effectively scuttled from this point onwards. The NPP, as a result of the intense media campaign which surrounded the amendments, became even more distrustful of the media than they had been previously, and they came to feel that labourr owed them an obligation due to the intense criticism the government had had to endute.
The Actioas of the OFL
The OFL behaved as a member of the sub-government of employment relations throughout the LRA reform process. The lobbying efforts of the OFL could be characterised as being nonconfrontational and low-key, and mindful of leaving manoeuvring room for the government. The information relating to the LRA process will be analysed to test the validity of the assumption that it was the OFL'e membership
12- 12- September 12 1992.04 .... 49 within the sub-govetnmont which allowed the organization to achieve its policy objectives, rather than any reliance upon past relationships with the NDP. Following the methodology advocated by Coleman and Skogstad, the OFL's role in the LRA process will be coneiderad in three aspects; the autonomy and capacity of relevant state agencies (the Cabinet, the Ministry of Labour and the Labour elations Board), the organizational development of the sectotal interest (the on), and the relations between the state and the OFt. Such an investigation should provide insight into the LRA process and the relevance of the labour-NDP relationship to specific policy outcomes. The degtee of autonomy retained by the state in the LRA process is beat understood as involving two distinct stages. The first was the period from the Throne Speech in 1990 to the introduction of Bill 40 in June of 1992. Here the idea of the LRA being amended was by no means a stated government priority, nor was it for the OFL. As events unfolded, the OFL began to lobby the goveznment to addteas the issues raised by an increasingly deep recession and transforming economy, and the LRA was argued to be the most effective method to deal with these changes. The OFL functioned in its cuatomaxy role in the employment relations field, of advocating the worth and desirability of collective bargaining to deal with various labour relations problems.~3 This began before the Burkett Committee was appointed, it
13 In the opinion of the OR, unions contribute positively to society in two distinct ways; by promoting economic growth, innovation and productivity; and by helping to empower those in society with less economic and -al resources by providing them with a collective voice. From pp.34. ...a continued during its existence, and continued after the Committee's report was delivered to the Ministry of Labour and recommendations were made on the basis of its report. The OFL also maintained its participatory role in the hearings on the government's proposals. In all these events the nature of the state activity and the approach of government was to delegate authority to lowet decision making bodies and to allow the experts in the field to control the process. The motivation for the state to utilise impartial committees or commissions established at am's length is so that the state cannot be accused of favouring one interest unduly over that of another. By leaving such issues to supposedly neutral experts and the parties themselves, any resulting regulatozy regime will have the greatest degree of legitimacy possible by guaranteeing that its impact is balanced. 14 The employment relations field has traditionally been an area where the state has delegated considerable authority away from itself. This reflects a corporatist approach, with the objective being for government, business and labour to come together: to achieve industrial peace. The rationale behind such a sttategy, is that, [IJnsteadof the conflict, inefficiency, and disorganization of traditional pluralistic political arrangements, corporatism is seen as fostering the kind of consensual, efficient, and organized political environment that has become necessary to ensure the continued expansion- of the capitalist economy. IS
14 Monahan, the Pi- 100. 1s Mark James Oobeyn, "Gplaining the Mineof Macro-Corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies," 6 (1) (January 1993) pp. 3-22,at 4. .... 51 Apart from the political environment which corporatism creates, contemporary corporatist thinkers lay Y...emphasis upon the granting of official policy-making and administrative roles to labour by the state in exchange for consistent elite-imposed moderation of tank and file
demands. "16 Labour organizations such as the OFL ate given the opportunity to implement policy in return for guaranteeing labour peace and limiting their demands. The first stage of the LRA reform process had such a characteristic, in that the OF& did have considerable input over Ministry proposals submitted to Cabinet, but the expectation was present that labour would cooperate with business to help restructure the province's economy. The NDP government allowed the Burkett committee to cover a wide breadth of issues because the government had a commitment. to corporatist principles. More specifically, Premier Rae conceived of governance in corporatist terma, as demonstrated by reliance upon words such as npaxtnershipsn to describe the interaction of labour and capital.17 Premier Rae outlined his ideas of socialism and government in general in a letter to major Ontario newspapezs.10 In this manifesto of sorts, Rae argued that government's role was to get labour and capital to agree to constzuctive solutions rather than bicker. Apart from serving as an attempt to mollify the fears of the business community, this treatise offered the first glimpse of how the NDP government might proceed. Rae [TIhe interests of economic democracy would be better served by some inmediate practical changes in our laws on labom relations, ca~~anylaw and employment standaxds. Do away with this now widespread notion that everything not mentioned in the collective agteexnent belongs to the company. 19 These sentiments express a desire for labour and business to meet as equals, or at least to have the significant difference in bargaining power substantially offset. With such an attitude expressed by the Premier, the NDP government allowed the Ministry of Labour and its committees to determine the agenda for reform of the LRA. The primary example of state delegation was the formation of the Burkett committee. Composed of expetts in the labour relations field who had no attachment to the government, the committee en joyed a large degree of independence. The mandate for the committee, to simply determine a possible agenda for reform of the LRA, enabled the OIL to address questions of why the LEU exists. The executive of the OPL became convinced that the LRA was only going to be open for amendment once during the NDP's mandate.20 and that any proposals which it would recommend to the codttee should reflect the 0FL8s ideas as to the future of labour relations in the province. The OFL's focus was upon lowering the requirements in the LRA for organizing and certifying unions. The objective was to allow for unions to
------19 Ibid. 20 Whether there was a limited opportunity to amend the LRA or not, the perceptions of the OFL executive were that such was the case. According to Julie Davis, ORsecretary treasurer, 'People thought you were only going to get one kick at the labour relations act...,' and in the opinion of ORpresident Gord Wilson We knew we would only get one chance." Cited in Walkom, R$a n- 125. *...53 be organized in the service sector, most notably in those industries which wete heavily reliant upon part-time labour. 21 The private sector unions of the OFL were sensitive to the new marketplace emerging from Ontario's economic restructuring, and believed that continued reliance upon manufacturing industries for union membezships would lead to a decline in OFL numbers oveE the long term. Criticising the LR~for being relatively unchanged from a design intended for 1930's labour conditions, the OFL concluded that the Act had *not kept pace with a rapidly restructuring economy and, [was] itself, in need of extensive resttuctuting in order to be effective and efficient ."22 The government 's decision to create a committee of partisan supporters of labour and management, with a limited time in which to repott, meant a consensus on recommendations was not likely to be reached. The OFL thetefore urged the labour representatives on the committee to recouunend that the LRA be amended to better deal with Ontario's teetructuring economy. In contrast the management representatives focussed upon arguing that there was a lack of evidence to conclude that the LRArs design was flawed. Hence, the only concrete proposals given to the Minister: reflected the priorities of the OFL. By recognising the natute of the committee which the government had put in place, the OFL was able to have input over the agenda for reform of the LRA. The second stage of the LRA reform process involved the
21 arlQMBil June 6 1992,61,B8. In senrcnrcc8industries outside of the public sector, only 6.9% of employees are unionised in Ontario, as compared to 19.1 % of Ontario workers outside of private sector service industries. 22~ubmlsganbvm. tothe -Of-. . 53. ....54 introduction of Bill 40 in the Legislature, and at this stage the OFL was barely visible. The OFL leadership evidently recognised that legislati- proceedings were not matters in which a meaningful participatory role could be achieved. Getting LRA reform on the agenda and endorsing their preferred proposals for reforms were where the OFL could function as a member of the sub-government. To attempt to maintain a high degree of involvement once legislation was tabled would interfere with the direct exercise of state authority by Cabinet, and would involve the OPL in matters of political credibility. The OFL astutely realised that its role was to be involved in the groundwork of the LRA amendments, but once these amendments were put into concrete form and approved by caucus then the matter was no longer open for serious debate. The level of state involvement at this stage would only allow policy advocacy, and this was unnecessary, as the OFL had already been involved in the earlier stage where actual participation was possible due to the state delegating authority to Ministry officials and committees. The organizational development of the OFL has been discussed above in Chapter 1, in the context of how labour can be characterised as a pressure group. As noted, the OFL possesses a number of weak associational characteristics in regard to its atructute and the nature of its membership. These charactetistics did not detract from the ability of the organization to lobby government, however, as the issue of reforms to the LRA was one which affected every member of the .. . .55 OFL to the same degree. Because such reforma affect the very nature of collective bargaining in the province, every single union, representing either public service or private sector employees, had an interest in them. This allowed for the OFL to overcome many of the associational weaknesses that it encounters in other issues, such as how to control government spending, or how to collect government revenues. By being part of the employment relations policy community, the OFL was able to participate without having to justify its involvement to its membezrship. The OFL membership could appreciate that more influence would be gained by working collectively through the OFL to lobby the government. The structure of the OFL also enabled it to lobby the goveznment and its ministries effectively. By being a permanent organization, with a full time staff and research department, the OFL was able to offer specific proposals to the Ministry of Labour. The submissions of the OFL kept opinionated commentary to a minimum and focussed upon the particular details of the LRA. The Om's proposals were only directed to the issues raised by the LRA, and its leaders maintained a consiatent focus upon certain defined options, such as the removal of the right to hire replacement workers. The OFL is designed to allow labour to address government collectively, and there is little effort devoted to appealing to the public fox approval of its objectives. In contrast, the business groups created to oppose Bill 40 devoted substantial energy to public appeals. The actions of the OFL reflect a confidence that its opinions on LRA reform were .... 56 focussed and well founded, The third variable affecting an interest's ability to have input in a policy community is its relations with the state. The OFL had relations with the Ministry of Labour and the Labour Relations Board long before the NDP formed the government. The nature of the 0FL8s relations with state agencies also reflected a corporatist form of government, as the regulatory regime for employment relations had for many years only recognised the interests of management and labour. Labour therefore did not have to compete with a broad spectrum of intetesta when employment concerns were at issue. The OFL leaders therefore had a personal relationship with MinistIy officials even before the NDP came to powet. The superficial intimacy between labour and the NDP has led some observers to conclude the LRA reform process was simply a sham, and the OFL was guaranteed success.23 This conveniently ignores the actions of the OFL throughout the entire process and assumes that the NDP had already abandoned any hope of reelection and was indifferent to the appearance of not govezning in the public intereat. The OFL made submissions to government, it lobbied individual party members, it criticised the backtracking of the government from positions labour: coneidered more favouruble, 24 and it defended the legitimacy of its proposals in the media. In short, the OFL behaved as it would have if another party had formed the govetnment. As an influential labour leader acknowledged, the OFL still had "... to make [their] case and ....57 document [their] arguments. [They did not] expect that to change with the change in governments. "2s The OFL was successful in promoting its objectives in the LRA refonn process due to the low degree of autonomy retained by the government, the solid organizational capacity of the OFL provided by its structure and the similatity of interest of its membership, and by the relations the OFL posseseed with decision makers in the NDP and the Ministry of Labour. The combination of these factors allowed the OFL to be a member of the sub-government in this policy community, which translated into a policy participation role rather than policy advocacy. By way of conttaat, the actions of the Ontario business community led to policy advocacy and a different outcome, and provide an opportuaity to consider the actions of the OFL from a different perspective.
The Actions of Business Groups
If the OFL approach could be described as incremental and nonconfrontational, then the activities of business were confrontational and immoderate. Despite business interests being credible members of the employment policy community, they were unable to forestall the implementation of Bill 40. The proposals of most concern to business wete provisions barring the use of replacement workera and giving the Labour Relations Board the power to impose a first contract where a newly certified union and an employer were unable to
25 October 5 1990, A5 ....58 negotiate an agreement. As mentioned, the busineae community was skeptical of the NDPrs ability to manage economic matters responsibly and to appreciate the environment in which business had to operate. The LRA reforme reinforced these
Premier Rae's stated desire for government and business to work together notwithstanding, business could not support Bill 40. The NDP government approached Bill 40 with the attitude that business had been the beneficiary of earlier government decisions ,26 and any complaints about the LRA epitomized selfishness. Thomas Walkom concludes that, to business, ...these matters were not equivalent. Being nice to foreign investors might be laudable. But labour law speaks to the heart of capitalist enterprise, (and] sets the ground rules for the most important relationship in any f irm.27 The LRA reforms affected every business's interests individually, and past decisions of the gave-nt of benefit to individual companies were of no consolation to the business community. In many ways this hostility acted to prevent business from exploiting thoee opportunities to influence government which did exist. In Ontario, the degree of autonomy retained by the state in employment relations was relatively low. In keeping with the general corporatist environment of this policy community, management opinions on LRA reform wete sought out. The Burkett committee was composed of equal members of both
26 This is in reference to the Varity Corporation situation, the Wsh Gas purchase, as well as the government's retreat from its early plan to impfement public auto insurance, and tho agreements it reached with pharmaceutical companies. 27 Walkom, 164. labour and management. The committee members with management backgrounds chose to focus upon questioning whether the LRA was in need of reform at all. By not providing specific proposals these members left the Minister of Labour with a one sided argument in regards to LRA ceforms. This was to be a consistent facet of businessfa response, in that no alternative proposals were generated to oppose those advanced by the OFL. There were just blanket condemnations that the proposals were unworkable. Management concerns were never effectively presented to the government when the agenda was still to be determined. A possible explanation for the reluctant response of business conmrunities to engage in partnership with labour and government is offered by Mark Gobeyn. His analysis of corporatist structures in Europe in the 1990fs leads him to conclude that business has withdrawn from corporatism because it no longer is seen as being beneficial to business interests.28 With recent transfolrmations to the global capitalist system, and widespread domestic changes in capitalist societies, the motivation for business to engage in such partnerships is vanishing. If the purpose of corporatist structures is to constrain the political and economic militancy of organized labour in return for a greater division of the profits of capitalist enterprise to ensure economic stability, then if businesa can achieve this objective without sharing power it is in its interest to do so. With the recession in Ontario in the early 1990ts,
26 Gobeyn. 'Explaining the Decline of Ma#o-Corporatist Political Bargaining Structures in Advanced Capitalist Societies," 3. ....60 Ontario business interests felt they had significant bargaining power to exert against labout and were not enthusiastic about negotiating changes to a regulatory regime which was likely to strengthen labour's bargaining position. Another explanation for business's unwillingness to fully take advantage of the opportunity to influence the agenda fo+ labour reform is that business did not think the reforms would be implemented. Given the lack of business resources applied in the period prior to the government's request for comments on its proposals in November of 1991, one could conclude the strategy was to focus upon the later stages of the LRA reform process. Given the policy flip- flops that occurred early in the NDP's mandate, notably on public auto insurance, business interests possibly believed that the NDP would not proceed if faced with serious opposition to Bill 40. Such a strategy abandoned incremental negotiations with low level decision makers and consisted of exerting large scale political pressure on the government. In co-htrast to the OFLps decision to be heavily involved in the early stages of the LRA reforms, business did not truly exert itself until the government was preparing to introduce legislation. As noted, at such a time the autonomy wielded by the state is very high, and presents a barrier to a pressure group successfully influencing policy formation. But if one considers that business did not wish to see any policy formed in this matter, and wished to see an absence of government action, then its activities become more comprehensible. ....61 If the business interests of Project Economic Growth, the All Business Coalition, and the More Jobs Coalition were solely inteeested in seeing the LRA refornr process aborted outright, their organizational structure reflects this objective- The structure of these groups reflected a short- term focus. None of the groups had a permanent full-time staff, nor did they have a strong centralised leadership. These shortcomings were offset by the substantial financial resources which these groups could comxnand. Such resources allowed these groups to hire lobbying firms such as Hill and Knowlton, who did have full time lobbyists at their disposal. By being so loosely sttuctuted, these groups were best suited to policy advocacy activities. These groups were well suited to fulfil this purpose, and their efforts involved the full range of advocacy tactics. The -membership of these business groups was heterogeneous except for the fact that they were composed of members whose sole purpose was to generate economic profit. A notable element within these business coalitions was the presence of media outlets. The More Jobs Coalition included the Southam corporation, with several large and medium sized newspapers in its holdings. The print media offered business an excellent opportunity to ctiticiee the government's proposals. The otherwise dispatate nature of the memberships of these groups made it difficult for a common strategy to be adopted. The common characteristic of each of these group's actions was to criticise the government and its proposals at every opportunity, in the hope that the public would disagree .*..62 with the government and exert pressure upon it to weaken or abandon Bill 40. Hill and Knowlton recommended a high profile public campaign to swing public suppozt away from the NDP.29 Such advice was baaed upon consistent polling results that indicated the Ontario public feared Big Labour more so than Big Business. 30 Businesa had considerable public support fot its position, it just required mobilisation. Business utilised a storm of advertising designed to elicit an emotional response from the public. A strong ally in this regaxd was the Canadian Daily Newspapers Association (CDNA) and its membership. Their motivation for opposing Bill 40 vigorously was expressed at the hearings into the government's proposals in February of 1992. In reference to the proposal to ban replacement workers, the head of the CDNA stated "Any wotk stoppage can do extraordinary damage. There is nothing more perishable than a newspaper," and without the removal of the proposal then the LRA would amount "...to nothing less than a legislated employer surrender."31 These hearings produced a constant refrain from employers that the proposals would increase union power, increase costs of production, and cause layoffs. When the business coalitions were criticisad for fear mongering, Norm Stewart, spokesperson fot Project Economic Growth simply admitted ".. .maybe you could characterise it that way, but we are
29 Monahan, Pm119- 30 Alan Whitehorn. 9on VF-lyPe (Tomto: Oxkrd University Press. 1992) 15. The results indiite that on average. 30 % of those palled teared Big Labour, as opposed to 17 % fearing Big Business. 31 February 7 1992, A4. ....63 afraid."32 The advertising campaigns became even more aggressive after Bill 40 was inttoduced in the legislature, and it prompted Premier Rae to denounce the ads as false and misleading. He also felt it necessary to declare, "[The govenmhnt] will not be intimidated. No premier would accept that the province has to retreat or turn around in the face of this 0nslaught.~33 The attitude of business was urWelcome to the big leagues.' That's what lobbying is all about."34 Although intense, the advocacy efforts of the weakly structured business lobby did not dissuade the NDP from their chosen course. The NDP did attempt to mollify business, by adopting 55 changes to the original draft of Bill 40,35 but business maintained its attack-oriented ads xight up to the passage of the bill. Professional lobbyists were critical of the business approach, for it violated the primary rule of the lobbying industry, to leave the government sufficient room to manoeuvre. 36 This unrelenting opposition to Bill 40 convinced the government that it could not maintain any credibility if it backed down. The weak structure of the business associations served to prevent long term, low level negotiation from being a strategy of action. The only choice in such a time sensitive situation was for high scale advocacy. This avenue involved high risk with the potential for high reward, but the gamble did not pay off for the
32 stt& March 221982.84. 33 fdrantb September 28 1992, A1 ,A4. 34 This is reference to the statements of Catharine Swift of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business. March 22 1992.64. 35 -to Stat. October 1 1992, A2 36 foronto MMarch 22 l992,W. ....64 business lobby. The options available for business to pursue might have been more extensive if their relationship with government had been different, different in the sense of having long term relationships on which to draw to acquire greater access to decision makers. The business community posseesed little knowledge of, or: shared expeziences with, the members of the NDP government. Going into the 1990 election, the NDP was not considered likely to achieve a majority so there was little motivation for business leaders to cultivate relationships with the party. Had such contacts existed, business might have been able to communicate-its concerns to the government through calm discussion rather than inflanunatory rhetoric in various press releases. As with the poor organizational development of business interests, the lack of preexisting relations with the government put business at a disadvantage relative to the OFL. Such relations wese not determinative of the outcome in the LRA reform process, but they provided the OPL with better access to decision makers. The business lobby was unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent the enactment of Bill 40 because of its own inability to develop a structured organization. It was not the links between the NDP and labour which were the prinwy reason for the outcome of the process. This was a factor, but given that the business lobby did not take advantage of the low level of authority exercised by the state at the beginning of the LRA process, and their weak structural characteristics, and the ....65 disunity of theit membership, other explanations exist to explain the final outcome.
Summary
In contrast to the reasons for the business lobby's failure, the 0FL8s success in the LRA process was the product of solid organization. The OFL saw the beginnings of the process for what it was, an opportunity to shape the agenda before the government had committed itself to any particular course. By providing specific proposals at the early committee stage the OPL gave the government a framework of options from which it could build. This approach was possible because the OFL membership was united in pursuing its objectives, and it possessed a centtalisad structure to carry out the steps necessary to satisfy these goals. There is little doubt it was an asset for the OFL to have a preexSsting relationship with the NDP upon which it could rely for opportunities to present its proposals. The OPL's actions could be chaxacterised as being proactive in nature, whereas the business lobby was zeacting to events. The OFL did utilise its relations with the NDP, there is no question, but to conclude this was the basis for LRA reform is to consider all the other actions of the OFL and the NDP over a two year period meaningless. Not surprisingly, a combination of factors is more likely to have led to the outcome rather than a sole variable. The Social Contract Process
The time period of the Social Contract process was more truncated than the LRA example, but the root causes for the events can also be traced to the beginnings of the NDP mandate. It will be suggested that the Social Contract provides an example of an unsuccessful attempt by the labour movement to achieve their desired policy outcome. The relationship between the NDP and the labour movement, although a motivation for both organizations in their actions, was not sufficient enough of a reason for the government to alter its course. As will be demonstrated by an investigation of the actions of the OFL and the NDP government, the determining factor in the outcome of the Social Contract dynamic was the retention of significant state authority by the government, thereby denying the labour movement a participatory role in the process. The OFL could only engage in advocacy oriented lobbying. As with the examination of the LRA process, the Social Contract scenario will be considered in light of the three variables which affect an intereatrs ability to participate in a policy community: the autonomy retained by the state in the matter, the organizational development of the OFL and its effects upon OFL behaviour, and any relationship between the interest and the state. Although not directly involved in the events of the Social Contract itself, the financial and investment ... .67 community was able to exert influence on the government, and this factor will be examined where applicable to provide more context in understanding the ability of the OFL to influence policy outcomss.
The Social Contract Process
A series of events led up to the Social Contract negotiations in the summer of 1993. The decision of the government to launch these negotiations was in response to decisions which had been mada in the beginnings of the NDPrs term in office. The NDP's justification for the Social Contract was to control public spending, and as a result, the provincial deficit. The need to control government expenditures was in part due to the early spending choices made by the government. One of the first major expenditure decisions was, ironically, in regards to contract talks with the Ontario Public Service EmpLoyeee Union (OPSEU) in the fall of 1990. The advice of civil servants responsible for the negotiations was for the government to proceed slowly in the talks, so that the province's worsening financial picture would become clear to the union and the public.1 Their contention was that once the financial ptoblems of the govexnment became more widely known the union would be under public pressure to temper its demands for a substantial wage increase, and that subsequent negotiations with other unions would reflect this established level of restraint. The ....68 govexnnrent minister responsible for the negotiations, Frances Lankin, a former OPSEU negotiator herself, rejected this slow
pace, and urged a speedy settlement to the talks.2 The final agreements with the union were for a five per cent increase in wages. Critics argued that the government should have used its authority to cap public servant salaries, as these employees enjoyed greater job security than their counterparts in the private sector and this offset any wage
freeze .3 The result of the NDP's decision to offer wage increases was to increase spending, which the Social Contract was designed to redress. The NDP*s budget of 1991 was the first opportunity for the government to set forth its economic agenda, and to reveal the the state of the province's finances. The budget, and any forecasted deficit therein, were traditionally the decision of the Premier and the Treasurer alone. Premier Rae, however, elected to determine the appropriate level of the deficit by the consensus of Cabinet.4 This became crucial, as the Cabinet proceeded to disregard the Premier's opposition to any deficit approaching $10 billion for the 1991-1992 fiscal year and arzived at a consensus on a projected deficit that was indeed $10 billion, an unprecedented figute in Ontario history. 5 The reason for this rise in the deficit was the government's decision to increase government spending over the previous fiscal year in
2 Ibid., 49. 3 Ibid., 50. 4 Ibid., 52. 5 Ibid., 54. ....69 the face of falling provincial revenues due to a worsening provincial recession.6 As Treasurer Laughren later admitted,
this was a decision both he and the Premier regretted.7 The decision to increase the deficit at the time of falling revenues intensified the perception in the financial community that the NDP were incompetents in the economic sphere and came to influence the response of financial markets to future NDP decisions. The provincial deficit situation continued to worsen as 1993 began. The figure circulating in the Treasury department was for a deficit of $17 billion to be incurred in the 1993-1994 fiscal year if no changes were made in public spending. Spending cuts were the focus of NDP discussions as increases in taxation to garner more revenue was considered a politically disastrous move, given increases imposed in previous years. The fear of the Premier and Treasurer, whether legitimate or not, was that the province would reach a "debt wallu where international investors would refuse to purchase provincial bonds, effectively eliminating the province' s ability to acquire credit. 0 Demonstrating how human perceptions can influence govetMlant policy as much as logical reasoning, the feats of Cabinet were in large part
6 lbid. The 1901 budget called for an incrwoin spending of 13.4 % over 1990 levels. 7 lbid. HBd ib increase in spending been closer to 5 or 6 cant per year, the savings during the NDP's term in office mruld have amounted to $12 Mlliar, or $3 billion per yw. This might have made the Social Contmt an unnecessary exemWse,as it was designed to save the government the sum of $2 billbn annually, 8 Wakan- 117. TMB was not a legitimab fear, for Ontarbs ability to acquire funds had not evaporated. A worsening deficit only meant that the provim would have to prowa higher interest rate on its bonds to attract investors. The e~peneof obtaining credit would therefore increase, but othew*se it would still be available. Regardless or whether credit would still be available, the NDP ansidered it polihically inadvisable to procBBd with such a high defidt. ....70 derived from a television broadcast on the program uWS".9 Cabinet membera were alarmed at the parallels between the NDP ' s situation and that of New Zealand's Labour government; where a social democratic government faced with large foreign debt had to impose spending cuts to areas previously considered sacrosanct, after coming to the realization that increased taxes on the corporate sector and the wealthy would not generate the revenue necessary to avoid such cuts and would only drive away future investment. By giving credence to the claims of such critics, the NDP was allowing itself to be convinced by those it had traditionally distrusted, namely, the media. Whatever the source of such warnings, the government took them seriously. The NDP was reluctant to cut spending in social services, for the basis of social democratic principles holds that society's most vulnerable should not bear the burdens of society, and the party wanted to avoid the tactics of its political rivals which it had always criticized. The NDP therefore had few options with which to cut spending. The wages of the broader public sectorlo began to look inviting. This aector amounted to more than 950 000 workers, whose wages, in addition to those of the 90 000 direct employees of the province, amounted for just over 50
9 lbii.. 119. The program, CN,New Zealand: A Crisis d Debt,' 28 Febmary 1993, Eric Malling, narrator, chronicled the respocrse of New Zealand's Labour gommtto po888881hg extensive foreign debt The choscm course was for deep spending cuts and greatly increased taxes. loTho broader public sector refers to those people who are not direct empb- of the government but whorre salaries are provided for from provincial mies. Examples include hospital staff, teachers, police, and firefighters. The salaries of such empbyees are provided by provincial transfer payments to school boards, municipalities and other administrative bodies. ....71 per cent of the province's program spending.11 The problem was that the wages of these employees were established in over 8 000 collective agreements between employers and public sector employees' unions. By not being the employer of record in most of these cases, the province could not be at the bargaining table where wages were set. The government could choose to cut its transfer payments to groups around the province, or to legislate a wage fteeze. Instead, the government chose to try and convince ptovincial unions and employers to reopen preexisting collective agreements. The government called for a meeting between the Policy and Priorities Board of Cabinet and provincial labour leaders on March 21, 1993. Divisions in the labour movement surfaced at this meeting.12 Both Laughren and Rae tried to impress upon those present the gravity of the provinces finances, and Rae specifically warned that the government would act on the deficit with or without labour's support.13 Following this meeting the NDP caucus approved the target of a five per cent reduction in public sector wages, but this was to be in return for job security for those affected, and critically, it was to be reached by a brokered agreement with labour and employers and was not to be imposed.14 Premier Rae then announced that talks would be held between the government, the unions representing provincial employees, and their employers, to try and reach agreements to cut the provincial
11 Monahan. 14. 12 Ibid., 172. 13 Ibid., 173. 14 Ibid,, 177. .... 72 payroll by a total of $2 billion per yeax.15 The government's announced strategy was to keep the deficit to a figure of $10 billion a year by generating $6 billion from revenues and savings, to be accomplished by previously announced tax increases totalling $1.8 billion and spending cuts of $2.4 billion, and the Social Conttact savings of $2 billion.16 The process of negotiations began on April 5, 1993. In excess of 250 unions and employe+sr associations attended. The government released a statement of its objectives, entitled Jabs Social the
Public -37 The government provided a definition of a social contract as being a device ...used to achieve basic trade-offs between economic performance measures, such as productivity enhancements and the containment of compensation costs, in return for employment security gains and labour*s empawexmentin planning processes. 10 The government proposal was a corporatist initiative whereby labour's demands were to be restrained in return for input. As will 'be argued below, this initiative was thwarted by a variety of factors. As for the talks themselves, the major flaw was an absence of any guidance as to the structure and procedures to be followed, so those present were fotced to try and introduce some order to a confused gathering. The government imposed a deadline of June 4 for the talks to come to final agreements, but there was no mention of any
1s Wekom. 137. 16 Ibiid. 7 Jobsand- for fw(Toronto: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993). 18 ApMail.19 1993. A9. ****73 penalties to be levied against the participants if no agreement was reached, reflecting the assumption that with the unions at the table an agreement was assured. This assumption was proven wrong when the unions walked away from the talks on June 3. The unions refused to agree to the government ' s final offer, which would have given employers the unilateral tight to revoke existing collective agreements to reach savings tatgets.lg In assdnq an agreement would be reached, the government had no alternative process in place on which to rely, and with having to release the 1993 budget soon after, legislation was the only solution. Despite the earlier desire for a brokered agreement, the NDP caucus was solidly behind Premier Rae's decision to legislate wage cuts. Their support went so far as to blame the unions exclusively for the failure of the talks-20 The government introduced Bill 48 on June 14, 1993. The bill reached final reading by July 7, and despite intense lobbying of backbench NDP M.P.P.s by labour, the bill passed and was proclaimed into law as the bEf (SCA).21 Sixty six of sixty nine NDP caucus membara voted for the bill.22 The ScA was to be in force for a three year period, and provide public sector employers with the tight to open collective agreements to unilaterally impose wage freezes and temporaty layoffs to achieve spending targets 33 The SCA ....74 imposed a deadline of August 1, 1993 fotthere to be umbrella agreements in eight sectors. The government declared these agreements were reached by the deadline, even though many unions were boycotting the talks.24 The SCA also provided an incentive fot unions and employers to negotiate their own local agreements and have these ratified by August 10, for if this deadline were reached than the savings target to be met would be reduced by twenty per cent.25 with this new incentive structure, almost every employer and union were able to reach individual agreements. The aftermath of the SCA8s passage is still being felt by the NDP and the Ontario labour movement. It is premature to conclude that an unbridgeable divide has arisen between the two groups. The OFL did cease to make its annual donation to the ONDP, and direct this money to the federal arm of the party instead, as did the Canadian Autoworkers union. 26 The OFL membership also voted at their November 1993 meeting to withhold support from the Ontario NDP, to defeat members of the NDP government, and to shift resources previously donated to the NDP to broad-based coalitions.27 This motion at the OPL meeting served to fracture the organization, with most major private sector unions (with the exclusion of the CAW) refusing to vote to remove support from the ONDP.28 The impact is still being felt by both the NDP
24 August 2 1993. A1 . 25- 25- Juiy31 1993. Al. 26 Ontario Federation of Labour. 'Repeal of Bill 48." Epfyg (February 9 1994) 1 . 27 Ontario Federation of Labour, "Labour and NDP at Cmssr~ads.~Epyy( (December 17 1993) 1. 28 Ibid. ... -75 and labour, and it is not yet possible to determine what its long term effects might be. It is enough to say at present that the SCA served to launch the labour and NDP relationship into a distinct new phase. The activities of labour and the government will be investigated to determine whether the relationship between the two was the dominant variable influencing the SCA outcome, or whether it was how labour found itself situated within the policy community surrounding matters of government spending.
Labour and the Social Contract
The Social Contract process exhibits a number of similazities with the LRA example. As with the LRA case, the input of labour organizations was actively sought by government, as a consultative exercise between government, labour and employers. There were therefore elements of corporatism present in each case. Yet labour was satisfied with the outcome of the LRA process and incensed with the Social Contract. An examination of the vaxiables relevant to a sectoral interest's ability to to be part of a policy community will reveal that the two cases possess more differences than similarities. In teme of the level of autonomy retained by the state, the Social Contract example was characterized by substantial state control of the proceedings. Whereas in the LRA process the government was content to allow the OFL and business the opportunity to set the early agenda, in the Social Contract .. ..76 the government, particularly Cabinet, controlled the situation from the beginning. Instead of a committee of individuals not aligned with the government providing suggestions, the Social Contract process was nm largely from the Premier's and Treasurer's offices. This reflects the highly politicized nature of the proceedings. In the Social Contract the government made government spending an issue from the 1991 budgets onwards, and by virtue of having their positions on record, the government's credibility would be at stake were it to retreat or alter its policies. In the LRA case, the OFL had opportunities to set forth its submissions to an audience which was well versed in the field, where the attentive public concerned with the issues was small. In questions of public finance, the numbers of interested parties was great, so that the government was unable to engage in any low-key discussions. Members of the labour movement were aware of the - political nature of the underlying causes leading to the Social Contract. Labour leaders simply disagreed with the conclusions reached by government. Patt of their dismay was directed towards the language and arguments coming from a government which claimed itself to be socially democratic in
nature. 29 Labour claimed that the government ' s insistence the deficit be kept at a figure of $10 billion was simply a political choice. It was a political decision, and its
29 An example of such a sentiment is expressed in the reaction of Jamt Solberg, a long time member of the NDP ancl labour supporter; megovernment's style]has let people down the most..l think you can't [sic] get elected by saying that you're going to be different and come out talking the same. And what I mean by talking the same is; deficit, deficit, deficit. Cutbacks. Control expendires. I mean this is the discourse of the nmsewative landscape. Why adopt it?" Walkom, nw259. ....77 importance lies in the fact the NDP was considering the reaction of those outside the labour movement. By this time in their mandate, the NDP had learned the lesson that their performance in economic matters crucially affected the attitudes of the electorate, and the investment community upon whom they had to rely for credit. As a matter of political survival the NDP was attempting to regain public support by showing its ability to control expenditures. The NDP was more concerned with the electoral impact of the Social Contract than with the effect this would have on one of the most prominent constituent elements of the party. As it was an issue closely tied to future NDP fortunes, the Premier and Cabinet kept diteet control over the process. The Social Contract was designed to cut costs, which reflected a government priority. The government was not solely engaged in considering the public interest, but also had its own interests in mind. The government was therefore unwilling to altet the agenda of reducing expenditures. In meetings between labour leaders and the Premier in early 1992, the Premier was asked if public servants were going to receive the two per cent wage increase called for in their collective agreements. The Premier responded by telling the labour movement to "Get reaLW3o Labour tried to offer alternative suggestions to =each the $2 billion savings target. It was suggested that the NDP should attack the federal government's policy of maintaining high interest rates rather than reduce the debt on the backs of public
30 Monahan. the Pi- 154. ....78 servants.31 There were calls to increase the taxation rate of corporations to acquire the sought after funds.32 The attitude of labour was succinctly expressed by Judy Darcy, the president of COPE, that "The government must continue to allow a reasonable level of deficit until the jobless recovery becomes a true economic recovery. "33 The key word in this statement is the word reasonable. The OFL and the government disagreed as to what this meant in terms of the deficit. The OFL was unable to persuade the government that their alternative proposals were credible. The government was convinced by the financial community and the Treasury department that a deficit of $17 billion was unsustainable, both econoxnically and politically. Since the process was instigated and controlled by the Premier, the credibility of the government was at stake. For labour leaders to publicly state that "We want to talk about our agenda, not their agenda,"34 and that they were interested in m...c'onstructive input but not if it would cut their members8 throats, "35 waa to display an inability to appreciate the government's resolve. Proposing a variety of alternative measures might have made labour leaders look good in the eyes of their members, but it was unlikely to prevent a government from fulfilling an agenda to which they were committed. Labour leaders effectively had to react to the
31 Ontario Federation of Labour. Fows. (June 2 1993). 2. 32 Ibid. 33 wh4 &dl5 1993, A4. 34 Quote of Fred Uphaw, then-president of OPSEU. April 6 1993. A5. 35 Quote of Judy Darcy, Ibid. ....79 government's agenda after it had been determined, much as employers had in the LRA case. While the government was sincere in hoping a negotiated settlement could be reached, the government's own actions made this unlikely, for it imparted a sense of urgency to the process. When labour chose to walk away from the negotiations they did what business interests had done in the LRA case; they left the government no room to manoeuvre. Once legislation was introduced the government committed itself to proceed, and the intensive lobbying of the NDP caucus by the OIL only sezved to solidify the NDP's resolve. As the de facto employer with which labour was negotiating, the government had recoutse to legislative authority to achieve its objectives . Labour, however, was reduced to simply being a advocate rather than a full participant. The weak organizational structure of the labour movement was put on vivid display in the Social Contract. Whereas in the LRA example there was a unity of interest in the OFL membership, the Social Contract revealed the differing aims present in the organization. The Social Contract was an exercise involving public sector unions. Private sector unions were concerned about the possibility of collective agreements being reopened aa a matter of principle, but the impact upon their members was minimal. This helps to explain the refusal of most major private sector unions to vote against supporting the NDP at the OFL convention following the passage of the Social Contract.36 The private sector
36 OlobaandMail. November 23 1993, A1, A7. ....80 unions had no reason to feel embittered towards the NDP. When the Premier claimed that a wage cut was preferable to the possible layoff of 40 000 wolrkers,37 the private sector unions could easily agree that job security outweighed slight material hardship, a8 layoffs, downsizings and factory closings were common events in their negotiations with business. The leader of the Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation, Liz Barkley, acknowledged this difference: "[private sectot unions] are very supportive of the NDP and until very recently have not really been concerned about the Social Contract."3e There was also some resentment towards the public sectot, as the private sector unions had been forced info wage concessions in many industries. There was the impression that many public servants, such as teachers, were spoiled and affluent and enjoyed benefits unavailable in the private sector. There was also some animosity between public sector unions, notably CUPE and OPSEU, who were in competition to represent public servants, and who had even raided each other's affiliates in the paet.39 This division in the OFLts membership weakened their ability to apply pressure to the government. What is more, the Social Contract divided the labour leadership from the rank and file of the unions comprising the OPL. The leaders might criticize the govetnment for its desire to cut spending, but union members are also taxpayers and have an interest in a
37 Ibid. 38 June 21 1993, A!, A2. 39 WaJkm.Rae 1135. ....81 government being as free of debt as possible. Obviously this interest would affect private sector workers more than their public sector counterparts. But there was also a division of interests within the public sector rank and file, for the Social Contract provisions were only to apply to those workers who were earning in excess of $30 000 per year. In light of these many differences, the lack of a concerted strategy for lobbying the government is mote easily undesstood, and explains the differing approaches of particular unions in the process. The structure of the OFL and its affiliates also weakened the effectiveness of the organization and prevented inclusion in the sub-government of the public finance policy community. As discussed earlier, the Om's leadership is not involved in the negotiation of particular collective agreements, as this is a function for each union local's own executive, who resist allowing others to interfere as this would deny the executive the ability to take credit for any negotiated gains. The Social Contract negotiations and the media's coverage of the event gave prominence to the statements of various union presidents. Special emphasis was given to reporting the comments of leaders such as Sid Ryan, Liz Batkley, Fred Upshaw, and Judy Datcy. Although these individuals were responsible for trying to organize a consistent strategy for the entire breadth of the unions involved in the process, they had no authority to bind any union local to a particular agreement or coutse of action. For example, Judy Darcy and Sid Ryan, national and Ontario ... .82 presidents of CUPE respectively, had to secure the agreement of all 700 COPE locals involved in the Social Contract talks for there to be a boycott of the procese.40 In cases where such an executive desired to directly challenge the NDP government over its priotity of cutting the deficit, nothing of substance could be accomplished if the Local executives favoured a more resenred approach. The natuxe of the OFLrs structure was also poorly suited for the actual Social Contract process. The government ' s decision to have centralized negotiations (at the OFL's urgings)41 created an atmosphere of confusion and spectacle that was not conducive to constructive bargaining. The basic problem with publicly held centralized bargaining was that it provided a ready-made spectacle for the media. 42 The media was drawn to the event for several reasons. It involved a matter of substantial public concern; it involved an emotionally charged, often overtired group of people who offered ripe possibilities for inflammatory sound bites; and it presented the political drama of a government engaged in conflict with one of its most loyal conetituencies. BY subjecting the negotiations to public scrutiny, the unions and the goverment virtually guaranteed that "hard
40 June 23 1993. A7. The reason is hat a union's amtitutlon gives the locak in the union the authority to bind the union, and not the provincial or national leadership. 41 Ehring and Robem, 324. The motivation for the ORto pursue this type of centralized negotiation was to ease the strain on the executives of the unions involved, who would be unable to keep abreast of developments in a decentralized process. As OPSEU had over 350 Wsinvolved, and CUP€ in excess of 700, the kgistia, of centralized bargaining make apparent sense. 42 Monahan, lhe Pink Pm180. .... 83 bargainingf843would emerge. The problem with such a process for the OPL and its unions is that it is in such negotiations that a union's leadership justifies its existence.44 As will be discussed below, the temptation to engage in self-serving rhetoric was great, and the potential for human emotions to interfere with reasoned argument arose as the result of such comments. The weak structure of the OFL provided for no means to put a halt to such behaviour, apart from personal appeals to desist from engaging in such actions. Another element of the Social Contract negotiations which prevented a unified response from the OFLfs members was the lack of any definitive procedure in the talks themselves. The government did not limit the scope of the negotiations solely to the wage reduction question. It is the nature of collective bargaining that unions will attempt to discuss every other issue in contention before broaching the subject of wage reductions or layoffs. The incentive for union locals to settle such issues in typical bargaining sessions is to avoid the economic hardship of being on strike or locked out by the employet.45 Until the govetnmant legislated the SCA the unions had no incentive to discuss such issues, or even remain at the talks. Once the statute gave employers the unilateral right to open collective agreements barring settlements by the August 1 deadline, unions had an
43 This tern refem to negotiations where both sides attempt to avoid tho appearance of any weakness in their bargaining posit&m. It is still possible to reach cumpromise in this scenario, but the length of time necessary is much greater than in negotiations where cortcessions are forthcoming. 44 Monahan, the- 100 45 Ibid., 182. .... 84 incentive. This was reinforced by the opportunity to reduce the savings targets by twenty pet cent if ratification of agreements occurred before August 10. ~achunion local was therefore free to operate independent of union executives. Decentralized negotiations and broad self-interests at this stage removed any incentive for grandstanding or hard bargaining. The combination of these weak organizational characteristics operated to prevent the OFL and its unions from engaging in anything other than a reactive role to the government's agenda. The divisions is the OFLVs membership between private and public sector unions, and the animosity in the public sector itself, when combined with the absence of a centlralized leadership capable of coordinating and binding its members, prevented the OFL from engaging in any activity other than policy advocacy. The media's reports of the Social Contract negotiations reveals an absence of any reference to the actions of the OFL leadership except in largely superficial roles. The references to the leaders of union executives and influential union locals was more prevalent, and reflects the greater prominence of the constituent elements of the OFL rather than the organization itself. Given such weak organizational characteristics, it would be difficult for any pressure group to engage in the activities of the sub-government in any policy community. An analysis of the relationship of the OFL to the government during the Social Contract process demonstrates a qualitative difference from the preexisting relationship. ....85 The linkages between the party and the labour movement existed unchanged, but in a much different context. Rather than being allies joined in opposition to business or govesnment, the two were adversaries. Despite Premier Rae's desire for an open discussion to achieve a negotiated settlement, a clear inequality in bargaining power existed. As the government's targets were revealed, labour Leaders awakened to the realization that the NDP, despite its initial reluctance, was as much an adversary to labour as any previous government. The NDP appeared to acknowledge the new facts of their relationship only nluctantly. The government repeatedly stressed their commitment to reaching their targets, yet they stated they had no will to legislate in the matter3 The NDP caucus had agreed to endorse the Premier's plan of a five per cent wage cut, but not if the cuts were imposed. The NDP seemed to be expecting labout to acquiesce, as opposition would politically harm the paEty they had spent so long supporting. If the Premier hoped for labour to help ease his debt burden and therefore raise his political approval rating, he fundamentally misunderstood the nature of a labour organization. Labour might choose to support the NDP because they are the party most congenial to the general interests of the labour movement. But the vezy raiaon d'etre of a union's existence is to best satisfy their members8 material interests. The political interests of the NDP might be of concern to elements of the labour movement, but they know full we11 that their continued existence as union
46 Ibid, 187. ....86 leaders is predicated upon their ability to defend their membersp interests. Were labout leaders to do otherwise they would be in breach of their statutory obligations to dutifully represent their mambetship. Labour therefore was prepared to call the NDP's bluff; either tha government would legislate a wage reduction or they would not. Either the party would be vilified by the membership, or the labour leadetahip would be rewarded for forestalling a wage reduction. Rational explanations do not account for the obvious emotional distress caused by the Social Contract. Even if various labou leaders took advantage of the media spotlight to engage in melodramatic condemnations of the government, the sheer volume of these statements suggests that laborv was genuinely surprised their political ally was asking them to make such a sacrifice. Shows of union solidarity were intended to u...send a strong message to Rae's government."47
. References to preferred outcomes were expressed in absolute terms; YWegre not going to tolerate job losses. We're not going to tolerate rollbacks.*4a The tactics of the NDP government were deacribed as "...economic terrorism."49 The depth of despair and enmity towards the NDP reached its peak after the introduction of legislation. A sampling of reactions: 'This no doubt will go down in the annals of histoty as being the greatest betrayal of workers in this
47 Fred Upshaw, April 5 1993, Al, A4. 48 Sid Ryan, Ibid. 49 April 5 1993, A4. ....87 province by any government of any stripe. "50 "It's no mystery, in two years you'll be histo~y.~51 "In terms of the life of this party, it means ceztain defeat at the polls this time around, there's no question about that."sz The basics of the government's defence to these accusations was to emphatically state again and again ".. .it is important for the government to be able to govern and for there to be a recognition of those respon~ibilities.~53The government was more concerned with the electorate's reaction than the OFL's.
The NDP and the Social Contract
The NDP government's decision to engage in a consultative process at the beginning of the Social Contract reflected the belief of Premier Rae that goals could always
be achieved through dialogue. 54 The government also was influenced by the belief that it could negotiate a deal with its traditional ally through a less confrontational process than had previous governments. The very decision to rely on consultation evidenced the hopes of the NDP to be able to trade off their special relationship with labourass Premier
Raefa opening comments at the Social Contract negotiations reflected hie hopes and the underlying motives for the so July 1 1993, AS. 51 July 8 1993, A1 , A2. This chorus was shouted in the Legislature visitors' gallery by labour actMsts 52 Sid Ryan, Ibid. 53 Premier Bob Rae, quoted in June 18 1993, A7. 54 Monahan, 165. 55 Ehring and Roberts. a a325. ....88 process; "1 say to my labour friends in this room: you asked for a dialogue and that is what we are offering. We are not acting by unilateral order or fiat. .. If we can save jobs through this process, it will be better for the public
service and better for the province. "56 The nature of the process reflected a confidence that a negotiated settlement could be accomplished which would satisfy both parties. The government hoped to utilise its special relations with labour, but it coerced labour to negotiate. The government made the deficit an issue of magnitude to the public quite explicitly. It was the desire of the premier ".. .to convince and persuade the public of Ontario that we have a public problem and we have to find a public solutf0n.~s7 By stating the issue was critical to the province as a whole, the government made it difficult for the unions to refuse to attend, for to do so would have allowed the government to portray such a refusal as intransigence and generate public support against the unions.sa Once the negotiations began, the relationship between the NDP and labour also influenced the government's negotiating strategy. With continuing references to their long time alliance with labour, the NDP exerted pressure on labour representatives to moderate the stridency of their demands.59 The Pramier continually stressed to labour that accepting pay cuts would engender public support foz labour
56-ApMail.161993,Al. 57 Premier Bob Rae, Ibid. 58 Ehring and Roberts. 325. 59- ApMail.16 1993, Al. by demonstrating a codtment to promote the social good of the province.60 The government also sought to secure labour's agreement by referring to the impact thaf failure in the negotiations would have upon the government. The NDP was assuming labour did actually care about the political fortunes of the government, and would agree that labour' s interests would be better served by the NDP remaining in power. In pressing labour tot concessions, the NDP could argue that it had to secure labour8s agreement to cute, for any other outcome would suggest to the public that the NDP had put labour ' s interests above those of the public ' s .61 The strategy of the government to have the Premier and Cabinet directly involved ensured that the government would not alter its objective of achieving its savings targets. Their participation also intensified public interest and media scrutiny, which acted to constrain the demands of Labour, since demands perceived as unrealistic would only serve to alienate the public and increase suppozt for the government.62 In spite of the govermentrs assumption of a continuing commitment, the attitude of labour towards the Social Contract was to consider it an exercise in political opportuniem by the NDP government. Labour leaders would likely have looked favourably upon the NDP improving its public approval rating had the impact of its choices been
60 Monahan, #, 165. 61 June 29 1993, A6. 62 Government negotiation often referred to the degree of public support for controlling the deficit, and for the use of wage cuts to achieve spending controls. Polling indicated 75 % of the public supported the government in the Social Contract. Globe June I8 1993, A7. .***90 imposed upon another constituency. The relationship between the NDP and labour did not prevent the government from seizing upon an oppottunity to advance their own political interests. When the labour movement began lobbying the NDP caucus to vote against Bill 48 their appeals could not convince party members to defeat legislation popular with their constituents. The Premier and his advisors believed they could act by legislation because the labour movement would come to recognise that on balance the NDP had accomplished much for labour in their mandate, notably the LRA, and that labour truly had no where else to go to find political allies.
Summary
The Social Contract was a part of the NDPOs larger reelection strategy. Rae and his advisors hoped that the Social Contract would show voters and the media that the party posaeesed the determination to be fiscally tough and to consider the interests of the province rather than any special interest such as labour. Any loss of support from traditional constituencies was to be regained in the later stages of the mandate through progressive measures such as welfare reform. But revenues in 1994 were $1.6 billion below projections.63 The government lacked the funds to implement the programs necessary to win back traditional allies or make new ones, and to spend money the province did not have would ....91 alienate whatever support the party gained by endeavouring to be fiscally responsible. The political dividend the SCA was supposed to provide never materialized, so the NDP expended considerable political resources for dubious gains. The intensity of the disappointment of labour and the NDP government were the result of dashed expectations. The labour movement expected that the goverrrment would eventually accept their alternative proposals to acquire the $2 billion in funds the Treasury said it needed. The frenzied lobbying of backbench NDP caucus members by labour reflects a belated realization that the matter might actually be resolved by legislation. The labour movement assumed that the caucus would refuse to open signed collective agreements and as a result they had no alternative in place upon which to rely when the the caucus rejected their appeals. Again this illustrates their reactive role in the process. As for the government, there seemed to be genuine optimism that the
. public sector unions would appreciate the gravity of the situation the govelrnment had placed itself in by incurring such a large deficit. When this optimism was dashed, the need for a quick resolution necessitated a legislated
solution. Another government ( such as the present Progressive Conservative government under Premier Barris) might have simply cho~ento cut transfer payments, and leave it to the various administrative bodies in the province to make the hard decisions as to where the cuts would be placed, thereby preserving the governmentrs political capital. Both labour and the NDP seemed to expect the best of one another, ....92 and they neglected to protect thenselves as they might have if the opponent was not also considered a friend. The labour movement was therefore unable to utilise its relationship with the NDP to achieve its desired policy outcome. Both the parties wanted the other to accept thei~ position but neither was prepared to offer any incentive for an agreement to be ~eachedshort of legislation. The OFL was therefore unable to do anything more than react to the government's agenda. As such, it exemplified the characteristics of a member of a policy community restricted to activities of policy advocacy, with effective participation denied. The thesis has applied a structural analysis to investigate the ability of a pressute group to influence policy outcomes. The pressure group in question, the OFL, has had a long term relationship with a political patty, the NDP. It was populalrly assumed the OFL would be able to obtain favoutable policies from the NDP when it formed the provincial government. To determine whether this assumption was valid, it was proposed to study the ability of the OFL to achieve its desired outcomes in two particular examples, the LRA reform process and the Social Contract. The theories of Paul Pross relating to pressure group behaviout suggest that such a pressure group's relations with a government must be considered in conjunction with the organizational development of the pressure group and the autonomy retained by the state in the particular instance. The entire dynamic of state and pressure group relations can be analysed in terms of the policy communities which develop around particular areas of interest to the state. It was the contention of this thesis that the inclusion or exclusion of the OPL from the policy communities at issue was the determining factor in the OFLrs ability to influence the policies implemented by the NDP government and the relationship which existed between the pressure group and the political party were only relevant to the processes implemented by the government. An examination of the historical relationship between the NDP and the labour movement revealed that the two group's .-..94 interests are dissimilar. The OFL is an organization designed to represent the interests of its msmbetship alone, namely the unions which are affiliated with it, and relatedly the matetial interests of these union membezrs. The labour movement does have political interests, but these are latgely tangential to its core interest of representing its members' material interests. By contrast, the NDP, as any political party must, has only political interests. This interest is to garner enough electoral support from the electorate to form a government. An investigation- of the history of the NDP reveals that this electoral focus was not initially prominent, and only developed aftet the party-was exposed to the competition of the political marketplace. The theories of Herbert Kitschelt describe the actions of the NDP as reflecting the goal of electoral competition, and as is the trend with many parties of the left, this goal supplanted the original objective of repreeenting the interests of the party's constituent members. This process of placing electoral fortunes ahead of constituent concerns is relevant as it led the party to favour those policies which would attract voter support rather than policies that would mainly benefit constituent elements of the party. As such a constituent element, labour cannot rely upon the party to satisfy its interests, and must fulfil this function itself. It is the argument of the thesis that the actions of the NDP in the Social Conttact example reflected this electoral fixation, as the interests of the labour movement were for a repeal of the legislation inttoduced. The relationship which ....95 existed between the NDP and the OFL could not be relied upon to avert this outcome, as the interests of the party were clearly opposed to those of the labour movement. The government retained significant autonomy over the proceas , thereby forestalling any attmpt by labour to tealise a different policy outcome. The relationship between labout and the NDP was also strained due to the weak associational characteei'stics of the labour movement. The OFL, as an organization devoted to - representing labour's interests in government forums such as the Burkett committee and the- -Ministry of Labour, is structured upon the premise that it has credibility in the policy community .of employment relations. In situations where this is not the case the differing interests of the member unions of the OFL prevent the adoption of cohesive and unified strategies of action. In the LRA refom process, the OFL and its members were united due to their: common interests . - in improving the regime of collective bargaining in the province. 1n the Social Contract this unity- .. of* - interest vanished, as €he"dfffering intareits of member unions weakened the ability of the organization to influence NDP membarrr to refuse to implement the Social Contract. The particular outcomes in the Social Contract and LRA examples were based more upon the organizational development of the OFL, and particularly the autonomy retained by the state in each instance. The relationship between the OFL and the NDP was relevant in that it tended to make government members mote likely to listen to OFL arguments. But the .A6 relationship did not control the actions of either the NDP or the OFL. This is why the OPL engaged in various lobbying efforts in the LRA process as if it had no relationship with the NDP. It also is why various labour unions bitterly criticiaed the NDP govetment in the press to try and motivate popular opinion against the government. Each group acted to protect its own interests when the time for final decisions neared. The NDP gooemmat's decision to amend the LRA on its sutface would appear to have been in the interests of the labour movement exclusively, but it came to reflect the interests of the government. In the face of such heavy opposition from the business lobby in the media, the government concluded that to back down would be an admission that it could be swayed by critical attacks. To appear as a party without any commitment to its own agenda would alienate the electorate, in that a vacillating government with no discernible policy focus cannot be relied upon. Rather than
. have the electotate develop the perception that the NDP wete without any fortitude the party chose to implement its reforms of the LRA process. The relationship between the two groups is significant in terms of pexeonnel, finances, and otganizational support. But this relationship teflects a habitual situation mote than a design to gain a desired outcome. The labour movement support8 the NDP due to their mutual history, and out of habit. The utility of the relationship is primaxily confined to the NDP providing an outlet for policy adwcacy favourable to labour's position on particular issues. Such an interest ....97 is not enough to justify unquestioned support of the party, and explains the choice of the labout movement to establish links with bxoad social movements. The core interests of the labour movement and the NDP have never been similar in nature, but this was only revealed when the NDP formed the government. It would seem that labour leaders implicitly realise this fact when they devote moze energy to remaining members of the sub-government in the policy community of employment relations than they do to solidifying the links between labour and the party. If Premier Rae and his advisors assumed that the labour movement had nowhere else to go in the political world their assumption was not accutate. The labour movement does not need to rely upon the NDP to achieve its objectives; the OFL for example, has the capacity to achieve certain objectives under its own auspices. The relationship that the OFL has with the NDP only provides more options it may utilise to achieve its own particular goals. Having a close relationship with the state is only one of the three variable8 which affect a pressure gtoup's ability to be a active membef of a policy community. The OFL throughout most of its history has not had such a relationship upon which to draw, and it has still been able to achieve many of its objectives. The organizational development the OFL possesses and the autonomy the state retains have had more influence upon the 0FL.s ability to achieve its goals than its relationship with the NDP, and it is submitted that this was demonstrated during the NDPfs term in office. ....98 The present disaffection between elements of the labour movement and the NDP needs to be the subject of futther study. Do those labour organizations still loyal to the NDP tealise they do not require the NDP to achieve its core interests? Can the NDP surtrive as a significant political party capable of attaining political office without labour's support? With the absence of Bob Rae ftom the party's leadership will labour support the EIDP? Will labour strive to establish linkages with other parties in Ontario? The decisions which will be made by the leaders of the OFL and the NDP must be further studied to answer these questions. Hopefully this effort can provide some guidance to those who shall conduct such research in future. bibliography
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