Identifying the opportunitiesfor, and hazards of, arms control in Akobo County, Jonglei State, southern Sudan, during the 'Interim Period9

by David G. Lochhead

B.A. McGiIl University

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

In

CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT

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Director, Dr. Gregory Cran, School of Peace and Conflict Management, Royal Roads University

ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY August, 2007

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"Ifa man with bare hands meets you on the road andyou have thegun- you are like a god to him. " (Akobo Trader, 2006) "Death has become monotonous to us here. You sleep withfear because ofthe gun. " (Akobo Peace Committee Member #6, 2006) " Ifthe gun is not withdrawnfrom the hands ofthepeople, death will not stop. " (Akobo Peace Committee Member #7, 2006)

"Central to conflict transformation is its challenge to the role which violenceplays in most cultures as the chosen means and arbiter ofconflict... " (Francis, 2002)

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Executive summary This action-oriented inquiry on the opportunities and hazards of arms control in Akobo County, Jonglei State, Sudan, is informed by both historical and field research and contains an analysis ofthe dynamics surrounding ongoing disarmament in the research area, within southern Sudan. It is intended to be descriptive, analytical and reflective. The study explores a number ofrelated issues that the author considers to be critical to a nuanced understanding of the potential impacts of disarmament on communities in the research area: the history ofNuer expansion; the history of firearms proliferation and use in the research area and their effects on an analysis ofNuer cultural transformation in response to colonization and competing governance structures; as well as the implications of disarmament for self-determination, state building and the 'rule of law'. The first chapter of the study is concerned with the presentation ofthe political and historical context for the inquiry. It covers the causes and effects of weapons proliferation within the context of Sudan's civil wars and weapons use amongst nomadic pastoralist communities in the Horn of Africa. It also provides an overview ofthe field research findings and contemporaneous disarmament activities. This chapter finishes with a discussion of some of the main themes affecting conflict in the research area and their reflection in the literature informing the research design and research questions. Chapter 2 describes the methodology for the field study component of the research and begins a deeper exploration of the literature. It then briefly touches on some ofthe assumptions and ethical issues associated with the research, before exploring the definitions and literature around the inter-related issues of 'small arms' and 'human security'. Chapter 3 begins the conflict analysis portion ofthe study, with an exploration of geographic, political, policy, cross-border, historical and identity aspects of the dynamics affecting disarmament and security decisions in the research area. It examines the sources of conflict, the effects of conflict and potential future scenarios. The chapter also touches on gendered aspects of evolving Nuer cultural norms surrounding violence. It provides an overview ofthe dynamics surrounding disarmament. A detailed stakeholder conflict analysis is attached as Appendix 5 (p. 132). The chapter finishes with an analysis Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards iv of the relationship between 'rule of law' concepts and programmes, state-building processes and disarmament. Chapter 4 provides an historical description and analysis ofthe pre-colonial period, colonial period, first and second civil wars as they affect and are affected by weapons proliferation and use in the research area. Chapter 5 contains the research findings from the formal field research component of the inquiry, with analysis ofthe two hypotheses ofthe study, relating to local opinions on disarmament opportunities and hazards and on the secondary hypothesis relating to trade and disarmament. This chapter also provides further detail on the forced disarmament which took place concurrently to the field research as well as a follow-up survey that describes some ofthe perverse impacts of disarmament on trade. Chapter 6 explores the role of the external actor in mediation and the evolving relation between the Nuer and foreign/outside governance systems. This chapter explores competing concepts of sovereignty, cultural change, violence and legitimacy from historical, anthropological and political philosophy perspectives. Chapter 7 provides a detailed account of post-research disarmament activities (aimed at reducing the violence surrounding ongoing disarmament campaigns by the GoSS) that were at least partly influenced by the field research and assesses the political and security impacts ofthese events on the community in light ofthe field research. Chapter 8 provides conclusions from the study. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards ?

Table of Contents

Chapter I - Introduction and Overview 1 Purpose of Study 2 Background for the Research Project 3 Project Context: Arms Control, self-determination, violence and identity 7 Overview of Inquiry 10 Questions Influencing the Research Project 16 Objectives ofthe Research Project - Deliverables Defined 16 The Research Question 17 Needs Assessment: Relevance ofthe Research Project 18 Contribution to the Field 18 Chapter II - Methodology 20 Field Research Methodology 20 Data or Information Sources 20 Assumptions, Limitations and Ethical Issues 23 Definition of Terms 24 Defining Security- Whose security matters? 28 Chapter III - Understanding the Causes and Drivers of Conflict and weapons proliferation in Jonglei and Eastern Upper Nile 3 1 Significance ofthe topic to the specific local context in Upper Nile/Jonglei states:.... 31 Cross-border and international dimensions to the conflicts 31 National Sources of conflict and conflict resolution efforts affecting the research area ...... 33 Post-War Opportunities and Challenges affecting disarmament decisions 33 Sources of conflict in Southern Sudan, threats to Peace and their effects on disarmament decisions 35 Policy Clarity Still Emerging 37 Potential effects on disarmament ofhigher order conflicts in Sudan 38 Local Sources of conflict 39 Water, grazing land and the control ofwomen's reproduction as a source of conflict 41 Overview of Dynamics surrounding disarmament 44 Notions of 'Law and Order' 45 Chapter IV - Understanding the historical dynamics of small arms and light weapons proliferation and use in Akobo County, Jonglei State 5 1 Historical acquisition and use of firearms amongst the Nuer: Firearms as a vector in cultural transformation 51 The Colonial Period 52 The First Civil War 53 The Second Civil War 54 Chapter V -Overview of Survey Findings 57 Methodology 57 Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards vi

Research Participants 57 Modifying the research instrument during the research Period 58 Preliminary Observations on Focus Groups and Interviews 58 Perceptions of security and insecurity 59 Patterns of weapons possession and use: The Contemporary Trade in and use ofArms and Ammunition: 60 Weapons and ammunition as commodities and socially significant objects 61 A Snapshot of the Human Cost 64 Existing Arms Control Measures 65 Formal Security Structures and Associated Dilemmas 67 Effects ofweapons proliferation on trade 69 Women, Weapons, Trade and Security 70 Weapons Facilitate Hunting and Gathering 71 Infrastructure and transportation corridors 72 Disarmament, Arms Control and the Implications for Trade 73 Mixed effects of disarmament on trade: A rapid post-disarmament follow up survey ...... 78 Chapter VI Understanding the dynamics of intervention 80 Traditional Mediation 80 Authority and state creation: cultural and legal transformation 81 Chapter VII— Post Field-Research Disarmament 91 Disarmament Building on Peace Processes and preliminary research findings 94 Effects of Disarmament 99 Murle Disarmament and Militia Absorption: Priority number one for the Lou Nuer community 104 Chapter VIII- Conclusions 107 Reference List Ill Appendix 1 [See p.3] 123 Appendix 2 [See p.6] 126 Appendix 3 [See p. 16] 130 Appendix 4 [See p.42] 131 Appendix 5 [See p.45] 132 Appendix 6 [See p.56] 142 Appendix 7 [See p.58] 143 Appendix 8 [See p.60] 149 Appendix 9 [See p.61] 150 Appendix 10 [Seep.98] 152 Appendix 11 [Seep.102] 154 Appendix 12 [Seep.104] 156 Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1

Chapter I - Introduction and Overview

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005) calls on the UN in Sudan to "assist in the establishment ofthe disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs ofwomen and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction". Article 14.6.5.15. ofthe Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), specifies that all illegally armed Sudanese are to be disarmed with monitoring, verification and support ofthe international community (the UN in this case). At the time of this writing, the new Government of South Sudan (appointed primarily from former SPLM structures and the leadership of those militia subsequently allied to the SPLM/A) does not have a regulatory framework on arms, ammunition and explosives in place and has already carried out or attempted both coercive and non-coercive disarmament in this legal vacuum, leading to significant loss of life in some instances and peaceful although grudging compliance in others. The CPA allows for power and wealth sharing, the creation of a government ofNational Unity, the creation of a sub-national but independent 'Government of Southern Sudan', as well as limited integration ofthe Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLA as 'Joint Integrated Units'. At the end of an 'Interim' 6 year period, the populations of southern Sudanese states and three 'Transitional Areas' between the 'North' and the 'South' will vote in a referendum on secession. Preparatory surveys and consultations at a community level in many areas of Sudan prior to the signing of the CPA had indicated that many southern Sudanese civilians (both inside Sudan and in refugee camps in neighbouring countries) consider the small arms problem to be a significant obstacle to real and lasting peace or development. (IGAD, 2001) In one example, during a 2002 USAID funded Peace and Conflict Mapping exercise in SPLM controlled areas of Southern Sudan, community stakeholders identified the following security and military related drivers of local conflict, inter alia: poor control over soldiers, destructive activities ofmilitias, the existence of irregular armed groups, marauding army deserters, proliferation and availability ofweapons, illegal possession and untrained use of weapons by civilians, cross border trading in arms and the use of landmines. This report also concluded that, ". . .protracted war has brought a Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 2 culture ofviolence and proliferation of arms which in turn is perpetuating more violence. The mapping exercise demonstrated the tragic impact decades ofwar is having on the general population: trauma, the breakdown of cultural values and norms and the effects ofbroken trust are widespread and are forming part ofthe culture ofwar that is underpinning many ofthe conflict situations assessed." (Sudan Peace Fund, December 2002) Similarly, post-CPA state-level planning exercises universally identified security as the primary challenge to the establishment of governance and subsequent provision of services and development. Many of the debates generated through the 'South-South dialogue' process organized under the auspices ofthe Moi International Institute, identified civilian disarmament as critical pre-conditions for development.1 Similarly, post-CPA state-level planning processes within 'Southern Sudan' have overwhelmingly identified security and civilian disarmament as high priorities for state governments and preconditions for development and the provision of services. Many communities have expressed the need for reciprocal or simultaneous disarmament of potentially threatening neighbours or armed groups. Most communities in the southern and transitional states of Sudan have been politicized by the broader conflict and militarized to a greater or lesser extent. Recent local-level consultations also suggest that civilians and GoSS civil authorities would like to examine ways and means of initiating arms control through non-coercive means, while formalizing security and rule of law and reserving the right ofthe state to carry out forcible disarmament when necessary as a security measure.

Purpose of Study This study will examine not only the negative effects that these weapons have had on communities, but also any positive roles they may have played. Most importantly, it will also examine the potential hazards of arms control interventions over the short and long terms in light ofthe local power dynamics, drivers for possession, levels and dangers ofpossession. In doing so, the author hopes to examine the central question ofwhether or not it is within the ability of local actors to address the drivers and negative manifestations of arms proliferation with existing resources and mechanisms, and consequently, whether there is any role for outside support to local efforts that will not create vulnerability, negatively alter local

1 The author, in the capacity of Small Arms Project Coordinator for the UNDDR unit, based in Nairobi, Kenya, attended two of these meetings as an international observer. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 3 conflict dynamics or otherwise negatively influence local, regional or state-level prospects for sustainable peace. Simply put, "What benefits and hazards are there to local solutions and to external support?" To this end, this study will ask those who could potentially face conditions of increased vulnerability as a result of disarmament within the research area, what they consider to be the minimum and optimal conditions under which arms control or disarmament could take place, if at all. It will also examine how power and conflict dynamics (be they local and personal or regional in scope) will affect choices and programming towards arms control, should broad stakeholder consultations suggest that this is a desirable and potentially achievable goal. As a piece of 'action research', this study was also conducted with a view to passing on the findings to relevant UN and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) authorities in order to minimize harm associated with disarmament during the interim period (until July 5, 201 1)2. The formal research questions and hypotheses are covered in the methodology section ofthis paper. [See Appendix 1 at p. 123 for a treatment ofreflective practice, ethical research and identity dilemmas associated with the research]

Background for the Research Project In the adjacent border areas of Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, sometimes referred to as the 'Karamoja cluster', the communities are largely pastoralist, state authority is weak and civilians possess military small arms and light weapons in abundance. In 2001 and 2002, 1 was able to travel in the border areas of all four countries, and to observe the final months ofwhat was then a non-coercive disarmament, taking place in Karamoja, Northeastern Uganda. The precariousness of conducting a civilian disarmament in an area where the state lacked sufficient control and civilians sufficient protection was apparent at that time and led to my interest in conducting research and designing programmes that would identify and meet the minimum conditions for safe and sustainable civilian disarmament, based on community inputs- to safely

2 Sudan gained independence on January 1st 1956 and experienced civil war between August 1955 and March 1972 and again between May 1983 and January 2005. The six month period immediately following the signing ofthe CPA on January 9th 2005 is referred to as the 'pre-interim period' and the following six years are referred to as the 'interim period' (see Part B, sections 2 and 2.2 ofthe Machakos Protocol) 3 Coercive disarmament began soon afterwards in Karamoja, and has continued intermittently to date. After the initial period ofvoluntary disarmament (which according to Ugandan Government sources netted some 8500 weapons), forced disarmament began in Feb 2002. In an effort to prevent Lords Resistance Army rebels from infiltrating through Karamoja and areas immediately to the South of Karamoja (Katakwi and Soroti), these weapons were reportedly re-distributed to civilians, which led within days to renewed cattle rustling and raiding of IDP populations in Katakwi by Karimojong 'warriors'. (Author's field notes, March-June 2002, Katakwi) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 4 reduce violent death and injury from small arms while providing an enabling environment for development and prosperity. The 2000 Nairobi Declaration, a political agreement between states ofthe 'Great Lakes and Horn of Africa', including Sudan, to establish minimum standards and inter-state cooperation for the control of small arms and light weapons, was transformed into a legally binding protocol between 1 1 state parties in 2004, promoting an emergent regional legal norm and minimum standard for national regulatory frameworks. State parties recently re-committed themselves to the ratification ofthe Protocol, which came into force in 2007. One agreed article within the Nairobi Protocol for regulating the civilian possession of firearms is a total prohibition on civilian possession of semi-automatic and fully automatic weapons,4 with clear implications for pastoralist communities in the sub-region. Within the Karamoja cluster, while disarmament has been attempted many times according to existing national legislation5 and state security prerogatives, this agreement now forms an additional and contemporary legal basis for the attempted disarmament ofpastoralists armed almost exclusively with 'military' weapons. Simultaneous disarmament amongst the four states comprising the Karamoja cluster, has been impossible because of insurgency, civil wars and weak states within Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. However, it has been the protracted civil conflict in Sudan, the fierce independence of pastoralist groups on all sides ofthese borders (including Kenya where state authority in the northern Districts is often contested by armed pastoralists), the proliferation of cross-border raiding and attacks by tribal militia and insurgent groups, the lack of state authority and governance inside Sudan, (coupled with the inaccessibility of the area owing to the use of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines) that has prevented concerted and complementary disarmament throughout the Karamoja cluster. Khadiagala (2003) offers an analysis ofthe potential for cross-border collaboration and the effects of past and disarmament attempts. Experiences from Kenya have suggested that, "Voluntary handover ofweapons, backed by pressure from elders working with peace committees, has been more productive than forced collection by security forces." (Walker, Ibrahim & Shuria, 2003)

4 While civilian semi-automatic hunting rifles do exist, the author has yet to see one in Africa. The overwhelming majority ofweapons being used by pastoralists being WW II and cold war era weapons designed for military use, i.e. to kill and wound human beings efficiently. 5 Often little modified from colonial era laws Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 5

A report of the neighbouring Kenyan National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons raises the complementary issue ofthe commercialization of cross-border cattle rustling- and the role of small arms in this parallel or black-market economy as a form of organized crime6 which is linked to many human rights abuses, observing that, ... cattle rustling is increasingly becoming a means ofgenerating income amongst the pastoralists, in the absence ofother economic activities. It was reported that a cross-border market in cattle exists, with raided livestock no longer supplementing local herds, but being driven straight to the market. It was also reported that these armed raids and other violent and armed activities are contributing to loss oflife, rape, displacement, property destruction and other human rights abuses. The presence ofsmall arms in these communities wasfurther observed to befuelling ethnic rivalries and conflict over scarce resources, and to be a severe impediment to development. This phenomenon is not confined to Kenya, but has a significant cross-border dimension involving clansfrom Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. (Government of Kenya, 2006)

The Jan 9, 2005 CPA between the ruling Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A began to alter this dynamic and the potential for future disarmament in the Karamoja cluster and adjacent areas. While arms, ammunitions and explosives laws and regulations have existed within Sudan since the colonial period7, the lack of effective and sustained government since independence, the massive influx of weapons during two civil wars as well as the deliberate and incidental armament of civilians has allowed for the collapse ofcompliance with any legal framework that once existed and for the re-emergence of patterns ofweapons possession that probably correspond more closely to pre-colonial ones (albeit with different types ofweapons) than to common international norms ofpossession. Between February and May 2001 the IGAD Partner's Forum carried out a participatory 'grassroots consultation' in 9 geographic cluster areas in Opposition controlled' (SPLM/A) areas of Sudan, to "contribute to the development of a more comprehensive planning framework for the establishment and consolidation of peace in Sudan." (IGAD, 2001) Among many other areas of concern, arms control and weapons proliferation related security issues were identified in all ofthe cluster areas. One of the communities that participated in this consultation process was the research area itself- Akobo town- although insecurity prevented meetings from taking place 6 For a further exploration ofthis theme, see Patrick Chabal & Jean Pascal Daloz. Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument. African Issues. International African Institute in Association with James Currey and Indiana University Press. 1999. 7 For detailed information on existing legislation see Catherine Flew and Angus Urquhart. Strengthening Small Arms Control: An audit of small arms control legislation in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. Saferworld and SaferAfrica. 2004. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 6 outside ofthe town itself. According to the final report resulting from this process, "Even the Meeting Trees are Perishing: Planningfor Peace in Sudan ", the participants of the Akobo consultation identified numerous "Perceived Opportunities and Threats to Peace". Amongst the Opportunities' identified, representatives included existing ethnic tolerance and a functioning traditional authority (chief structures and chiefs courts) with experience in local peace agreements. The 'Threats' to peace identified are indicative of the fragility of local conditions, however, and include the following: lack of services; lack of food, clean water and education; insufficient employment; a bad system of governance; bribery and corruption; no courts or police; lack of educated people, lack of information and communications (isolation and rumours causing conflict); proliferation of arms; local militias and groups not in favour ofpeace; disease; lack of fairness in the distribution of services and materials or foreign assistance. (IGAD, 2001, p. 1-9) In anticipation of, and based on draft provisions within the CPA, between September 2004 and November 2005 a planning process between the (former) GoS, SPLM/A and the UN to develop both a Disarmament demobilization and Re-integration (DDR) and an 'Arms Reduction and Control' (ARC) programme took place. However, the ARC programme faltered because of a lack of capacity and support within the UN system and institutional development problems within and between the UN agencies involved in the UNDDR unit (UNDP and UNDPKO), as well as institutional conflict within the nascent northern and southern Sudanese DDR institutions. The ARC programme was negotiated based on 'Do No Harm' principles, explicitly acknowledging the duty of care towards communities in an effort to build security without generating vulnerability. [See Appendix 2 at p. 126 for further detail on the rationale for a 'Do No Harm' approach as explained in the draft ARC programme document negotiated by the, South Sudan DDR Interim Authority, north Sudan DDR Interim Authority and UNDDR units].8

Had this programme been implemented as intended, it is possible that forced disarmament could have been avoided. Disaranamesit Opportunities and Hazards 7

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SSDDRC, UNDP, Akobo Women's Welfare Assoc, Nile Hope Development Forum and SPLA. Joint SPLM-UN team conducting preliminary assessment in Akobo in July 2005. At this point the SPLA pictured here are anticipating another militia attack (having experienced 4 such attacks on Akobo since the signing ofthe CPA). Project Context: Arms Control, self-determination, violence and identity This research project has emanated from the author's interest in and eight years ofwork on small arms control, which can itself be seen in the context of 'small arms and light weapons issues' as an emerging field of inquiry, advocacy, negotiation, as well as policy and programming development in international affairs and multilateral diplomacy. This 'field' has many progenitors and contributors. Included among these are the conventional arms control Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 8 movement; national and international gun control efforts and campaigns; longstanding domestic public security and public health approaches to firearms possession and use, emergent national and regional structures and regulatory frameworks; disarmament, demobilization and re- integration (DDR) theories and lessons learned, 'derived best practices' and efforts; post-conflict civilian arms control programmes; as well as the theoretical and lived application ofpolitical philosophy, deterrence, balance of power, 'human security' and development theories. This investigation is also a reflection of the author's personal interest in the cultural, legal and sociological transformation of armed pastoralist communities in the post-conflict environment; the gender and age roles and societal obligations for 'warriorship' and participation in blood feud mechanisms inherent in these communities; as well as the comparative and evolving conceptions of killing in society that have led to a condition described by Douglas Anglin as "the widespread acceptance of force as an appropriate dispute settlement procedure". (Anglin, 2003) In some sense the investigation of arms control options and hazards in this particular research area must necessarily contend with, explore and reflect upon many ofthe debates within the academic and 'grey' literature, as well as the government, NGO and civil society driven policy and 'field' programming foci. While civilian arms control in the Sudanese context is widely recognized as a precondition for the reconstruction (and in some cases the initial historical application and recognition) of civil authority or 'Government', clearly it is an effort fraught with challenges and dangers for all actors involved. While emerging norms of state practice and negotiated multilateral political agreements between state-level actors have (with a few notable exceptions), overwhelmingly supported the tight regulation of civilian ownership and use of small arms and light weapons by states, compliance and civilian responses to state regulation have not been nearly as unanimous or convinced. Some authors make the case that state attempts to control civilian possession of small arms encourages human rights violations against civilians, or even genocide. (Tartaro, 2004) State parties, and even civil society organizations, are also far from unanimous when it comes to proposed prohibitions on arms transfers to non-state armed groups- implicitly affirming and continuing the millennia-old dialogue around the existence of inalienable rights to resist tyrannical rule through force that is inherent and central to much western political philosophy discourse. (Hobbes, 1651) As the principal physical weapon ofthe poor, interventions and Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 9 policy promotion around small arms are necessarily part of a global political and philosophical discourse around 'security', state power and sovereignty on the one hand, cultural self- determination and individual and collective rights, freedoms and obligations on the other. This 'discussion' has always been and continues to be at the heart ofthe 'social contract'. (Rousseau, 1762) Equally important is the international, regional, national and local context ofthe research project. This subject should be seen through a number of historical, political and conflict lenses. Among the higher order considerations should be the inter-related and inter-dependent conflict systems ofthe Horn of Africa, Great lakes and Central African sub-regions; the politics ofthe Nile Basin (at least partially influenced by colonial era water treaties which are in the process of being re-negotiated); the historical legacy of Arab migrations, the slave trade, Ottoman, Ethiopian and Egyptian imperialism, European imperialism, anti-colonial struggles, the effects of de-colonization and post colonial domestic political dynamics, cold-war politics and proxy wars; natural resources as a driver of conflict and in particular the broader petroleum driven foreign policy agendas of major and minor powers involved in Sudan. However, a detailed analysis of all ofthese evolving historical dynamics would be well beyond the scope of this investigation and are covered by numerous political and historical works in great detail. Identity politics undoubtedly plays an important role in any reading of Sudan's conflicts and has historically been an important driver of conflict. Sudan's southern civil war can also be seen in the context of a re-emergent radical form ofpolitical Islam and the deliberate supportive developments of civilian militarization, through religiously indoctrinated paramilitary structures and religiously chauvinistic war-fighting methods justified according to narrow concepts of violent jihad. There has been a confluent pursuit of 'Islamisization' (religious, linguistic and cultural conversion and assimilation), resource extraction, asset stripping, forced displacement, agribusiness and attendant labour mobilization (Johnson, 2004)- in the pursuit and maintenance of elite northern Sudanese (Arab) privilege, political and military dominance by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and National Islamic Front (NIF), military, intelligence and religious actors and the political and economic disenfranchisement ofthe southern Sudanese peoples and territorial integrity of Sudan. De Wall suggests that, ". . .the practical experience of the NIF in government has demonstrated to the Sudanese Moslems to what extent the slogans of Islamification are false, for they resulted in the cruelest, harshest and most inhumane regime in Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 0 the 20 Century history of Sudan. Through its experience in government it has stained the name of Islam and portrayed it as inherently authoritarian and discriminative." (Ajawin & de Waal, 2002) This can be seen in contrast to dynamics created by the slave-raiding period. Deng, in War of Visions: Conflict ofIdentities in Sudan comments on an early opposing dynamic created by Arab penetration and slave raiding into the South during the 18th and 19th centuries: ". . .since the Arab Muslim was interested in the actual or potential value ofthe Negro as a slave, he did not desire to interact and integrate with him in the same manner as in the North. If the Negroes ofthe South had been converted to Islam, the Arabs could not have justified slave raids on them." (Deng, 1995)

Overview of Inquiry Deadly armed violence, insecurity and underdevelopment in eastern Upper Nile and Jonglei states, Sudan, is fuelled by unresolved inter-personal, local, national and regional political, ethnic, identity and resource-based conflicts and facilitated by the proliferation, trafficking in and 'civilian' use of military small arms and light weapons (primarily assault rifles and machineguns, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and hand grenades) and their ammunition. The challenges of creating security for communities, establishing the rule of law and asserting the state's authority and monopoly on the use of force in this area will be coincident with, and contingent on, efforts to peacefully resolve conflict, establish controls over arms and political boundaries and support non-violent livelihoods. Identifying the local linkage between arms possession, violence and livelihoods will also be important to an understanding ofthe implications of any proposed arms control measures during the interim period in Southern Sudan. Akobo County is located in the extreme eastern part ofthe Upper Nile Region of southern Sudan. It borders Pibor County to the South, Pochalla County to the southwest, Latjor County (formerly Nasser District) to the North and Diror County to the northwest. It shares a border with Ethiopia to the East. Numerous rivers flow through Akobo County (the Pibor, Gila, Geni, Akobo and Agvey), which has naturally attracted pastoralists competing for access over water and grazing points for their livestock, resulting in a gradual increase ofpopulation in Akobo, especially the Lou Nuer. As will be explored in further detail in this paper, Akobo has historically been an Anuak area and was conquered by the Lou Nuer in the late 19th and early Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 1

20th centuries. The original Anuak inhabitants were killed, displaced and assimilated by the Lou Nuer at that time. Some Anuak still reside in eastern parts of the County as do a few Anuak families within Akobo town itself at the time ofwriting- although these are mainly persons recently displaced from conflict with Ethiopian authorities to the East in the area surrounding Gambella. Akobo County consists of eight Payams. There are four Payams in the northeastern part of the county namely, Denjok, Burmath, Alale and Akobo Town. The southwestern part ofthe county contains the remaining Payams: Walgak, Derol, Bong and Burmath. The eastern and western Payams are 45 miles apart and are separated by an open uninhabited stretch of grassland, at least partly de-populated as a result ofMurle raiding. The western Payams suffer from lack of water and therefore suitable grazing land.

The Research Area: Eastern Akobo County Sudan f Ethiopia Cattle Camps on Gila River Pibor River

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Overview of findings At the end ofthe research period (March-May 2006), the author was in the unexpected position of being able to present some ofthe preliminary research findings to UN and GoSS stakeholders and advocate for the course of action recommended by the community who had participated in the research, through limited pilot programming in support of a locally driven disarmament process carried out jointly by civil authorities, chiefs as well as representative disarmament committees at the county, payam and village levels. Between November 2005 and June 2006 (before and throughout the research period), efforts to negotiate non-coercive arms control between the GoSS, State-level civil authorities, armed civilians ('white army') and militia elements in Jonglei and Eastern Upper Nile had collapsed and led to open violent conflict, loss of life, displacement, destruction of individual and communal property and asset stripping. 10 The advocacy efforts, based partially on the field research, were intended to reduce violence

For a detailed treatment ofthe disarmament, see Sudan Issue Brief, Human Security Baseline Assessment, Anatomy ofa civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: recent experiences and implications. Small Arms Survey, Geneva. November 2006. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 3 associated with a civilian disarmament that had begun almost by accident, at the initiation ofthe community itself. In effect, the full action research cycle ofreflecting-planning-acting and observing can be seen in this paper, although initially the author had intended to limit the inquiry to the field research period and the supporting literature and archival research materials. By presenting the background materials, the formal field research, descriptions and reflections upon subsequent events, as well as some personal reflections on some ethical aspects ofthe research process- as a package, the author believes that a richer, and hopefully more useful product has been realized. [See Appendix 3 at p. 130 for a description of the Action Research cycle, as used in this paper] This report will contain descriptive, analytical and reflective observations from the entire period between March-September 2006, and draws on previous relevant work and experiences in Sudan in 2001, 2004 and 2005. As a result, the author will present the findings in light ofboth initial hypotheses (tested and modified during the research) and subsequent observations made during and after the limited implementation ofprogramming designed to address the conditions described in the research. The author is currently involved in ongoing civilian disarmament in adjacent areas of South Sudan, the dynamics ofwhich are also relevant to this study, and which will also be referred to in a limited way in this study.

Major Research Hypotheses The two main hypotheses (see below for further elaboration): 1) that weapons holders and communities would prefer comprehensive approaches to disarmament incorporating peacebuilding, security and development; and, 2) that disarmament would have a beneficial impact on economic development- generated mixed results based on both the formal research and post-research events. While there was a near consensus between all ofthose interviewed as part of the research on the necessary and minimum conditions required to ensure a smooth, peaceful and sustainable disarmament (and this was eventually 'tested' by meeting a 'bare bones' version ofmost ofthese conditions during the pilot disarmament intervention), the effects on trade were mixed, with some perverse impacts immediately apparent after the disarmament, when the author conducted a rapid follow-up survey amongst Akobo traders, which is presented as a limited case study within this paper. Overall, however, disarmament provided an enabling environment for the Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 14 establishment of control by civil authorities, the return ofrefugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the opening up of regular river traffic and the movement of peoples between Akobo and the rest of Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as a massive influx oftrade goods, capital and traders. Overall, the disarmament that was eventually carried out barely conformed to the demands of the community that were identified during the initial field research: 1) for security guarantees, 2) for simultaneous disarmament; 3) for compensation for weapons; and, 4) to be disarmed by a neutral party. Armed 'white army'11 youth had also suggested during the research period that they would resist (with force) attempts to disarm them by force by the SPLA/GoSS. While the threat of forced disarmament (and the brutal example of how this would be carried out that had been set during forced disarmament by SPLA further West in Jonglei) certainly may have affected compliance and the decisions of chiefs to promote disarmament amongst their people, the initial research suggested that most community members supported general disarmament ofthe civilian population under the above conditions. Similarly, the application ofDianna Francis' 'People, Peace and Power' to the initial study, as an exploration of the opportunities for, and limits of, community derived and driven solutions to local conflict, brings mixed results. While this author's initial assumption, echoing Francis' main thrust, that inputs from both civil society representatives (including average community members, women's organizations, youth organizations, armed youth leaders, traders, church and peace committee representatives) as well as civil authorities, police and military (SPLA), would provide the best grounding for local interventions, higher level considerations, ongoing violence and outside influences affected how disarmament played out, as much as local concerns and locally stated minimum conditions. Perhaps given more time (eventual civilian disarmament was carried out rapidly under threat of forced disarmament by SPLA forces under Commander Peter Bol Kong) a peaceful civilian disarmament could have been carried out through peace committees and other community groups as a controlled and gradual process.

1 ' The 'white army' is a collective term for the cattle camp-based Nuer community militia, based primarily amongst the younger age sets ofthe Lou, Gawaar and Jikane Nuer. Young, (2007) suggests that, " Lacking any separate military structures, the cattle camp served as the nucleus ofthe white army. Initially the components ofthe white army were closely linked to the community and responsible to the traditional authorities who saw the youth as providing a highly valued service ofprotecting the community 's cattle. But increasingly powerpassedfrom the chiefs to the youthful leaders ofthe white army. While initially acknowledging the authority oftheirparamount chiefs, the youth grew increasingly independent ofthem and this seems due to their ability to acquire weapons without their sanction" Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 5

As it occurred in four weeks between mid-July and early August 2006, the disarmament yielded large numbers of high quality small and medium caliber weapons and explosives without violence. Supporting Francis' thesis, since the preliminary research results were used as a tool to advocate (amongst UN and Government of Southern Sudan officials), for a peaceful disarmament and these results were based on community consultations carried out during the field research, it can be argued that the voice of community stakeholders was heard and may have had an effect on high level decisions not to use force. This author contends that the research and advocacy did have an impact within UN circles and decisions to deploy assets in support of a peaceful disarmament. Assessing its impact on high-level GoSS decision-making relating to disarmament would require further study. The time ofwriting is characterized by the near collapse of peace agreements between the Lou Nuer, Dinka and Murle tribes within Jonglei, ongoing mistrust between nascent county and state government officials (corresponding to tribal rather than, and in spite of, politico-military affiliation), ongoing violent cattle raiding, economically motivated trade and security-related conflict drivers and the seeming re-emergence of militia elements opposed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This reinforces the importance of continuing to examine the dilemmas relating to cultural, ethical and physical security hazards identified in the research- that are explored in this paper. In support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) the UN and other international non-governmental actors have begun, and are actively participating in, a process of close engagement with both local and national authorities, as well as community stakeholders and traditional leaders, in a deliberate and conscious effort to maximize benefit and minimize harm associated with arms control and generally to introduce a package of interventions linking security, rule of law, arms control, youth mobilization and development along the lines ofthe comprehensive and interdependent elements for a successful disarmament described during the research. The process of state creation was once described by a professor of this writer in the following bleak but realistic terms: "State creation is like childbirth: It is painful, it is bloody and it is sometimes fatal."12 Nowhere in the author's experience is this more applicable than in Sudan, two and a half years into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

12 Professor John Shingler, former Professor of Political Science, McGiIl University, 1996 Disarmamenî Opportunities aedi Hazards 16

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Conducting a cholera assessment along the Pibor river. Note the assault rifle at the ready against the tukul (thatched hut) on the right

Questions Influencing the Research Project Planning for the research project was influenced by a number of questions. These included ethical questions as to whether and how best to engage in research and contend with communities experiencing violent conflict, how to engage with the emerging state and current or former non-state armed group actors including rebels, militia commanders, community self defense groups, many ofwhich may have been involved in crimes against civilian non- combatants and whose leaders are now in positions of authority within communities. In addition, the author must ask himself about the implications of engagement in light ofthe high probability of renewed higher-level conflict in southern Sudan. In effect, this paper aims to make a contribution to a broader study ofthese questions.

Objectives of the Research Project - Deliverables Defined The objective ofthis action research is to both review the literature and conduct field research to produce a report detailing local opinions on the hazards and opportunities associated with arms control in Akobo County. The findings ofthis research will be disseminated to relevant governmental and non-governmental agencies within Southern Sudan in order to advocate for arms control related programming designed to minimize harm and maximize benefit based on the concerns and recommendations of local stakeholders. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 7

The Research Question

The overall research question is: "What is the current need and local capacityfor arms control in Akobo County, Sudan, and what, ifany, are possible rolesfor external parties to become involved in supporting analysis, mediation and/or otherpractical measures identified by the community to manage conflict and enhance physical security through arms control during the interim period? "

Answering the research question above involves four main areas of inquiry: 1) identifying the nature, causes and scope ofpolitico-military, inter and intra-communal conflict in Akobo county and the surrounding area, and its effect on security, as well as understating the dynamics surrounding, and levels of, civilian weapons possession and use, 2) identifying and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of past and current conflict resolution mechanisms and efforts (both violent and non-violent) available through traditional, civil, legal and military mechanisms 3) soliciting the opinions of civilian community stakeholders as well as civil, police and military representatives to identify possible opportunities for and constraints to conflict management and arms control interventions by existing stakeholders (or potential neutral parties), based on local capacity and experience, evolving local political and military power relations and previous experiences in similar conflict contexts. 4) on the basis ofthis inquiry, identify factors that could play a role in supporting peacebuilding, reconciliation and arms control and offer recommendations for further action and support by appropriate actors. This inquiry will involve the use of interviews, surveys and a community consultation process as part ofthe proposed action research, to pose the following sub-questions: 1 . How has the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affected the target community? 2. What measures might be taken to address the negative (if any) impacts that these weapons have had on communities, families and individuals in southern Sudan? 3. What opportunities and risks are currently associated with these (current and potential future) measures? Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 8

Hypothesis 1: That communities would support an approach to civilian arms control or disarmament that integrates local peacebuilding, improved formal security and inter-communal confidence building measures, and that this approach is more likely to contribute to sustainable peace and recovery than coercive disarmament

Hypothesis 2: That there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between sustainable arms control efforts and economic development, where comprehensive approaches to community security and arms control reduces conflict allowing for increased trade and economic development, which makes non-violent livelihoods more attractive and creates further incentives for the consolidation and expansion of security.

Needs Assessment: Relevance of the Research Project Akobo County had been identified as a potential site for supporting civilian disarmament in mid 2005 by a joint team of UN and SPLM/A officials under the auspices ofthe UN and Sudanese Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme. However, no substantial conflict analysis was conducted at the time to assess the potential positive and negative impacts of any proposed initiatives, beyond a limited 2-day field assessment conducted in late July 2005. This research was conceived as an attempt to generate a deeper understanding ofthe opportunities for and hazards of any future arms-control related activities in this volatile border area.

Contribution to the Field It was initially hoped that this action-oriented research would focus attention on the need to comprehensively analyze the need for and potential impacts of any intervention contemplated by the international community and/or in partnership with Sudanese authorities or communities. It may, at the same time, offer insight into how the target community has been affected by the proliferation ofmodern weapons historically and contribute to our understanding ofthe scope of weapons possession and effects ofweapons use in Akobo contemporaneously, as well as attitudes towards disarmament and disarmament during the interim period in southern Sudan. The time lag between the field research being conducted and being written up as the MRP (now nearly 1 Vi years later)- and the coincidental emergence of a coercive disarmament campaign in adjacent areas meant that the information gathered during the formal research Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 19 period could not instantly be put towards the development of a comprehensive intervention along the lines ofthat recommended by the community. Some ofthe key findings ofthe field research, as relating to whether and how the community would prefer disarmament to take place, were, however, pivotal in advocacy efforts with the UN and GoSS, encouraging neutral participation in and political support for peaceful disarmament. As it played out, the research was put to use in order to encourage a more sophisticated understanding amongst UN actors of the local conflict dynamics and the potential impact of further disarmament carried out by force. At the time of research, the UN Mission in Sudan had no presence in Akobo County and extremely limited intelligence about local conflict dynamics surrounding the civilian disarmament and associated violence in central Jonglei. In the post- research period, this led the UN to provide operational support for a non-coercive disarmament organized by the Akobo County Commissioner, civil administration, chiefs and SPLA, as a way to reduce the harm that would likely be caused by an expansion of existing coercive disarmament. This urgent intervention (described in some detail in the section on post-research activities within this paper) was designed to save lives in the short term, to check the expansion of coercive disarmament by demonstrating an alternative peaceful approach and to build upon the commitments to peace and disarmament agreement reached by the Lou and Murle at Akobo in June 2006. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 20

Chapter II - Methodology

Field Research Methodology The research is intended to be action oriented and qualitative in nature. Janesick (1994) offers the following guidance on qualitative research design, perhaps all the more important to consider during action oriented research in a low-level conflict situation: Qualitative design is holistic. It looks at the largerpicture, the whole picture, and beings with a searchfor understanding ofthe whole. ..[it] looks at relationships within a system or culture. ..to the personal, face toface and immediate... [it] demands that the researcher stay in the setting over time [and] requires the researcher to become the research instrument... requires informed consent decisions and is responsive to ethical concerns. ..[and] ...incorporates roomfor description ofthe role ofthe researcher as well as description ofthe researcher 's own biases and ideologicalpreference. (Janesick, 1994) The field research component ofthis inquiry, through informed consent, identified and solicited information and opinions from all relevant community stakeholders, in order to identify the approaches to community security and arms control that do not create vulnerability or fuel conflict and that are most likely to contribute to sustainable peace, stability and development. The onsite research and analysis involved the following four components: 1) Identifying the stakeholders whose opinions would impact on, or be impacted by the implementation of community security and arms control interventions and travelling to relevant locations in order to interview community members; 2) Conducting in depth interviews with key community stakeholders/informants/officials; 3) Carrying out a survey (either individual or through a focus group depending on conditions) and making observations amongst these stakeholders to assess the dynamics of arms possession and optimal conditions for safe arms control efforts; and, 4) Development of limited supporting case studies (examples of illustrative or significant local dynamics) through direct observation of conditions and events in the field and anecdotal information.

Data or Information Sources The background literature necessary to inform this investigation included materials drawn from a number of fields and representing different approaches to understanding the local conflict context in Eastern Upper Nile and Jonglei states (and Akobo specifically): the development of action research methodologies relevant to a (post?) armed conflict context, 'Do No Harm' interventions and programming methodologies used by development organizations, conflict Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 2 1 resolution practitioners, humanitarian agencies, NGOs and the UN; Sudan specific conflict resolution/transformation literature, Nuer specific historical and ethnographic writing; planning and programming documents from UN and NGO sources; and, small arms literature of regional and local relevance. Literature on Participatory Action Research in post-conflict transition settings (Johannsen, 2000) and (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2000) and methodologies for analyzing the potential effects of engagement (conflict sensitive approaches to conducting research and engaging with communities in the areas of peacebuilding and reconciliation) (Anderson, 1999) (Nyang'oro, 2001) and (UNDP, 2002) focused attention on the duty of care towards communities involved in conflict-related research. The theoretical framework for this investigation was drawn from Dianna Francis's People, Peace and Power: Conflict Transformation in Action. Francis (2002) focuses on the role that ordinary people can play in conflict transformation in a situation such as that existing in the research site in the border area of Eastern Upper Nile and Jonglei states, Sudan and Gambella, Ethiopia: which are characterized by fractured and violent inter/intra-communal relationships, a fledgling civil society and weak, emerging or non-existent state institutions of law and order. Sudan Specific Literature and 'Grey' Literature relating to Sudan's civil wars: UN and NGO reports/assessments and conference reports relating to Sudanese post-conflict planning (Deng, 2003); conflict analysis (Government of Sudan, UNICEF & UNDP, 2003) (Johnson, 2004) and mediation (Al Zain, 2002) in Sudan; small arms research and planning and DD&R activities) (IGADa, 2001) (IGADb, 2001) and (Al Nour, 2004) were also used. These have include selected internal working documents developed by the UN, SPLM/A (2003) and Government of Sudan DDR Interim Authorities (Government of Sudan [GoS], Government of Southern Sudan [GoSS] & United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] a, 2005) and the small arms teams represented within these offices (UNDP b, 2005), as well as field mission reports and the author's field notes from this period (UNDP c, 2005). In addition, Nuer specific ethnographic, historical and political writings were sought out in order to generate a more nuanced and holistic understanding ofthe potential effects of armament and disarmament on local culture, identity, tradition, history and attitudes towards conflict and its transformation amongst the local population, (Evans-Pritchard, 1940) and (Evans-Pritchard, 1951) as well, conversely, as the potential impact of arms control and state building on the same. Micro- Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 22

Disarmament and DD&R specific literature, conference reports, assessments and best-practices guides (UNDPKO, 1999), (UN Integrated DDR Standards, 2006), (Pike, 1999) (Beasley, Buchanan and Muggah, 2003) were also reviewed. A variety of sources in the literature make the case for community-based demand reduction strategies (drawing the links between disarmament and development, weapons proliferation and child soldier recruitment and SALW proliferation and recurring cycles of violence among other themes).(Small Arms Survey [SAS], 2003) (Miller et al., 2002) (Mugumya, 2003) In a 2001 study, while war was still raging in Southern Sudan, a study was undertaken by the new Sudan Council of Churches and Pax Christi- Netherlands of a forced disarmament, ofthe civilian population by the SPLA, that took place in Cuibet, Rumbek and Yirol Counties in Bahr el Ghazal State. While distant from the research location, these counties and their inhabitants were faced with most ofthe same security dilemmas and challenges faced by the inhabitants of Akobo, and associated a number of problems with the proliferation of automatic weapons amongst the civilian population. These included an escalation ofhistorical conflict, an erosion oftraditional authority. The study also suggested that "Violence and conflict in and between the communities are historically part ofthe community interactions and traditional weapons mediated them. The introduction of firearms has caused a wide difference. The people have learnt ofthe dangers that the firearms poised [sic] in the community." (Nyaba, 2001) Importantly for the current research and echoing Diana Francis' thesis in People, Peace and Power, the 2001 report goes on to propose that, "This situation calls for a strategy for a sustainable, voluntary and participatory disarmament. The usual governmental, top-down approaches to issues of disarmament could be counter-productive...and fail to bring peace and stability. . .Only community-based solutions linked to dialogue and understanding between community leaders and elders...are the real feasible and sustainable solutions to the conflict and violence." (Nyaba, 2003) The study offered a number of recommendations in support of security, peacebuilding and community stabilization, many of which were echoed during the research in Akobo undertaken for this study. These include, social, economic, cultural, political, administrative and judicial measures: the restoration oftraditional leadership; the rehabilitation ofeducational infrastructure and the promotion of adult education and skills training; the establishment of Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 23 youth, women, farmer and trader self-help groups; a the use of local arts, culture and drama; and, the building of a responsible local civil administration and a separation ofmilitary and civil administrations. Further, the study recommended that, "The solutions to the community-based conflicts must of necessity be long-term self sustaining and participatory, address the underlying causes and must be people-owned. . .[and that]. . .The people should own the process and outsiders could only facilitate and provide resources to help the process [emphasis added]." (Nyaba, p.26, 2001) Other Sudanese authors have emphasized the impacts ofweapons proliferation on communities. Gakmar (2002) suggested that the militarization of communities, ". . .has far reaching implications throughout Sudanese culture and society. Young men and even children, who are brought up in a militarized environment will value commands and force, not discussion and compromise. Men will treat their wives and children as their military subordinates. There will be a low threshold for violence." (Gakmar, 2002)

Assumptions, Limitations and Ethical Issues This study was undertaken with the primary objective of reducing harm and maximizing benefit for any potential beneficiaries, subjects or participants becoming involved in arms control interventions in Southern Sudan. It takes as its starting point that there is a massive duty of care towards the participants taking part in the study, both during the research period and, as importantly, during any subsequent interventions based on the research. AU participants did so with informed consent about the role and identity ofthe researcher as well as the potential uses for the research. Indeed the author contends that the participants were particularly forthcoming in their engagement with the researcher precisely because they wanted their voices heard by authorities within the GoSS and UN systems and that disarmament was considered to be both imminent and potentially catastrophic for the community should it be undertaken by force. In a research area already experiencing high levels of inter-communal violence, the emphasis must necessarily be on developing strategies for reducing harm as well as ensuring that the research itself does not generate additional vulnerability. While eliminating violence associated with potential disarmament strategies used by Sudanese state and non-state actors is a goal ofthe research, the limitations of such action research must also be clearly stated. What is clear is that the GoSS and SPLA were going to disarm Akobo County within weeks ofthe end of the formal field research period at the end ofApril 2006. Massive loss of Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 24

life had resulted from fighting between the white army and the SPLA during disarmament to the West of Akobo and was moving eastward, scattering the white army in its path, towards the Sudan-Ethiopian border along the Pibor and Akobo rivers, at whose confluence Akobo sits. This disarmament was going to take place either by force by the SPLA (which the white army vowed to resist) or peacefully through the communities, neutral parties or both (as it happened). This research, and advocacy efforts based partially upon it, may have contributed to decisions by the UN and the GoSS to support a peaceful and participatory disarmament organized through the local civil authorities.

Definition of Terms

What are small arms and light weapons and why is it important to examine 'arms control' in the Sudanese context? Defining 'security'- whose security matters? As the primary tools of both offensive violence and self-defense in Sudan, civilian owned small arms and light weapons are an important vector for analyzing the potential for recovery and development during the 'Interim' six-year period, ending in 2011. While there is still no single internationally agreed definition of small arms and light weapons. The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the UN use the following definition:

Small arms and light weapons are man-portable weapons made or modified to military specificationsfor use as lethal instruments ofwar. Small arms are broadly categorized as those weapons intendedfor use by individual members ofarmed or securityforces. They include revolvers and self-loadingpistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and, light machine guns.

Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons intendedfor use by several members ofarmed or securityforces serving as a crew. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers ofanti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers ofanti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars ofcalibres less than 100 mm.

The Nairobi Protocol (2004), a regional, legally binding arms control instrument- to which Sudan is one of 1 1 state signatories, has adopted a wider definition of 'light weapons' which includes "howitzers...anti-aircraft weapons and launchers and air defence weapons".13

13 The full title ofthe Protocol is The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn ofAfrica. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 25

The term 'SALW control' refers to those activities, which, together, aim to reduce the human, social, economic and environmental impact ofuncontrolled SALW proliferation and possession. These activities comprise legislative and regulatory measures, SALW awareness and communications strategies (through public information campaigns, programmes or events), SALW control, collection and destruction activities, cross-border control issues, the management of information and SALW stockpile management. However, 'SALW control' and its constituent activities cannot be addressed in isolation, as there is significant overlap with complementary peacebuilding, humanitarian and developmental programmes, including with peacekeeping and Disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes focusing on formal combatants. Broadly speaking, all actors in Sudan's southern conflict—government, military, intelligence and paramilitary units, militias, armed opposition, SPLA guerrillas, foreign insurgency groups and proxy forces, predatory and opportunistic criminal armed groups as well as sedentary and nomadic civilians—have used small arms and light weapons (SALW) in pursuit oftheir political, economic, cultural, religious and security aims, including, of course, in actions justified by the perceived local 'self-defense' ofthese interests and identities. Sudanese men, women and children have been deeply affected by the use of SALW during past and ongoing conflicts, as the primary tools ofviolent change and self-defense. While few studies have been carried out in Sudan thus far, in similar conflict contexts the majority of SALW victims and users are unemployed, uneducated young men. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in addition to killing and injuring, SALW have been used to facilitate many other human rights violations and criminal acts in the Sudan, including rape, torture, abduction, coerced recruitment, kidnapping, theft, looting, forced displacement, forced marriage and extortion. Any cursory examination or experience of conditions in southern Sudan suggests that the impact of such violence on access to infrastructure, employment, healthcare, education, social welfare services and development has been profound. A comprehensive survey ofthe perceptions of humanitarian and development workers in 42 countries on the impacts of small arms on their work concluded that, ". . .small arms are ubiquitous and affect the quality and quantity of our work. . .and their unregulated availability and misuse constitute a menace to humanitarian access and protection, as well as formidable obstacles to human development." (Beasley, Buchanan & Muggah. 2003) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 26

While the scale of small arms proliferation is not documented for Sudan as a whole, limited recent field studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that civilian possession of military small arms is widespread, although ofvarying concentrations depending on local conditions, conflict dynamics, histories, traditions and opportunities. A small body ofhigh quality post-CPA research relating to disarmament is beginning to emerge through the Geneva based Small Arms Survey's Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) study14, which will contribute to a nuanced appreciation of dynamics surrounding weapons proliferation. There are a variety of armed actors (military, paramilitary, police and civilian) in the Sudan, who possess military weapons. Weapons and ammunition held by civilians have been acquired through a variety of means: including through distribution by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Popular Defence Forces (PDF) or 'Deffa Shabi', militia and SPLA; through supply by foreign governments in support of proxy forces; through the pooling of community assets in order to create community self-defence forces, tribal or clan-based militia or vigilante groups; through theft, desertion, individual purchases and barter; cross-border trafficking, raiding and banditry; and, as a result of abandoned stockpiles and battlefield losses. Given the combination of extreme poverty, overwhelming social wounds, emerging, untested government structures and nascent security structures- not to mention unresolved state and local level political and security issues- it is not difficult to understand how and why violence using SALW is likely to continue during the interim and post-interim periods. The Small Arms Survey, a Geneva -based small arms research and advocacy organization, has suggested that, "There is a growing body of evidence indicating that even a modest build-up of small arms can lead to disproportionately large increases in armed violence, conflict, and criminality." (SAS, 2001) Studies have suggested that, in similar post-conflict situations, those factors potentially contributing to increased violence, crime, or a return to conflict include: • a lack of economic opportunities for civilians and former combatants; • a thriving international illegal market through which guns can be sold; • poverty, economic stagnation and disease, as well as collapsed health and education services; • unequal access to rights, resources and markets;

14 For more information on the HSBA study, see www.smallarmssurvey.org Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 27

• severe damage to the social structure overall, particular damage to family and community cohesion; • a lack of government programmes and funds for support; and, • insufficient training and resources for police services and security forces, • lack of infrastructure and a legal system undergoing massive change.

SALW can continue to undermine efforts at peace and stability in Sudan long after major conflict has ended. Ifnot controlled, SALW will likely be: • maintained by some former combatants and civilians as their only source of security and income generation; • traded internally or internationally to a variety of armed insurgent groups; • sold to organised crime and other violent groups; and/or • hidden for future use in local conflict or ifwar begins again.

A UN study notes that, "The proliferation of small arms...affects the intensity and duration of violence and encourages militancy. . .a vicious circle in which insecurity leads to a higher demand for weapons." (UN, 1997) The rate of death by small arms may decrease only slightly following war, as compared to during the war. In fact, in some places, the casualty rate has actually increased during the "post conflict" phase. A failure to address the trauma and stress associated with war has led, in other situations, to increasing levels of alcohol and drug abuse, suicide with firearms (with attendant higher "success" rates than by other methods), armed domestic violence and the murder of intimate partners with firearms. Numerous studies have drawn the link between armed violence, small arms control and development. A recent review ofthese linkages reiterated that, A descending spiral can link thwarted development and armed violence, fed by small arms proliferation. In circumstances ofpervasive poverty or declining economic prospects, especially where these are combined with insecurity or lawlessness, the demandfor small arms grows. As the number of weapons increases, violence and its corrosive impact on development also increase, leading tofurther demandfor small arms. (Epps, 2007)

Following the signing of the CPA, the formation of the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), communities in the war affected areas face incredible obstacles to rehabilitation and reconciliation. Studies and anecdotal evidence suggests Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 28 that the prevalence of SALW can lead to a cultore of violence in the community, which "privilege^] violent solutions to peaceful ones; in which individuals seek recourse to physical protection rather than dialogue and reconciliation." (International Alert, 2004) In such an environment, respect for indigenous practices and traditional institutions may also decline. Military leaders may be glorified compared with civil and traditional authorities, religious leaders or elders. Revenge attacks and blood feuds carried out with SALW may perpetuate a climate of privatized justice in the face of weak institutions of law and order. Relationships in the home and community can also be distorted, particularly as traumatized former combatants, including child soldiers, return to their families. In such cases, sons no longer defer to fathers, gender relations may be affected and resorting to violence can become commonplace. In such situations, the easy availability of arms can make conflict more deadly and contribute to the rapid escalation of disputes. (International Alert, 2004) All of the dynamics noted above were identified in the research area.

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Evacuating wounded from Akobo during the research period. April 2006.

Defining Security- Whose security matters? Much has been written about the shifting or broadening conceptions of 'security' employed by governments and non-governmental actors since the end ofthe cold war. It is Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 29 important to define these concepts in the context of the discussion on how arms have affected and will continue to affect conflict, security and human development in Akobo County in order to better understand the benefits and hazards associated with disarmament. As part of an ongoing global political discourse, security has variously been conceived vis-à-vis threats from outside ofthe state, security from internal threats to state power or sovereignty and finally, as security from threats to communities and individual human lives and rights. This latter notion is often referred to as 'human security'. Ginwala (2003) proposes that, "Security between states remains a necessary condition for the security ofpeople, but national security is not sufficient to guarantee people's security. For that the state must provide various protections to its citizens. Individuals also require protection from the arbitrary power ofthe state, through the rule of law and emphasis on civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights." A further body of discussion has emerged on the nexus between concepts ofhuman security, human development and human rights. The United Nations Development Programme has embraced an evolving concept ofhuman development, which shifts away from GDP and measures ofproduction, towards one focused on the quality and richness of human lives. Amartya Sen (2003) suggests that, "Human security as an idea fruitfully supplements the expansionist perspective of human development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called 'downside risks' . . .insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily life. . .[and] . . . demands protection from these dangers and the empowerment of people so that they can cope with-and when possible overcome-these hazards." (Sen, 2003, p. 69) The linkage between state security and human security on the one hand, and security and disarmament on the other have been explored in the literature and are at the heart of the security dilemmas facing Akobo County and its inhabitants. Nathan (1998) further proposed that while there is a positive relationship between good governance, development and security- which is important to understand and qualify in the Sudanese context- focusing exclusively on disarmament in post-conflict contexts will not yield significant results unless the drivers of conflict are mitigated, structural problems addressed and democratic and effective government created. Nathan goes on to conclude that the complex, overlapping problems of heavily militarized post-conflict environments, such as exist in the Akobo context, can be overcome by, ...entrenching respectforpoliticalpluralism and human rights; accommodating ethnicity and otherforms ofdiversity; building the capacity ofstate departments and local authorities; and achieving some degree ofeconomic growth and equity. These measures, often referred to as 'post-conflictpeacebuilding ' are Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 30 the cardinal means ofpreventing crises and are therefore as much pre-crisis as much as post-crisis imperatives. The term post-conflict peacebuilding is also inapt since peacebuilding has everything to do with the ongoing management ofsocial andpolitical conflict through good-governance. (1998) In this section we have defined some ofthe terms used in this paper, examined the mostly negative impact ofweapons on the community and explored various concepts of security for vulnerable community stakeholders. Conflict analysis relating to the local, national and international dimensions of the conflicts and disarmament dilemmas facing the research area will be informed by a broad notion of security, including 'human security'. A concern for the effects of armament and disarmament on trade is meant to explore, even in a limited way, one impact of weapons on development. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 3 1

Chapter III - Understanding the Causes and Drivers of Conflict and weapons proliferation in Jonglei and Eastern Upper Nile

Significance of the topic to the specific local context in Upper Nile/Jonglei states: The areas ofEastern Upper Nile and Jonglei bordering the Gambella region of Ethiopia, where this research was carried out, have been deeply and negatively impacted by a series of overlapping violent conflicts linked to local, national and international political, identity, religious and economic factors. These conflicts have, over time, resulted in large-scale organized violence between armed groups, violence perpetrated by and against the state as well as violence directed against civilian populations; massive and repeated population displacement; continuing inter and intra-communal conflict; underdevelopment and competition over scarce natural resources; a breakdown in law and order; a contraction of state authority across large geographic areas: and, an associated proliferation of arms and armed Sudanese and foreign armed groups. It is possible to see many ofthese conflicts as part of overlapping and unfinished state building processes.

Cross-border and international dimensions to the conflicts Specific to the research area, violent contests have, until recently, taken place between Khartoum-backed militia (recruited from among sections ofthe Gajaak, Gajok, Lou and Anuak, Murle) and Nuer sections supporting the SPLA. Insurgent groups reported to be operating across the porous border between Ethiopia and Sudan in this area include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Gambella People's Liberation Movement (GPLM) and the Ethiopian Patriotic Democratic Front (EPDF). This border area has been a critical staging, logistics and operational base for the SPLA and former Anyanya insurgents fighting against successive regimes in Khartoum since 1955. 15 In line with and independent ofthe strategic, although shifting, cold war and post-cold war alliances between Sudanese, Ethiopian and Eritrean state level actors16, rebel groups and armed civilians have perpetuated and exacerbated relations based on power, coercion, ethnic

15 While the SPLA would historically fit the description of an insurgent group, representing one of the largest currently operating in the region in fact, it should currently be considered as the standing army of the Government of Southern Sudan. 16 And their international patrons and backers. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 32 chauvinism and violence. During the cold war, the U.S. has been an important ally ofthe Government of Sudan, with sources suggesting that after Israel and Egypt, Sudan was the largest recipient of U.S. aid, with, "a considerable proportion ofthis aid. . .procured by the Sudanese government in the form of advanced military training, weapons and ammunition." (Hutchinson, 1998) This support was ostensibly purpose ofthis support was to deter Libyan invasion and deter Soviet expansion from Ethiopia under the Marxist Dergue regime, "the bulk ofthese military supplies were subsequently unleashed against the civilian population ofthe South." (Hutchinson, 1998) Support by the Soviet Union and Cuba, through the Dergue (among other client states) to the SPLA, in the form of bases and military equipment and training and education, is a critical factor in the introduction of modern weapons in to the research area.17 (Kaplan, 2003) Similarly, SPLA battlefield capture ofweapons sold or donated to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) (by allied states for political and ideological reasons or according to purely economic motivations) and the subsequent distribution ofthese same weapons has contributed to a complete breakdown in state control over these military weapons in Southern Sudan and neighbouring areas. The current ethnic demographic composition of the research area, Akobo County in Jonglei State, is a product of 19th and 20th century conquest, expansion and assimilation, being mainly occupied by Lou Nuer and Anuak inhabitants at the present time. The contours of ethnic borders have at least partly been defined according to the historical patterns of acquisition and use of firearms and the application of force and firepower against rivals. These rivals, and their ethnically-based community self defense forces (in this case the 'White Army'), have also been used as proxy forces in the conflict between the NCP regime and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army and, most dramatically, between the Torit and Nasir factions ofthe SPLA which developed during the 1991 split in the SPLA. It would not be unreasonable to expect that these same actors will need to be involved in designing solutions to the security and resource dilemmas facing their constituencies, in order for peace, security and development to prevail. However, the challenge facing local and external parties wanting to support non-violent solutions is to avoid interventions that will create perverse and unintentional vulnerability, generate new or exacerbate existing tensions, or otherwise create

17 See Robert D. Kaplan's Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea for a realist treatment of cold war impacts on and militarized contest within the sub-region. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 33

conditions that could encourage or promote violence. It is equally clear that many actors still, or may in the future, have an interest in creating instability, generating violence and proliferating the tools of such violence in the research area.

National Sources of conflict and conflict resolution efforts affecting the research area The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 marks a critical juncture for Sudan and opportunity for the people of Southern Sudan in particular as the area, historically, most affected by Africa's longest running civil war. Since independence in 1956 Sudan has suffered from civil war for all but 1 1 years (1972-1983). Since 1983 there have been an estimated 2 million deaths attributable to the conflict (mostly from war-induced famine and disease), 4 million internally displaced people (attributed to the so-called North-South conflict as well as the SPLA split in 1991), in addition to the more recent 2 million IDPs caused by the situation in Darfur), and over half a million refugees in neighboring countries. (Von Habsburg and Lochhead, 2007) The prolonged conflict has left Southern Sudan with development conditions among the lowest to be found anywhere in the world, as measured by almost any indicator. The recently- completed Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) has provided a comprehensive review ofthe situation in Sudan, including separate data for Southern Sudan in many cases. This includes an overview ofthe conflict, status on the Millennium Development Goals, an assessment ofexisting capacity and the political-socio-economic situation generally.

Post-War Opportunities and Challenges affecting disarmament decisions The CPA also represents a real opportunity for the GoSS to put into practice its stated visions for bottom-up, responsive and democratic governance in Southern Sudan. However it also poses enormous challenges. The new GoSS will need time to establish itself and develop and implement policies and legislation, as well as build new capacities, systems and structures. The GoSS will also have to shift the governance 'culture' from a highly centrist-militarized administration into an open, representative and responsive civilian government. Nathan (1998) suggests that, The problem ofmilitarization in Africa is largely a consequence ofstructural conditions which constitute an intrastate crisis. Four structural conditions are central in this regard: authoritarian rule and abuse ofhuman rights andfreedoms; acute socio-economic deprivation and inequity; the exclusion ofminority or majority groupsfrom governance and economic opportunity because oftheir race, Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 34 ethnicity and religion; and weak states lacking the institutional capacity to manage normalpolitical and social conflict in a non-violent and consensual way.

Beyond these political, identity and rights issues, the GoSS will need to handle immense post war recovery challenges: the (re) construction of a devastated Southern Sudan, the return and reintegration of up to an estimated 3-4 million people in the first years following the CPA; the reintegration ofthousands of ex-combatants; the continued existence of militia groups in Southern Sudan; the reduction and control of small arms in the hands of civilians; the clearance of mines/UXOs with accompanying risk education; the establishment of basic rule of law and law enforcement; reconciliation between fractured and dislocated southern communities affected by generations of conflict; the establishment of basic services in all sectors and all areas; and, the management of a major increase in inflow of resources (including oil revenues and post war reconstruction funds from international donors and aid agencies). The JAM (2004) recognized that "easy access to weapons and the proliferation of small arms have contributed to increasingly violent and entrenched clashes" and committed the new national authorities, among other objectives and actions, to "exerting maximum efforts to create and spread a culture of peace that creates stability and effectively minimizes the possibility of future conflicts". Findings ofthe JAM highlighted that ...demilitarization ofareas ofreturn is a necessaryprecondition, as is the training ofcivil authorities in the promotion andprotection ofhuman rightsfor all. Recovery programmes can address the proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons by encouraging community involvement in and responsibilityfor disarmament... The objective ofthe arms control component ofthe DDR will be to limit the negative effects ofsmall arms and light weapons proliferation and misuse on the health, safety, rights and lives ofthe Sudanese and on the development ofSudanese communities, families and individuals... (JAM, 2004. p. 230-245)

The legacy of 40 years of civil war in Southern Sudan since independence in 1956 has been a significant influx ofweapons, light and heavy, both through the direct conflict of the two former antagonists, GoS and SPLA as well as through neighbouring countries to meet individual and/or community needs for protection from other neighbouring communities against aggression, cattle theft and/or other perceived threats. The militarisation of societies in Southern Sudan became a feature of the 1983 - 2005 conflict, characterized by the widespread induction/forcing of civilians into the conflict by both of the main parties to the conflict as well as by other armed groups. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 35

In addition to deliberate and incidental Islamisization processes, the penetration of Christianity, through missionary organizations during the colonial and post-colonial periods, has had an equally dramatic effect and as well as being negatively associated with cultural transformation and the alteration of societal power relationships, Deng (1995, p.205) suggests that, "traditional identity and Christian Western influence have combined to consolidate and strengthen a modern southern identity ofresistance against Islamization and Arabization." The political mobilization carried out by the SPLA/M during the conflict contributed to a heightened awareness by southern civilian populations of the political background to the conflict and served to build a militant and later militarized society. The current situation- 2 Vz years into the 6-year Interim Period ofthe CPA (which, it bears repeating, will culminate in a referendum on secession for Southern Sudan)- continues to generate a general sense of uncertainty, anxiety and fear ofwhat the future holds for many civilians. Many have found security in keeping their weapons, citing continuing localized insecurity as well as serious impediments to the implementation ofthe CPA, while others feel that by keeping weapons problems of insecurity may deepen. Here we see the confluence of national and local security dilemmas.

Sources of conflict in Southern Sudan, threats to Peace and their effects on disarmament decisions Southern Sudan has seen a considerable amount of ongoing insecurity since the signing ofthe CPA and throughout the research period, with the continued existence and influence of militia groups, technically defined within the CPA as 'Other Armed Groups' (OAGs), which have, contrary to the CPA, committed themselves neither to SAP nor to SPLA. Their indecision and delay, coupled with longstanding mistrust between former adversaries (both groups and individuals), has created the potential for conflict in areas where different armed groups exist alongside communities in both rural and urban areas. Ongoing insecurity, comprised in part of inter and intra-community clashes as well as the initiation of a disarmament campaigns by GoSS/SPLA in various parts of Southern Sudan, including parts of Jonglei, Warrap, Unity and Lakes States have, in some cases, met with resistance from communities and led to significant loss of life and injury during the first half of 2006, and to burning and looting ofproperty, including, for example, tens ofthousands of heads of cattle in Jonglei State. This was significant as it resulted in continued and serious violence as Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 36 well as a political backlash within Southern Sudan against political actors accused of supporting coercive disarmament. The contours of conflicts within Southern Sudan are complex and not only State specific, but also extend beyond the boundaries of Southern Sudan into Northern Sudan and neighbouring countries. There are four broad elements, all ofwhich interlink: • Clan and community-based conflicts over cattle, marriage disputes, borders and natural resources; • Political conflicts including those stemming from the continued existence of OAGs that have not participated in the Juba Declaration18 and remain resistant to GoSS policies; • Latent conflict between the two CPA implementing partners, NCP and SPLM, over implementation ofthe CPA, including the use of proxy groups such as OAGs for destabilization of Southern Sudan; and, • Conflicts around oil (including access to and/or control over oil resources).

Because ofthe complex and interlocking nature ofthe conflict, there are strong risks of the security situation spiraling out of control. Violence such as the recent outbreak of fighting in Malakal19 indicates that the risks outlined above, where they overlap, could destabilize the peace. The current reorganization of the SPLA, as Southern Sudan's army, and ofthe Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), as well as the Southern Sudanese Police structures (which is at a very basic stage and whose organization is as yet un-established) leave a serious vacuum. Deep-rooted poverty, stemming from poor governance, marginalization and decades of war, coupled with the current slow delivery of peace dividends is providing an environment rife for conflict. Given such threats to peace and stability, and recognizing that the basic fabric ofthe CPA is under threat, the GoSS is itself deeply concerned. The existence of a large number of

Declaration signed between SPLA and SSDF on 8 January 2006 catalyzing fragmentation of SSDF (Paulino Matip becoming Deputy Commander-in-Chief of SPLA and Gordon Kong leading an SSDF remnant based out ofNassir) and leading to merging of significant number of SSDF combatants into SPLA and setting of deadline ofMarch 2006 for remaining OAGs to join either SAF or SPLA- a number of OAGs remain uncommitted currently 19 Fighting broke out in December 2006 in Malakal between SPLA forces and SSDF militia forces (part of an ongoing politico-military conflict between the two groups) that rapidly spread to involve the SAF, resulting in the use oftanks and artillery, leaving over 150 dead, several hundred wounded and causing widespread destruction and looting Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 37 small arms within Southern Sudan underscores the urgency of developing programmes to address the insecurity generated by these weapons, while ensuring the security of communities and reducing, as much as possible the negative effects of a 'Statebuilding' process- in cultural, legal and sociological terms. Consultation meetings on these issues, involving the UN, the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and the Minister of Interior (MoI) and the GoSS President and Vice President seem to have produced agreement that peace and development will depend largely on the ability to conduct a successful arms reduction and control exercise in Southern Sudan. All groups to the conflicts state clearly that they wish to disarm, but are emphatic that they will not do so unless other groups also disarm and unless they have security and development guarantees, as the research in Akobo has suggested. The need to turn away from the use of guns and a militarized style of living to securing alternate livelihoods and long term peace and development, as well as the continued existence of militias, have acted as a trigger to encourage dialogue between GoSS and communities. As part ofthis dialogue, communities are seeking to establish a vision for their future- one which provides a secure environment for future generations. This dialogue includes the need for Local Government and other institutions such as Police to seek solutions that would convince civilians to hand in their weapons and seek out non-violent livelihoods.

Policy Clarity Still Emerging As the research suggests, the GoSS faces many complex policy issues, not least ofwhich are those around security and arms control. The lack of an agreed policy and legal framework on small arms reduction leaves a dangerous vacuum. Recent consultations under the "Community Security and Arms Control Core Group" in September 2006 led to a common understanding of the concept among GoSS actors, as well as providing a common platform for coordination. More significantly, the recent workshop held by GoSS in Juba on "Community Security and Arms Control Policy"20 identified key principles, guidelines and actions for GoSS and other actors, thus forming the first step in a policy dialogue within Southern Sudan. GoSS has committed itself to moving ahead with this process, specifically recognizing that the provision of 20 The GoSS "Community Security and Arms Control Policy" workshop, facilitated by Saferworld and UNDP, was co-chaired by the Vice President of GoSS and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission Chairperson on 26 - 27 February 2007 in Juba and included members of the GoSS cabinet, Office ofthe Presidency, SPLA, Police, Peace Commission as well as observers from the international community Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 38

'human security' is paramount for peace and development in Southern Sudan and that community security contributes to the process21.

Potential effects on disarmament of higher order conflicts in Sudan During the implementation of any programming building upon field research, there are strong risks and threats relating to the higher -level conflicts within Sudan that exist and could impact on arms control efforts. These should not be ignored in any analysis of factors affecting decisions to arm or disarm, and include a variety ofcontingencies: 1) Lack of implementation ofthe CPA leads to a breakdown in NCP-SPLM relationships and creates an outbreak of hostilities, in particular along the 1-1-1956 border line, within the oil producing areas and in areas hosting Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of the SAF and SPLA. General de-stabilization would affect confidence in the GoSS and community level decisions to arm or disarm. The recent failure, as ofJuly 9th, 2007, ofthe SAF to withdraw their forces according to the CPA mandated timetable is a worrying indicator in this regard. 2) The conflict in Darfur spills over into Greater Bahr El Ghazal. Movement of IDPs into neighbouring Southern Sudan States, and possible use of Southern Sudanese soil by Darfurian rebel movements leads SAF to launch attacks against their bases. This would lead to political and military destabilization within the North/South border area and have broader political impact within Sudan, with predictable impacts on weapons holdings. 3) The continued existence of militias or OAGs in Greater Upper Nile area and other parts of Southern Sudan leads to an intensification of conflict with GoSS/SPLA. Communities, divided in their interests, provide support to both sides and are drawn into the conflict. This will further underscore the ethnic fault lines in existence between Dinka, Nuer, Murle and other groups, and is likely to be exploited by politicians and/or signatories to the CPA, possibly leading to open warfare. Additionally, disarmament and reintegration of OAGs, or equally their lack of

21 Principles included "Establishing community security is a building block for development, democracy and good governance and these are fundamental duties ofthe Government of Southern Sudan" and "Community security is built from the premise of human security" Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 39

integration, could lead to serious tensions and outbreaks of violence, further fracturing of OAGs and alternative, opposed leadership with differing interests. 4) Tensions between or within the southern states and/or neighbouring nation states leads to a breakdown in cooperation and open conflict. These fractures could lead to further political destabilization within the GoSS. 5) Inter or Intra-State community-based conflicts over grazing, water etc. leads to political tensions and growing fault lines between political blocks, resulting in open conflict within or between States.

6) Existing tensions between communities on the international border-lines increase and are heightened over border demarcation, resources, economic and trade or political interests and could lead opposing communities or opposition groups to clash. 7) New civil authorities and traditional authorities rely exclusively on wartime relationships and former alliances (and potential future military power-bases) along ethnic lines and are unable to build trust amongst neighbours and support for the GoSS. This contributes to insecurity or makes the generation of security, and hence peaceful disarmament, impossible- leading to a renewal of forced disarmament campaigns by the SPLA.

Local Sources of conflict During the research period, the following were identified by community members as resulting from the widespread proliferation of small arms amongst civilians: clan fighting, theft, domestic violence and looting. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) Additionally, the existence or presence ofthe weapon itself was suggested on numerous occasions as a cause of violence, as individuals could be attacked in order to steal their weapons. The overall effect of armed violence on the community was often stated in stark terms, including the typical statement that, "The war has turned Akobo back to zero". (Author's field notes. Akobo Peace Committee. Akobo. April 10, 2006.) The same local actors and community members identified the following as being the proximate causes of incidents involving injury from small arms: previous affiliation with militia groups, drunkenness, lack of proper training with weapons handling, competition over women, Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 40 poor relations between the community and civil authorities. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) Specifically, the Akobo Peace Committee listed the following sources of violent conflict between Lou and 'outside' actors: Lou and Murle; Lou and Jikane; Lou and Gagwong and Gajak; Lou and Anuak; as well as, conflict with Ethiopian authorities across the border. These were recurring themes during mixed focus groups with community members. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) While rarely referring specifically to the higher order causes of conflict, when they were mentioned it was usually in reference to local actors willingly used as proxy forces by the NCP regime in Khartoum, since the 'local' actors are usually the ones with which local militia, armed civilians or the SPLA have had to contend militarily. While at the time ofwriting, the white army in central Lou territory were only weeks from defeat by the SPLA 'disarmament forces', and local stakeholder suggested for example that, "Arab hands are still in Pibor and that is why they [Murle] are still proud"22 (Author's field notes. Peace Committee Member # 3. Akobo. April 2006.) The creation and use of the 'white army' as a proxy force by the Nasir faction of the SPLA, where the youth ofthe cattle camps were the end recipients ofweapons coming from Khartoum, further altered local power dynamics and injected considerable modern weaponry into the Lou Nuer community. Young (2007), in a recent preliminary study ofthe white army, cites sources claiming that some 10,000 weapons were distributed through the Nasir faction and that these weapons were held by the recipients to be necessary to protect community owned cattle from the SPLA and against traditional enemies like the Murle cattle rustlers (Young, 2007) migrating and raiding from Pibor County to the South (even though the Murle were similarly backed by the SAF as an anti-SPLA proxy force- making NCP/SAF 'divide and rule' strategies all the more transparent). According to Young, the weapons were also used in intra-Nuer conflicts between the Lou Nuer of central Upper Nile and the Gajok, Gagwong and Gajak

22 The 'Arab' Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) garrison was finally withdrawn from Pibor town in April 2007 in a state of drunken disorder witnessed by the author, although many believe that these northern forces, their intelligence apparatus and local 'agents' are still involved in collecting intelligence and/or supplying splinter groups ofthe Murle militia (aka the Pibor Defense Forces or PDF) who did not join the SPLA alongside paramount chief and PDF commander Ismael Konye- and who are reportedly responsible for creating insecurity in neighbouring areas within Jonglei and neighbouring areas of Ethiopia. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 41 sections of the Jikane Nuer during the seasonal migration oftheir cattle to the grazing lands and inter-connected waters ofthe Sobat, Baro and Gila and Pibor River systems. (Young, 2007) The segmentary sectional structure ofthe Nuer, along which the white army are created, and well developed concepts of collective action are also important for understanding offensive raiding and conquest by the Nuer according to Raymond Kelly (1985)- and should in fact be considered as an important source ofNuer strength and 'success' as a cultural and political group. Duany (1992) suggests that, "The Nuer have learned to defend themselves using militias. Militias are the feasible way in a society, where the hierarchy that is used by many societies to organize defense, is incompatible with acephalous ordering."

Water, grazing land and the control of women's reproduction as a source of conflict The historical record shows that firearms and the desire for grazing and water resources have contributed to, and amplified the ability ofwarriors to capture the reproductive capacity in young female captives. This pattern continues today in the research area, especially during Murle raids against the Nuer, where children reportedly continue to be abducted. The increase and codification of bride prices and compensation rates (in an effort to create a standardized penal code) by the Colonial officials, through nguot Fangak may also have altered local dynamics to this end, although raiding, abduction, capture of reproductive females and assimilation appear to have been the norm. A study by the Sudan Peace Fund (2002), which focused among other areas on Pibor, Akobo and Bor, identified a variety of sources of conflict in the area: non-politicized ethnic clashes over economic and environmental resources; the failure of governance systems to implement and/or enforce laws either equitable or at all; regional cattle raiding and inter-ethnic conflict; inter-clan conflict and the abduction of children; as well as ethnic clashes based on political affiliation and the results ofthe 1991 split in the SPLA. During the research period, the compensation rates for homicide seemed to represent a hybrid between fixed rates, modified according to local concepts of fair price based at least partly on reproductive concerns. Contemporary bride prices are often identified as a source of conflict, requiring raiding to meet high dowry rates. In this sense, the expansionist system ofthe Nuer both represents and creates a self-generating need for securing pasture, water and reproductive females. Beswick (2004) explores the theme of lineage slavery, quoting Dinka elder, Philip Thon Marol: Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 42

There has been a lot ofraidingfor greed. It has always been important to show we are good warriors and when you are strong you go and rob the weak. It was theformulafor those days and everybody did it. Ifyou defeated another clan you took their cows and women. We took the women to become wives while young girls could be married to other men and bring more cows [through dowry]. Small boys could raidfor more cattle. Beswick, goes on, referring to the work ofJohn Lovejoy on pastoral practices that he describes as 'lineage slavery', where, "women and children abducted in raids are forcibly cut off from kin and the property element, the alien identity, the role ofviolence and the productive and sexual exploitation of human beings is always present in pastoral raiding systems". (Beswick, 2004) Kelly (1985) suggests that direct mortality from the Nuer conquest ofneighbouring Dinka and Anuak had a negligible impact on their longer-term population growth, but that the capture and assimilation of reproductive women did have a very significant one. This is a consequence ofthe distinctive age and sex distribution ofcasualties and captives, respectively. Most ofthe individuals killed in Nuer raids were men and older women while most ofthe captured were young women and girls. The loss ofmales andpost-reproductivefemales would not significantly affect the birthrate, as the latter would already have produced their demographic replacements while the wives oftheformer would continue to bear children after their remarriage to other men... The capture ofa single Dinka woman or girl thus reduces the Dinka population byfour individuals several generations later, and adds a like increment to the Nuer population. (Kelly, 1985, p. 59,)

Local rates of compensation in the case ofhomicide indicate a hierarchy of value, linked directly to women's reproductive status and virginity (and hence paternity of future offspring). During the research period, compensation rates were offered by a mixed male and female focus group. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) [See Appendix 4 at p. 131 for sex and age disaggregated compensation rates for homicide] One research participant, when asked about territorial competition between Lou Nuer and Anuak, suggested that before the 1980s, Lou Nuer used to give daughters or cattle to the Anuak paramount chief in exchange for land. The participant suggested that at that time, the Lou possessed superior firepower compared to the Anuak and that the two groups fought a definitive battle which pushed the Anuak eastward once again, thereby settling the current boundary and, presumable removing the requirement for such exchanges ofreproductive females for land. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) Disaranameiat Opportunities asid Hazards 43

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Akobo Peace Committee representatives offered the above graphic representation of Lou Nuer perceived ethnic boundaries, between Lou Nuer, Jikany Nuer, Anuak and Murle cattle grazing areas, human settlements, water resources and cattle raiding routes, covering Akobo County. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 44

Overview of Dynamics surrounding disarmament As the above breakdown demonstrates, a complete picture ofthe dynamics surrounding arms control for all actors involved is a complex one, involving multiple stakeholders, interests, agendas and security dilemmas. Civilian and militia disarmament has already taken place, with both resistance and compliance, with both improvements in security and development in some areas and continued poor security in other areas. From a strategic perspective, the GoSS is faced with the dilemma of how to demonstrate peace dividends to various populations fractured by ethnic and political differences and violent histories. Demonstrating progress in security and development is critical in order to maintain support for the state-building project advocated by the majority of SPLA and the southern population. At the same time, improving development conditions is contingent on a secure environment, which the GoSS has determined can only be created after a general disarmament of civilians. The disarmament of some areas has revealed the existence of groups choosing to maintain weapons in order to challenge state authority, for personal or political reasons, which forces the hand ofthe GoSS towards negotiations, and at some point, the use of force to contain or combat these forces, as specified in the CPA. Some spoilers have pointed out that they were not direct parties to the CPA and hence cannot be held accountable to it. The re-organization, retraining and conversion of the SPLA into a conventional army is proceeding, but, at the time ofwriting, has meant that the SPLA require additional time and logistical support in order to be able to sustain forces in the field- to act as buffer forces between armed and disarmed areas. Lack of roads, food stores and potable water in remote border areas has hampered these efforts, which have, in spite ofthese obstacles, improved over time by the deployment of additional forces. Commitments by the GoSS to provide security for disarmed populations have, over the past eight months, been delayed to such an extent that loss of life has occurred in the interim. Similarly, an ongoing lack of Police capacity has hampered local law enforcement efforts. Perhaps on balance this has meant that by avoiding forced disarmament of communities, consequent destabilization and large scale loss of life have been avoided- while some areas have experienced a security gap, have been subject to violence by predatory neighbours and have begun to resent the GoSS as a result of its failure to protect them. The failure of initial negotiated disarmament dialogue between Lou Nuer, Dinka and GoSS authorities, as a result ofwhite army attacks on SPLA forces, created a chain of events Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 45

(including the eventual creation of a non-coercive disarmament process by GoSS civil authorities in order to minimize loss of life and prevent de-stabilization of the CPA) the results ofwhich are still being felt across Jonglei. Both the GoSS and the UN were ill prepared for the sudden outbreak ofviolence that accompanied initial negotiated disarmament attempts (which had actually been initiated with local civil authorities by Lou Nuer wishing to access Dinka cattle grazing areas where Dinka 'hosts' had required disarmament as a pre-condition for access to water and grazing resources). All efforts subsequent to this period ofviolence have aimed to limit the violence and destruction associated with disarmament- in effect to minimize rather than eliminate harm (an ideal, but difficult state to achieve considering the multiplicity of actors, huge geographical area, lack of infrastructure and poor capacity of security forces, including Police and the reluctance ofthe UN to become involved in the protection of Sudanese civilians). The field research demonstrated that communities faced similar disarmament and security dilemmas. The emergence ofa disarmament process, begun by Sudanese civilians and civil authorities, which eventually turned violent, set the stage for all subsequent disarmament efforts and decision-making by armed communities. The research demonstrated that before disarmament took place the vast majority of those interviewed were either supportive of general disarmament or were not against disarmament per-se, but requested reasonable security guarantees, simultaneous disarmament, the involvement of a neutral party and compensation for weapons. Suggestions by White army elements at the time suggested that an expansion of coercive disarmament into the eastern part ofAkobo County would have met with resistance and presumably widespread killing, looting, sexual violence, livestock theft and destruction as in other areas- and resulted in a destabilization of the area. Instead, peace agreements between the Lou Nuer chiefs and Akobo civil authorities and some Murle chiefs set the stage for subsequent disarmament. [See Appendix 5 at p. 132 for a detailed stakeholder analysis] Notions of 'Law and Order' The Sudan appears to be at a criticaljuncture between the modern concept ofthe nation-state and the traditional order. Traditionally, leadership reigns bypersuasion and regulates the militancy of the youth-warrior age sets through moral authority. In the modern nation-state, state institutions monopolizeforce ofarms to maintain the social andpolitical order. In this transitionalphase, government leaders reflect both the use ofpower by the state and a display ofthe manhood values of youthful military tradition. Because the state is neither strong enough to have a monopoly ofpower nor neutral enough to be above the traditionalfactions ofconfrontation, it tends to be perceived and infact presents itselfas a competitor on the same level as the rival warriors oftradition. (Deng, 1995) Francis MDeng on identity and the dynamics ofmilitarism in Sudan Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 46

At the heart ofthis analysis of the "opportunities and hazards of arms control" in Akobo County, some cultural, legal and governance aspects ofthe post-conflict transition have been highlighted in a cursory way. Insofar as the transformation of local security and power relations provides opportunity for both positive and negative change, it may in either case simultaneously represent a further movement away from 'tradition'. A full exploration of cultural and legal transformation amongst the Nuer was made in the mid 1990' s (Hutchinson, 1996) (building on an earlier body ofwork beginning in the 1930's) and could gainfully be revisited in the current post-conflict context. However important that exploration might be, it is well beyond the scope ofthis paper and these issues are raised to illustrate the variety of impacts that decisions to arm or disarm may have on the people ofAkobo, their neighbours and the emergent governments and processes with which they engage. The legacy of change raises the question ofwhether/how best outside parties should engage in supporting the re-establishment of 'law and order' in such a post-conflict23 environment, when the fundamental concept of, or approach to, law and justice, not to mention acceptance of 'government' is disputed and tenuous. Post-conflict blueprints conceived by the nascent Ministry of Legal and Constitutional Affairs in the new southern capital Juba have certainly not been consultatively devised in cooperation with populations in areas as remote and volatile as Akobo or Pibor Counties. In addition, these blueprints, and the planning processes that produced them, are at least partially the product of 'capacity building' by external actors, including the UN, NGOs, donor nations and private consultancy firms. In an area as fundamental as governance, the historical record shows that it rarely matters whether a subject territory and population wish to be governed, but rather how the mostly violent contest for control shapes the decision making/negotiating power of a group. The availability ofweapons and ammunition certainly shapes that 'negotiation' . Even agreeing on a useful definition of 'law and order'- perhaps based on an agreed concept of 'justice' combining colonial, pre-colonial and Islamic law (let alone developing donor-funded programmes to support this hybrid concept), should require that people are fundamentally convinced that they want to accept representative government inclusive of people with whom they have been in violent political and ethnic conflict. On the ground during the

23 The designation as a 'post-conflict' environment is of course debatable considering the ongoing low- level violence and potential for future local and higher-level violence including a return to war Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 47 research period, there was evidence that populations were reluctantly beginning to accepted this cooperation with the emerging state, but with local decision making still shaped by former alliances, militarized relationships and ubiquitous intra-sectional conflict (including costly blood feuds), some limited local peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts may or may not indicate progress. A variety of local conflict resolution mechanisms exist in Akobo; some ofwhich were witnessed in operation during the research period. Traditional chiefs' courts were in evidence on a daily basis, both in outlying areas and in the center of the administrative area within Akobo town. Issues of family law, including 'elopement' and pre-marital pregnancies were resolved in public by elders, chiefs, the offending parties and the families themselves, under a shady tree- and often evolving into bride price negotiations on the spot once the facts ofthe matter had been ascertained- with the number of cattle required being negotiated with the use of sticks to represent cattle exchanges in an innumerate setting. Local Police lacked capacity, training, equipment and literate recruits during the research period. They were seen conducting parades and training. They were also clearly involved in human rights violations, including the arrest, detainment and corporal punishment ofthe relatives of persons suspected of crimes, in an effort to encourage the surrender ofthe actual suspect. The author also witnessed disciplinary hearings and corporal punishment being carried out against Police officers for various derelictions of duty, involving the whipping of the offender with a stick across the back while lying in the prone position. After revenge killings took place within the town itself, Police were witnessed taking part in mixed SPLA and Police nighttime patrols within the town in an effort to maintain security. During the research period, the author also witnessed Police failing to intervene in revenge killings, presumably because of fears of implicating themselves and their families in blood feuds. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006) Approximately 90 Police were employed by the County Authorities although none had been paid at the time of research. Police were armed with a variety ofweapons of mixed quality, including AKM series rifles, G3 rifles and 1 rocket propelled grenade launcher, but possessed little ammunition. UN Police brought in as observers during the later disarmament exercise conducted a 3 -day, and later a 1 month long, training for local Police. The author's impression was that the establishment of 'rule of law' control through 'civil' authorities was a direct and assumed extension ofwartime military control by competing Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 48

rebel and militia groups . On numerous occasions during subsequent disarmament activities, local elders in remote disarmament sites explicitly stated that the presence ofneutral parties (UN military observers and UN civilian staff) affected their decision to disarm and even in some cases their beliefthat the disarmament process was authentic rather than a trick by neighbouring groups or the civil authorities to alter local conflict dynamics in their favour. One elder in Burmath stated to UN representatives upon their arrival as part of a joint UN-GoSS local government delegation at the beginning ofthe formal disarmament period, that, ". . .now that you have arrived we know that the disarmament is real. We trust you because ofthe colour ofyour skin and because you are not a son of the area." This is significant in that it reinforces the suggestion that communities might have refused to cooperate with the disarmament organized by the nascent civil authority in Akobo, in spite of the predictable human cost of an impending forced disarmament by the SPLA within 2 weeks. This also gives credence to the warnings by white army youth leaders made during the research period that they were not against disarmament per se (under the additional conditions of simultaneous disarmament and disarmament by a neutral party), but that they would resist attempts by the GoSS/SPLA to disarm them by force [see below]. The pressure exerted by the availability ofdonors money in support of 'rule of law' projects may also shape the end 'product', regardless of what package of RoL concepts and support are in vogue and available. Arguably, and if successful programming is the actual intended goal, interventionist policies and actions by powerful members ofthe international community require a minimum public commitment to establishing or re-establishing the rule of law in societies affected by their interventions, regardless of the true geo-political and/or economic motivation behind the intervention. Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks (2006) identify the challenges, describing 'rule of law' ...as a handy shorthand way to describe the extremely complex bundle ofcultural commitments and institutional structures that supportpeace, human rights, democracy andprosperity. On the institutional level, the rule oflaw involves courts, legislatures, statutes, executive agencies, elections, a strong educational system, afi-ee press, and independent non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as bar associations, civic associations, politicalparties and the like. On the cultural level, the rule oflaw requires human beings who are willing to give their labour and their loyalty to these institutions, eschewing self-help solutions and violence infavour of democratic and civilparticipation.

County commissioners were elected, although they could be appointed and replaced by presidential decree. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 49

Critically, and assuming the various economic, geo=strategic and development concepts and agendas behind donor support to such programmes, these authors also ask the questions, "Concretely, how does one go about creating the rule of law? How can one tell when the rule of law has been established? At what stage do interveners have an obligation to stick around, and at what stage do they have an obligation to go home and leave local actors to determine their own destinies?" (Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, 2006) This is an important issue, and echoes question ofwhat role outside parties can and should play in arms control efforts (as one factor contributing to rule of law as defined above), that the author is exploring in this inquiry. Outside support for disarmament and/or other 'security', 'governance' and 'rule of law' type programmes intimately implicates donors, NGOs and UN agencies in the cultural, legal, economic and security transformations taking place in this volatile environment.

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Akobo Police recruits undergoing training in Akobo Town, April 2006.

Outside involvement in disarmament, as a rule of law-related intervention, by all observation and common sense, suggests an extremely conscientious duty of care towards the populations that will be most affected by this transformation- the effect ofwhich can only be fully appreciated in historical context. Perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that, from a conflict transformation perspective, a reduction in violence should not be conflated with a true 'peace', or a return to a state ofequilibrium- that may never have existed in the first place. While it may allow for institutions to be created, roads and schools to be built and for commerce to flourish, and allow for better healthcare and education, it may still be characterized by a failure to involve local stakeholders in decisions affecting their political and cultural destinies, Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 50 sowing the seeds of future violent conflict. The dual hypotheses ofthis study relating to disarmament and to trade, while supported, do not capture the complex problématique revealed once the hazards and dilemmas associated with cultural survival are introduced into the analysis.

Sharon Hutchinson, in Nuer Dilemmas, suggests that the relative 'peace' and 'prosperity', roads, legal codification, market penetration by outside traders and the comodification ofNuer cattle that was brought to Nuerland after a brutal pacification campaign by British colonial forces in the late 1920' s and early 1930's should be seen in the same light. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 5 1

Chapter IV - Understanding the historical dynamics of small arms and light weapons proliferation and use in Akobo County, Jonglei State

Historical acquisition and use of firearms amongst the Nuer: Firearms as a vector in cultural transformation Ethiopian royal chronicles give us some evidence for the early use of firearms in the research area, along what is now, while still porous and lightly administered, the modern border between Ethiopia and Sudan. The armies of Emperor Iyassu (1682-1706) reportedly used firearms to defeat Nilotic tribesmen in this area with dramatic effect- resulting from the novel and intimidating sound and psychological impact of firearms used for the first time against a "peripheral tribal people". (Weeramantry, 1993) Kelly (1985) suggests that the Nuer began to acquire and use firearms in significant numbers towards the end oftheir expansionist period during the end of the 19th century and early 20th century. Initially the weapons used by the Nuer were muzzle-loading muskets and the comparative advantage of evolving firearms technology did play a role in the establishment and consolidation of contemporary ethnic and political boundaries. Kelly (1985) suggests that the eastward expansion of the Nuer, through traditionally Anuak territory (including Akobo itself) spanning the contemporary Sudan-Ethiopia boundary may have been halted by the effects ofthe tsetse fly. However, the literature also suggests that the Anuak, who had been pushed by the Lou to the East along the Akobo river,26 began to acquire breech-loading firearms (which would allow for a considerable increase on the firepower available to a small group ofwarriors) through Abyssinia by 191 1. (The Upper Nile Province Handbook, p.275, 1995) Kelly (1985) also suggests that these weapons were used effectively by the Anuak to re-capture territory from the Lou Nuer at the time and would, speculatively, have turned the tide against the Nuer conquest had the British not intervened with gunboats to quell this 'tribal fighting'- and in doing so consolidating the contemporary boundary between Anuak and Lou Nuer.28

The contemporary Sudan-Ethiopia border. 27 In Akobo during subsequent civilian disarmament, the author collected functioning breech-loading rifles dating back to the 1890s and more that a dozen functioning World War 1 and 2 era rifles. 28 Lou Nuer interviewed in Akobo acknowledge that Akobo town was once Anuak territory, with some interviewees suggesting that Lou-Anuak fighting in the early 1980s and 'treaties' and exchanges (including inter-marriage) based on the outcome ofthis fighting in the modern period gave legitimacy to contemporary Nuer occupation on the basis of conquest. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 52

The Colonial Period A similarly illustrative example during the historical period exists in descriptions ofthe effects of firearms on Lou Nuer consolidation ofcontrol over the Duk Ridge through conquest of the 'original' Dinka inhabitants. At the time Colonial records suggest that a typical Lou Nuer 'war party' involved in attacks on British outposts would be comprised of between 1000 and 1500 warriors, possessing some 100 rifles, the rest being armed with traditional weapons. At that time, along the Duk ridge (to the West ofthe research area, but also representing a boundary of the expanding Lou Nuer population under consideration in this investigation), the British colonial authorities had distributed rifles to Dinka warriors in order to defend against ongoing and incremental Nuer prédation. In spite of this limited armament by the British it seems that Lou Nuer tactics involving disciplined and overwhelming force were able to overcome the superior firepower of Dinka armed by the colonial forces operating from Bor. This suggests that strategic and tactical considerations should also be taken into account when trying to understand the effects ofweapons availability and proliferation on local conflict dynamics. (Kelly, 1985) By establishing police posts along the boundaries created by Lou Nuer expansion into the Duk ridge between 1890 and 1930, the British also consolidated Lou claims to 'traditional' tribal boundaries- most ofwhich are still recognized and functionally extant today. We can see how the effects of relatively brief but dramatic European colonial involvement with government and state creation in this area has both exposed local actors to competing concepts and models of political and military control and also how it temporarily froze historical conflict- with implications for current and future governments and communities. The effects ofthis may continue to play out (as it did throughout Sudan's second civil war), but the impacts on traditional governance concepts has been dramatic over time. Hutchinson's Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State provides an in- depth description and analysis ofthe cultural transformation that has been taking place in 'Nuer land' from the colonial period up until its publication over a decade ago. It also offers a critique of the early anthropological work of Evans Pritchard (with his comparably static view ofthe Nuer), and describes the dramatic and destructive effects ofthe war on Nuer individuals, communities and social structures, as well as the shifting meaning and power assigned to money and weapons in Nuer culture. Civilian disarmament, as part of a post-CPA security and state- Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 53

building exercise by the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, represents a new chapter in his process of change. Hutchinson also references the failure of previous disarmament attempts by both colonial authorities: Having thus established its hegemony in this region, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government adopted as one ofits immediate priorities the goal ofrupturing the cross-border arms trade and instituting a system ofgun licensing. It was hoped that afuture disarmament ofthe general population would become possible once an adequate level ofsecurity was assured. However the government soon discovered that the suppression ofNuer/Anuak hostilities along the Ethiopian (Abyssinian) frontier provoked an increase rather than a decrease in the westwardflow offirearms into the province. Although the British administration had earlier awarded Remington rifles to its newly awarded "chiefs, "principally as a matter of "prestige, " they were soon compelled to expand this "experiment" to the arming ofchiefs 'police as well. And by 1939, any British optimism about the prospect ofafuture disarmament ofthe population ofthe region was based more on a current scarcity of ammunition than on the establishment ofan adequate state ofsecurity...However it was principally the failure ofthe British administration to negotiate a coordinated and cooperative grazing agreement with the Abyssinians that bedeviled all their efforts to assert a consistentpolicy ofarms containment. (Hutchinson, 1996, p. 112)

and post-colonial authorities: The immediate administrative priorities ofthe SPLA were to limit thefrequency and intensity ofinter- community confrontations, to establish an effective system ofindirect rule, to introduce a system of arms control and gun licensing.. . (Hutchinson, 1 996, p. 1 47)

The First Civil War Sudan's first civil war (in the post colonial period) contributed to the proliferation of weapons and began before the withdrawal of British colonial authorities in 1955. A Commission of Inquiry was carried out by the then Government of Sudan to determine the facts surrounding the outbreak ofviolence. This report references the attempted seizure of Government arms and ammunition stores by southern Sudanese military and Police personnel taking part in the attempted mutiny- as well as the police, military and civilian bystanders killed during Government attempts to defend these stores. (Republic ofthe Sudan, 1955) Edward O'Balance's The Secret War in Sudan: 1955- 1972 (O'Balance, 1977) describes military operations by Anya-Nya29 rebels fighting against northern Government forces in the area of Akobo. Akobo is reported to have been the Anya-Nya headquarters in 1966 and, according to O'Balance's account, was used as a springboard for raids into Sudan for cattle, grain, arms and recruits- who would be taken across the border into Ethiopian for training. (O'Balance, 1977)

Often translated as 'snake poison'. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 54

Akobo itself changed hands numerous times and was repeatedly attacked by rebel forces during this conflict. A typical engagement with Government forces in the Akobo area provides some idea ofthe scale of battlefield capture by Anya-Nya forces at that time, "On the 1 1th October [ 1 970] . . .a station at Burmath, 30 miles from Akobo, manned by two platoons of Government troops, was attacked by the ANAF, who overran it, killing 102 Arabs, ofwhom 40 were killed when a truck they were riding in hit a mine- for the loss of 7 ANAF killed and 17 wounded. Reinforcements sent from Akobo were included in the dead, while the ANAF captured 22 automatic weapons, 15 of them Soviet made." In another reported raid at Pochalla to the Southeast ofAkobo along the Ethiopian border six weeks later, Anya-Nya forces claimed to have seized 78 automatic weapons and 26,000 rounds of ammunition. (O'Balance, 1977) O'Balance (1977, p.88) refers not only to the rebel 'arms trail' from Mombasa (Kenya's deep water port) through Kenya, but also the Anya-Nya leadership's open use ofneighbouring territory in Uganda and Congo. (1977, p.89) At this time, northern officials also reportedly distributed weapons to villagers in order to protect themselves from the rebels. O'Balance also explores widely reported Israeli support for Southern rebels at that time, an assertion supported by Hutchinson (1996), including the use ofnighttime airdrops of Soviet-made weapons captured by the Israelis during the June war. (1996, p. 126) Hutchinson paints a grim picture ofthe human toll that the insurgency and counter-insurgency took on the civilian population. By the mid-1960s, a predictable pattern ofviolence emerged: swift attack-and-retreat rebel raids on government-heldpositions during the rains countered by massive dry-season retaliatory campaigns in which the army, bolstered by the Egyptian Air Force, plundered and razed the surrounding countryside. Ofthe estimated one halfto one million southerners slain during this seventeen year civil war, the vast majority were civilians caught in the crossfire between Anyanya and governmentforces. (1996, p. 135)

The Second Civil War Many civilians in Southern Sudan claim to have purchased weapons from the SPLA in exchange for cattle- used to feed SPLA cadres while on operation against government forces during Sudan's 'second civil war' between 1983 and 2005. Some GoSS and SPLA officials with whom the author has spoken claim that, in spite ofthis financial transaction made ofnecessity, the weapons were brought to Sudan 'in order to liberate Sudan' and, hence, still 'belong to the SPLA'. Abel Alier (1990), in Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, suggests that most arms available to the SPLA during the early part of the second civil war (before the Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 55 collapse of the Soviet Union, the Dergue regime in Ethiopia and the split in the SPLA), were of Russian manufacture and, ...judgedfrom the outcome ofthe engagement with government troops , appear adequate and include portable SAM 7 missiles30 which, between September 1983 and June 1988, brought down more than 15 aircraft, including civilian planes; they also have Gronovs, RPG 's, Kalashnikovs, explosives, G3 rifles and recently tanks and armouredpersonnel carriers, some ofthe latter capturedfrom the Sudan army. (Alier, 1990, p. 289)

Alier goes on to state that, The SPLA has obtained armsfrom the Sudanese army, as has the latterfrom the SPLA, in the course ofbattle. Most ofthe SPLA arms initially camefrom Libya when that country was using the SPLA and the National Front ofEl Sadiq El Mahdi as a stick to beat the Sudan Government, then led by president Nimeiri. Libyan arms gave the SPLA a suitable startingpoint and much-needed momentumfor winning battlesfor acquisition ofarmsfrom the Sudan army andfor winning political alliances. (1990, p. 289) Arop Madut Arop's Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace: A full Story ofthe Founding and Development ofSPLM/SPLA provides a detailed account of the failure to court direct Soviet and East German military support (Arop, 2006, p.88-95) for the SPLA during the early years ofthe 1983-2005 rebellion, as well as the politics and logistical mechanics of Libyan military support for the SPLA. (2006, p.90-91) For a comprehensive and detailed analysis of arms transfers to Sudanese government, proxy forces and opposition groups (including the SPLA) during the 1990s, see Human Rights Watch's 1998 report Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan. (Connell, 1998) A recently released study by the Small Arms Survey (SAS, 2007), The Militarization ofSudan: A preliminary review ofarmsflows and holdings provides the most up to date picture ofhistorical and contemporary arms imports into the whole of Sudan and notes some recent trends. This report offers that there are an estimated 1.9-3.2 million small arms are in circulation in Sudan. Dr. Lam Akol, the current Foreign Minister ofthe Government of Sudan, provides further insight into the weapons and ammunition procurement carried out by the SPLA during the civil war and details his involvement in launching attacks against Government forces in the Pibor- Akobo-Nasir axis along the Ethiopian border during the early years of the second civil war. Annexed to his SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution, (Akol, 2001) Dr. Akol provides transcriptions of de-coded Top Secret SPLA radio messages from the 1990-91 period (when he 30 The author found a poorly stored SAM 7 missile in Akobo during a July 2005 preliminary assessment mission, amongst an unguarded stockpile of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, explosives, mortars and rockets. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 56 was an SPLA field commander) that, inter alia, detail weapons procurement trips to 'friendly states'. Assuming that these are authentic and not intended for a variety of potential propaganda purposes, the chronological excerpts are revealing- and refer to the impact ofthe collapse ofthe Soviet Union and Dergue regime in Ethiopia on SPLA weapons procurement strategies. [See Appendix 6 at p. 142 for a chronological selection of excerpts from coded SPLA radio messages] Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 57

Chapter V - Overview of Survey Findings Methodology The author gathered information for this study in Akobo County, Jonglei State, Southern Sudan, between April 7th and April 28th, 2006, through formal meetings, individual interviews with key stakeholders and community members and a variety of focus groups.31

Research Participants The author carried out meetings, interviews and focus groups with the following persons and groups during the formal research in April 2006:

Civil authorities: Akobo County Commissioner Doyak Choi The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) Peace and Development Advisor to Governor ofJonglei State, John Jok Choi SPLA Commanding Officers; Col. Stephen and Major Thor SPLA Rank and File Akobo Peace Committee Nuer Peace Council Chairman, Rev. John Both Reath Luang Akobo Women's Welfare Association Akobo Lou Nuer Traders Alali Anuak Traders Kiir Lou Nuer Traders Primary Health Care Centre staff PACT Peace Mobilizer Murle Peace Mobilizer from Lekongole Nile Hope Development Foundation staff White Army Youth Leader or "Bunham' Murle ChiefNgantho Kabula32 Mixed Focus Groups with adult villagers North and West of Akobo town Focus groups with male Lou Nuer youth in Akobo town Akobo Youth Association Elders Informal discussions with random community members

31 The author is grateful for the translation services provided by James Wal, Choi Both, Paul Biel and Johnson Ruach de Jalghteah. 32 The author was able interview ChiefNgantho Kabula ofthe Murle tribe as a result of ceasefire overtures during which ChiefNgantho came into Akobo with a small force ofMurle militia ostensibly aligned to the SPLA, but involved in incessant raiding in Akobo county. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 58

Modifying the research instrument during the research Period The author used a comprehensive questionnaire comprised of 81 questions during initial focus group discussions. [See Appendix 7 at p. 143 to this paper for the Original Research Instrument including the verbal informed consent request] However, this tool proved to be too long and cumbersome and it was shortened to 19 questions during the field research. At times, questions were tailored towards different participants and the length oftime available. When little time was available and the participants were not involved in trade related issues, a set of 3 simple but general questions drawn from the research question below were posed directly. The research question is as follows: "What is the current need and local capacityfor arms control inAkobo County, Sudan, and what, ifany, are possible rolesfor externalparties to become involved in supporting analysis, mediation and/or otherpractical measures identified by the community to manage conflict and enhance physical security through arms control during the interim period? "

The simplified general questions posed are as follows: 1 . How has the proliferation of small arms and light weapons affected the target community? 2. What measures might be taken to address the negative (if any) impacts that these weapons have had on communities, families and individuals in southern Sudan? 3. What opportunities and risks are currently associated with these measures?

Preliminary Observations on Focus Groups and Interviews The author found that mixed focus group discussions and interviews were the best possible way to collect data from participants. Attempts to limit participation (by age, sex or occupation) in focus groups carried out while visiting homesteads North, West and South of Akobo town on foot was almost always a failure, with random soldiers, villagers, elders, children, women and men joining the discussion spontaneously. At no time during these focus groups did the author feel that respondents were modifying their responses because of the presence of random community members as participants or observers in the focus groups. Responses were candid and forthright, tending to be surprisingly bold and honest. Targeted interviews, focus groups and discussions were easier (or at least more controlled and private) with key individuals and community organizations who had their own discreet grass walled Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 59 compound and could more easily control access and participation (with key public figures and officials, the Akobo Women's Welfare Association or the Akobo Peace Committee for example). The author found it extremely difficult to keep elderly participants focused for any length oftime on the specific questions ofthe research instrument and tended, instead, to use the simplified, more general questions during interviews with elders, whose responses were often discursive, based on personal historical narratives and punctuated by requests for salt or other material support. These discussions with elders, themselves rare in an environment so affected by violent conflict and displacement and with such a low baseline life expectancy rate, reinforced the tangential aspects of this inquiry- towards the impacts of armament and disarmament on cultural survival, legal transformation and state creation.

Perceptions of security and insecurity When asked to define the geographical space inside which individuals felt secure (and inside which traders felt secure enough to not carry a weapon), based on their current location in the Akobo market, traders suggested that they felt secure in the narrow strip ofthe town itself (approximately 500 meters wide between the Akobo river boundary to the East and the forest to the West, and stretching approximately 2 km from the airstrip at the southern end to the compound ofthe Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency (PRDA) at the northern end of town). Traders also suggested that along the Eastern trade route towards Alali they felt safe for approximately the first 1 hour and 30 minutes, although when traveling along this route they would normally be carrying weapons as a matter of course. Throughout Akobo town, whenever individual non-traders and focus groups were asked to define the area in which they felt secure, they responded similarly, usually motioning to some invisible boundary within a few hundred meters and providing recent examples of looting and shooting incidents to justify their concerns. Often during these interviews, participants would identify themselves in relation to the victims, saying, for example, ". . .1 am the aunt oftwo ofthe four children who were hacked to death by Murle militia on the riverbank 45 minutes walk from here, two weeks ago. ..", or, "this morning my brother and a few neighbours were trying to walk to the Geni river [45 minutes away] to go fishing and were fired on by somebody, but we don't know who it was..". (Author's field notes. Akobo. July 2006) In the absence of functioning and impartial formal civilian security structures and as a result of past and current insecurity, the adult male population is heavily armed and militarized in Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 60 the research area. Between 75 and 90 % of males between the ages of 15 and 30 appear to have weapons in rural areas outside ofAkobo town (an area of not more than 2 square kilometers). Many have combat training and experience through previous affiliation with SPLA, SAF and allied militia falling under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF); through long-term inter-tribal ethnic cleansing and warfare; in defense of family, livestock, and other assets against neighbouring armed civilians and predatory armed groups and through participation in wars and insurgencies in neighbouring countries.

Patterns of weapons possession and use: The Contemporary Trade in and use of Arms and Ammunition:

"Ifyou have no gun, they say you have a vagina- thatyou are a coward." Lou Nuer youth

Before, during and after the research period, local interviews, conversations and personal observations suggested that ammunition and weapons had entered the local community from a variety of sources and by a variety ofmeans over time. As an active war zone for most ofthe previous five decades, Akobo has seen its share ofweapons inflows and outflows, fighting and destruction. By source ofmanufacture, the variety of weapons types being carried and used by SPLA, former and now absorbed SSDF militia, local Police and community members, while probably fairly typical of Southern Sudan, is still notable. [See Appendix 8 at p. 149 for a complete list of weapons identified during the research period and post- research disarmaments] Rarely were large numbers of identical weapons seen (or later surrendered) in a given area, with the possible exception of Chinese Type 56 AKM series rifles (which were described as being very popular because they were 'new' rifles in comparison with weapons brought in by the SPLA in the early 80s) and a small batch of identical, unmarked (and inferior quality) FAL rifles. This may simply demonstrate the extent to which weapons are transferred through a variety of exchange mechanisms, the period oftime over which weapons have been circulating into and out of the area and, speculatively, the distribution to the white army of mixed batches of weapons captured elsewhere. No new weapons were identified by the author during the research or post- research interventions in Jonglei State, although ammunition for the RPG launchers and 60mm mortar ofrecent manufacture (2003) was identified. (Author's field notes. Akobo. July 2006) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 61

During the research period5 interviewees and focus group participants said that weapons were obtained from militia in Nasir (who in turn would have obtained weapons from SAF Military Intelligence in Malakal), through purchases from the SPLA and through private sales within Sudan or across the border in Matar, Ethiopia . Although most interviewees suggested that weapons and ammunition were currently traded privately between individuals, during the research period the author saw evidence that small arms ammunition was being commercially traded in town 'markets'34 outside of Akobo. The author did not see arms or ammunition for sale publicly in Akobo town itself. [See Appendix 9 at p. 150 for a presentation and analysis of local weapons and ammunition prices]

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33 Matar was the destination of choice for Akobo and Al Ali traders conducting trade missions by foot. Now that river boats have become the predominant means oftransporting goods and people, the destinations for trade missions are more likely to be Malakal or Gambella. 34 Often village 'markets' are simply the wares of two or more traders, spread under a tree for a few hours as they pass through a village en route from Ethiopia. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 62 the issue ofthe surrender of weapons, and a number of interviewees suggested that this makes compensation for surrendered weapons an important consideration of any future non-coercive arms control strategy. (Author's field notes. Member # 3 ofAkobo County Peace Committee, April 27, 2006) In his 1940 book, The Nuer, E.E. Evans Pritchard describes the paucity and social significance of material objects amongst the Nuer.

As Nuer have veryfew kinds ofmaterial objects and veryfew specimens ofeach kind, their social value is increased by their having to serve as the media ofmany relationships and they are, in consequence, often invested with ritualfunctions. Moreover social relationships instead ofbeing diffused along many chains ofmaterial links are narrowed by the meagerness ofculture to afew simplefoci of interest. (Pritchard, 1940, p.88) Pritchard' s observations concerning the material culture ofthe Nuer in the 1940s are relevant today, especially with regards to weapons. The projection ofpower, status, coercion and violence associated with these particular objects makes this observation even more relevant and their social significance greater. However, the reasons that most Nuer lack modern manufactured goods likely has more to do with conflict, displacement, lawlessness and poverty than a continued distain for modern conveniences and artifacts explained by cultural attitudes. It is nevertheless sadly ironic that, apart from a few short wave and HF radios, an unpredictable and miniscule commercial supply ofmedicines and the odd functioning hand water pump, outside ofAkobo town the only examples of modern technology or functioning machinery in evidence in communities visited during this study are Cold War era arms and ammunition ¦

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During the research period, focus group and interview participants described a precarious security situation, weak control by security forces and the civil administration.35 36 They also identified numerous reasons for possessing weapons (prestige, gender identity, self-defense, defense against Khartoum backed militia, for use in offensive activities alongside the SPLA, hunting, for use in celebratory gunfire, for carrying out blood feuds, for use as a component of bride price) and reasons for firing weapons (indication that someone has been killed, signaling of alarm when raiding occurs, signifying happiness, upon being re-united with family or arriving at a location after a long journey). The majority of participants reported hearing gunfire 'regularly' with youth suggesting that they heard gunfire "all the time" or "every day" (Author's field notes. Focus group of 5 male Nuer youth aged 23-25, Akobo town, April 9th, 2006) Youth suggested that their response to hearing gunfire depended on the volume of fire, suggesting an experience with and habituation to the public use of automatic firearms.37 38 The abuse of alcohol was often identified as a contributing factor in incidents involving the discharging of firearms. (Author's field notes. Akobo and Wanding, April 2006) Additional contributing drivers of firearms use identified by participants in several focus group discussions included elopement and unmarried pregnancies; non-payment of cattle in bride price or compensation for crimes; blood feuds, grazing and water access. (Author's field notes. Akobo and Wanding, April 2006) The impacts of firearms by members ofthe community included their use during revenge killings and escalating cycles of fighting, conflict and violence between family members, accidents, threatening with firearms, robbery and suicide with firearms. At the same time, youth interviewed before disarmament suggested that a change in the prestige associated with carrying weapons was taking place in anticipation of disarmament, with

This opinion was shared both by civilians and members ofthe civil administration and security services. 36 During a preliminary assessment carried out in Akobo County in July 2005 by the UN and SPLM DDR authorities, the County Commissioner expressed publicly that the civil and military authorities had almost no control over the town and surrounding areas- and suggested that development would be impossible until control had been asserted. 37 The author heard weapons being fired most, but not every day during the research period, within Akobo town. Only once was sustained gunfire heard, during and after the murder of two local healthcare workers during a blood feud. 38 The frequency of firing increased before and during the disarmament as individuals and groups fired ammunition as a deterrent against Murle incursions. At this time the author also heard several large explosions, the source of which could not be identified by the SPLA, who did not possess such heavy weapons in the area. Speculatively, these distant but heavily concussive explosions were artillery from Ethiopian forces to the East, carrying out counter-insurgency operations against Anuak GPLM rebels. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 64 individuals attempting to offload weapons at reduced rates and with a resurgent use of 'traditional weapons' (short spears, long spears and fighting sticks). Participants suggested that between 50-70% ofhouseholds possessed firearms, that weapons were shared between family members, but not between neighbours in the same village. The number of weapons possessed by a given family was reported to be a function of family size, the number of male family members and available resources. It was also reported that all youth in cattle camps would possess weapons (leaving homesteads undefended in some cases, even though small numbers of cattle, nursing mothers, infants and small children and the elderly may remain at the homestead while youth maintain and graze the herd in the 'toich' (seasonal cattle camps).39 It was also suggested that it was extremely unusual for an individual to possess more than one weapon, although the author suspects that chiefs possessing some ofthe heavier weapons found in the community (rocket propelled grenade launchers, light and medium machineguns and mortars for example) would also possess a personal small arm, such as the ubiquitous AKM. The inheritance of a weapon through the death of a family member reportedly resulted in the 'surplus' weapon being re-distributed to family members, newly initiated youth or as a component ofdowry payments.40

A Snapshot of the Human Cost The level ofviolence in this area is high: Peace Committee representatives suggested that in the ten weeks between February and mid-April 2006, they had documented between 60- 70 persons as having been killed during Murle raiding and militia incursions. (Author's field Notes. April 16, 2006) The number ofwounded would typically be double this at a minimum, although the wounded to killed ratio may be distorted by the severe lack of advanced medical facilities41 42 and the failure to anticipate a gap in medical evacuation services after the cessation

At the time of research, a number of interviewees complained that all the weapons had been taken by the youth and that they were consequently unable to defend themselves from attacks and looting by the Murle. This was said to be the reason that the Nuer were displaced from the area West ofAkobo and for nightly movement into town for protection. This was identified as a factor by persons living within 500m ofthe center of Akobo and within 500m ofthe SPLA barracks, again indicating the ineffectiveness of local security actors. 40 Disarmament Committee registrars training for weapons registration in July 2006 raised this issue when asking how the weapon of a deceased person should be registered. 41 Medical Staffai the Primary health Care Centre in Akobo suggested that persons wounded in the torso typically die before receiving medical attention because of the distances and time involved, and the attendant lack of vehicles and roads to facilitate the transportation ofthe wounded to appropriate facilities. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 65

of ICRC air evacuations and closure of the ICRC hospital in Lokichoggio, Kenya. A report by the Nuer Peace Council suggested that between December 2005 and May 2006, 150 Lou Nuer were killed during attacks by Murle raiders or militia. (Nuer Peace Council, 2006) Interviews at the Primary Health Care Centre (PHCC) in Akobo on April 10 revealed that the PHCC had received 21 live persons with gunshot wounds over the previous eight weeks, although this was atypically high since the signing of the CPA, in spite of the fact that Akobo had been attacked four times after the signing ofthe CPA. Thirteen persons had reportedly been killed during the associated clashes with the Murle in the week preceding the research. PHCC staffreported having treated 183 with gunshot wounds in May of 2004 (with 204 persons reportedly having been killed in associated fighting with the Murle), before evacuating many of the wounded to the ICRC hospital in Lokichoggio.45 Additional persons were killed and wounded by small arms as a result ofMurle-Lou Nuer fighting, Lou Nuer intra-clan fighting, revenge attacks and hunting accidents during the course of the study.46 (Author's field Notes. April, 2005)

Existing Arms Control Measures At the time ofresearch, some arms control measures had been put in place by local civil and Police authorities in Akobo town, prohibiting the public carriage ofweapons by civilians. However, weapons remained in the hands of civilians (including traders and CBO staff) within the town itself. Penalties for publicly carrying weapons in the town reportedly include a combination of arrest, beating, fines and detention. In addition, as is the case in the rest ofthe research area, it is almost impossible to distinguish armed civilians, soldiers and Police from one

42 Two ofthe three trained local medical staffai the Akobo PHCC were subsequently killed on the evening ofApril, 25, 2006 at the PHCC, as a result of a blood feud and mistaken identity, stimulating further violence and further reducing the capacity ofthe already stretched local health providers to deal with wounded and a cholera outbreak which erupted three days later, claiming eight lives on the first day. 43 UNMIS has filled this gap on an ad hoc basis and has entered into discussion with ICRC, MSF and the Ministry of Health to address this lack of services, which has contributed to avoidable death. 44 Between the end of research and the commencement of disarmament in July 2006, more than 20 additional persons were killed, mainly in inter-clan fighting and revenge attacks rather than Lou-Murle fighting or raiding. 45 1 1 ofthese 21 recently wounded were evacuated by air to Malakal by UNMIS on April 14, 2006, after sending the head UNMIS surgeon to Akobo to conduct an assessment ofthe seriously wounded. Those selected for evacuation were the most seriously injured- 10 with fractured bones and one with a bullet wound through the pelvic area. 46 5 wounded and 2 killed in and around Akobo town; 2 killed and three wounded in Burmath; 1 killed and 4 wounded in Gila River toich; 15 killed and 15 wounded in Pochalla Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 66 another- since all wear a combination of civilian clothes and military uniforms. Some interviewees suggested that while local decrees has been put in place prohibiting the public carriage of firearms within the town itself, arms holders were mostly concerned with maximizing the firepower available to them in villages and cattle camps, as this was where their important assets were. When asked what sorts ofarms control measures existed within villages outside of Akobo town, participants explained that weapons were usually stored in the man's house (polygamous family compounds often included multiple dwellings, including separate dwellings, grain and cattle storage areas for each wife). The vast majority ofweapons (youth claimed 90%, but this was not and cannot now be verified) are reportedly stored loaded with a bullet in the chamber, with clearly implications for household weapons safety and potential accidents.47 A female focus group participant stated that accidents were "common here in Akobo". (Author's field notes. Interview with 2 middle age women West of Akobo town, April 2006) Local administrators and civilians interviewed within Akobo town stated that a local decree had prohibited the public carriage of firearms within the town ofAkobo by all persons not belonging to an official security force (SPLA, Police, Military Intelligence and the Commissioner's bodyguard ). Consumption of local alcohol was often mentioned as a factor in shootings, as were trauma and long-term mental illness. Local understanding of mental incapacity as a vector for small arms violence also included nuanced interventions aimed at reducing the incidence of violence. When questioned about how the community dealt with the dangerous nexus between reportedly widespread mental trauma and the availability ofweapons, interviewees indicated that the community differentiated between 'permanent' and 'temporary' mental illness. Persons with serious mental illness, it was reported, should not have access to firearms, as opposed to those suffering from temporary delusion caused by malaria, whose weapons would in theory be removed from their possession until they recovered.49 Violence with firearms, the participants

47 Male and female participants in several focus groups identified accidents with weapons as one ofthe dangers of widespread weapons possession, linking it more commonly to poor training in weapons handling rather than improper storage. The author heard several accounts of persons being killed while cleaning weapons. 48 All of which, incidentally, included persons younger than 18 years of age carrying weapons- some being as young as 15. 49 An alternate approach was witnessed by the author in neighbouring Murle areas during subsequent disarmament in January-May 2007, where an adult male known to be suffering from a longstanding mental Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 67 suggested, was unfortunately often carried out by individuals made temporarily mentally unsound by fever, before anyone was aware of the danger.

Formal Security Structures and Associated Dilemmas When asked why they did not provide security for the community and along trade routes, SPLA soldiers interviewed during a separate mixed focus group on April 14 offered a number of reasons: for example, that the SPLA does not have the material and logistical capacity (shoes and ammunition) and are concerned by what is "behind" Murle raiding (here, when asked to clarify, SPLA suggested that SAF and Murle militia were still active and that engaging with them militarily would be a violation ofthe CPA). SPLA soldiers also stated that they were not supplied with more ammunition than was necessary to protect their weapons because officers wanted to prevent them from distributing ammunition to their relatives to be used in cattle raiding. The soldiers then removed the magazines from their weapons to demonstrate that they carried only between 3 and 5 rounds of ammunition in their weapons. (Author's field notes. Mixed focus group. April 14, 2006) One ofthe central issues facing the civil authorities, Police and military forces is the inability to enforce law and order. The reasons for this are manifold: they are outnumbered and outgunned by the civilian population; they lack training on the laws and legal processes of South Sudan as well as human rights training; they lack a literate and numerate pool ofrecruits and a trained judiciary; there is uncertainty over the relationship between customary law and common law; they lack infrastructure, uniforms, communications equipment (and presumably, sufficient ammunition), among others. A member of the Peace Committee suggested that, "in the village, the person with the gun has the same power as the soldier. . ." and this is patently true to even the most casual observer. However, an even more fundamental reason cited by numerous interviewees and witnessed by the researcher, is that these forces and services are simply not considered to be neutral because they are "composed ofthe sons and daughters ofthe area". (Author's field notes. Akobo Peace Committee. April 27, 2006)

illness was seen carrying an assault rifle. His colleagues stated that they thought it important to let him continue carrying this weapon so that he did not feel himself to be different from other male members of the community (potentially generating additional social stigma - and hence perceived mental or social harm for the individual), the only difference being that his peers did not allow him to possess ammunition for his weapon. The author considers this approach an unlikely candidate for emulation by western mental health practitioners. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 68

Any actions taken by these forces and services are seen in the context of local political contests (many ofwhich have a long history ofviolence and are linked to and manipulated according to the higher-level conflicts in southern Sudan), as well as sub-sectional and family blood feuds. At the time of research, identity politics, blood relationships and historical violent conflict play a much stronger role in individual decision-making than does the threat of sanction from weak government and security institutions.50 The security dilemmas and politico- militarized relationships extend to all segments of the population: traders and CBOs included. As the primary tool of local change over the last 50 years, small arms and light weapons have both generated and circumscribed options and choices for local civilian stakeholders. In an area where the state has failed to monopolize the use of force or offer protection for some time, civilians have used weapons purchased from the SPLA and distributed by SAP-backed militia to assert their own political destiny and to facilitate offensive cattle raiding, as well as the looting and killing that are required of, and inevitably accompany, this age old activity. However, there is a broad recognition amongst the civilian population ofthe costs that attend this violent and anarchic situation, and provided that coercive disarmament is not attempted, and certain other security compensation and development criteria are met, all stakeholders interviewed suggested that general and simultaneous disarmament would be a welcome relief. These local sentiments concerning the need to improve security echo the concerns of Kenyan pastoralist communities that have faced state-driven disarmament efforts. A 2003 report commissioned by Oxfam GB to document lessons learned from disarmament processes in northern Kenya suggested that, Boosting security in marginalized communities is important, precisely because the culture ofself- protection that is endemic in pastoral communities derivesfrom a legacy ofstate neglect. Even where there is popular supportfor weapons recovery, the lack ofalternative security mechanisms undermines lasting disarmament. The reach ofthe state in pastoral communities is important in addressing their security needs, but it also needs a better systemfor controlling legal weapons, since most illicit weapons start out as legal arms in the hands ofState securityforces. (Khadiagala, 2003, p.5)

In an even more complex and alarming example during the research period, the author witnessed a group of persons in military and civilian clothing attempted to take revenge on the distant relatives of an individual who had carried out a revenge killing. This mixed group of approximately 20 heavily armed persons attempted to enter the SPLA barracks in order to kill an SPLA officer. There was no attempt on the part of Police to intervene in order to prevent the killing of innocent persons. It was explained that any attempt to intervene by SPLA, Police or private citizens would then implicate these persons (and their extended families) in the blood feud as well. Young educated male members of a given family are described as priority targets in such blood feuds, since their loss is seen as being even more significant to the family being targeted. Eventually the County Commissioner was able to prevent the homicide. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 69

Effects of weapons proliferation on trade Beyond the preceding analysis of attitudes, dynamics and dilemmas associated with disarmament, this study takes as its secondary hypothesis,

"That there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between sustainable arms control efforts and economic development, where comprehensive approaches to community security and arms control reduces conflict allowingfor increased trade and economic development, which makes non-violent livelihoods more attractive and createsfurther incentivesfor the consolidation and expansion ofsecurity. " This section will begin with an overview ofthe effects ofweapons possession and use on local traders, economic activity, food security and transportation for men and women in Akobo. It will also discuss the potential impacts of forced disarmament on trade and then the actual impacts of the disarmament that took place in Akobo, including some perverse effects. Almost all traders interviewed possessed assault rifles and saw them as critical tools for the protection of life and property, including goods in transit. Although traders suggested that they traveled in large groups as a deterrent to attack and carried personal weapons for protection (between 80-100% oftraders reportedly carried weapons during trading trips), these trading groups were still vulnerable to attack and looting of assets. An Akobo based trader suggested that trading groups were often comprised of as many as 50 persons, and that 12 persons was considered to be the minimum size for a trade mission, for reasons of security. Akobo-based traders suggested that the success and safety oftrading missions was largely a function of luck and that no trade routes were any safer than any others. In addition, it was suggested that at all times ofyear these trade routes were equally unsafe. When asked to quantify the likelihood of violent incidents taking place during trade missions, a trader from Alali (East ofAkobo along the Akobo river towards Pochalla) claimed to have been attacked 8 times over the last six months (traders generally moved between locations on trading missions every two weeks) suggesting that 67% of trade missions were involved in violent incidents involving small arms. A second trader reported that 5 of his last 8 (62.5% of trade missions) involved deadly incidents taking place either in front or behind the trader while on the trail. (Author's field notes. Mixed focus group oftraders. April 15, 2006) In exchange for these risks, traders reported an average 50% profit on each trip.51 Neither mechanized

51 However, this rate of return does not include accounting for additional costs associated with each trade mission. These include the hiring ofporters at 50 Ethiopian Birr (approximately $7) per load from Akobo to Alali and accommodation for porters at 15 Birr per trip. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 70 transport, nor pack animals are used on these trading missions, and all goods are reportedly transported by foot, and carried on the heads oftraders and their hired porters. Traders also reported taxation by armed groups along the trade route between Akobo and Matar in Ethiopia (Matar is accessible by road from Gambella town). According to Akobo traders, they were required to pay 15 Birr to 'Police' in both Kotke and Jingme (along the Baro river) in exchange for their protection. Similarly, at Ketbek, traders were required to pay 20 Bin- to 'Security men' who claim to be part ofthe local authority, as payment to cross the river into Ethiopia. This force describes itself as SPLA (traders identified these forces as former SSDF operating under the control of Gordon Kong Choi and now ostensibly integrated into the SPLA command structure according to the 'Juba Declaration').

Hazards of cross-border trade missions: An example from mid April, 2006 In the second week of April a Trade mission, comprised of 50 traders from Akobo town, set off from Akobo towards Matar. Over the course oftheir journey, traveling on foot for three days, the group split into two groups, with one moving more quickly than the other. The smaller of the two groups was intercepted by a group of armed men claiming to be SPLA, who attempted to disarm them, stating that they would not be allowed to enter Matar with their weapons. During the 'disarmament' traders were beaten and robbed by the 'SPLA'. One trader who was carrying cash contributions from a number of colleagues in Akobo (and who was going to make purchases on their behalf in Matar) was robbed of over $900 USD and badly beaten. The two groups were re-united in Matar. While the group that had been robbed outside of Matar stayed behind in an attempt to negotiate the return oftheir cash and assets with the local authorities, the larger ofthe two groups completed their purchases and began the return journey towards Akobo. Without warning, this larger group of traders was attacked by a large force who opened fire on them with automatic weapons. The traders did not return fire, but ran for their lives, many dropping trade goods in their haste and fear. This group arrived in Akobo, a week after their original departure- traumatized, dejected and fearful for the future of their enterprises- and having to explain the loss of hard-won capital and goods to colleagues who had helped to finance the trade mission.

Women, Weapons, Trade and Security A mixed focus group of male and female traders suggested that women traders did not carry weapons for cultural reasons. At the same time, it was suggested that there were 70 women trained to use weapons as part ofthe Police and SPLA in the area. Women also suggested that recruitment into the security forces was more likely when the husband of the woman had been killed. It was not clear whether this was because cultural prohibitions would be overcome in the absence of a dissenting spousal voice, or ifwomen who had lost husbands were Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 71

more likely to seek security and livelihoods through association with the military and Police, or a combination of both factors. Alternately, women might seek access and societal sanction for weapons possession through association with Police and military forces, as a means to maintain personal security after the death oftheir husbands. Finally, it may simply be a function of inheriting and possessing the weapon of their late husbands, allowing access by women to 'employment' in the security services by meeting a recruitment criteria ofprior weapons ownership. It was suggested by a 52 year old woman trader from Akobo that 80% ofwomen in the community are widowers as a result ofthe war and inter-intra tribal/sectional fighting.52 (Author's field notes. Mixed focus group of Akobo and Alali traders. April 15, 2006)

Weapons Facilitate Hunting and Gathering Game meat is regularly for sale in the Akobo market. Antelope are hunted with military weapons both by civilians and the SPLA (or mixed groups) in the area surrounding Akobo. The author witnessed two hunting parties of approximately six persons each, comprised of male Lou Nuer wearing mixed civilian and military clothing, with one AK 47 per person, hunting antelope. On the way from attempted peace meetings with the Murle in a de-populated corridor to the South-West of Akobo53, the author also witnessed the peace delegation's SPLA security detail hunting and gathering- antelope with their weapons and ammunition issued by the SPLA, searching for wild bird eggs along the river banks, and smoking out bee hives in search ofhoney. It is uncertain whether these natural products would have been consumed rather than sold in the Akobo market, but access to these scarce products can only be gained by traveling in armed groups and risking the threat of armed engagements with Murle raiders or militia.

There are 12 woman traders in Akobo and 65 male traders according to Akobo Traders Union (AKOTU) representatives. 53 According to World Food Programme drivers who recently pushed through a road to Akobo from Waat, the entire population in a band approximately 20-30 km wide, stretching westward from Akobo town, has been displaced by Murle raiders and militia. Various locals, including relatives and an elderly witness to the incident- in separate interviews, reported that in late March 2006, four children (three boys and one girl child) were hacked to death by Murle raiders on the banks ofthe Geni river, immediately West of Akobo. DIsarmameirit Opportunities and Hazards 72

1. Game meat for sale in the Akobo Market; 2. As a result of current insecurity, access to wild bird eggs and other natural products or food sources outside oftown can only be secured through weapons possession; 3. SPLA soldiers smoking out bees in search of honey, in the insecure, displaced corridor West ofAkobo town.

Akobo youth also reported the common usage ofhand grenades for fishing until the supply dwindled in 2006. These hand grenades had reportedly been distributed by SAF Military Intelligence from Malakal to Nasir in support of militia attacks on Akobo in early 2005 and, as a consequence oftheir use as a means to secure access to food, have subsequently become quite scarce. (Author's field notes. Focus group with 5 Akobo male Lou Nuer youth. April 9, 2006)

Infrastructure and transportation corridors In the absence of roads and vehicles, rivers provide the most obvious transportation and trade corridors. However, in the dry season riverine trade is constrained by low water levels, the presence ofwater hyacinths and fishing nets- and the threat ofviolence associated with potentially damaging these nets by passing through them with a boat. It was reported by local CBO staffthat attempting river travel at the time ofthis research would almost certainly result in locals threatening the boat's occupants with their personal weapons. This problem is reported to be especially acute in the dry season when water levels are low. If new roads can be cut between Akobo and Nasir (or Matar) then all season travel would be possible by using a combination of land and river transport, provided that passage can be negotiated through local chiefs and fisher- folk ahead oftime.

54 Perhaps more alarming, on a field assessment to Abwong, along the Sobat river in July 2005, locals reported using mortar rounds found in abandoned stockpiles as weights for their fishing nets. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 73

Disarmament, Arms Control and the Implications for Trade The author concluded at the time of research and before the peaceful disarmament took place, that had forced disarmament taken place in Akobo, it would most likely have had a dramatic effects on trade in the short and long term. If forced disarmament, had been carried out by the SPLA, moving eastward into Akobo County, then traders as members ofthe armed civilian population would necessarily have been forced to make a choice between fighting the SPLA or peacefully surrendering their weapons. At the time ofresearch, I also concluded that if security could not be improved after forced disarmament, or if disarmament was unevenly applied and incomplete, then traders would likely be even more reluctant or unable to ply the route between Akobo and Matar. Similarly, preliminary observations and conclusions by the author, as ofMay 2006, suggested that should 'White Army' youth leaders, 'Burham', have choosen to resist disarmament, then it would have been expected that all trade would cease along the Akobo- Matar trade route as a result of fighting, population displacement and asset stripping. A Burham interviewed in Wanding during the research period suggested that 'White Army' would resist disarmament unless the SPLA and UN could provide security guarantees, simultaneous disarmament and compensation for weapons: a position echoed in various ways by almost all interviewees and focus group participants throughout the research period.

Excerpt from a discussion with 'White Army' youth leader in Wanding, April 2006 Q: What conditions would have to be met for armed youth to consider disarming?

A: "Youth would also be willing to disarm ifMurle would be disarmed. We are tired ofthe gun, but don't want to be vulnerable. The owners of weapons also want compensation."

Q: Ifthe SPLA came here and triedforced disarmament, would the youthfight?

A: "Yes, it is going to happen."

Since the cattle migration routes between the toich (cattle camps) and Akobo are essentially the same as the trade routes, it could be anticipated that fighting associated with disarmament would prevent trade, would implicate traders in the fighting, and would likely involve asset stripping and looting on the part ofthe SPLA forces carrying out the disarmament. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 74

Any further disruption of trade, along what is already a precarious and insecure supply chain, would have led to further increases in the prices of increasingly scarce commodities. The availability of medicines in local markets, including antibiotics and malaria drugs, would necessarily also have decreased without alternate sources of supply, with predictable consequences. The risk and high costs associated with trade conducted on foot and in large, armed groups, results in higher costs for local consumers and produces higher profit margins for risk- taking entrepreneurs.55 In a secure and disarmed environment, competition and the opening of road transport would both increase the volume and types of commodities reaching towns such as Wanding, Kier, Akobo and Alali, facilitating reconstruction, lowering the costs ofbasic goods and services and generally creating an enabling environment for economic growth and employment. [See 'Mixed effects of disarmament on trade: A rapid post-disarmament follow up survey' below] The important impact that employment in a cash economy could have on the decision- making of armed youth, cannot be overstated. The author witnessed youth leaders refusing to answer an urgent call to take up their weapons and return to fight in the cattle camps- because these same youth leaders had secured paid employment, assisting in the renovation of a CBO compound in Akobo town. Lou Nuer elders from both the Nuer Peace Council and the Akobo County Peace Committee suggested that supportive, longer term engagement with youth, in the areas of adult education, livelihoods support and entertainment would contribute dramatically to the consolidation ofpeace, provide an alternative to violent and criminal livelihoods and act as a tangible 'peace dividend' facilitating disarmament. (Rev. John Both Reath, personal communication, April 9, 2006) (Author's field notes. Member # 3 of Akobo County Peace Committee. April 27, 2006) Speculatively, cultural and economic transformation, shaped by Sudanese and intra-Nuer civil wars, asset stripping and displacement, may accelerate with the advent of peace, security, development and exposure to new sources of information and entertainment. The link between local economic opportunities and the current culture ofweapons possession and violence amongst male youth, can be seen in the context of cultural and economic transformation amongst the Nuer generally over the last seventy years. While the anthropologist, E. E. Evans-Pritchard,

Local traders reported a 100% profit from some trading missions Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 75 in his 1947 book, The Nuer, suggests that, "trade is a very unimportant social process among the Nuer" and tellingly, that, "Nuer do not sell their labour" (Evans-Pritchard, 1947, p.89), it remains to be seen how exposure to outside cultural influences, experiences as refugees in neighbouring countries during the war and an increasingly cash-based economy will affect Nuer peoples and their decisions to arm or disarm.

Disarmament Dilemmas and the effects on Trade During the research period, forced disarmament by the SPLA, as part of the new Government of South Sudan, was being carried out in adjacent areas (and at the time ofresearch was likely to move into Akobo County within a matter ofweeks- according to SPLA officers involved in the forced disarmament taking place in the counties to the West ofAkobo and local civil authorities). The future relationship between the remaining armed Lou Nuer in Akobo and the GoSS, and any implications for future stability and the opening of secure and predictable trade, would be at least partially determined by the methods used to disarm. A post-mortem report on the violence surrounding disarmament further West, suggested that, By most standards, the human costs ofdisarmament in northern Jonglei were high. Though it is impossible to establish the exact numbers, an estimated 1,200 white army and 400 SPLA soldiers were killed over the course ofthe campaign. Officialsfrom SPLMNyirol County report at least 213 civilian deaths. There was pervasive looting and houses were burned in the villages ofKaram, Gogoak, and Chuai Dok, which were perceived as the centers ofresistance. Another unanticipated consequence ofthe coercive disarmament was chronicfood shortages: the white army raided cattle and goatsfrom the community while the SPLA also lived offthe land during their interventions. (SAS, November 2006) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 76

Selected civilian disarmament Sites, j ungici State, 2606

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^m (SAS, November 2006) The Nuer Peace Council (2006), in their May report "Massacre in Lou-NuerArea on Forceful Disarmament" identified factors that led civilians ('white army') to resist the disarmament (it should be noted that civilians attacked the SPLA first). These included, inter alia, lack of capacity on the part of the GoSS; security threats from neighbouring groups (namely the Murle); suspicions that they are being unfairly targeted for disarmament; lack of community involvement; lack of legal and regulatory framework for the disarmament process; fear ofthe SPLA (relating to conflict during the war when these communities resisted SPLA mainstream under the SSDF and SPLA Torit factions); and, lack of compensation for weapons purchased from the SPLA for cattle during the war. This report also made a series of recommendations for future "cordial disarmament". These included the recommendation that "The GoSS should adopt a non-partisan approach in the promulgation ofthe disarmament processes and guidelines by involving the southern Sudanese communities, the civil society, UN Mission in Sudan, IGAD member states. . ." (Nuer Peace Council, 2006) It also proposed the following, phased approach to disarmament: Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 77

The disarmament process should be community-based and implementedprogressively in phases cautiously in a very transparent and accommodative system thus:- i. 1st phase- To creating awareness and inspiration and motivation on arms issues, peace building and restoration ofstate security apparatus, ii. 2nd phase- To enhancing ownership and responsibility ofthe local communities towards disarmamentprocess. Hi. 3rd phase- To carry out the actual disarmament through ajoint operation ofthe government forces and the UN mission in Sudan on agreed modalities which are acceptable to the stake holders ofthe peace initiative, iv. 4th phase- The implementation ofthe gradual cessation ofarms amnesty depending on the success ofthe disarmament. (Nuer Peace Council, 2006)

Based on interviews and focus groups conducted during the field research, interviewees were nearly unanimous in proposing the minimum conditions required in order to carry out a successful non-coercive disarmament, with a view to minimizing harm and maximizing benefit. Research participants proposed that disarmament should be organized through chiefs, youth leaders, local authorities and peace committees, accompanied by security guarantees, supported for formal security structures and the UN, it should be conducted in adjacent areas simultaneously disarmament by a neutral party and compensation should be provided for weapons (as valuable and socially symbolic assets). (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006)

Overall, during this research, community stakeholders have highlighted the following minimum requirements for safe civilian disarmament: 1) Security guarantees for communities; 2) Verifiable and simultaneous disarmament of neighbouring armed groups; 3) Disarmament carried out with the support of a neutral party; and, ______4) Compensation for surrendered weapons

During the research, almost all interviewees suggested that forced disarmament would almost certainly lead to killing, asset stripping, increased vulnerability, displacement and the disruption of trade and trade networks over the short term, as it has in other areas. In spite of this, numerous participants suggested that because local security conditions had become so Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 78 intolerable (because of the weapons related dangers described above, sectional violence and uncontrollable youth possessing small arms) if these conditions could not be met, forcible disarmament should go ahead in order for civil authorities, police and the army ofthe GoSS to assert control. The ongoing forced disarmament taking place in central Jonglei and along the Sobat river also generated security in a number of distinct ways: 1) through direct violence between SPLA disarmament and resistant communities or armed groups (central Jonglei); 2) by creating security vacuums through selective or incomplete disarmament (as between Yakwatch, Dome and Ulang villages along the Sobat river); and, 3) when civilians attacked the SPLA to re-gain their weapons (as happened in Jingmir along the Sobat-Baro river on the Ethiopian border). (Author's field notes and presentation. Malakal, April 2006) Throughout the interview and focus groups process, adult and youth participants (both male and female), civil authorities, Women's association members and Akobo Peace Committee members unanimously pointed out the need to develop alternative livelihoods for disarmed communities, and in particular, 'idle youth'. A review of lessons learned from previous weapons collection programmes in northern Kenya (where similar, but less severe lawlessness prevails), came to the same conclusion: Credible and lasting weapons collection initiatives by local actors need to be accompanied by strategies thatpromote alternative livelihood opportunities. Questions ofeconomic capacity and strategy go un-addressed both by the Nairobi Declaration and by national policy debates on small arms control. The problem is three-fold: creating economic incentivesfor communities to disarm; initiating rehabilitation and reintegration programmesfor gun runners and users, particularly youngpeople, and initiating long-term developmentprojects that specifically target communitiesformerly in conflict. (Khadiagala, 2003, p.5)

Mixed effects of disarmament on trade: A rapid post-disarmament follow up survey The author was surprised to note, towards the end of the official Akobo disarmament exercise carried out in July-August 2006, that the Akobo market was suddenly full oftrade goods after having been nearly empty since April 2006, when trade missions halted as a result of insecurity (see Hazards ofcross-border trade missions: An examplefrom mid April, 2006 above). The author initially and hopefully speculated that the increased confidence oftraders was a product ofthe altered security environment resulting from civilian disarmament. Interviews carried out with traders in Akobo market on August 2n presented a mixed picture. According to 26 traders interviewed in the Akobo market on August 2nd, 2006, the disarmament encouraged the organization of a final large-scale trade mission by foot in mid-July, with 60-70 persons traveling to Ethiopia, while they were still "powerful enough".56 Approximately 45-50 of the participants in this trade expedition were armed with automatic weapons and

The Akobo disarmament was launched on July 15 by local civil authorities. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 79 subsequently surrendered these weapons through the ongoing civilian disarmament process upon their return to Akobo. The traders interviewed paint a picture of the impacts of the disarmament on then- trade practices, suggesting both positive and perverse effects. While they stated that they can now move within Lou territory as far as the Gila River cattle camps (north of a 'traditional' boundary between Lou and Jikane Nuer territory South of Wanding) freely without weapons, the traders stated that most of them were now unable to move all the way through to Matar in Ethiopia (the closest source of trade goods) and that those traders who had relatives or friends amongst the Gagwong (Jikane) Nuer occupying the area between the Gila toich and Matar were now able to trade through these connections operating as middle-men. In spite of this new limitation (and the potential for it to reduce profit margins) the majority of traders suggested that the disarmament had been "good for the Lou area" (Author's field notes, Akobo. July 2006) In the period between the field research and the disarmament carried out in Akobo County, Lou Nuer (including 'traders' were reported to have carried out attacks on Mariai in Ethiopia (inhabited by Gagwong Nuer civilians), killing 1 1 and wounding 20, so reluctance on the part of these populations to allow access by Lou Nuer traders is hardly surprising. (Doyak Choi, personal communication, June 23, 2006) Simultaneously, and as a direct product ofthe disarmament operation, a boat had been chartered from Malakal to transport fuel needed for the logistical support of disarmament taking place in 10 disarmament centers spread along the Pibor river between Wanding and Cuiban. The pilot of this vessel was paid a considerable 'hazard pay' to make the journey South from Nasir to Akobo which had, according to local sources, not been made for 9 years as a result of insecurity. The arrival of this vessel significantly altered the local market, with the above mentioned trading group returning to Akobo by boat and the subsequent almost daily appearance of trading boats from Malakal and Gambella, Ethiopia. The effect on local markets has been profound. During a brief visit to Akobo in May 2007, the author noted that Akobo market had expanded by approximately 4-500% in size and equally dramatically in terms of quantity and type of goods and services available to consumers.57 While new products, new construction and a variety of new types of businesses using generators to provide electricity were in evidence, a new (and old) problem was reported: recently arrived northern Arab Muslim traders were seen by local as reminders of northern economic dominance as well as attempted cultural 'Arabization' and religious 'Islamification' (primary causes of Sudan's civil wars in the first place), were being regarded with suspicion and were being accused by the local security apparatus of acting as spies for the 'North'. Disparities over access to capital and feared domination of local markets by northerners could play a role in furthering tension within the community.

57 Anecdotally, the daily arrival and departure of trade and transportation vessels plying the route between Akobo and Malakal or Gambella had also brought increased numbers of northern Muslim traders with substantial capital, concerning local authorities with issues around protection of local traders, intelligence gathering and taxation. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 80

Chapter VI Understanding the dynamics of intervention

Traditional Mediation One ofthe primary purposes ofthis research was to assess whether there was/is a role for outside parties to become involved in supporting arms control-related interventions. Most interviewees described local security dilemmas and factors that had prevented disarmament from taking place up until that point. These included macro and micro level issues: from a potential resumption ofhigher level political, ideological or religious conflicts, to fears over security vacuums or the dilemma faced by an armed youth walking along a footpath with his rifle over his shoulder. The following illustration was provided by a white army youth in Wanding: ... the problem is that there is no chancefor dialogue. People want a return to dialogue. Now when two people carry the gun and they meet on apath and do not recognize each other then one person firesfirst and then both are shooting. Once one is killed then dialogue cannot take place. Ifthere are no guns, then dialogue can take place. There can be inter-marriage. (Author's field notes. Wanding. April 20, 2006.)

The author believes that it is important to have some understanding ofNuer conflict resolution traditions, in order to better understand the potential requirement for outsiders' involvement. Traditionally, the use ofmediators was critical not only to induce the parties to negotiate, but also to reach a just settlement. Duany (1992) suggests that, The maintenance ofacephalous order is thefunction ofmultiple agents with limitedjurisdiction in resolving conflict. When a Nuerfeels insulted or wronged, he does not take advice ofseek arbitration, he prepares tofight. Threats may yield counterthreats. Hostility easily escalates to destructivefighting that breaches the covenant or the peace ofthe community. The openness ofNuer decision processes affords recourse to multiple agents who seek to dojustice and maintain the peace ofthe community by finding means to resolve conflicts when parties cannot settle itpeacefully themselves.

However, it is important to note that in these processes, while valued, coercion and the back-up of sanction, whether physical or spiritual, was required in order to induce individuals involved in conflict to 'come to the table'. From both the literature and contemporary personal interviews it would seem that the decision to enter into a negotiated settlement was/is based on relative power (including violence or the threat of violence), rather than an innate and communally internalized sense that justice should always be done. A neutral mediator with the capacity to sanction is a necessaryfeature ofan effective dispute resolution mechanism. Among the Nuer such a person is available in kuar muon or earth custodian. He is a member ofa lineage with the power to curse or to banfrom the territory the individual obstructing Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 8 1

efforts to settle disputes. Disputes were argued before ad hoc assemblies ofthe acknowledged leaders of the kin groups involved. Conflict resolution involved compensation through the payment ofcattle and the rate ofcompensation as well as the time it took to be paid, depended on the local availability ofcattle. Agreement was reached and compensation enforced according to the willingness ofkin groups involved to reach a settlement. This willingness was often affected by the closeness ofthe kin relationship between the groups, the existence ofother contemporaneous disputes between the groups, and the threats of physical retaliation made by the victim 's group against the lineage ofthe wrongdoer. A judicious use of the threat ofbanning or cursing enabled an earth custodian to get groups to meet and to agree to a settlement. In addition to the threat ofa curse or a ban, the earth custodian 's power ofpersuasion and knowledge oftraditional law were also important in the settlement ofdisputes... (Duany, 1992, p. 69-69)

The re-establishment ofthe 'covenent' between groups or individuals in conflict was often made through a 'blood sacrifice' of cattle. The use of "cattle ofthe blood" had ritual and symbolic significance similar to 'bridewealth' (dowry) cattle exchanged during marriage. The blood sacrifice, and more importantly, the actual dismemberment of the animal was meant to remind those entering into the covanent ofthe potential outcome ofviolating or breaking the covanent- the potential for the spilling ofhuman blood in retribution as an expression of God's will (in order to achieve justice and potentially carried out through a 'blood' feud). Fear of God and associated concepts of shame are also critical control mechanisms within inter-related Nuer constitutional order, religion and governance concepts. (Duany, 1992, p.74) As some offences against a person—homicide, adultery and incest—also involved spiritual 'sin ' (duer) which must be removed before a case could be completely settled, the earth custodian 's other duty was to perform the necessary rituals ofspiritual cleansing. Thus the settlement ofmany cases involved both negotiation ofreparations and spiritual atonement. It is necessary to emphasize that the acts of spiritual atonement are necessary to anypermanent settlement ofconflict. (Duany, 1992, p.68-69) Hutchinson (Hutchinson, 1996, p.108-109) documents how the introduction ofmodern firearms, participation in 'government' and involvement as combatants in the political and military struggles ofthe first and second civil wars dramatically affected traditions of accountability for homicide, atonement, spiritual cleansing and compensation, as a result ofthe type and scale of killing made possible with these weapons.

Authority and state creation; cultural and legal transformation When these distinctions have once been admitted, it is seen to be so untrue that there is, in the social contract, any real renunciation on the part ofthe individuals, that the position in which theyfind themselves as a result ofthe contract is reallypreferable to that in which they were before. Instead ofa renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead ofan uncertain andprecarious way ofliving they have got one that is better and more secure; instead ofnatural independence they have got liberty, instead ofthe power to harm others securityfor themselves, and instead oftheir strength, which others might overcome, a right which social union makes invincible. Their very life, which they have devoted to the State, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defence, what more are they doing than giving back what they have receivedfrom it? What are Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 82 they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the state ofnature, in which they would inevitably have tofight battles at the peril oftheir lives in defence ofthat which is the means oftheirpreservation? All have indeed tofight when their country needs them; but then no one has ever tofightfor himself. Do we not gain something by running, on behalfofwhat gives us our security, only some ofthe risks we should have to runfor ourselves, as soon as we lost it?

Jean Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract or Principles of Political Right, 1762. Although Nuerpractice a common language, a single religious heritage, a sharedpast, the glue of nationhoodfor them is to befound in an individual 'sfreedom ofaction. Freedom ofaction and reciprocal accountability are the essential ingredientsfor the working order ofan acephalous society. Nuer believe God has given man 's life and a capacity to think and act in ways that are consistent with ownfree choice and respectfor the samefreedom ofchoice by others. When individuals choose to combine toform a village or a cattle camp, they become kin who use theirfreedom ofaction to resolve their differences. Some individuals are 'ordained' to exercise priestly and mediating roles that carry unequal authority. These positions are exercised, however, as a public trust accountable to other members with whom they share the bond ofmutual trust in covenantal relationships. The prerogative ofpositions are not to be considered as instruments ofpower to exercise dominance over others. They are means to resolve conflicts among members ofan acephalous society. WaI Duany, Neither palaces nor prisons: The constitution of order among the Nuer, 1992 "A government without salt is not a government. " Lou Nuer Elder focus groups participant, Akobo, 2006

The research suggests that the implications of any proposed interventions in support of arms control are profound. The suggestion being that not only will the immediate security situation and conflict dynamics be altered for better or worse, but also that a fundamental transformation of and amongst the various political, military and social actors will take place. The author's reflections on and reaction to this potential transformation expose his concerns about the effects of modernization and globalization on culture as well as the relationship between the individual and the state. In the earlier and later sections referring to perceptions of security amongst the population in the research area, a dramatic transformation is documented: the expansion of space under the authority of civil, police and military authorities of the Government of South Sudan. The establishment of control ofterritory (and to a lesser extent external borders), as well as the establishment of a monopoly on the use of force by GoSS security organs, is the beginning of a process of establishing governance and rule of law by a civilian government. The local populations have not experienced an attempt at centralized, civilian governance since the Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 83 colonial period, which was of course also a foreign occupation. During the research period, local 'lawlessness' was sometimes expressed in the terms such as the following, "Lou [Nuer] are saying no to the government with the Kalashnikov and the RPG. " (Author's field notes. Interview with John Jok Choi, Peace and Development Advisor to the Governor of Jonglei State, Akobo. April 2006) In fact, as will be explored further in this chapter, the Lou had been saying 'No' to external government and governance all along- a set of concepts largely antithetical and destructive to their culture, religion and legal system, and not simply a response to a particular standing government, political or religious ideology. Armament and disarmament, must always be seen in this context of conquest and self defense, aptly expressed by a community leader in Akobo during the research period (and in spite ofthe obvious and ongoing human cost of gun violence locally), "Ifyou don 't have the gun, you become a useless man- you don 't have life ". (Author's field notes, Akobo. April 2006) Culturally speaking, many Nuer have, as a result ofdisplacement into refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, been exposed to western culture and media (which many youth would not otherwise have any experience of). In the more remote villages, moving out from Akobo town (and especially to the South along the Pibor river away from Ethiopia) in some cases the populations will not own radios, or have access to batteries to power them ifthey do exist. In these cases, all information comes by word of mouth. The establishment of control over territory and the establishment of law and order are preconditions for the hoped for beginning of longer- term development projects. This development will undoubtedly lead to increasing exposure to outside cultural influences, 'modernity' and alternative sources of information and communication. In fact, since the research period, a local CBO has installed a satélite internet (VSAT) connection and plans to offer computer training and access to the internet for the local population. Beyond, but in parallel to the opening up of new channels for information, communication and cultural change, riverine trade routes have also allowed for the movement of persons in need ofmedical attention, access to valuable commodities and external markets inside both Sudan and Ethiopia and safe movement of persons into and out of Akobo county. The

58 In some cases the author was mistaken by community elders (some ofwhom had worked with the British colonial government in the 1950s) as being the return of 'Government' -meaning in this case the return of British, foreign (and 'white') rule. 59 In fact, Akobo was a British Royal Air Force (RAF) base, the ruined remains of which currently serve as the SPLA barracks. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 84 movement of boats on the river also contributes to a sense ofprogress and builds confidence in the movement towards stabilization. In an immediate sense, however, disarmament has had perverse effects on land-based trade, which will be discussed in the section on the outcomes of limited disarmament. A number of key works allow us to see these changes in the context of the history ofthe Nuer (and in particular the Lou Nuer)- over the last 200 years. Ofparticular relevance to this study are 1) an examination ofthe ways in which Nuer governance, law and culture has been affected by contact with external colonizing forces and European governance models in the late 19th and first half ofthe 20th century; and, 2) the longer view, in which violent Nuer conquest, territorial expansion and assimilation ofneighbouring ethnic groups during the 19th century, informs current trends and attitudes. This section will examine the findings and trends explored earlier in this paper (as they relate to security, arms and trade) and will rely heavily on a small number of relevant texts, including Douglas Johnsons's PHD Dissertation "History and Prophesy among the Nuer ofthe Southern Sudan", WaI Duany's PHD Dissertation " Neither palaces nor prisons: The constitution of order among the Nuer" and Raymond C. Kelly's "The Nuer Conquest: The structure and Development of and Expansionist System". Collectively, these texts paint an un-romanticized view ofthe impact that conquest by the Lou Nuer have had on their neighbours and explain how Nuer expansion, with its destabilizing and violent impacts has been a product oftheir spiritual beliefs, political, legal and governance systems. The author proposes that as long as additional conditions are met (those proposed by the community themselves during the research period), disarmament may contribute to improved physical security and enhanced trade. However, the surrender ofweapons to the new Government of Southern Sudan has symbolic and real significance as the continuation of a century-long process of accepting state authority and western concepts of law and order, justice and governance. This submission, while hardly complete or irreversible, raises issues of what could be called 'cultural security' or cultural survival, as corollary to contemporary discourse on the dynamic interplay of state-centric and 'human' security concepts.60 The 'House of Nationalities' project has been established in Southern Sudan in an effort to help protect the human rights of Southern Sudan's 65 distinct cultural communities, and is based on the premise

60 For a substantial treatment ofthis idea, see Conradin Perner. The Human Rights of Cultures: Lessons from experiences with traditional South Sudanese Cultures. Presented at Emergent Human Rights Themes in East Africa, Challenges for Human Rights NGOs Conference in Nairobi Kenya, October 2004. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 85 that, ". . .[the] cultural diversity of the South Sudanese is their biggest wealth. . . Language and cultures are the bricks of any national identity, and their respect forms the foundation of sustainable peace and development."61 The population ofAkobo county, at a collective and individual level, are having to choose between competing concepts of order- one being the tradition ofhierarchical state-centric societies, state sovereignty and the social contract between citizens and the state and the other being stateless, or 'acephalous', societies. This choice, (while the potential for hybrid arrangements exists and already has some expression locally) is of a fundamental nature. The ability and/or desire of an isolated community to choose to resist this homogenizing submission to hierarchical governance and western legal traditions (which have near universal acceptance globally) appears limited, although not impossible. Certainly the ability to resist violently will be, at least temporarily, circumscribed by civilian disarmament, although there has rarely been a lack of external forces willing to provide arms and ammunition in support of groups willing to challenge state authority- it is for purposes which rarely coincides with local interests to preserve cultural integrity. As a case in point- during a November 2006 meeting between 13 Lou Nuer chiefs and the Murle paramount chief, and former SAF-backed Pibor Defense Forces militia commander, Ismael Konye, Lou chiefs stated that unless certain conditions were met (Murle disarmament and a secession ofMurle raiding, moving the state capital to a neutral location and replacing the State Governor), the Lou Nuer would move to Ethiopia, rearm and create a new state. The pastoralist Karimojong, facing similar governance and disarmament pressures, have reportedly made similar claims. (Knighton, 2003) Much has been written about the choices facing pastoralist communities in neighbouring areas within Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. Many ofthese communities face similar dilemmas: acceding to external/state control; change and adaptation of culture; loss ofpersonal freedom and control over their own political, religious, ecological, territorial and cultural destinies (however violent the traditional assertion ofthese 'destinies' may have been historically). Indeed the tensions between sedentary farming communities and nomadic pastoralist (and agro-pastoralist) communities, is as old as the domestication of animals and plants and has a biblical resonance. A recent study of armed cattle raiding among nomadic herding societies in East Africa, however, suggests that contemporary (since the 1970s) raiding by pastoralists using automatic

See the 'House ofNationalities' project at www.houseofnationalities.org Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 86 weapons such as the AK 47 is linked to a loss of population resilience and increased mortality of young children, adult males and decreased female fertility, that it represents a, "singularly maladaptive cultural behaviour. . .[and] . . .represents the single greatest threat to their biobehavioural resilience and ultimately may have profound evolutionary costs in terms of pastoralists' survival." (Gray et al., 2003) Clearly, most pastoralists in the area seem to be facing security dilemmas described in similar terms to those facing the research population in Akobo.62 The inter-connected pastoralist belt, referred to earlier in this paper as the 'Karamoja cluster', extending northward along the Kenya-Uganda border and further northward into Sudan and Ethiopia, can be extended through Upper Nile, Kordofan, Darfur and Northward or Westward into Egypt, Libya, Chad and across the southern fringes ofthe Sahara to the coast of North-West Africa. Even among these other 'lightly governed' areas, the research area stands out as having resisted the very concept of external government until the present day, barely acquiescing in the face of early Colonial era 'pacification' patrols, Royal Air Force punitive air raids or Arab Sudanese counter-insurgency campaigns, bombardments and chemical weapons attacks. While British Colonial agents eventually admitted that their lack ofunderstanding of the governance structures ofthe Nuer brought misunderstanding and conflict (often violent), their efforts at gaining a more sophisticated understanding ofNuer society were aimed at improving acceptance of and compliance with British Imperial rule (the ultimate expression or autocephalous or 'sovereign' governance models) (Duany, 1992). The seminal anthropological studies ofthe Nuer by E. Evans Pritchard (forming part ofthe canon of cultural anthropology), from which we gain at least some of our modern understanding of this particular society should be seen as a tool for improved domination and colonization, according to the precept of 'knowing one's enemy'. WaI Duany describes traditional Nuer governance models as a system linking, individual freedoms, family, religious and societal obligations and conflict resolution. He suggests that conflict (and its physical manifestation through feuding and warfare) is critical to the constant re- affirmation of a societal and religious 'covenant', which is at the heart ofNuer belief, strength and ethnic solidarity. He argues that, " ...feuding resolves disputes and allows mutual adjustment

62 While conducting the field research and subsequent disarmament, the author collected testimony detailing the use of mortars and anti-personnel mines during cattle raiding attacks and withdrawals with captured livestock. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 87

between groups. Conflict, by creating regularpatterns ofallianceformation, serves as a functional substitutefor a central government. It is in conflict situations that higher levels of organization becomes visible when regulative ideas are acted uponfor marshalling activities in the society" (Duany, 1992, p.61) During the early decades ofBritish colonialism, 'interactions' between the colonial administration and the Nuer were carried out through heavily armed 'patrols' (often made up primarily of Sudanese auxiliary forces composed ofneighbouring tribes with whom the Nuer had been in longstanding violent conflict- particularly the Dinka from the area around Bor), meant to pacify and collect 'tribute' from the Nuer in the form of cattle without attempting to actually govern the population. Over time, the violence associated with these methods (which predictably failed to gain the lasting trust of the intended 'subject' population) escalated in order to punish recalcitrant groups, and included the use ofairpower against Nuer nomads (a method still being used in neighbouring Uganda in an attempt to disarm the related Karimojong). Daly (1986), in Empire on the Nile: The Anglo Egyptian Sudan 1998-1934 describes the relations between the Nuer and the Colonial era government as, "a long chapter ofmisunderstanding and neglect punctuated by official violence and popular mistrust." (Daly, 1986, p. 398) During this early period, colonial patrols were often considered by the Nuer as no more than a form of cattle raid, with counter-raiding against government and proxy forces seen as a legitimate way ofrecuperating lost cattle and resisting subjugation.63 Attempts to disarm Nuer in 2005-2006, which led to considerable loss of life, also fit into this pattern, with asset stripping and cattle theft reported during a coercive disarmament campaign carried out by a mobile SPLA force moving in an arc North and East through Nuer occupied areas along the Duk ridge (conquered by the Nuer from the Dinka between 1890 and 1930) towards largely Nuer inhabited Akobo (conquered by the Nuer from the Anuak as part ofthe same Nuer conquest by 1912). Daly describes a 1920 patrol into eastern Nuer areas, to the North of the research area, as, ". . .a depressingly familiar routine oftorching villages, capturing livestock, and killing as many as possible of the "enemy' . . .and as usual led to no political solution." (Daly, 1986, p. 399)

Studies on contemporary attempts to disarm and pacify the Karimojong by the government of Uganda have also been described in similar terms: See: Ben Knighton. The State as raider among the Karimojong: 'where there are no guns they use the threat of guns'. Africa 73, (203) University of Edinburgh. 2003. pp 427-55 Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 88

Eventually, the British, (after a campaign characterized by the liberal usage of machineguns and airpower as well as the separation of conflicting populations according to what was termed the 'Nuer Settlement') concluded that it would be prudent to impose a system of 'indirect rule' amongst the 'subject' Nuer population. The methods used to impose indirect rule evolved over time to make them more effective and included attempts to create hierarchical governance structures, codify Nuer law, to dismantle and undermine diffused consensual decision making, conflict resolution and governance systems. Beyond the codification of laws and penalties64, the imposition of a foreign legal system involved the undermining ofNuer traditions in a number of ways: through the creation of chief s courts (which eroded the involvement of authorities traditionally involved in mediation, secularized the Nuer system of governance; and, opened up the justice system to patronage in chiefs appointments and opportunities for self-aggrandizement and corruption); the use of physical confinement and prisons; through the use of corporal punishment and humiliation as a punishment. (Duany, 1992, p.72-73) The Nuer also challenged the written laws enshrined in nguot Fangak because they failed to deal with the spiritual aspect of life, justice and reconciliation, arguing that, "A social order based solely on penal law and punishment has no moral foundation to build upon." (1992, P- 74). Duany describes the foundations ofNuer self-governance in the following way, Conformity can only be maintained ifthe rules have some measure ofauthority behind them. The continuity ofthe social order depends upon the passing on oftradition, ofknowledge and skill, of manners and morals, religion and taste, from one generation to the next. Among the Nuer the largest share in the control and education ofthe youngfalls to the parents and other relatives ofthe parent 's generation. (Duany, 1992, p. 11) Research participants reported an erosion oftraditional family relations, suggesting that children no longer defer to parents and sometimes sell cattle and buy weapons without the consent of their parents. One elder recounted how youth, who were refused a firearm by their parents, have on occasion borrowed firearms from friends and laid an ambush to kill someone carrying a weapons as a means of obtaining one. (Author's field notes, Mixed focus group. Akobo. April 2006)

referred to as the 'nguot Fangak' or Fangak laws after the location where the codification took place through compliant chiefs selected to participate by the British. These 'agreed' laws are contained in Howell's "A Manual ofNuer Law" in 1954. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 89

In an effort to understand the inter-related social significance ofweapons, historic or cultural concepts of governance, law and community self-defense, we should examine the historic and current results ofNuer beliefs in terms of collective violence, cultural solidarity and conquest. Duany proposes that, "In Nuer thought, man has a unique responsibility to "subdue the earth." This subduing involves the realization of all the potential within creation that might offer glory to the Creator." (Duany, 1992, p. 64). Further, he suggests that, "The cosmological conception of "subduing" the earth to the glory oftheir Creator can be said to have led to massive assimilation oftheir neighbours who do not acknowledge the same worldview. Raids and land appropriation can be considered to result from this conception." (Duany, 1992, p. 81). A compatible economic, cultural and sociological explanation for Nuer expansionist tendencies is provided by Duany, as it relates to the economic and cultural drivers within pastoralist societies in general.

The relativefreedom ofvillagers coupled with the need to meet their requirementsfor security and economic well beingfrequently result in efforts by Nuer villagers to expand the physical size of lineage land holdings and to construct alliance, especially thefrontier communities. When they were successful, their efforts resulted in increases in capital (cattle), human population, and land takenfrom non-Nuer neighbours. Live cattle are culturally defined as items ofexchange that may legitimately be accumulated and held in reservefor anticipated bridewealth payments ... [and] the productive process is largely governed by exchange-based rather than consumption-based strategies. . . . exchange requirements push production requirements well beyond that requiredfor subsistence purposes and engenders the accumulation ofsurplus productive capacity. . . . surplus cattle held in reserveforfuture payments must ofcourse befed. Grazing requirements are thus significantly expanded. This dynamic creates grazing shortages that cannot satisfactorily be resolved by herd reductions since the latter are antithetical to the accumulative goals ofproductionfor exchange. Territorial expansion thus represented the only solution that was consistent with the exchange-based organization ofproduction. Duany (1992) formulates an explanation of the causes ofNuer expansion sympathetic to Nuer needs in terms of economics and self-defense and somewhat euphemistically describes the results, "The consequence ofNuer success in expanding pasturage was that the Dinka people (and Anuak) had to accept re-settlement and common use of grazing resources." (Duany, 1992, p. 143) While suggesting that both religious concepts and internal market forces drove Nuer expansionist tendencies, and necessitated the organization of internally coherent and consistent religious, governance and military organization, from a contemporary point ofview many ofthe activities justified or explained this way can be described as murder and assault, theft, looting, destruction of property, colonization, massive cultural assimilation of subject populations, kidnapping and rape. This phenomenon has been described in systemic terms, ". . .as an instance Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 90

of an expansionist system, characterized by an unremitting constitutional predisposition to territorial appropriation...a non-equilibrium system." (Kelly, 1985, p.8) Nuer and Dinka split between 1400 and 2000 years ago according to linguistic analysis (Kelly, 1985, p.l 1). The Funj kingdom, which dominated the caravan routes for gold and slaves from the periphery of southern Sudan and the Blue Nile basin, was undermined by rebellion and inter-tribal wars by 1776. (Kelly, 1985, p.21). The contraction ofthe Funj kingdom of Sennar allowed for Dinka expansion to the North. The causes ofboth Nuer and Dinka expansion remain unclear. However, there seems to have been a coincidence between the two. Owing to previous Dinka encirclement ofNuer populations, any Nuer expansion would necessarily cause a ripple effect. Whatever the original cause ofthis expansion, the effects on groups neighbouring the Nuer were dramatic. Nuer speakingpeople progressively appropriated territory in the center ofthe Upper Nile Basin, and Dinka speakingpeoples progressively expanded to the northern and western margins ofthis ecological zone (ofsome 160,000 square miles). We shall see that the Nuer assimilated an extraordinary number ofDinka and it is likely that the Dinka likewise assimilated most oftheformer inhabitants ofthe periphery. The mostprominentfeature ofthis remarkable transformation is thus the replacement ofone set ofcultural systems by another, i.e., an "ecological succession" ofculturalforms. (Kelly, 1985, p.22) Beswick (2004) suggests that 18th century migrations ofthe horse-riding Bagarra peoples, eastward from modern day Chad, through Darfur, also played an important role in the Nuer conquest oftheir neighbours and 'assimilationist' tendencies, proposing that the, ...historicalfactors ofBaggara slave raids should befactored into these events as the one which initiallyfueled this migration. As thousands ofDinka and Nuerfled towards eastern Dinkaland populations intensified, land became limited and conflict erupted. These ongoing wars which have lasted for centuries encouraged an ethnic meltdown between both Dinka and Nuer resulting in a profound historicalphenomenon: by the twentieth century seventy percent ofthe Nuer comprisedformer Dinka citizens. Whatever the contributing causes, the Nuer conquest during the 19th century led to a four- fold expansion oftheir territory, from 8700 sq miles to approximately 35,000 sq miles. (Kelly, 1985, p.23) It, "typically followed a period of intensive raiding in which the burning of settlements, destruction of crops and theft of cattle eventually precipitated a Dinka withdrawal." (Kelly, 1985, p.24) Some 100,000 - 1 12,000 Dinka and Anuak persons are likely to have been assimilated during the Nuer conquest of their neighbours. (Kelly, 1985, p.66) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 91

Chapter VII— Post Field-Research Disarmament

Towards the end ofthe research period, the security situation in Akobo continued to deteriorate- even by the standards ofthe local authorities. While Nasir-based militia attacks had only subsided 12 months before (5 months after the signing ofthe CPA), the occurrence ofblood feud related revenge attacks within the town itself (within the area considered to be 'safe' by locals, which measured roughly 1km X 500 m) suggested a further erosion of control by local civil, police and military- outside ofpolitically motivated violence that had characterized the post-CPA militia-SPLA fighting. Indeed, from local accounts ofthe January-May 2005 militia- SPLA fighting over Akobo, in spite ofthe fact that the town changed hands several times, few lives were lost, with each group withdrawing in the face ofthe other. After the killing of 2 ofthe 3 local health care workers in late April 2006, and during what can only be described as the increased 'hunting' ofprominent members of the community within the town itself, an emergency meeting was convened, which included local chiefs, civil authorities, Police and SPLA. Large-scale nighttime patrolling ofthe town by local Police and SPLA took place as a result, in an attempt to maintain control of even this limited 'safe' area.65 While the dry season violence and death toll had been characterized by Murle attacks on Lou civilians, as the rains began and forced disarmament moved into the western payams of Akobo county, the scale of Lou-Lou inter-lineage/sectional and revenge killings increased. It was suggested by local CBO workers that the levels ofviolence increased in anticipation of disarmament, with the settling ofold scores (some feuds reportedly being as old as 10 years) before weapons would be removed, by force or otherwise, (personal communication with local CBO worker, June 2006)

The author witnessed these new nighttime patrols comprised of approximately 50 armed Police and SPLA, moving through and around Akobo town during a time when many local 'intellectuals' refused to move at night, fearing for their own safety as a result of clan affiliation and blood feuds. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 92

After leaving Akobo at the end ofApril, the author made presentations to military and civilian components of UNMIS and UNDP in Malakal, Khartoum and Juba, offering analysis of the security situation in Akobo County and describing the dynamics surrounding ongoing forced disarmament in Jonglei and Upper Nile and the potential impacts on Akobo County.66 This was followed by meetings with UNDP and high-level political authorities ofthe GoSS to discuss the preliminary findings ofthe research and potential alternative models of disarmament through collaboration between the GoSS, local actors and the UN.67 A May 10 press release from the South Sudan United Democratic Alliance (SSUDA- the political wing ofthe South Sudan Defense Forces or 'SSDF' SAF-backed militia) suggested that the forced disarmament was a deliberate attempt by elements ofthe GoSS or SPLA to target the Nuer and amounted to genocide. It also directly criticized the then Special Representative ofthe Secretary General (SRSG), Jan Pronk, for failing to prevent the deaths resulting from the violence surrounding disarmament, inferring UN complicity through inaction in the claimed genocide. (South Sudan Defense Forces [SSDF], 2006) While these claims were inaccurate, they raised the profile of the crisis surrounding the violence in central Jonglei within the UN system globally and within Sudan. As the effects of disarmament and ongoing clashes became apparent to the UN through multi-agency assessment missions led by UNMIS civil affairs and UNDSS and reports from the Nuer Peace Council, a multi-agency Jonglei Task Force was formed to develop a coordinated inter-agency response to the crisis. At various times, and as required, this taskforce operated from Juba, Malakal and Khartoum in order to coordinate UN responses to the unfolding situation in central Jonglei. As such it represents a successful model of flexible multi-agency coordination, addressing variously, political issues with the GoSS, coordination of field assessments and reporting as well as internal UN and UNMIS policy development. At this time, reports were filtering out from the field of houses being burnt, water points destroyed and livestock looted during the ongoing disarmament campaign. (Nuer Peace Council b, 2006) UNMIS assessments and SPLA claims also suggested that militia elements were fighting alongside 'white army' (armed civilian Lou Nuer acting as

The source of this information was mainly through HF radio operators in Akobo who received information from other military and civilian radio operators throughout Jonglei, as well as Nuer Peace Council, State Government officials and Pact employees. 67 During this period, the author met twice with the Vice President of South Sudan, the South Sudan DDR Commissioner, as well as with the State Governor for Jonglei State and the GoSS Minister for Youth Culture and Sport to discuss alternative approaches to disarmament. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 93 community self-defense forces) and, at the time more alarmingly, that SPLA were reporting the interception of ammunition stocks by truck to re-supply the retreating militia and white army elements.68 SSUDA claims of alliances being formed between Murle and Lou militia, raising the specter of a campaign to destabilization Jonglei and contest GoSS authority through continued direct military confrontation. The UN's response to the violence was confused by the various characterizations ofthose involved in the fighting as 'civilians', 'white army' and 'militia', since these labels carry with them different legal connotations and implications vis-à-vis the CPA and the UN's interpretation of its own mandate according to UN Security Council Resolution 1590. For example, while according to the CPA all illegally armed civilians are to be disarmed, no directly relevant civilian arms laws exist and hence civilian arms possession is not technically illegal. Similarly, although clear provisions existed in the CPA to address the absorption of 'Other Armed Groups' through absorption into SAF and/or SPLA or though demobilization, the nature ofthe 'white army' more closely resembles civilian community self defense forces as opposed to military structures that could be considered as OAGs. Bodies designated in the CPA to negotiate the fate of OAGs were also never convened by the GoSS and GoNU. Lastly, the Juba declaration, as with the OAG provisions in the CPA suggested that any OAGs refusing to be absorbed, would be considered as illegally armed groups that would be dealt with by the state as such. Hence, what was taking place could have variously been considered as an attempt by the GoSS to establish law and order, an illegal disarmament by the state, or an attempt to deal by force with the continued existence of illegal armed groups/recalcitrant OAGs. Emergency decisions taken by the GoSS behind closed doors to support first negotiated disarmament and then forced disarmament also added confusion as to which GoSS policies to support and internal UN responses to the violence taking place. The failure to convene formal and transparent OAG negotiations (with CPA mandated monitoring by the UN as a neutral party) through the OAG Collaborative Committee (OAGCC) also lends credibility to the claims by OAGs that they were not sufficiently (and certainly not transparently) involved in processes to negotiate their own absorption or legal status. The failure to engage directly with OAGs to discuss demobilization options may also have left them in the

At the time ofopen conflict between the white army and SPLA, the UN and other international agencies were barred by the SPLA from visiting the areas in question. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 94 dark as to alternatives to maintaining their immediate power base by force of arms instead of opting for absorption or demobilization support. In June 2006, UNDP Southern Sudan developed a proposal for the establishment ofa Jonglei focused Community Security and Arms Control Programme. This was used as a working document to support discussions on alternative, non-violent approaches to disarmament. UNDP Sudan entered into discussions with the SSDDRC and UNDDR units to fund this programme through the IDDRP as an implementing partner. At the same time, the Jonglei Taskforce conducted multi-agency humanitarian assessments to the areas affected by the ongoing disarmament, once access was approved by the SPLA, and coordinated the provision of limited humanitarian support.

Disarmament Building on Peace Processes and preliminary research findings During the research period, a preliminary ceasefire was arranged between Murle chiefs and Lou Nuer peace representatives and civil authorities, in the displaced corridor west of Akobo, after widespread attacks and killings- including the butchering ofchildren by machete. Local peace Committee representatives suggested that they had documented 60-70 deaths in the previous two months, resulting from Murle attacks on the Lou Nuer ofAkobo County. (Author's field Notes, Akobo. April 2006) Violence continued at high levels towards the wet season as clan fighting and blood feuds escalated and Murle activity waned in step with southward migrations back into Murle wet season villages. At least another 20 persons were killed, with a similar number ofwounded during this period. The initial ceasefire led to limited peace talks that evolved into a Pact Sudan supported Lou-Murle peace process in June 2006, and culminating in a peace and cooperation agreement.69 Agreement reached to disarm at this Lou-Murle meeting led immediately to a Lou-Lou meeting of chiefs to discuss an alternative model of disarmament.

An outcomes document was prepared and signed by the Murle and Lou representatives, titled Resolutions made at Lou-Nuer and Murle communities peace conference held at Akobo on the 261 to 3(f 2006 Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards

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What had made the disarmament somewhat urgent was the need to sustain commitments made during the Lou-Murle process, the extreme violence ofMurle and clan fighting that had taken place respectively before and after the Lou-Murle process and the need to demonstrate to the SPLA and GoSS that non-coercive disarmament could be organized through local structures in order to avoid the thoroughly militarized approach that had been applied in Central Jonglei (which led to considerable loss of life on all sides). By the end of the Lou-Murle meetings, Akobo County Commissioner, Doyak Choi, had been informed that the SPLA would be moving into eastern Akobo payams within 2 weeks to begin the disarmament by force. Commissioner Choi developed an alternative community-driven approach, based on consultations with chiefs and community representatives and secured the buy in ofthe Jonglei State Government in order to proceed- by demonstrating the community's commitment to disarmament by registering weapons through chiefs ahead ofthe SPLA's arrival. It quickly became clear that the overall Jonglei CSAC programme would not be approved and operational in time to provide support for alternatives to coercive disarmament, so a proposal was put forward to the GoSS, Jonglei taskforce and UNDDR for support to carry out a rapid intervention in support ofthe non-coercive model of disarmament proposed by local officials in Akobo, and agreed by chiefs. This proposal was accepted both by the local authorities and the GoSS in Juba, with the understanding that activities would also take place to support reconciliation and peaceful disarmament in areas previously affected by the forced disarmament. Local authorities in Akobo welcomed UN support for the disarmament exercise. (Doyak Choi, personal communication, June 2006) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 96

The proposal put to UNMIS and UNDDR to support the process included the use of UNMIS Force Protection to build confidence and provide security; the use of UNMIS Riverine units to open the river, build security and provide logistical support to the UN staffto move between disarmament centers; air operational support as had already been dedicated through the Jonglei Taskforce; and, shipping containers to safely and securely store the collected weapons. UNDDR was asked to provide food and non-food items in order to sustain the operation and provide token non-food item compensation for collected weapons. UNMIS Chief of Operations agreed to meet these requirements, but in the end, only the force protection and dedicated air transportation support was forthcoming, owing to logistical constraints and inhibitions on the part ofthe Bangladeshi Force Riverine Unit. In order to allow the operation to proceed, two local petrol fuelled boats were loaned by Nile Hope Development Forum (NHDF) and the Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency (PRDA) in order to support the operation and fuel was purchased on the open marked in Malakal by UNDP staff and transported by chartered boat to Akobo.70 Two rotations of UNMIS Force Protection composed of soldiers and officers ofthe Jamu and Kashmir Light Infantry took part in the disarmament process through a static presence in Akobo town and accompaniment on 4 ofthe more than 20 riverine patrols carried out using local boats. The Force Protection, provided bullet proofvests for those carrying out activities in remote areas in their absence, medical assistance to UN and local persons and assistance in the carriage and storage of weapons between the boats and the SRRC compound or Police building where weapons and ammunition respectively were stored separately at the end ofthe disarmament process. The formal disarmament began two weeks after it had been agreed by local authorities and chiefs, on July 15, organized by County Commissioner Doyak Choi through chiefs, county, payam and community level disarmament committees- once school teachers had been trained by UN officials to safely clear, register and store the weapons and security had been organized for disarmament centers. 10 SPLA and 10 local deputies were appointed at each of 10 disarmament centers to provide security and guard weapons. Mobilization teams were also created and public information carried out, supported by the UN, traveling daily between the 10 disarmament

The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had been unable to transport fuel for this purpose because of internal regulations prohibiting the transportation of petrol onboard UN planes and helicopters. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 97 centers along the Pibor and Agvei rivers (this river had not been used commercially or for transport for 9 years as a result of insecurity, so this had the additional benefit of 'opening up9 the river for trade and transport). Typically, mixed groups of UNDP and UNMIS civilian staff, UN Military Observers, SSRC, payarn administrators and SPLA would patrol in 1 or 2 boats between disarmament centers, sharing information, monitoring and verifying weapons registration and collection, providing logistical support, meeting with community members to discuss and resolve emergent problems and build confidence in the disarmament process. This was particularly important in areas where lineage sections had been feuding with one another and were skeptical about the disarmament of antagonistic groups (with whom they had been deliberately separated from for the purposes of disarmament). In one area, for example, all male youth belonging to a feuding clan restricted themselves to a disarmament center for a period ofweeks, under the protection of the SPLA and local auxiliaries, until their rivals had been verifiably disarmed.

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Non-compliance, slow compliance, confusion over registration procedures, one attempt to regain weapons guarded by SPLA and various local confusions, tensions, logistical constraints and difficulties attended this process. Nonetheless, and in spite of poor communications and mechanical breakdowns, the climactic difficulties of rain and sun in open boats, tropical diseases :ees, SFU iiefs, elden . CBO partners, local authorities and the UN. With the exception ofthe UN support as a neutral interlocutor and observer and through the provision oftraining and logistical support, this process was carried out by local civilians, Police, Military and Civil actors. [See Appendix 10 at p. 152 for a breakdown ofthe GoSS County, payam and village disarmament committee organization]

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Effects of Disarmament Though concerns that SAF-backed Murle militia might disrupt the process, disarmament took place relatively peacefully. The population had been approached by white army/militia agitators fleeing the forced disarmament further West, attempting to mobilize the community to resist disarmament, but the community threatened them with arrest and told them to leave the area. (Author's field notes, Wachoman/Gagdong, July 2006) Three persons were killed during the disarmament period: an SPLA officer shot his wife and a bystander in a domestic dispute in Akobo town before fleeing, and one person was shot and killed in Cuiban as a revenge killing related to an ongoing blood feud begun in April 2006. To the knowledge ofthe author, no further Lou-Lou killings have taken place post-disarmament, although reports of substantial Murle raiding continued and escalated during the 2006-2007 dry season. The deployment of sufficient SPLA forces, towards the end of the dry season began to quell this insecurity, although it speculatively revealed the presence of militia opposed to the CPA and Murle militia absorption, rather than exclusively conventional civilian raiding. By July 30, 2006 (the formal end ofthe two week-long process), an estimated 1,280 weapons were turned in. All ofthese weapons were removed from the disarmament centers by boat, transported to Akobo town and stored under lock and key (with the key for weapons stored in the SRRC compound remaining in the hands of the County Commissioner and the key for the ammunition and magazines stored and in the hands ofthe Akobo County Police). Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 100

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As a participant in the process, the author cautiously contends that given the relatively small number of young men in the community (perhaps as a result ofhigh mortality caused by the war and associated fighting, displacement and disease)71 (Nile Hope Development Forum, 2005), the addition of 500 persons (and hence 500 guns) that reportedly joined the SPLA and whose guns had then come under government control72, additional weapons brought under control by former SPLA who had deserted and who now returned to duty as SPLA and, finally, the number of gun-owning men who were out ofthe community at the time ofthe disarmament, it generated high returns ofweaponry. In a November report on cross-border dialogue between Akobo and Gambella authorities, Commissioner Doyak Choi suggested that up to 50 Lou Nuer youth had also fled the disarmament with their weapons. Immediately after the disarmament, Akobo County Commissioner Doyak Choi further reported that fewer than 200 weapons

71 A 2005 Nile Hope Development Forum (local Akobo community development organization) report included a household survey of returnees suggested that of 30,000 returnees to the County in 2005, only 1800 were adult males. 72 This may include many who had previously fought with the SPLA and had subsequently deserted, but who reported themselves to the SPLA during the disarmament. The figure of 500 was provided by the Akobo County Commissioner, but has not been independently verified. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 0 1 remained in private hands and that the communities have continued to surrender weapons. Anecdotal reports suggests that, predictably, some weapons have been hidden through burial.73 Others, including some SPLA representatives, are more guarded about whether it successfully netted high ratios of weapons. Former militia commanders ofthe South Sudan Defence Forces suggested that the ratio ofweapons surrendered during the disarmament was low. According to interviews conducted as part of a Small Arms Survey report, Simon Gatwitch, who had previously provided the Akobo people with weapons said that the 1,300 weapons was less than % of the actual number. (SAS, November 2006) Similarly dubious, former SSDF Commander in Chief, Paulino Matiep estimated that it amounted to 10 per cent, while Peter Gedet, who also had experience distributing weapons in the area, thought that the number of weapons handed in were a small fraction ofthe actual amount. (SAS, November 2006) At the time ofwriting, more than 1400 serviceable rifles, machineguns, RPGs and mortars have been voluntarily surrendered.74 It is important to note (and in response to the above estimates by those having previous experience with the supply of ammunition to SSDF in Akobo County), that only 3 ofthe County's 6 Payams (sub-county administrative units) were disarmed through this process. The two additional western Payams in Akobo County were disarmed by the SPLA moving eastward as an expansion ofthe forced disarmament. As well, Alali Payam to the East ofthe 3 Payams disarmed during this exercise was not disarmed because of logistical constraints75. As a result, it is possible that the quotes for higher numbers refer to Akobo County as a whole, and not to the 3 Payams disarmed through the formal process alone. Because there are currently no accurate and impartial baseline figures for the numbers of weapons in civilian hands before disarmament, it will be almost impossible to verify ratios of disarmament to non- compliance.

73 A GoSS source suggested that 80 weapons had been buried in Walgak, West of Akobo in an area that was disarmed peacefully by the SPLA following fighting with the White Army. These weapons may have been used by Lou Nuer raiding Murle areas during Murle disarmament and in reprisal for Murle raids against Lou Nuer areas after the Lou disarmament. These attacks against Murle were used as a reason by Murle to resist or delay disarmament. 74 Enough weapons to arm 1 1A Battalions of infantry 75 Al Ali Payam is inhabited by people belonging to the Anuak tribe, which straddles the Ethiopia-Sudan frontier. Akobo town was traditionally an Anuak area and Lou Nuer conquest ofthe Anuak between the 1880s the 1980s set the current demographic conditions. Lou-Anuak fighting over the site ofAkobo are reported in the colonial record going back as far as 1912. DisarmameiQt Opportunities and Hazards 10:

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Perhaps a more meaningful indicator of the effects of the pilot intervention, based on the field research and the limited measurable indicators relating to movement and trade, would be increased control by government authorities (with the associated dilemmas and implications explored earlier in this paper); the opening up ofriver transport76; an expansion in the free movement of civilians throughout the County between Cuiban and Wanding (especially when compared with the extremely circumscribed movement described during the research period); and an explosive growth of markets (estimated to have expanded at least five-fold in a subsequent visit to Akobo in April 2007) and the variety of trade goods and services available locally and a dramatic decline in violent death caused by inter-sectional fighting within the Lou Nuer community.77 On September 8th 2006 in the GoSS Capital of Juba, GoSS President and First Vice President ofthe Government ofNational Unity, Salva Kiir Mayardit, in a speech before the Southern Sudan legislative Assembly, announced a 200-Day Action Plan to monitor the implementation ofthe GOSS programs of action, that referenced the disarmament activities taking place in Akobo County. (Salva Kiir announces 200-day action plan, September 2006,) [See Appendix 1 1 at p. 154 for an excerpt ofthis speech] During subsequent visits and satélite phone conversations with persons in Akobo, it is apparent that local civilians are not openly carrying weapons in the community and the state has asserted control over territory for the first time, so that persons found carrying weapons can be arrested by Police. This began to happen immediately post-disarmament as persons from Gajak Jikane Nuer areas migrated into Lou areas. It is highly unlikely that every weapon was handed 76 Boats are reportedly arriving daily in Akobo as their southern terminus on the Pibor river. 77 As the dry season and Murle migrations began, violent clashes between Murle and Lou increased. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 103 in, and under the circumstances of a rushed disarmament taking place under threat of force by the SPLA, it seems like an unlikely outcome. The post-disarmament priority shifted towards the need for disarmament ofthe Murle as required under the Lou-Murle peace agreement of June 2006 and adequate protection by the SPLA and Police for the community as the dry season began, including Police training and equipment, continued UN presence in border and tribal boundary areas and a greater SPLA presence and logistical support.78 At the time of disarmament, UN officials in Juba received guarantees from high-level GoSS officials that additional SPLA forces would be sent to Akobo to provide supplementary security for the community as the 220 SPLA soldiers in the Akobo garrison were deemed insufficiently prepared or equipped to carry out dynamic patrolling and security functions, as identified during the research period. Another interesting aspect ofthe disarmament process, and one that demonstrates the successful collaboration between local, NGO and UN programmes in a conflict-reduction effort, was the use of youth in 'peer to peer' discussions on the issues of disarmament at the village level. Many of the youth workers had previously participated in armed groups, blood feuds and cattle raiding and their reputations were known amongst the 'target' communities where disarmament was to take place (which in this case gained them the trust and admiration oftheir peers). At the same time, these youth workers (who had been hired and flown up from Nairobi) had lived and received an education in refugee camps and in neighbouring countries. They were well dressed, educated and would have been considered as elite, cosmopolitan and intellectual by local standards. Together with their previous experience of armed conflict, raiding and the dilemmas associated with weapons possession, these youth were seen as credible interlocutors. In a number of instances, local white army responded to the counseling oftheir peers and surrendered weapons and ammunition directly to the 'youth mobilizers'.79 Although further study amongst the disarmed youth population in Akobo would provide additional insight into the decision making process among white army to disarm, hide weapons, potentially fight or flee, on the surface the author believes that in some critical cases direct discussion by youth peer

The local garrison is divided between former SSDF and old SPLA (now absorbed as SPLA) and doesn't even have enough ammunition to patrol, let alone regular salaries to encourage them to be proactive about security. 79 These mobilizers were trained and deployed by Pact Sudan in both Lou Nuer and Murle areas. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 104 mobilizers may have had a beneficial effect, where chiefs from communities initially reluctant to disarm appeared to have limited control over non-compliant armed youth leaders. It is impossible to gage whether, in isolation, these peer-to-peer efforts, coupled with the disarmament and security committee structures created through local authorities, disarmament- focused sermons by local churches and household-level analysis and discussions would have produced the same result without additional confidence-building from the UN as a neutral party. The author contends that increased involvement of all potential partners and increased resources to facilitate the work of local weapons registrars deployed to isolated communities would have improved the process and that without UN support the process might not have been completed quickly enough to placate forced disarmament advocates within the GoSS and SPLA. The work ofthose deployed in Murle areas was inhibited by unresolved higher-level issues, specifically including the then unresolved absorption ofMurle militia into either the SAF or SPLA and the related political future ofthe Murle chief (and leader ofthe Pibor Defence Forces), Ismael Konye. A joint UNDDR-Pact Sudan follow up 'Community Security Assessment' suggested that the population generally considered the security situation to have improved after disarmament and that the number one priority of interviewees was security from Murle raiding. (Pact Sudan & UNDDR, 2006) This report also recommended a number of activities to reduce conflict between the Lou Nuer and Murle, beginning with the disarmament ofthe Murle as a first priority. [See Appendix 12 at p. 156 for a list of additional proposals for conflict reduction]

Murle Disarmament and Militia Absorption: Priority number one for the Lou Nuer community From the initial joint UNDDR/SSDDRC assessment mission to Akobo in July 2005, throughout the research period and during the disarmament process, the Murle militia and armed Murle civilians had been identified as a major source of insecurity. Initial discussions between the UN and Murle civil authorities during the time of forced disarmament in central Lou areas suggested that any attempts by SPLA to forcibly disarm Murle civilians would lead to a "bloodbath", and that such resistance would be supported not only by SAF backed Murle militia (aka- the Pibor Defence Force), but also by Murle civilians under chiefs who had ostensibly gone over to the GoSS/SPLA and who had agreed to disarm through the Lou-Murle peace meeting of June 2006. (UN official, personal communications, Juba, 2006) This would have led to a major Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 105 destabilization ofthe region and the CPA and a missed opportunity to peacefully bring an area historically hostile to the SPLM/A under GoSS state control. At this time the Murle militia were backed by a mainstream Sudan Armed Forces garrison in Pibor town itself. While UNMIS reports suggested that militia fighting the SPLA during forced disarmament in Lou areas were seeking to link up with and be re-supplied by other SAF backed militia to the North in Korfluz (towards Malakal) and to the South in Murle militia areas, no obvious or overtly active alliance emerged. (UNMIS Civil Affairs briefing, Malakal, June 2006) Indeed, in later discussions with Murle leaders, it was proposed that Lou Nuer youth who had escaped the forced disarmament in central Jonglei had moved South into Murle areas and (according to different accounts by the Murle Paramount Chief and the Pibor County Commissioner), had "surrendered themselves in Pibor"80 (William Boren, personal communication, November 2006) or conversely, were heavily armed and actively raiding both Murle and Dinka towards Bor (the State capital to the West, inhabited by the Bor Dinka- historical adversaries and periodic target of Lou raiding). ft 1 It is impossible to verify these claims, although Murle were subsequently killed and identified by SPLA during attempted raids as late as June 2007. A joint GoSS-SPLA-UN disarmament of the Murle subsequently took place, between January and May 2007, resulting in the collection of some 1300 weapons from Murle civilians, while some 1200 Murle militia were withdrawn from Pibor town and taken for re-organization and training within the SPLA in Juba. Again, the UN acted as a neutral observer and provided logistical support to a locally driven disarmament process. Insecurity generated by spoilers and bandits remains a significant problem in Jonglei and a renewal of forced disarmament is threatened.

Discussion between the author and Commissioner William Boren- (later replaced by presidential decree) and Sultan Ismael Konye, Paramount Chief ofthe Murle and Major General ofthe Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)-backed militia, the Pibor Defence Forces (PDF), thought to number some 1500 soldiers, who has, as of March 2007, handed over the bulk ofthe PDF to the SPLA. November 2006 81 William Boren contends that 7 persons reportedly killed by Murle East of Bor in November 2006, were actually killed by a large group of Lou Nuer (who fled the fighting in central Jonglei in early 2006) operating along the Nanaam river system (parallel to the Pibor river between Pibor town and Bor) armed with PKM machineguns and RPGs and accompanied by cattle. The presence of this group, let alone verification of its ethnic identity cannot be confirmed. fri ·"""

¿faBmA

¦&mmm 1) Ammunition dump in a schoolhouse, Pibor town, 2007. These munitions were removed and destroyed. 2) Weapons collected from civilians being stored in Pibor town under the guard of Police. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 07

Chapter VIII- Conclusions

In conclusion, the action research process described in this paper follows the research cycle of diagnosing, planning, taking action, evaluating and reflecting. The author had hoped that the findings of field research could be used to advocate for the development of sensible, conflict sensitive approaches to arms control in Akobo, and elsewhere in southern Sudan by GoSS and UN authorities, during the interim period. As it turned out, an unintended and unanticipated forced disarmament campaign erupted in adjacent areas of Jonglei state and altered the conflict dynamics ofthe area. This had a profound impact on the disarmament options facing the citizens and civil authorities ofAkobo County. In effect, it narrowed the options facing armed individuals and focused the decision-making process, by generating a situation where overwhelming coercive disarmament suddenly became imminent. The disarmament that followed does not test the research, since it was done under threat of forced disarmament, but at a minimum it demonstrated that a locally driven disarmament could be carried out without widespread killing, destruction of property and the looting of assets, which at the time was the alternative option. The disarmament experience suggested that the participation of an outside neutral party, working alongside local authorities and representative disarmament committees, facilitated the process in a climate ofmistrust and ongoing insecurity. With the moral imperative of reducing harm: the author believes that disarmament could have been done better in many ways with more resources and more time (and along the lines of what communities proposed during the research), but in the end an imperfect process was better than potential large scale loss of life. The defeat ofthe white army by the SPLA, after initial resistance, no doubt played into the decision making of armed Akobo residents, but the research suggested that overall, local inhabitants had very reasonable responses to their own security dilemmas, and were not against disarmament- in fact, the vast majority were supportive, in spite of the attendant hazards. The research suggested that the population was overwhelmingly in favour of general civilian disarmament and given the appropriate minimum conditions of 1) security guarantees; 2) simultaneous disarmament; 3) involvement of a neutral party; and, 4) compensation for weapons, the communities were willing to disarm without violence. The primary fear ofresearch participants was that security vacuums created by disarmament would be taken advantage ofby Murle, who would subsequently raid their cattle Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 08 and kill civilians. This did take place as the Lou-Murle peace agreement was violated by Murle civilians or militia elements and the SPLA were unable to improve security well into the dry season. However, through disarmament, the overall level of killing was reduced as violent Lou- Lou lineage section conflict diminished dramatically, the SPLA eventually deployed themselves across the state to counter the threat created by Murle spoilers, Murle militia were absorbed into the SPLA and withdrawn for training (exposing the splinter militia) and Murle civilian disarmament began. This avoided the immediate need for a massive and destabilizing disarmament drive by the SPLA into Murle areas, which would almost certainly have been violently resisted, generating massive insecurity and killing and would have damaged the CPA and prospects for southern unity moving towards the referendum at the end ofthe interim period- with substantial implications for future violent conflict. The study has explored how has the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has affected Akobo and its residents. It has examined what measures might be taken to address the negative impacts that these weapons have had on communities, families and individuals in southern Sudan through comprehensive disarmament processes according to minimum conditions of security, neutral participation and simultaneous disarmament. It has also explored the political, security and institutional opportunities and risks are currently associated with these measures for local, state, national and international-level actors. Certainly, the hypothesis that "communities would support an approach to civilian arms control or disarmament that integrates localpeacebuilding, improvedformal security and inter- communal confidence building measures, and that this approach is more likely to contribute to sustainable peace and recovery than coercive disarmament" seems to have been borne out by the research, but cannot be proven by the disarmament that follows. Some have suggested that forced disarmament should have continued in order to reduce the likelihood of farther resistance to the assertion of GoSS state control, using violence where necessary. The author contends that comprehensive approaches should be adopted for any future disarmament interventions, in order to provide genuine security for communities and avoid the creation of security vacuums. The secondary hypothesis, "That there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between sustainable arms control efforts and economic development, where comprehensive approaches to community security and arms control reduces conflict allowingfor increased trade and economic development, which makes non-violent livelihoods more attractive and createsfurther Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 109

incentivesfor the consolidation and expansion ofsecurity. " also seemed to generate mixed results, although market expansion, population movement and mobility and hence access to healthcare and material resources have expanded explosively since disarmament and the consequent opening ofthe Pibor river to commercial traffic. While this has the potential to generate some new tensions within the community, (especially with the re-appearance of northern traders) it also provides new non-military livelihood options for disarmed youth and increases information flow between communities. The author speculates that the expansion of trade networks between Akobo and Pibor county will dramatically reduce conflict between the two communities, will allow for cooperation between County level GoSS authorities in the adjacent counties and will have a stabilizing effect on the security situation (trading boats have yet to make the journey between Akobo town and Pibor town directly to the South on the Pibor river). The re-establishment of trade networks and the increased penetration of cash-based economies may also contribute towards the continued transformation ofLou Nuer cultural, governance and legal systems. The associated question: "What is the current need and local capacityfor arms control in Akobo County, Sudan, and what, ifany, are possible rolesfor externalparties to become involved in supporting analysis, mediation and/or otherpractical measures identified by the community to manage conflict and enhance physical security through arms control during the interim period? " has already been tested by subsequent events. Local authorities carried out a successful disarmament ofAkobo County, with the assistance of international and local NGOs, community stakeholders and the UN. Should any further outside involvement take place in support of community disarmament, it should only take place after comprehensive community consultations and conflict mapping and analysis, and through a comprehensive programme based on this analysis: one designed ahead oftime to guarantee community security through appropriate and proportional training and material support for local and state-level civil authorities and Police; simultaneous disarmament of neighbouring armed groups (including alongside neighbouring states' governments); through continued participation as a neutral observer and the provision of logistical support to a carefully planned process; through critical joint planning and programme approval between international, GoSS and community stakeholders; and, pre-negotiated and resourced development assistance to disarmed communities as a disarmament dividend. To do otherwise, or provide less, would be Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 1 0 unethical and violate the duty of care according to which all outside support should be measured in such a complex and fragile security environment. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 111

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Appendix 1 [See p.3]

[Reflective practice, ethical research and identity dilemmas| The ethical implication of engaging with a community involved in what is a set of complex, overlapping and ongoing historical conflict systems, conflict drivers and state creation processes are innumerable, but of fundamental importance to this author. Clearly this applies not only to the research itself, which was initially limited to the period between March 7 and March 27, 2006, but also to the programming decisions that have preceded and followed the research- resulting in current (and ongoing) field activities and politico-security dynamics. In this section I will reflect on how my personal involvement with the community ofAkobo in this research affected the product of and follow-up activities to the research. Reflectively, I will also briefly discuss how I was affected by my experiences while conducting field research. For the primary researcher the formal field research setting was a difficult one (in terms of local conditions and events) during the research period, with ongoing Murle militia violence, cattle raiding, inter-sectional fighting82 and revenge killings taking place between lineage sections of the Mor-Lou Nuer, as well as an outbreak of cholera. In addition, the community lacked electricity, road access to the outside world and adequate medical facilities or security and rule of law institutions. At the time of field research, the only modes of communication with the outside world were by HF radio and satélite phone. Smith and Kornblum (1996), in In the Field: Readings on the Field Research Experience aptly describe the challenges and ethical dilemmas inherent in conducting research in a community, all the more relevant in a society emerging from violent inter and intra-communal conflict: Social scientists who engage in ethnographicfield research often become deeply involved in the lives ofthe people they are studying. In some cases the researcher actually becomes a member ofthe group or community andparticipatesfully in its day-to-day activities. This experience can have a profound effect on the researcher, who often must reexamine his or her values and attitudes and may be forced to make choices that would not be required in the ordinary course ofevents. (Smith & Kornblum, 1996)

During the research period, the author became closely involved in a number of events that undoubtedly shaped the community's attitude towards him, and perhaps towards interactions that followed- and certainly I, as that researcher, was shaped by these experiences. The limited resources and advantages at my disposal as a researcher, namely a satélite phone, cash money, high-level contacts

Fighting between lineage sections ofthe Mor Lou Nuer. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 124 within the UN and the clear physical appearance as a foreigner and outsider, affected these interactions and made a difference in a number of crises facing the community, which resulted in raising my reputation and status as someone who could make a difference rather than simply asking questions about local conflicts and weapons for academic purposes, or make vague promises about potential future benefits. Specifically, using my satélite phone and key UN contacts, this included organizing the evacuation of persons by UN helicopter who had been wounded in fighting between Lou community members and Murle raiders, as well as individuals who were wounded in later Lou-Lou blood feuds. I was involved in organizing 4 such evacuations from Akobo and the surrounding area. Luckily, although unintentionally, those evacuated were from all sides of local feuds and political contests, creating what I believe was a demonstrable example of non-partisanship in local violent conflicts. With cash to buy fuel I also helped to facilitate an assessment to determine the veracity and scale of a reported cholera outbreak in an area of considerable insecurity, without a road or secure river access. I used the satélite phone to contact UN agencies and the WHO to report this outbreak. This gave me the opportunity to interview white army youth leaders on their way to cattle camps in Ethiopia, while again contributing to saving lives in a non-partisan way. I also became involved, as a neutral observer, in efforts to arrange a ceasefire between Akobo authorities, peacemakers and the Murle who were looting and terrorizing the surrounding area. Lastly, while conducting an interview I was unintentionally caught in the middle of an attempted revenge killing, with the subject of my interview being the target of the attempted attack. Out of necessity, circumstance and a genuine wish to save the life of a colleague and fellow human being- and, again, facilitated by the satélite phone and contacts, I became involved in negotiating, protecting and evacuating the interview subject to safety. Bosk (1996) suggests that, Full understanding requires an intimate contact and that is whatfieldworkprovides. It allows us to describe a set offundamental life experiences as they occur. Fieldworkprovides precisely what other methods drop out- the experiencing individual as a member ofa community and the set ofshared meanings that sustain the individual's action in an uncertain world. (Bosk, 1996)

During the research period I was also a witness to successful revenge killings and in one instance a young man died of a critical gunshot wound while I was trying to arrange for his evacuation by helicopter. In the spirit of reflective practice, I think it is important to acknowledge the strain and stress that becoming involved in these events, and assuming roles I had not anticipated (largely because of the advantages that I possessed as a privileged outsider), had on myself during the research period, as well as the impact that this may have had on the research. At the same time, being involved in these community Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 125

crises certainly brought me closer to the community and the key individuals with whom I shared and worked together through these experiences: volunteer research assistants and translators, health care workers, peace and women's group leaders, youth leaders, local CBO workers and civil authorities. I do not wish to list these events as a catalogue of hardships endured, and I have often- and increasingly- resisted the pressure to convert these experiences into a narrative form. Above all, as one who has the privilege of being able to fairly easily extract myself from such situations, I am constantly reminded that I can only vaguely begin to understand the life experiences of many of those with whom I work, even though I may know some of their stories. Often their humour, laughter, honesty and generosity is a humbling daily reminder of a resilience, will and determination in the face of unimaginable loss that I hope I will never have to fully comprehend.

Identity Issues Similarly, although I was at pains to explain at the beginning of each focus group or interview that I was conducting research for my MA, I had visited Akobo as a UN official in July 2005, meeting all of the key community stakeholders at that time. I also hoped to continue working for the UN after the research had been completed. Trying to distinguish between these former and current roles in a way that was understood by the community, proved difficult and seemed to be an unimportant distinction to local research participants. I believe that I was perceived, regardless of my repeatedly stated role or affiliation, as an outsider publicly committed to the full cycle of action research who was genuinely concerned for the community and attempting to make a real difference, was willing to spend time in a volatile area and share to some degree in the endemic prevailing insecurity- and who was genuinely committed to understanding the security dilemmas facing the community in order to advocate for sensible approaches to arms control. Even so, during the research period I made a conscious decision not to probe too deeply into certain types of local conflicts- particularly those involving key security and civil stakeholders as individuals and the specifics behind particular cases of lineage section conflict (often over homicide, cattle exchanges and women). I considered it unnecessary to go into that level of detail for the purposes of this study and potentially threatening to key community stakeholders as well as to the research itself. At the time of writing, having moved well beyond the formal field research period itself, the ethical dilemmas and risks are, as anticipated by the research, manifest in all policy and programming decisions and ongoing field activities with which the author is involved. All post-research activities should be seen in the context of attempting to lessen the negative effects of the crude application of power by a new, inexperienced and highly militarized government while supporting a state-creation process. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 126

Appendix 2 [See p.6]

An excerpt from the DRAFT ARC Programme Document of the SSDDRC, NSDDRC and UNDDR August, 2005- A component of the Interim DDR Programme for Sudan (IDDRP), approved by the GoSS. The ARC Programme was negotiated between September 2004 and July 2005. "Arms Reduction and Control (ARC): The overall strategy for 'Arms Reduction and Control' activities (comprising the civilian component of arms control efforts in support of the peace process) will be to build support for peace and security through national, regional and community-based arms-control interventions. These activities will be carried out according to the laws of Sudan and according to 'guiding principles' agreed by the GoS and SPLM. The civilian focused interventions are described in more detail under the title of 'Interim Arms Control Measures' below.

Guiding Principles for Disarmament, Arms Reduction and Control

Why Guiding Principles?

In a complex security environment, such as exists in the Sudan during the transition into a post-conflict environment, the potential for continued low-level violence is high. One factor affecting levels of violence is the high rate of military small arms proliferation. In order to prevent interventions by Sudanese authorities and the international community from inadvertently harming community members (either in the short or long term), all aspects of arms control programmes should be planned in order to maximize benefit and minimize harm.

To engage in what is both a human and state security issue, without considering the ways in which this engagement will positively and negatively affect individual members of Sudanese communities, is unethical. Towards an 'Arms Reduction and Control Plan' that will consider the context of the past, present and potential future violent conflict(s) in Sudan, that will focus both on re-establishing the state's monopoly on the use of force during peacetime, as well as on creating a physically and psychologically safe environment as a necessary co-condition for development, commerce, rule of law and peace, Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 127

'Guiding Principles' for engagement must be agreed between the Sudanese parties, the UN, communities and other partners engaging in arms control activities.

It is of paramount importance that Disarmament, Arms Reduction and Control activities should 'Do No Harm' by creating vulnerable communities or groups within communities. These activities should be designed and implemented in such a way so as to be safe, controlled, transparent, sustainable and replicable and they must be carried out by designated and qualified UN and Sudanese parties. The process must be carried out incrementally according to comprehensive sub-national Arms Reduction and Control Plans (ARCP) that must be created by the parties and coordinated between the parties with the assistance of UNDDR.

ARC activities should take place according to the laws of GoS and SPLM administered Sudan for the ownership and use of small arms and light weapons that are compatible between northern and southern Sudan. ARC activities should comply with legally binding international legal instruments to which Sudan is a party. Involuntary or 'forcible' disarmament should only be carried out as a last resort, and in accordance with the laws of North or South Sudan respectively, in order to quell violence or as a measure to enforce law and order at the end of amnesty periods and other 'interim control measures' created to facilitate the voluntary surrender of illegal weapons or the provision of security in communities pending the deployment of a new Police Service within the Ceasefire Zone.

This process should be transparent, adequately resourced and politically supported by the parties. Arms control activities should be preceded by community consultations, awareness raising and sensitisation targeted at all relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries, specifically including women, and should recognising the different impacts of small arms use and proliferation through the conflict on women and men. To this end, the parties will ensure that the ARC programmes promote equal inclusion of women in consultation, design and implementation. ARC activities should take full advantage of existing conflict resolution mechanisms and civil society networks in order to promote community ownership and responsibility for arms control and disarmament.

Any interventions should be designed so as to avoid fuelling domestic and cross-border trafficking and should focus on creating positive incentives for affected communities to disarm, rather than on providing incentives to individual weapons holders. Planning, activities and the selection of pilot sites should be coordinated between GoS and SPLM controlled Sudan through the UNDDR and the Arms Reduction and Control Programmes of the NSDDRC and SSDDRC. Approaches, priorities, geographic selection for Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 128 initial roll out of programming should be preceded by carefully designed Baseline Information Gathering with communities on requirements and opportunities to engage in arms control throughout the Ceasefire Zone. Baseline Information collection processes should be designed according to ethical research guidelines in order to ensure the privacy and security of participants over the medium to long term, should conflict resume before or at the end of the interim period .

Where 'command' disarmament or arms control is possible (where weapons can be controlled as part of existing command structures or with existing resources within the SAF and SPLA) an assessment of existing resources should be made before UN support is provided. Any processes of command disarmament should be verified by the UN and information on arms and ammunition included in the overall arms and ammunition database.

Guiding Principles for data collection in support of military arms control: • Parameters, modalities and timelines agreed by the parties and UNMIS Military Observers and UNDDR • Adequate planning , resources, time, and communications between parties and UNMIS Military Observers and UNDDR • Safety; • Control; • Transparency; • Sustainability; • Replicability; • Legitimacy. Guiding Principles for ARC:

• Do No Harm • Legal and Rights-based approach • Incremental and Equity/parity between North and South • Consultative • Voluntary and community-based • Gender Integration • Discourages arms trafficking • Safety; • Control; • Transparency; • Sustainability; • Replicability; • Legitimacy.

'Do No Harm' Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 129

Do No Harm Principles are derived from the desire to avoid the negative impacts of outside interventions in communities that are recovering from or are currently experiencing conflict. The focus of Do No Harm is on inter-group divisions and tensions that are dangerous to society- (in particular those that are violent and destructive).

To understand how beneficiary selection can worsen conflict, it is important to focus on whether (and, if so, how) our involvement in interventions or assistance match and reinforce dangerous societal divisions. This process begins with context analysis, in particular the 'Dividers' and 'Connectors' between the groups where conflict is active or likely—this can bring out ideas that were not considered in the original plans and this is how new insights into programming impacts emerge.

It is critical to identify WHO is in Conflict and to focus on the schisms between groups which are dangerous and destructive. Not all differences within societies are dangerous. It is important to analyze the proposed Community Security and Arms Control interventions in order to identify the potential impacts over the short and longer term. It is in the details of programming that the impacts of interventions on conflict are to be found. People often know when there are problems with programme impacts. However, without the analysis, they do not know how or why these impacts occur. When they understand how and why programmes have negative impacts, they can identify options for improving the delivery of programming so that it does not create or exacerbate conflicts and unequal access to goods and services.

In order to address this issue, the first activities of CSAC staff on the ground will be to conduct conflict mapping, stakeholder mapping, the collection of human security indicators for ongoing evaluation of the programme, community consultations and public awareness activities within communities. The collection ofthis information will be standardized across all project sites and will culminate in the generation of a 'Community Security Action Plan'." Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 130

Appendix 3 [See p. 16]

The Action Research Cycle

The action research cycle is composed of the following stages:

Pre-step: Establish the context and the purpose

1 . Diagnose the problem, including for example working theme, key issues, theoretical foundations articulated, despite the fact that they may need to be changed after later iterations of the research process. 2. Make an action plan. The action plan is made up of sequent cycles of spirals: o diagnosis o action planning o action taking and o evaluation. 3. Take action. 4. Evaluate: o if the diagnosis was correct? o If the action taken was correct? o If the action was taken in an appropriate manner? o What feeds into the next cycle of diagnosis, planning and action?

Meta learning/ reflection takes place during the research process. According to Mezirov, (1991), there are three forms of reflection:

5. Content reflection, what to think ofthe issues, outcomes etc. 6. Process reflection, what to think of the strategies, procedures. 7. Premise reflection, what to think of the underlying assumptions and perspectives. These three types of reflection form the meta cycle of inquiry in each of the research cycles. (Coghlan & Brannick, 1993, P- 133) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 131

Appendix 4 [See p.42]

Comparative Sex And Age-Disaggregated Table Of Compensation Rates For Homicide Sex and Reproductive status Compensation Rate in Cattle Uninitiated female child 100 cows initiated male child/ uninitiated male child 50/30* reproductive aged unmarried woman (who has 100 cows not reproduced) Mother 70

Adult male 50 * interviewees suggested that the age for male initiation had lowered dramatically since the 1970's from 18-20 at that time, to 12-15 currently. (Author's field notes. Akobo. April 2006.) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 132

Appendix 5 [See p.45]

[A. stakeholder analysis of structures and conflict dynamics affecting the research) area

The following table will be used to break down the structures, actors and dynamics surrounding the question of disarmament during the research period.83 Conflict Analysis Table Structures: Sources of Actors Dynamics (in relation to tension and Conflict disarmament security ? Interests ? Longer term trends of political ? Relationships conflict economic ? Capacities ? Triggers of violence social ? Agendas ? Capacities to manage ? Incentives conflict ? Future scenarios

Structures: Sources of tension and conflict affecting disarmament decisions

Security Local security structures have limited resources, facilities and training Security forces and civil administration did not operate outside of Akobo town and did not have a monopoly on the use of force Heavily armed civilian population, fractured by lineage sectional alliances and blood feuds, as well as the legacy of sectional affiliation with either militia or SPLA forces during the war. Neighbours know where their looted assets are and want them returned. Human rights abuses by security forces Poorly controlled border with Ethiopia Lack of roads and presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) Children (under 18) present in security forces Many security personnel are local, are not considered to be neutral and are afraid to implicate themselves in blood feuds as a result of lineage relationships Weak or non-existent judiciary and prisons services Incomplete absorption of former militia into the SPLA within local garrisons

Modified from Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes. Department for International Development (DFID). UK. January 2002. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 133

• Ongoing predatory violent conflict with neighbouring groups (Murle, Jikane Nuer, Anuak) through cattle raiding and spoiling incidents ascribed to rump-militia elements allied to Khartoum • Difficulty of proving security to a nomadic pastoralist population, whose wealth and assets are primarily in the form of livestock and require seasonal movement to grazing areas and water sources

Political • Legacy of higher-order political, military, religious and identity conflict between North and South • Transition from 'warlordism' towards competition between local political actors over access to power through civil contests as opposed to military ones • Disarmament circumscribes the ability of local civilian actors to replace their leaders by force • Local leaders are supported according to lineage affiliation (inter and intra-sectional politics, relationships and conflicts)

Economic • The research area, surveyed by oil companies in the 1970's, is suspected to be sitting on a massive cross-border oil reserve • Wealth sharing provisions within the CPA require a 2% allocation of oil revenue to be returned to the communities of extraction and local political actors will clearly be involved in allocating this wealth. • Non-existent infrastructure: lack of roads and health facilities, presence of non-state armed groups and predatory armed civilians, insecurity of rivers, affects local trade, health and development

Social • Traditional legal system requires privatized violence as a form ofjustice through blood feuds or 'revenge killings' in the case of failed arbitration and compensation mechanisms • Youth have grown accustomed to power, status and decision making based on weapons possession • Few educated citizens. Many ofthose with educations are returning from refugee camps in neighbouring countries, locally considered as intellectuals and threatening local power dynamics and status according to military power » Few alternative livelihoods and lack of adult education facilities • Transformation of culture and identity through displacement and militarization

Actors (Interests, Relations, Capacities, Agendas, Incentives and Dynamics) SPLA: The SPLA has an obvious interest in the course of disarmament and conflict. As a participant in fighting against the white army after a failed disarmament attempt, the SPLA represent a coercive threat to communities that may resist disarmament in the future. SPLA battlefield losses during previous disarmament attempts (some 300-400 killed) have meant that the SPLA is more likely to use Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 134 overwhelming force when faced with similar situations. The SPLA, in light of a weak extant Police Service, is also the only body currently capable of protecting communities post-disarmament and preventing security vacuums or imbalances. SPLA forces are currently deployed to protect communities in Lou Nuer areas against predatory armed Murle militia splinter groups and armed civilians.

Military intelligence: SPLA Military Intelligence is presumably interested in monitoring and limiting the influence and ability of northern and allied elements to create support or generate conflict within communities. The tactics employed to achieve this objective may also generate conflict. Military Intelligence seeks to support the political and security interests of the SPLA, GoSS and SPLM. The resistance of GoSS officials to attempts at destabilization by northern allied elements is important for the future credibility ofthe GoSS and its political projects, including the referendum on secession in 201 1 . Disarmament offers an opportunity to spoilers and provides multiple entry points for such destabilization.

Police: GoSS Police face incredible obstacles to the establishment of law and order in their areas of responsibility. Police have an interest in arms control in order to be able to carry out their duties effectively and impartially. Ongoing Police training and the provision of appropriate communications and transportation equipment to Police will improve this capacity, and generalized civilian disarmament would certainly make it less hazardous. Currently, Police in many areas do not have a monopoly on the use of force.

Former SSDF militia: Through the Juba declaration, many militia operating under the umbrella of the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) -backed by Khartoum, SAF and SAF Military Intelligence, have come over to the SPLA. The success in incorporating these forces into mainstream SPLA units removes them as immediate potential spoilers of peace. In some areas, militia remnants choosing not to be absorbed into SPLA have taken advantage of disarmament activities to create instability and insecurity. Political engagement with, and/or military action against these elements are likely GoSS responses to the insecurity that they have generated and the risk they pose to the civilian population of South Sudan and hence to the CPA.

Armed civilians: The interests and agendas of armed civilians vary considerably. While many have used weapons for self defense, they have perhaps more often been used for offensive raiding, for political and personally motivated seasonal and opportunistic participation in militias and rebel groups, in domestic violence, revenge killings, murders, suicides, in criminal violence, for hunting, as commodities and as a component of bride price. Relations between armed civilians and other actors in the research area also Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 135 varied considerably. Sectional, political and economic relationships and histories are as varied as individuals and communities. Most of those participating in field research expressed concerns about security and also a desire to disarm in order to pursue non-violent livelihoods, obtain medical and development assistance, education opportunities and enjoy free movement between communities and neighbouring countries. Comprehensive support in all of these areas, beginning with the provision of adequate security, represents the best possible incentive for civilians to disarm.

Women: While some women in the research area have participated in violence as members of organized armed groups, most have been victims of violence perpetrated by small arms and light weapons, either in the community, during 'raiding', during displacement and political violence or in sexual and domestic violence. Overwhelmingly, individual women and the local women's organizations participating in research (Akobo) or disarmament activities (Akobo and Pibor) have expressed a desire for disarmament and the demilitarization of their communities and homes. Women and girls have been raped by SPLA soldiers both during and after the forced disarmament. They have also been killed, raped and abducted by neighbouring predatory Murle civilians or militia. As such, they are aware of the dangers associated with both armament and disarmament during the interim period.

White Army: The motivations ofthe white army are complex. Studies have suggested that their interests in involvement in local violent conflict have tended to be opportunistic and economic in nature rather than political. (Young, 2007) By nature they are not a cohesive group, nor have they exhibited lasting military hierarchies and advanced strategic or tactical skills. Their structures have a greater resemblance to traditional opportunistic Nuer segmentary community militia. Disarmament reduces the opportunity for individuals and groups to profit by carrying out offensive raiding- essentially murder, kidnapping and the plunder of neighbouring communities and their assets- and similarly their capacity to protect against these activities by neighbouring groups. As such, it pushes white army elements towards an acceptance of state protection and/or efforts to re-arm should they chose to reject state control or simply wish to continue in criminal predatory activity and privatized justice or self-defense as the case may be.

Traditional leaders: Much has been written about the erosion of traditional leadership mechanisms as a result of conflict. In the context of what was an acephalous governance structure historically, the restoration of power to 'chiefs' is actually a return to hierarchical control structures created by the colonial authorities rather than a return to pre-colonial Nuer traditions. The incorporation of elected chiefs into judicial and civil structures ofthe GoSS (including the use of Chiefs courts and Chiefs Police) is a deliberate effort to bring such communities under the control of Government, in this case the GoSS. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 136

Chiefs will have an interest in either supporting arms control or resisting it based on their own calculations around security, prospects for future conflict, involvement in criminal enterprises or resistance against state authority (including particular government representatives as individuals). Not least of these considerations will the maintenance of privilege, limited local power and status and the ability to mobilize the community for peaceful development focused activities or for future violence. Chiefs interviewed during the research period predictably encouraged disarmament as a way to re-assert control over armed youth who have undermined their authority.

Former SPLA/militia who have deserted: These individuals, in the face of decisions by the GoSS to disarm the civilian population either by coercive or non-coercive methods, face a choice between resisting disarmament, surrendering their weapons or reporting for duty to the SPLA with their weapons. Throughout the conflict, many persons fought informally as auxiliaries to the main combatants, as 'harvest guerillas', when necessary in defense of their home areas or during offensives by the main belligerents in their areas. Others joined only to obtain training and a weapon and then deserted to use the weapon for their own purposes. In light of the re-organization of the SPLA and the associated payment of salaries to SPLA forces for the first time, re-joining the SPLA may be an attractive livelihood option.

Local civil authorities: The Office of the County Commissioner, as the seat of local government, was seen during the research period to be the center for formal dispute resolution within the community. There is an obvious benefit to local authorities if the civilian population can be both disarmed and protected from neighbouring security threats. In light of the violent history of Akobo, and the fractured and cyclical nature of Lou Nuer sectional conflict, the Civil Authorities stand to benefit from disarmament in a number of ways. The civil authorities and hence 'Government' will monopolize the use of violence and will begin to be able to assert control, provide security and 'rule of law' over territory, borders and people. With appropriate support from GoSS, national and international actors, and without further violent conflict, this will eventually allow for improvements to local conditions in terms of infrastructure, development and economic growth, security, justice, education and health. These tangible improvements will raise the status of local government officials and improve their chances of re-election. Disarmament also makes it more difficult for the civilian population to remove government representatives by force or more generally to pursue political and economic objectives through the use of armed violence, as has previously been the case.

State Government of Jonglei: The State Government of Jonglei has overall responsibility for activities taking place in the state and for the security of the citizenry of Jonglei State. However, the decision to Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 3 7 carry out disarmament activities using the sub-national army (SPLA) lies with GoSS authorities in the Southern capital Juba. State authorities have supported both negotiated non-coercive disarmament as well as coercive disarmament in the face of attack by the white army and Lou Nuer militia elements, as well as by Murle militia and armed Murle civilian attacks on neighbouring civilians. Some state authorities believe that there is an opportunity cost associated with non-coercive disarmament in that it allows predatory criminal elements to flourish, who should be dealt with exclusively by force. Such elements should be considered either as criminals or as non-compliant 'Other Armed Groups' (OAGs) under the provisions of the CPA and dealt with accordingly through dialogue and/or force under the auspices of the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee structure outlined in the CPA and the basic rule of law responsibilities of the state- including, specifically, the protection of the citizenry from violence by appropriate and proportional means. Carrying out a broad forced disarmament, targeting an entire ethnic group would more likely inflame historical tensions between ethnic groups according to wartime patterns of alliance (among Nuer, Dinka and Murle) and constitute a form of collective punishment against populations that have already substantially disarmed and are concerned about retribution for wartime alliances with Khartoum and the SAF. More so since gross human rights violations have attended previous forced disarmament attempts. Such efforts may generate violent resistance and make communities more receptive to outside manipulation aimed at baiting the GoSS into destabilizing the CPA.

Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS): The Government of Southern Sudan has responsibility for the security, welfare and governance of persons in southern Sudan. As a semi-autonomous government responsible for the area constituting 'Southern Sudan' according to 1956 Colonial district boundaries, control over territory, populations and a monopoly on the use of violence is generally considered to be a pre-requisite for legitimacy. GoNU agencies, including federal (Khartoum-based) customs and immigration services have gradually asserted control over border controls in some areas of the South, while others remain porous. No dedicated border security forces exist that are able to engage in a sustained cross-border collaboration with neighbouring states to control inflows and outflows of small arms, light weapons and ammunition. The Security Council of the GoSS have responsibility for decisions affecting internal security in the South, including decisions to deploy the armed forces to protect communities or create buffer forces between armed and disarmed communities. The Offices of the President, Vice president, Ministry ofthe Interior and Chief of Staff of the SPLA have been involved in decisions affecting disarmament dynamics. State government officials and the Vice President have personally been involved in Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 138

The Government of National Unity (GoNU): This Government is composed of NCP, SPLM and allied officials according to the letter of the CPA. It has overall responsibility of the governance of Sudan. As an alliance between a totalitarian Islamic military dictatorship and a nascent Government of the South based on former SPLM/A military and political structures, this fragile political arrangement is meant to ensure the implementation of the wealth, power and security arrangements of the CPA and shepherd the census, elections and referendum processes outlined for the interim period. The success of this government will dramatically affect conditions of security and development in Southern Sudan, and hence armament decisions by communities and individuals and safe disarmament prospects.

Southern Sudan DDR Commission: The SSDDRC began as in interim planning body conducting cross- lines negotiation and planning with SAF and then Government of Sudan representatives with support from the integrated (UNDP, UNMIS and UNICEF) UNDDR unit, before the signing of the CPA. This body is responsible for the planning and implementation of a sub-national DDR programme targeting combatants of the SPLA forces and former SAF aligned militia operating in Southern Sudan who have not chosen to be integrated into SAF. SSDDRC management at Juba level and programme staff for Jonglei state have been involved in civilian disarmament field activities in Pibor County. This body, whose mandate has yet to be formally approved by the GoSS parliament, is likely to take responsibility for the planning and implementation of future community security and civilian disarmament activities on behalf of the GoSS.

Akobo Peace Committee: The Akobo Peace Committee had a well-established committee structure, including a number of chiefs and had received outside support from Pact Sudan, an international NGO. However, actual ceasefire overtures and peace meetings that took place and were witnessed by the author during and subsequent to the research period seemed to be carried out under the auspices of the office of the County Commissioner rather than the Akobo Peace Committee. Since several chiefs took part in the Peace Committee, they would also be involved in formal discussions (including those on disarmament). During interviews with the author, the Peace Committee members and elected leadership complained of a lack of resources and hinted at internal conflict that had hampered the establishment of a peace and youth vocational training center. Delayed vocational training, for which material support had already been provided, suggesting some dysfunction and lack of capacity, however dedicated and knowledgeable the members of the organization were. Peace Committee members' comments (as prominent citizens) on disarmament options were in line with widely held community views on the security hazards posed both by disarmament and by the existing armed community. It is unclear how the peace committee will be used as civil authority and the formal justice sector establish themselves. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 139

Community Based Organizations and Local Religious Groups: A variety of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) exist in the research area. Prominent among these are the Presbyterian Relief and Development Agency (PRDA) and Nile Hope Development Forum (NHDF). Tensions within and competition between CBOs could affect future local conflict. A split within the leadership and membership of the Presbyterian Church threatened to erupt into conflict (perhaps violent) at the time of research. The first meeting of the Church leadership in 4 years was held in Akobo during the research period and the County Commissioner was forced to suspend the meeting (backed up by his 6 person bodyguard) in order to prevent a confrontation between church members backing rival candidates (reportedly some vying to change the church constitution to extend the term of the incumbent). At the time of disarmament, both CBOs cooperated with and were instrumental to the success of disarmament. CBO members hoped to recover CBO assets looted by nearby white army and militia after disarmament had been carried out. Disarmament also provides an excellent opportunity for these organizations to expand programmes outside of Akobo town itself, including health, education and agricultural outreach programmes. CBO programmes are equally affected by insecurity resulting from security vacuums, uneven disarmament or insufficiently equipped and trained security forces. Church members at the time of disarmament suggested that sermons had provided messages encouraging compliance with ongoing disarmament efforts. Additional CBOs have been established since the disarmament took place.

International NGOs: Those international non-governmental organizations operating in Akobo at the time of research included Veterenaires Sans Frontieres (VSF), Pact Sudan and World Relief. World Relief was providing support to PRDA to run Akobo's Primary Health Care Center (PHCC). VSF was unable to operate outside of Akobo town to provide emergency vaccination programmes during an outbreak in the cattle camps as a result of insecurity along the land or river route. Pact Sudan had been supportive of a number of community initiatives including the establishment of a peace and youth center through the Akobo Peace Committee, support for projects within PRDA and NHDF, projects to train a local trade association as part of a cross-border trade and security enhancement programme with Gambella Ethiopia and lastly in support of local peace meetings between the Lou Nuer and Murle, where ceasefire and disarmament commitments were made by both communities and the first weapons were symbolically surrendered. Immediately following that meeting, arrayed Lou Chiefs and civil authorities agreed to a general disarmament through local committees.

Neighbouring Governments: Governments of states neighbouring southern Sudan have variously provided direct material support, accommodated SPLA forces and provided rear bases for training, Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 140 recruitment and logistical support to the war effort or, through weak control of their own borders, simply provided a passive transit point for the movement of soldiers, arms and ammunition and other material support. At the political level, shifting alliances, power dynamics and material support for rebel and unaccountable proxy forces between the neighbouring states within the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa have encouraged the massive proliferation of military weapons from military to civilian actors. Any attempt to control weapons in the border areas of one state will necessarily need coordinated action on the other side of the border. As explored elsewhere in this paper, the borders of the 'Karamoja cluster' areas of Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia represents one such area- heavily armed and lacking full state control. Counter-insurgency operation in border areas of Ethiopia against Anuak and Oromo rebel groups have also resulted in incursions by the regular Ethiopian army into Sudan and affected local security conditions. The re-occupation of border posts and the establishment of cross-border collaboration and dialogue would improve efforts at weapons interdiction. However, in light of potential future conflict in southern Sudan, tightening border controls may not serve the interests of a GoSS intent on re-equipping its army overtly and clandestinely for potential future wars, should the CPA collapse, the conflict in Darfur spill into the South, LRA peace talks collapse or in other internal security scenarios.

Donor Governments: Broadly speaking, donor governments have been supportive of efforts to help the GoSS stabilize the security situation in southern Sudan during the interim period, as a precondition for development, return and recovery programmes. Donors have short and longer term priorities in southern Sudan ranging from oil extraction and arms sales, supporting the 'war on terror' and curbing the export of radical Islam, containing 'Islamisation' and supporting Christian mission, to encouraging peace and the stabilization of the entire Horn of Africa. Some donors have been providing material and training support to the SPLA in order to create a 'credible deterrent' to the SAF in the event that the CPA collapses or the course and results of the referendum on secession are not honoured. All of these agendas will affect the short and longer-term security of communities and prospects for local, inter-community or cross-border regional disarmament.

UN Development Programme: The UN Development Programme in Sudan has been involved in supporting the establishment of Sudanese DDR authorities since 2004. As part ofthis effort, it has worked with the UN Mission in Sudan and the Northern and Southern DDR Commissions to negotiate, plan and execute field programmes. UNDP has developed a holistic Community Security and Arms Control programme concept to support security, peaceful disarmament and development. This programme is based on lessons learned during pilot disarmament activities in Akobo and Pibor. The successful launching of this programme is contingent on working closely with Southern Sudan DDR Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 4 1 authorities, UNMIS, State Governments, local governments and the GoSS at a political level to coordinate activities.

UN Mission in Sudan (Department of Peacekeeping Operations'): UNMIS is mandated to monitor and verify the terms of the CPA, including the disarmament of illegally armed civilians. The Security Council resolution mandating the mission specifically includes provisions for UNMIS to support voluntary civilian weapons collection and destruction initiatives. It also provides UNMIS with a mandate under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to protect civilians in imminent threat of bodily harm by all means necessary. UNMIS troop contributing countries (referred to as a 'force protection' focused on protecting themselves and other UN assets, as opposed to a 'protection force' for protecting threatened communities or individuals) have largely chosen to ignore this civilian protection component of their mandate and are rarely proactive in efforts to protect Sudanese civilians, perhaps because of a reluctance on the part of troop contributing nations to put their troops at risk by becoming involved in complex conflict systems within southern Sudan. UNMIS force protection and military observers have been closely involved in disarmament activities in Akobo and Pibpr in a protection capacity for other UN personnel. UNMIS DDR staff have been intimately involved in the disarmament processes in Akobo and Pibor as direct participants and organizers, alongside UNDP Sudan and the GoSS DDR Commission. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 142

Appendix 6 [See p.56]

De-coded SPLA radio transcripts referring to clandestine weapons and ammunition procurement, as annexed to Lam Akol in SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution. I arrived backyesterday, 21/6/90, after (35) days away during which time I visited ten (10) countries and met their presidents. The visits were very successful and we are or will be getting some military assistancefrom seven (7) ofthese countries... Above isfor your information and also to allay fears ofthose under your command who might have been concerned about the recent developments in Europe and the Soviet Union. The truth is that since 1983, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, USA etc. ofthe big countries, none ofthese has ever given us any military assistance. The impact ofthe changes in the international situation on our military supplies in thus marginal and indirect. And to assure them there is no causefor alarm. In addition, what we getfrom Bashir, especially artillery and armour, adds to the above. The Sudan has many borders and whatever we get will enter. (2001, p.274) 18/1/91. I arrived back today after three (3) weeks to Ethiopia, Kenya and Zaire on a begging missionfor enemy dry season offensive. (2001, p.279) / arrived back to MERCURY County yesterday, 31/5/91, afterfifteen (15) days during which I visited this country, Zambia (twice), Namibia, Nigeria (twice), Ghana (twice) and Zimbabwe (from where Ijust came)... I have beenfollowing the developments in Ethiopia over the media as all ofyou have been doing with great concern. I decided to extend the visits in view ofthese developments so that we can secure in some ofthese countries the necessary ammos to defend and extend our gains. Despite the adverse situation in Ethiopia, I am glad to inform you that I was able to get (800) tons ofammos of various types from some ofthese countries. These include (15) million rounds ofAKM (about 10, 725 big boxes). The main problem is now air transport which I am working to solve. The total number offreight flights using a (727) Boeing is (20) at a cost ofabout (50,000) U.S. dollars. I have already secured moneyfor (3) trips and hope to get todayfor another (6) trips. So we will be able to transport halfofthe ammos before June 15. I am still working to transport the remaining halfso that everything is at Rvs. before the end ofJune. (2001, p.280-281) / am happy to inform you that we have been able to acquire more ammos than at any time before. This includes (20) million rounds ofAKMammos plus good quantities ofshells: 60-mm, 82-mm, 120- mm, RPG-7, BM 122-mm, howitzers, anti-tanks and anti-personnel mines. We have also raised the necessaryfunds to transport by air all these ammos to thefield. As I write, (15) millions rounds of AKM has already reached and the rest is on the way... There should therefore be no excuse that we have no ammos because ofthefall ofMengistu... What we need now is more manpower andfor the majority ofSPLAforces to converge now on a decisive objective... All soldiers are to move according to ordersfrom their Cdrs immediately beginningfrom today 18/7/91... Victory is certain and near. SPLA Oyeel (2001, p.284) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 143

Appendix 7 [See p.58]

______The Unmodified Research Instrument Community Security and Arms Control Focus Group Survey Form (6 page) Date: Name of Information Collector: Translator:

The title of this project is: The opportunities and Hazards of Arms Control in Akobo County, Jonglei, Sudan.

The primary researcher is David Lochhead, a Masters student in conflict analysis and management at Royal Roads University in Victoria, Canada. Translation services will be provided by XXXX

Each one of you is being invited to participate in a research project. The purpose of the research project is to better understand how the community has been affected by the availability of military weapons, to understand existing conflicts that the community is involved in and the mechanisms used to resolve these conflicts and to seek the opinions of community members on the opportunities and risks associated with controlling weapons. The researcher will not be providing services or implementing programs based on this research although the results will be passed to organizations that may choose to further engage with you on these issues.

You are expected to participate by providing information and your opinions through a group meeting or survey. These questions will be related to local and regional conflicts and conditions that affect you, your perceptions of security and how weapons are owned and used in this area, as well as questions relating to how you feel the negative effects of weapons and insecurity can best be resolved

Your name is not needed for this survey and identifying information about you will not appear in the final report, but the opinions and information collected from you and other participants will be available for other organizations to benefit from. If your personal opinions are quoted in the final report, your name will not be used and will be replaced by an identifying number or false name [for example: interviewee # 23, a female aged 45 from Wunding, expressed her opinion that...] Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 144

All identifying information collected will be kept confidentially by the researcher until six months after the research has been completed, when it will be destroyed. You are free to not participate in this survey and you may leave at any time and keep your entitlement/compensation (TBD)

Do you have any questions? Do you consent to participate in this research under these conditions?

Assessment location and contact information 1) Name of community: [Secure information to be codedJ 2) Region/State/County/Payam/Boma: [Secure information to be coded] 3) Name of Chief(s): [Secure information to be coded] 4) Senior local Civil Authorities representative: 5) Senior local Police representative: 6) Senior local SPLA officer: 7) Who belongs to the community (tribes, clans, sub-clans, families)? [Secure information to be coded]

Focus Group Individual Participant (check one) 8) What is the composition of the focus group? (or participant) male/ female/ mixed? [Secure information to be coded'] 9) Age range of focus group (or participant) 12-15 / 16-19 / 20-25 / 25-40 / 40 and above ¡Secure information to be coded] 10) What are the occupation(s) of the focus group participant(s)? List[Seeure information to be coded] 1 1) What level of education have/ has the focus groups participant(s) attained? [Secure information to be coded] Community 12) What commercial activities is the community/individual involved in? List 13) Has the community previously managed any development or recovery projects? 14) Has the community previously received any training or capacity building? 1 5) What structures or processes exist for conflict resolution in the community? Who participates in this? Who does not? [Example: Formal courts, traditional courts, police, peace committees, SPLA, NGO, CBO, rNGO]

16) Which local organizations exist within the community? 16) Which international organisations has the community worked with up to now? 17) What types of media and communications are available to the community, and what are the closest media and communication/ publicity outlets? [Example: Sudanese radio/ short Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 145

wave radio/ radio from neighbouring countries/ newspapers/ posters/ word of mouth/ military/ etc.] 1 8) Are there active women and youth organisations in the community? List them. How many members do they have?

Security 19) Has the community been attacked in the past? If so, by whom and when was the last time?

20) Has community property been looted or destroyed? 21) Have community members been displaced in the past? 22) Have community members been involved in fighting? Why? [Example: a) to defend the community; b) in offensive operations supporting SPLA; c) other] 23) Are the people ofthe community currently concerned about insecurity and violence? [never concerned/ periodic concern/ constant insecurity and violence] 24) Are the people of the community concerned about possible return to war?

25) Is it safe for women and children to walk around alone after dark? 26) What are the geographical limits ofthe area where you feel secure (how far can you walk in each direction)? 27) Are weapons required for self-protection when travelling between locations? Effects of weapons possession on trade 28) Do traders carry weapons or require armed escorts? 29) If traders are attacked or robbed, what is the reaction? [fight to protect property, punitive actions etc.] 30) Are certain times ofyear more dangerous? 31) Are certain trade routes more dangerous than others? 32) What percentage of trading trips encounter some sort of armed interference Insecurity 33) How often is a weapon fired in this geographical area? [per month] Last time? 34) How does hearing gunshots make you feel? How does this affect the choices you make?

35) 36) What are the types and sources of insecurity in the community? [Example: Personal safety/ Threat to property/ Drugs and alcohol misuse/ domestic violence/ thieves/ bandits/ cattle raiders/ food insecurity/ Arms, mines and UXO/ Lack of Law Enforcement / environmental/ land use/ Other] Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 146

37) Who are the sources of insecurity within the community? [Example: Ex-combatants/ Youth/ IDPs /Foreign Nationals/ military/ paramilitary/ militia/ nomads/ Police/ cattle rustlers / Other etc] 38) What are the sources of insecurity outside ofthe community? 39) How does the community respond to heightened insecurity and violence? [Example: nothing/ existing conflict resolution methods/legal action/ relocation/ arming for self- protection/ community self defence force/ other] Weapons possession and use 40) Are there weapons now present within the community, if so, what type and how many? How much do they cost by type in cash or barter? 41) Is ammunition available? Ifyes, from what source? Is the supply steady? Has the price changed over time? How much does it currently cost for different types? 42) Who owns the weapons? 43) Who has access to the weapons and who uses them? 44) Are weapons shared within families? 45) Are weapons shared between families? 46) Are weapons shared within the community? 47) Are weapons passed between families as bride wealth? [Sometimes/always/ trend increasing/decreasing/constant] 48) Are weapons fired during celebrations in this area? 49) What percentage of households have guns? [define 'household'] 50) How many guns are there per household on average? 51) What percentage of persons in cattle camps keep guns? 52) At what age do people learn how to use guns? 53) At what age does it become socially acceptable for someone to carry a gun? Has this age changed over time? If so, why? What percentage of male youth have guns? 54) Why would these people have weapons now? [Example: Self defence/ Protect Property/ Hunting/ official use/ community self-defence force/ SAF or SPLA allied militia or paramilitary group active in community/To commit crimes/ Other] 55) Do some people consider it to be prestigious to carry weapons? If yes, who? If yes, is it more or less prestigious now than in the past? Is this changing? Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 147

Impacts 56) What are the negative impacts of SALW on the community? [robbery, cattle raiding, killing, injury, rape, threatening behaviour, accidents, suicide] For each of the impacts listed, ask the following: 57) Where are each of the negative impacts are more likely to occur? 58) When are each of the negative impacts are more likely? 59) What factors fuel each of these negative impacts? [alcohol, competition over girls etc.] Existing Arms Control 60) What arms control measures currently exist in the community, if any? 6 1 ) How do people learn gun safety? 62) How are weapons stored? 63) Can people carry guns anywhere? [into towns and markets, weddings, celebrations etc.] 64) If restrictions on carrying weapons exist, how were these negotiated? 65) Have the civil authorities or SPLA tried to control arms held by civilians in the past? [When? How? Describe? successful/unsuccessful / lessons learned?] 66) Have other communities attempted to control weapons? If so, detail. 67) Has dialogue taken place in this community to discuss arms control? If so, detail. 68) Has dialogue taken place between communities to discuss arms control? If so, detail. 69) Is there a need for increased control of weapons in this community? If so, how? 70) Is there a need for increased control of weapons in neighbouring communities? Where?

Risks 71) What risks are associated with controlling or removing weapons at this time? 72) What could be done to offset these risks? 73) Do local stakeholders have the power to initiate an arms control programme? 74) Do you see any need for outside support for arms control? If so, how? 75) What power dynamics between members of the community affect the ability to control arms?

76) Would some people resist attempts to remove weapons? Opportunities 77) What conflicts would have to be resolved in order for arms control to take place? Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 148

78) What additional conditions would have to be met in order control weapons in the hands of civilians? [Example: Instruction from Paramount Chief/ Searches and Arrests/ Sensitisation and community pressure/ Community Development Project/ individual compensation in exchange for weapons / Other- List If compensation, what kind?] 79) What are the alternatives to weapons use by civilians? 80) Are there people who manufacture or repair weapons in the community? 81) How many civilian Police would be necessary for the community to consider disarming? 82) Are the community members knowledgeable about existing Sudanese laws on arms ammunition and explosive (including local decrees etc.)

Notes and Observations: Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 149

Appendix 8 [See p.60]

Weapons identified during the research period and during the post-research disarmament

WW I and WW II vintage .303 lee enfields; Nosin Nagants (carbine versions); 1 Mauser of unknown manufacture with Ethiopian Police markings; 3 Steyr Manlichers; AKM series rifles manufactured in the former Soviet Union, Russia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, East Germany; Czechoslovakian VZ 58s; Belgian, British, Indian, Israeli and unmarked FAL rifles, Chinese and Russian SKS rifles, German and Iranian G3 rifles, Chinese and Russian RPD light machineguns, Russian PKM machineguns; Yugoslavian and Russian RPK light machineguns; Russian Rocket propelled Grenade Launchers and of unknown manufacture; Turkish MG3 MKE medium machineguns; German Heckler and Koch MP 5 sub- machinegun; Russian RP 46s; American and Chinese 60mm Mortars. Additional weaponry included non-functioning Bren guns, sterling smgs, 2 inch mortars, plastic explosives, and armoured vehicles, Russian PPSH 41 sub-machineguns, Israeli UZI sub-machineguns, Russian 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm heavy machineguns, Italian, American and Iranian anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, H&K MP5 smgs, UZIs, SA7 surface to air missile launchers, Chinese towed multi-barreled rocket launchers, various anti-tank weapons, towed single and multi-barreled anti-aircraft guns. (Author's field notes. Akobo and Pibor Counties. March 2006-May 2007) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 150

Appendix 9 [See p.61]

Qualitative comparison of weapons and ammunition exchange rates in Akobo surrounding areas based on field interviews Current (at the time of research) and past values for weapons may give an indication of relative scarcity and can be used to assess the availability of weapons and ammunition over time, as a result of market forces. As disarmament becomes imminent, the cash and kind value of weapons may decrease as individuals attempt to offload them at reduced rates rather than lose the weapons through forced disarmament with no compensation- as is currently happening. At the time of research (and before disarmament) Akobo youth offered the following values for weapons, in cattle and cash:

Weapon by Type Value in cattle Current value in cash (USD or Ethiopian Birr) AKM 2-5 cows (depending on $200-500 condition) with 5-10 rounds of ammunition and one magazine included RPD 4 cows $400 PKM 10 cows (with one box of 200 $1000 rounds of ammunition included RPG 5 cows $500 60mm mortars uncommon Cash value not known Hand grenades $10 7.62 X 39 mm bullet (AK 47 5-7 Birr ($1) and RPD) 7.62 X 54 mm (rimmed) 1 Birr (approximately 14 cents bullet (PKM) each)

The value of ammunition for the most common weapon (AKM series) has risen by between 500- 700% in the last year, with 1 bullet reportedly valued at 1 Birr one year ago and currently ranging in value between 5 and 7 Birr.84 This calculation is based on a local exchange rate of 7 Birr for $1 . Ammunition for the AK 47 was for sale in the Kiir market at a rate of 5 Birr per bullet. The five-fold increase in the price of small arms ammunition can be attributed to the lack of new inflows since the period of January- May 2005, when ammunition introduced through SAF MI in Malakal to Dr. Riek Guy and Col. Keuth Simon in Deng Jok North of Akobo (as a way to facilitate militia attacks on Akobo) entered into

See also: Report on July 25-28, 2005joint South Sudan DDR Authority-UNDDRfield assessment mission to Abwong, Akobo andJuai Bor, Upper Nile and Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) Reports 95-99 (www.cpmtsudan.org) Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 5 1 circulation amongst the 'civilian' population being mobilized and subsequently spread through local trade. A White Army 'Bunham' or youth leader interviewed in Wanding, at the entrance to the Gila River toich (cattle camps), gave comparable values for weapons and ammunition although the value of the PKM belt-fed light machinegun was given as 15 cows (approximately $1500- half as much again as the rate quoted in Akobo by Lou Nuer youth).

Weapon and Ammunition by Type Value in cattle or Birr AKM Maximum 5 cows PKM 15 cows G3 (German and Iranian under license) 4-6 cows FAL (Belgian and various under license) 4-6 cows 7.62 ? 39 mm bullet (AKM) 5 Birr 7.62 ? 51 mm bullet (FAL and G3) 5 Birr (but increasingly scarce) .303 inch bullet for WW II era Enfield rifles 'scarce, but available from Jalaba traders' A Murle peace mediator from Lekongole offered the following values for weapons and ammunition in Murle areas (with reference to cattle and the government currency, the dinar86):

Weapon and Ammunition by Type Value in cattle or Dinar 100 bullets 1 year old bull 200 bullets 1 heifer 1 bullet 50 dinar 1 gun (AK47 or G3 not specified) 5 bulls

It is interesting to note that at the time of research the price of ammunition in Lou Nuer areas is roughly 300% higher than in Murle areas. In Murle areas, a single bullet for the Ak 47 is reported to be approximately $.22, compared with $.70-$ 1 in the Lou Nuer areas surveyed. It was suggested that market forces and the recent supply by the SAF from Juba of Pibor-based Murle Militia under Ismael Konye explained this dramatic difference in the price of ammunition. A number of sources also reported that ammunition was available for sale in the Pibor market.

Directly South of Akobo, within what local Lou Nuer describe as Murle territory. Valued at 224 dinar to 1 USD in Khartoum at the time of writing. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 52

Appendix 10 [See p.98]

Akobo Disarmament Committee Structure

The 10 collection centers in Akobo County (North to South) 1 . Wanding 2. Kier 3. Wachoman/Gagdong 4. Wuthpiny 5. Tirgol 6. Old Akobo 7. Akobo 8. Mer 9. Burmath 10. Cuiban

The Overall supervisory structure for the disarmament process was as follows: 1 Disarmament Security Committee 2 Disarmament Committees (1 for 5 centers) 10 Disarmament Committee (1 for each center) 10 Security Team (1 for each disarmament center) 1 Mobile security team (as required) UN team (UNDP; UNMIS DDR staff, UNMOs and Force Protection) Youth mobilizers (Pact sponsored) Composition of the Disarmament Security Committee: Akobo County Commissioner: Chair Chief of Police Commanding Officer of the SPLA: (OIC Maj. Thor Deng) UN

Disarmament Committee for Supervision and management of S disarmament centers Payam Adminstrator- chairperson Head chief- member Executive chief- member Police in charge for 5 centers- member Public security in charge of payam- member Payam personel officer- secretary

The Disarmament Committee for each center:

1 . Boma Administrator 2. Police Squad in charge 3 . Sub-chief of the center 4. Church representative Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 153

5. Woman's association representative 6. Youth representative (from 10 youth charged with guarding the weapons) 7. Registration team leader (to oversee the proper registration or weapons and verify and safeguard registration forms) Responsibilities of each disarmament committee To keep collected weapons in a safe protected place Weapons are to be collected in a safe tukul or hut Ammunition to be stored separately To organize the center to be free of crowds Rifle owners should stand either in one line or in one place apart from the disarmament team and must be called one by one Mobilization on how they come to the registration center in organized line Resolving any problems that come up in the center during the disarmament process The Security detail for each disarmament center was composed of the following members: • 10 SPLA (1 officer minimum) • 10-20 male community members (1-2 selected by each sub-chief). This number could be augmented by the local SPLA as required for security. Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 54

Appendix 11 [See p.102]

Salva KUr announces 200-dayPresident.action plan,SeptemberExcerpts2006from a speech made by the GoSS

During this tour, we were shocked to learnfrom the citizens ofsome ofthese areas that some of our leaders, people holding constitutionalpositions and senior SPLA officers were involved in the incitement that led to the inter-clan clashes that took so many lives. Allegations were made to the effect that some military commanders supplied arms and ammunition to their respective clans. In response to these allegations I directed that a thorough and unfettered investigation be carried out immediately. Thosefound guilty will not be spared. They will be prosecuted in accordance with the law. I am proud to say that the Interim Constitution ofSouthern Sudan does not allow anyone to be above the law.

The Government ofSouthern Sudan will strive to restore harmony and co-existence among our communities, because this is the only way to realize true peace, unity and reconciliation among our people. Nevertheless, your government will not lose sight ofpursuing the culprits who are behind this phenomenon. However, I would like to remind ourselves here that more work needs to be done. The situation in manyparts ofSouthern Sudan today still remainsfragile and volatile where eruption or resumption ofsimilar clashes between various clans are inevitable as long as the arms proliferation in Southern Sudan is still going on unabated.

The availability ofarms and means ofacquiring them by our localpopulation is a major concern for our government. Though as government we have always thought ofdesigning a comprehensive disarmamentpolicy that takes into consideration some concerns ofour local communities living along the regional borders, as well as those who have a history offighting each other, so that when such a policy goes into effect, its end results should not be exploited by the side that may continue to retain its arms.

The disarmamentpolicy should also be cautiously designed in such a way that it does not trigger ethnic violence within our communities. It will not therefore be long before our security and law enforcement agencies take a step to implement this policy once the laws guiding it are promulgated.

I call upon our legislators at all levels ofour government to take the lead in this campaign meanwhile, your government will do everything in its power to protect the lives andproperty ofour citizens and guest residents all over the Southern Sudan. Recently, I learnt that our youth inAkobo took a unilateral Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 1 5 5

decision and disarmed themselves, where 1200 AK 47s were handed over to the authorities inAkobo in the presence ofthe United Nations Peace Keeping Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). This move taken by our youth is very encouraging and I wholeheartedly welcome it. I therefore would like to take this opportunity to salute our youth in Akobo, and congratulate the authorities there and whoever may have helped in making this to happen. " Disarmament Opportunities and Hazards 156

Appendix 12 [See p. 104]

Additional proposals'Communityfor conflictSecurityreductionAssessment'fromJunethe UNDDR-PactSeptember 2006Sudan follow up

• Civilian disarmament of the Murle community; • Increasing the number of police; • Establish corridors (using satellite images and historical accounts) through the following Counties to allow Murle safe passage for cattle grazing and access to water; • Reinforce the peace talks and strengthen the agreements made between the Murle and Nuer tribes; • As a temporary measure: install SPLA security cordons between Murle and Nuer in strategic locations; • A longer-term solution: put in place administrative check points in strategic corridors used by the communities; • Further investigation of irrigation projects that would be designed to increase water and grazing points in Murle areas; • Encourage greater exchange of knowledge between the Nuer and the Murle through joint activities and workshops, such as agricultural and construction training, in an attempt to destroy historical misconceptions and stereotypes; • Develop trade links between the Nuer and the Murle, building on historical exchanges and identifying commodities unique to each area to create a regular and positive interaction between the communities; • Bring together youth leaders for a Peace meeting in Akobo; Develop the transport infrastructure of the region (by clearing the roads of mines) to support trade, develop information exchange and support the fishing industry through the provision of a boat; and, « Develop the health care facilities and education system in Akobo County. ak€3£

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ISK

Elusive Peace