Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster Lessons Learned Workshop Report

Flamboyent Hotel Masvingo

17-21 November 2014

Compiled By MacDonald Kadzatsa: Workshop Facilitator

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Acronyms

CCCM Camp Coordination and Camp Management CMED Central Mechanical Engineering Department CRS Catholic Relief Services DDF District Development Fund DRM Disaster Risk Management FAO Food and Agricultural Organization IASC Inter Agency Standing Committee IOM International Organization on Migration LL Lessons Learned NFIs Non Food Items OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children UNDP United Nation Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Zim Asset Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation ZINWA Zimbabwe National Water Authority

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Table of Contents Executive Summary ...... 5 Summary of findings ...... 8 1. Introduction ...... 12 1.1 Participating Organizations ...... 13 1.2 Purpose of the Lessons Learned Workshop ...... 13 1.3 Workshop Programme ...... 14 1.4 Methodology ...... 14 Findings ...... 15 Day II: Field Visit ...... 15 Day III ...... 16 Workshop proceedings ...... 16 Session I: Opening of workshop ...... 16 Session I: Approaches and Best Practices for Lessons Learned ...... 17 Session II: ...... 18 (i) DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe...... 18 (ii) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe ...... 18 (iii) Humanitarian Principles ...... 19 Session III ...... 19 (i): ZINWA: Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe ...... 19 (ii): Climate Change Office: Climate and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe...... 21 Session V ...... 22 (i): Policy, regulations and procedures on the construction of dams ...... 22 (ii) ...... 23 Session VI: ...... 24 Response of Zimbabwe to Flooding emergencies using Geo-information Science and Near real-time Geo-data ...... 24 Session VII: Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Disaster ...... 25 (i) The Social Cost of Tokwe Mukosi Dam...... 25 (ii) National Coordination of the Disaster ...... 26 (iii): Community Representative ...... 27 Day IV ...... 28

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Group Work ...... 28 Annexures ...... 29 Annex I: Presentations ...... 29 Annex II: Group work Tasks ...... 64 1. Group Work Guide ...... 64 Annex III: Group work presentation ...... 67 Annex IV: List of Participants ...... 80

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Executive Summary

The Lessons Learned Report provides a strategic level overview of lessons learned by the Government of Zimbabwe, disaster risk management stakeholders and its partners from rescue and relief activities in the immediate aftermath of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster of 2014. The report focuses on the complexity of responding to a disaster of the magnitude that Zimbabwe experienced, and what disaster risk management community has learned from the achievements and challenges from an organizational perspective, and institutional relationships. It comprises input from the experiences of some of the many government agencies, military, UN, civil society organizations and individuals who came to the assistance of the affected communities. Most importantly, it makes key recommendations on critical areas to be addressed to improve disaster management and response.

The generous contribution of all partners to the relief effort and to this review, epitomizes the best of humanitarian response to assist the people of Zimbabwe in times of great need. The combined experiences are a valuable resource to enhance preparation, response and management of future disasters.

The information on Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster lessons learned was gathered through a guided field tour, presentations by key stakeholders involved in emergency response and those involved and had hands on in the design and construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam as well as the participants’ group work organized around the 4 thematic areas defined below.

The key issues that emerged from the process can be grouped around 4 main themes – search and rescue; Camp Coordination and Camp Management; relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures and; regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and related flood disaster risk mitigation and preparedness.

The rapid nature and evolution of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster demonstrated the need to review disaster risk management in Zimbabwe especially so in the face of changing climate.

The disaster management capacity of the civil protection organization at national, provincial and district levels emerged as an element requiring immediate focus as it was found to have some limitations. At the national level, the Department of Civil Protection suffered from a significant scarcity of resources in comparison to the monumental caseload. Inadequate non-food items (NFIs) such as tents, tarpaulins, water bowsers, mobile water treatment plants among others curtailed provision of comprehensive emergency response. The lean budget that the department has meant that the provincial and district civil protection organization were inherently under-funded thus lacked the resources to mount an effective initial disaster response before external support has been marshaled. Equally lacking was the national guidelines and policy framework to guide emergency management operations particularly where there was need for total relocation, resettlement and compensation of the people displaced by a disaster generated by a development project.

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At the provincial and district levels, there was a distinct lack of capacity for provision of relief due partly to lack of funding, inadequate emergency resources, lack of appropriate all-terrain vehicles and inadequately trained personnel. Although capacity was strengthened over the course of time through on the job training in Camp Coordination and Camp Management, and warehouse management following the disaster, the crisis had by then largely passed.

The search and rescue operation were effective and the teams tasked (Zimbabwe Air Force and Zimbabwe Republic Police sub-aqua), the District Development Fund (DDF), Central Mechanical and Engineering Department (CMED) were diligent and dedicated and as a result no lives were lost. The rapidness at which the flood situation evolved negated the orderly relocation of a significant population (2,713 families, more than 18,000 livestock and household property) that was planned and called for swift marshaling of resources over a very short time space. The search and rescue operations thus experienced problems of inadequate appropriate vehicles to transport people, livestock and household properties. The operation also experienced shortages of A1 jet fuel and containers. Operations were also hampered by lack of baseline information such as population distribution maps and guidance on the low lying and high lands as well as inaccessibility of some of the areas due to the torrential rainfall that washed away roads and bridges.

Camp Coordination and Camp Management of the Chingwizi relocation camp was preceded with commendable coordination mechanisms established by the provincial civil protection organization and well complemented by the national level and UN cluster coordination mechanism for civil society organizations through United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Although challenges were experienced at the beginning of the emergency operations, significant support both in cash and in kind were mobilized to meet the humanitarian gaps. The lack of disaggregated list of displaced people, infiltration of beneficiary registers by ineligible beneficiaries, poor accountability, leakages of emergency supplies through pilfering and theft and corruption among those entrusted with safe keeping of emergency supplies were key challenges. Inadequate water supplies and sanitation and general hygiene upkeep of the relocation camp were also key challenges given the high population density of camp settlement.

Relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures was an area that experiences serious challenges. As identified above, the rapid nature of the flood disaster prevented the orderly and planned resettlement of the people displaced by the dam project. In order to decongest the Chingwizi camp in the face of increasing threats of disease outbreaks and to facilitate early settlement that would allow people to retain their livelihoods, allocation of 1 hectare plots was a method of choice. This move agitated the expectant communities causing serious conflict that instigated forcible resettlement. The relocation exercise by its nature disrupted people’s livelihoods particularly their food security. Inadequate grazing areas for livestock forced some families to move their livestock to other areas. The uncoordinated livestock movement resulted in the spread of lumpy skin disease to the host community. Efforts were however made to scale up livestock vaccination and dipping services which the relocated communities did not use.

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Although a significant number of organizations were physically present in Chingwizi during the acute phase of the flood emergency, these quickly thinned off leaving less than a handful to support early recovery.

On the regulatory processes and procedures related to dam construction and integration of disaster risk mitigation and preparedness, there is ample policy and regulatory frameworks to ensure dam flood safety in Zimbabwe. There however are major gaps to ensure compliance and enforcement of statutes particularly related to rural settlements. Settlements in the Tokwe Mukosi basin were not regulated despite existing plans for the dam construction. Lack of integration of disaster risk reduction on new development and adequate consultations of all key sectors including the communities, local government structures and the civil protection organization resulted in default planning and budgeting for the Tokwe Mukosi dam project. This lack of broad consultations may have contributed to failure to integrate social costs for the dam construction and to the unplanned settlements that exposed communities to flood risk. Furthermore, the lack of explicit policy framework and time bound activities for relocation and compensation mechanisms including a resettlement model for people displaced by development projects raised pertinent administrative gaps that caused disharmony between government and displaced communities. Government is however mobilizing resources to pay compensation for the remaining 1,908 families and for valuating an additional 3,054 homes in the Tokwe Mukosi dam buffer zone.

3 new schools, a clinic and clinic staff housing are at various stages of construction. Water supplies to these new facilities are however inadequate due to the low yielding boreholes. Plans are however underway to relocate the mobile water treatment equipment that was being used at the relocation camp and to install a six kilometer water pipeline to service the clinic and the schools.

It is also worth noting that there is assurance from ZINWA that there is no longer the risk of flooding of the Tokwe Mukosi dam as the a concrete facing over the dam wall rock fill has been completed and the civil works to raise the dam wall are nearly complete.

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Summary of findings

Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation Search and  Coordinated  2,713 families, more than 18,000  Relocation of people displaced  Development projects rescue search and rescue livestock and household properties by development project should should integrate social operations needed to be moved immediately take place well before costs in their budget to  No loss of life  Shortages of A1 Jet fuel and containers development project take into account the reported  Lack of baseline information on commence costs for relocation of  Well motivated population settlements  Availability of real time flood displaced people. and dedicated  Rainfall damage roads and bridges monitoring and information  Tertiary institutions such search and rescue  Soggy ground making road evacuation dissemination can facilitate as the University of teams; difficult search and rescue operations. Zimbabwe and  Verbal reports,  Lack of all- terrain vehicles development partners to meetings within  Control of emergency assets e.g. vehicles  Need to devolve command and be approached to support the communities, from outside emergency operation area; control of assets used for science based real-time information  Loss of livestock due to overloading and emergency operations to field flood monitoring, flood through local inappropriate transport level. mapping and technology structures, police based information and army foot  The complementarities of civil dissemination; patrols, cellphone and military stakeholders in an  Command and control of communication to emergency are integral to a emergency management the district successful response. operational assets should administrators’ be field based. offices, print and electronic media played a pivotal role to inform the nation.  People self- evacuated to high

Camp  Provincial  Lack of disaggregated list of displaced  Timely provision of  Beneficiary registration Coordination structures people, disaggregated data of should be disaggregate by and Camp established  Infiltration of beneficiary registers by beneficiaries assists in focused age, sex, status of head of Management before and during ineligible beneficiaries, and targeted humanitarian household e.g. child/OVC the emergency to  Poor accountability, leakages of assistance; or female headed, elderly

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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation coordinate emergency supplies through pilfering and  Need for beneficiary and disabled. activities theft and corruption. Inadequate water registration to be strictly  Verification of  Dedicated staff supplies and sanitation; monitored to avoid infiltration beneficiaries should be willing to work  General hygiene upkeep of the relocation  Planning for CCCM and regularly conducted with extended hours camp; warehouse management is the involvement of the  Coordinated  Inadequate security and lighting for important to ensure the safety traditional leaders and the support from people; and security of emergency police. partners and the  Lack dumpsite and cemetery; supplies;  Training in CCCM and national levels;  Inadequate familiarity of humanitarian  Procurement and pre- warehouse management  Targeted resource principles among responders. positioning of emergency NFIs should be mandatory for mobilization;  High prevalence of STIs at the Camp is critical to effective disaster the civil protection  Health and related to low health promotion activities response; organization staff and hygiene and lack of recreational activities  Although water and sanitation stakeholders; promotion and hygiene were  DCP should procure and contributed to compromised, health and preposition NFIs; reduced risk of hygiene can help reduce risk of  Humanitarian principles disease disease outbreaks; should be customized to outbreaks.  Inadequate shelter the Zimbabwean situation undermined privacy;  Awareness of humanitarian principles can facilitate effective disaster response

Relocation to  Families relocated  Flood emergency disrupted the planned  Delayed relocation of people in  Relocation of people permanent before the flood phased relocation exercise; the basin resulted in the displaced by development residence and disaster were  Lack of policy and guidelines on compromised planned projects to proceed early recovery adequately resettlement model and compensation resettlement; project commencement; measures catered for; mechanisms for people displaced by  Need for policy framework and  Resettlement and development projects; guidelines for resettlement compensation guidelines  The available land was under models and compensation for people displaced by Development Trust of Zimbabwe and the mechanisms for people development projects present land user frustrated the program displaced by development should be developed; despite the land being state land projects;  Early recovery framework  Permanent relocation did not adequately  Early recovery needs to be should be developed to provide for livelihood recovery and integrated with humanitarian ensure resilience of compromised food security; assistance; disaster affected

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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation  Boreholes provided in the resettlement  Geological and hydrological communities; areas did not yield adequate water; surveys must proceed  Availability of water and  Planning of permanent settlement did not relocation and resettlement of suitability of land for make provision for grazing areas; people. human activities should  Relocated families did not use livestock  Livestock welfare needs to be considered before vaccination and dipping services risking integral to human relocation relocation and the spread of livestock diseases; and settlement; resettlement of displaced  An early recovery framework for the flood  Announcements of people. affected communities was not developed compensation payments can  Training on livestock  Incidents of robberies reported after result in robberies; emergency guidelines and compensation payments standards must be conducted for civil protection organizations;  Appropriate and user friendly cash transfers need to be investigated to facilitate compensation payments.  Food assistance should continue until harvesting in April 2015. On the  Elaborate  Inadequate compliance and enforcement  Need for ensuring compliance  Enforcement and regulatory legislative and of dam safety statutes; and enforcement of dam compliance with dam processes and policy framework  Disaster risk reduction not adequately safety measures and best safety legislation need to procedures for dam integrated into dam project design practices; be enhanced; related to construction and process.  Civil Protection Act needs to be  The Civil Protection Act, dam safety standards  Current river water level monitoring reviewed should be replaced with a construction exist. system does not facilitate real time  Need for mainstreaming of proactive Act. and  International best relaying of river water levels to warn of disaster risk reduction into  Disaster risk reduction integration of practices relating possible flooding; development planning; should be mainstreamed disaster risk to procedures and  Relation between rainfall intensity and  The province did not anticipate into development mitigation practices for flooding has not been established. a flood disaster and thus had planning; and relocating people  There is limited capacity for flood no appropriate response plan;  Flood monitoring preparedness in during dam modeling and mapping;  Real time monitoring and including real time construction;  Best practices for dam construction and dissemination of early warning monitoring and  Regular dam relocation of at risk population were not critical for flood risk dissemination facilities for

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Area Good practices Challenges Lessons Learned Recommendation inspection are followed; management; flood early warning conducted on all  Funding for relocation of people in the  Flood mapping and modeling information and flood dams; basin was not integrated in the project can assist in emergency modeling and mapping  Disaster budget preparedness and response; should be prioritized; management  Consultation and  Communities should be legislation and communication with affected consulted and be well policy exist; communities can? informed of the need for relocation and on preferred models of resettlement;  Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical, expertise and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness, and response to manage the flood risk within the context of climate change

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1. Introduction

In early February 2014, communities living in the Tokwe Mukosi basin were inundated by the rising water levels at the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam which was still under construction. The water levels rapidly rose to 671 meters above sea level on the 3rd of February 2014 threatening communities within its basin. The communities within the basin were to be relocated under a phased relocation plan. The phased relocation plan had intended to relocate a total of 6393 families or about 32 000 people and their 18,764 livestock to make way for the dam.

Given the magnitude of the threat to extensive flooding, His Excellency, the President declared a State of Disaster on 9th February 2014 in regard to the confluence of the southern parts of Chivi and Masvingo Districts, the northern parts of Mwenezi as well as western parts of Chiredzi Districts.

The Government made an appeal from both local and international humanitarian communities to meet urgent humanitarian needs for affected communities in the Tokwe-Mukosi Dam Basin. The priority was the evacuation and relocation of affected communities as well as the provision of food, shelter, safe water and other basic needs

The Country’s Civil Protection Organisation comprising the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Management, the National Civil Protection Committee, the Masvingo Provincial Civil Protection Committee and District Civil Protection Committees of affected districts were tasked with coordination and management of the disaster.

Concerted efforts were made to safeguard life and property of the affected communities. As a result, 2 713 families were successfully relocated from Tokwe Mukosi basin to the designated Masangula, Chisase and Chingwizi resettlement areas.

The relocation exercise was burdened by a number of challenges ranging from lack of funds, resistance by some of the families in question to be relocated to the Nuanetsi Ranch in Mwenezi, lack of funding for compensation of affected households and other cultural and socio-economic dimensions yet to be deliberated on. It also took a long time for communities to take up their designated relocation plots due to challenges that also require an open discussion. There is also need to scrutinise the assumptions for Tokwe Mukosi dam construction project. For instance, the initial strategic plan for the dam was premised on recurrent droughts affecting most parts of Masvingo Province. Engineers thought that the dam would start filling up at a later stage when the communities within the Tokwe Mukosi basin would have been trans-located to their designated relocation sites. There is also need to assess the level of community involvement in the project design and implementation.

Furthermore, there was media hype that raised critical issues surrounding the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster with the bulk pointing at some weaknesses of the civil protection organization at central government, the provincial and district structures.

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There however were positive lessons and key achievements that were made upon which the civil protection organization can document and build on to strengthen future performance.

It is against this background that a national workshop is being organised to draw lessons from the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster. The Department of Civil Protection has therefore enlisted the services of a national consultant to facilitate at the workshop. Below are the terms of reference for the consultancy.

1.1 Participating Organizations National Protection, Provincial and District organizations, the UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, FAO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Non-governmental organizations: Save the Children, Plan Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Red Cross Society, Oxfam, International Refugee Council, Christian Care, CRS and Care International.

1.2 Purpose of the Lessons Learned Workshop

The 2014 Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster has reinforced the important need to go beyond disaster response but to also strengthen and institutionalize flood disaster risk management in Zimbabwe.

The purpose of documenting lessons learned is to share and use knowledge derived from experience to:

 Promote the recurrence of desirable outcomes

 Preclude the recurrence of undesirable outcomes.

The ultimate purpose of documented lessons learned is to provide information that can increase effectiveness and efficiency and to build on the experience that has been earned for future flood risk management. If documented and disseminated properly, lessons learned provide a powerful method of sharing ideas for improving work processes, operation, quality, safety and cost effectiveness among other advantages. It will also help improve management decision making and performance throughout the tiers of government as well as contributing to building resilience of communities impacted by disasters.

The Lessons Learned workshop brought together the various government departments, civil protection organizations in the country, the United Nations agencies in Zimbabwe and representatives from the affected communities to facilitate a national knowledge sharing platform aimed to:

 identify lessons learned through serious scrutiny of the flood hazard, its impacts and societal responses to them;  identify effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize emergency management Lessons Learned/Best Practices;  ensure a common understanding of national, provincial, district and community level priorities and objectives, as well as opportunities and challenges to feed into inter-agency preparedness for future flood disasters and

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 make recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements and enhance future emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery /development through existing training programs.

1.3 Workshop Programme

Day I: Traveling

Day II: Field trip to Chingwizi and the Tokwe Mukosi Dam.

Day III:

 Official opening

Presentations

o Lessons Learned Approaches and Best Practices o DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe o Humanitarian Principles o Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe o Climate Change and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe o Dam construction policy and regulations o Possible improved future response to flood emergencies based on Geo Remote Sensing and Real Time Data o Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Disaster o National Coordination of the Flood Disaster o Introduction to Groupwork

Day IV: Group presentations and plenary

Day V: Summary of Challenges, Lessons Learned and Proposed Activities

Recommendations and Way Forward

1.4 Methodology

The lessons learned workshop is an event where stakeholders come together to share their insights and experiences of flood disaster risk management. Specifically they will be asked to share their responses to three key questions:

1. What worked well in the flood disaster risk management?

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2. What could have been improved? 3. What should be done differently next time?

To ensure that participants to the workshop conceptualize the nature of the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster and its impact, a field trip was undertaken to the now disbanded Chingwizi relocation camp, Chingwizi resettlement area and to the Tokwe Mukosi dam. The camp site was now evacuated but some of the infrastructure such as water points and a mobile communication booster were still intact. The camp was home to 2,713 families comprising of people moved from the area down-stream of the dam, the areas where dam water flooded or threatened to flood homesteads as well as the buffer zone area that would contribute to environmental degradation and subsequent siltation of the dam.

Presentations by the Provincial Administrator for Masvingo Province, sector ministries and departments and the representative from the relocated communities assisted to inform the workshop participants on the situation that prevailed during the emergency operations up to the resettlement of the people evacuated from the Tokwe Mukosi basin. Follow up group work and plenary allowed for detailed discussions of thematic areas and to the identification of challenges, lessons learned and actions to be followed up after the workshop.

Findings

Day II: Field Visit

A visit was made to site where a permanent clinic and clinic staff housing were under construction. A briefing on the progress being made on the construction of the clinic and staff housing as well as the health service delivery was given by the Community based Nurse for Mwenezi District. Currently a temporary clinic donated by CESVI an Italian organization was being used while the permanent clinic under construction was being funded by the National Aids Council and the Zimbabwe Defence Force was constructing the clinic. The staff housing was being funded and constructed by the Family of God

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Church. Progress in the completion of the clinic was temporarily hampered by delays in the delivery of building materials.

The clinic was experiencing water shortages as the borehole provided had low yield. Problems of patient referral were also being experienced as the ambulance provided for the clinic was not permanently allocated. Scorpion bites were a major problem and the clinic lacked appropriate medicines to manage the scorpion bites. Reports of youth pregnancy and the attendant problem of referrals were also highlighted.

A visit was made to the Tokwe Mukosi dam where the resident engineers briefed participants on the progress being made on the dam construction. The technique of the dam construction was unique in that it involved a rock fill dam wall that utilized the abundant rocks that Chivi district was endowed. 7.5 million tonnes of rock over which a concrete face was overlayed made the costs of the dam construction lower. However because of the rapid inflows of water into the dam, water started sipping through the rock fill and there was risk of flooding downstream as there was need to release over 6 million cubic metres of water. The construction of the face slab was completed by 11 November 2014 making the dam safe from damage of the dam wall.

Day III

Workshop proceedings

Session I: Opening of workshop

The workshop was officially opened by the Minister of Local Government Public Works and National Housing (MLGPWNH) whose speech was read by the Permanent Secretary Engineer G.S. Mulilo. The Minister pointed out that the flood disaster was due high precipitation that resulted in the unanticipated rapid filling up of the Tokwe Mukosi dam that was still under construction. Also contributing to the disaster was the inadequate early warning systems along the river systems as well as the delays in relocating the communities vulnerable to flooding before the dam project got underway. The President His Excellency Robert Mugabe declared a state of national disaster for the areas impacted by the flood. Following the declaration, an appeal of Z$20 million was made to assist the people affected by the flood. Individuals, charitable organizations, the private sector, civil society organizations, churches and foreign governments contributed both in cash and in kind to support government’s efforts to assist the affected communities.

The emergency relocation and resettlement programme and its associated costs such as compensation for relocated households were a social burden requiring government to embark on phased compensation. Government has paid compensation to a section of the relocated families and mobilizing resources to compensate families whose properties have been valuated following the relocation and resettlement exercise.

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The process of providing emergency assistance for the people relocated to Chingwizi camp was not without problems. The Minister noted the problems encountered in beneficiary registration, management and distribution of emergency assistance both non-food and food items and the disharmony between the communities and the camp managers when people were forced to leave the camp for resettlement. The Minister stressed the importance of coordinated camp management.

The contributions made by stakeholders and partners including government departments, individuals, international organizations and foreign governments, church related organizations, civil society organizations and the private sector in the coordinated flood disaster response were acknowledged by the Minister. He also commended the efforts made by the different arms of government and its partners in the provision of uninterrupted health care delivery, education facilities, water and sanitation and emergency shelter and other critical services.

The coordination of the emergency response to the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster was generally good and the Minister expressed gratitude that no loss lives were lost. Furthermore there was a lot of dedication and sacrifice among the responders and credit should be given to government partners among them development partners and civil society organizations who came forward to close the gaps identified in the emergency response.

The Minister encouraged participants to have an interactive and fruitful discussion.

Session I: Approaches and Best Practices for Lessons Learned

Presented by: Mr. MacDonald Kadzatsa

The facilitator outlined workshop objectives, expected outcomes and the general approach to the workshop. He further highlighted the best practices when conducting lessons learned workshop. A set of guiding questions to guide the workshop discussions were presented and these included;

 What was learned about the flood disaster in general?  What worked well?  What could have been improved?  What should be done differently next time?  What was learned about what did not go well?  What was learned about budgeting/financing?  What was learned about working with partners?  What was learned about working with the affected communities?  How will this be incorporated into future disaster management?

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Session II:

(i) DRM Key concepts and Civil Protection Policy in Zimbabwe.

Presented by: Ms. Sibusiso Ndlovu

The purpose of the presentation was to provide participants with an opportunity to grasp the common terminology in disaster risk management. The terminologies discussed were those that the workshop was to continually use thus the importance of participants to understand them. The terminologies included:- what constituted a disaster, what was risk, management, hazard, vulnerability, disaster preparedness, early warning, emergency, disaster prevention, the conceptual framework of disaster risk management with reference to the Hyogo Framework for Action, the key elements of disaster in the pre-and post-disaster phases, rehabilitation and recovery, resilience as well as the relationship between disaster and development.

(ii) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe

Presented by: Ms. Sibusiso Ndlovu

The presentation was intended to familiarize participants with policy guiding civil protection in Zimbabwe. The topic covered the definition of civil protection, the policy statement, a description of the Civil Protection Act No 5 of 1989, the structural model of the Civil Protection System in Zimbabwe and the Civil Protection Organization in Zimbabwe. The legislative and resource gaps in the current civil protection system were also presented. The meeting was also informed of the existence of the draft Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Bill that was waiting promulgation by Parliament and the proposed structures of DRM organization and sub-committees in the bill.

Discussion

Concern was raised on the continued use of archaic policy and legislative frameworks that were not reflective of the global initiatives to elevating disaster risk management as development issue and Hyogo Framework for Action that Zimbabwe was signatory. A draft Disaster Risk Management Bill was developed in 2012 and is yet to be promulgated.

Recommendation

 The workshop recommended advocacy of the review of the Civil Protection Act and Policy and the need for Parliament to promulgate the Disaster Risk Management Bill.

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(iii) Humanitarian Principles

Presentation by: Ms. Melly Sibanda

The session covered the humanitarian principles that are guided by the code of conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Non-Governmental Organizations, the Humanitarian Charter, the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) 6 core principles on the code of conduct on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and the Guiding Principles for Internally Displaced. The humanitarian principles were however not legally binding. The principles are intended to provide guidance on procedures, practices, ethics, standards and the rights of people visited by calamities when providing humanitarian assistance vis a vis the Tokwe Mukosi Flood Disaster. The presentation also covered the definition of humanitarianism, the role of governments in disasters, the origin of the humanitarian principles. The presentation covered the Constitution of Zimbabwe Chapter 4 that made provision for the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms that were also applicable to people impacted by disasters. Additional principles applicable to disaster situations included the 4 Core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence and the Sphere Standards also provided guidance in emergency operations.

To complement the presentation Ms Sibanda showed a video on Humanitarian Principles.

Discussions

Concern was raised on the provision of food assistance where instances were sited where foodstuffs provided had no regard to people’s culture and norms and people’s religious beliefs. Furthermore some humanitarian workers failed to provide tips on how to prepare food stuffs that were foreign to the benefiting communities.

Recommendations

 It was recommended that staple food be distributed and where foreign food stuffs are introduced, instructions on how to prepare such food be given to the beneficiaries.  There is need to customize the humanitarian principles and the code of conduct to the Zimbabwean context.

Session III

(i): ZINWA: Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe

Presentation by ZINWA: Mr Viriri

The session provided some information on flooding, its nature, causes and outline of the flood risk areas in Zimbabwe, early warning mechanisms and their implications for planning. The session was intended to orient participants on the challenges and issues confounding flood risk management in Zimbabwe.

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Flooding in Zimbabwe was mainly due to the river networks failing to take the excess water from either torrential rains or water released from dams. The factors compounding flooding were, intense rainfall (+50 mm in 24 hours), cyclones, topography, river networks converging at confluences, river siltation, operations of dams and the unfolding impacts of climate change. The traditional flood risk areas in Zimbabwe include Muzarabani, Middle Save, Tsholotsho, Kamativi - Confluence of Gwayi and Shangani, Gokwe, Chikwalakwala, Malipati, Tuli-Shashe, and areas along Zambezi, Save, Limpopo river basins. ZINWA is charged with the responsibility to collect, process and disseminate information pertaining to river flow statistics and dam levels. Currently 342 of the 700 river water level monitoring stations are operational with the majority automated. The traditional rain gauge network is however not suited for flood monitoring as data from the stations are obtained at weekly intervals. Furthermore Zimbabwe has 7 real time water level monitoring stations with only 4 being operational. Plans to increase the number of real time monitoring stations were being hampered by poor local network coverage and financial constraints. Vandalism of monitoring stations has also contributed to poor coverage of real-time monitoring systems. There currently is no capacity for flood forecasting and modeling. Rainfall forecasting and outlook are the only means available to warn of possible flooding.

In the case of Tokwe Mukosi river basin, 4 monitoring stations both up and down stream were used. Analysis of the data from the stations indicated that 902,115 million litres of water (50% capacity of the dam) had flowed into the dam. As the dam was incomplete, the water had to be released.

Discussions

Issues were raised on the low coverage of water level monitoring stations in dams and rivers and inadequate real time flood monitoring stations and lack of capacity for flood forecasting and modeling that meant the country was at risk of flooding.

Another issue raised was the inability of the early warning systems to estimate the extent of flooding in the event of a dam breach to facilitate informed evacuation of people at risk of flooding.

Financial constraints to procure monitoring equipment and for civil works, lack of network coverage, inadequate trained personnel and vandalism of monitoring equipment were the major challenges. Furthermore most of the monitoring stations were ill equipped and not suitable for flood monitoring.

Recommendations

 Capacity for flood monitoring should be enhanced through; o ZINWA approaching partners for support in strengthening capacity for flood monitoring particularly for the procurement of equipment and construction of real time flood monitoring stations as well as relevant training of personnel; o Approaching Potraz to facilitate local GSM coverage for monitoring equipment; o Monitoring equipment damaged by siltation, flooding and vandalism should be replaced; o Enhancing capacity for flood forecasting, mapping and modeling

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o Creating ownership and community self-policing to prevent vandalism of monitoring equipment. o Providing an inundation map to guide evacuation exercise though for example satellite maps and flood modeling;

(ii): Climate Change Office: Climate and Flood Risk in Zimbabwe.

Presentation by Climate Change Office: Mr. A. Moyo

The session provided an insight into the contribution of climate change and variability to flooding in Zimbabwe. The presentation discussed the recent climate and weather extremes, some projections, climate change concept, lessons learnt from past seasons, recommendations including for Tokwe- Mukosi and existing opportunities.

Climate change in Zimbabwe was expected to contribute to changes in the rainfall patterns. Extreme events were set to increase with some models suggesting a 10 – 20 % decline in Zimbabwe rainfall by 2050. Changing rainfall distribution with lower rainfall or fewer but heavier storms was the projected scenario. Furthermore, less predictable tropical cyclones were expected to increase in intensity. Chances for increasing variability, especially in areas where rainfall is already quite variable were expected to increase and in addition, strong winds and hailstorms were being projected. There is increasing evidence of infrastructure damage such as blowing away of roofs, damage of buildings by strong winds and injuries and damages due to hailstorms.

For the Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster there is need for strengthening of climate related early warning system through provision of radars and related capacity issues, provision of adequate automatic stations, ensuring monitoring equipment maintenance, need for more improved Radiosondes (upper air), partnership building to improve data collection. There is also need to review the early-warning system from the observing network, climate component, and institute studies to enhance the climate observation. Climate change adaptation including alternative livelihoods, poverty reduction and community empowerment, need to be accelerated through an integrated approach.

Discussions

Concerns on early warning systems with reference to collection, analysis and dissemination of real time information were raised.

Recommendations

 Opportunities for mainstreaming climate change in all sectors existing through Zim Asset;  Reviewing of existing policy frameworks including the civil protection policy and draft disaster risk management bill to integrate climate change adaptation;  Strengthening of national capacities to reduce climate change risk and build resilience for any climate change shocks

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Session V

(i): Policy, regulations and procedures on the construction of dams

Presentation By ZINWA: Engineer Mutazu

The session was intended to provide participants with insight into the policy and regulatory framework for dam construction. This was in order to facilitate informed discussions for the group work that was to follow. The presentation covered the following: provisions of the water act, construction of dams, periodic inspections of large dams, registration of dams, procedure in emergencies, appointment of board of consultants, procedure in emergencies arising during execution of dam works.

The Water Act Chapter 20:24 regulates dam safety and construction in Zimbabwe. There are 8,000 dams 245 of which are classified as large and the remainder small. Dams are subject to inspection during and after construction to ensure structural soundness and safety. It is mandatory for owners of dams to inform the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate of possible or existing threat of flooding and taking appropriate measures to prevent and control flooding from such dam.

As in the case of the Tokwe Mukosi dam, if, during construction of a dam, any sudden danger is posed to any works or structure connected therewith, and such danger renders it necessary to carry out immediate dam works different from original submitted design drawings or specifications; the owner of the dam is required to immediately commence with the recommended remedial works. The swift action to drain the Tokwe Mukosi dam and the subsequent acceleration of the completion of the concrete facing ensured dam safety.

Discussions

The inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi dam were not predictable and much of what took place in terms of the emergency evacuation was not planned for. The relaying of information on the river water levels draining into the Tokwe Mukosi dam was deficient to alert the onsite engineers to take appropriate flood prevention. Other factors such as the delays experienced in dam construction and relocation and subsequent resettlement of people in the basin and the buffer zone were also at play.

Concerns were raised on the capacity of ZINWA to demarcate the extent of inundation downstream in the event of release of dam water. Furthermore the need for information on the level of rainfall intensity and the extent inundation of river basins was critical to facilitate informed evacuation exercises.

The workshop was informed that ZINWA had no capacity for flood forecasting and modeling and would need to investigate the integration of these in its systems.

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Recommendations

 Timely relocation of people at risk of flooding;  Real time river water level monitoring and information dissemination should be enhanced;  Flood mapping and modeling should be seriously considered to avert flood disasters.  ZINWA should approach partners for support in procurement and installation of real time flood monitoring and for flood modeling;

(ii) Procedures for Dam Construction- the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project overview

Presented by: Eng. T. Maurikira

The session covered the provisions of the Water Act, dam design in Zimbabwe, design peak floods, Tokwe-Mukosi dam design flood control during construction, safety of dams in Zimbabwe, international best practice for communities displaced by dam projects. The purpose of the session was to provide additional background information on dam safety with focus on the Tokwe Mukosi dam construction. In addition to the presentation made by Engineer Mutazu, Engineer Maurikira outlined the critical hazard analysis conducted for dam construction. In ZINWA, for purposes of design and construction, dams are categorized into four classes i.e. class 1 – 4. These classes are related to the hazard potential which is based on the risk to life and the economic consequences which can arise if the dam fails. Class 1 dams are those that give the worst scenario and are designed to the highest standards. The hazard potential or class is used to determine the design flood for the dams. Tokwe Mukosi Dam whose dam wall height is 89.2 metres, and a capacity of 1,802, 600,000 cubic metres is on completion and is categorized in class 1. The Tokwe Mukosi dam has been adequately designed to prevent flooding before and after construction. There however was a high water inflow into the dam that surpassed the water level that had been estimated leading to the flood scenario and population displacements that was experienced. Dam construction like any development programme, is subject to international best practices and United Nations and World Commission on Dams guidelines that consider the issues surrounding population displacement. No dam project should be allowed to proceed on indigenous and communal lands without obtaining their free, prior and informed consent. Best practice dictates that compensation policies for dam projects should ensure a prompt and measureable improvement of the lives of the affected people and communities.

Discussions

In the face of ongoing dam construction country wide, concern was raised on the failure to relocate people in the Tokwe Mukosi basin and the resultant adhoc movement of people that resulted in disruption of people’s lives and livelihoods.

Funding for all activities for the dam construction was under the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate. However funding for other related activities such as relocation, resettlement and compensation for relocated families were not included in the dam construction budget.

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Recommendations

 From the lessons learnt from Tokwe-Mukosi, there is an urgent need to ensure that the resettlement of the affected communities is done early in the programme before similar events to the Tokwe Mukosi flooding recur.  There was need to build in related costs for the dam construction and that line ministries were expected to contribute components of the budget for their sectors for inclusion in the dam construction budget.

Session VI: Response of Zimbabwe to Flooding emergencies using Geo-information Science and Near real-time Geo-data

Professor. dr. Amon Murwira

The session covered the following: Flood Monitoring using GIScience technology Caprivi in 2004; Flood hazard mapping using GIScience technology Chikwarakwara and Muzarabani; Unpacking Tokwe-Mukosi 2014 disaster using GIScience and the Future response using Near Realtime Geodata collection and Aggregation. The motivation for the session was the introduction of science based real time monitoring and dissemination of early warning information as well as for possible support for search and rescue operations. The presentation covered use of historical data to determine flood risk based on the Caprivi flood scenario in Namibia as well as the experiences of the University of Zimbabwe in Chikwakwala and Muzarabani areas. A flood simulation exercise used was able to show areas that were likely to be inundated and those that would not in the event of flooding. Such information apart from guiding settlement patterns would also assist the search and rescue operations teams to identify areas to focus their operations. Science based flood early warning was also important to support flood mapping including levels of inundation. A pictorial presentation of the flooding scenario of the Tokwe Mukosi basin using satellite information demonstrated the capacity of the science based real-time flood monitoring that Zimbabwe could adopt. The relying of real time flood early warning information can be done through use of mobile telephones whose coverage is quite wide in Zimbabwe

Discussions

There has been limited use of science based/technology to facilitate real time flood monitoring and to rope in the tertiary institutions to play a leading role applied research on disaster risk management.

Recommendations

 There is need to rope in the tertiary institutions to support in capacity building and technology transfer in use of science based real time monitoring and dissemination of early warning information.  The tertiary institutions should assist in developing flood models and in introduction of real time early warning systems.

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Session VII: Manifestation and Management of Tokwe Mukosi Dam Disaster (i) The Social Cost of Tokwe Mukosi Dam.

Presentation by: Mr. F. Chikovo

The session covered the Tokwe Mukosi disaster management from the provincial, national and community perspective. Mr. Chikovo the Provincial Administrator for Masvingo Province presented provincial perspective covering the following topics: Socio Economic Importance of Tokwe Mukosi Dam, Social Cost of the Dam, Progress Before Disaster, Actual Disaster and Camp Establishment, Identification of Permanent Resettlement Sites, Camp Decongestion and Lessons Learnt. He outlined the benefits of the Tokwe Mukosi and its contribution to food security at national and provincial levels including the downstream benefits accruing from tourism and electricity generation and related investments. The dam however entailed relocation of 6393 families, more than 18 764 livestock and household property. In anticipation of the relocation exercise, a committee was established to draw a plan for the relocation exercise and the accompanying budget. A 3 phased relocation plan to commence in October 2013 was developed and submitted to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate as well as the key ministries. Funds for the relocation begun to be allocated in July 2013 to support head counting, property valuation, planning, pegging resettlement areas, borehole drilling and for paying compensation. The relocation process begun albeit laboriously and 611 people, 994 livestock and household property were relocated to the Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi. Additional land for resettlement had to be identified as the area pegged had been exhausted. The heavy rains that fell in the basin between in January 2014 resulted in the rapid water inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi dam that was still under construction. Flooding in the basin and the risk of a dam breach required swift evacuation of 2,713 families, their livestock and household property. Heavy rains however impeded speedy evacuations requiring that people move themselves and their property to high ground. Emergency needs mounted and plans for relocation had to change to transit centres and later to the emergency relocation camp at Chingwizi. A state of national disaster was declared on 9 February giving way to external emergency support for relocated people in Chingwizi relocation camp. The initial stages of the emergency relocation exercise was beset with challenges of inadequate emergency shelter, water and sanitation facilities, leakages of emergency supplies due to pilfering and theft as well infiltration by bogus beneficiaries. The situation however improved with the provision of additional staff and receipt of additional emergency supplies from well-wishers. Training on Camp Coordination and Camp Management as well as warehouse management also facilitated improved service delivery and accounting for emergency supplies. Despite the improvements noted, conditions in the camp there was need to decongest the camp and allocate permanent settlements.

In order to decongest the camp, 3,020 1 hectare plots were pegged for allocation to the people relocated. This plan agitated the relocated people creating disharmony as the promised 4 hectares and accompanying compensation payment was no longer the priority. People had to be forcibly resettled on the 1 hectare plots.

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Currently, 2,555 families have been allocated 1 hectare residential plots and another 146 families are yet to be resettled. 1,431 families have now been compensated and 1,908 families are still to be compensated. 3 primary schools (Tokwe Mukosi, Nyuni and Chingwizi) and 1 secondary school (Nyuni Secondary) are now established and are at various stages of construction. A total of 36 boreholes (6 institutional and 30 community) were drilled and a new clinic and staff housing are under construction with support from the National Aids Council, the Family of God Church and the Zimbabwe Defence.

Discussions

The participants noted with concern the lack of standards, and guidelines for the resettlement and compensation of people displaced by development projects. Futhermore the delayed relocation exercise contributed to the adhoc and chaotic relocation and resettlement of people leading to the disruption of lives and livelihoods. Although the emergency response needs stabilized after some 3 weeks, the initial stages of the emergency response was fraught with problems ranging from pilfering and leakages of emergency supplies, infiltration of leadership and bogus beneficiaries. Some people lost property including livestock and they are still to be compensated.

Due to disruption of livelihoods caused by the relocation exercise, the people resettled at Chingwizi were experiencing food shortages and would thus need food assistance.

Recommendations

 Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the actual cost of construction and social cost.  Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all  The Department of Civil Protection should have basic emergency supplies (non-food items tents, bowsers, water tablets, blankets, food hampers mosquito nets and some vehicles) to mitigate against disaster.  Funds to compensate service providers and take care of the welfare of those managing the disaster should be an integral component of the budget for the Department of Civil Protection.  There is need to provide regular training in camp coordination and camp management for civil protection organization at national, provincial and district levels.

(ii) National Coordination of the Disaster

Presented by Mr. S. M. Pawadyira

Mr Pawadyira presented the procedures followed for the declaration of national state disaster and on the processes that were activated during the emergency operations. He commended all the role players who contributed in cash and in kind and for the diligent search and rescue operations marshaled by the Zimbabwe Air force and complemented by the Air force of Namibia and that conducted by the Zimbabwe Police Sub-Aqua. The rescue operations however experienced fuel shortages particularly A1 Jet Fuel requiring urgent appeal to Treasury for urgent release of funds to procure adequate fuel and fuel containers. Mr Pawadyira underlined the importance of effective communication during emergency

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Due to the uncertainties on the resettlement exercise, a follow up presentation by the representative from the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement was made. A modified resettlement programme was implemented in the Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi Masangula areas. All the resettled people were however earmarked to benefit from a communal irrigation scheme in order for them to benefit from the Tokwe Mukosi dam whose construction had displaced them.

Discussions

There were still uncertainties on the resettlement model for the people resettled in Chingwizi. The plans and time frames for the people resettled in Chingwizi to benefit from the Tokwe Mukosi water for irrigation is still unclear. There is also the debate on the ownership of the land on which the people were settled between the government and the Development Trust of Zimbabwe that has potential to derail the resettlement exercise.

Recommendations

 There is need to establish clear lines of communication between government officials and communities in order to gain trust and allow communities to contribute to plans that affect their welfare

(iii): Community Representative

Presentation by Mr. N. Mangwengwe

The community perspective was given by Mr. Mangwengwe who narrated the relocation exercise up until the final permanent resettlement. People were moved by helicopter and by road when they suddenly found themselves surrounded by flood water. The people did not know where they were being taken to. On arrival at Chingwizi there was no ready shelter and people slept on the open. Shelter, food supplies, kitchen utensils were provided on the next day. There however was no water and sanitation and health facilities but these facilities were later provided. When people were advised to move to newly pegged resettlement area, there was disharmony because of the mistrust that the promised 4 hectares of farming land and 0.5 hectares for irrigation as well as compensation were not going to be honoured.

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Day IV

Group Work The group work was introduced with 4 thematic areas as follows:

Group I: Operational challenges, lessons /suggested solutions on search and rescue (aerial, water, land) with regards to (subtopics)

Group II: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to Camp management

Group III: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures

Group IV: a) Identify any gaps and propose solutions with regards to the extent to which current regulatory processes and procedures related to dams under construction integrate disaster risk mitigation and preparedness (use the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project as a case in point)

b) Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical expertise and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness and response to manage the flood risk within the context of climate change.

Details of the members to each group and related details are provided in Annex I below.

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Annexures

Annex I: Presentations

Session I: Lessons Learned Best Practices

Introduction

• Hydro-climatic disasters (Floods, droughts, tropical cyclones) are responsible for the serious disruption of the functioning of a society and widespread human, material or environmental losses. • These disasters and the communities exposed to them are expected to rise with increased climate variability as a result of climate change. • Zimbabwe continues to experience flood disasters and for each of these new lessons are learned. • Tragically, the span of attention given to flood disasters is often short, probably because the disaster events continue only for a short while, and as the memory of disaster events fades, so does the urgency for disaster risk reduction strategies. • The Tokwe Mukosi flood disaster has however raised a scenario that has a unique perspective to which new lessons were learned.

Workshop objectives

• To provide an opportunity for parties to engage with experts and stakeholders

• To discuss the scope of the flood disaster response

• To use the lessons learned/identified to scope the way forward.

Expected outcomes

• Lessons learned identified • Effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize emergency management Lessons Learned/Best Practices identified; • Recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements and enhance future emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery /development made

What are Lessons Learned • The process of organizational learning and improvements by identifying significant successes achieved and how to replicate them And

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• The process concerned with how issues, problems, and other setbacks were encountered, how they were overcome, and how they can be avoided in future projects. • Involve: – Review sessions conducted to gather feedback from team members and stakeholders on what went well and what didn’t go well on a scenario. – Identifying lessons learned through serious scrutiny of scenarios, their impacts and societal responses; – Identifying effective approaches to integrate and institutionalize emergency management Lessons Learned/Best Practices; – Ensuring a common understanding of national, provincial, district and community level priorities and objectives, as well as opportunities and challenges to feed into inter-agency preparedness for future flood disasters and – Making recommendations that will contribute to continuous improvements and enhance future emergency planning, preparedness, response and recovery /development through existing training programs. Guiding Questions

• Key questions: – What was learned about the flood disaster in general? – What worked well? – What could have been improved? – What should be done differently next time? – What was learned about what did not go well?

– What was learned about budgeting/financing?

– What was learned about working with partners? – What was learned about working with the affected communities? – How will this be incorporated into future disaster management?

Practice Overview • Lessons Learned sessions tend to bring out the negatives, be sure to ask "What Went Right“; • LL include the processes necessary for identification, documentation, validation, and dissemination of lessons learned; • Distribution of LL to appropriate organizations and personnel, • Identification of actions that will be taken as a result of the lesson learned • Follow-up to ensure that appropriate actions were taken. • Take steps to ensure that the LL sessions will be comfortable and non-confrontational; • Encourage creative thinking - make it a relaxed environment for having the discussion

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During Discussions • There is effective participation. • Participants achieve a mutual understanding. • All contributions are considered and included in the ideas, solutions or decisions that emerge. • Participants take shared responsibility for the outcome. • Focusing the discussion around actions/solutions. • Identify top items to be worked on • Ensure that outcomes, actions and questions are properly recorded and actioned, and appropriately dealt with afterwards. Lets not forget issues of gender (women, men, girls and boys) were impacted

Closing

• Identify clear actions and owners/responsible agencies where appropriate; • Focus on identifying solutions for the most important issues In summary

• Lessons learned are

• Not a complaining session or finger pointing

• A process to identify what was learned

• Used to analyze data and prioritize actions

• Basis for development of action points by identified institutions

• LL documented, archived and disseminated to relevant organizations for their action

• LL are about “how to get it right the next time there is a similar disaster?”

Disaster lessons we have been calling ‘lessons learned” are really not learned but only identified. When they are addressed they can legitimately be called lessons learned. Otherwise, they should be called “lessons identified”.

Ultimately there is no such thing as failure. They are lessons learned in different ways.

Twyla Tharp

Session II (i) Civil protection policy in Zimbabwe

Definition of Civil Protection All humanitarian measures aimed at protecting:

~Populations, ~ Their environment and their

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~ Natural inheritance against accidents and disasters of every kind Broad Policy Statement  National Policy for Civil Protection states that “ Every Citizen of Zimbabwe should assist where possible to avert or limit the effects of a disaster”.  Central Government initiates disaster preparedness programmes through the relevant sector ministries with local administration taking the responsibilities for implementing and maintaining its effectiveness.  Sector Specific Policies

Overall coordination.

The Minister of Local Government Public Works and National Housing is charged with the coordinative role as empowered by the Civil Protection Act No. 5 of 1989. The Act provides for:-

 Special powers designed to establish, coordinate and direct the activities of both the public and private emergency services  Guidelines for action and maximum use of resources since disaster mitigation requires a multi sectoral and interdisciplinary approach;  The establishment of a National Civil Protection Fund which receives money from both Government and the public. The fund is applied to the development and promotion of Civil Protection activities throughout the country.  Commandeering of resources for the purpose of mitigating a disaster,  Declaration of a State of Disaster by the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe

The Structural Model of the Civil Protection System in Zimbabwe

 President (Head of State)

 Parliament (Legislative)

 Cabinet (Policy formulation)



 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

 MLGPWNH, Sister Ministries/Departments/ NGO, UN

 Parastatals

 NB: Other members are co opted as and when necessary.

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Civil Protection Organisation in Zimbabwe

CO-ORDINATOR PLANNING COMMITTEE

N Minister – LGPWNH National Civil Protection Coordinating

A + Committee (NCPCC)

T Civil Protection Directorate with a Multi sectoral Representation

I Secretariat

P Provincial Administrator Provincial Civil Protection

R MLGPWNH Planning Committee (NCPPC)

D District Administrator District Civil Protection

I (DISTRICT MLGPWNH

S Planning Committee (DCPPC)

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LEGISLATIVE GAPS & RESOURCE

 Structural/ organisational gaps,  Centralisation of capacity for rescue  Communication,  Decision making and information flow  Public awareness and education

Proposed Policy Act / Bill on Disaster Risk Management

 Provisions ~ organisation ~ financing

Subcommittees of the National Platform and Functions

 Emergency Services Subcommittee  Food, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Subcommittee  Epidemics and Zoonotics Subcommittee

Concluding remarks

Evident government commitment to manage disasters as demonstrated by the existence of policy and the legal enabling statutes, and efforts to improve on existing mechanisms in order to create a conducive environment for disaster risk management.

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Session II (II): Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Concepts

• Disaster ~ a serious disruption of the functioning of a community / society, causing major human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected society to cope using only its own resources ~ Better understood as consequences of everyday actions and decisions which cumulatively lead to disaster (Hewitt 1997) Risk: probability of harmful consequences or expected losses Management: Follet’s, art of getting things done through other people; Malik’s transformation of resources into utility; and generally referred to as planning, organising, controlling and leading

Key Terms

• Disaster terminology ~Hazard, vulnerability, disaster risk, emergency • Disaster management terminology ~ capacity, mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation resilience

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Hazard and Vulnerability

• Hazard– potentially damaging event, phenomenon, human activity, that may cause loss of life, injury, property damage, social and economic disruption and or environmental degradation • Vulnerability – The conditions determined by physical, social, economic, environmental factors which increase susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards

Disaster Risk • Disaster Risk - Function of the risk process, result of combination of hazard, vulnerability and insufficient capacity to reduce the potential negative impacts (ISDR 2006) Hazard x vulnerability = disaster risk

Capacity

Emergency

• A state in which normal operating procedures are suspended and extra ordinary measures are taken. - Compound emergency - Complex emergency

Disaster Preparedness

• Activities to provide outright avoidance of the adverse impact of hazards • Activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of disasters include public awareness, forecasting, early warning, alert mechanisms and preparation of response plans

Early Warning • Chain of events namely; - understanding the hazard and the vulnerable

- monitoring and forecasting impending hazard events

- processing and dissemination of timely, accurate and understandable warnings to populations at risk and political authorities

- Facilitate appropriate response measures

- ultimately seek to minimize loss and damage

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Session II (ii) Humanitarian Principles

Presentation by Ms. M. Sibanda

Purpose

To conduct an introspection on individual and or organizational/sectoral performance on quality of assistance/services rendered to the then displaced population in Chingwizi holding camp.

Objective

To promote awareness on ethical issues in disaster risk management (DRM) rights of people affected by disaster.

Definitions

Humanitarianism: To promote awareness on: ethical issues in disaster risk management (DRM) rights of people affected by disaster.

Origins of humanitarianisms

The principles are derived from the core principles which have guided the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. The Humanitarian Charter (Sphere Project, 2011).

References

 Code of Conduct for International Red Cross, Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief  Humanitarian Charter  Inter-agency’s Standing Committee (IASC) Six Core Principles of the Code of Conduct on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

** Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Humanitarian Charter

Principles are reflected in:

 International humanitarian law  International human rights law  Refugee law

NB: Zimbabwe - a signatory to conventions

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The right to life with dignity

 All human beings have a right to life, an adequate standard of living, freedom from cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. State and non-state actors must not frustrate or withhold life-saving assistance from deserving civilian populations during disasters or conflicts. Any assistance rendered to deserving populations must be impartial.  Legal instruments - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); International Convention of Civil and Political Rights (1966); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)

The right to receive humanitarian assistance

 Adequate food, water, clothing, shelter and basic health care. State and non-state actors should observe the principles of non-discrimination and impartiality.

 Legal instruments - Customary International Humanitarian Law; The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949; Additional Protocols of 1977

The Right to Protection and Security

 Identify and protect people who are vulnerable to abuse due to their age, gender, religion, race, ethnicity etc. The principle of non-refoulement is to be observed, that is, no refugee shall be sent back to a country where his life or freedom would be in danger due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

 Legal instruments: International Humanitarian Law; Geneva Conventions of 1949 and additional Protocols of 1977; Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)

Constitution of Zimbabwe (Chapter 4 Part 2 (Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms)

The right to:

• Life

• Human dignity

• Personal security

• Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

• Equality and non-discrimination

• Environmental rights

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Core principles & Additional principles

All humanitarian activities are guided by 4 humanitarian principles:

• humanity

• neutrality

• impartiality

• independence

Principle 1 : Humanity

• Human suffering MUST be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.

Principle 2: Neutrality

• To act without preference for one group or another

• Humanitarian actors MUST not take sides in

• hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

Principle 3 : Impartiality

• To act on the basis of need without discrimination

• Humanitarian action MUST be carried out on the

• basis of need alone, giving priority to the most

• urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions

• on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious

• belief, class or political opinions.

Principle 3 : Independence

• Humanitarian action MUST be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

Additional Principles

• Respect culture and custom • Humanitarian response to use local resources and capacities as much as possible

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• Participation of the beneficiaries to be encouraged • Emergency response to strive to reduce future vulnerabilities • Accountability - to both donors and beneficiaries • Humanitarian agencies to portray affected people as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects • Do No Harm • Humanitarian actors should as far as possible avoid exposing people to further harm

References

• Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) ACT 2013 • IASC • Sphere Project Handbook, 2011 • UN OCHA website

Role of Government

Primary responsibility to protect and take the lead in offering citizens assistance in the event of natural and human induced disasters.

Session III (i): Flood Risk and Related Early Warning Mechanisms in Zimbabwe

Presented by : Mr. M.F Viriri

Definition of floods

The temporary inundation of normally dry land area from the overflowing of natural or artificial confines of a river or other water bodies (J Burton 2003). Causes of floods

• Intense rainfall • Tropical Cyclones • River network – dense network at confluences of rivers • Topography – steep slopes followed low laying areas • Operation of Dams • Siltation of Rivers –leading to loss of channel capacity • Climate change-increase in the frequency of cyclone occurrences and floods overtime. • Tropical Cyclones & Intense rainfall

 Two types of floods mainly affect the country.  The most frequent is the seasonal flood, occurring normally in JFM, at the peak of the rainfall season.  The second and not so frequent one is the cyclone-induced flood, having become more frequent than before.

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River Network

• Dense river networks occurs on confluences of rivers. • This result in one river (normally the smaller) failing to drain into the bigger river leading to the river bursting its banks. Dam Operation

• Dam releases may lead to flooding especially in downstream areas if not managed well. • If more water is released into the main river it may also lead to flooding (flush) at the confluences with minor tributaries. • Normally releases from the dams are made during the peak of the rainfall season. Traditional Flood Prone Areas in Zimbabwe

 Muzarabani  Middle Save  Tsholotsho  Kamativi- Confluence of Gwayi and Shangani  Gokwe  Chikwalakwala  Malipati  Tuli-Shashe  Areas along Zambezi, Save, Limpopo etc.

Flood Early Warning Systems

• ZINWA has got a number of measures in place for monitoring the floods. • The organisation collect, process and disseminate information pertaining to river flow statistics and dam levels. • The organization has in place a stream flow measuring network for monitoring river flows and dams which also act as temporary storage of flood water during peak event. • The river flow monitoring system consists of automatic water level recorders located on various points on the rivers of the country. • In the event of floods the observers who maintains the stations are required to send water levels by telephone on daily basis to the Head Office. Flow monitoring system

• The hydrological network consists of 342 stations which are currently operational. • Most of the stations collect river levels through automatic recorders • While providing useful data, the traditional river gauge networks are often not suited directly to flood monitoring. • The main reason being data from the stations is obtained at weekly intervals when the chart is changed

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Real time stations

• The country has 7 real time stations currently working. • 4 stations (C68,C59,B59&E74) installed under SADC HYCOS Phase II project are working. The other 3 (F23,F22 and F24) were installed under the joint Pungwe Project. • For HYCOS a total of 13 stations (5 Phase I and 8 for Phase II) were earmarked in the country. • All the stations under Phase I (B62,C57,B37,D75&E43) were installed but none is currently working mainly due to vandalism. • Installations of the other stations(4)-A38,B27,B85,E130 are hampered by finances to construct the necessary civil works. • In addition there are recommendations to relocate E43,C57 and B37 due to accessibility and GSM network coverage limitations • Estimated cost to complete the installations $200,000

Dam level monitoring

• 148 major dams are monitored across the country. • Dam levels are collected twice a week; • The dam levels are processed to get dam capacities (volumes) and a State of Major Dams Report is produced and disseminated. Data Transmission

• The SADC HYCOS real time stations transmit data through the satellite to a server in SA & data can be accessed through website with a 1-hour delay. This method is vital for flood monitoring. • The Pungwe stations transmit levels through the local GSM network. The stations are programmed in such a way that if the river levels reach a certain threshold level an alarm in the form of SMS would be sent to our cellphones. • Telephones are used to collect levels from other key stations on daily basis. • The same means of communication is used for dam level collections. • The bulk of stations which collect levels through charts are not ideal for flood monitoring since charts are submitted after the hydrological season for processing. Flood Forecasting Capabilities

• The main objective of forecasting is to predict accurately the exceedence of critical flows/flood heights or thresholds in order to issue warnings to the public to take the necessary evasive action. • Currently no flood forecasting model of repute is available. • However hydrological forecasts/outlook based on the rainfall forecast are produced for the country and for specific catchments e.g Tokwe Mukosi. • The forecast are disseminated to stakeholder nationally and internationally.

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• Hydrological Update Report for Flood Monitoring are produced every week and disseminated nationally and internationally.

Tokwe Murkosi Dam Flood Assessment for 2013/14 Season

• The assessment was based on processed 2013/2014 flow data from the hydrological stations feeding into the Tokwe Murkosi Dam system. • The key questions answered through the analysis were a) if the dam was complete prior to the 2013/14 rain season would it have filled or spilled or to what storage level would the dam have reached? b) What was the magnitude & frequency of the peak flow which occurred at the dam site during the season Methodology

Selection of stations

• Key stations upstream and downstream of Tokwe Mukosi Dam system were selected for analysis. E112 in Tokwe River, E117 in Ngezi River, E107 Musokwesi River and E176 in Tokwe River downstream of the Tokwe Mukosi Dam site. • The flow data for the stations was processed and used for the analysis. Peak flow for the season

• The peak flow at the dam site was estimated from E112 (Tokwe) by transposing the peak at the station to the Tokwe Murkosi Dam site. This was done by factoring in the catchment area at the dam site.

Determining the storage level the dam would have reached

• This was estimated using the stations feeding into the dam system (E117 Ngezi, E112 in Tokwe River and E107 in Musokwesi River). The flows from the three systems were transposed to the dam site by factoring in the catchment area. • The mean daily flows were then estimated by averaging the resultant inflows from the three stations. • The total inflow of the season at the dam was determined by adding the mean daily flows. • The total inflow was equated to the volume of water which would have accumulated in the dam if the dam was complete. • The water balance for the dam was also determined and plotted.

Results: Determining the storage volume of the dam

• An estimated total flow of 902,115ML passed through the Tokwe Mukosi Dam site

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• If the dam was complete prior to the 2014 hydrological season, this volume would have been captured by the dam as storage & when the volume is equated to the storage of the Tokwe Mukosi Dam it translates to a percentage full of 50%. • This means by the end of May the dam would have been reached 50% full.

Results: Water balance at the Tokwe Mukosi Dam

• The graph shows the r/ship between the inflows & outflows & storage trends at the dam site. • The inflows increased sharply since the beginning of Feb resulting in the sharp increase in the storage levels at the Tokwe Mukosi Dam from the 6th February to mid-February. • Subsequent releases (Approx 873,207ML) were made from the dam to lower the water levels. Results: Determination of the peak flow for the season

• The peak flow at E112 occurred on the 7th of Feb 2014 at approximately 1400hrs & measured 272m3/s. The time to peak was approx 10hrs 30 minutes. • This peak was recorded at the Dam site on the 8th of Feb, 2014 when the level reached 675.28m above msl.

Summary Conclusions from the Tokwe Mukosi Flow Assessment

• If Tokwe Mukosi Dam was complete prior to the 2014 rainfall it would have reached a storage level of 50% full. • The total inflows into the Tokwe Mukosi Dam for the 2014 season were approximately 902,115ML. 3 • The estimated peak flow for the 2014 season at the dam site measured 1614m /s with a return period of 26 years. • It takes approximately a day for flows at Tokwe Bhanya (E112) to reach the Damsite while flows released from the Tokwe Mukosi Dam reaches the downstream station within a day. Recommendations

The need for closer gauging stations to effectively monitor inflows and outflows from the Tokwe Mukosi Dam should be re-emphasised.

Challenges

• Very few Real Time Stations for effective flood monitoring. • Vandalism-hydrological station susceptible to vandalism leading to decrease in the hydrological network. • The network used to have over 700 stations

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• Some of the stations were washed away /damaged by floods, submerged by dams ,siltation leading to closure • Information gaps on ungauged major rivers like Angwa River. Approximately 15/151 subzones completely ungauged. • Lack of flood forecasting models & skills. • Communication problem-most of the flood prone areas & hydrological station sites do not have GSM network coverage. • Financial challenges to construct the necessary civil works for installations.

Implications for Planning

• Expansion of Real time DCP systems on the hydrological network. • Rehabilitation of vandalised hydrometric stations. • Acquire flood forecasting software like Mike 11 and training of users. • People should be resettled to areas where flooding does not occur. • Schools, clinics and other public utilities should also be located at areas where flooding does not occur. • More resources should be channeled towards capacitating communities on risk reduction issues.

POLICY, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS Presentation by ; Engineer Mutazu

• There are over 8,000 constructed dams in the country. Of these 245 are large according to the Water Act. • The policy regulating the design and construction of dams in Zimbabwe is covered under the Water Act [Chapter 20:24] Part IX – Dam Safety. • According to section 96 of the Act dams fall under: o Small dams which are classified as those dams with a vertical height of more than 8 3 metres but less than 15 metres and are capable of storing more than 500 000 m but 3 less than 1 000 000 m of water. o Large dams are defined as those with a vertical height of 15 metres or more and are 3 capable of storing more than 1 000 000 m of water. Dam Design and Construction

The designs, drawings and specifications for

• a small dam are required to be prepared by an approved civil engineer or civil engineering technician

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• A large dam are required to be prepared by an approved civil engineer, assisted by such qualified engineers, geologists and other specialists as the Secretary in consultation with the National Water Authority

• The designer certifies the adequacy and safety of the proposed dam works and the documents shall be submitted to the secretory for approval.

Periodic inspections of large dams

• The owner of a large dam is required to engage an approved civil engineer to carry out inspection of a completed large dam:- o before the end of the month of June or the month immediately following. o the first season during which water was diverted or stored by the dam; and o the first season during which water spilled from the large dam; and o each successive period of five years reckoned from the date of completion of construction of the large dam; and • The owner of the large dam shall be required to carry out the remedial measures as contained in the detailed inspection report. • If the owner of a large dam fails to carryout maintenance or remedial works as specified by the approved engineer where a dam is considered to be unsafe and is a potential hazard the Ministry may proceed with the required remedial works and take all necessary measures to recover the cost from the owner of the dam.

Dam Registration • The owner of dam is required to obtain a registration certificate upon production of certified completion drawing and completion report. • The completion certificate is required to indicate adequacy in the structural safety of the dam. • The owner of a dam who contravenes provisions of these requirements shall be guilty of an offence and is liable to being fined or to be imprisoned or both.

Procedure on Emergencies • If the owner of a small dam or large dam learns of any sudden or unprecedented flood or alarming or unusual circumstance or occurrence, whether anticipated or existing, which may adversely affect the small dam or large dam, he shall, in addition to discharging any duty, liability or obligation imposed on him by or under any other law— • Forthwith take all such steps as may be reasonable and practicable for dealing with the flood, circumstance or occurrence, as the case may be; and • As soon as practicable and by registered letter notify the Secretary and the National Water Authority, as fully as possible, of the flood, circumstance or occurrence, as the case may be, and of the action he has taken or proposes to take in terms of paragraph (a). • The owner shall be required to:

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o notify the Secretary by registered letter, immediately after commencing to take any action; or

o report to the Secretary within a period of forty-eight hours after commencing to take the action on the progress and results of the action; and

o comply with such other instructions as the Secretary may from time to time give to him.

• Failure to comply with the above is an offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both.

Appointment of Board of Consultants

• If in the opinion of the Secretary , the safety considerations relating to a small dam or large dam are compromised,

• may appoint a board of consultants to report to him on any action to be taken in relation to the small dam or large dam concerned or to any design, drawings, records, reports or specifications relating to the dam.

• A board of consultants shall consist of two or more engineers who have—

o had wide experience of the design and construction of small dams and large dams; and not previously been associated with any dam works in respect of the small dam or large dam concerned.

Procedures in emergencies arising during execution of dam works

• If, during construction of a dam, any sudden danger is posed to any works or structure connected therewith, and such danger renders it necessary to carry out immediate dam works different from original submitted design drawings or specifications; o the owner of the dam is required to immediately commence with the recommended remedial works, and o proceed with procedures as stated under the emergency procedures above.

Session III (ii): Tokwe Mukosi dam project: The design, safety and the flood

Presentation by : Eng. T. Maurikira

Provisions of the Water Act

• According to section 96 of the Act dams fall under:

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o Small dams which are classified as those dams with a vertical height of more than 8 3 metres but less than 15 metres and are capable of storing more than 500 000 m but 3 less than 1 000 000 m of water. o Large dams are defined as those with a vertical height of 15 metres or more and are 3 capable of storing more than 1 000 000 m of water. • According to Section 102 of the Act, there shall be thorough investigations and a detailed design and a construction programme before commencement of construction works. • The supervising engineer, as defined in section 103 of the Act has a duty to ensure construction works conform to the designs and programme of works.

Dam Design in Zimbabwe • In ZINWA, for purposes of design and construction, dams are categorized into four classes i.e. class 1 – 4. • These classes are related to the hazard potential which is based on the risk to life and the economic consequences which can arise if the dam fails. Class 1 dams are those that give the worst scenario and are designed to the highest standards (i.e. 1: 2 000 year

• return period with a dry freeboard and checked against overtopping for a 1: 10 000 year flood)

• The hazard potential or class is used to determine the design flood for the dams. Tokwe Mukosi Dam is categorized in class 1.

Hazard Potential

HAZARD POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE ECONOMIC LOSS

Very low Impossible Minimal

Low Impossible Marginal

Moderate Possible Appreciable

High Probable Excessive

Dam Classification

HAZARD / SIZE SMALL MEDIUM LARGE MAJOR

Very low 4 3 2 1

Low 3 2 1 1

Moderate 2 1 1 1

High 1 1 1 1

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Design peak floods

• Class 4: 100 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 250 year return period with no dry freeboard. • Class 3: 250 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 750 year return period with

o no dry freeboard.

• Class 2: 750 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 2000 year return period with

o no dry freeboard.

• Class 1: 2000 year return period, with dry freeboard allowance. 10 000 year return period with no dry freeboard. Tokwe-Mukosi dam design

• Tokwe-Mukosi Dam is classified as a large dam with a height of 89.2 m and on completion will be capable of storing 1 802 600 000 m3.

• Construction works commenced in April 1998. Due to financial challenges, the project went through a series of partial and full suspensions before works commenced in earnest in April 2011.

• The project was targeted to be complete in April 2013 but due to financial challenges the project is now anticipated to be finished in June 2015.

• For, Tokwe- Mukosi Dam, as also applies to all large dams in Zimbabwe, the standard design flood requirement is that the flood of 2 000 year return period must be passed with adequate dry freeboard allowance, and that the 10 000 year flood must be passed without overtopping of the dam wall or embankments.

• Application of the standard stated above, the design flood data for Tokwe-Mukosi Dam was assessed to be as follows; 3 • Maximum Probable Flood (M. P. F.) with a return period of 10 000 years: 10 290 m /sec. 3 • Flood with a return period of 2 000 year : 7 630 m /sec • An emergency/auxiliary spillway is allowed for on saddle dam number 5, with a spillway cill at level 706.44m. The spillway length is 150m. This will discharge the flood waters above

3 • 8 000 m /sec and prevent overtopping of the dam.

• In addition to the emergency spillway a parapet wall will be built to level 708.3m as an additional safety measure against overtopping of the embankment. • Major features of the dam flood design are; 3 • Two drop inlet spillways of capacity 1090 m /sec at the full supply level 701.00m

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• A 150 metre long auxiliary spillway at level 706.44m • And a parapet wall on the dam crest built to level 708.3m • Thus the design flood is adequately catered for.

Flood Control during construction

• Provision is generally made for the care and diversion of floods during construction and this is usually achieved, at the early stages of construction, through the outlet works.

• The outlet works are put in place at an early stage of construction and works on the main embankment particularly on the river bed area are timed to be done and be substantially completed during the dry season. Floods may also be allowed to pass over an uncompleted embankment. When provided for an upstream cofferdam will help as a temporary storage for floods and divert the flood flows through the outlet works.

• As for Tokwe-Mukosi, the diversion of water was through the outlet works where water was being discharged through twin 2m diameter pipes.

• The diversion works were designed to pass 80m3/s which translates to 6.912 x 106m3 per day. The Engineer’s estimate for river diversion was based on a mean annual inflow of 300 x 106 m3, which translates to 9.64m3/s.

• The diversion works were designed to pass a 1: 2 year flood with a reservoir surcharge up to level 660m.

• The Engineer estimated that the reservoir could impound water up to level 660m and the outlets would cope with the diversion requirements without overtopping the dam.

• However, the flood water that reached the project site was estimated to be of the magnitude of 1: 10 year flood, hence the diversion works could not cope.

SAFETY OF DAMS IN ZIMBABWE

• During the Elnino induced floods of the year 2000 the spillway capacities of our dams were able to pass the floods without any problem. However there is need to review our hydrological data in view of the climate change phenomena. CHALLENGES

• The safety of any dam is as good as its maintenance. Maintenance of dams remains a challenge due to the nonpayment of bills. It is desirable that part of the money collected from each dam goes towards the routine maintenance of that dam. • For sustainability of operations in the water sector one of the principles adopted is user pays principle. • Through this principle it is envisaged that the people who use the stored water pay for it in order to ensure that the dam is maintained in a safe and operational condition.

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• The Dam Safety budget has not received any fiscal support over the years making it difficult for ZINWA to comply with the requirements under the Water Act. • For the safety of Tokwe Mukosi dam it is imperative that beneficiaries of the Tokwe Mukosi water pay for the use of the stored water.

DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OF COMMUNITIES

• It is expected that the relocation and resettlement of affected communities will be done and completed before the commencement of the programme for dam construction activities. • On Tokwe-Mukosi Dam the desired timing of relocation and resettlement of affected communities was not possible.

Due to these financial challenges, the Government through the Ministry of Local Government had planned to resettle affected communities in three phases; Phase 1

• This was made up of families under level 660m and families affected by the construction of saddle dams. • The total number of families under this zone was 1247. Phase 2

• This involved the families living under high flood level and above level 660m • The total number of families under this zone was 1878. • Due to the flooding event of February 2014 all families in this zone had to be evacuated and relocated to a safe holding camp at Chingwizi. Phase 3

• This involved the resettlement of families in the buffer zone. The Buffer Zone is the area above the high flood level which is designated for conservation around the dam so as to minimise siltation of the dam. • The total number of families in the Buffer Zone is 3268

INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE FOR DISPLACED PROJECT COMMUNITIES.

• It is now recognised that development-induced displaced persons can be classified as a distinct group of persons requiring protection under international human rights law. In 1994, forced eviction was recognised as a human-rights violation by the UN Secretary General and in 1997, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) formulated guidelines on displacement. These principles identify rights and guarantees that apply to the protection and assistance to be rendered to displaced people during their displacement and eventual resettlement.

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• The World Commission on Dams (WCD, 2000) and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP, 2007) also recommends that no dam project should be allowed to proceed on indigenous and communal peoples` lands without obtaining their free, prior and informed consent. Best practice dictates that compensation policies for dam projects should ensure a prompt and measureable improvement of the lives of the affected people and communities by; o Ensuring the improved livelihoods of affected people o Implementation of developmental approaches. o In-kind compensation instead of cash compensation. o Compensation of affected people without formal entitlement to the land. o Enhancing participatory approaches. o Ensuring compliance with resettlement agreements • Currently ZINWA is supervising the construction of the following dams; Gwayi-Tshangani, Marovanyati, Semwa and Mutange. From the lessons learnt from Tokwe-Mukosi, there is an urgent need to ensure that the resettlement of the affected communities is done early in the programme before similar events to the Tokwe Mukosi flooding recur.

Design Flood Data

• M. P. F. (10 000 year) : 10 290 m3/sec. • 2 000 year flood : 7 630 m3/sec • Time to peak (2 000 year) : 21 hours • Flood volume (2 000 year) : 760 000 Ml • Discharge capacity of 2x drop inlet spillways : 1 090 m3/sec • Flood rise : 5.44 m • Dry freeboard : 1.16 m • Full Supply Level (F.S.L.) of dam : 701.00 • High Flood Level (HFL) : 706.44 • Crest level of dam : 707.60 • Reservoir area at F.S.L. : 9 640 ha

CONCLUSION

• Our dams are structurally safe but need yearly maintenance works to prevent continuous deterioration which might lead to the loss of these valuable investment structures, loss of water security and worse still the loss of lives. • It is recommended that budgetary support be channeled towards the mandatory inspections and follow up rehabilitation measures on a yearly basis and beneficiaries of the stored water pay for the water to ensure adequate maintenance of the developed dams.

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Session III (iii): Climate Change and Flood Risk

Presentation by : Mr E.N Moyo

Climate at the Centre of ZimASSET

• Food Security and Nutrition; - > 70% of Zim’s livelihood depends on rain-fed agriculture and downstream sectors related to it. 1. Social Services and Poverty Eradication;

2. Infrastructure and Utilities such as Tokwe-Mukosi; – Climate extremes causing serious homelessness and infrastructural damage – Energy and power generation – Health and DRR Climate Projections and Recent Trends

• Climate projections can be assessed from physical understanding of the processes governing regional responses; and recent historical climate change’- use of Physical Mechanisms (IPCC, 2007) • First step is to look at present day variability than 2080 Climatology in Zimbabwe ( Washington et al, 2006) • Use of Proxy- such as maize harvest • precipitation change rely models along with physical insights with agreement encouraging stronger statements as to the likelihood of c. change.

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IPCC-AR5 on Climate Change & Precipitation

• Extreme precipitation is expected to increase with warming. • Observations and model projected future changes both indicate increase in extreme precipitation associated with warming. • Analysis of observed annual maximum 1-day precipitation (RX1day) indicates a significant increase in extreme 24hrs precipitation with a median increase about 7% per °C rise • The global atmospheric water content is constrained by the Clausius–Clapeyron equation to increase at around 7% K–1; • Heavy rainfalls associated with T cyclones likely to increase with continued warming induced by enhanced GHG concerns. • For a range of emission scenarios (SRES A2, A1B, and B1), a 1-in-20 year annual max 24-hour precipitation rate is likely to become a 1-in-5 to 1-in-15 year event by 2100

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Projected Rainfall Change

• Tradoss et al, 2005 also found out that the – decrease in the OND rainfall is more of a consistently late onset – Increase in JFM is more of few intense storms – CWD Project, EMA-UNDP-GoZ says: – Rainfall patterns are likely to change & extreme events set to increase with some models suggesting a 10 – 20 % decline in Zimbabwe rainfall by 2050. – Changing rainfall distribution – Tending to be Lower Rainfall / Fewer but heavier storms • Tropical Cyclones to increase in intensity, less predictable • Increasing variability, especially in areas where rainfall is already quite variable • Strengthening of winds, Hailstorms Microburst & Macroburst

• A microburst is a very localized column of sinking air, producing damaging divergent and straight-line winds at the surface that are similar to, but distinguishable from, tornadoes, which generally have convergent damage. • The air moves in a downward motion until it hits ground level. It then spreads outward in all directions. • A microburst often has high winds that can knock over fully grown trees. • Usually last for a duration of a couple of seconds to several minutes. • Examples: – Wet Macroburst (Bindura Feb 4 2014/ Rutenga-Chilonga April ‘13) or WestNich-Mberengwa 2 April 2013 – Dry Microburst (Chivi 29 Dec, 2012; Dotito 19 Nov 2012)

• A changing climate leads to changes in frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of extreme weather and climate events, unprecedented extreme weather and climate events. • However, mean precipitation is expected to increase less than extreme precipitation because of energy constraints (e.g., Allen and Ingram, 2002) • Some climate extremes (e.g. floods or drought) may be the result of an accumulation of weather or climate events that are not extreme when considered independently.

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Tokwe-Mukosi & National Early Warning System

• Radars & related capacity issues • More automatic stations (AWS) – Maintenance plan and Sustainability issues • Need for more improved Radiosondes (upper air) • Need for partnership to improve data collection – Leadership & Security agents help us to secure the equipment • Need to review the early-warning system from the observing network, climate component, and institute studies to enhance the observation. • Do disaster scenario analysis

Need for C. Change EAT & Behavioural Change

• Engineers, Designers, City Planners, Leaders, Chiefs etc • ZINWA, Agritex, Constructors and Disaster planners • Economic development and financing • Improved adaptive capacity which is an issue of poverty, lack of education and livelihood options. – Lets empower our people further – Lets embrace Technology to disseminate info

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Opportunities

1. ZIMASSET identified development of a Climate Policy as one of the key outputs under the Food Security and Nutrition Cluster. – presents a good opportunity for us all to mainstream climate change into key development sectors – through strengthening of national capacities to reduce climate change risk and build resilience for any climate change shocks. – Policy presents an opportunity to decouple climate variations and DRR /other sensitive sectors 2. Finalisation of the NCCRS w strategies to deal with climate change issues including flooding Creation of Climate Change Management Department within MEWC

Session V: Socio economic importance of Tokwe Mukosi dam

Presented by: Mr Chikovo-Provincial Administrator Masvingo Province

Tokwe Mukosi Dam project is part of the Provincial Irrigation Master Plan which is a strategic objective of this province after realizing that 90% of our people depend on agricultural production and yet our region does not support rain fed agriculture and that therefore irrigated cropping is the way to go.

On completion the Tokwe Mukosi dam will have full supply level capacity of 1802 600 mega litres of water whose 010% yield of 423 000 mega litres of water can irrigate 25 000 hectares downstream

This hectarage can be translated to 150 000 tonnes of cereals per season and definitely the dam is envisaged to become the development hub of the province opening as it does vast and diverse investment opportunities in agriculture, downstream value additions and vast tourism related enterprises.

ACTIVITY TIME FRAME AMOUNT REQ Enumeration/Head Count 1st Sept 2012 36,040.00 Valuation 11 Sept 2012 415,502.00 Compensation for 500 families Aug to Oct 2012 2,330,770.00 Compensation for 2 500 families Nov to June 2013 11,653,850.00 Relocation of 1st 500 families Sept to Oct 2012 71,377.00 Relocation of 2nd 2 500 families (PSIP) Mar to June 2013 356,886.00 Demarcation of Buffer Zone - Physical 1st Sept 2012 23,550.00 marking Land Use Planning 1st Sept 2012 93,077.00 Identification of Irrigation Land 15 Nov 2012 14,750.00 Development of Irrigation for 500 PSIP 2013 1,200,000.00 families Development of Irrigation for PSIP 2013 6,000,000.00

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2 500 families Drilling of 5 boreholes 15 Sept 2012 38,900.00 Drilling of 95 Boreholes PSIP April 2013 712,500.00 Construction of first 2 primary schools 1st Sept 2012 4,183,250.00 Construction of 3 schools (2 primary & 1 PSIP - Jan 2013 1,405,460.00 secondary) Construction of clinic 1st Oct 2012 2 500 000,00 construction of 3 dip tanks 1st Sept 2012 42,000.00 construction of 9 dip tanks PSIP 2013 126,000.00 TOTAL 31,435 992.00

This was communicated to the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate responsible for the dam funding and also copied to the Ministry of Local Government and all other Provincial Heads were directed to communicate this Activity Calendar to their Ministries for budgetary considerations.

PROGRESS BEFORE DISASTER

The Ministry of Local Government was allocated $50, 000 for Head Count and Coordination in July 2013 and the assignment established the following.

That 6,393 families and their 18, 764 cattle including 8167 primary school going and 2,295 secondary school going children would need to be relocated from the basin. These would however, be relocated in three phases viz:

Phase 1 – relocate 1, 247 families who were deemed to be at Level 660m above sea level and would be in danger of flooding by October 2013.

Phase II – relocate 1, 878 families who would be affected when dam was expected to fill up by October 2014.

Phase III – relocate 3, 268 families in the Buffer Zone, who would be moved to protect the dam by October 2015.

In the same month of July, Ministry of Public Works received $140, 000.00 and valuated 1, 950 families in the basin.

Ministry of Lands received $40, 000.00 to plan and peg Masangula Resettlement Scheme and produced 800 A1 plots.

DDF and ZINWA received each $57, 500.00 and drilled 11 boreholes at Chisase and Masangula.

The Ministry of Local Government again received $3,832 490,00 as compensation funds and compensated 896 families under Level 1.

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Ministry of Local Government then relocated 611 families and 757 cattle and 137 donkeys to Chisase, Masangula and Chingwizi at a cost of $142, 754,00.

Before the disaster the process of relocation was laborious, commencing with compensation, then driving the families to see their allocated land, allowing for 2 weeks to clear land, then finally transporting the families to their new resettlement. The process consumed a lot of time.

By December 2013 Chisase and Masangula were full and in January the province decided to go back to 5,020 planned plots in Chingwizi because there was no other planned land available for resettling people affected by Tokwe Mukosi.

This meant that all 1,247 families less 611 that we had moved in Level 1 plus 1,878 in Level II and some 199 families in Level III totalling 2,713 families, their livestock and movable property needed to be evacuated at once to avoid imminent flooding.

The Provincial Administrator immediately reactivated the Provincial Civil Protection Committee and District Civil Protection Committees for Chivi, Masvingo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi to plan and evacuate people from the flood basin and warn people downstream of the dam in the event that the dam wall collapsed.

We also realised that several families in Level 1 were inaccessible by trucks as the area was now bogging heavy trucks, so we immediately established pick–up points at higher grounds at Gororo, Zunga, Kushinga, Zifunzi, Rarangwe, Gunikuni and mobilised tractors to assist scotch carts to pick people to these pick up points.

We immediately realised that we needed +50 trucks, +20 tractors, thousands of tents, food, water, water tablets, drugs, blankets and sanitation facilities to cope with the disaster so we applied for a declaration of State of Disaster.

The province realised that they could not continue to pick people from the basin and allocate them the 4 hectare arable land as before but that we needed to establish an evacuation Transit Holding Camp at Chingwizi. This would quicken the process so that families would be picked from the basin and dropped at camp and allocated tents, food and blankets.

Meanwhile we agreed to assign the following duties to our working teams.

Search and Rescue Team under Propol – to use uniformed forces to identify families in danger, move them to pick-up points by scotch carts, tractors and helicopters.

The Transport Team under CMED - to deploy the 10 CMED vehicle we had to pick people from pick-up points to Chingwizi holding camp some 120km away at the rate of 1 or two families per day per truck. This meant that we were evacuating people at a rate of 15 to 20 families per day.

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The Logistics Team under District Administrators – to mobilise people to go to higher ground, to organise those that would look after livestock and maintain records of movements of people and livestock.

His Excellency declared our situation a Disaster on 9th February 2014 and the National Civil Protection Committee descended on the Province and collected all our logistical requirements to mitigate against disaster and immediately called for a Press Conference to appeal for well-wishers to assist.

We started receiving tents, food, drugs, clothes, blankets and trucks from ordinary Zimbabweans, the corporate world, churches, NGOs and members of the UN Family and Zimbabwean and Namibian Air Force. We improved our evacuation rate to +100 families a day and to +200 families at the peak.

All donations were accounted for at Provincial Administrator’s office and sent to the District Administrator Mwenezi for safe keeping and allocation to beneficiaries.

The Provincial Civil Protection Committee would meet twice daily at 6AM and 6PM together with cooperating partners to assess the situation and relocate and feed people and cater for their welfare both at pick-up points and holding camp.

CAMP ESTABLISHMENT Owing to non-availability of planned land to resettle people we established a temporary transit camp at Chingwizi as indicated earlier in my report.

We set up a Camp Management Team at Chingwizi headed by District Administrator Mwenezi, supported by Civil Protection Unit and assisted by I.O.M and UN Agencies and NGOs.

On arrival at camp a family would be allocated a tent, 50kg mealie-meal, 2 litres cooking oil, 1kg salt, 4kg sugar, 10kg sugar beans, 5kg Kapenta.

We also had to provide water to the families. At first we were carting the water from Triangle until we drilled some 3 boreholes and established a piped water scheme for the transit camp.

We equally put up a clinic to offer essential health services which was ably supervised by PMD.

By 19 February 2014 a primary and secondary school had been established to cater for all school going children.

With the support of NGOs we built up around 700 temporary toilets which we would decommission and build new ones when full.

IDENTIFICATION OF PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT SITES AND CAMP DECONGESTION

Following completion of the evacuation process the Province resolved to relocate all the families from

60 | P a g e the camp by offering them 1 hectare residential plots first and then demarcate arable land for their use later.

The Ministry of Lands mobilised a team of planners who pegged 3,020 one hectare residential plots and provided for schools, clinics, business centres, Police Station and community centres.

The Province then directed people to move to 1 hectare plots and build permanent houses while government planned arable land for irrigation.

The people complained that they need compensation first and wanted 4 hectare arable land like the other 611 families that had been resettled before the disaster.

Government advised that they feared continued stay in camp would expose the people to disease outbreak and would reduce their time to build before the next rainy season and appealed to people to leave camp for residential stands.

The first 800 families moved voluntarily to the new stands although some rogue elements attacked them for leaving before compensation.

The rest only left camp when they had burnt Police vehicles which led to some running skirmishes with the police.

To date a total of 2,555 families have been allocated 1 hectare residential plots and another 146 families are yet to be resettled. We equally need to regularize 250 illegally settled families in Chingwizi to the 1 hectare stands.

1,431 families have now been compensated at a cost of $5, 389, 840.00, we still have to pay 1,908 families in Level 1 and II at a cost of $7, 357, 978.00.

3 primary schools (Tokwe Mukosi, Nyuni and Chingwizi) and 1 secondary school (Nyuni Secondary) are now established.

A total of 36 boreholes (6 institutional and 30 community) were drilled.

58 institutional and 780 household toilets donated by IOM (230), Catholic Relief Services (250) and BH

ASO (300) have been built.

IOM , one of the UN Agencies that remained has funded the production of Ward 13 Community Based Plan, the draft plan is now in place and will be sent to council for consideration by the Full Council before marketing it for funding.

The government top priorities for Chingwizi are:

• Payment of compensation to the tune of $7, 357, 978.00 for 1,908 families in Level 1 and II.

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• Need to valuate 3,054 families in the Buffer Zone and pay subsequent compensation. • Allocation of arable land and grazing land to all the people in Chingwizi. • Feeding these people monthly until they harvest

Completion of permanent social infrastructure like the 3 primary schools, 1 secondary school, 1 or 2 clinics, additional boreholes, Police Camp, Community Centre, Dip tanks etc.

The disaster was declared for a period of 3 moths from 9 February to 9 May 2014.

LESSONS LEARNT

Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the actual cost of construction and social cost.

 Period between application of disaster and declaration should be made shorter to allow easy sourcing of resources.  Virtually all NGOs and UN Agencies that were partnering government have now left Chingwizi;  Funding for huge projects such as Tokwe Mukosi Dam construction should include both the actual cost of construction and social cost.  Period between application of disaster and declaration should be made shorter to allow easy sourcing of resources.  Provincial and District Civil Protection Committees should do a thorough environmental scan and ranking of possible disasters that may occur taking into consideration climate change.  Mobilisation of resources by government requires a lot of time and hence requests for funding should be done in time.  The disaster period for Tokwe Mukosi disaster was shorter than the work to be done and should have been extended to 6 months.  Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all.  The disaster period for Tokwe Mukosi disaster was shorter than the work to be done and should have been extended to 6 months.  Integrated and coordinated response to disasters requires commitment and sacrifice by all.  Civil Protection Unit should have basic equipment to mitigate against disaster like, tents, bowsers, water tablets, blankets, food hampers mosquito nets and some vehicles.  It is easy to commandeer resources when disaster has been declared but Civil Protection Unit should have a fund to compensate service providers and take care of the welfare of those managing the disaster.

CONCLUSION

My presentation would not be complete if I did not thank His Excellency for declaring the disaster, National Civil Protection Unit for all the disaster mitigation direction and mobilisation of partners and resources, all partners, the corporate world, churches, ordinary Zimbabweans, our Traditional Chiefs,

62 | P a g e local authorities and parastatals, the academia for being there when we needed them most, the Provincial and District Civil Protection Committee members who worked day and night to ensure no life was lost.

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Annex II: Group work Tasks 1. Group Work Guide

For Groups 1 to 3: group work to be undertaken in 3 steps

a). Brief overview on roles and activities undertaken by identified sectors or institutions as well as address itemised subtopics b). Plenary on challenges, lessons/ suggested solutions c) Preparation of report for presentation

Group 1

Topic: Operational challenges, lessons /suggested solutions on search and rescue (aerial, water, land) with regards to (subtopics):

~ alert mechanism and information on location of vulnerable communities, identification and accessibility of areas of refuge,

~mobilisation of communities and livestock to move to safety, movement to pick up points and management at pick up points

~ movement of communities from pick up points and reception challenges at campsite

~manpower levels and skills, equipment and related logistics as well as general coordination of search and rescue operations

~ other pertinent issues related to search and rescue.

Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews

~ Air Force of Zimbabwe: HQ

~ Zimbabwe National Army 4 Brigade

~ ZRP Sub Aqua: HQ

~ DA Chivi and DA Masvingo

~ Veterinary: Province

~CMED: HQ

~ NGOs: IOM

Group 2

Topic: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to Camp management:

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Subtopics

~ Siting, layout planning, security

~ Donations, warehousing and distribution of tents, food, clothing, etc

~ Provision of water and sanitation

~ Provision of health services, health promotion, psychological support

~ Education and recreational facilities

~ Environmental management

~livelihoods

~ Manpower levels and skills

~ Co ordination of camp management

Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews

DA Mwenezi

Social welfare: Mwenezi

Water: Province

Health: Mwenezi

Education: Province

Environment: Province

Veterinary: Mwenezi

NGOs: Oxfam, ? others

Group 3

Topic: Operational challenges, lessons and suggested solutions with regards to relocation to permanent residence and early recovery measures

Subtopics

~ valuation process and compensation

~ land identification, layout planning, consultations with communities on land use and anticipated nature of livelihoods

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~ manpower levels and skills

~ co ordination of relocation exercise

Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews

Valuations: HQ

Lands: HQ

Agriculture/ irrigation: province

Group 4

Topic: a) Identify any gaps and propose solutions with regards to the extent to which current regulatory processes and procedures related to dams under construction integrate disaster risk mitigation and preparedness (use the Tokwe Mukosi Dam Project as a case in point) b) Conduct a SWOT analysis on the country’s capacity (institutional, technical expertise and equipment, financial) for mitigation, preparedness and response to manage the flood risk within the context of climate change

Sectors/ institutions to present brief overviews

ZINWA

Climate Change Office

Department of Water

Local Government

Universities

NGOs

Meteorological Services

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Annex III: Group work presentation

GROUP 1: OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES LESSONS LEARNT ON SEARCH AND RESCUE

INTRODUCTION

A disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society. Disasters involve widespread to human, material, economic or environmental impacts, which, exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. The Tokwe Mukosi disaster started on 01 Feb 2014 when the community who were in the basin were surprised by rising water as a result of the construction of the Tokwe Mukosi dam. Villagers had to report to the police verbally, used cell phone to alert the local government district administrators. Police had to be moved in to access the situation and identify the most vulnerable and advising the residence to move to higher grounds.

ALERT MECHANISM

Verbal reports, meetings within the communities, information through local structures, police and army foot patrols, cellphone communication to the district administrators offices. Print and electronic media also played a pivotal role to inform the nation.

CHALLENGES

-Communication was a serious challenge- poor network, lack of airtime allowances no facilities for re- charging the phones. Because of the nature of terrain in the Tokwe Mukosi basin even army and police radios relay system had problems as well. Troops had to walk long.

IDENTIFICATION OF AREAS OF REFUGE

There are factors to consider when establising a camp hence the identification of areas like Gunikuni, Rarangwe, Zunga, Zifunzi and Gororo these are:

- accessebility by road with use of heavy trucks - water - shelter - sanitary facilities this was done with at the back of our minds and most serious that it was a high groud and away from danger.

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CHALLENGES

-Damaged roads.

-Water logged roads.

-Inadequate vehicles (tractors)

-Breakdown of vehicles.

MOBILISATION OF COMMUNITIES AND MOVEMENT TO SAFETY

As earlier on mentioned above during the identification of the vulnerable it was concurrent that victims were advised to move to safe places. They used their scotch carts and tractors to uplift house hold equipment while live stock was moved on foot, cattle, donkeys and goats. The marooned had to be airlifted and some were ferried by boats to the shore. it must be noted that the ground was heavily soaked hence pickup points refer to identified places that could be accessed by tractors and to holding points where they would be carried to the final destination in this case Chingwisi.

MOVEMENT FROM PICK UP POINTS AND RECEPTION CHALLENGES

Movement challenges: (as mentioned above).

The same animals which were used as draught power where the same animals required to be moved to new destination.

- outbreak of lumpy-skin disease. - families taking too long to prepare. - families resisting to move. - elderly and disabled who could not carry for themselves (these were assisted by the soldiers and police) - air and boats could not carry most belongings e.g. grinding mills, barbed wire and asbestors sheets. - inadequate shelter and ablution facilities. - food inconsistences supply of food. - bogus beneficiaries. - chronically ill (those on art) - animals stayed too long resulting in over grazing and destruction of crops. - loss of livestock on transit (14 cattle due vehicle breakdown)

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MANPOWER LEVEL, EQUIPMENT AND RELATED LOGISTICS

The security forces had enough manpower for the task at hand with requisite skills provided by army and airforce and the Zimbabwe republic police. challenges we had include

(a) inadquate fuel for helicopters. we had 30 000 litres of jet a1 which was positioned at Ngundu and this only lasted 5 days. an aditional 30 000 litres was again provided for the task. (it was be noted here that aircrafts and boats consume a lot of fuels (b) few trucks to ferry families and their livestock. (c) erratic supply of fuel. (d) some vehicles were controlled from their headquarters and not by those on the ground. (e) backup services were not available. (f) lack of updated maps and latest technological equipment for easy location of points of needy.

OTHER PERTINENT ISSUES RELATED TO SEARCH AND RESCUE

Upkeep support.