Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Zimbabwe (2006-2010)

EVALUATION OF FAO COOPERATION IN

ZIMBABWE (2006-2010)

Report Commissioned by the Office of Evaluation, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 00153 Rome, Italy

Independent Evaluation Team

James K. Gasana

Lori Bell Julius Kajume Shinga Mupindu Marjorie Smith-John

May 2011

Map of Zimbabwe

Source: http://www.goldbamboo.com/topic-t8659-a1-6Zimbabwe_.html

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Zimbabwe (2006-2010)

1. This report presents findings and recommendations of the Evaluation of FAO-Zimbabwe Cooperation (2006-2010) which was commissioned by the Office of Evaluation, FAO and was carried out from 1st to 25 February 2011. The period under evaluation saw difficult relations between Zimbabwe and Donors. FAO played a key role of “Coordination/Honest broker” between Donors, Government and other emergency aid and development partners. It followed, with great success, the principle of partnership with government, while taking into account the donors’ funding constraints and the accountability requirements. In most of this period, FAO’s cooperation with Zimbabwe, which consisted mainly of an emergency program, was not guided by an overall official framework document. Nevertheless there was continuity of a rolling strategy consisting in adjusting interventions as needs and the context changed. Furthermore, there is a Draft Country Programming Framework (CPF 2009-2013) as well as a Plan of Action (PoA 2010-2015) entitled “Zimbabwe: Transitioning Emergency into Rehabilitation and Development”. Its expected outcomes are improved food security through increased production and sustainable management of natural resources and the environment. To implement its program, FAO works through a large number of Implementing Partners (IPs). Main areas of intervention over the period have included large scale agricultural inputs distribution, conservation agriculture, animal health, support for strengthening market linkages, technical assistance for the development of an agriculture policy and HIV in agriculture strategy and coordination of multi-agency relief and rehabilitation work within the agriculture sector.

2. The purpose of the Evaluation was to (1) assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of FAO activities in Zimbabwe; (2) provide accountability to FAO member countries; and (2) learn lessons about the factors affecting FAO performance and development impact at country level to inform the finalization of FAO’s strategy for Zimbabwe. It was a forward looking exercise, learning from past experience to make recommendations on future interventions.

SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

Relevance

3. The Mission found that FAO’s Program is aligned with Government’s policies and plans with regard to improving food security, and is relevant to the Government’s agriculture sector development priorities. With regard to supporting increased crop production, Government, Donors, other partners and beneficiaries are satisfied with FAO project activities.

4. On Food Security and Nutrition (FSN), the Mission found that improved food consumption and reduced hunger have not been an explicit objective of FAO interventions in Zimbabwe. It further found that the lack of a national FSN policy and strategy is a constraint with respect to optimizing the alignment of FAO’s work to Government priorities. On the positive side, strengthening the capacity for collecting Food Security and Nutrition data and supporting the Food and Nutrition Council addresses an important priority for improving integrated FSN analysis and related decision-making.

5. On Conservation Agriculture (CA) and agricultural intensification, overall, FAO’s activities in Zimbabwe are quite relevant; they address poverty through increased yields in the

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context of sustainable land management (SLM) concerns. However, there is scope for strengthening appropriateness to beneficiaries through differentiating larger beneficiary groups according to specific needs criteria. There is also scope to more adequately integrate crop – livestock – tree production in the extension package in a way that will optimize the overall outcomes of the farming systems. In particular it will help improve the resilience of small holder farmers (SHFs) to vulnerability factors, including climate variability and change.

6. With regard to Animal Health , FAO’s interventions are relevant to the needs of livestock keepers and the country at large. They were designed with the objective of saving/ protecting livestock assets, livelihoods and human life. They consisted mainly in vaccinations (against Foot and mouth disease, Newcastle’s disease, Anthrax, Rabies), surveillance and resuscitating of dips. They focused on important livestock (cattle, small ruminants, and poultry) and on priority diseases. However, there was a lack of focus on other livestock, other animal health problems and on livestock production. In particular, there was little attention on small ruminants (especially goats) largely owned by small holders and vulnerable groups.

7. With regard to HIV and AIDS, FAO’s interventions are aligned to HIV and AIDS national priorities, policy and to the national context. FAO supported the developing of an HIV approach in Agriculture Strategy and related training interventions have been appreciated by the Ministry.

8. On Gender, The draft CPF is reflecting neither FAOs commitment to gender equity nor the gender priorities reflected in ZUNDAF, Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), or National Gender and Women Empowerment Strategic Action Plan.

Effectiveness

9. With regard to FSN, the approach of promoting gardens through schools, training of extension workers in nutrition, and promotion of community gardens contributed to greater knowledge on nutrition and increased horticulture production. However, less attention has been paid to targeting vulnerable food insecure households as a priority for FAO interventions. While food security information has been used for decision making with respect to relief provision, there is not yet enough analysis of the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity to inform development efforts.

10. With regard to SLM and intensification of agricultural production , FAO was effective in scaling up adoption of CA which has a potential for reversing land degradation, thus establishing the foundations for SLM practices at farm level while promoting the intensification of agricultural production. Through this effort, CA found strong ownership amongst Government and NGOs partners. There are also considerable achievements evident in the recovery of agriculture and on grain yield increases. The target households were able to increase production of maize yields from less than 1T/ha, to an average of 2-3T/ha under CA, in the last 2 years. However, scaling up of CA has been in terms of the number of practicing households rather than the area under CA per farm. There has been a slow introduction of mechanized CA. The extension model used has been top-down, “one-size fits all”, focusing on land productivity of grains on CA plots and not on labour productivity on the whole farm.

11. With regard to Livestock, FAO was effective in its response to the threats of animal diseases. There was adequate coverage and response. For FMD and Anthrax the risky areas were covered, and for ND, Rabies, Avian Influenza awareness, all areas have been protected. Surveillance for FMD, ND, HPAI was satisfactorily carried out; dipping operations were revived

with high response from livestock owners. Training of Community Based Vaccinators enhanced effectiveness in ND vaccination. Constraints to effectiveness have been principally related to inadequate Government transport, cold chain, syringes/needles; low staff morale; non-induction of new staff; shortage of vaccine in some cases (ND). The targeting of diseases should have also included support therapy such as de-worming and minor treatments to enhance the effectiveness of disease prevention and control efforts.

12. On Gender mainstreaming . FAO has not been effective with respect to gender mainstreaming. The positioning of the FAO Gender Focal Point is too low to influence FAO programming. The ToR for FAO management staff are unclear on gender accountability and mandate and the gender mainstreaming capacity of FAO staff and IPs is limited. Thus internal lobby and advocacy in FAO Zimbabwe Office is lacking. The focus has been on gender outputs i.e. male/female beneficiary numbers without adequate attention to the examination of the equitable distribution of benefits for males and females resulting from interventions. And no link is established between HIV and gender mainstreaming efforts.

Efficiency

Project design and operations planning are standardized to aid efficiency. During the review period $89m was mobilized with 97% operated through the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). However, the internal consultative process does not adequately address: i) timeliness; and ii) weak linkages between feedback from monitoring and evaluation and project operations, and follow-up by senior management is not systematized. The operating modalities are not always transparent or fully utilized i.e. selection of IPs, use of LoAs and MoUs. Leadership and guidance are lacking, negatively affected by factors including the multiple roles played by the FAO Representative. These and other factors also impact negatively on FAOR visibility. A resource mobilization strategy has not been developed which weakens management for the Representation as a whole. Technical support to the field programme is weak as SFS, co-located in the FAO Zimbabwe representation, seems stretched to cover the 11 countries in the sub-region, and inputs from other FAO technical units is either not requested or unavailable. Impact

13. The Mission bases its analysis of the impacts on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF). The Mission considered these areas of impact with respect to FAO Zimbabwe main areas of intervention as indicated above. It further has assessed whether the improved assets contribute to reduction of vulnerability of SHFs and to reinforcing their resilience to shocks.

14. Overall results. With regard to environment, there has been some rehabilitation of farm production potential through improved soil and water conservation. With regard to food availability and animal health, the Program contributed to increased crop production, crop diversification, and improved protection of livestock from disease, increased income from sale of crop and animal production, and there has been a gradual improvement of food availability since 2009. FAO’s projects on input distribution and CA have enabled beneficiaries to increase maize yields significantly above the national average. Interventions aimed at establishing linkages between smallholder farmers and the private sector have been successful.

15. Food security and nutrition. Training on nutrition has contributed to “first generation” changes in knowledge i.e. at the level of the direct beneficiary. However, as a training-of- trainers approach has been used in a number of activities (e.g. Health Harvest training for extension workers, training of teachers and students in school gardens), further efforts are

needed to measure changes in behaviour at household level resulting from FAO’s interventions. With respect to other interventions, the rather generic programming approach used by FAO over the past five years to promote adequate scaling up may have had a downside insofar as interventions may not always have had the desired impacts for different target groups. More vulnerable food insecure groups (in particular those with household labour deficits) do not appear to have been as successfully reached as more economically viable households.

16. Livelihood assets. On physical assets , FAO’s Program has not tackled physical infrastructure deficiencies. In general, the impact of inputs distribution projects on physical assets at SHFs level was generally low. The exception to this is project OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA which supported enhancement of some productive infrastructure consisting of livestock fences and dipping facilities for use by cattle owners. In some areas, wells have played a key role in increasing water availability for beneficiaries of the horticulture program. This reduces the time that particularly women have had to devote to the daily search of water for gardening. With livestock projects, various physical assets such as bicycles, motorcycles, motor vehicles, computers and laboratory equipment were provided as part of capacity building for improved service delivery.

17. On human assets, training in CA transferred new skills and knowledge to beneficiary SHFs. However, FAO’s projects have not been able to tap into farmers’ innovations and knowledge in coping with diverse vulnerabilities in order to engineer extension packages that address resilience concerns. In animal health, Government personnel and other partners interacted with FAO through training, workshops, working group meetings and other consultative and information sharing forums; this has built synergy and increased knowledge among the interacting parties. Community knowledge and experience acquired through Avian Influenza awareness creation, poultry management training and training on dip tank management among others is still in memory. Human asset improvements were also achieved in the areas of nutrition and HIV and AIDS. Promoting gardens through schools, training of extension workers in nutrition, and promotion of community gardens has contributed to greater knowledge on nutrition and horticulture production. The strategy of using training colleges for HIV mainstreaming to train extension staff has allowed for a scaling-up of the efforts to change knowledge attitudes and practices.

18. On natural assets , FAO’s projects promoting CA contributed to reducing land degradation. However, no effort was deployed to integrate crop production, livestock and tree planting. Furthermore, farmers did not get any assistance to manage community range resources. At farms level and in the immediate context of the farms, there is no impact of the Program’s interventions on natural assets.

19. On social-political assets , communities were encouraged to develop their capacities to work together as groups in CA operations strengthening their capacities for collective action in solving their own production problems. This coming together starts through training in demonstration plots. With improved social adhesion, it is easier for groups to benefit from opportunities for other development services, in particular those aiming at access to inputs and market linkage. Whether these groups can grow stronger and be able to access institutions (ex. extension, credit) and services providers remains to be seen.

20. On financial assets , many beneficiary SHFs visited by the Mission indicated that their families are now by far more financially secure than before FAO’s project support. They are able to manage payments for school and home needs without compromising agricultural plans and investments for the future.

21. Impact on policies, institutions and processes. FAO’s interventions have had a limited impact on rural institutions. Such institutions are important because they influence the way in which rural people interrelate and act, how assets are controlled and used and influence livelihood strategies. There was no investment in creating or catalyzing the creation of spaces where SHFs can interact with transformation structures and processes that impact on livelihoods. With regard to empowerment processes, some CA, goat and gardening projects empowered women and helped them improve their livelihoods. However high labour requirement for CA had a negative impact on women as it resulted in heavy workload burden for them.

22. Reducing vulnerability of SHFs. In Zimbabwe, SHFs operate in a context characterized by high vulnerability. The factors of this vulnerability are diverse and include climate variability and climate change, market access and market conditions, and shocks (droughts, livestock diseases, etc.). The Mission analysed how the strategies used in FAO’s interventions strengthened the resilience of SHFs and their farming systems to the impacts of these vulnerability factors. Many of the Program’s strategies such as crop diversification, livestock genetic improvement, training, and market linkages, contribute to reducing SHFs vulnerably. The interventions on prevention and containment of animal disease outbreak – by reducing disease risk and possible loss of livestock contributed to reduction of food insecurity and vulnerability. However, there is still room for assisting the farmers to establish farming systems that can increase their resilience, in particular to climate variability.

Sustainability/Connectedness

23. Food security and nutrition. The normative products produced (particularly Healthy Harvest) will have enduring usefulness beyond the duration of any individual project. UNICEF has up-scaled the initial school gardens pilot within the context of their “child friendly schools” program in Zimbabwe.

24. SLM and intensification of agricultural production. Longer term sustainability is an issue due to the fact that FAO and its partners are not devoting enough resources to supporting/strengthening of farmers institutions. Resources have been extremely limited, until recently, for institutional capacity development for Government extension services at provincial and district levels. Within Government, there is a severe lack of capacity and an inadequate incentive environment for the provision of extension services.

25. Livestock. No sustainability mechanism was built in the program, such as, for example, introducing cost recover in dipping operations, and MoAMID policy is clear. However, in the long term there is a basis for government and community effort to sustain disease control and capacity because of the training and material support provided by FAO’s Program.

26. HIV and AIDS. Horizontal and vertical HIV and AIDS structures created in Ministry of Agriculture will help ensure continued support. HIV modules for training in colleges are being utilized. The use of training colleges for HIV mainstreaming to train trainers is an effective strategy for scaling-up efforts to change knowledge attitudes and practices over time.

27. Management. The mission found that there was good coordination between the Representation and the Emergency and Relief Coordination Unit (ERCU) in a number of areas and concrete examples were provided to the mission of where initiatives, depending on their nature and funding source, had been transferred between the different management units. A

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surprising amount of normative work has been done by the ERCU which will render long term benefit. Nevertheless the lack of a CPF for FAO cooperation in Zimbabwe means that a longer term vision of transitioning to development and the necessary internal management systems and structure to support this, have not been articulated.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

28. The Evaluation has demonstrated the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of FAO’s cooperation program in Zimbabwe in the period 2006-2010. The portfolio consists mainly of short term interventions funded by emergency resources, but its main partner, the GoZ, would like to shift swiftly to development, while maintaining and consolidating the achievements reached so far. In the perspective of planning and implementing longer term development interventions, it may be expected that the new CPF will require a shift in expertise in the Country Team. All stakeholders being satisfied with the relevance and the effectiveness of the interventions, the following recommendations are made on key issues to suggest what the Mission believes to be measures that would allow FAO’s Zimbabwe program to consolidate its many valued results, particularly at SHFs level, especially in relation to the impacts and sustainability of those results.

29. FAO’s Cooperation Framework not yet formalized. FAO has not had a formalized framework for its cooperation with Zimbabwe during a key transitional period. The ZUNDAF represents a broader framework for assuring coherence/alignment with Government priorities and synergies with other UN Agencies. The draft CPF and PoA largely reflect the same priorities – one reflecting a strategic vision and the other an operational tool. However, in such a dynamic context, it is not appropriate to have a 5 year operational plan.

− Recommendation 1: The FAO Representative in collaboration with the Senior Management Team (SMT), and in consultation with GoZ and UNCMT, should finalize the CPF. Priorities that the FAOR and the GoZ may wish to consider for their collaboration could include gender, SLM, forestry and its interfaces with agriculture and livestock, climate change adaptation, food security and nutrition, and building capacity of farmers unions and other farmer’s organizations to better provide services to their membership. The CPF should be used as a tool for advocacy and resource mobilization. The PoA should be reshaped to reflect a biennium country work plan for 2012/13 with a clear RBM framework.

30. Plethora of coordination mechanisms . There is a plethora of coordination mechanisms in place. ERCU efforts to coordinate the agriculture sector have been effective and have contributed to improved coverage and improved the quality/consistency of interventions. However, coordination at sub-national level has been weak. The political context is starting to change and it is time for FAO to begin to gradually hand back the leadership for coordination to the MoAMID.

− Recommendation 2: FAO should look for opportunities to support MoAMID to co-chair the relevant coordination working groups and eventually to develop coordination mechanisms at district and provincial levels. The TOR for the working groups should clarify expected coordination outcomes.

31. Elaboration of national policy frameworks . FAO is to be commended for its contribution to the elaboration of national policy frameworks including the agriculture policy and HIV and AIDS in agriculture strategy – given the context. Nevertheless there are gaps in the strategic

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framework and FAO is in a position to support the Government and facilitate dialogue on policy and strategy between Government and Donors.

− Recommendation 3 : FAO should continue providing assistance and support on policy development and the implementation framework in the areas of SLM, gender & agriculture, food and nutrition policy, climate change adaptation, irrigation and water management, and agricultural extension. This will require additional support from its sub-regional and HQs services (TCS and Technical Divisions).

32. Strengthening delivery of extension services to SHFs. The approach of working with Farmers Unions (FUs) as IPs has not strengthened SHFs empowerment – in particular their negotiating capacity. FAO’s approach has not contributed to strengthening the accountability of the Farmers Unions to their grassroots members. FAO support has impacted favourably on veterinary services. While FAO and IPs have provided training and small financial/material support to individual AGRITEX extensionists, AGRITEX has received very limited support at an organizational level.

− Recommendation 4. FAO should seek more effective forms of cooperation with Farmers Unions to strengthen the empowerment of SHFs, assisting them in developing local associative and self-managed organizations that would enable them to access services and markets. This should be accompanied by a capacity development strategy for strengthening AGRITEX extension at provincial and district levels. Providing free inputs through FUs should be avoided as this may create a distraction to their core mission.

33. Gender equity and gender mainstreaming. 70% of Zimbabwe’s agricultural workforce is female and gender equity is a priority identified by the GoZ, UNDAF, SADC and FAO’s own corporate framework. The FAO Zimbabwe program, however is not contributing in any deliberate way to female empowerment within the agricultural sector.

− Recommendation 5: FAO should mainstream gender both in FAO’s interventions and in those of the sector. It should specifically develop clear gender equity outcomes and indicators for the Program, and establish clear gender mainstreaming responsibility and accountability internally within management job descriptions.

34. Livelihood analysis. FAO has made an important contribution to the collection of crop production data and has participated in a number of other food security and nutrition related data gathering efforts. In addition, it supported the development of normative guidance and standardized approaches that have helped to scale up interventions across the country. It is now time, however, to invest more in understanding livelihood challenges and opportunities to develop differentiated interventions appropriate to the needs of different areas and groups.

− Recommendation 6 : In collaboration with FNC and other partners, undertake household livelihood studies to support the development of integrated farming models and extension material and interventions for more viable SHFs and targeted asset building interventions for the chronically food insecure.

35. Identifying and reaching the target groups . Design and targeting of FAO’s interventions have been generic. Differential targeting would reinforce the relevance of the program because it is the best way of taking specific group needs into account. There is scope to improve

targeting criteria and targeting mechanisms in order to reach the beneficiaries in a more differentiated way, according to their specific constraints.

− Recommendation 7 : Adopt clear principles that should be followed in identifying and reaching the target groups. Based on these principles, project documents should provide a clear definition of target groups and should specify the criteria and mechanisms to be used to select and reach the target groups.

36. Reengineering CA. FAO has achieved considerable results in the promotion of CA in Zimbabwe. In some of its projects, there are promising results as far as promoting integrated farming systems is concerned. However, there are important challenges of how to scale-up in terms of area coverage both at national and farm levels. At farm level, many SHFs face a problem of labour availability to be able to cover more than 1-2 ha with CA. There is also a challenge of how to put in place a whole-farm approach that integrates CA with livestock and trees to sustainably address the farmers’ diverse livelihood needs, and to reduce the rates of Nitrogen applied from chemical fertilizers over time.

− Recommendation 8: Consider reengineering the technological component in the CA package to optimize the contribution of livestock and trees to SHFs’ livelihoods in a landscape planning approach. This requires including action research within agricultural extension to involve farmers in designing appropriate farming systems in different agro- ecological zones, that integrate CA with livestock and trees (CALT), testing adapted mechanized CA equipment, and assessing how new technology can be accessed by poor households.

37. Operational support and programming. Internal systems are appropriate – although senior management team functioning can be improved to ensure effective steering of the programme and efficient planning of interventions. There have been delivery delays, confusion on the management of repayment and subsidy modalities, and insufficient transparency with respect to the selection of IPs. With regard to distribution of inputs, it should be noted that market functioning has improved in the last two years and direct distribution of inputs to beneficiaries is no longer appropriate.

− Recommendation 9 : Selection and management of partnerships - improved transparency of IP selection through establishing clear criteria, performing a capacity analysis of all partners, include NGOs at local level who may not be members of ACWG, in compliance with procedures in MS 507. For contracting with IPs, use a mix of LoAs and MoUs with Government and other partners, e.g. MoUs for general over-arching activities and LoAs for specific activities with specified outcomes etc. For operational efficiency – involve finance, logistics/procurement from the programme design and planning stage.

− Recommendation 10: Move away from direct distribution of inputs. Seek guidance from CSAP to test the use of vouchers (with or with or without contribution by farmers) as an effective means for helping farmers purchase their inputs and strengthen markets.

the community and documented. This approach should be made explicit in the LoAs and appropriate controls built in to ensure accountability.

− Recommendation 12 . The FAO Representative, TCEO, ADG/RAF and OSD should consider combining the two units i.e. the Programme Unit and the ERCU, to create a strategic planning/programming function, and an operations function that would have responsibility for planning and implementing the overall field programme. The FAO Representative should establish regular Senior Management Team (SMT) meetings to discuss strategic direction of the programme, resource mobilization (human & financial) priorities, and key FAO messages and organizational positions. To maximize the feedback loop between learning and programming, and to ensure gender mainstreaming receives adequate attention, the mission recommends that both the M&E Officer and Gender focal point be included in the SMT.

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 5 1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE ...... 5 2 EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE...... 5 3 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH...... 5 4 COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM ...... 7

II. THE COUNTRY AND RURAL SECTOR CONTEXT ...... 8 1. COUNTRY FEATURES AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND...... 8 2. DECLINE IN FOOD SECURITY, PUBLIC HEALTH AND EDUCATION SERVICES...... 9 3. AGRICULTURE SECTOR – RECENT PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS...... 9 4. LIVESTOCK SECTOR ...... 10 5. FORESTRY SECTOR CHARACTERIZED BY AN ALARMING DEFORESTATION RATE...... 10 6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION...... 10

III. FAO’S PORTFOLIO DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ...... 12 1. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT...... 12 2. THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT ...... 12 3. FAO’S ZIMBABWE PROGRAM FRAMEWORK...... 12 4. DESCRIPTION OF THE PORTFOLIO 2006-2010 ...... 13

IV. EVALUATION RESULTS...... 16 1. RELEVANCE...... 16 2. EFFECTIVENESS...... 21 3. EFFICIENCY...... 48 4. IMPACTS ...... 57 5. SUSTAINABILITY AND CONNECTEDNESS...... 61

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 63 1. CONCLUSIONS...... 63 2. RECOMMENDATIONS...... 64

ANNEXES

A. Evaluation Terms of Reference B. Evaluation Matrix C. FAO Organogram D. List of Persons Met E. Study on FAO Support for Strengthening Market Linkages F. Study on FAO Effectiveness in Coordination G. Project Briefs and Summary Table H. Bibliography

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACWG Agricultural Coordination Working Group AEZ Agro-ecological zone AFSMS Agriculture and Food Security Monitoring System AGRITEX Ministry of Agriculture Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome APT Agricultural Project Trust CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program CA/CF Conservation Agriculture/Conservation Farming CAP Consolidated Appeal Process CBV Community based vaccinators CCA Climate change adaptation CFU Commercial Farmers Union CMT Country Management Team CPF Country Program Framework CSAP FAO Procurement Service DVFS Department for Veterinary Field Services ECHO Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission ECTAD Emergency Centre for Trans-boundary Animal Diseases ERCU Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (FAO) EU European Union EUFF European Union Food Facility FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FAOR FAO Representative FEWSNET Famine Early Warning System Network FNC Food and Nutrition Council FTLRP Fast Track Land Reform Policy FSN Food Security and Nutrition FPMIS Field program management system GCP Government Cooperative Program GFP Gender Focal Person GMB Grain Marketing Board GoZ Government of Zimbabwe GPA Global Political Agreement HH Household HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus HPAI Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza HQs Headquarters IP Implementing partner IPC Integrated Phase Classification LFA Logical Framework Analysis/Approach LoA Letter of Agreement MDG Millennium Development Goal MDT Multi-Disciplinary Team (FAO) MDTF Multi-donor Trust Fund M&E Monitoring and Evaluation ME&T Ministry of Environment and Tourism MIS Management Information System MLLRR Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement MoAMID Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development MoA Memorandum of Understanding MTP Medium-Term Plan NAC National AIDS Council NARDS National Agricultural Research and Development System ND Newcastle Disease NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development NEWU National Early Warning Unit

NGO Non-governmental organization OCHA Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs OECD-DAC Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEDD FAO Office of Evaluation OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance OSRO Office for Special Relief Operations (FAO) OVC Orphans and Vulnerable Children PLHIV People living with HIV PoA Plan of Action RAF Regional Office for Africa (FAO) RARP Rural agro-dealer restocking program REOSA FAO Regional Emergency Office for Southern Africa RP Regular Program (financed through assessed contributions ) SADC Southern African Development Community SAT Sustainable Agriculture Trust SFS Sub-Regional Office for Southern Africa (FAO) SHF Smallholder farmer SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency SLM Sustainable Land Management SMDP Smallholder Market Development Project SMT FAO Senior Management Team in Zimbabwe SNV Netherlands Development Organization STERP Short Term Emergency Recovery Program TCE Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (FAO) TCEO Emergency Operations Service (FAO) ToRs Terms of reference UPT Union Project Trust USD United Sates of America Dollar WG Working group WILSA Women and Law in Southern Africa ZCFU Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union ZFU Zimbabwe Farmers Union ZimVac Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee ZUNDAF Zimbabwe United Nations Development Assistance Framework

Acknowledgements

The Members of the Evaluation Team of the FAO Cooperation in Zimbabwe wish to express their gratitude for the advice and recommendations provided by the Consultative Group comprised of the Donors and Zimbabwe Government Representatives based in Rome, and by FAO HQs staff.

The Team Members wish to thank all those persons met in Government services in Harare and at provincial and district levels, to FAO’s Donors and UN Agencies representatives in Harare, to FAO Programme implementation partners, and to the smallholder farmers – men and women - who gave their time to share information.

The Team Members would like to acknowledge the considerable organizational and logistical support, and the invaluable information and insight they received from FAO staff at the HQs in Rome, at FAOR and SFS in Harare, and REOSA in Johannesburg.

The Team Members wish also to recognise and take special cognisance of the FAO Office of Evaluation (OEDD) for overall guidance, advice and coordination, including the preparatory desk review, evaluation database, organization and management of visits of the Team Members in Rome. They acknowledge the research assistance by Genny Bonomi as well as international travelling and administrative arrangements by Nadine Monnichon from FAO OED.

I. Introduction

1 Background and Rationale

1. This report presents the findings of the Evaluation of FAO’s Cooperation in Zimbabwe in the period 2006-2010. The evaluation is part of a series of country evaluations that started in 2006. It is based on specific directive providing for evaluation of the totality of FAO’s work with individual countries. It also respects the General Assembly Resolution 59/250 of 2004, which stresses that the operational activities for the development of the United Nations System should be valued and assessed on their impact on the recipient countries, specifically their capacity to eradicate poverty and ensure sustained economic growth. FAO has completed ten country evaluations (Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, India, Honduras, DRC, Tajikistan, Sudan, Brazil and Ethiopia). The country-focused evaluation examines the totality of FAO’s work, including national projects, country participation in regional and global projects, use made of normative products and performance of the FAO country representation. The key considerations in these evaluations are the utility of the Organization’s work to the Member Country and the extent to which this draws on FAO’s comparative advantages. Zimbabwe has been selected as the focus of a country evaluation during 2010-2011 based on the overall size of the program and lack of existing recent evaluations of specific projects within the program.

2 Evaluation Objectives and Scope

2. As required by the terms of reference which are included in Annex A, the main purposes of the evaluation are:

− To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of FAO activities in Zimbabwe; − To provide accountability to FAO member countries; and − To learn lessons about the factors affecting FAO performance and development impact at country level to inform the finalization of FAO’s strategy for Zimbabwe.

3. The evaluation was forward-looking, i.e. identifying areas for improvement and drawing lessons in order to further FAO cooperation relevance and effectiveness in the future. It intended also to assist the Government and partners in Zimbabwe to maximize the comparative advantage of FAO, and to contribute to development of the methodology for carrying out evaluations at country level in the future.

4. The evaluation covered the totality of FAO’s work in Zimbabwe, encompassing all activities in direct support to the country, irrespective of sources of funding (Regular Program or extra budgetary resources) or from where they are managed (HQs, Regional Office or the FAOR) during the period 2006-2010. The evaluation also included an assessment of the activities of the FAO representation which are not necessarily carried out through projects as well as examine its capacity to perform efficiently and effectively.

3 Methodology and approach

5. The overall approach . The methodology and approach adopted for this Evaluation comply with the OECD-DAC criteria. In the use of these criteria, particular attention was paid to

providing evidence-based findings that are credible and reliable, and strong foundations for the Mission’s recommendations. These criteria are as follows: − Relevance to what extent are the project or program objectives consistent with the needs and aspirations of the beneficiaries, the country’s social, economic and environmental conditions, and the government’s policies, strategies and plans, and FAO’s mandate, functions and country plans.

− Effectiveness , a criterion that measures the extent to which planned results are being achieved or are likely to be achieved at the level of outcomes.

− Efficiency , a criterion that measures the relationship between outputs and inputs in terms of human and financial resources, focus and timeliness management.

− Impact which consists in organizational, community, system, or framework (institutional, policy, regulatory) changes that are expected to result from activities. Unintended impacts are also captured.

− Sustainability which is the probability that long-term benefits from an intervention are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn, without causing social or environmental harm.

6. The Evaluation Work Plan . The Zimbabwe CE was conducted in five stages. First, there was an initial review of the country context and portfolio of FAO projects in Zimbabwe over the period 2006-2010 and the preparation of terms of reference. Second, an Inception Mission carried out in Zimbabwe between 18-22 October 2010 by the Team Leader, with the objectives of ensuring that FAO staff in Harare (SFS and Zimbabwe Office) received adequate information about the scheduled Evaluation and to provide them with an opportunity to discuss its terms of reference, that external key stakeholders have adequate prior information on the CE and to give them an opportunity to discuss key issues for the Evaluation, and to discuss with FAO staff practical issues relating to the organization of the Evaluation Mission. Third there was a presentation of the results of the inception mission to the Consultative Group at FAO HQ including the Zimbabwe Permanent Representative to FAO, representatives to FAO from key donor Governments to FAO’s Zimbabwe Programme, senior managers from the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCEO) and some of the main technical units who provide backstopping to the Zimbabwe program. Fourth the inception report (Annex B) was finalized taking into account the recommendations from the Advisory Group. Fifth, two pre- studies were commissioned, one which examined through both qualitative and quantitative methods the effectiveness of FAO’s role in coordination, the other which conducted in-depth field work to assess FAO’s efforts to strengthen market linkages. Finally, the Evaluation Team carried out a four week Evaluation Mission to conduct interviews at FAO HQ (one week), and to Zimbabwe to interview stakeholders and visit field projects and participate in debriefing/validation meetings with partners (3 weeks). Following the preparation of the draft report, the Consultative Group was once more convened to discuss the results of the Evaluation and solicit any additional inputs before the report was finalized.

7. The Evaluation instruments. The findings came from a process of triangulating information through several instruments and getting information from different stakeholders and different levels of management. The data sources and instruments used were as follows:

− Data gathering and desk reviews: − Development of an Evaluation Matrix − Establishment of a Mission Work Plan − Interviews with stakeholders at agency, partner, and community levels 6

− Partner survey − Field visits (interviews and observation).

8. The Mission concluded its visit in Zimbabwe with separate debriefings aimed at sharing its preliminary findings with FAO staff, Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization, Irrigation Development (MoAMID) and a wide range of FAO partners gathered in the Agricultural Coordination Group (ACWG) meeting.

9. Structure of this Evaluation Report. This report is organized into six chapters. After this Chapter one of introduction, the second chapter describes the Zimbabwe national context in which FAO Cooperation operates. The third Chapter highlights FAO’s portfolio development and implementation. The fourth Chapter presents the main Evaluation findings and is organized around the five Evaluation criteria. The last Chapter provides conclusions and recommendations.

4 Composition of the Evaluation Team

10. The evaluation was conducted by an independent team of three external consultants a staff member of the FAO Evaluation Office (OED), and a staff member from the Office of the Inspector General (AUD) as follows:

− M. James K. Gasana (Rwanda) -Team Leader, Development Policies, Sustainable Land Management and Conservation Agriculture − Ms. Lori Bell (Canada) – Food Security and Nutrition − Ms. Shinga Mupindu (Zimbabwe) – Gender and HIV/AIDS − Ms. Marjorie Smith-John (Jamaica) - Operations − M. Julius Kajume (Kenya)- Livestock and Fisheries

11. In addition to the Evaluation Team, a consultant, Jayne Stack, was contracted to conduct a study on FAO market linkages initiatives in Zimbabwe, whose results were used as input to this Evaluation. The qualitative study of the effectiveness of the agriculture sector coordination under FAO’s chairmanship was undertaken by Kudzai and Borrel (Annex E) which was complemented by a partner survey implemented by Genny Bonomi (Annex F).

II. The Country and rural sector context

1. Country features and historical background

12. Zimbabwe is a landlocked southern African country occupying 390,757 km2, comprising four physio-geographic regions which are the Eastern Highlands, the Highveld, the Middleveld and the Lowveld. The Eastern Highland and the Highveld range in altitude between 1,200 and 1,800 m, the Middleveld lies between 600 and 1,200 m, and the Lowveld lies below 600 m. The country borders with Botswana, the Republic of South Africa, Mozambique, and Zambia. . It has a population of 12.084.304 inhabitants, of which 41.9% are below the age of 15 years1.

13. Duality is the marking feature of Zimbabwe’s agrarian structure. For more than a century, land has been the most important political issue in Zimbabwe. Due to land access and land tenure injustices resulting from the colonization period, the agrarian structure of Zimbabwe was characterized by the duality of resource endowments and production systems. Until 1999 there was a large–scale commercial farm sector comprising 4,000 white-owned farms and about 20 large agro–industrial estates, together owning 11 million hectares of prime agricultural land (with holdings averaging 2,000 hectares per farm). The remainder of land in Zimbabwe was under communal land ownership and farmed by small scale subsistence farmers. After Independence, the return of lands to black farmers was enacted in a limited manner until 2000 when the Fast Track Land Reform resettlement program was instituted (FTLRP). The First Track program resulted in the removal of white occupants from commercial lands and replacement by black farmers. This caused a virtual cessation of commercial agricultural production in the country, a food deficit and an economic setback. A national emergency was declared by the Government in 2002 resulting in the intervention of the main humanitarian aid institutions, International Organizations (including FAO), and international and local non- government organizations (NGOs). Donors placed restrictions on development aid because of alleged problems in the democratic processes and defaults on international bank loan repayments.

14. The land reform has resulted in the restructuring of both production and marketing institutions. There has been a reallocation of former large-scale white commercial units to indigenous farmers under the A1 and A2 resettlement schemes. The A1 scheme targets the landless, poor and vulnerable families who are provided land occupation and use permits on relatively small plots for cropping, common grazing or woodland areas. The A2 scheme targets commercial farming where farms are relatively larger. They are provided to actual or potential farmers with proven farming skills and/or resources on the basis of long term leases. However, even after the land reform, the overall picture remains that of a dualistic grain producing sector that consists of large-scale commercial farming sector and a relatively complex set of heterogeneous smallholder farmers (Moyo, 2008)2. The traditional communal sector comprises approximately 16.4 million hectares, the A1 farms occupy up to 4,231,080 hectares, and A2 farms some 2,198,814 hectares (Moyo, 2004)3. In spite of this dualism, it is recognized that the

1 http://www.indexmundi.com/zimbabwe/demographics_profile.html. 2 Sam Moyo (2008). The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe. http://www.bankie.info/content/moyoa.pdf. 3 Sam Moyo (2004). The Land and Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe. Work-in-progress paper presented at the “Conference on 'The Agrarian Constraint and Poverty Reduction: Macroeconomic Lessons for Africa”, Addis Ababa, 17-18 December, 2004. http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001097/P1211-Moyo_Dec2004.pdf. 8

land reform has a potential to contribute to poverty alleviation and to reduce the pressure on the land in the communal areas.

15. Since the land reform, Zimbabwe has experienced protracted political crises that has led to economic and social difficulties. These difficulties were further compounded by frequent droughts. The rate of recovery of the country has also been affected by a brain drain that has impacted on its capacity to recover from the economic and social crises. In addition, the majority of the main donors placed economic embargo on the Country and confined their support mostly to relief and emergency assistance. The ensuing economic crisis characterized by hyperinflation and shortage of essential commodities among other economic woes imparted negatively on the rural sector. There was very little investment in the sector.

2. Decline in food security, public health and education services.

16. Over the last 10 years, Zimbabwe has faced problems of food availability caused by the decline in national food production, the collapse of the markets, and hyperinflation. It is estimated that 10-15% of the population are food insecure4. Investments in public services have declined. Chronic malnutrition is on the rise. Zimbabwe has also been severely affected by HIV/AIDS, with a prevalence rate of about 18%. Though this rate is one of the highest in the world, it is one of the few countries to register a decline in the prevalence rate, the high having reached 25%.

17. The years 2006-2008 were exceptionally difficult because of internal political, economic and emergency context, and difficult relations between Zimbabwe and the donors. The year 2009 saw the dollarization of the economy, reform of the Grain Marketing Board, and some political change. The years 2009 and 2010 demonstrate substantial economic recovery in general and the recovery of agricultural production in particular.

3. Agriculture sector – recent production and productivity trends.

18. Agriculture is at the heart of the Zimbabwean economy, contributing approximately 17% to Zimbabwe’s GDP. As the main source of livelihood for about 65 – 70% of the population, the performance of agriculture is a key determinant of rural livelihood resilience and poverty levels. General challenges facing smallholder farmers (SHF’s) include low and erratic rainfall, low and declining soil fertility, low investment, shortages of farm power - labour and draft animals, poor physical and institutional infrastructure, poverty and recurring food insecurity.

19. Over the past five years the national average yield has been below half a ton per hectare in maize while in the wheat sector total annual output fell from 325,000 tons in 1990 to 18,500 tons in 2008. Key constraints to production included a limited and unreliable supply of low-cost inputs (e.g. seed, fertilizer), and limited capacity to mobilize capital. The grain sector has therefore been characterized in recent years by low volume and poor quantity and quality production relative to regional markets.

4 Zimbabwe National Nutrition Survey and the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee: Rural Livelihoods Assessment. Food and Nutrition Council 2010. 9

20. Agricultural production is vulnerable to periodic droughts. The peasant sector which produces 70 per cent of staple foods (maize, millets, and groundnuts) is particularly vulnerable. It has access to less than 5 per cent of national irrigation facilities.

21. The Agriculture sector grew by 14.9% in the year 2009 from a decline of about 39.3% the previous season. This contributed to the improvement of the national GDP which increased from -14.8% in 2008 to 5.7% in 20095. Agriculture output growth is projected to continue. Improved agriculture-sector performance is underpinned by expanded output of tobacco, dairy, horticulture and maize production.

4. Livestock sector

22. Livestock and livestock products contribute significantly to the economy of Zimbabwe, with cattle accounting for 35-38% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contributed by the Agricultural Sector. It is estimated that 50-60% of rural households own cattle, 70-90% own goats, while over 80% own chickens. The importance of livestock in rural livelihoods and food security lies in the provision of meat, milk, eggs, hides & skins, draught power, and manure. They also act as strategic household investment. Small ruminants (sheep and goats) and non- ruminants, particularly poultry, are an important safety net in the event of a drought – they are easily disposable for cash when need arises or during drought crisis. One of the impacts of the land reform on the livestock sector is the decline in both production and productivity and was the substantial shift of the production system from the previously predominant commercial farming system to small holder system that henceforth took a center stage in agricultural development. The small holder system has the potential to grow and become the mainstream of the livestock sector’s performance indicator (DVFS, 2006).

5. Forestry sector characterized by an alarming deforestation rate.

23. Although with a forested area of 15,624,000 ha forests still cover 40% of Zimbabwe’s total land area, successive FAO reports on the State of the Forests of the World show that Zimbabwe has had a steady deforestation rate in the last twenty years. This rate averages 327,000 ha6 lost annually since 1990 or more that 6 million ha of forests lost in the last 2 decades. For the rate of deforestation, Zimbabwe ranks 3 rd among African countries after Sudan and Nigeria. One of the explanations of this sustained deforestation rate is that land use policies do not adequately take into account the interlinkages between trees and woodlands and agricultural and livestock productions. Agriculture policies and practices are centred on crop production and do not adequately recognize and seek the linkage between agriculture and trees, or livestock and wood resources; particularly as far as environment protection and sustainable livelihoods are concerned. The gap in interlinkages has been further widened by the recent land reform.

6. International Cooperation

24. Reluctance of international donors to fund development work. During much of the evaluation period, bilateral Donor support to national development was absent due to the

5 http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/96938DF6AAA4EE184225785700294912/ . 6 FAO (2011). State of the World’s Forests 2011. Rome, Italy. 10

sanctions imposed by western governments. Assistance was focused mainly on humanitarian activities and was provided to vulnerable groups in the country through the UN Agencies and NGOs. The World Bank and IFAD also suspended their support in 2000 and 2006 respectively due to Zimbabwe’s non-payment of arrears owed to these institutions. As a result external aid to Zimbabwe has been very limited and has come mainly from the regional bodies such as SADC and bi-lateral assistance from the South African Government. Donors have however indicated their intention to renew aid assistance, once the sanctions are lifted, and in preparation have either developed strategies or outlined areas of focus in their development programs to assist the government in reducing poverty and improving productivity and incomes. Much rests on the process and outcome of the upcoming 2011 presidential elections.

25. Funding of emergency work and transitioning. The annual UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) is the main tool for highlighting the humanitarian crisis and for providing a means through which the donor community can support priority actions. However, improvements in the economy over the last two years aided by what is hoped to be a more stable political environment, has resulted in a gradual stabilization of the humanitarian situation. There is now consensus among the donor, Government and multi-lateral communities that there is need for a new approach. Government, in setting out its priorities has also indicated its wish to move away from emergency towards development as a means of improving food security and reducing poverty. As a result, the nature of the CAP is also changing as it adopts a more strategic focus by using a program approach to link humanitarian interventions with recovery/development initiatives already endorsed by Government. In addition, several other funding modalities have been introduced e.g. the Education Transition Fund, Global Fund, Joint Initiative and the Multi- Donor Trust Fund, that are aimed at providing donors with more options through which to channel resources towards recovery, to which the donor community is responding positively. The realization that existing vulnerabilities will require longer-term interventions than currently possible in an emergency context is accepted and demonstrated by the increased support from the Donor community.

III. FAO’s portfolio development and Implementation

1. Institutional context

26. The Organization’s reform process has increased the Representative’s responsibilities for field program development and project operations. It has also brought changes to the planning processes as FAO Representatives are included in the Sub-regional Multi-disciplinary teams (MDT) and are expected to contribute to the Organization’s strategic planning process. Representatives now report administratively to the Assistant Director General (Regional Office for Africa), and functionally to the Sub Regional Coordinator (SRC) within the Southern African Sub Regional Office (SFS) as members of the MDT. There has however been little or no adjustment to the staffing and structure of the Representation. The FAO Representation in Zimbabwe is co-located with the Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa (SFS) in Harare. The Representative is therefore also the SRC and member of the MDT. In principle, the Representation should be able to take advantage of the closer proximity to the MDT, higher delegations of spending authority and benefits accruing from the larger numbers of staff in the office in developing and executing its field program activities.

2. The operating environment

27. Following the 2008 elections and creation of the inclusive government formed under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by three political parties, the political and policy environment has become more stable. However the economy still suffers from limited markets, weakened capacity of the civil service, fragmented sector responsibilities between several Ministries, and inadequate policy environment which present formidable development constraints. As a result of donor sanctions, there is a veto on using donor resources to support badly needed capacity development in Government. All these factors have created special local operating conditions where short-term humanitarian assistance in support of national food security is a proxy for longer-term development interventions.

3. FAO’s Zimbabwe program framework

28. FAO’s Representation in Zimbabwe has responded, within the organization’s mandate, to both emergency and non-emergency needs while assuring coherence with Government and Donor priorities, and also with FAO’s corporate strategic objectives. The resulting priorities are reflected in a draft National Medium Term Planning Framework (NMTPF), now referred to as the Country Planning Framework (CPF) and a Plan of Action (PoA) prepared in December 2009. These two documents represent the planning framework for development interventions and those activities in the transition from emergency to development, respectively. They individually establish a link with Government, UN and FAO corporate priorities but cover virtually the same time-period and the same developmental priorities.

29. Operationally, though not documented until the CPF and PoA were drafted, specific strategies were developed and applied around the over-arching context of improving food security. These could be grouped into four main categories: a) Humanitarian - input distribution to targeted beneficiary households at community level through various modalities such as direct distribution through IPs; maintaining livelihoods among vulnerable households including activities such as support to animal health; b) Recovery – contract farming for small holder farmers as a way of improving livelihoods; increasing agricultural production among communal farmers through improving agronomic practices; establishing market linkages through support to

small holder farmers and the Private Sector; c) Coordination and monitoring – information and knowledge sharing among key stakeholders in the sector through the Agricultural Coordination Working Group (ACWG); and, d) Creating an enabling policy environment through advocacy with Government and the donor community.

30. These four approaches allowed the Representation to establish a degree of coherence within its field program and to create synergies between the large ‘emergency’ activities and the smaller ‘non-emergency’ component. This was especially noted with respect to policy initiatives where concerted advocacy with government and donors helped to reduce price controls thereby encouraging private sector interest in agricultural commodity trading; and, initiated discussions of, and, funding for developing an agriculture strategy. The Evaluation noted however that there was no strategy nor clear-cut practice in place to address cross-cutting issues e.g. Gender. As a result the themes were not systematically addressed in the field program.

4. Description of the portfolio 2006-2010

4.1 Focus of FAO’s interventions in Zimbabwe

31. The national field program portfolio over the period is valued at about USD 89m and consists of 47 projects. Of these 38 are related to emergency interventions and nine are supported through FAO’s Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). The main areas covered by these two components are complementary and for the emergency program include: Crop Production; Livestock; Animal health; Seed certification; Nutrition; Coordination and Monitoring. FAO’s annual budget in the country has significantly increased going from USD 2.9 million (average 2006/2007) to USD 25 million (average 2009/2010) which has increased the capacity of the organization to extend its activity to more domains. Crop Production projects were and remain the most numerous, followed by Coordination and Monitoring projects, Animal Health and Nutrition projects. The most recent Crop Production projects focus more on Conservation Agriculture.

32. The field program portfolio includes nine TCP projects. Due to the variety of objectives and special foci they address, it is difficult to group them into categories. There is a TCP project for each one of the following areas: Human and wildlife conflicts management; HIV and AIDS; Cassava Production; Forestry; Fishery; Mechanization support services; Small Grains; and, Policy support. A list of the projects with a short description of the context of intervention and main objectives is provided in annex G.

33. Of the 38 regional and global projects operational during the period only six made any significant contribution to Zimbabwe mainly in the areas of livelihoods and conservation agriculture. Most of the projects in the Emergency component had several foci and were linked to other projects through either continuing or complimentary activities. For example, five projects funded by the EC had Input Distribution and Coordination and Monitoring activities that were either continuations of earlier projects in the same geographical areas or introduced new sites and/or activities. They focused on Vulnerable Rural Communal Households7 with an average of 0.5 ha and sufficient labour to cultivate 0.5 ha of cereals.

7 Priority is given to families with handicapped, chronically ill or disabled members; families with orphaned children, elderly and child-headed families, single women headed families, HHs affected by loss of harvested, livestock and other livelihood assets. Implementing Partners are NGOs and AGRITEX 13

34. For crop production interventions, the projects provided the same support over several seasons in the same geographical areas. This strategy was adopted as emergency projects are short-term and usually last for 12 months while support to crop production requires several seasons to ensure technologies introduced, such as conservation agriculture, are properly transferred to the beneficiary farmers8. This limitation has been recognized and several longer- term projects were successfully negotiated in 2010 to provide support to conservation agriculture considered to be both a core and a cross-cutting activity in the move towards increasing agricultural productivity.

35. Through its Coordination and Monitoring work, FAO provides information to help implementing partners (and the whole donor community) to conduct geographic and beneficiary targeting, select appropriate seed packs and timing of input delivery, identify urgent gaps and provide complementary assistance. Under the input distribution component, FAO has a gap filling role since it intervenes in areas where other donors are not present. It procures the inputs for distribution by the implementing partners (IP) and works to build and strengthen the capacity of the IP to deliver technical advice and extension services to farmers.

36. Emergency/non-emergency donor-funded versus regular program. The transition from emergency to development is managed through the emergency program due to the funding flows that come through the emergency support. As a result, the ERCU manages more than 90% of the field program. Programme support provided through the regular program budget is small with a 2011 budget of just over USD 500,000 and is dependent on TCP and telefood resources. In additional to the almost negligible external bi-lateral aid going through Government, other inhibiting factors to the growth of the non-emergency program include the weakened capacity of the Government institutions to respond to FAO requests for information or project proposals, their limited understanding of FAO’s mandate and appreciation of the Organization’s non-emergency activities.

37. Though the ERCU makes an effort to involve the Assistant FAOR (program) in developing interventions that are very clearly outside the emergency mandate, such as policy development, this is not systematic and consequently the expected synergies between the two components are not as strong as expected.

4.2 Funding and sources

38. Funding of the field program is through a number of traditional and non-traditional donors, collaboration with other UN Agencies and FAO’s regular program resources. As shown in Figure 1, with a contribution of USD 64 million, the EU is the biggest donor. It financed 10 projects representing 71% of the total portfolio budget, followed by USA (6.2%), the Netherlands (5.6%) and the UK (3.6). The 9 projects financed by FAO are all Technical Cooperation Projects.

4.3 Implementation of the portfolio

39. Project Status and Duration. Between 2006 and May 2010, 37 projects were approved that are included in this analysis. The majority of these projects (12) are still operationally active

8 The beneficiaries of these projects are whole communities (all farmers of the respective communities are invited to participate, poor and very poor families) based on minimum land and labour capacities. Slightly better off farmers are also included as they are required to participate as lead and model farmers who have a key role in the extension system and for the adoption of new technologies. Implementing partners are AGRITEX and NGOs 14

representing 69% of the total budget, 7 projects have completed their activities but are not yet financially closed (6% of total budget), 10 are financially closed (12% of total budget) and 8 are operationally closed (14% of total budget).

Figure 1: Total budget and number of projects by Donor

Source: Field Program Management Information System (FPMIS)

40. The Evaluation Mission noted that of the six on-going TCP projects one had an NTE of 2009, without any expenditure in 2010 indicating that action to close the project is significantly delayed. For the emergency program, of the 15 projects listed as on-going, seven had NTEs in 2009 and of these, four had expenditures in 2010. This indicates delayed implementation and late reporting to donor partners which will further delay project closure.

41. The average life of a project is 18 months. There are five projects lasting more than 24 months; 16 projects with an average duration between 12 and 24 months, and 16 projects lasting 12 months or less.

IV. Evaluation Results

1. Relevance

1.1. Alignment with Government

42. Alignment with GNU policies and plans. With its priority interventions aimed at improving national food security by focusing on agricultural input support, conservation agriculture, crop diversification, animal production and health, and mainstreaming HIV and AIDS, FAO’s program is highly aligned to and coherent with the policy of the GNU. The Government’s Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) covered the period February to December 2009 and is superseded by the Medium Term Plan (MTP 2010-2015). Both policy documents recognize agriculture as one of the priority sectors, especially because of its lead role in food security and nutrition.

43. The adoption by the GNU of the STERP and MTP established for FAO’s program conditions for alignment that were lacking in the period 2006-2008. In fact, all FAO’s activities under implementation when STERP was adopted were coherent with Government’s agenda, and those that were designed later are fully aligned with this agenda. In principle, most of FAO’s current activities in Zimbabwe can be considered to contribute to food security and nutrition because they address issues of availability, access or utilization of food. A significant number of projects explicitly mention improving food security and/or nutrition as an objective. These interventions fall broadly under the headings of a) information systems for food security, b) support for policy & normative guidance and c) interventions that support chronically and acutely food insecure households.

44. However, the mission found that the lack of a national FSN policy and strategy is a constraint with respect to optimizing the alignment of FAO’s work to Government priorities. FAO appears to have tried to help fill this gap through support for the development of related strategies such as the Draft National Policy on Drought Management and National Smallholder Input Support Program for Food Security. However, these frameworks are insufficient for tackling chronic food and nutrition insecurity. FAO has been involved in recent discussions on the process and format for the FSN policy – and now need to bring their considerable global experience in supporting the development of national FSN related policies, strategies and programs to the table in support of articulating a well-developed institutionalized approach to social protection for non-economically viable households, asset building for subsistence farming households, and market-oriented growth strategies for the segment of society that has both access to productive assets (in particular good quality land) and capacity to invest in agriculture.

45. With regard to gender, attainment of gender equity is given priority in the STERP. A gender policy was developed as well as a national gender policy implementation strategy and workplan (2008-2012) in order to operationalise gender mainstreaming perspectives in national development. The Government through the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development has seconded gender focal points in all the Ministries including Ministry of Agriculture to spearhead gender mainstreaming activities in a bid to attain gender equity across all the sectors. The existence of a national gender institutional and coordination machinery is an enabling factor that can be tapped for programming. However despite the national context. FAO’s alignment to Government’s gender policy remains weak as it has not adopted a deliberate and planned approach for gender equity in its strategic policy and programming processes.

46. Relevance to the Government’s agriculture sector development priorities. Consulted government authorities and partner services indicated that FAO’s Program remained relevant throughout the period covered by this Evaluation, adding that FAO’s projects were able to fill the gaps in agricultural extension. However, as far as Government priorities in the Agriculture sector is concerned, the conditions for alignment are weak because of the absence of an official Agriculture Sector Policy. The Mission was informed that the Draft 1 “Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Policy” of 2009, is not yet finalized nor in the public domain. The format of FAO’s interventions is based on a broad consensus between it and MoAMID. According to the Draft NMTPF 2009-2013 that reflects this consensus, the priority interventions are: enhancing the policy and macro-environment, improving incentives, inputs and services, and strengthening institutions and the operational framework.

47. With regard to livestock sector, FAO’s interventions are highly relevant to the needs of livestock keepers and the country at large. They were designed with the objective of saving/ protecting livestock assets, livelihoods and human life. They consisted mainly in vaccinations (against FMD, ND, Anthrax, Rabies), surveillance and resuscitating of dipping services. They focused on important livestock (cattle, small ruminants, and poultry) and on priority diseases (FMD, ND, Avian Influenza). However, there was a lack of focus on other livestock, other diseases and on livestock production. In particular, there was little attention on small ruminants (especially goats) largely owned by small holders and vulnerable groups.

48. While FAO’s Program is aligned with Government priorities, there is scope for further alignment with Government systems at implementation level. FAO has done some effort to align its Zimbabwe Program with Government systems. It provided assistance to agriculture policy process by funding consultant studies. It supported the elaboration of Zimbabwe’s position as a contribution to SADC agricultural policy and funded the workshop to launch Zimbabwe CAADP process. Its projects are executed mostly withr AGRITEX and the Veterinary Department which appreciate the support received and are satisfied with the schedules and quality of implementation. FAO has played an active role in coordination working groups, particularly the ACWG. This role allowed it to bring together different stakeholders within the agriculture cluster/sector under the Agriculture Coordination Working Group (ACWG) and related technical sub-working groups. It is seen as being highly relevant to the needs of Government, donors and implementing organizations with respect to providing a forum for information sharing, learning and coordinating responses. However, there is no mechanism yet to ensure similar coordination at sub-national levels where project implementation takes place.

49. FAO could have further optimized alignment with Government systems if it had formalized the involvement of AGRITEX in the implementation of field activities, with higher coordination responsibility at provincial and district levels. This would have strengthened the capacity of AGRITEX. Instead, to implement these activities FAO contracted, for example, NGOs and Farmers Unions whose normal mission is not project implementers. An opportunity of working more closely with and through AGRITEX structure was therefore missed. This led to parallel extension structures with varying practices, and to a certain disabling of extension services 9.

9 In relation to alignment, the last part of DAC Principle 7 states: “Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these”. www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates. 17

50. The Mission understood that it is due to the Government and Donors relation context that FAO did not optimize alignment with Government systems as far as implementation is concerned. Indeed FAO Program in Zimbabwe is largely donor-driven, and in the context of the period covered by this Evaluation, there was a risk of falling out with donors if there was more alignment with Government systems. The consequence of this high donor-driveness is that FAO cannot be in full control of the separation between emergency work and development work. There are exceptions in which donors have been more flexible. For example, the animal health program is closely aligned with Government’s veterinary systems as, in addition to strengthening them, it is implemented through the veterinary services. Another exception is the close collaboration with ZimVac to strengthen the capacity for collecting Food Security and Nutrition data and support for the Food and Nutrition Council in order to address an important priority for improving integrated FSN analysis and related decision-making. Among field project, Project OSRO/ZIM/906/NET was exemplary in alignment with AGRITEX at all levels. In its implementation, AGRITEX was co-responsible with FAO for the achievement of results. However, it is for this relatively weak alignment with Government systems that FAO could not play a role in supporting Zimbabwe’s CAADP process and objectives beyond funding a workshop. For the same reason it could not play an advocacy role of raising the awareness of donors on the need to transition from humanitarian assistance to improving capacity and development.

51. One of the consequences of the weak alignment with Government systems is that certain key activities like conservation agriculture are not implemented in an appropriate institutional framework but through multiple uncoordinated structures, which leads in some cases to duplication at district level. Although there are relations with AGRITEX, they remain ad hoc as they are not formalized and future-looking. This is important because it relates to the sustainability of results. In this situation, FAO cannot use its interaction with the Ministry of Agriculture to have a strong position on policy dialogue with Government on all issues including land tenure, and to influence sectoral policies.

1.2 Coherence with ZUNDAF 2007-2011

52. It should be recalled here that ZUNDAF is a product of a consultative exercise involving GoZ, the UNCT, the international partners and the civil society organizations. In the absence of an agricultural sector strategy and an official CPF, the ZUNDAF filled an alignment gap in the period preceding the STERP. FAO’s interventions were aligned with ZUNDAF 2007-2011 even before the STERP was adopted. The ZUNDAF identified outcomes fot which FAO was most concerned under Outcome 6 “Improved access to food security and sustainable management of natural resources and the environment”. In general there is a fair degree of coherence between the Draft CPF, PoA and ZUNDAF with respect to the approach to food security. The coherence with ZUNDAF strengthens the complementarity between FAO’s Program with the work of other UN agencies involved in humanitarian and development programs. By its involvement in inputs distribution, FAO addressed important needs that other humanitarian aid agencies do not address.

1.3 Coherence of CPF with FAO’s corporate strategy

53. In addition to the absence of an explicit GoZ policy on the Agriculture sector, FAO’s Draft CPF is itself an unofficial frame. For operational purposes, the TCE’s Zimbabwe “Plan of Action 2010-2015” fills the gap as it covers more than 90% of FAO’s activities in Zimbabwe, and establishes a good link with ZUNDAF. It makes a good diagnostic of key challenges and issues facing the country’s agricultural development, including land issues. Also good is its diagnostic of environmental issues relating to sustainable land management (SLM). It notes for example that increasing poverty is fuelling resource over-exploitation, widespread deforestation,

uncontrolled veld fires, land clearing for crop production. Among the priority interventions, it lists a number of strategies at policy level, but there is no mention of streamlining SLM in FAO’s projects.

54. However the overall food security strategy remains quite vague due to a lack of sufficient disaggregated livelihood analysis to help hone interventions to the specific needs of different groups10. The PoA also oversimplifies the analysis of constraints by looking almost exclusively at the individual level. The CPF priority interventions largely reflect a focus on the organizations’ “core functions”11 while the PoA approaches program design uses a logic model framework – making it difficult to understand how the PoA will be used to operationalise the overall strategic vision represented in the CPF. A strategic approach builds on lessons learned and good practice identified through M&E efforts. Neither the CPF nor the PoA sheds any light on how FAO’s past experience in food security and nutrition is being used to focus on the most effective interventions and channels for providing assistance.

55. As far as food security is concerned, reducing hunger is one of FAO’s corporate goals and reflects the organizations’ commitment to support the MDGs and member country priorities reflected through regional initiatives and organizations such as NEPAD and SADC. However, while the ZUNDAF 2007-2011 identifies improved food security as one of six priority outcomes, the draft CPF 2009-2013 takes a sectorial perspective demonstrating inadequate analysis of the distribution and underlying causes of poverty and food insecurity. The CPF identifies food insecurity as a key challenge but defines this principally as a problem of domestic grain production. The issues of food consumption and nutrition are not identified at all within the document. The so-called “food security” framework indicated in Annex 1 of the CPF identifies priority FAO interventions in the following areas:

− Reviewing agriculture and land policies − Formulating and implementing drought mitigation (including irrigation and water harvesting) strategies − Improving farmers access to finance/credit (in particular for women and youth) − Enhancing access to agricultural inputs − Strengthening extension and research and diversification of crop and livestock production systems − Strengthening farmers organizations − Improving pest management and reducing post-harvest losses − Establishing an agricultural management information system

56. The FAO Plan of Action 2010-2015 has a goal statement that includes the concepts of improved food security, livelihoods, incomes, health status and nutrition – realized through improved production and sustainable management of natural resources.

1.4 Relevance to beneficiary groups needs

57. The relevance of the program is weakened by lack of an integrative approach to adequately link Crop – livestock – tree production. FAO’s Zimbabwe program is clearly relevant to the needs of smallholder famers as a large group of primary beneficiaries needing to rehabilitate crop production in a period of economic meltdown and decline of agriculture

10 Zimbabwe Livelihood Zone Profiles. ZimVac/FNC. February 2010. 11 Information and knowledge, development of norms and standards, policy assistance, capacity building,

development. By focusing on some of the immediate causes of decline of agricultural productivity, such as agricultural inputs shortages and inappropriate farm management technologies, FAO’s interventions address poverty through increased crop yields, improved animal health and input and output market linkages.

58. The projects target low-income farming populations whose livelihoods normally depend on several areas of production on the farm, including crop, livestock, home production (fruit trees, vegetables).To be fully relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries, an integrated model covering crop production, livestock, trees and woodlots, home vegetable garden and market linkages ought to be implemented but this approach was used by only some projects. Generally projects cover one area, such as crop production or animal health, because of funding constraints.

59. The relevance is further weakened by lack of specific and systematic criteria for targeting. The Mission noted a lack of rigor in differentiating target groups within the larger beneficiary group of SHFs. Targeting is understood by the Mission as the extent to which certain groups of beneficiaries who are poorer or socially marginalized are given more benefit from planned interventions, and this planning addresses their specific development needs and constraints in the context of existing power relations and social exclusion factors. Though the Mission recognizes that enforcing individual eligibility criteria may be politically contentious and managerially difficult, it finds that FAO’s program targeting approach is very broad. With regard to primary stakeholders, the projects focus on a strategy of intervention that is uniquely relevant for smallholder farmers taken as a large homogeneous group. For example, women are not specifically targeted, and the interventions do not undertake detailed gender assessments and develop necessary targeting criteria to give special consideration to women-headed households. The extension approach is the same to farms with 1 ha or less of land or more than 5 ha.

60. The effects of projects promoting CA as a labour-intensive technology in its initial stage on labour-scarce households and the consequences for gender have not been analysed. The reading of the project documents does not show specific concern on such differentiation within the larger beneficiary group of SHFs. They do not provide an operational categorization of beneficiaries according to their particular constraints, resources and needs. There is no wealth or vulnerability ranking. While beneficiary assessments are undertaken, no sample surveys are undertaken to generate baseline data at the start of the project or at mid-point of the project to measure change. It is therefore difficult to assess target group involvement and the corresponding poverty and assets impacts. Although potential targeting issues (such as gender, HIV and AIDS, women-headed or child-headed households) may be mentioned they are not taken into account in action design and in implementation. Where the project documents provided a clear definition of target groups, there was no description of mechanisms for reaching them during the implementation.

61. Because of the importance of targeting for a stronger relevance, the Mission looked at how project documents included targeting approaches and criteria in activity design. Results show that although generally targeting was poorly clarified in projects documents, some projects made an effort to define criteria during the implementation. For example, the following criteria were adopted for the selection of beneficiaries for the European Union Food Facility (EUFF) component of project OSRO/ZIM/906/NET:

− Families with access to land for planting (at least 0.6 to 1 ha of arable land); − Families with the potential to fully utilize the inputs (e.g. not too old, too ill, not enough labour to carry out proper agronomic activities like weeding on the area to be planted or any other condition that could make it difficult for good utilization of inputs); and

− Families that could afford or had other means of accessing inputs or were getting inputs from other.

62. These criteria were even further fine-tuned to allow giving priority to families as follows:

− Families with handicapped, chronically ill or disabled members; − Families with orphaned children; − Elderly and child-headed families (household head above the age of 60 or below 16); − Single woman-headed families; − Households affected by loss of harvest, livestock and other livelihood assets.

63. In the project document of OSRO/ZIM/402/UK, FAO was emphatic in recognizing targeting as a fundamental area of the humanitarian interventions that requires comprehensive action. FAO planned not only to take a central role in co-coordinating NGOs in the selection of geographical target locations for the provision of assistance, but also to take a lead role on the issue of household targeting and to identify more locally specific needs/requirements, find gaps in assistance, recommend priorities for intervention, and propose strategies for actions. Among the criteria needing greater focus were HIV and AIDS, and gender related issues.

64. The Mission recognizes that in the political context, FAO had to walk on a tight rope in order to avoid being accused of a politically biased targeting. However, while it is difficult to exclude some households as ineligible, it is possible to make sure that the specific needs and constraints of the more vulnerable households are taken into account in the design of solutions. Care needs to be taken to ensure that targeting criteria are not internally inconsistent.

2. Effectiveness

2.1. Program coverage and content

65. The Mission found that FAO’s Zimbabwe program in the period under Evaluation shows a logical synergy between existing and new interventions, in both geographical and content terms. In the area of agricultural input distribution which is the backbone of the Program, there is much synergy with regards to the definition of the objectives and outputs of the projects. With regard to the thematic coverage, FAO Zimbabwe Program comprises agricultural input support, promotion of crop diversification and market Linkages for SHFs, animal production and health, mainstreaming of HIV & AIDS, nutrition, forestry, agricultural and food security related information systems. While this listing covers key rural sectors in the context of Zimbabwe, the problem identified is in the allocation of resources to each theme which is linked to funding availability. There is a considerable imbalance in the thematic and sub-sectoral allocation of funding as far as integrated solutions of addressing the tangle of needs at household level are concerned. These needs are more than agricultural inputs.

66. In relation to geographical coverage, the Mission heard concerns about overlaps of FAO’s projects in some locations. There are projects that operate in the same district without clear criteria to differentiate their target groups and without seeking to harmonize their approaches and to synergize their action. Another concern relating to the wide geographical coverage is the multiplicity of extension structures which are neither coordinated among themselves nor coordinated by AGRITEX. This links to a challenging situation that Government’s structures will face when they will have to take over the post-project extension services in order to sustain the results of the completed projects.

67. FAO’s Zimbabwe Program is commendable for its success in achieving a harmonious and non-controversial geographic coverage and in linking to the poor SHFs during a politically difficult time context. However the national coverage of operations did not create synergies between projects to use and scale up experience that each one generates. Instead, with the exception of the promotion of CA that concerned all input distribution projects, the Program followed a “patchwork approach” in line with the source of project funding. Hence for example, some interesting experiences in the areas of animal health, linkage of SHFs to markets, integrated natural resource management, are not adequately exchanged between projects for their wider use.

2.2 Accomplishment of development objectives

2.2.1 Food security and nutrition

68. Objectives and key activities. Over the past five years, FAO has provide continuous support to the agricultural information system, assisting the MoAMID to collect, analyze and disseminate information on crop production and to some extent market prices and functioning. This has included annual crop assessments (including CFSAMs in 4 of the past 5 years) which have fed into broader food security assessments undertaken by the FNC/ZIMVAC. FAO has also been a regular participant in the UNICEF-lead nutrition cluster and was an important partner in the 2010 national nutrition survey. Other efforts by FAO to improve the quality of information and analysis on food security and nutrition have included introducing the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) to stakeholders at national and subnational levels as well as developing a concept note for an initiative to strengthen the capacity of the FNC.

69. With respect to policy and normative support, within the context of FAO technical assistance for the formulation of the HIV/AIDS in Agriculture Strategy, FAO mainstreamed nutrition messages into both the strategy and in the subsequent capacity building programme. In collaboration with UNICEF and the FNC, FAO prepared training material called the Healthy Harvest for community level extension workers on growing, preparing, and processing nutritious foods. This is accompanied by the For Healthy Eating recipe book. Together with the Ministry of Education, FAO developed a manual entitled “A Practical Guide on School Gardens in Zimbabwe”. Finally, FAO produced a trainers guide on solar drying for fruits and vegetables and a manual on post harvest processing of cassava.

70. To help households manage climatic risks, a national policy on drought management was drafted with FAO support in 2008.started to introduce drought resistant crops such as cassava and small grains. At community level FAO together with implementing partners has promoted improved household food consumption through projects that have focused on horticultural production with respect to: • Establishing school gardens (50) in a joint initiative with UNICEF, MoA, and the MoE. • Support for community gardens with a number of implementing partners. nutrition.\ • Information, education, communication activities related to HIV/AIDS and nutrition in the context of FAO supported crop production related activities e.g. CA

71. Targeting. The PoA identifies vulnerable households and more economically viable smallholder farmers as FAO’s main target group. It describes vulnerable groups as being those with deficient adult labour at household level. For the more economically viable smallholder farmers, constraints to productivity include lack of knowledge and extraneous factors such as uncertain land tenure, weak markets and lack of investment. There is an implicit assumption made that this group only needs to intensify and diversify their production in order to enjoy improved income, food security and nutrition. Lastly, the MoAMID is seen as an important target

group in terms of strengthening capacity for the collection and analysis of agricultural information to support decision making related to transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance.

72. FAO was effective in focusing on satisfying smallholder farmers households staple food needs. The period covered by this Evaluation was characterized by important food shortages. The Mission finds that FAO’s program was effective in providing support to address those shortages. However interventions often promoted exclusively maize production which was observed not to be a viable crop in a number of the project locations visited – potentially creating undesirable risks for smallholder farmer beneficiaries. Small grains and cassava have been introduced quite late in semi-arid areas and little attention has been paid to diversification of food production (including livestock) that would strengthen coping strategies during drought years.

73. Improved food availability and access (rather than food consumption and reduced hunger) have been the most common explicit objectives amongst FAO interventions12. Interviews with different stakeholders revealed that the term food security in FAO and within Zimbabwe more generally is largely understood as self-sufficiency at household level in staple food production. This is an inadequate definition that largely ignores access (market/household income) issues as well as issues of nutritional quality and acceptability of food available and consumed13.

74. Amongst the most effective projects as far as nutrition focus is concerned, the main activity has been gardens (school, community, and homestead) with the stated result being improved access to nutritious foods, nutritional intakes and nutrition. Again the focus has been on increasing the availability of vegetables & fruits rather than on improving consumption – and nutrition education is not an explicit activity within these projects. The approaches that have been designed to address nutrition (i.e. to change knowledge attitudes and practices through institutionalized training channels such as schools and colleges) have been appropriate. However, the mission finds it a missed opportunity that FAO was not able to go forward with a TCP request from the Ministry of Education for funding for supporting the development of a nutrition curriculum in schools (follow up to the 50 school pilot school gardens project). As an important means of improving incomes and stabilizing food consumption throughout the year, the mission also finds that FAO has not paid enough attention to food conservation/processing14.

75. FAO has been effective in its support to collection and analysis of agricultural information to support decision making. Over the past five years, FAO has provide continuous support to the agricultural information system, assisting the MoAMID to collect, analyse and disseminate information on crop production and to some extent market prices and functioning. This has included annual crop assessments (including CFSAMs in 4 of the past 5 years) which have fed into broader food security assessments undertaken by the FNC/ZimVac.

12 TCE’s new results based integrated planning and monitoring tool makes the overarching food and nutrition security goal statement and indicators (including food consumption) required and explicit. 13 The review of FAO Role in Coordination (Kudzai and Borrel Dec 2010) similarly found that the ACWG and its sub working groups have not been able to articulate how agricultural interventions are contributing to improved dietary diversity and nutrition. 14 Exceptions: A manual on cassava post-harvest storage, processing and value addition was prepared by MoAMID and FAO in 2010. However this manual missed the opportunity of stressing the nutritional value of consuming the cassava leaves which are very high in iron. A regional project (OSRO/RAF/510/SAF) included small scale activities in Zimbabwe for the promotion of solar drying in Bikita/Mashvingo. 23

Information collected has been analysed and discussed within the FAO-lead agricultural coordination working group (ACWG) and related sub-committees (including the nutrition gardens WG). FAO has also been a regular participant in the UNICEF nutrition cluster and was an important partner in the 2010 national nutrition survey. Other efforts by FAO to improve the quality of information and analysis on food security and nutrition have included introducing the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) to stakeholders at national and subnational levels as well as developing a concept note for an initiative to strengthen the capacity of the FNC.

76. The policy environment was strengthened by FAO’s normative support and agricultural information produced by MoAMID . With respect to policy and normative support, within the context of FAO technical assistance for the formulation of the HIV and AIDS in Agriculture Strategy, FAO mainstreamed nutrition messages into both the strategy and in the subsequent capacity building program. A national policy on drought management was drafted with FAO support in 2008. In collaboration with UNICEF and the FNC, FAO prepared training material called the Healthy Harvest for community level extension workers on growing, preparing, and processing nutritious foods. This is accompanied by the For Healthy Eating recipe book. Together with the Ministry of Education, FAO developed a manual entitled “A Practical Guide on School Gardens in Zimbabwe”. Finally, FAO produced a trainer's guide on solar drying for fruits and vegetables and a manual on post-harvest processing of cassava.

77. To help households manage climatic risks, FAO has started to introduce drought resistant crops such as cassava and small grains. At community level FAO together with implementing partners has promoted improved household food consumption through projects that have focused on horticultural production with respect to:

− Establishing school gardens (50) in a joint initiative with UNICEF, MoAMID, and MoE. − Support for community gardens with a number of implementing partners. − Information, education, communication activities related to HIV and AIDS and nutrition in the context of FAO supported crop production related activities e.g. CA

78. FAO has been a regular contributor to the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac) throughout the period under review – and has worked to support early warning and crop information within the agriculture sector. Both of these activities have been important in terms of increasing the availability of quality information for decision making. In the national nutrition survey 2010, FAO brought its comparative advantage to bear through its participation in working groups insofar as aspects of food availability were brought into the survey instrument and design.

79. Stakeholders interviewed during the mission indicated that the agricultural production information being produced by MoAMID was quite good – in large part due to the capacity building efforts of FAO. In the past, FAO provided refresher training, supported data gathering and analysis and provided materials for AGRITEX staff at district level to undertake crop production assessments. In 2011, the Minister of Agriculture announced that no external agency support would be needed for the current year exercise. Interviews at district level indicate that while technical skills are present amongst government staff (and the recent distribution of hardware i.e. computers and bicycles by FAO is highly appreciated), morale is quite low due to the lack of incentives provided to staff. Some concern was expressed that this could result in lower reliability of the data and serves to highlight the fact that technical capacity is only one element contributing to effectiveness.

80. The data being gathered by AGRITEX and the ZimVac are cited extensively by Government, donors and implementing agencies and are being used for policy and programming. Annual needs assessments feed in systematically to annual funding appeals

which have been successful in raising an average of 25 million USD each year for agricultural assistance to small holder farmers in Zimbabwe15. However, while food security information has been used for decision making with respect to relief provision, there is not yet enough analysis of the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity that would inform development efforts. To complement food production data, market information has also been systematically been collected. Market analysis is provided to ACWG members however other “users” have not been targeted. In particular farmers have not been seen as important decision-makers to be served by the market information system.

81. With respect to FAO normative support, a recent independent review of the Healthy Harvest initiative looked at effectiveness in terms of the quality of the manual itself, the change in knowledge attitudes and practices of persons trained, and the extent to which the initiative contributes to the national agenda on nutrition. Overall the material was found to be good16 and participants demonstrated pre/post training changes in knowledge. However, while trainees reported using their new knowledge in their work at community and household levels, participants indicated that training/facilitator materials were needed to help them to use the materials more effectively and no M&E system was put into place to allow for the verification of the cascade of information to community level.

82. Worth mentioning is a relatively new joint initiative to strengthen the analysis capacity of the Food and Nutrition Council. Currently at the design stage, FAO, WFP and UNICEF have supported consultancies to undertake an analysis of the capacity of the existing institutions collecting and analysing food and nutrition security in Zimbabwe and to propose a revised structure, institutional set-up and conceptual framework for undertaking food and nutrition analysis. The mission found this initiative to be laudable with the potential to contribute to policy and program related decision making with respect to food insecurity and malnutrition in the country. Stakeholders interviewed, however, cautioned that chronic food insecurity should be the main focus of analysis and some skepticism was expressed about the suitability and added value of the IPC as an analytical framework in this context.

83. Could FAO have been more effective? While FAO support for information systems related to agriculture, food and nutrition security have been quite effective, the mission notes that little technical backstopping has been received and interviews at country level and in the Regional Emergency Office for Southern Africa (REOSA) indicate that current thinking at FAO HQ is not well connected to the field resulting in inadequate synergies and application of lessons learned. For example, while efforts have been made to promote the Integrated Phase Classification for Food Security (IPC) as a specific analytical framework, other efforts such as the development of a FAO corporate strategy for ISFNS and technical tools and guidance on topics such as disaster risk management, livelihood assessment toolkit (LAT), measurement of access to food (HDDS), remote sensing for early warning, etc. have not been made accessible to the FAO Zimbabwe program. This gap should be quickly addressed given FAO’s current efforts to develop a broader program of support for the Food and Nutrition Council.

2.2.2 Sustainable Land Management and Conservation Agriculture

15 Agriculture Cluster Programs Overview. Program Based Consolidated Appeal Process. Zimbabwe 2011. 16 However, a gap was noted in terms of inclusion of livestock and the contribution of animals to nutrition. 25

(a) Sustainable Land Management (SLM)

84. What is Sustainable Land Management (SLM) and how does FAO practice it in Zimbabwe? SLM is defined by TerrAfrica17 as the adoption of land use systems that, through appropriate management practices, enables land users to maximize the economic and social benefits from the land while maintaining or enhancing the ecological support functions of the land resources. According to TerrAfrica, SLM encompasses or contributes to other established approaches such as sustainable agriculture and rural development, integrated natural resources management, and ecosystem management and involves a holistic approach to achieving productive and healthy ecosystems by integrating social, economic, physical and biological needs and values. SLM is therefore a good response to the problems of land degradation.

85. Key land degradation and management problems in Zimbabwe include deforestation , unsustainable farming , forest fires, and inadequate exploitation of range resources. They are aggravated by inappropriate policies, inadequate investment in SLM as defined above, and unresolved land tenure problems and climate factors such as recurrent droughts. In FAO Program in Zimbabwe, responses to land degradation problems are not designed in a comprehensive manner for lack of a landscape planning approach. However there are project activities relating to SLM, which fit under “Sustainable Management of Natural Resources and the Environment” , which is one of the priority interventions of the Draft CPF. This document identifies the following priority areas:

− Enhancing the capacity of the MoAMID, MLLRR and ME&T in agro-ecological methodology, land evaluation and land use planning; − Strengthening the capacity of stakeholders on sustainable use of limited indigenous resources; − Development and implementation of a fire strategy; − Development and implementation of a community-based wildlife conflict management strategy. − Strengthening the capacity of ME&T to mainstream Multilateral Environmental Agreements related to the food and agriculture sector into national policies, plans and programs.

86. Of the priority issues identified by the CPF in its annexes, the following are relevant to the above area:

− Increasing area under irrigation − Improving sustainable farming systems − Enhancing the Natural Resource Management Policy Environment − Enhancing land and environment information management systems.

87. There are no specific interventions focusing on SLM but there are projects on improving sustainable farming systems. Although there are no projects focusing specifically on SLM, many projects provide support for SLM technologies that contribute to reduction of land degradation. An example of such technologies is CA which has the potential to reverse land degradation, thus establishing the foundations for SLM practices at farm level, while promoting sustainable livelihoods. Perhaps the best cases are the projects funded by Spain which, in addition to CA, have been successful in applying a model integrating important components of land use to improve farming systems and achieve food security. OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA

17 FAO (2008). TerrAfrica - A Vision paper for Sustainable Land Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. 26

“Enhancing Productivity for Communal Farmers in Zimbabwe, through Advanced Land Use and Management Practices”; implemented by SAT in Kadoma, is the third project financed by Spain on this theme. One of ten project outputs is “Planting of 15 000 tree seedlings to improve reforestation”, and the 10 th is “All participating farmers are trained and supported to execute improved crop, gardening and livestock management methods”. Among its activities are the following:

− Plan holistic approach to improving livelihoods of entire community through crop scheme, nutritional gardens, livestock and reforestation. − Introduce and implement improved farming methods (CF/CA); − Establishment of irrigation infrastructure at all garden sites, training and practicing in agroforestry and reforestation − Training and outreach programs on crops, horticulture and animal husbandry.

88. The project and the two previous operations are unique among FAO’s agriculture development projects in supporting an integrated range of agricultural development activities. These include small scale vegetable production to enhance household food security and to earn additional income and a livestock component. For those households with cattle and goats the project supports improvement of livestock genetics. Interventions for those without cattle take the form of assistance to poultry activities. The project also has a reforestation component but its implementation has not satisfactorily taken off.

89. The Mission visited the Project area in Kadoma. It observed that there is considerable success in interventions that integrate livestock in the food production systems. The main activities include training, contract farming, and poultry. Range is communally owned but not managed. By artificial insemination activities, the project is infusing improved genetic material in local cattle using Boran, Brahma and Beefmaster, but there is no development of markets for livestock.

90. Discussions with farmers revealed that they are happy with the support the project provides on crop production, livestock genetic improvement and poultry. On the crop side, the project’s achievements include support to more than 700 households for crop production and market linkage. The project also encourages farmers to work together to implement CA. In these groups, farmers are taught to run their farms as a business. The crops practiced are sugar beans, cotton and contracted sorghum seed crop. A market for cowpeas was found. Vegetable production in nutrition gardens is contributing to improving nutrition and income. The support to horticultural production involves more than 300 beneficiaries and a total area of about 1.6 ha.

91. With regard to livestock, the farmers mentioned that purchase of livestock receives priority for the use of net household income after paying school fees for children. They are quite attracted by rearing of broilers and layers as they see a tremendous potential of poultry development and the possibility to add value to maize crop of their production by feeding chicken and selling broilers and eggs.

92. In spite of a good approach, project OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA lacks a clear building blocks implementation strategy for Advanced Land Use and Management Practices . While achievements in crop production and livestock are satisfactory, there are mixed results as far as effectiveness in reaching sustainable land management results is concerned. Regarding range condition for example, there is a need to improve the all-year round quality of range. There is encroachment by Acacia, Lantana, but the project was unable to quantify this problem to the Mission and to provide information on what is planned to control this invasion. Although collaboration with local AGRITEX staff is good, effective engagement and participation of

provincial level Government structures in co-steering the model implementation is lacking. The different technical directorates of different ministries such as livestock, forestry, irrigation, are not required to provide technical support and quality assurance. Although the project encourages the formation of farmers groups, there is no strategic work of developing farmers’ institutions for savings and marketing, that can also negotiate with third parties on behalf of their members for services.

93. FAO’s strategic documents recognize problems of land degradation but the program has been only partially effective in providing responses. One of the problems of land degradation is low fertility of cultivated soils. About 70 per cent of Zimbabwe is covered by sandy soils, with low cation exchange capacity due to low clay and organic matter content. When cultivated, these soils become deficient in nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. In addition, the sandy soils are generally acidic. These problems characterize particularly soils on the communal lands. As these soils are inherently of low fertility and subject to rapid depletion in fertility, their intensive use for crop production requires increasing organic matter content and regular applications of fertilizers are necessary. Another problem of land degradation that was already mentioned above is deforestation. Loss of tree vegetation has increased at an alarming rate in recent years in and around farmer resettlement areas. Among the drivers of deforestation are the needs for fuelwood and construction material, opening new farming areas, unmanaged range resource use and illegal squatting of public forests, including national parks.

94. Water management and irrigation development . Small-scale irrigation development is a good strategy for agricultural growth, and production diversification and intensification. Many analysts met believe that small water management and irrigation schemes helped farmers obtain two crops rather than one per year and increased yields, while reducing the cost of production per ha and per unit of labour. FAO’s interventions of the last five years have not assessed opportunities for water harvesting in drought-prone areas, for example in AEZ IIb and III or drier. Some projects that target these zones have considered water management only in a limited way for nutrition gardening, and there is no support given to target communities to improve water resources management in a wider landscape resource management approach. The Mission visited areas where project supported vegetable gardens are competing with livestock and home needs for water. To development sustainable agriculture in drier AEZ, the optimization of the use of scarce water resources is of strategic importance, and efficiency of water use is essential to develop community resilience to climate variability.

95. Enhancing the Natural Resource Management Policy Environment. With Projects TCP/ZIM/3102 “Reducing forest fire emergencies during winter 2008 and beyond through stakeholder dialogue and preparedness” and TCP/ZIM/3301 “Securing farming systems and livelihoods in communal lands adjacent to Protected Areas through human and wildlife conflicts management” FAO was effective in assisting the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (a) to reduce fire occurrence and damages in gazetted forests and forest plantations of some provinces; (b) reduce agricultural losses in rural areas adjacent to Protected Areas while biodiversity is preserved. FAO provided also support to Zimbabwe Forest Commission to implement the first phase of the Zimbabwe National Forest Facility project. The partnership agreement was signed between FAO and the Government in 2009.

96. In general, FAO was not effective in addressing forest resource management policy issues. The Mission recognizes that there are crucial issues in the forestry sector that were neglected in spite of their importance. In the framework of implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Program Development, one of the major concerns is the possible environmental degradation due to the influx of settlers particularly to A1 resettlement areas. A1 settlers do not necessarily have experience in institutionalized forest resource management. This became a problem in some contexts around the national parks where conservation strategies and park

and natural resource integrity were threatened. In addition, many A1 migrants engage in non- agricultural livelihood strategies such as sale of fuel wood, which if uncontrolled, may result in overharvesting of the forests.

97. There is no specific study that provides a good understanding of the changing relationships between rural society in Zimbabwe and the forests in the framework of the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reform Program Development and implementation of a fire strategy. No information in the framework of FAO’s program is available on how much forest area was lost to Fast-Track resettlement, and what the environmental and biodiversity conservation implications are. In an interesting meeting the Mission had with representatives of various forestry and environment agencies, participants showed a realization that in recent years the fate of forests has been largely determined by factors outside forests and the forestry sector. On the other hand, the Mission got an impression of disconnect of FAO with this alarming problematic. On the key issues of inter-sectoral linkages involving forestry, FAO’s strategic documents are silent. On a crucial issue like the alarming rate of deforestation, FAO Representation gives the impression that politically it is neither feasible nor practical to consider the extent and the impacts of deforestation in Zimbabwe. When in one debriefing to FAO staff the Mission presented FAO’s own data on the rate of deforestation in Zimbabwe, the information came as a total surprise to the FAOR who asked for caution in presenting that kind of data.

98. Without timely reviews of the country’s forest issues, FAO has not been effective in facilitating policy reviews and reforms as far as linkages between forest sector, food security, and the agriculture and livestock sectors are concerned.

99. Enhancing land and environment information management systems. With regard to land related aspects such as land tenure, access to land resources, land information management systems, FAO has not had any involvement in the period covered by this Evaluation. It did not use its privileged position as a trusted organization that is viewed by its partners as apolitical. This trust would have given it the strength to be involved in providing information and advice to government on land tenure and land administration in contexts and on issues other than those relating to A1 and A2 farms. Development of the agriculture sector cannot be dissociated from land tenure issues.

100. Land issues. In the ZUNDAF, outputs for FAO on land issues include:

− FAO: (…) Strengthened land and property rights of women − FAO: Capacity of staff from MoAMID, MoLLRR and MoET strengthened in agro- ecological methodology, land evaluation and land-use planning. − UNDP/FAO: Land (including land-tenure security) policy reviewed and updated. − FAO/UNDP: Strengthened capacity of the MoAMID and Lands, Land Reform and Rural Resettlement and Environment and Tourism on information management.

101. FAO has not engaged on these issues. Although its strategy of avoiding issues relating to the politics of land reform was and remains wise, other land issues not related to land reform should not have been overlooked.

(b) Conservation Agriculture and Intensification of Agricultural production

102. Objectives and key activities. CA is based on the practice of three main principles: minimum soil disturbance, permanent soil cover and crop rotations. Although CA occupies a pivotal place in FAO’s program in Zimbabwe, no program-level objectives were defined for it. In fact there is no mention at all of CA as a major strategic activity in the Draft CPF. The PoA 2010-2015 mentions CA among FAO’s project activities in Zimbabwe as an example of activities

for the “enhancement of productivity for communal farmers in Zimbabwe through advanced land use and land management practices”. However, many projects have among their objectives promoting CA through training, provision of inputs, and extension. In addition to this, OSRO/ZIM/907/EC has among its objectives promotion of country-wide scaling-up of CA. All project sites are in communal farmer or old resettlement areas.

103. FAO’s projects were effective in using CA as a locomotive to improving farming practices. FAO’s Program promotes CA as an appropriate technology that can address some of the underlying crop management problems facing farmers with their degraded or degrading lands. When practiced to a high standard CA can significantly boost production and the livelihoods of farming households. In addition to the three main principles on which it is based, the promotion package comprises the following additional elements:

− Maize hybrid seeds; − Sugarbean, cowpea, or groundnut seeds; − Vegetable seeds; − Fertilizers (basal and top-dressing fertilizers).

104. Some projects provide, in addition, herbicides and lime. The adoption of CA principles is a non-negotiable condition for farmers participating in project activities. At farm level, the area supported per farmer is one hectare. Farmers generally receive inputs for a hectare of land split into: a third hectare of food grains (maize or sorghum), a third for a legume and a third for a cash crop. Through project support and adoption of CA to stabilize the fragile production environment, farmers are expected to increase yield levels of cereal crops (maize and sorghum) swiftly which will enable them to reduce the area under cereal without jeopardizing food security. Free land resources will then be used to produce legumes (a rotational crop) and an appropriate cash crop, enabling farmers to improve soil fertility and generate cash income.

105. Farmers are also provided with training and extension support on conservation agriculture (CA) practices. To demonstrate crop management techniques, beneficiary farmers visit demonstration plots on field days, and can get continuous support in the lifetime of FAO’s interventions. During field days the projects demonstrate various management practices, including correct land preparation, no-tillage seeding and seed saving, application of fertilizers, the importance of timely weeding, plant thinning, mulching, and compost making. On average, a beneficiary household gets support to manage one ha of its farm: 0.33 ha for staple food crop, 0.33 ha for legume and 0.33 ha for cash crop.

106. The supported area of one ha may be considered as appropriate for households with not more than two labour units and for small landholdings. This is definitely not so for larger than 2 ha, and those having more than 2 labour units or means to hire labour, though after a few years CA is less labour demanding than traditional agriculture.

107. The vast geographic spread of FAO’s CA activities, with near national coverage has given a boost to an effective way of transforming farming practices in a relatively short time. The approach and content of CA have lent themselves to rapid expansion and replication in all the projects of agricultural input distribution. The support from Government and Donors to this expansion has been very strong. There is a consensus that CA represents the best practice for improved farming, and a good opportunity to devote attention to SHF needs, where linkages to the market can have a meaningful content.

108. Conservation agriculture projects met or exceeded the objectives in terms number of SHFs reached and improvement in crop productivity. The implementation consists in organizing training in order to transfer knowledge related to crop production in CA. For this the projects

encourage farmers to form groups for training and farming operations. Demonstration plots are used to provide the training.

109. FAO’s Program succeeded in making upstream contributions to Government CA policy work and agricultural extension. Thanks to the role that FAO plays in the coordination of Agriculture Working Group, and in the CA Task Force, it has been effective in the contribution to the promotion of CA in Zimbabwe. This promotion role is played at three levels. At Government level, FAO supports the coordination of CA mainstreaming. It works closely with MoAMID on the promotion of CA within its services, namely by supporting mainstreaming within technical departments and the organization of workshops with provincial AGRITEX officers. With this effort, MoAMID has included CA in its practices. At technical level, its contribution consisted in the definition of concepts and standards, and the publication of guidelines. At implementation level, it mainstreamed CA in its agricultural inputs distribution projects and provided training to NGOs. CA demonstration plots have been established in many localities to train farmers on crop management practices which are simple but influence yields, such as planting time, weeding practices and fertilizer levels. Though CA mainstreaming is not yet well consolidated in the Agriculture sector policy as this is not adopted yet, the Government is fully supportive. Indeed MoAMID has an objective of reaching at least 500,000 households practicing CA nationally. It is using FAO’s experience and support to train AGRITEX extension staff in CA.

110. Further success in scaling-up CA needs to face the challenge of introducing mechanized CA. As CA is promoted with and by agricultural inputs, there is a synergy which is helping to rapidly reverse food insecurity and to improve household income. Overall, the advantages of CA can be summarized as follows:

− The package consisting of the three CA principles and inputs allows higher crop yields to be realized. − Enabling households with no draught power to plant early. − Help improve soil physical properties, soil fertility and soil water retention. − Repeated weeding leads to decrease in weed density in successive years and therefore to less labour needs.

111. As CA in FAO’s Program is based on hoeing, weed control remains a challenge due to pressure on household labour. Indeed in the earlier years the soils are not yet covered with mulch which could reduce weed growth. One of the problems of manual weed control in the first years of CA introduction is the additional workload for women. Another challenge is on how to scale-up in order to increase the area under CA. So far, scaling up within the Program has been in terms of number of households and not in area under CA per farm. It appears that very soon it will be difficult to make further progress if mechanized CA is not introduced. A third important challenge is to find a flexible extension model that allows adapting the CA package to different AEZ. The current extension model is top-down, “one-size fits all”, focusing on land productivity of grains on CA plot and not on labour productivity on the whole farm. The model is too much centered on demonstration plots and there is no action-oriented research approach to promote farmers’ participation and to take in their innovations. With regard to changes in agricultural practices, there were no activities aimed at promoting good practices in irrigation and water management in general.

112. There is considerable evidence of positive achievements in enhancement of crop production. About 20 projects focus on crop production and are characterized by the centrality of support to grain production and agriculture inputs distribution. Indeed an important objective underlying FAO’s Program in Zimbabwe is to rehabilitate agricultural production, both of staple and cash crops. FAO’s interventions have been effective in achieving this objective. Its support has focused on seeds and fertilizers to increase grain yields and improve food security. Due to

improved availability of agricultural inputs (seeds and fertilizers) to which FAO contributed markedly, there has been a considerable increase in land productivity and overall grain production levels. This resulted in significant improvement of food security and household incomes in the last two years.

113. Maize is the dominant crop across all AEZ, and occupies most of the cropped area. This dominance is a reflection of its importance as a food crop for communal area households and as source of their income. The joint FAO/WFP report18 of August 2010 states that the total area harvested for maize in that year reached a historical high of 1.8 million ha and communal areas represent the largest sector. The report noted further that the contraction of areas planted with important cash crops such as cotton contributed to the expansion of maize area.

114. Is the CA extension package agro-ecology sensitive? Zimbabwe is divided into five agro-ecological zones (AEZ), also known as natural regions (see Map), on the basis of the rainfall regime, soil quality and vegetation among other factors. The quality of the land resource and the sustainability of intensive crop production decline between AEZ I and AEZ V. FAO’s projects promoting CA do not take sufficiently into account Zimbabwe’s diversity of climatic and other environmental conditions that must be considered for sustainable farming systems. This diversity of conditions is also linked to the diversity of risks and vulnerabilities for smallholders, which requires research for more resilient production systems particular in drier areas. With the exception of the Spain funded projects reviewed above, projects show little variation in the design of the basic change model in the promotion of CA. In this setting, there is no focus on building capabilities of farmers individually or in communities in different AEZ, to make adequate and compatible choices in adapting CA in their farming systems.

115. Lack of integrated approach to face challenges for building livelihoods that are resilient to climate variability and climate change. Zimbabwe is vulnerable to climate change through shifting rainfall patterns and frequent droughts which are factors of risk to agricultural production. The most vulnerable social group to climate variability comprises female headed households, households with no access to irrigation and the poor SHFs. However both the Draft CPF and the PoA 2010-2015 are silent on climate change issues and their relevance to FAO’s Program in Zimbabwe. For this reason, apart from the promotion of CA, FAO has not been effective in streamlining CCA in its projects activities that reduce the climate risks facing target groups, and that increase SHFs resilience to climate variability and climate change. However, many project documents mention the impact of frequent and prolonged droughts to on crop production. For example, it is stated in the project document for OSRO/ZIM/907/EC “Promotion of Conservation Agriculture (CA) and Coordination of Agricultural Activities in Zimbabwe”, that adoption of CA will significantly increase productivity of smallholder farmers, hence improving their food security and income status, while bolstering their resilience to climatic change and preserving natural resources”.

116. Undoubtedly CA contributes to CCA through increased soil organic matter, with multiple benefits such as enhancing soil fertility, water holding capacity and overall sustainability, which are important for CCA. While not explicit in the design, recent FAO interventions which have supported crop/variety diversification, genetic improvement of livestock, market linkages and forest fire strategies, will contribute to climate change adaptation and resilience at household level, particularly in drier agro-ecoregions. The Rural Agro dealer Restocking Program however, may not contribute to resilience building because, while it protects agro-dealers, it does not

18 Special Report, FAO/WFP Crop and food security assessment mission to Zimbabwe – 9 August 2010. 32

insure farmer’s crops against shocks. Incentives to support crop production are largely private- sector focused.

117. However, this patchy implementation is not a good way of approaching CCA. Focus on grain production without integrating other productions such as livestock and trees may increase vulnerability on drier AEZs (IIb, III, IV, and V). In fact the farms that are most successful in adopting CA look like demonstration plots and share the same risks to climate related shocks. To be more effective in promoting CCA, FAO needs an approach that allows synergizing development objectives in its projects with CCA requirements. This is important because at community level, adaptation is a social process which requires collective action. With social capital and political capital, the communities can interact with appropriate public institutions, civil society and public sector to negotiate means for formulating or reinforcing sustainable livelihood strategies that would enhance their ability to cope with climate variability and climate change.

118. CA extension approach does not include a projects’ adaptive management framework. In general, the effectiveness of FAO’s interventions has been limited as a result of the focus on inputs and conservation agriculture, without addressing integrated farm management, gender and land issues. While there is ample information on CA from research and lessons learnt from Zimbabwe and other countries, the principles that form its basis need to be fit in specific farming situations. This requires going beyond demonstration plots to integrate “Action Research 19 ” into the extension model in order to allow to incorporate CA experience into farmers own knowledge and take into account their own innovations. Part of the resources and effort invested in managing Demonstration Plots could have been used for Action Research to provide solutions for integrating the tree component in the farming systems in the form of Agroforestry. From an environmental and livelihoods perspective, agroforestry, with its diversity of techniques, would fit well with CA. In drier regions in particular, it may allow developing more resilient livelihoods because of the possibility to adapt approaches to production and management objectives such as fixing atmospheric nitrogen thereby reducing the rate of chemical fertilizers application, improving soil physical conditions, recycling nutrients from lower soil horizons, supplying fuel, fodder, fruits, mulch and building material.

19 In this context, Action Research is understood as learning by doing – developers/extensionists and target groups identify a problem, plan together the search of a solution to resolve it, see how successful their efforts were, and if not satisfied, try again. 33

Figure 2: Zimbabwe’s Agro ecological zones (AEZ)

Lake Kariba R eg ion 1 R eg ion 2a R eg ion 2b R eg ion 3 R eg ion 4 R eg ion 5

200 0 200 400Kilometers

2.2.3 FAO’s interventions for engaging smallholders with markets

119. Support to contract farming . FAO’s interventions in CA promote commercialization of smallholder producers through intensified cropping and linkages with private sector partners. Their specific objectives are to support smallholder farmers in achieving food and nutrition security through increased crop productivity as well aiming at significant income generation by the creation of market linkages and the promotion of diversified crop production. All project sites are in communal farmer or old resettlement areas. Projects and Implementing Partners include:

− Conservation Agriculture Program implemented by the Union Project Trust ( UPT); − Enhancing Productivity for Communal Farmers in Zimbabwe, through Advanced Land Use and Management Practices, implemented by Sustainable Agriculture Trust (SAT); − Smallholder Market Development Project (SMDP) implemented by Agricultural Project Trust (APT).

120. The logic of project intervention rests on the premise that farm management constraints are the single most important factor accounting for low productivity in communal farming areas and as a result isolated input support activities for poor communal farmers have only a limited impact in terms of increasing yields, improving food security and stabilizing livelihoods. Further, in the absence of stable and profitable links to markets for surplus agricultural outputs, farmers with the potential to produce a surplus are unable to realize the full benefits of increased production and improve their incomes. It is envisaged that through an all - inclusive support model (extension, inputs and market linkages) smallholder farmers can increase their productivity considerably and achieve food security and significant marketable surpluses.

121. The projects organize linking smallholder farmers with private sector companies in contract farming agreements. Private sector companies are expected to compliment project activities through providing inputs and purchasing agricultural products for contracted growers after the initial phase of the project.

122. The input distribution mechanism employed by these projects has been direct distribution. FAO or the private sector partners procure inputs centrally from reputable dealers and transport them to project areas for distribution to beneficiary households. This ensures that the correct inputs are supplied in quantities specified in the crop budget in a timely manner. However, direct input distribution has the disadvantage of not directly supporting the development of agro-dealer networks in rural areas.

123. The Mission learnt that the conditions under which inputs are provided (free, co-financed or loans) vary by project and changes over the project life. In some projects, such as those implemented by SAT, FAO is providing free inputs for the maize crop although the IP encouraged farmers to contribute between 1-3 bags of their maize yield, depending on performance, which is sold to the highest bidder and the proceeds go to the community. While laudable, the modalities for the use of these funds have not been clarified in the LoAs.

124. The arrangement for repayments of inputs under the Union Project is quite varied. When the Union Project started FAO did not ask farmers to pay back inputs for the food security crop. These inputs are now repayable in kind and there is a big debate around this issue. In the future, it is anticipated that project funds will not be used to provide inputs in kind for maize and farmers will source these on their own from local agro dealers. The plan with regard to the legume and cash crop was for the project to kick start contract farming arrangement by providing inputs in the first year and with the sale of their produce, farmers will enter into agreements for the following season and use part of their revenue to secure inputs, sourced by the private sector. The original need for external direct input support was based on the prevailing economic environment (high inflation, shortage of inputs, high input costs etc.), in the first year of the project (2008/2009) when many potential private sector companies were not able to provide credit to farmers. As a result external input support was needed to set production and crop sales in motion and to encourage private sector to get involved or expand their grower base in project areas.

125. Private sector partners are expected to provide agricultural inputs in kind at full cost (no subsidy) which would be fully covered by the private company. However, in 2010/2011 marketing seasons, FAO supported contract growing partnerships by financing 50% fertilizer component of the input package private sector extends to beneficiaries. FAO is also supporting a pilot weather index insurance program in Chiweshe in collaboration with a Private Sector Contract Farming Partner.

126. Overall, FAO was effective in promoting a relevant and appropriate approach that addresses many of the challenges identified by farmers whilst also recognizing the risks and uncertainties the private sector partners face in servicing and linking with smallholder producers. The effectiveness was particularly high in gearing the above projects towards the needs of SHFs who have the potential to produce a marketable surplus but are constrained by the unavailability and un-affordability of inputs, limited agronomic skills and limited access to output markets. By providing a comprehensive input package combined with intensive training and extension to improve farmers’ agronomic skills and by linking farmers to the private sector in contract farming arrangements the projects are expected to reduce key barriers to market engagement. The number of smallholders reached has grown more than 10 fold over the evaluation period, from a base of 400 in 2006/07 season to over 5000 in 2009/10. In the beginning of 2011, some 7247 households are directly participating in market linkages projects.

The growth in numbers has been due to expansion of activities at existing project sites and expansion into new project areas. Currently FAO is supporting contract farming activities in 16 Districts through four IPs, three local NGOs & one International NGO (Concern Worldwide). The area of supported crops per farmer varies between IPs and project sites, from 0.5ha – 1ha, depending on various factors (donor finance, farmer interest & capability, availability of private sector partners, type of crop, crop viability, characteristics of growing season etc.). The average area supported per farmer across all project sites was 0.75 ha in 2009/2010.

127. Both FAO and its partners see these projects as building on Emergency and Development Programs and recognize that target groups may well require humanitarian assistance in the early years that justifies the provision of free inputs in the early stages of a project with a gradual phasing in of full cost recovery over time.

128. FAO’s effectiveness in market linkage interventions is confirmed from focus group discussions with farmers in Chiweshe and other project sites. Limited access to inputs is identified as a priority problem by all groups of farmers. The GMB is one market outlet for surplus maize but farmers noted that the GMB has not been purchasing commodities other than maize and payments are often received late, well into the next agricultural season and too late for timely purchase of inputs. Farmers indicated that the main impact of these challenges has been to reduce agricultural output through both a reduction in planted area and lower yields. An additional impact noted by farmers is a reduction in diversity of crops grown with households indicating the tendency to mono crop (maize) with small amounts of other crops such as ground nuts for own consumption. In this context, poorer female headed household indicated that they were restricted to planting retained seed. Some groups also commented that production and marketing challenges had reduced the incentives to produce a surplus such that their goal was only to produce for own consumption. Younger farmers also mentioned that unemployment and absence of opportunities to earn income from agriculture contributes to unsustainable income generating activities such as collection and sale of firewood and distress responses such as crop and livestock theft.

129. During the focus group discussions, farmers were asked about the activities implemented by the project to help them meet the challenges they face and the relevance and effectiveness of these activities. The farmers appreciate project activities and highlighted as particularly relevant and effective the timely provision of US$350 of maize inputs, including herbicides to support the production of one hectare of maize per farmer combined with training & extension on the correct and efficient use of inputs under CA. Farmers recognized that Contract farming arrangements with the private sector partner enable them to access inputs on credit with no upfront co- payments and to repay after harvest. The contract guarantees to purchase up to two tons of maize from each assisted producer at a price set in advance (US$250 per ton). At the time of the focus group discussions farmers had not harvested their maize so could not comment on marketing arrangements. The level of fertilizer support (200kgs of Compound and 200 kg of AN) is at the upper end of recommended fertilizer levels for smallholder maize production but farmers considered the input package relevant and appropriate given potential yields in this region. Yields with these input packages have ranged between 2-3T/ha.

130. Support for market-driven input distribution. From 2006-2010, FAO directly supported market driven input distribution systems in two main areas: (1) FAO and SNV’s Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Program (RARP); (2) FAO’s Pilot Electronic Input Voucher in Large Scale Input Distribution Projects. The expected outputs are:

− Support for market-driven input distribution methods; − Reestablishment of sustainable links between suppliers of agricultural inputs and agro- dealers. − Stocking of rural agro-dealers outlets with quality seeds, fertilizers, agro-chemicals, veterinary products, tools and implements; − Agro-inputs are available to rural households via shops close to their homes at accessible prices, in order to boost and revitalize agricultural production and enhance food security.

131. In RARP, FAO is facilitating insurance to mitigate distributor’s risks. The objectives of the program are:

− Reestablishment of sustainable links between suppliers of agricultural inputs and agro- dealers. − Stocking of rural agro-dealers outlets with quality seeds, fertilizers, agro-chemicals, veterinary products, tools and implements; − Strengthen capacities of agro-dealers and wholesalers to do business with each other; − Ensuring local access to inputs by smallholder farmers.

In 2009/2010, a pilot project was operational in 15 districts in four provinces, and worked through three wholesalers covering around 60 rural agro dealers. In 2010/2011 there was a scaling up of the project (RARP II) targeting over 500 shops countrywide & working with eight wholesalers. However, as shown earlier, focusing only on mitigating distributor’s risks may not contribute to building resilience of the SHFs as it does not protect/insure farmer’s crops against shocks. Focusing on insuring crops would indirectly ensure the distributor’s risks because the farmers would be able to meet their food security needs and pay for the inputs received.

132. FAO’s Pilot Electronic Input Voucher Project is implemented in the framework of large scale input assistance projects which are part of a general rehabilitation & recovery strategy for smallholder holder agriculture in Zimbabwe. In the 2010/11 season, donors supported extensive voucher based input distribution systems that use local agro dealers to distribute inputs to beneficiary households thereby supporting development of rural input markets FAO supported two pilot electronic voucher projects within the EU funded programs implemented by Help Germany to investigate the ability of smallholder households to co-finance input vouchers and the viability of electronic voucher systems.

2.2.4 Livestock

133. Main focus of FAO’s livestock activities in Zimbabwe . The main livestock related projects implemented within the period 2006 – 2010 under FAO’s program were designed as part of emergency interventions. The projects included both country and regional projects. Livestock activities carried out centered on animal health, mainly control and containment of important diseases as well as disease surveillance activities. Diseases covered included Foot & Mouth disease, Newcastle disease, Anthrax, Rabies, Avian Influenza, and tick borne diseases. A few livestock projects, focusing on livestock production aspects, were part of more integrated projects (crops, livestock and nutrition / gardens) meant to enhance productivity through proper land use. The main outputs/results from these interventions are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Project outputs of FAO’s livestock interventions in Zimbabwe (2006-2010)

Interventions / activities Main output s Comments Control of Newcastle Disease Outbreaks and spread of the disease contained, through vaccination and leading to risk reduction awareness creation Highly Pathogenic Avian Knowledge about the disease imparted on The knowledge gained Influenza (HPAI) awareness stakeholders and general public; Public made through awareness creation is creation aware of the potential threat, their role in a useful asset but needs preventing and combating the disease in the occasional ‘testing’ through event of occurrence ; simulations. HPAI Surveillance Free –status of the disease determined; All samples collected showed surveillance system and preparedness plan negative results; strengthened; Capacity of DVS strengthened ; Vaccination against Anthrax Disease outbreaks contained; risk reduction, livestock and human life protected Vaccination against Rabies Disease outbreaks contained; risk reduction, livestock and human life protected Vaccination against Foot & Status of disease including risky areas Though disease outbreaks Mouth Disease; surveillance determined; outbreaks and spread of the and spread contained, disease contained; restoration of previous disease free zone not attained; beef export market still closed. Resuscitation of cattle dipping Reduction of cattle tick borne diseases through The incidence of TBDs has tanks through supply of increased cattle dipping; gown down. acaricide and establishment and training of dip tank committees. Strengthening of fish production Knowledge on the management of small water Training report by K. through improved management bodies (e.g. fish ponds) and dams imparted on Nyakahadzoi and B. of small water bodies and leaders and interest groups (fish farmers) Zamasiya) available. dams. Distribution of poultry and Beneficiaries gained experience and skills in provision of artificial management of poultry (layers and broilers); insemination service. income generation through sale of eggs and broilers; local cattle breeds upgraded for improved productivity;

Table 2: Key outcomes of FAO’s regular program on livestock in Zimbabwe (2006-2010)

Activity Main outcome Comments Coordination Active livestock coordination By the time of evaluation, a meeting of the LWG was working group (Livestock Working scheduled for 24 February 2011 at the FAO offices. Group – a subgroup of the Agenda for the meeting included agriculture news, GMO Agriculture Working Group), Products & Zimbabwe’s current stand, essential vaccines meeting regularly to promote program, the role of small livestock in food security and livestock visibility for better support; poverty alleviation in marginalized communities, and Several studies conducted – small stock production models; providing useful database and better understanding of ‘who is who’ in the livestock sector;

Policy Through LWG, a draft Livestock Both the drafts on livestock development policy and development development policy was developed Agriculture Policy framework were availed to the in 2007 – the document was a key evaluation mission. The Agriculture Policy Framework is input into the Zimbabwe’s drat not yet in the public domain. Agriculture policy framework of 2009, Information Information and FAO’s experience Livestock Journals including Farm Management sharing and shared among the key stakeholders Handbook (livestock production) available. Limited technical and players through consultative technical support provided by the sub-regional office in backstopping meetings – livestock journals Zimbabwe and ECTAD Unit based in Gaborone, developed and in circulation; Botswana.

134. FAO has not developed a complete strategic approach that critically guides its livestock operations in Zimbabwe. The strategic documents (CPF and PoA) reflect marginally on livestock – they are ‘fertile’ as far as crops are concerned and ‘barren’ with regard to livestock component. In essence, FAO’s Program strategic approach in the livestock sector has fallen short of expectations of the stakeholders. However, FAO and the implementing partner (DVS) responded adequately to the disease occurrences. Following the model LEGS, the most important and critical points to consider in the prevention and containment of livestock diseases are: occurrence (disaster), response, risk identification, mitigation and prevention, and preparedness. FAO and the implementing partner (DVS) responded to the disease occurrences (disaster) through vaccination, awareness creation and to some extent surveillance (i.e. emergency side). To link with long term control and prevention strategy (development), a small component of capacity building was factored in. However, there were no mitigation and prevention measures put in place to ensure sustained regular vaccination programs, surveillance (risk identification) and preparedness. The DVS does not have sufficient capacity to sustain regular vaccination schedules and surveillance.

135. FAO’s Achievements under the main livestock interventions in Zimbabwe (2006- 2010 ). The achievements under the main livestock interventions are mostly in the areas of vaccinations, dipping, and surveillance and awareness campaigns on HPAI. The FMD outbreaks were addressed through three projects namely, OSRO/ZIM/404/SAF, OSRO/ZIM/511/SAF, and OSRO/ZIM/802/IRE. In the first project, implemented from May 2004 to April 2005, a total of 388,987 head of cattle were vaccinated against a target of 529,488 head of cattle thus establishing coverage of 73.5%. The second project, implemented within the period January 2006 – July 2007, recorded a coverage range of between 56 % (Matobo) and 98% (Chiredzi), while in the third project, implemented between March 2008 and Dec 2009, a total of 209,506 head of cattle were vaccinated in high risky districts along the borders with Botswana and South Africa against the set target of between 195,000 and 205,000 animals – a coverage of more than 100%. Apart from containing the outbreaks, the FAO’s support under these projects enabled the Department of Veterinary Services to define the status of FMD through surveillance activities. Under OSRO/ZIM/802/IRE a total of 8,723 blood samples were collected from low, medium and high FMD prevalence zones against the set target of 11,534 sera samples, thus reflecting an achievement rate of 75.6%. Despite this achievement however, FAO’s strategy of confining its support mainly on outbreaks (perhaps within the dictates of donors) is weak – it amounts to firefighting without addressing the cause and preventive measures.

136. The responses to Newcastle Disease outbreaks and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza scare were through three main projects:

− OSRO/ZIM/602/IRE(May 2006 to April 2007) – under this project, the first round of vaccination against Newcastle disease was carried out by DVFS staff in high risk areas but

was not particularly effective due to shortage of staff. During the second round of vaccination, the Community-based vaccinator’s concept was initiated in which 123 trainers of CBVs and 8,000 CBVs were trained. A total of 2 million chickens were vaccinated against the target of 11 million chickens. The number of beneficiaries was only 139,500 households. The low coverage during this time was due to the fact that substantial amount of resources and time was spent on training CBVs. The strategy was to ensure adequate number of vaccinators at community level.

− OSRO/ZIM/701/IRE (August 2007 to December 2008) - this project was the successor to OSRO/ZIM/602/IRE and largely focused on vaccination against Newcastle Disease and awareness creation about HPAI. The strategy of using CBVs was enhanced with a further training of 44,471 CBVs. Consequently, 6.5 million chickens were vaccinated against the set target of 7.8 million, reflecting a good coverage of 83.3%. Within this achievement, 18 Newcastle Disease outbreaks were brought under control and 737,681 households benefited from the vaccination operation. In addition, Avian Influenza awareness campaign and surveillance were carried out along Newcastle Disease vaccination.

− OSRO/ZIM/901/USA (Jan 2009 to December 2009) – using the experience from the previous two projects, 50,656 CBVs were trained / re-trained, 8.3 million chickens vaccinated against Newcastle Disease in round one and 3.9 million in second round benefiting 784,885 households, 4 cluster Newcastle Disease outbreaks (Gutu, Guruve, Mt. Darwin and Mutare) contained, and 918 veterinary extension assistants from 26 districts trained on surveillance. The innovation of using CBVs, though coming late during project implementation, proved useful and beneficial to the community.

137. The regional project OSRO/RAF/719/USA, phases 1 & 2, implemented from April 2008 to September 2010, focused on strengthening HPAI surveillance, preparedness and response capacity in Southern Africa. Under this project and within the objective of ‘ Improved surveillance and diagnostic capacity’ , 11,530 samples were collected from 18 districts in all provinces of Zimbabwe out of the total 28,649 samples collected in the region (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) – all tested negative for HPAI; 290 vet staff in Zimbabwe were trained out of the total 640 trained in the region; geographical positioning system (GPS) was supplied to DVS, Zimbabwe; Poultry producers nominated by Poultry Association were trained; and surveillance guidelines for backyard and free-range farming system were developed for the SADC Region. Under the output ‘ Enhanced regional networking and coordination’ : surveillance at border districts was synchronized and harmonized between neighbouring countries.

138. FAO’s support to contain outbreaks of two zoonotic diseases, i.e. Rabies and Anthrax, was provided through OSRO/ZIM/803/EC implemented between April 2008 and September 2009. The project took off only in September/ October 2008 due to delayed delivery of vaccines. A key result of the project was ‘ Protection of animals from Anthrax and Rabies and subsequently humans from these zoonotic infections, through Anthrax and Rabies vaccinations’. Projects reports indicate that by the end of February 2009 a total of 1,868,689 h/c had been vaccinated against Anthrax benefiting 186.320 households against the targets of 1,996,767 h/c and 233,177 households. By the end of June 2009 vaccinations against Anthrax and the corresponding benefiting households had gone up to 2,387,467 and 322,762 respectively, thereby exceeding set targets of 1,996.767 vaccinations and 233,177 beneficiaries. As regards Rabies, a total of 444,485 dogs had been vaccinated by the end of February 2009 benefiting 232,051 households against set targets of 499,623 dogs and 309,057 beneficiaries. By the end of June 2009, Rabies vaccinations and the corresponding beneficiaries had gone up to 546,770 and 319,044 respectively against the respective targets of 499,623vaccinations and 309,057 beneficiaries, and like Anthrax vaccinations exceeded the set targets. The achievement beyond the set targets however raises the question of accuracy of the data used in setting those targets.

Proper statistical evidence aside, it may appear that livestock data are to some extent underestimated. Nevertheless, the vaccination interventions were carried out effectively.

139. The tick control project, OSRO/ZIM/902 /FIN implemented from July 2009 to December 2010, achieved two outputs. The first output is “Dipping Chemicals Produced and Provided at Dip Tank Level ”. A quantity of 120 tons of acaricide was manufactured as planned and distributed to dip tanks. Although there were no data availed to show the actual level of dipping, discussions with beneficiaries revealed that nearly all livestock owners were taking their cattle for dipping. There was also clear indication from both beneficiaries and DVS staff that prevalence rate of tick borne diseases had decreased significantly. However, dipping of goats was low and was not being practiced in many areas. The second output is “Capacity Building of the Committees in Charge of Dipping Services”. The achievements included establishment of 3527 dip tank committees against the target of 4000, development of Guidelines on setting up of Livestock development committees including terms of reference for the committees; training of 733 veterinary extension assistants; 67 animal health inspectors, and 20 government veterinary officers;. Additionally, 2549 (63.7%) LDCs / dip tank committees were trained out of the targeted figure of 4000. As far as revolving funds are concerned, the project was designed with an assumption that the dips would ultimately be handed over to beneficiaries under which the revolving fund bank accounts would be managed. However, there is no clear policy direction on this and consequently the dipping fee charged on beneficiaries in the form of cost sharing is being submitted to and managed by the DVS.

140. Two integrated project already described above, OSRO/ZIM/807/SPA and OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA had livestock component whose objective is to improve breeding stock through introduction of better germplasm, mainly introduction of artificial insemination service and distribution of better performing poultry (layers and broilers) to selected beneficiaries. The achievements under OSRO/ZIM/807/SPA included insemination of 149 cows benefiting 120 households out of 132 households originally selected, and distribution of 225 layers and 2250 broilers to 270 beneficiaries. The beneficiaries were also trained on animal husbandry and management. Under OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA, 153 cows received artificial insemination service against the target of 600; 3100 broilers and 1125 layers distributed to 664 beneficiaries against the targets of 5,625 broilers, 900 layers and 750 beneficiaries; and training of beneficiaries on animal husbandry and commercial production of poultry. As regards artificial insemination service, it needs to be noted that the number of inseminations carried out does not necessarily translate to the same number of calves, In one case, as low as 19,2% calving rate was reported. It is apparent that the achievements under the two projects are not particularly weighty but provide a basis for enhanced take off of the practices.

141. This is exemplified in Table 3 by a sample of vaccination campaign (2010) from selected districts in Masvingo10 province. Factors that contributed to adequate coverage included good publicity through posters and local channels (by the time of evaluation, some posters were still visible displayed at office doors), some free of charge services, and the fact that most of the interventions came in at a critical time when beneficiaries were in need of those services. In addition, the training of community-based vaccinators greatly enhanced the effectiveness in vaccination of poultry against Newcastle disease.

Table 3: Sample of vaccination campaign (2010) from selected districts in Masvingo Province

1. Newcastle Disease vaccination District Census (no. of chickens) Number vaccinated % vaccinated Bikita 164,402 158,819 96.6% Masvingo 375,023 369.862 98.6% Mwenezi 181,624 170,419 93.8% 2. Foot and Mouth Disease District Census (number of cattle targeted) Number vaccinated % vaccinated Masvingo 94,503 75,246 79.6% chiredzi 184,280 158,168 85.8% 3. Anthrax vaccination District Census (number of cattle targeted ) Number vaccinated % vaccinated Masvingo 79,542 67,175 84.5% Mwenezi 121,137 101,269 83.6% 4. Rabies vaccination District Census (no. of dogs targeted) No. vaccinated % vaccinated Masvingo 59,200 57,242 96.7% Source: Provincial veterinary Office, Masvingo

142. Constraints and challenges with negative impact on effectiveness. There are challenges with negative effect on the results of vaccination activities, which included inadequate transport (shortage of vehicles and motorcycles), inadequate cold chain, inadequate automatic syringes and needles (some of poor quality), lack of camping equipment for vaccination teams leaving them with the inconveniencies of looking for alternative accommodation, inadequate daily subsistence allowance for vaccinators, inaccessible vaccination sites in some areas due to poor access roads, inadequate protective clothing with some vaccinators working without them (reflecting negatively on professional image), lack of induction of newly recruited veterinary staff, and inadequate supply of Newcastle disease vaccine. The meagre daily subsistence allowance of two US dollars per person, described by some interviewees as unbelievable , drew particular attention of the Mission as it was not enough to meet basic personal needs while in the field. This had a dampening effect on the morale of the field staff concerned. Similarly the CBVs were not motivated in any way, and despite the common belief that they offered themselves as volunteers, it cannot be entirely assumed that they had no other expectation. Due to small cold chain capacity, several trips had to be made to collect more vaccines at the district headquarters, thus resulting in fewer vaccinations per day and extra cost on already constrained transport. In one instance, a cold room visited by the mission had broken down and the vaccine had to be stored in borrowed facilities belonging to individuals. A shortage of means of transport meant that the vaccination took longer than would have taken had there been adequate transport. In some areas the situation was rescued by individual livestock farmers who helped with transport. Finally, there was a strong feeling in the Department of Veterinary Services, especially at national level, that FAO did not treat the Department as an equal partner, certainly taking advantage of the “under- resourced position of the Department to have its way.”

143. Other challenges related to livestock production were also noted. The poultry component of the integrated crops, nutrition/gardens and livestock interventions in Kadoma district (Enhancing Productivity for Communal Farmers in Zimbabwe through Advanced Land Use and Management Practices ) experienced delays in supply of chicks (shortage of suppliers), suffered heavy mortality rate of day-old chicks, at least in the initial stages due to transportation stress,

and poor growth rates (broilers) due to poor quality feeds. In Insiza district, goats and poultry distributed to women groups experienced high mortality rate possibly due to diseases and management problems. In this particular case, the project was conceptualized within the Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development. FAO came in following a request to financially support the project. The intervention was made at the wrong time of economic crisis when essential commodities including drugs were in short supply, the choice of beneficiaries was not well considered, and training of the beneficiaries was conducted after delivery of goats / poultry. There should have been greater consideration for animal health care and management before goats/poultry were distributed to the target beneficiaries. It is however observed that this was an isolated case of poor performance compared with other projects.

144. External factors that affect FAO’s effectiveness in the livestock area. In its operations, FAO faced a number of constraints with direct influence on delivery of its mandate and obligations. The first is the Donors’ conditionality. Whilst FAO has been advocating for linking emergency interventions with recovery and development, and mostly in line with the priority of government, the main donors to FAO program on the other hand have been cautious and largely unwilling to go that way. The consequences for livestock sector is that the interventions were largely limited to short term measures aimed at prevention and containment of some few livestock diseases. The second is the limited choice of implementing partners in livestock sector. The Animal Health Act gives the Department of Veterinary Services a wide mandate, virtually to the exclusion of other players. On this basis therefore, FAO had to engage the Department of Veterinary Services as the Implementing Partner for all animal health interventions. The legal mandate aside, the other potential implementing partners such as NGOs did not have sufficient capacity to successfully carry out the animal health interventions. The third is the inadequate capacity of implementing partner. An assumption was made that the Department of Veterinary Services was sufficiently equipped to execute its obligations within the partnership framework. This was not always the case – FAO had to contend with the situation or where possible make adjustments. The fourth is the short duration interventions. Donors’ conditionality favoured projects of short duration (emergency interventions). This was not fitting for livestock development which under normal circumstances calls for medium and long term interventions. FAO’s projects were therefore designed and delivered within the scope of donors’ conditionality. The fifth is the non-conducive economic and political context. Within the context of ‘fast track land reform program’, coupled with the volatile political situation following the 2008 general election, FAO was operating within an unpredictable and delicate economic and political environment that required extreme caution and due diligence. Under these circumstances, some of the inputs including vaccines and vehicle spare parts were not locally available and the cost was high due to hyperinflation.

145. What could have been done better? Indications are that some of the problems encountered could have been minimized had there been adequate consultations and involvement of district and provincial staff in the planning for requirements. This was echoed by all the district and provincial staff met. The effectiveness of the animal health interventions could have been enhanced with an inclusion of support therapy such as de-worming and minor treatments. Any livestock improvement or production intervention must take into account all aspects of livestock management including health, transportation where applicable, housing, nutrition (feeds, water etc.), breeding and marketing among others. With regard to s urveillance, although a system was put in place (HPAI), with coverage of border districts, greater consideration should have been given to:

− Veterinary border posts (e.g. Beitbridge) to ensure they are equipped to handle chickens that may be impounded at the border – for instance, provision of incinerator or similar facility.

− Capacity building of regional laboratories (Masvingo, Mutare, Bulawayo) to reduce workload at the Central Vet Laboratory.

2.2.5 Mainstreaming the integration of Gender

146. FAO gender related issues and activities in FAO’s Zimbabwe Program . There are few mentions of gender issues in FAO strategic documents for Zimbabwe. However, the Draft CPF recognizes the need for gender-sensitive programs aimed at improving farmer’s access to credit and inputs, and also the management of agricultural credit schemes. Under Priority Area “Food Security” one of the two priority areas defined in Annex is “Improving Gender Sensitive Agricultural Services”. For future activities, the PoA 2010-2015 mentions that FAO will continue mainstreaming gender in its 2010-2015 program, and will do it with support from a gender focal person to be appointed to ensure that all staff have the capacity to mainstream gender and that a gender perspective is incorporated into activities.

147. FAO has not been effective in mainstreaming gender in the entire project cycle. FAO has not taken gender mainstreaming capacity and political will into consideration when choosing partners to work with. Some FAO partners who were consulted want FAO to support gender mainstreaming efforts. Information sharing and dissemination with partners on gender issues is limited. The organizational communication material on the organizational vision does not indicate gender equity as a key principle reflecting perhaps that gender equity is not prioritized as key to the program. While there is a Gender Unit at the FAO HQ, contact and information exchange between the HQ and FAO Zimbabwe is limited, however some FAO staff members indicated that little effort and initiative had been made from their side to request for information and support.

148. It is commendable that FAO has a gender focal person (GFP); however there are no clear terms of references that can provide guidance, parameters, responsibilities and obligations on gender mainstreaming work. The GFP is not part of the policy making structure and hence does not sit in senior management meetings which makes it difficult to influence gender equity issues from a high level perspective. The GFP does not have a crucial responsibility of acting as a gender think tank nor a role to ensure systematic quality control as an initial gender screening point e.g. on consultants terms of reference, project documents, partner selection, evaluation and research reports, M&E and surveillance systems. Additionally the GFP has a number of responsibilities including nutrition and HIV and AIDS which makes this portfolio a heavy one considering the time demanded for the gender component. FAO Zimbabwe does not seem to have rigorous gender quality control mechanisms and this has resulted in the limited gender related results in the program components.

149. There is little evidence that staff have competence in mainstreaming gender dimensions in programming as evidenced by the limited planned integration of gender dimensions in the entire project cycle and from the discussions with the staff. Weak enabling environment and an organizational culture which is heavily focussed on the achievement of technical tangible outputs at the exclusion of social outputs has not been conducive to integrating gender equity issues in the program. Moreover there are no mechanisms for internal lobby and advocacy to effectively drive the gender equity agenda.

150. Mainstreaming of gender is not included as a crucial element in the performance appraisal of staff which means that there is no accountability for gender mainstreaming for staff. Terms of reference for consultants who carry out tasks for FAO such as monitoring and research do not necessarily require them to address issues of gender. Additionally the consultants may not have the capacity to see through gender lenses in relation to the

assignment. Consequently the majority of the research, monitoring and other reports that have been produced are silent on gender dimensions and the results cannot be used to influence gender sensitive programming. There are weak gender mainstreaming systems and mechanisms applications in place.

151. Achievements and weaknesses. There is no specific project on gender equity and equality issues or deliberately aimed for the empowerment of women. A major omission in the programming process is the lack of gender situation analysis before the projects are implemented. Projects have subsequently taken a homogeneous approach which does not consider the gender differentials of men and women in agriculture in relation to their access and control of agricultural resources, gender roles, differential practical and strategic gender needs. There were two projects that included some specific activities related to gender and these involved training on gender and agriculture, inheritance and property rights. This has been done in partnership with UNIFEM, UNFPA, WILSA and UNDP. Some initiatives which have been used as gender mainstreaming entry projects for empowerment include the cassava, goat projects and gardening projects. However for the goats and gardening projects, although gardening and small livestock such as chickens and goats are usually a female activity, but the mission noted that when gardening became mechanized and/or there was possibility for commercialization of the products men joined the projects in numbers almost equal to women.

152. Although FAO has not supported projects specifically aimed at enhancing gender equality per se , some achievement of gender mainstreaming is evident at implementation level in terms of beneficiaries reached who are mostly women. One woman mentioned that she had attended a domestic violence workshop which was organized through the support of FAO. Two staff training workshops were carried out in 2008 and 2010, one for 3 days and one for two days respectively. Awareness raising was created but the workshop periods were too short to allow for sustainable human capital formation on gender. Moreover, it is not FAO’s systematic practice to have all of its staff trained in gender mainstreaming on initiation of duty to give them skills for gender sensitive programming and implementation.

153. The FAO office was not performing adequately on the promotion of gender equality amongst its partners. FAO partners were aware of the technical support and products offered by FAO but the gender dimension as a social product in the agricultural sector has not been integrated in most partners work. This implies that FAO does not deliberately engage its partners for gender mainstreaming during the program formulation processes subsequently gender mainstreaming has not been a commonly shared, and prioritized agenda during most project implementation processes. The results of the AWG coordination survey carried out as part of the evaluation revealed that respondents rated as medium, FAO Zimbabwe’s support in mainstreaming gender within the sector.

154. The lack of analysis of the varied gender dynamics in project inputs such as in livestock, crop production, forestry, fisheries, nutrition and food security, - from farm to plate, has denied the program of diverse gender sensitive entry points which could have had positive influences and impact to women and men and the overall household economy. The issue of climate change has not received much attention yet climate change exacerbates gender inequalities and intensifies gender specific experiences of poverty.

155. Lack of attention on the relevance and impacts of gender issues relating to forests and forestry on food security and gender equity. In the framework of FAO’s Zimbabwe Program, there is no specific attention on gender issues, gendered use of forests and gender roles in forestry and agroforestry. During the field visits, the Mission observed along its itinerary that women are primary users of forests through their involvement in fuelwood collection, either for home needs (mostly) or for selling in city markets to get some income. In some farms visited

particularly in drier areas, women play an active role in managing and tending fruit trees in or near the homestead for nutrition and income. With regard to recent trends of rural out-migration in which men’s migration inside and outside Zimbabwe is greater than women’s, women as heads or de facto heads of households take primary responsibility for managing the trees and fruit trees on the farm and satisfying the households needs in in forest products. The Mission found that there is no public extension service that is helping them in this regard and there is no related activity in FAO’s projects. FAO is not including fuelwood and non-wood forest products issues in food security issues.

156. Gender issues have not received much attention in M&E systems . Monitoring, evaluation and surveillance systems have largely focused on production outcomes and outputs and social issues such as gender have not received much attention. Some gender disaggregated data has been collected however the data has not been analysed and used to inform programming. Programming does not always include gender mainstreaming outcomes and indicators, making it difficult to track progress and impact of interventions in relation to gender.

2.2.6 Mainstreaming HIV and AIDS

157. FAO’s activities to mitigate HIV and AIDS in Zimbabwe. The Draft CPF recognizes HIV and AIDS as one of the key challenges for the development of Zimbabwe’s Agriculture sector. It prioritized addressing of HIV and AIDS in the agricultural sector, and provides for using the MoAMID as an HIV and AIDS entry point which can cascade to other sector specific stakeholders. FAO support for the development of the Agriculture Sector Strategy on HIV and AIDS was planned for in the CPF. Similarly the PoA 2010-2015 recognizes the negative impact of HIV and AIDS on Zimbabwe’s rural economy and it considers mainstreaming of HIV awareness as cross cutting in agronomy, livestock, extension work, information management dietary diversities and nutritional practices. Mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS through small livestock production, nutrition gardens and counselling is one of the activities listed by the PoA under “Strategic Focus Area 1: Humanitarian-Livelihood Assistance and Increased Food Security”.

158. The FAO overall strategy has not clearly spelt out its strategic approach in dealing with HIV and AIDS. The three strategic documents (ZUNDAF, CPF and Action Plan) tends to have a strategic focus on prevention and mitigation. As part of mitigation the approach has however not considered the importance of creation of economic autonomy of women as an important strategic prevention measure. Moreover gender inequality is one of the driving forces behind the spread of HIV yet it has not received much systematic consideration in the strategic framework. FAO has not come up with a common HIV mainstreaming strategy which can guide it in its operations such as in selection criteria of partners, interventions, strategic targeting and potentially effective preventive and mitigation measures. Moreover focus has been more on crop production but emphasis should encompass all the other FAO operational areas such as livestock, fisheries, and forestry.

159. FAO approach to HIV and AIDS is one of mainstreaming . FAO is contributing towards the promotion of a coordinated approach to the response to HIV and AIDS within the agricultural sector and the inclusion of HIV and AIDS in the prevention and mitigation in its work. Awareness of HIV is created when FAO is doing its humanitarian work. FAO chairs the garden working group which brings together diverse stakeholders who are involved in mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS. FAO has supported programs on food access and nutrition interventions for PLHIV and people affected by HIV and AIDS. FAO has maintained a strong link between HIV and AIDS, nutrition and food security in its HIV mitigation approach.

160. FAO has commissioned research relating to HIV and AIDS in the agricultural sector such as the impact of HIV and AIDS in extension work. The research has informed policies and strategy development on HIV and AIDS. It supported the MoAMID in coming up with the Zimbabwe Government Sector Strategy on HIV and AIDS 2006-2010. Following this successful project, FAO approved support for a TCP project on strengthening institutional capacity in mainstreaming HIV and AIDS concerns in the agricultural sector. This project has built the capacity of Ministry staff at various levels such as policy and managerial level, college lecturers and extension level. Training modules, strategy and handbooks have been developed. HIV and AIDS has now been incorporated in the agriculture training colleges’ curriculum. This approach has a multiplier effect as the trained graduates will cascade the HIV and AIDS issues in their areas of operation after they graduate.

161. FAO was effective in assisting the development of the HIV and AIDS strategy for the Agriculture Sector. A situational analysis of HIV and AIDS in the Agricultural sector was made in 2009 in order to inform the strategy development. The Agricultural sector strategy has been developed, approved and is now under implementation. The strategy development process which involved participatory processes of people from varied multi-sectoral backgrounds was in itself a learning process which built the capacity of those involved. To get ownership of the strategy by local communities, consultative processes included chiefs, communities and farm workers. The FAO support resulted in the development of a handbook on building capacity for Agricultural Sector Response to HIV and AIDS which can be used for reference by extension workers and other stakeholders.

162. A monitoring and evaluation plan was produced for the strategy using the technical support from the NAC and as a collaborative effort of the Ministry of Agriculture and FAO. The Monitoring system has however not yet been used. FAO participated in the new HIV and AIDS National Strategic Plan which is in process of being developed. There is appreciation and realization of the role that the agriculture sector can plan in mitigation and prevention of HIV among FAO stakeholders.

163. FAO’s intervention in HIV and AIDS resulted in the formation of an HIV and AIDS Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture. The Unit is staffed by two persons and has established 30 HIV and AIDS focal persons in all agricultural departments, provinces, districts, ZFU, CFU and ZCFU. These focal persons were trained in HIV and AIDS. The senior management staff of MoAMID were trained in order to build their appreciation and capacity to mainstream HIV and AIDS in programs. Agricultural colleges’ lecturers were trained. Of the 6000 Ministry extension workers, 120 were trained and within this group 30 extension workers were trained as trainers to cascade the information and knowledge to the other extension workers.

164. External factors influencing FAO’s delivery effectiveness. FAO’s Partners do not always have resources to support the implementation of HIV and AIDS mainstreaming. The resources within the organizations may not allow for continuity of interventions or their rolling out. For instance NAC and AGRITEX are decentralized but are very poorly resources for project implementation.

165. Issues of concern:

− The training of 120 extension workers out of 6000 was said to be a drop in the ocean and that cascading the message to the others countrywide would be an uphill task especially because the Ministry does not have budget for this. − There is limited budget for HIV and AIDS in the Ministry.

− No implementation plan and monitoring mechanisms were put in place to implement the strategy that was developed. − There has not been a strong linkage between HIV and AIDS programming and gender, yet gender inequality is a key driver of the spread of HIV. − Not all projects mainstreamed HIV and AIDS for instance PLHIV were not necessarily deliberately targeted for some FAO activities.

3. Efficiency

3.1 Appropriateness of the Program implementation strategies

166. The strategies employed by the Representation to implement its programs are largely appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and have helped FAO to respond to the changing needs and priorities of the various stakeholders and to achieve its program objectives. For example, community level targeting is effective in including households from a cross-section of society (in terms of age, gender, economic status) in project activities. There are however areas of weakness that should be addressed to improve efficiency. These areas can be summarized as follows: a) The project planning process does not systematically include the administrative unit, M+E or HIV/Livelihoods Units to ensure all risks to the successful implementation of the activity are properly identified and mitigating actions planned such as: creating realistic budgets based on up-to-date market information; identifying special needs; and ensuring cross-cutting issues are included in the design; b) Some strategies should either be abandoned or fine-tuned to assure their continued relevance e.g. free input distribution to vulnerable households should be reviewed to ensure appropriate targeting and to reduce the risk of conflict with other program objectives and strategies such as contract farming and establishing market linkages. The mission believes input distribution should be handled by the NGOs though FAO should continue its coordination to minimize overlaps. Furthermore, FAO interventions are focusing on small holder farmers on communal lands but some stakeholders felt that to make a real change FAO should start focusing more on middle size farms. c) There is need to focus more closely on FAO’s comparative advantage and technical strengths. This would enable the Representation participate more actively in key sectoral issues for which FAO is ideally suited to offer technical guidance such as on land use planning and management, and, livestock management especially small ruminants. These areas were also considered to be priorities by all stakeholders. d) There is no obvious strategy to promote gender equity or inclusion of particular vulnerable groups in program activities neither is there a strategy to draw greater donor attention to livestock issues. These themes are an integral part of the development reality in Zimbabwe and should be addressed to improve the relevance of the interventions at all levels.

167. External factors influencing FAO’s delivery . The external factors influencing FAO’s delivery include the following:

- Weak institutional capacity; - Donor restrictions on direct support to Government institutions; - Operating development interventions in an ‘emergency’ setting; - Weak local markets for procurement of inputs;

- Unreliability of International suppliers; - Late provision of information from IPs; - Political pressure to change operating practices – input distribution is subject to high political pressure; - Land reform.

3.2 Use of resources

168. Deployment of the resources. The structure of the Representation and its relations with other FAO units is shown in Annex C. The Representation has over 50 national and international staff and is divided into two units20 to support its regular program and emergency field operations. Administrative support is provided through the SFS and the administrative unit of the ERCU. This division of responsibilities is appropriate and ensures efficient management of the field program.

169. The Representation uses its available staffing and accesses additional technical support from the Sub-regional Office for Southern Africa (SFS), REOSA, ECTAD, RAF and Headquarters to implement its field program. It relies heavily on the SFS for policy support as well as to technically backstop conservation agriculture, forestry and wildlife, and, crop production activities. Nonetheless, there is no structured collaboration between the Representation and SFS technical staff. Contact is either on a personal basis or according to interest and availability of the individual Technical Officers. Other limiting factors to accessing SFS technical inputs are: a) the technical expertise available in the SFS is insufficient to respond to the extensive needs in the region; b) reimbursement of technical support service charges for SFS officers is not always forthcoming from the ERCU as funding is not systematically included in the project budget for this cost. This practice raises the risk of reducing the ERCU access to SFS inputs during implementation and requires the ERCU to consult the SFS at the project design stage to ensure adequate budgeting for technical backstopping.

170. REOSA, ECTAD and headquarters resources are not extensively used except to, respectively: facilitate knowledge exchange on conservation agriculture; support emergency cross-border regional interventions; and, provide technical clearance of specifications and terminal reports.

171. Staffing of the Representation. Staffing of the Program Unit and the ERCU has remained fairly stable during the review period, and was appropriate for the level of program activities in 2008. However this is no longer the case in the ERCU in view of the increased and more varied program activities in 2009 and 2010, as well as the requirements of the CPF and Plan of Action for 2011 and beyond. For example, there are now two Emergency Coordinators in Zimbabwe, both of whom have been in post for more than five years. On the other hand, there is insufficient capacity in gender, livestock development and none for marketing and credit, or land use planning, all of which will be required if current activities in these areas are to be scaled up. It may be timely for TCEO and the FAOR to review the staffing structure to bring in the technical support required to strengthen the process of linking emergency and rehabilitation interventions into longer term development interventions.

20 The Program Unit carries out the FAOR’s functions as indicated in MS 118; the Emergency Recovery and Coordination Unit –ERCU implements the emergency field program 49

172. Furthermore, comments from some key IPs indicated that there was some dissatisfaction with the level of technical support provided and they surmised that this was due to the limited technical staffing of the ERCU. In addition, the Representation is sometimes overloaded administratively which creates a burden for some staff and delayed responses to stakeholders or suppliers. The multiplicity of roles played by the FAOR in the Country Office, in SFS and as FAOR in two more countries impacts negatively on the visibility of the Country Office. It contributes to weakened FAOR leadership and affects the guidance that the Country Team needs. In his view, the Representative spends approximately 50% of his time on Zimbabwe issues and the remaining 50% on all other responsibilities. The Representative’s heavy workload has, in our opinion, diluted the effectiveness of the incumbent’s leadership and coordination of the field program which has impacted on overall efficiency of the Representation’s operations. Even where economies of scale would have made the non- emergency activities more timely and cost effective, especially with respect to procurement of inputs, the Representation did not take advantage of existing staff resources at its disposal in the ERCU.

173. Selection of Implementing Partners. The ERCU uses NGOs and the farmers unions as the main implementing partners, except in animal health interventions where the Department of Livestock Veterinary Services is the only possible choice by Government decree. IPs are selected from the database of NGO members of the ACWG as well as from personal contacts made at local levels. Stated selection criteria include: a) the ERCU’s past experience with the NGO; b) the NGO’s geographic coverage and relationship with the communities in the project areas; c) their expressions of interest in working with FAO in the domain being considered; and, d) the level of innovativeness of the NGO. However, the process is not documented and there is no overall assessment done of the IP’s capacity to deliver before the selection process is completed. The final choice of IP appears to be subjective as evidenced by statements from other stakeholders interviewed that some NGOs seemed to be favoured. The ERCU indicated that work was initiated on themes that demanded testing over several seasons e.g. establishing market linkages, which required continuity with the same IP. The mission believes that the Representation has not done enough to de-mystify the selection process and that its practice of using only those NGOs which are members of the ACWG creates an unfair advantage especially against those local level NGOs which might be more capable on some topics e.g. gender issues, but which are not members of the ACWG.

174. Overall the Existing modalities for Procurement of Goods and Services support project operations. The Evaluation found that the new organizational guidelines (MS 502) for procurement of goods and services are not yet fully applied. However systems are in place to expedite all phases of the procurement process once a request is received, and, the Procurement Unit tries to find the quickest means of obtaining the items, especially for the ERCU transactions which account for more than 90% of total expenditure. Nevertheless, IPs complained of delays in FAO providing inputs and in one case the complainant also stated that the quality of seeds provided were below acceptable standards. Contributory factors to reported delays included: a) weak procurement planning; b) late receipt of donor funds; c) delays in approving LoAs and in identifying inputs to be supplied as part of the LoA; d) ad hoc changes during implementation; and, e) staffing constraints in the procurement unit. The Representation should address these internal issues and make a case for using regional procurement to CSAP, the advantages being that this would create a wider database of suppliers and reduce the risk of delays from the longer international tendering process followed for large procurements.

175. Could FAO resources have been employed more efficiently? The mission found that extraneous factors resulted in the interruption of activities in 2007/8 which negatively affected the implementation of a number of activities. In particular, the ban on NGO field activities for an 18 month period in 2007/8 resulted in an important interruption in FAO supported assistance to

school gardens, community gardens, food production and marketing and related training21 – which were largely being implemented by NGO partners.

3.3 The quality of services

176. Management of the Field Program. The evaluation of FAO’s decentralization in 2004 concluded that where there were complex emergencies, ‘…..the first priority is to unify the lines of command and responsibility, rather than having divergent arrangements for the emergency work and continuing development projects, which can and do cause tension’. Through establishing a Country Management Team 22 (CMT) the Representative has created a forum to address this concern. The CMT is scheduled to meet monthly and presents an ideal opportunity to undertake strategic planning of the field program; establish the necessary coherence and synergies between the emergency and non-emergency programs; and, establish a resource mobilization strategy that takes both regular program and extra-budgetary resource requirements into consideration. It should also provide a forum for discussing and agreeing on solutions to operational constraints such as changes in government policy that impact on program implementation e.g. the burning issue of free input distribution. However, a review of minutes of meetings held during 2009 and 2010 indicated that mainly matters related to the administrative functioning of the Representation were discussed.

177. Expertise, Approaches and Methods. The FAO regular program unit does not have resident expertise to carry out its projects but works through Government counterparts and recruits staff as needed. The A/FAOR (program) and the Liaison Officer monitor implementation through ad hoc field visits and close liaison with Government counterparts. These arrangements appear adequate for the small size of the field development program but should be reviewed as the CPF is implemented.

178. The ERCU is comprised of five Units23 however their roles and responsibilities are not well defined, which makes assessment of their performance difficult. Since most of its projects are implemented through NGOs, the ERCU has a strong monitoring role in two main aspects: a) monitoring NGO compliance with contractual obligations; and b) monitoring performance of the interventions. Creating the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was aimed at addressing the second purpose but it also established a second level of ERCU control over project implementation and use of resources. The Evaluation Mission felt that this was a noteworthy step that should be shared with other Representations. However, we believe that management has not made full use of the Unit to improve efficiency of operations. This may be attributable to the following factors:

− the M&E Unit provides capacity building support to the ZimVac which makes planning and establishing priorities difficult especially in view of the limited staffing and overlaps in the assessment work for both the ZimVac and FAO. For example, collecting baseline information on key indicators in the EUFF project coincided with work for the ZimVac which proved difficult to manage in light of the limited staff resources. Furthermore, methodologies

21 Health Harvest Evaluation. January 2011. 22 The CMT is composed of the Policy Officer of SFS, the Administrative Officer (SFS), the A/FAOR (program), the Administrative Officer (ERCU), the Senior Emergency Coordinator, and the Emergency coordinator with the Representative as Chairperson 23 Operations (Crop and Livestock); HIV/Livelihoods; M+E; Coordination and Reporting; Administration 51

used in data collection for the ZimVac and FAO differed which increased the workload of the Unit; − the M&E Unit is not systematically involved at the project design stage where indicators and data needs are identified. This makes it difficult to ensure indicators are realistic and that objectives are reasonably stated before the project becomes operational; − although there is informal exchange of information between the M&E and the Operations Units, and, back-to-office reports are posted on the intranet, a formal forum has not been created to ensure the Operations Unit follows-up on issues raised by the M+E. − as the M&E Unit was created under the ERCU, it provides little support to the non- emergency program.

179. In principle FAO’s strategy to use IPs to implement its programs, under its supervision, is appropriate and cost-effective in the current context. In view of the costs24, FAO neither has nor can it recruit, enough technical staff to directly implement all its programs; and, donors are not agreeable to working through the Government institutional framework. Despite these operating constraints the ERCU manages the emergency program in a coherent manner, ensuring that there is complementarity, and at times continuity, between project activities. Technical decisions are timely at country level but administratively there are implementation delays especially if the transaction exceeds the Representative’s delegated authority and must be approved in headquarters. This was particularly the case for large LoAs and procurement carried out under the EUFF project where headquarters approval was necessary. This affected project start-up and some IPs were obliged to advance funds so as not to be too late with input distribution.

180. Coordination and monitoring of the Portfolio. Though an effort was made to ensure coherence between the CPF and the PoA, there has been little joint planning of activities. The on-going non-emergency program is very small and the project pipeline limited. One donor stated that there was scope for expanding collaboration with FAO but that they were only familiar with the competences of the emergency team, with which they were satisfied. Current management arrangements do not enable the Representation to fully exploit development opportunities and create the necessary visibility of the Representation as a whole. FAO has been effective in coordination and in playing the ‘honest broker’ role given difficult relations between GoZ and donors. This has contributed to FAO’s good external image, but according to partners met, this image hinges almost exclusively on the professionalism and dedication of its ERCU Team.

181. The quality of services led to production of outputs in a cost effective manner though delays were noted. In general, the ERCU and Program Units have both delivered planned outcomes within budget, despite delays in implementation caused by internal and external factors as discussed in this report. Though not fully recognized by Government, the draft agriculture policy prepared through the Program Unit was a major achievement in the move towards creating an enabling policy environment.

182. The annual field program budget 25 and financial delivery increased significantly over the period (see figure 3) from almost USD 3 million in 2006 to USD 14 million in 2010. The most

24 A rough estimate of staff costs of the ERCU (excluding contributions to TCEO and the cost of the FAO representative’s supervision) based on payments made to local staff during 2010+ the standard cost of one P5, two P4 and one P3 is approximately $1.8m per year. 25 For each project, the annual budget has been calculated as the average daily budget (total project budget divided by the days of duration of the project) multiplied by the number of days the project was active during the year. The total budget by year is then calculated as the sum of each project’s annual budget. 52

significant increases were noted in 2008 (delivery was USD 10.9m) and 200926 (delivery was USD 25m) when the growth rate was 314% and 129% respectively. Total budget for the period was USD 89,614,807. The decrease in the delivery rate in 2010 was due to the late approval of several projects and difficulties in approving and clearing LoAs.

183. Over 97% of the annual budget and financial delivery was through emergency recovery activities for which the budget holder was the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE). The FAO Representative was budget holder for just under 3% or USD 2.5m of the total program of USD 89m. This is a reflection of the donors’ preference for working outside the government framework under the ‘emergency’ umbrella.

Figure 3: 2006-2010- Annual Budget and Delivery

Source: Elaboration of Field Program Management Information System (FPMIS) data

184. The greatest challenge during the period was the delivery of more than USD 21m allocated to support the EU Food Facility Project implemented through the ERCU. The project, an exercise in logistics, distributed input packages to approximately 170,000 vulnerable households. Despite the operating constraints mentioned above, Zimbabwe was able to deliver over 80% of the original budget (USD 21m) by December 31 2010. An additional allotment from the EUFF of just over USD 3m was provided to cover support to the HIV/Livelihoods and Livestock activities which should be completed by end of June 2011. This success was to some extent at the expense of timely implementation of the rest of the field program since the ERCU did not hire additional staff to manage this huge operation.

3.4 Coordination

185. FAO achieved good coordination with other initiatives at national level . The ERCU activities in coordinating sector interventions through the ACWG and its working groups are widely recognized by all stakeholders. The ACWG was thought to be an effective forum for:

26 The boost in delivery during 2009 was due to expenditure of approximately USD 16.7m recorded for one project- the EU funded Food Facility project (GCP/ZIM/017/EC) 53

sharing information and knowledge among NGOS, Government and the donor community; reducing the extent of geographic overlap of NGO activities; and, agreeing on strategies to move the sector forward. However it appeared to the Mission that membership of the ACWG is almost a pre-requisite for partnering with FAO, which runs the risk of marginalizing local NGOs who are not members. Furthermore, as many NGOs and farmers organizations do not have the experience or skills to implement some activities, the Representation needs to be more innovative in building those skills.

186. An independent qualitative study, complemented by a quantitative survey of 125 ACWG stakeholders from Government, donor, NGO, private sector and academic streams, was undertaken to examine the effectiveness of FAO’s support for coordination in the agriculture sector. A full report is presented as annex F and the main findings are highlighted here. More than ¾ of the respondents indicated that information provided/shared within the ACWG was of good quality, enabling their organization to make plans and take decisions. Only ¼ of respondents, however, felt that the ACWG facilitated discussions on technical issues such as new technologies, good practices and common standards and tools. In terms of FAO’s performance and added value, in general the organization scored quite high27. FAO support for mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues, in particular HIV and AIDS and gender, scored less favourably. Key areas where respondents thought FAO could make improvements in coordination were identified as being a) through support to decentralization of coordination to regions/provinces, and b) through working to create greater ownership and involvement of Government in coordination fora.

187. While government has accepted FAO’s role in coordinating donor and NGO interventions on its behalf, they regard this as an interim solution until the political climate is more settled. They also expect FAO to advocate more actively with the donor community to support capacity building of its institutions in the sector and to support efforts to improve productivity, especially on communal lands.

188. FAO’s leadership in ACWG has not reduced the gap at sub-national levels. The Mission noted that there is a big gap in coordination at Provincial and District level that FAO and partners have not yet fully addressed. For example, in Hurungwe, AGRITEX seemed to have a limited overview of who was doing what where and at provincial level it appears as if contact between FAO and SAT and the AGRITEX officers has been limited to “courtesy calls” and information sharing on projects already funded/under implementation. Feedback suggests that AGRITEX would like to be involved in interventions from the planning stages. The gap may have arisen because there is no link or direct communication between the ACWG in Harare and the Provincial or District authorities. The Mission believes that FAO is right to prioritise and focus on strategic interventions in support of GoZ development agenda, and cannot take on coordination tasks at subnational levels. However it finds there is the need for improving communications through either decentralizing the ACWG activities, or, establishing an institutional response where all members of the ACWG, including FAO, would be required to report to the ACWG on actions taken to improve information sharing with Government at Provincial or District levels.

27 On a scale between 1 and 5, FAO scored on average 3.5/5.0 on things such as promoting emergency preparedness, engaging in policy dialogue with Government on issues of concern to the group, improving impact and accountability though adequate M&E, etc. 54

3.5 Partnerships

189. FAO partnerships with different stakeholders at various levels could be more effective. The Representation uses LoAs to define the scope of the partnership with IPs. This is not always appropriate however to cover broader areas of longer term cooperation that do not require funding. A broad framework agreement i.e. Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), that defines the types of activities, roles and responsibilities, methodologies and geographic coverage would help to establish a clear platform for partnering with all interested NGOs. For example, an LoA has been established with SNV (a Dutch NGO) to carryout time-bound activities with respect to testing the voucher system. The mission believes however that it would be more effective to have a broad based agreement that could also be used to mobilize resources dedicated to supporting agreed activities in testing the system. A second example where an MoU might be a better instrument is the current arrangement with the Department of Veterinary Services for implementing livestock disease control projects. Though adequate quantities of inputs are identified in LoAs signed with the Department, the mission was informed during our field visits that quantities received at District level were insufficient for the operations. It may be better to have a MoU with the Department that outlines all the areas of collaboration under which LoAs could be established at Provincial level for specific activities to be carried out. This would facilitate more timely delivery of adequate supplies of inputs at District levels.

190. Furthermore, not all of ERCU’s partners share a common understanding of one of the Representation’s strategic objectives i.e. to improve food security in vulnerable households. This raises the risk that well intentioned efforts to introduce cost recovery approaches to reduce dependence may result in the exclusion of vulnerable households if not well planned and communicated. It could also cause conflict with beneficiaries and/or within FAO.

3.6 Use of LoAs

191. A summary of commitments and expenditure for 2008-2010 is presented in Table 4.

Table 4 Summary of Annual LoA Commitments and Expenditure LoA / Year 2008 200928 2010 Number 22 45 37 Total commitment ($) 740,609 4,772,335 2,942,396 Total Paid ($) 740,820 4,239,115 2,347,041 Average size of LoAs 33,664 106,052 79,522 Source: ERCU records

192. The budget of LoAs linked to input distribution had an average of approximately 35% budgeted for training, 25% for NGO personnel costs and the remaining 40%29 covering logistics, travel and administrative costs. The LoAs included a note requiring NGOs to work with AGRITEX in training beneficiaries for which funds were included in the budget. However, as the Representation does not clearly specify the expected working relationship between the NGO and AGRITEX in the LoA it is up to the NGO to determine the modalities. During the Evaluation Mission’s field visits the AGRITEX Provincial and District level staff stated that some NGOs ‘hijacked’ their extension workers, which undermined the government’s program in the area.

282009 was an abnormal year due to the more than USD 2.5m committed on behalf of the EUFF project and the need to spend these funds within 12 months. 29 logistics 13%; travel 17%; administration 10% 55

Other NGOs worked closely with the AGRITEX staff from the planning stage so that all stakeholders were informed of on-going activities. Furthermore, the Representation treats the LoA as a ‘service delivery’ contract and its technical role or the extent of any technical guidance to be provided by FAO is not always indicated. From a capacity building perspective, the mission believes this strategy is not an efficient way of strengthening farmers’ access to the extension services given the short-term nature of the LoA or project and the NGOs wide interpretation of how to ‘collaborate’ with AGRITEX. There is a risk that without a more systematic approach to strengthening the extension services, it will not be possible to scale up other innovations introduced through the field program thereby raising questions of sustainability of these activities.

3.7 TCEO backstopping

193. TCEO provides operational support to those projects for which it is budget holder and also facilitates ERCU access to the technical divisions and CSAP as found necessary. This arrangement appears adequate and the mission found that support to the Zimbabwe office is usually timely and relevant to the issues being addressed. However, interviews with concerned staff indicated that there is a gap in the process. TCEO only becomes aware of innovations at country level, planned or on-going, if the ERCU includes the new concept in a project document or makes a specific request for assistance to TCEO. As a result, TCEO was not always informed of developments in a timely way consequently ERCU access to technical inputs from headquarters to help elaborate new concepts is ad hoc. We note that TCEO is planning more regular backstopping visits to Zimbabwe that will also include trips to project sites.

3.8 Innovative approaches to operations

194. Operationally, the Representation has responded flexibly to developments within the sector by trying out new approaches or by giving its support to other stakeholders who are willing to experiment with issues on which there is general agreement. Some efforts have been successful such as negotiating with the Government on policy issues like relaxing price controls that helped increase support for private sector re-entry to agriculture markets. Others, such as its attempt at drafting a sector strategy, have not been as successful since the draft has not been approved by Government.

195. Through partnering with NGOs, an initiative such as use of the voucher system is being piloted for FAO programs. Earlier attempts by NGOs showed that this approach was generally accepted by both farmers and suppliers and was effective in increasing farmer’s access to necessary inputs that they prioritized. If transparent and well managed, the approach should serve to increase incentives for vendor entry into the market and create healthy competition. The risk of households making bad choices must however be recognized and appropriately mitigated. FAO has had extensive experience with the voucher system in other countries which could greatly benefit the Zimbabwe program.

196. Use of revolving funds to improve farmer access to project benefits is another innovation currently being discussed with TCEO and which is also being piloted on a limited scale. The mission noted that the NGOs were largely acting on their own initiative and that critical issues such as who would manage the fund and how it would be used have still to be determined. The ERCU does not have the experience or the capacity to manage this initiative and will need assistance from headquarters as the expertise does not exist in the SFS.

197. The internal consultative process for both ERCU and the non-emergency program needs strengthening as the current process does not adequately address: i) timeliness; ii) the weak linkages between feedback from M+E and project operations or the lack of systematic follow-up

by senior management; iii) the weak synergy between the two program components. For example in designing a project, not all the key stakeholders are involved to ensure, inter alia, that gender considerations are included in the project or that the procurement process can be initiated in a timely way or that realistic budgets have been assigned for all activities. The M+E feedback process for both sets of activities is not adequately linked to the operations nor does it include systematic follow-up by senior management. The operating modalities are not always transparent or fully utilized i.e. selection of IPs, use of LoAs and MoUs. A resource mobilization strategy has not been developed which weakens management for the Representation as a whole.

4. Impacts

4.1 The use of Sustainable Livelihoods Framework to assess impacts

198. In this chapter on impacts, the Mission bases its analysis on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) because most field projects of FAO’s Zimbabwe Program focus on the improvement of SHFs livelihoods. First the analysis looks at the overall outcomes of the major strategies of the Program which are crucial for sustainable development and improved rural livelihoods. These strategies are agricultural input support, CA, crop diversification, animal health, mainstreaming HIV and AIDS, and forestry. The analysis continues with the assessment of the impacts of FAO’s interventions on households assets (or capital) which, in the context of the Program. For this it interrogates the following aggregations of livelihoods assets:

− Natural assets (land, water, forests, range). − Social-political assets (membership of local groups, farmers’ associations for self-help, access to wider institutions of society). − Human capital (knowledge, skills, health). − Physical capital (transport and irrigation infrastructure, water wells, tools and equipment). − Financial (income, contracts, stocks, savings).

199. In a third step, the analysis assesses whether the improved assets contribute to reduction of vulnerability of SHFs and to reinforcing their resilience to shocks.

4.2 Livelihoods outcomes resulting from the major FAO’s Program strategies

4.2.1 Environment

200. The agricultural projects emphasized conservation agriculture and inputs (including fertilizers) distribution. The basic principles of CA are minimum tillage, crop residue retention, and crop rotations. Their correct application leads to positive results on environment. There is an improved status of soil organic matter and soil cover through mulching. One clear positive environmental impact is therefore the rehabilitation of farms production potential through improved soil and water conservation. However, even if the extent of carbon sequestration under CA requires to be ascertained in some AEZ and cropping systems, CA remains an important technology that improves soil biological processes, and improves its physical characteristics.

4.2.2 Crop and animal productions

201. Overall, the main outcomes of the Program include a considerable contribution to increased crop production, crop diversification, improved protection of livestock from disease,

and increased income from sale of crop and animal productions. With the concurrent positive trend in rainfall pattern in since 2009, there has been a gradual improvement of the food availability since 2009. FAO’s projects on input distribution and CA have considerably enabled beneficiaries to increase maize yields significantly above national average. 70-100% beneficiaries achieved maize yields equivalent to at least 2000kg per ha in 2009/2010 agricultural season and top 25% farmers had mean maize yield of 3500-4500 kg per ha. There was also an impact on farmers who did not get direct assistance from the project but who could witness the progress made by their neighbours and visit the demonstration plots. Another important outcome is the contribution of vegetable gardens and poultry in terms of nutrition and year round cash flow. There is a steadily growing awareness among SHFs that farming is a business and input loaned in the contract farming system need to be repaid. Linkages between them and the Private Sector have been established, though they are still fragile.

4.2.3 Food security

202. FAO's M&E system has tended to focus on measuring impact at the level of food availability with less focus on impacts on food access (i.e. income) and utilization (consumption). One good practice encountered during the mission was observed during a site visit to a CADS horticulture project. CADS has been promoting vegetable production for some time in the area and has recently trying to more systematically collect information from beneficiaries on what use is made of the food produced. Although the information provided to the mission was crude and unprocessed, there is clearly potential for undertaking analysis of income and food consumption based on the data collected.

203. With respect to impacts on knowledge, the mission believes that training on nutrition provided has contributed to “first generation” changes in knowledge i.e. at the level of the direct beneficiary. However, as a training-of-trainers approach has been used in a number of activities (e.g. Health Harvest training for extension workers, training of teachers and students in school gardens), further efforts are needed to measure changes in behaviour at household level resulting from FAO interventions.

204. The rather generic programming approach used by FAO over the past five years to promote adequate scaling up may have had a downside insofar as interventions may not always have had the desired impacts for different target groups. More vulnerable food insecure groups (in particular those with household labour deficits) do not appear to have been as successfully reached as more economically viable households.

4.3 Impact on livelihood assets

4.3.1 Physical assets.

205. FAO’s Program has not tackled physical infrastructure deficiencies. In general, the impact of inputs distribution projects on physical assets at SHFs level was generally low. As many projects focused on CA in which no-tilling was one of the key messages, households did not get support to have better endowment of farm equipment such as low-tillage assets. The exception is with project OSRO/ZIM/905/SPA which assisted the enhancement of some productive infrastructure consisting of livestock fences and dipping facilities for use by cattle owners. In some areas, water wells played a key role in increasing water availability for beneficiaries of the horticulture program. This reduces the time that particularly women had to devote to the daily search of water for gardening.

206. With regard to livestock projects, important results have been achieved for prevention and containment of disease outbreak with the aim of reducing the disease risk and possible loss

of livestock. In a number of these projects, various physical assets such as bicycles, motorcycles, motor vehicles, computers and laboratory equipment were provided as part of capacity building for improved service delivery. The laboratory capacity building in particular facilitated the accreditation of the Central Veterinary Laboratory for Newcastle disease and FMD test protocols (ISO 17025).

4.3.2 Human assets.

207. FAO’s interventions increased knowledge and experience at various levels. In relation to CA, training gave skills and knowledge to beneficiary SHFs to enable them to use CA. This new experience gave them motivation to be more productive in their farming activities. As a result, they are able to perform activities that can sustain livelihoods. However, FAO’s projects have not been able to tap in the multiple farmers’ innovations and knowledge in coping with diverse vulnerabilities in order to engineer extension packages that can address resilience concerns.

208. In relation to animal health, Government personnel and other partners interacted with FAO through training, workshops, LWG meetings and other consultative and information sharing forums; this has built synergy and increased knowledge asset among the interacting parties. The practical experience in, for example, M&E which has been useful in implementing other similar programs, such as those funded by the European Union and USAID. Community knowledge and experience acquired through Avian Influenza awareness creation, poultry management training and training on dip tank management among others is still in memory and is being used for instance in Kadoma district where a number of farmers and village groups have started their own Broiler projects with the knowledge and experience gained through one of the FAO supported projects implemented by Sustainable Agriculture Trust (SAT).

209. Human assets improvements were also achieved in the areas of Nutrition and HIV and AIDS. Promoting gardens through schools, training of extension workers in nutrition, and promotion of community gardens has contributed to greater knowledge on nutrition and horticulture production. The strategy of using training colleges for HIV mainstreaming to train trainers has allowed scaling-up of the efforts to change knowledge attitudes and practices.

4.3.3 Natural assets

210. FAO’s projects promoting CA contributed to reducing land degradation. However, no effort was deployed to integrate crop production, livestock and tree planting. Furthermore, farmers did not get any assistance to manage community range resources. At farms level and in the immediate context of the farms, there is no impact of the Program’s interventions on natural assets.

4.3.4 Social-political assets

211. Communities were encouraged to develop their capacities to work together as groups in CA operations strengthening their capacities for collective action in solving their production problems. This coming together starts through training in demonstration plots. With this improved social articulation, it is easier to benefit from opportunities of development services, in particular those aiming at access to inputs and market linkage. Whether these groups can grow stronger and be able to access institutions (ex. Extension, Credit) and services providers remains to be seen.

4.3.5 Financial assets.

212. Many beneficiary SHFs visited by the Mission indicated that their families are now by far financially more secure than before FAO’s project support. They are able to manage payments for school and home needs without compromising agricultural activities plan for the future. One farmer even said that with CA he increased maize yields and got higher income which allowed him to buy a plow and two draught cows.

213. With free or subsidized inputs, production with the main crops is profitable. However, with the relatively high rates of chemical fertilizers that are applied for maize (reaching 400-600 kg/ha) profitability would be questionable if the farmer had to meet all the costs. Profitability of FAO’s projects supported crops varies considerably with grain crops and commercial legume crops offering returns of less than US$360 per hectare in 2010/2011 agricultural season based on targeted yields. Legume seed crops show estimated returns of US$500-560 per hectare whereas horticultural crops such as paprika and Tabasco have a projected return of US$1300 – 1500 per hectare. Returns to family labour for other crops range from around USD$2 per day for groundnuts (due to poor prices combined with high labour demand) ; USD3-4 per day for grain crops and USD$5-6 per day for horticultural crops such as Paprika and Chillies (due to labour demands in excess of 200 labour days per hectare).

214. In poor households, particularly in drier AEZ which present higher climatic variability risk, financial assets are of a particular importance for successful livelihoods strategy. There was considerable evidence from FAO’s partners interviewed, field visits, special consultant study and document review showing that the field projects have resulted in improved income situation for the beneficiary SHFs. Control of tick borne diseases and vaccination against FMD, Anthrax, Rabies, and Newcastle Disease contributed to saving livestock asset which is an important illiquid financial asset.

4.4 Impact on policies, institutions and processes (PIPs)

215. FAO’s interventions have had a limited impact on rural institutions. Such institutions are important because they influence the way in which rural people interrelate and act, how assets are controlled and used and influence livelihood strategies. There was no investing in creating or catalyzing the creation of spaces where SHFs can interact with transformation structures and processes that impact on livelihoods. National structures that have sub-national presence are for example the Farmers Unions. These lack capacity and means to interact and engage with local communities. In FAO’s Program, they act as IPs in a way that does not allow their grassroots membership to hold them as accountable.

216. With regard to empowerment processes, some CA, goat and gardening projects empowered women and helped them improve their livelihoods. Some women indicated to the Mission that they had managed to pay fees for their children, gained confidence to deal with marketing agencies, developed social skills as a result of mixing and networking with others, built houses, bought utensils from the proceeds of their agricultural produce.

217. Women do not usually own draft power as cattle are a male domain traditionally, however conservation farming has managed to encompass even the women and men who do not have draft power and this enabled women and the youth who are less likely to have draft power to participate in agricultural production. However high labour requirement for conservation farming had a negative impact on women as it resulted in heavy workload burden for them. Women compared to men are already involved in a variety of reproductive roles such as home and child care, and with the advent of HIV they are involved in home based care. Some women reported that they had chest pains as a result of digging of holes. The program has not effectively introduced herbicides and mechanization which could have lightened the burden for women during holing and weeding.

4.5 Reducing vulnerability of SHFs

218. In Zimbabwe, SHFs operate in a context characterized by high vulnerability. The factors of this vulnerability are diverse and include climate variability and climate change, market access and market conditions, shocks (droughts, livestock diseases, etc.). The Mission analysed how the strategies used in FAO’s interventions strengthened the resilience of SHFs and their farming systems to the impacts of these vulnerability factors.

219. Many Program’s strategies such as crop diversification, livestock genetic improvement, training, and market linkages, contribute to reducing SHFs vulnerably. The interventions on prevention and containment of animal disease outbreak – by reducing the disease risk and possible loss of livestock contributed to reduction of food insecurity and vulnerability. However, there is still room for assisting the farmers to establish farming systems that can increase their resilience, in particular to climate variability.

5. Sustainability and Connectedness

220. The assessment of sustainability attempts to show what might happen after projects completion. In particular, the Mission considered the likelihood that services provided by FAO’s projects during their implementation will continue. In this regard, longer-term sustainability is an issue due to many factors. First, FAO and its partners are not devoting enough resources to supporting/strengthening of farmers institutions. Second, resources have not, until recently, been available for institutional capacity development for Government extension services at provincial and district levels. Third, within Government, there is a severe lack of capacity and an inadequate incentive environment for the provision of extension services. Fourth, there is still lack of a clear strategy not only in targeting but also in duration as far as free distribution of agricultural inputs is concerned. Input subsidies can undermine sustainability when provided for productions that are commercially viable and sustainable even after the project closes and the subsidy is discontinued. On the other hand, in addition to helping counter food insecurity in poorer households, input subsidies were undoubtedly useful in promoting conservation agriculture.

221. With regard to the livestock sector, most of the livestock/animal health interventions were of emergency nature. They were primarily designed to prevent and contain disease outbreaks. In this case, there was virtually no sustainability mechanism built in. Apparently, it was assumed that once the ‘emergencies’ were contained, the Government, through the Department of Veterinary Services, would sustain routine disease preventive schedules. Whereas it is possible that in the long run, and after the economic situation improves, the Government of Zimbabwe will be able to sustain disease control measures; there is urgent need to put in place stop gap measures to ensure smooth transitioning. FAO should create an avenue for discussion with other stakeholders with a view to finding a way forward.

222. In the area of nutrition, successful experiences have been scaled up. The Healthy Harvest continues to be used by partners and materials developed under the school garden pilot together with UNICEF have been incorporated by UNICEF in their national “Child Friendly Schools” program. Efforts by organizations such as CADS to link up horticultural groups with Harare vegetable wholesalers is also to be commended and will help ensure that producer groups establish enduring relationships with markets that help them to maintain predictable incomes.

223. In food security, training provided by FAO to MoAMID extensionists has created skills that will continue to be employed. However, individual knowledge is not sufficient to create long term institutional capacity and this and future years crop assessments may be jeopardized if financial and material resources are not made available to AGRITEX in a sustainable way. In the same vein, while FAO and partners are to be commended for the institutional approach being taken in the design of the new FNC capacity development initiative, due attention should be paid to sustainability aspects associated with the new structures, and resource requirements for technologies and data gathering and analysis options fully considered.

224. While the coordination mechanisms set up under the ACWG are highly effective at a technical level, they are substituting at least theoretically for Government oversight and coordination mechanisms that would help link in a more sustainable way technical issues with policy. There is talk about establishing a “food security cluster”, joining up the food aid sector and agricultural cluster work – however given the explicit focus on humanitarian action within the OCHA lead cluster approach, it is not clear how appropriate or useful such a shift would be.

225. On HIV and AIDS, Horizontal and vertical HIV and AIDS structures created in Ministry of Agriculture will help ensure continued support. HIV modules for training in colleges are being utilized. The use of training colleges for HIV mainstreaming to train trainers is an effective strategy for scaling-up efforts to change knowledge attitudes and practices.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

1. Conclusions

226. FAO’s cooperation with Zimbabwe, in a particularly difficult context of the period 2006- 2010, has been of high quality. The results reached are valued by all partners (Government, donors, and implementing partners) and the beneficiaries. The program was clearly relevant to the needs of beneficiaries in a period of agricultural production breakdown, and to the priorities of government as far as the recovery of the agriculture sector is concerned. FAO’s readiness to work with a range of partners (Government, NGOs, private sector) was also relevant. Playing a key role in coordination groups has been appropriate and responsive to the particular country’s context. With regard to supporting increased crop production, Government, Donors, other partners and beneficiaries are satisfied with FAO project activities.

227. With regard to the five evaluation criteria used by the Evaluation, FAO’s overall performance warrants acknowledgement. In particular, the Program has been effective in contributing to the recovery of agricultural production. The yield increases are attributed both to rainfall and the adoption of the technological package CA-fertilizer supported by FAO’s input distribution program. The activities supporting market linkages for SHFs brought significant benefits to the beneficiaries. With regard to animal health, there was an adequate coverage and response to deal with diseases. Training of Community Based Vaccinators enhanced effectiveness in ND vaccination. In the area of food security and nutrition, the approaches of promoting gardens through schools, training of extension workers in nutrition, and promotion of community gardens has contributed to greater knowledge on nutrition and horticulture production.

228. There are several opportunities for further improvements. With regard to relevance, lack of an integrative approach to adequately link Crop – livestock – tree production in order to optimize their contribution to climate change adaptation reduces appropriateness to beneficiaries needs. To strengthen SHFS’ resilience namely to climatic variability in drier AEZs (IIb, III, IV, V), more support should be provided to SHFs to integrate other productions such as livestock and trees in their farming systems. In the area of food security and nutrition, FAO efforts to support food and nutrition security have tended to focus on increasing staple food production with a community targeting approach that has allowed for significant scaling up but not always the most suitable interventions for different areas and groups. FAO nutrition related interventions offer some positive examples of how to change nutrition related knowledge attitudes and practices. Support provided for collecting and analysing food and nutrition data has been effective and appreciated. However, further analysis is needed to fully understand the underlying causes of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in order to inform longer term policy and planning. There are gaps in the Government policy/strategic framework with respect to food and nutrition security and disaster risk management that urgently need to be addressed.

229. Operational strategies developed facilitated adaptation to the functioning environment for both Emergency and non-emergency operations. Project Design and Operations Planning are standardized to aid efficiency. The staffing structure and funding resources in the past were appropriate for the program activities, but that may no longer be the case against the requirements of the CPF and Plan of Action.

2. Recommendations

38. The Evaluation has demonstrated the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of FAO’s cooperation program in Zimbabwe in the period 2006-2010. The portfolio consists mainly of short term interventions funded by emergency resources, but its main partner, the GoZ, would like to shift swiftly to development, while maintaining and consolidating the achievements reached so far. In the perspective of planning and implementing longer term development interventions, it may be expected that the new CPF will require a shift in expertise in the Country Team. All stakeholders being satisfied with the relevance and the effectiveness of the interventions, the following recommendations are made on key issues to suggest what the Mission believes to be measures that would allow FAO’s Zimbabwe program to consolidate its many valued results, particularly at SHFs level, especially in relation to the impacts and sustainability of those results.

39. FAO’s Cooperation Framework not yet formalized. FAO has not had a formalized framework for its cooperation with Zimbabwe during a key transitional period. The ZUNDAF represents a broader framework for assuring coherence/alignment with Government priorities and synergies with other UN Agencies. The draft CPF and PoA largely reflect the same priorities – one reflecting a strategic vision and the other an operational tool. However, in such a dynamic context, it is not appropriate to have a 5 year operational plan.

40. Plethora of coordination mechanisms . There is a plethora of coordination mechanisms in place. ERCU efforts to coordinate the agriculture sector have been effective and have contributed to improved coverage and improved the quality/consistency of interventions. However, coordination at sub-national level has been weak. The political context is starting to change and it is time for FAO to begin to gradually hand back the leadership for coordination to the MoAMID.

41. Elaboration of national policy frameworks . FAO is to be commended for its contribution to the elaboration of national policy frameworks including the agriculture policy and HIV and AIDS in agriculture strategy – given the context. Nevertheless there are gaps in the strategic framework and FAO is in a position to support the Government and facilitate dialogue on policy and strategy between Government and Donors.

agricultural extension. This will require additional support from its sub-regional and HQs services (TCS and Technical Divisions).

42. Strengthening delivery of extension services to SHFs. The approach of working with Farmers Unions (FUs) as IPs has not strengthened SHFs empowerment – in particular their negotiating capacity. FAO’s approach has not contributed to strengthening the accountability of the Farmers Unions to their grassroots members. FAO support has impacted favourably on veterinary services. While FAO and IPs have provided training and small financial/material support to individual AGRITEX extensionists, AGRITEX has received very limited support at an organizational level.

43. Gender equity and gender mainstreaming. 70% of Zimbabwe’s agricultural workforce is female and gender equity is a priority identified by the GoZ, UNDAF, SADC and FAO’s own corporate framework. The FAO Zimbabwe program, however is not contributing in any deliberate way to female empowerment within the agricultural sector.

44. Livelihood analysis. FAO has made an important contribution to the collection of crop production data and has participated in a number of other food security and nutrition related data gathering efforts. In addition, it supported the development of normative guidance and standardized approaches that have helped to scale up interventions across the country. It is now time, however, to invest more in understanding livelihood challenges and opportunities to develop differentiated interventions appropriate to the needs of different areas and groups.

45. Identifying and reaching the target groups . Design and targeting of FAO’s interventions have been generic. Differential targeting would reinforce the relevance of the program because it is the best way of taking specific group needs into account. There is scope to improve targeting criteria and targeting mechanisms in order to reach the beneficiaries in a more differentiated way, according to their specific constraints.

46. Reengineering CA. FAO has achieved considerable results in the promotion of CA in Zimbabwe. In some of its projects, there are promising results as far as promoting integrated

farming systems is concerned. However, there are important challenges of how to scale-up in terms of area coverage both at national and farm levels. At farm level, many SHFs face a problem of labour availability to be able to cover more than 1-2 ha with CA. There is also a challenge of how to put in place a whole-farm approach that integrates CA with livestock and trees to sustainably address the farmers’ diverse livelihood needs, and to reduce the rates of Nitrogen applied from chemical fertilizers over time.

47. Operational support and programming. Internal systems are appropriate – although senior management team functioning can be improved to ensure effective steering of the programme and efficient planning of interventions. There have been delivery delays, confusion on the management of repayment and subsidy modalities, and insufficient transparency with respect to the selection of IPs. It should also be noted that FAO has recently updated its guidance on the use of LoAs, including transfers to beneficiaries. With regard to distribution of inputs, it should be noted that market functioning has improved in the last two years and direct distribution of inputs to beneficiaries is no longer appropriate.

− Recommendation 11 : Where an asset is created (i.e. from demonstration plots) or a farmer repayment is envisioned i.e. into a revolving fund or put towards a public good, the modalities for managing and using the proceeds should be discussed and agreed by the community and documented. This approach should be made explicit in the LoAs and appropriate controls built in to ensure accountability.

− Recommendation 12 . The FAO Representative, TCEO, ADG/RAF and OSD should consider combining the two units i.e. the Programme Unit and the ERCU, to create a strategic planning/programming function, and, an operations function that would have responsibility for planning and implementing the overall field programme. The FAO Representative should establish regular senior management team meetings to discuss strategic direction of the programme, resource mobilization (human & financial) priorities, and key FAO messages and organizational positions. To maximize the feedback loop between learning and programming, and to ensure gender mainstreaming receives adequate attention, the mission recommends that both the M&E Officer and Gender focal point be included in the SMT.

ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

FAO Office of Evaluation

EVALUATION OF FAO’S COOPERATION WITH ZIMBABWE 2006- 2010

November 2010

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 72 THE FAO ZIMBABWE PROGRAMME: LAST FIVE YEARS 74 PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION 78 SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION 78 EVALUATION ISSUES AND QUESTIONS 80 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 83 THE EVALUATION REPORT 85 COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM 85 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 86 EVALUATION TIMETABLE 87

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

ACWG Agricultural Coordination Working Group

AGRITEX Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services

CA/CF Conservation Farming /Conservation Agriculture

CFSAM Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission

ERCU Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (FAO)

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

GoZ Government of Zimbabwe

GPA Global Political Agreement

IP Implementing Partner

LoA Letter of Agreement

MDT Multi-Disciplinary Team (FAO)

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NMTPF National Medium Term Priority Framework (FAO)

ODA Official Development Assistance

PoA Plan of Action (FAO)

SFS Sub Regional Office for Southern Africa (FAO)

STERP Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme

TCE Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (FAO)

TCP Technical Cooperation Programme

ZimVAC Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

Introduction 2. The evaluation of FAO’s Cooperation in Zimbabwe is part of a series of country evaluations that started in 2006. Since then eight country evaluations have been carried out and two synthesis reports drawing common conclusions and lessons from like-type country evaluations have been presented to the Programme Committee. Country-focused evaluation examines the totality of FAO’s work, including national projects, country participation in regional and global projects, use made of normative products and performance of the FAO country representation. The key considerations in these evaluations are the utility of the Organization’s work to the Member Country and the extent to which this draws on FAO’s comparative advantages.

3. Zimbabwe has been selected as the focus of a country evaluation during 2010-2011 based on the overall size of the programme and lack of existing recent evaluations of specific projects within the programme. The terms of reference have been prepared after an initial review of the country context and portfolio of FAO projects in Zimbabwe over the period 2006-2010, an inception mission to Zimbabwe to discuss the evaluation focus with internal and external stakeholders, and following exploratory discussions with stakeholders at FAO HQ including the Zimbabwe Permanent Representative to FAO, senior managers from the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCEO) and some of the main technical units who provide backstopping to the Zimbabwe programme.

4. The purpose of the terms of reference is to describe the Zimbabwe programme and identify some of the key areas of work undertaken over the last five years, to table the scope of the evaluation, and to define an initial evaluation workplan. The terms of reference will be complemented by the Inception Report – which is a document prepared by the independent evaluation team leader to further refine the scope, methods, team composition and roles & responsibilities.

The Context

5. Zimbabwe has an estimated population of 12.2 million people and a land area of 390,580 km with 37% of the population leaving in rural areas. In 2007, it ranked 151 out of 179 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI). Life expectancy at birth is 44 years and adult literacy rate amounts at 91.4%. In the Sub-Saharan African region, Zimbabwe is amongst the worst affected country by HIV pandemic. In the last decade, the country has made significant effort to reduce the spread of HIV with positive results. Adults HIV/AIDS rate went down from 26% in 2001 to 15.3% in 2007.

6. Zimbabwe has experienced ten years of economic crisis. This period was characterized by hyper-inflation, massive devaluation of the currency, low productive capacity, loss of jobs, food shortages, poverty, massive de-industrialisation and general despondency (GoZ, 2009). After the 2008 elections, a new Inclusive Government was formed, under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by President Mugabe (ZAMU-PF) and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mtambara. Even though the GPA has not been fully implemented yet, the new government is making progress and the situation has improved. In March 2009, the new government launched the Government’s Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP I) covering the period February to December 2009. The Plan is a key document summarizing Government’s priorities to address the economic crisis.

Agricultural 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 GDP growth est. exp. rate % -3.9 -22.7 -1.0 -2.9 -10.0 -4.5 -5.0 -17.5 positive

Source: CFSAM 2009

7. The STERP gives central position to the Agriculture Sector and addresses the crucial issue of the Land Reform. Hyper-inflation has recently come down. In 2009 the Government has abandoned the Zimbabwe dollar replacing it with the USA dollar, South African Rand and Botswana pula, and it has undertaken economic reform liberalizing most sectors of the economy. Recently, a new five-year Medium-Term Plan (MTP) 2010-2015 has been drafted, representing the overall macroeconomic and social policy for the next five years.

8. The Agricultural sector accounts for 15/20% of GDP and about 70% of the population depends on it. Since 2000, the agricultural sector has experienced a significant negative trend. In 2000 following political and social pressures (land occupation), the government introduced the Fast Track Land Reform that has had a strong impact on food production. Moreover, a combination of other factors contributed to decreasing production. The main agricultural constraints are shortage of agricultural inputs, insufficient extension services due to inadequate resources (human and financial), limited use of mechanization, unsatisfactory dipping facilities and a seriously under-staffed and under-founded veterinary service. The policy of price control introduced at the end of the 90s further decreased food production. The recent implementation of liberalization policies has ended the Grain Marketing Board GMB monopoly. The liberalization policies are having positive results on productivity as competition creates new incentives for production.

9. However an important issue as yet unresolved is the issue of land tenure, particularly with respect to areas of high agricultural potential. Since the land reform started in 2000, the fertile farmland previously managed by large commercial Zimbabwean farmers have been nationalized and subsequently given out in 5ha parcels to smallholders (A1 resettlement) or in larger commercial land tracts (A2 resettlement). Donors have not agreed with the Governments fast track land reform programme and in general have not been willing to provide support for production in the resettlement areas. Recently, however, there have been movements to launch a land audit to resolve ongoing ownership disputes. The EU has committed funds for this work within the context of their recent decision to support the recovery of the sugar sector in Zimbabwe - on the basis that this was “critically needed to ensure a proper framework for an increased productivity of the agriculture sector.” 30

10. International assistance (ODA) over the past five years has totalled roughly half a billion USD per year. While there are some funded programmes (i.e. HIV/AIDS), aid has largely been confined to emergency funds channelled through the UN and NGOs – in the agriculture sector, specifically for livelihood support to subsistence farmers living in the less fertile communal areas.

11. The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC) 2009 Report estimated that 1.1-1.6 million rural people are food insecure (10-15% population). The highest levels of food insecurity are found in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. The highest numbers of food insecure households are concentrated in the Midlands and Manicaland regions.

30 EU Press Release Oct 2010. http://www.delzwe.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/sugar_sector.pdf

The FAO Zimbabwe Programme: Last Five Years

12. The FAO Zimbabwe team, in consultation with national Government and partner stakeholders, has prepared a cooperation framework (NMTPF/NPF) within which the following priorities have been identified for the period 2009-2013; • Enhancing the policy environment • Improving incentives • Pricing and marketing • Finance and Credit • Agricultural Information Systems

13. The document is still in draft form as of September 2010 – almost two years into the implementation period. FAO has also prepared a Plan of Action 2010-2015 for transitioning emergency into rehabilitation and development. The PoA identifies the following priorities for the next five years: • Humanitarian-Livelihood Assistance and Increased Food Security for Vulnerable Groups • Increased Productivity and Commercialization of Smallholders • Strengthening Agriculture and Early Warning Management Information Systems

14. The current FAOR has been in post for 3 years and is also the Coordinator for the Sub- Regional Office for Southern Africa (SFS). Including the SFS team, the Country Office and the Emergency Unit there are approximately 80 FAO staff based in Zimbabwe. The Country Office regular programme budget covers only 5 staff including both officers and support staff while the emergency coordination unit includes 40 staff. There are 12 staff for administration, finance and IT. The balance represents the regional multi-disciplinary team (MDT). The Zimbabwe programme is supported through the regional office in Accra (SAF) and, at headquarters level, a cross-divisional country focus team has been established under the coordination of TC. Finally, technical advice on emergency interventions has been provided by the regional emergency office for southern Africa (REOSA) and in the area of animal health, by the ECTAD regional office in Gaberone.

15. The Zimbabwe programme total delivery over last five years includes roughly USD 1.3 million of regular programme funding 31 managed by the FAOR principally used to finance the FAO Representation, plus approximately USD 2.1 million in responses to GoZ requests for TCP support and an additional USD35,000 in Telefood projects. In addition FAO has secured USD 72 million of extra-budgetary project funding (29 country dedicated projects) managed by TCE. Complementary support has been provided through 38 regional/global projects which have included Zimbabwe as a recipient country.

31 Excluding FAOR salary and benefits.

Of the 41 projects implemented exclusively in Zimbabwe over the past 5 years (Annex 1), projects totalling over US$ 2 million include:

Total Starting and Project Project Title Budget Ending Date DWH

Agricultural Input Assistance to Vulnerable Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe and the Co- GCP /ZIM/017/EC SD 2009-04 ordination and Monitoring of Agricultural $24,004,712 Emergency Interventions ED 2010-12

Promotion of Conservation Agriculture (CA) OSRO/ZIM/907/EC and Coordination of Agricultural Activities in SD 2010-01 Zimbabwe. $13,855,422 ED 2012-12

Agricultural Input Assistance to Vulnerable Smallholder Farmers in Zimbabwe and the Co- OSRO/ZIM/805/EC SD 2008-08 ordination and Monitoring of Agricultural $5,744,296 Emergency Interventions ED 2009-07

Conservation Agriculture (CA)/Farmers Unions Project: Enhancing and Stabilizing Agricultural OSRO/ZIM/806/EC SD 2008-08 Productivity for Communal Farmers through $4,197,083 Advanced Land Use and Management Practices ED 2011-08

Improvement of food security and livelihoods of OSRO/ZIM/906/NET smallholder farmers through provision of SD 2009-07 extension and inputs $2,941,159 ED 2010-08

Provision of emergency agricultural assistance to smallholder vulnerable families in Zimbabwe OSRO/ZIM/501/EC SD 2005-05 and the co-ordination and monitoring of $2,527,381 emergency agricultural interventions ED 2006-02

Improved Coordination through Generation of OSRO/ZIM/901/USA Agricultural Information, Seed multiplication, SD 2009-01 Livestock Vaccination and surveillance. $2,434,000 ED 2009-12

16. Of these projects, none have had independent OED evaluations. Two important thematic evaluations carried out by FAO OED, however, have included Zimbabwe among the visited

countries; these are the 2010 evaluation of FAO’s work in Capacity Development and the 2010 Strategic Evaluation of Country Programming and the NMTPF of FAO . In both cases, the focus of the visit was on the Sub-Regional Office, although information on FAO’s Zimbabwe programme is also provided. Furthermore, a Mid-Term review of the projects OSRO/RAF/510-511/SAF “Strengthening Livelihood through Food and Nutrition Security in Vulnerable SADC Countries” (incorporating Lessons from 403/404/SAF) was carried out in 2006. The EU has carried out an independent monitoring exercise of Food Facility work undertaken by FAO in Zimbabwe and ECHO has undertaken 2 verification missions during the period under review. The existence of independent evaluations that have covered aspects of FAO’s work in Zimabwe is considered positive; however, the number of these evaluations is limited if compared to other countries.

17. A large share of FAO’s programme in Zimbabwe has focussed on input distributions. Conservation Agriculture (CA) has been promoted across a number of input distribution projects, providing training to beneficiaries of inputs. There have also been a number of dedicated CA projects. There are several projects which have focussed on Animal Health and another group of interventions that have promoted Nutrition Gardens with a special focus on HIV/AIDS affected households. Other areas of work have included: certified seeds, education, livestock, human and wildlife conflicts management, cassava production, forestry, fishery, and mechanization support services. A desk review of FAO projects indicates that very little attention has been paid to the issue of gender equity in the design of the interventions. The main target group has been smallholder farmers living in communal areas.

18. In Zimbabwe, FAO plays an important role coordinating the humanitarian relief and recovery interventions in the Agricultural sector, leading the Agricultural Working Group ACWG and supporting other sub-working groups (Conservation Agriculture Task Force; the Seed Houses Meeting; the Livestock Working Group; the Garden Working Group and the Market linkages Working Group). FAO has also a strong monitoring role; it works to provide reliable information to stakeholders and monitoring relief interventions through the collection, analysis and presentation of agriculture-related information and statistics. There is a large FAO M&E team in Harare who works both on monitoring of projects being directly implemented by FAO and its partners – as well as on monitoring and analyzing the overall food security and agriculture situation and trends within the country. This and other analysis (e.g. IPC, crop and food supply assessment missions) contribute to a broader analysis undertaken by the Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZIMVAC).

19. With respect to FAO’s work in policy, FAO has played an important role in the development of an HIV/AIDS in Agriculture strategy, a strategy to mitigate human-animal conflict in protected areas, and most recently has supported the drafting of a national agriculture policy. FAO has engaged in policy debates on maize marketing and the role of Government.

20. Amongst the 38 regional and global projects, activities that appear to have had a particular focus on Zimbabwe include two HIV/AIDS related projects that focus on support for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OSRO/RAF/617/SWE and OSRO/RAF/806/CEF), two transboundary animal disease control interventions (OSRO/RAF/511/SAF and OSRO/RAF/719/USA), a regional food security project (OSRO/RAF/510/SAF), several conservation agriculture projects (OSRO/RAF/810/SWE, OSRO/ZIM/907/EC and OSRO/RAF/812/NOR), and a horticulture outgrower project (CFC/FISGTF/19). All but the last is managed by the FAO regional emergency office for Southern Africa in Johannesburg (REOSA).

21. Many of the projects cover multiple provinces and districts which are sometimes but not always identified in project documentation. During the inception mission, evaluation team members attempted to get an overview of the geographic focus of country programme activities.

The mission request for a mapping of interventions was still outstanding at the time of the finalization of the TORs.

22. Providing USD 55 million to the programme, the EU has been by far the largest donor to the FAO’s Programme in Zimbabwe over the past five years - representing 74% of the total budget, followed by USA (5.1%), UK (4.4%), Netherlands (4%), Sweden (2.8%%), Spain (2.1%), Ireland (1.8%%) and South Africa which has been an important donor to regional projects which have implicated Zimbabwe.

Purpose of the Evaluation

23. The Zimbabwe Country Evaluation aims at improving the relevance and performance of FAO interventions, providing accountability and deriving lessons for better formulation and implementation in future. It must provide stakeholders with a systematic and objective assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the interventions, as well as of their performance in responding to HIV/AIDS gender and social equity issues 32 .

Key Stakeholders to the Evaluation

24. Rural communities are a primary stakeholder for the FAO Zimbabwe programme and a cross-section of community members from different regions and from different socio-economic groups will be consulted with during the evaluation.

25. The FAOR, management at country and HQ levels within the Emergency and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) and the Government will be key target audiences for the evaluation report. Furthermore, implementing partners among which NGOs and Farmers’ Unions will be also consulted.

26. The main donors to the FAO Zimbabwe programme (listed above) will be important stakeholders.

27. Sister UN agencies (including in WB, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA and IFAD) and in particular those with whom strategic interventions were identified in the context of the UNDAF will need to be consulted.

Scope of the Evaluation

28. The evaluation will cover the totality of FAO’s work in Zimbabwe encompassing all activities providing direct support to the country, irrespective of the source of funding (Regular Programme or extra budgetary resources) or from where they are managed (HQs, Regional Office or the FAOR) during the period 2006- 2010. A complete list of projects is included as Annex 1 to this document.

29. The evaluation will also include an assessment of the performance of the FAO representation which are not necessarily carried out through projects, using as a framework the definition of functions and responsibilities of the FAOR (FAO manual section 118), .

30. Given the increasing importance given to the area of humanitarian coordination, the evaluation will undertake a specific and rigorous study to better understand what role FAO has

32 See Handbook for Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality Perspectives in Evaluations in the UN System. Internal Draft Document 2010.

played in coordination; how effective and efficient FAO partnerships have been; what FAO’s comparative advantage has (if any) in coordinating the agriculture sector, and; what the positive/negative results are identified as resulting from coordination efforts.

31. Stakeholders are beginning to increasing importance on moving towards more sustainable and market oriented interventions in Zimbabwe. FAO and partners have promoted contract farming, credit-in-kind, input trade fairs and vouchers, and cost-sharing approaches. A special study will be commissioned to examine in detail these experiences to determine how relevant the approaches have been, what has worked and what has not, how sustainable these approaches are – and how primary stakeholders see the approaches as meeting their needs and supporting their livelihood strategies.

32. All OED evaluations are required to include an analysis of gender mainstreaming and equity. The UN Development Assistance Framework for Zimbabwe (ZUNDAF 2007-2011) identifies gender equity as one of six core areas of collaborative work. The NMTPF and PoA unfortunately make scant reference to gender issues. In this context, the evaluation will put an important focus on the examination of FAO’s gender based approaches with a view to identifying what results FAO has achieved for women – and to making strong recommendations on the ways forward.

33. The initial context review indicates that the political situation in Zimbabwe is dynamic and that there have been positive changes over the past 18 months. Elections are scheduled for 2011 which may result in political change. An important issue to examine will be the role that FAO is playing and the extent that the organization has and is adapting to changing needs, expectations and opportunities.

34. The scope of the evaluation will be further refined in the Inception Report to be developed by the independent team leader.

Evaluability/Logic Model

35. A draft of the NMTPF is available; however, the document has not been finalized yet. In the absence of an operational NMTPF, the evaluation team will not have a country overall strategic framework against which to evaluate FAO performance. However, the FAO Emergency Operation and Rehabilitation Division has recently launched a Plan of Action covering the period 2010-2015 focusing on “Transitioning Emergency into Rehabilitation and Development”. While this plan covers a large share of FAO’s activities carried out in Zimbabwe, it has limitations as an evaluative framework – principally due to the fact that it has only just recently been prepared and thus may not be appropriately applied retrospectively. As indicated above, another difficulty is that there is not strong coherence between the draft NMTPF and the PoA in terms of priority areas of action.

36. To deal with this situation, a desk review of the portfolio of extra-budgetary projects will be undertaken prior to the mission to identify common goals, objectives and activities. This combined with the main defined functions and responsibilities of the FAOR, will serve as an important analytical reference for the team.

Evaluation Issues and Questions

37. The evaluation will consider the extent to which FAO’s cooperation with Zimbabwe over the past five years has been relevant, effective, and efficient, the extent to which impacts on households and institutions is evident, and whether such benefits are likely to be enduring. In addition, some specific questions which have arisen from initial scoping interviews are highlighted below:

38. Relevance: The relevance of initiatives implemented by FAO since 2006 will be assessed by the extent to which they addressed country priorities and needs. Issues and questions specifically to be explored include: • To what extent is FAO’s programme aligned with priorities stated in key Government Strategies such as the STERP and the newly drafted GoZ Medium-Term Plan 2010-2015. What has been the dialogue on programme priorities between FAO Zimbabwe and HQ, the federal Government and other national actors? Has FAO consulted with intended beneficiaries? • To what extent is FAO’s strategy coherent with the UNDAF objectives? • What are other stakeholders doing in the same sectors? What is FAO’s added value and comparative advantage in the context of national priorities and what others are doing? • How coherent is the FAO’s strategy internally? Is the new NMTPF coherent with FAO’s new corporate strategy? What is the added value of the Zimbabwe: Transitioning Emergency into Rehabilitation and Development Plan of Action? • What is the overall quality of the design of FAO interventions? Is the internal logic sound enough to allow for the achievement of the desired results? • Does the design of FAO interventions appropriately reflect opportunities for transitioning from emergency to development? What are the constraints?

39. Effectiveness: The evaluation will seek to determine the results of FAO’s work in Zimbabwe, examining changes in capacity, policy, knowledge, skills, resources, and assets (at different levels) to which FAO has contributed 33 . • How effective has advocacy by the FAO Representation been, both with the Government and with other development partners in influencing national strategy, policy and prioritization in favour of rural development and food security? • To what extent has FAO played a facilitating or leadership role (NGO-UN-Govt-Donor- Investors) at national and regional level? Within communities of practice, how effective has FAO been in networking and bringing their corporate comparative advantage to bear? • What has been FAO’s success in developing and fundraising for its own and GoZ priority programmes? • How effective have FAO partnerships been? In particular, what has FAO’s contribution been to the UNDAF process and results achieved? How effective has FAO been in bringing GoE, UN and donors together on policy issues related to agriculture and food security? • What changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices are in evidence as a result of FAO interventions at community level? • What changes can be seen (if any) in institutional performance of partners supported with capacity building resources?

33 Dimensions of effectiveness is framed within the context of FAO’s corporate core functions.

• How effective is the existing project and sectoral humanitarian monitoring system? What innovations and good practices have been identified? To what extent have these been disseminated and scaled up? • What level of adoption and appropriation by Government and other stakeholders of FAO public goods and normative guidance? • How have FAO information, analysis and technical support influenced strategy, policy and programming in Zimbabwe?

40. Coverage: • How great has the coverage of the benefit been compared to the overall needs? Who has benefited? In particular, how have females and HIV/AIDS affected households participated in and benefited from the FAO programme?

41. Efficiency: The evaluation will examine the extent to which FAO’s operational, technical and management capacity was adequate to support the delivery of the programme. In particular the mission will assess if the resources (materials, funds, expertise and corporate knowledge) were used in the best way for the outputs achieved. • What has been the performance of the FAO representation office in Zimbabwe? The FAOR plays multiple roles including heading the sub-regional office inter-disciplinary team, providing technical support to country programmes in the region in his capacity as livestock expert within the team, and acting as FAOR for Botswana. How have these multiple roles affected his ability to provide strategic guidance, advice and oversight to the country programme and member state? • How has the proximity of the Zimbabwe representation to the SFS office affected the performance of the Zimbabwe programme? What role have HQ and regional technical units played? Have synergies been created between FAO interventions development and emergency interventions at country level? To what extent has FAO HIV/AIDS policy and capacity building work been mainstreamed within its other interventions? • How has FAO collaborated with other UN agencies and what synergies have been created? How has FAO’s support for coordination contributed to improved coverage, reduced duplication and the gathering of lessons learned? • Are management systems well established for delivering the desired outputs? Have interventions been delivered on time and according to plan? Is the use of human resources making the most of the skill sets available within the team? Are the physical, human and financial resources sufficient for the delivery of the programme? • How have partnerships impacted on programme delivery and efficiency? • What have been the effects of decentralization on the performance of the country programme? Does staff have the needed competencies for the job profiles in place?

42. Impact: The wider effects of the FAO programme on individuals, communities and institutions, both positive and negative, will be examined. • What have been the impacts of the programme on levels of food security, nutrition, poverty/income and capacity development? • To what extent has FAO strengthened farmer-market linkages through its work? • To what extent are policies and programmes that benefitted from FAO support under implementation today? • Have there been any unintended impacts of the programme?

43. Sustainabi lity: The evaluation will consider the extent to which the benefits resulting from FAO’s interventions will be sustained over time. • To what extent will interventions result in benefits that will continue after the interventions cease? What is the extent of national participation and ownership in the interventions? Are the interventions financially and technically sustainable? • How have FAO efforts to reduce beneficiary dependency and better link small-holders to markets contributed to sustainability of approaches and benefits? • What contributions is the Government of Zimbabwe making to the programme? Is their contribution in line with agreed co-participation arrangements? • In what ways has FAO contributed to strengthened capacity at decentralized levels (regional, community) to plan, coordinate and deliver agricultural and livestock services and create livelihood opportunities for rural families? To what extent and in what capacity have direct beneficiaries been involved in FAO interventions?

44. Gender Equity: All FAO’s initiatives in Zimbabwe will be assessed against the following questions on gender equality and social inclusion, as appropriate. • To what degree did FAO undertake a systematic analysis of the livelihoods and vulnerabilities different groups and in particular of males and females separately? • Extent and effectiveness of FAO’s work in support to Zimbabwean institutions, in raising awareness, mainstreaming and implementing the principles of gender equality, social inclusion and reduction of inequalities; • To what degree did participating organizations change their policies or practice to improve gender equality or social inclusion fulfilment? • What changes occurred in relationships among women and men, and among different groups of rights-holders and duty-bearers?

45. The inception mission (October 18-22, 2010) further defined key issues and questions. The inception mission report, prepared by the evaluation Team Leader, includes an evaluation matrix which will guide the work of the independent evaluation team. While it is not necessary that FAO’s work in Zimbabwe responds to all of the corporate objectives and core functions of the organization, the evaluation will examine the relative balance within the portfolio and the extent to which the organizations comparative advantage has been brought to bear at country level.

Evaluation Methodology and Organization

46. The evaluation will draw its conclusions and recommendations based on the evidence found and make its independent assessment of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of FAO cooperation with Zimbabwe as a whole, in each area of focus and on key services provided by FAO, including capacity building, applying and sharing knowledge, partnership building and resource mobilization.

47. The evaluation will use a range of tools and methods, including stakeholder consultations through workshops and semi-structured interviews with check lists, desk studies and field visits, among others.

48. The evaluation will adopt a consultative approach whenever possible, seeking and sharing opinions with stakeholders. Triangulation of information across stakeholders will be a key tool for gathering and validation of evidence. Stakeholders include: • FAO staff in HQ, the Regional Office for Africa in Accra, the sub-regional office for Southern Africa in Harere who have been involved with support to FAO activities in Zimbabwe; • FAO Regional Emergency Office for Southern Africa REOSA in Johannesburg • FAO programme/project staff in Zimbabwe; • Government staff at policy and implementation level; • Other UN organizations; • Donors; and • NGOs, Framers’ Unions and civil society organisations, and ultimate beneficiaries.

49. Special Studies will be organized prior to the main mission in order to examine in greater depth specific themes (market linkages, coordination & partnership) relevant to the FAO Zimbabwe programme. Separate Terms of Reference will be prepared for these studies.

50. Desk reviews of OED independent evaluations that have included Zimbabwe will be carried out to synthesize the main findings, conclusions and recommendations. This will be complemented by a literature review of project documentation including progress and final project reports, and of documented project outputs.

51. Prior to the launch of the mission, a HQ consultative meeting will be held with key member state representatives and senior FAO staff to discuss the TOR for the evaluation and to reflect on key issues identified by the inception mission.

52. At the beginning of the mission, an internal briefing session in Rome will allow all team members to have access to information on FAO as a global organization, on evaluation methods and approaches and on respective tasks of team members in the mission. A briefing will also be organized in Zimbabwe with the FAOR, SFS and senior country programme and project staff, to inform team members of the overall programme of FAO in Zimbabwe.

53. An evaluation mission, involving the entire team, will take place over a 3 weeks period in February 2011. FAO regional offices in Johannesburg (REOSA) and Gaberone (ECTAD) will also be consulted. Field visits at sub-national level will be undertaken to verify information collected through other channels as well as to obtain the views of primary beneficiaries. Locations for field

visits will be selected based on a desire to review a broad cross section of FAO current activity across core functions.

54. The evaluation will use a wide range of tools and methods including stakeholder consultation through individual and group semi-structured interviews; check-lists; background document analysis; and field visits.

55. At the end of the mission, the team work together to jointly undertake an analysis of the information gathered using tools such as SWOT analysis and applying the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework to examine changes effected. The team leader will facilitate team consensus building around the main conclusions and recommendations of the mission. The team will give its preliminary overall results and recommendations in a debriefing session with the FAOR, senior programme/project staff, key Government counterparts and interested partner representatives. This will be an occasion to obtain feedback from stakeholders on the findings and recommendations of the evaluation, although the final draft report will also be circulated for comments and suggestions.

56. Once drafted, the evaluation team leader will present his independent report to the HQ consultative group for feedback. Internal stakeholders will have the opportunity to review the draft report and to offer any corrections of fact and to contribute supplementary information as necessary.

Sources of Data:

• Portfolio analysis and review of project documentation, progress reports and terminal reports, budgets and financial reports for the regular and extra budgetary activities, procurement reports, the FAOR annual report. Back to officer reports from FAO backstopping missions. • Interviews with internal stakeholders at FAO HQ, RAF, SFS, REOSA, and country level. • Interviews with external stakeholders at regional (Accra, Johannesburg, Gaberone) and country level (government, donors, direct and indirect project beneficiaries, civil society partners, UN partners, other organizations offering similar types of support/engaged in the sector). • Documentation related to contextual analysis (EIU, needs assessments, national surveys and studies related to FS, rural development and agriculture, MDG reports). • Government policies and strategies. • Household surveys, focus groups and key informant interviews at community level. • Expert observation

The Evaluation Report

57. The report will be as concise as possible, focusing on findings, conclusions and recommendations. The report will be in English and will include a two page executive summary.

58. The Evaluation team will decide the precise outline of its report. However, the report will include: • a contextual analysis of the rural development and food security situation and priorities in Zimbabwe; • the overall evaluation of FAO cooperation in Zimbabwe; • the assessment of effectiveness and impact in each area of focus; • the assessment of the performance of the FAOR Office; • recommendations and lessons learned to enhance the effectiveness of collaboration between FAO and Zimbabwe.

59. Special Studies will be provided as Annexes to the main report. The report should not be more than 65 pages excluding annexes and will be delivered to OED by the Team Leader according to the deadlines indicated in the timetable below. Final recommendations should be well defined and actionable – to the greatest extent possible within realistic expectations of the resources available to the programme.

Composition of the Evaluation Team

60. The evaluation team will be lead by an independent expert evaluator with international experience leading complex strategic evaluations and technical experience in one of the substantive domains to be examined by the evaluation.

61. Team members (4-5) will include national and international experts (external consultants and staff members of the FAO Office of Evaluation) with broad sectoral experience, demonstrating an ability to collect and analyze information at both technical and strategic levels and to function effectively in a multi-disciplinary team. Sectoral areas requiring full time team participation include crop production and conservation agriculture, animal health, economic policy, markets and trade, and humanitarian livelihood responses. One team member will be recruited to cover FAO management and operations and the role and functioning of the FAO representation. A gender expert will join the team – however all experts must be able to undertake gender analysis within their substantive areas. Additional resources may be required on a short term basis to undertake specific thematic studies.

62. Specific ToRs will be prepared for each team member. All team members must be fluent in English (written and oral).

Roles and Responsibilities

63. The fao representation and key technical unit of the Zimbabwe programme are responsible for contributing to the draft terms of reference and for supporting the evaluation preparation and field work during the mission. They are required to participate in meetings with the team, to make available information and documentation as necessary, and to comment on the final draft report. the faor is also responsible for leading and coordinating the preparation of the fao management response (MR) to the evaluation, in which it expresses its overall judgment of the evaluation process and report and accepts, partially accepts or rejects each recommendation. for accepted recommendations, responsibilities and timetable for implementation will also be indicated; for rejected recommendations, a justification should be provided. One year after the management response is issued; the fao representation will prepare the follow-up report to the mr, to inform on progress in the implementation of the recommendations.

64. FAO Office of Evaluation, after a careful portfolio analysis and scoping interviews with key stakeholders drafts and finalizes the ToR, identifies independent experts and sets-up the evaluation team, and organizes the evaluation work. It is responsible for the clearance of the ToR and of the team composition and briefs the evaluation team on the evaluation methodology and process. The Office has a quality assurance role on the final report, in terms of presentation, compliance with the ToR, timely delivery, quality of the evidence and analysis done. The Office of Evaluation has also a responsibility for following up with the FAOR on the timely preparation of the Management Response and the Follow-up to the evaluation management response.

65. The Evaluation Team is responsible vis-à-vis FAO for conducting the evaluation, applying the methodology as appropriate and for producing the evaluation report. All team members, including the Team Leader, will participate in briefing and debriefing meetings, discussions, field visits, and will contribute to the evaluation with written inputs for the final draft and final report.

66. The Team Leader guides and coordinates the team members in their specific work, discusses their findings, conclusions and recommendations and prepares the final draft and the final report, consolidating the inputs from the team members with his/her own. The mission is fully responsible for its independent report which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government or of FAO. FAO is not entitled to modify the contents of any evaluation report, although it can require modifications to the report to improve its quality of, nor is an evaluation report subject to technical clearance, beside the quality assurance control by the Office of Evaluation.

Evaluation Timetable

Preparation Phase (June-October 2010) Tentative

Dates

Initial informal consultations with internal stakeholders, scoping of evaluation and June-September definition of an initial set of key issues

Desk review and analysis (budget overviews, budget summaries, review of relevant June-Sept literature, summary of existing relevant evaluation findings, inventory of related projects and outputs, etc)

Draft Terms of Reference and budget prepared. Design of proposals for Special October Studies.

Advertise/head hunt for evaluation team member candidates October/November

Inception Mission to Zimbabwe October 18-22

Evaluation Phase - (Nov 2010 – Mar 2011)

Team Leader Inception Report Written and circulation to key stakeholders. November Preparation of the evaluation matrix and evaluation tools/instruments. Selection and contracting of team.

Meeting of the HQ consultative group Dec 2010

Special Studies Jan 2011

Preparation and Briefing of the evaluation team

Desk review February 1-4

HQ briefings

Evaluation mission to Zimbabwe Feb 5-28

In country presentation of initial conclusions Feb 24th

Report Writing and Dissemination Phase – (March-May 2011)

Prepare draft report, circulation and review by team members April

Review and Comments by stakeholders May

Final Report and dissemination activities June

Management Response June 2011

Budget * see separate annex.

Annex B: Evaluation Matrix – Evaluation of FAO Cooperation in Zimbabwe 2006-2010

Evaluation Expected Situation Evaluation questions Evaluation instruments Criteria/Issue Cooperation strategy Relevance The design and Pertinence − Interviews with FAO Officials in Rome objectives of FAO’s and Harare, relevant government − Are the interventions appropriate to target groups’ priorities, interventions in representatives, UN and other context and realities? Zimbabwe between development agencies, civil society 2006-2010 address − Is the logic of interventions the most appropriate in the context? organizations, review of government the needs of the policies. − To what extent will FAO contribute to long-term development target groups and are − consistent with the needs of the rural sector? Desk reviews and analysis of policy and strategy documents country’s − In which ways have gender and other issues been relevant cross development cutting issues to be addressed? − Strategic documents (STERP, sectoral policies and plans. strategies). Alignment − Review of data and surveys, studies and − What are the priorities of the Government in the last five years? analysis on food security situation). − To what extent has FAO identified and planned responses to Government priority issues? − To what extent is FAO’s strategy coherent with the UNDAF objectives? − Is FAO’s program aligned with priorities stated in key Government Strategies such as the STERP? − On which issues is policy dialogue formally established with Government partners? − To what extent has the Ministry of Agriculture been involved in the

design of FAO’s NMTPF? − Could cooperation between FAO and the Government have been run differently? Design − Did FAO apply the strategy within the specific political, economic and social context of the country? − How coherent is the FAO’s strategy internally? Is the new NMTPF coherent with FAO’s new corporate strategy? What is the added value of the Emergency Plan of Action? − How did FAO anticipate and respond to changes in the country’s emergency and development context? − Are key cross-cutting issues (gender, environmental sustainability, HIV/AIDS, DRR and CCA options built in the interventions (at micro – meso – macro levels)? − What are the critical gaps and missed opportunities in FAO’s programming? Development processes Efficiency − FAO was − How efficient has FAO been in using the resources and deploying − Interviews with FAO staff and with key successful in the skills available in Zimbabwe, SFS, RIOSA, ECTAD, HQ to stakeholders and partners; choosing support Zimbabwe Office? Were these resources sufficient to − Desk reviews. effective achieve the objectives? delivery − Were the program’s deliverables provided in a cost efficient way? instruments (projects, policy − How were the choices of implementation partnerships made? dialogue and − advice to How efficient are existing modalities for buying and selling government, inputs/outputs as supported by FAO and its partners?

coordination, − Is the management system in place conducive to timely delivery of partnerships, results? knowledge − management); Is the division of labor and costs between FAO and IPs rational and efficient? − The quality of − services Is M&E providing feedback to ensure constant improvement in (expertise, program efficiency and effectiveness? approaches and methods, training etc) was as planned and led to production of outputs in a timely and cost effective manner. Coordination − There was Coordination − Interviews with FAO staff and with key and effective stakeholders and partners;

Partnerships collaboration − Desk reviews. arrangements − To what extent did FAO harmonize and align its interventions with between regular other initiatives? − Borel and Kudzai study. and emergency − activities with − Did FAO’s own structures and processes facilitate or hamper Partnership survey. FAO Zimbabwe coordination? Office; − Did coordination amongst and within projects of the portfolio lead − FAOR insured to synergy effects? overall − Has FAO’s leadership in coordinating the agriculture sector coordination and contributed to reducing the gap and increasing coverage? monitoring of

the portfolio. Partnerships − FAO HQ − How did FAO leverage partnerships at different levels –national, backstopping provincial (with government – other UN agencies, donors, NGOs, has been private sector, Farmers associations)? efficient and − effective. To what extent are FAO's current partnerships and contracting arrangements coherent with FAO’s new procurement guidelines? − Are there agreements among partners about results frameworks? − Do the partners have access to the best FAO’s knowledge and good practices? − How was accountability to partners achieved? Development results Effectiveness FAO contributed to Accomplishment of intended objectives − Interviews with FAO staff and with key poverty reduction stakeholders and partners; − How well did FAO implement its strategy and how effective was it and greater food in achieving the main objectives? − security, to Desk reviews; mainstreaming the − How effectively has FAO deployed innovative approaches in − Field visits and discussion with integration of relation to policy, coordination, partnerships, poverty reduction, beneficiaries. Gender, HIV/AIDS, and development implementation? and CCA and CCM − options in How effective was FAO in mainstreaming the integration of development Gender, HIV/AIDS, CCA and CCM in its activities? strategies, human − Was FAO effective in identifying key issues in women's access to and institutional land to strengthen women's standing in relation to land and as a capacity building of basis for formulating policies to improve food security? its main government − partners. How effective has FAO been in introducing new technologies? − Did FAO influence sectoral policy discussions?

Overall effectiveness What are the strengths and weaknesses of the program? Coverage All the needy groups Issues − Interviews with FAO staff and with key and relevant stakeholders and partners; − Have the most relevant issues been addressed? What issues were stakeholders were left out? − reached. Desk reviews; Equity − Interviews of beneficiary group − How were the interventions differentiated across target groups? representatives. − Did FAO’s interventions contribute to reducing vulnerabilities of the rural poor? − Was the selection of different target groups and geographical areas guided by need? Impact FAO has contributed Livelihood capital assets − Review of project documentation to enhancing including M&E reports; − Did the interventions result in improvements of capital assets for resilience of food the agricultural systems of the smallholder farmers (natural, social, − and agricultural Interview with FAO staff and project human, physical and financial assets)? systems to shocks managers; through improved Equity − Individual project reports, evaluations livelihood assets − Did gender mainstreaming have clear impacts? and impact studies; (human, social, − physical, financial, HIV/AIDS Field visits and interview with natural), beneficiaries. Did FAO’s interventions mitigate the effects of HIV/AIDS on food strengthening security? farmer-market linkages and institutional action, paying due attention to gender equity.

Sustainability − There are − To what extent are the results and benefits derived from FAO’s − Interview with FAO staff, Government activities interventions likely to endure? officials, partners and other stakeholders; dedicated to − Have successful experiences been scaled up? − Field visits and interview with environmental beneficiaries. protection and − How has FAO contributed to strengthening capacities of climate change AGRITEX and other partner government services? mitigation and

adaptation. Policy, institutional and regulatory framework − Did FAO’s support to government and civil society partners lead to − FAO supported institutional capacity development and sustainable ownership of mainstreaming results? of the integration of sustainable land management and climate change considerations in agriculture, forestry and livestock policies

93 Annex C: FAO Zimbabwe Organogram ( TCE in colours ) – November 2010 ERCU Structure

FAOR - Sub Regional Representative TCEO Mr. Gaoju Han

Assistant FAOR Administration Officer Senior Emergency & David Mfote Claudia Broderick Rehab Coordinator Policy Officer (Zimb.) Perpetua Katepa -Kalala

SFS/FAOR Admin Liaison Off.. Finance & Fleet Admin Clerk –Vacant B. Mathemera

Admin Assist. R. Chindove Emergency & Rehab Coordinator Operations (crop, livest) officer Michael Jenrich

Emergency Admin Officer HIV/Livelihoods Officer M&E Officer Head of Sub-Unit Head of Sub-Unit Crop Officer Livestock Officer Head of Sub-Unit Coord/Info & Reporting Ronald Okuonzi Mildred Mushunje F. Dzvurumi F. Chinembiri Douglas Magunda Off.

Deputy Administrator Assistant Assistant M&E Coord/Info Nutritionist Crop Officer Livestock (FAO Projects) C. Oka D. Takawira Vacant Vacant

Logistician D. Mangenje Field M&E Officers M&E Assistant Assistant Inputs/CA Horticulture -W. Mudzamiri (Nal surveys) Nutritionist HIV/LivH K. Kwazira Vacant - P. Gabayi T. Mugara Isabel Magaya L. Makonese - B. Nhau

Assistant Logistician Admin Assistants / Clerks P. Masendeke N. Chirombe - Finance I. Madondo – Travel, LoAs, Meetings T. Rudzivzo – Travel, Personnel Information /Database Communication Reporting Officer Transport Clerk A. Nyirenda – MTC processing Officer Officer C. Takawira R. Mashingaidze R. Mayingehama - Inventory 94 7 drivers

Senior Emergency & Rehabilitation Coordinator

Administration

Nutrition/HIV

Operations

M&E

Coordination, Information & Reporting

Annex D : PERSONS MET

Internal/FAO Personnel

Name Organisation/Locality Designation / occupation / role

Amaral, Christina FAO Rome Chief of Emergency Operations Service

Bamba, Madhy M. FAO Rome Senior Food Security Officer TCSF Farmer, Graham FAO Rome Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator, TCER Groppo, Paolo FAO Rome NRLA Gunjal, Kisan FAO Rome CFSAM Hinrichs, Angela FAO Rome Liaison and Operations Officer, TCEO Kassam, Amir FAO Rome AGP Kenmore, Peter FAO Rome Chief AGPP Klompenhouwer, Yves FAO Rome Programme Officer (Coordination) OSD Laub, Regina FAO Rome Gender NRM Officer ESW Lawina Were, Jacqueline FAO Rome Operations Officer, TCEO Mack, Simon D. FAO Rome Chief, Livestock Production Systems Mol, Victor FAO Rome Programme Officer OSD Mrema, Geoffrey C. FAO Rome Director Rural Infrastructure and Agro- Industry Division Muehlhoff, Ellen FAO Rome Senior Nutrition Officer, AGN Nyberg, Jennifer FAO Rome Emergency Division Osborne, Tom FAO Rome OSD Phiri, David FAO Rome TCSP Chief Pound, Jonathan FAO Rome CFSAM Sauvinet-Bedouin, Rachel FAO Rome Senior Evaluation Officer, OED Scaglia, Jean Alexandre FAO Rome Liaison and Operations Officer, TCEO Scherf, Beate D. FAO Rome Animal Production Officer (Genetic Resources Monitoring) Slingernbergh, Jan FAO Rome Livestock Thomas, Laurent FAO Rome Director FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division Holleman, Cindy FAO REOSA Regional Emergency Coordinator for Southern Africa Yiannopoulos, Alexandros FAO REOSA Food Security Officer

Ager, Martin FAO Zimbabwe Water Resources Officer

Broderick, Claudia FAO, SFS Administrative Officer SFS

Chinembiri, Frank FAO Zimbabwe Livestock production and animal health Officer, FAO ECRU, Zimbabwe Chirombe, Nellia FAO Zimbabwe Administrative Assistant – Finance Czudek, René FAO SFS Forestry Officer D’Amelio, Jacopo FAO Zimbabwe Information Officer Dzvurumi, Felix FAO Zimbabwe Crops Officer, FAO Zimbabwe Gaoju, Han FAO Zimbabwe FAO Representative, Zimbabwe

SFS SRC Hove, Lewis REOSA Regional Conservation Agriculture Coordinator Jenrich, Michael FAO Zimbabwe Emergency Coordinator, FAO Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division. Zimbabwe Katepa Kalala, Perpetua FAO SFS Senior Policy Officer, SFS Kilawe, Edward C. FAO Zimbabwe Natural Resources Management Officer Magaya, Isabel FAO Zimbabwe A / Nutrition Officer Magunda, Douglas FAO Zimbabwe Monitoring and Evaluation Manager Makonese, Loveness FAO Zimbabwe Assistant HIV and Livelihoods Officer Mangenje, Donald FAO Zimbabwe Logistician Mbiba, Thembekile FAO Zimbabwe Livestock production and animal health, FAO ECRU, Zimbabwe Mfote, David FAO Zimbabwe Assistant FAOR Mushunje, Mildred FAO Zimbabwe HIV and Livelihoods Officer Newman, Songore FAO Zimbabwe Junior Fisheries Technical Officer, FAO Zimbabwe Oka, Constance FAO Zimbabwe Coordination, Information and Reporting Unit, Zimbabwe Okuonzi, Ronald FAO Zimbabwe Administrative Officer –ERCU Urvov, Jean-Claude FAO Zimbabwe Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Coordinator Munstermann, Susanne FAO Regional office Interviewed through phone (ECTAD), Gaborone, Botswana.

EXTERNAL

Name Organisation/Locality Designation / occupation / role

Andrew, Chikwange Zaka district District Education Officer, Zaka district Arroyo, Fenando OCHA Head Of Office Assefa, Fistum United Nations Children’s Fund Nutrition Manager – Young Children Survival & Development Bamezon, Felix World Food Programme Country Director Beffa, Mario Livestock WG, Harare Chairman, Livestock Working Group; Director – African Wildlife and Livestock Development Consultants (AWLDEC) /Livestock Identification Trust Beulla, Shambambeva (F) Zaka district Schools Inspector, Zaka district Bragge, Gordon OSRO 001/SPA Kadoma Consultant (Livestock) Cammelbeek, Simon World Food Programme Dept. Country Director Chadenga, Vitalis Parks & Wildlife Director Den Chagonda, Clive AGRITEX, Uzumba Maramba Agritex Extension Worker

Pfungwe Ward 7 Chahweta, Catherine CADS Monitoring & Evaluation Officer Chali, P. Ministry of Regional Integration Acting Deputy Director- and International Cooperation, International Cooperation Harare Department Charahwa, Kevin District Agricultural Extension District Agricultural Extension Office, Karoi Officer Chidziya, E. Parks & Wild Life Director Conservation Chihwayi, Miriam Mutoko District Beneficiary Chinyemba, Martha UNAIDS Gender HIV & AIDS Programme Analyst Chinyemba, Talent CADS Field officer Chirinda, F. Maramba Area Supervisor Chisi, Norah(F) Munjanja primary school, Zaka Head Teacher, Munjanja primary district school Chivhanga, Shecky Mhondoro, Chegutu District Agrodealer Davoux, Dominique European Union Economic Adviser Dube, Clara (F) Masvingo Province Provincial Director of Education Dube, Martin Beitbridge, Matabeleland South Animal Health Inspector / Ag. district District Head / Beitbridge Dumbanere, Engelbert OSRO 001/SPA Kadoma Site Supervisor Dzimwasha, Ernest Masvingo province Provincial Veterinary officer Elliud, Gomo Munjanja primary school, Zaka Farmer / chairman, School district development committee, Munjanja primary school Elphas, Chimoto Bakita district Veterinary livestock technician, Bakita district Esbon, Mashingidze Bakita district Veterinary livestock technician, Bakita district Florence N. (accompanied Ministry of Environment, Harare Permanent Secretary by 9 officers) Freeman, Karen L. USAID Zimbabwe Mission Director Fungai, Pise (F) Munjanja primary school, Zaka Deputy Head Teacher, Munjanja district primary school Gambara, P. Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Chief Economist & Head of Union Commodities Gombe, J. Forestry Training Center Principal Gondo, J. AGRITEX, Ministry of Agriculture, Principal Director Mechanization and Irrigation Development, Harare Gumbie, Chemist M. Forestry Commission, Zimbabwe Deputy General Manager, Research & training Gundani, Gracious Midlands province, Gweru Small Stock Specialist, Department of Livestock Production and Development Gurajena, A.M. Murewa Rural District Council Chief Executive Officer Guti Goromonzi District AGRITEX Agronomist Gutu, Herbert Ministry of Agriculture Acting Director, Department of Mechanization and Irrigation Mechanization

Development Hamandishe, M. Goromonzi District Acting District Administrator Henderson, Andrew SAT Harare Project Coordinator, Technical Kabudura, Collen Ministry of Agriculture Acting Director Mechanization and Irrigation Development Kadairo Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe District Administrator Kajawu, Gift Phillip UNICEF Zimbabwe Education Specialist Kambeva, Mathew Ward 11 Murehwa Sabhuku (Chair ward Farmers 11) Kanye, Bruce Murehwa District Agritex Ex officer HIV/ Aids CP in Agriculture Kasakete, Lawrence Midlands province, Gweru Department of Livestock production and development, Fisheries Unit Katemanyoka, Jonathan Katemanyoka Village, Ward 25, Farmer Hurungwe District Kujeke-Goliati, L illian Zimbabwe Farmers Union, Harare Gender, HIV/AIDS and Youth Coordinator Kunene, I.D. MENRM Director Kuwona, Leonard CADS Field officer Lenneiye, Nginya Mungai World Bank Zimbabwe, Harare Country Manager Livestock Development Chasvingo Dip Tank, Chasvingo Livestock development committee Committee Village, Ward 3 members / dip tank committee (Group discussion – 8 men) Mache, Bernard MoAMID Deputy Director, Agritex Mafutha women group – 6 Insiza district Beneficiaries: goats and poultry members distribution project (Group discussion) Magomana, Tariro Mwenezi district Senior Animal Health Inspector/ District Head, Mwenesi district Magwenzi, Medlinah (F) Midlands province, Gweru Provincial Head, Department of Livestock Production and Development Makaya, Pious DVTS (Diagnostic and Public Deputy Director Health), Harare Makayose, William Ministry of Agriculture Chief Agricultural Economist Mechanization and Irrigation Development Makodza, Bothwell Department of Livestock Director Production and Development, Harare Makonyere, Lawlence Mutoko District District Agriculture Extension Officer Makuvire Murehwa District District Agriculture Extension Office Makwena, Bonsani Lloyd Provincial Agriculture Office, Principal Training Specialist Mashonaland West Mandlhate, Custodia World Health Organisation Resident Representative Zimbabwe Mangai, Christopher Security service “Police” Constable Mangena, M.B Beitbridge Provincial Veterinary Officer, Matabeleland South Province

Mangwende, Irene Mutoko District Lead Farmer Manyanga, G. Ministry of Regional Integration Acting Deputy Director- and International Cooperation, International Cooperation Harare Department Marwa, Lee Absolom The LEAD TRUST, Harare Executive Director (Finance, Human Resources & Administration) Mashava, Malvern Bakita district Senior animal health inspector, Bakita district Masiyandima Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe Ward Traditional leader 7 Masoka, Ngoni Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary Mechanization and Irrigation Development Masukume, Lifias Ministry Of Women Affairs, District Development Officer Gender and Community Development, Insiza district Matanga, Ephraim Makoholi Research Station Acting Head, Makoholi Research Station Matarutse, Casper Windmill Group A, Ward 16, Farmer Kadoma Matipano, Mark Goromonzi District District Agriculture Extension Officer Mboweni, Godfery Mutoko District Agritex HIV and AIDS Focal Person Mdege, Vimbai National Aids Council National Gender and Workplace Coordinator Mdlongwa, Enat Gwanda Provincial Epidemiologist, Matabeleland South Province, Gwanda Mhuriro, Samuel Karoi District AGRITEX Supervisor Minde, Isaac ICRISAT ICRISAT Country Director Mleya Kushinga Pikelela College Principal Moso, Titos Mwenezi district Community-Based Vaccinator / Dip Committee Secretary /chief’s ‘police’, Mwenezi district Mpala Gweru Fish ponds / farming beneficiary Mubaiwa, Gerald T Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Gender, HIV and AIDS Officer union Mubi, Mary Sibusisiwe Embassy of the Republic of Ambassador Zimbabwe, Rome Muchenje, Victoria Murehwa District, Agritex Extensionist Muchera Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe Agronomist (HIV) Focal Person Muchiriri, Jestieri Agricultural Seeds and Services Agronomist Pvt. Harare Mudavanhu, Cephas Mutoko District District Administrator Mudzimbatsekwa, Gore Key Beneficiary Mufori Murehwa District District Environment Officer Mujene, Lovemore OSRO 001/SPA Kadoma Field Officer (Livestock) Mukonoweshuro, Fadzai GRM International Technical Support Manager Mukunguruse, F. Murehwa District Assistant District Administrator

100

Mukuyu,Talkmore OSRO 001/SPA Kadoma Consultant (Crops) Muleko Hanyani Mwenezi district Assistant Chief, chitanga chiefdom, Mwenezi district Muleya, Patrick chabwi dip tank, Beitbridge Chairperson, chabwi dip tank

Munangatire, Genatius OSRO 017/EC Program Manager Mhondoro, Chegutu District Mundowa, Mark Katemanyoka Village, Hurungwe Lead Farmer District Mungazi, Daniel Zimbabwe Farmers Union District Coordinator, Karoi Munyati, Martin Ministry of Agriculture Deputy Director – Soil and Water Mechanization and Irrigation Conservation, Department of Development Mechanization Mupuriri, Bernard Ministry of Regional Integration Director International Cooperation and International Cooperation, Harare Mushamba Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe Ward 7 Councilor Mutanga, Sabina Mutoko District Sabhuku, Beneficiary Mutema, M CADS Programe Manager Mutisi, C. University of Zimbabwe Dean of Agriculture Mutize, Musafare Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe ZFU District Coordinator Mutyoramwendo, Edson Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe ZFU Vice District Coordinator

Muzamhindo, Reston J Ministry of Agriculture Principal Director Mechanization and Irrigation Development Ndoro, Joylyn Embassy of the Netherlands Program Officer Nginya Mungai Lenneiye The World bank, Zimbabwe Country Manager Ngoni Masoka Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretary Mechanization and Irrigation Development Nhekairo, Florence Ministry of Environment &Natural Permanent Secretary Resource Management Nleya, B.S. Kushinga Phikelela, Marondera College Principal Noudéhou, Alain UNRC, Zimbabwe UN Resident Coordinator; UN Humanitarian Coordinator; UNDP Resident Representative Nyagundugu, Smart WADCO, Mutoko District Chair WADCO Nyamkapa, Arthur Ministry of Agriculture Chief Economist, Trade Mechanization and Irrigation Development Nyore, Laucencia Mutoko District Beneficiary Overmars, Rik SNV Zimbabwe Country Office Portfolio Manager

Riley, Steve SAT, 017/EC Chegutu SAT Senior Staff Ronzai, Maparara Village 4 Bikita A livestock owner and chairman, Jerwe dip tank

101

Rufugokuda, G. Provincial Vet Office, Masvingo Senior Animal Health Inspetor

Rukuni, Mandi Consultant Resource Person for the CE Mission Rutsito, Jane P. Mutoko District Beneficiary Rutsito, Sydney Mutoko District Sabhuku Rustito Village Rwiswa, S. Parks & Wild life Reg Manager Samson, Masara Zaka district Accountant Samuriwo, E.S. MENRM Director Sanchez, Walter CARE Sector Coordinator CARE Sengazi, Godfrey AGRITEX, Chegutu District AGRITEX Supervisor Shadreck, Hungwe SAT, OSRO 001/SPA and 017/EC, SAT Consultant Sanyati/Gokwe Shereni, William Livestock and Veterinary Services, Director, Tsetse Control Division / Harare Ag. Principal Director, Livestock and Veterinary Services Sherman, Carol CARE Country Director CARE Sibanda, Tulani AGRITEX Mubayira Agricultural Extension Officer Sigauke CADS Field Officer Sijbenga, Bart SNV Zimbabwe Country Office Senior Economic Development Advisor Soroti, Zwanyadza GRM International Urban Technical Coordinator Taffesse, Samuel The World Bank , Zimbabwe Operations Officer Tairose, Rice UP Project, Ward II, Karoi District Extension Officer

Tendai, Chitavati (F) Bakita district Animal health inspector, Bakita district Tirivangani Chipunza, Percy Ministry of Agriculture Principal Agricultural Economist Mechanization and Irrigation Development Tosivei, Emmanuel Chinorumba primary school, Zaka Head teacher, Chinorumba primary district school Tsvakwi Ministry of Lands and Resettlement Permanent Secretary

Usayi, Lorence SAT, Hurungwe District Project Officer Ushewokunze-Obatolu, Veterinary Services, Harare Director of Veterinary Services Unesu (Animal and Zoonotic Disease Surveillance and Control) Vaessen, Marcel OCHA Humanitarian Affairs Officer Verba, Javangwe Nyika dip tank, BIKITA Committee member, Nyika dip tank, BIKITA Zingwena, S. Forestry Commission Operations Manager Zisengwe, Rodiwel Mutoko District Sabhuku /Traditional leader Zvirevo Maramba Area District Agriculture Extension Office

102

Annex E: Study on FAO Support for Strengthening Market Linkages in Zimbabwe

Final Report

February 28, 2011

Author: Jayne Stack, Independent Consultant

Harare, Zimbabwe

Prepared on behalf of the Office of Evaluation, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations.

Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the support provided by the Emergency Unit FAO, Zimbabwe and its implementing partners (IPs), in particular the project staff of the Union Project Trust, Sustainable Agricultural Trust and Agricultural Projects Trust who all assisted by sharing information and facilitating field visits. I am also grateful to the many private sector partners who shared their implementation strategy for linking with smallholder farmers and experiences and lessons learnt in the process. Lastly, but not least, this work has benefitted tremendously from interviews and discussions with beneficiaries and field staff of IP’s and AGRITEX at various project sites. I would like to highlight the contribution made by farmers and field staff in Kadoma, Chiweshe and Guruve who gave up their time in the middle of the growing season to participate in focus group discussions and share their stories. I trust that this study accurately reflects their experience of projects and that all stakeholders will reflect on their feedback and continue to seek ways to work together effectively.

This Assessment Report was prepared under a service contract with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN. The views expressed herein are those of the consultant, and do not represent any official view of the FAO.

1. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION...... 111 2. METHODOLOGY ...... 113 3. CONCEPTUALISING SMALLHOLDER ENGAGEMENT WITH MARKETS & FAO MARKET INTERVENTIONS...... 115

3.1. BARRIERS TO MARKET ENGAGEMENT ...... 115 3.2. FAO INTERVENTIONS ...... 116 4. CONSERVATION AGRICULTURE PROJECTS WITH CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS 118

4.1. PROJECTS AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS ...... 118 4.2. PROJECT RELEVANCY : IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN ...... 120 4.3. PROJECT RESULTS ...... 125 4.4. PROJECT EFFICIENCY ...... 142 4.5 PROJECT IMPACT ...... 148 5. MARKET DRIVEN INPUT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS...... 153

5.1. FAO AND SNV’ S RURAL AGRO -DEALER RESTOCKING PROGRAMME (RARP) ...... 153

5.2. PILOT ELECTRONIC VOUCHER PROJECTS IN LARGE SCALE INPUT DISTRIBUTION PROJECTS ...... 155 6. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 161

6.1. CONSERVATION AGRICULTURE PROJECTS WITH CONTRACT FARMING ARRANGEMENTS ...... 161 6.2. MARKET DRIVEN INPUT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS ...... 166 6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 166

Table 1: Main Challenges Farmers Face in Accessing Inputs & Markets ...... 123 Table 2: Main Activities Implemented to help meet challenges Farmers Face...... 124 Table 3 : Number of Smallholders Reached 2006-2011 ...... 125 Table 4 : Cropping Patterns, 2009/2010...... 126 Table 5: Livestock ownership & distribution of beneficiaries by livestock category...... 128 Table 6: Age and Sex of Project Beneficiaries...... 129 Table 7: Project Beneficiaries – Vulnerability characteristics...... 130 Table 8: Focus Group comments about involvement of different types of farmers in project activities ...... 131 Table 9: Maize yields and level of self-sufficiency...... 132 Table 10 :Project Yields compared to national average smallholder yields,2009/2010 season ...... 132 Table 11: Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Kadoma...... 134 Table 12: Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Hurungwe, Chivakanenyama, ...... 134 Table 13 : Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Hurungwe, Zvipani, ...... 135 Table 14: Performance & Household Characteristics...... 136 Table 15: Percentage of Households deriving cash income...... 138 Table 16: Profitability of contracted crops in 2010/2011 season...... 141 Table 17: Project Impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Guruve ( 4 th year of project)...... 151 Table 18: Project impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Kadoma (3 rd year of project) ...... 152 Table 19: Project impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Chiweshe ( 1 st year of project) ...... 153 Table 20 : SWOT Analysis of the Rural Agro dealer Restocking Programme ...... 157 Table 22: Strengths and weaknesses of different types of Vouchers...... 158 Table 21: Cost of Alternative Input Vouchers...... 160 Table 23: Summary of Strengths & Weaknesses of Project Implementation , by farmer type, Chiweshe .... Error! Bookmark not defined. Table 24: Summary of Strengths & Weaknesses by farmer type, Kadoma ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Table 25: Summary of Strengths & Weaknesses by farmer type, Guruve...... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Appendix 1 Field work Visits & Data Collection Tools ...... 167 Appendix 2 Status of FAO M & E Data Sets for CA project with contract farming...... Error! Bookmark not defined. Appendix 3 Focus group summary Tables : Strengths and Weaknesses of Project Implementation ...... Error! Bookmark not defined.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACWG Agricultural Coordination Working Group

APT Agricultural Project Trust

AGRITEX Agricultural Research & Extension Service

CA Conservation Farming

CF Contract Farming

CFU Commercial Farmers Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

FEW Field Extension Officer

GMB Grain Marketing Board

GoZ Government of Zimbabwe

IP Implementing Partner

LOA Letter of Agreement

MoA Ministry of Agriculture

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

NGO Non-Government Organisation

SAT Sustainable Agricultural Trust

SHFs Smallholder Farmers

SMDP Smallholder Market Development Project

US$ US Dollar

USAID US Agency for International Development

UP Union Project

UPT Union Project Trust

WFP United Nations World Food Programme

ZCFU Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union

ZFU Zimbabwe Farmer’s Unions

ZimVAC Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

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Executive Summary

An evaluation of FAO’s Cooperation in Zimbabwe took place in February 2011, covering the totality of FAO’s work over the period 2006 - 2010. Prior to the country evaluation, this study was commissioned to examine the extent to which FAO’s interventions, over the period 2006 – 2010, have served to strengthen smallholder farmer access to markets in terms of the standard OEDC/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. This stand alone report was taken into consideration by the evaluation team during the consolidation of the evaluation missions findings, conclusions and recommendations.

FAO interventions with market linkage activities, over the period 2006 – 2010, include support to output markets (e.g. promoting contract farming arrangements between smallholder and private sector)) and support for market-driven input distribution methods (e.g. promoting use of input vouchers and market linkages between agro dealers and wholesalers). These activities have been complemented in many cases by a strong focus on training and extension in conservation agriculture – as a basis for improving productivity.

The activities of FAO and its partners in Zimbabwe have taken place in the context of a challenging political situation and weakened capacity of Government to engage in development and agricultural coordination activities. Most market linkage activities in which FAO and its partners have engaged in are included in the Emergency Programme and as such are constrained by the funding modalities of Emergency Assistance that tend to be short term (often a single season) rather than multi year. Further, donor support for projects within an Emergency Programme tends to be restricted to a limited range of interventions (E.g. Cropping rather than livestock and input distribution rather than capacity building) which limits the type of interventions which FAO and its partners receive funding for.

Key activities undertaken as part of the assessment process include a review of project reports and secondary data (including FAO baseline and post-harvest data sets and data relating to beneficiary performance from IPs), interviews with management staff of FAO, IPs and Private sector partners, interviews with district and ward- based staff of partner institutions and key informant interviews and focus group discussions with farmers and agro dealers in the communities in which projects are being implemented.

FAO supported interventions address two critical barriers to smallholder market engagement; inadequate access to private assets to produce a marketable surplus and limited governance mechanisms to link farmers to market (market knowledge, managerial capacity, organisation, dispute resolution mechanisms etc) which limit farmers ability to engage with output markets and make farmers highly susceptible to exploitative contracts or trade. Projects that promote links between SHFs and the private sector also assist in reducing transaction costs associated with institutional and physical infrastructure deficiencies, another factor that often limits incentives for market exchange.

The study assesses two broad groups of FAO market linkage activities:

1) Conservation Agriculture Projects with Contract Farming Arrangements

In 2006/07, there was one local IP working with 400 farmers in three Districts and by 2010/11 Conservation Agricuture Project Interventions with Contract Farming Arrangements are reaching over 6000 households in 16 Districts.

Findings: Project Relevance & Implementation Design

• Project Activities supporting Contract farming (CF) are relevant and appropriate and address many of the challenges identified by farmers whilst also recognising the risks & uncertainty Pvt Sector Partners face in servicing and linking with SHFs.

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• CF arrangements help overcome the barriers SHF face in engaging with markets and offer considerable potential to raise smallholder productivity & farm incomes • CA is appropriate in contract farming projects for both low resourced and better-endowed smallholders and is often identified by low resourced households as a Most Significant Change (MSC) activity in their lives. • Inclusion of legume seed crops, such as cowpeas or sugar beans that can double as a cash crop, help to overcome SHFs reluctance to allocate limited land resources to legume crops and improves soil fertility whilst also increasing farm income flows.

However:

Findings: Effectiveness

• Improvement of farmer management practices using CA approach together with acquisition of adequate levels of inputs ( seed, fertiliser and chemicals) offers considerable potential to raise productivity of smallholder production of both food and cash crops although performance levels vary considerably between farmers receiving similar input packages. • Project activities have enabled SHFs to increase maize & cash crop yields significantly above national average. E.g. 70-100% beneficiaries achieved maize yields equivalent to at least 2000kg per ha in 2009/2010 and top 25% farmers had av. maize yield of 3500-4500 kg per ha • Despite variability in farmer & private sector performance, projects have made significant progress towards achieving their major objective, which is to establish stable market linkages with the private sector and to support farmers to produce and market a variety of crops profitably.

However

• Links between smallholders and Private sector partners are still fragile and can easily be undermined by many factors (late delivery and poor quality of inputs, lower than anticipated output, drought season, lower than expected prices, higher than expected deductions etc.)

Findings: Implementation Efficiency

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• High extension officer to farmer ratio and use of demonstration plots as a practical training tool has been an effective tool in optimising yields through better management but the wide performance difference between top 25% and bottom 25% of beneficiaries suggests that the extension model is not effective for all farmers. • The mobility of Field Officers at UP project sites is compromised by lack of motorbikes even at supervisory level

Findings: Impact

• There is little doubt that CA programmes with market linkages have had an impressive impact on the ability of beneficiaries to meet staple food requirements through own production. What is more difficult to measure is the extent to which households have generated significant cash incomes and how income generated has enabled households to improve living standards and accrue assets to support further livelihood improvements. Many farmers in focus groups indicated that project activities had provided sufficient income to pay school fees and cash in the home to purchase preferred foods, cooking utensils, clothes and blankets. Receiving a lump sum after harvest also enabled some farmers to invest in assets such as cattle, donkey, chickens and goats and to purchase items such as wheelbarrows. Scotch carts and knap sack sprayers • Project activities have introduced new cash crops to SHFs including seed legume crops such as cowpeas & sugar beans and horticultural crops such as paprika and chillies • Additional activities, ( vegetable gardens and poultry projects) offer year round cash flow and potential to kick start self-sustaining parallel projects, although farmers are experiencing difficulty from time to time identifying profitable local markets • Both demonstration plots and fields of beneficiary farmers have had a noticeable extension impact on non-beneficiary farmers in the surrounding communities. • There is a growing awareness among smallholders that farming is a business, that input loans need to be repaid and contracts with Pvt Sector Partners need to honoured.

Findings: Sustainability

Linking SHFs to Pvt Sector input & output markets offers potential for sustainable market engagement after projects have finished and at some project sites IPs have started to withdraw and hand over growers to Pvt sector partners

However:

It takes time to build trust between stakeholders and to build the capacity of SHFs to produce a surplus. Moreover, project support is still needed to facilitate this process. Many potential Pvt Sector Partners are still not able to fully pre fund farmers due to financial constraints and lack of access to working capital at reasonable interest rates. An additional constraint to Pvt sector involvement is that groups of SHFs need to be able to produce sufficient output before Pvt Sector links are viable. This requires either the expansion in the number of growers at individual sites or expansion in quantity produced per grower.

2. Market Driven Input Distribution Systems • The input voucher system, as an alternative or complimentary to direct input distribution, is workable in the Zimbabwe situation and can be adequately supported by wholesalers and rural retailers. • There is need to open up the system to more rural outlets to reduce the distance travelled by farmers to redeem vouchers & to allow agro dealers to compete thereby increasing farmer choice & promoting competitive pricing. • Connectivity & network fluctuations are serious challenges that need addressing before electronic voucher systems can be widely implemented. It addition agro dealers need to be encouraged to open bank accounts to allow for instant transactions.

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• Paper Voucher Systems are likely to remain in widespread use for some time so need to look at ways to bar code for electronic processing to speed up information capture and redemption process. • The cost of inputs to the farmer through local agro dealers and under voucher based input distribution systems is higher than cost to farmers of inputs provided through direct distribution under contract farming projects. For example, the typical cost of Compound D fertiliser or Top dressing via agro dealers is US$30-32 per 50kg bag compared to US$25-27 in FAO & Pvt sector supported contract farming projects, roughly 20% higher. The difference in costs has an impact on crop profitability.

Main Recommendations

FAO should continue to promote approaches to recovery & development of smallholder agriculture that enhance linkages with market and reduce farmer dependency on external agencies and on free or subsidised direct input distribution FAO continue to promote diversified crop mix in contract farming projects and encourage more IPs to adopt a more holistic approach by incorporating vegetable gardens, poultry and livestock activities in programmes. IPs continue to promote legumes as cash crops which can also double as rotation crops. FAO/IPs continue to promote Conservation agriculture in contract farming projects but should incorporate support for mechanised CA that will enable better resourced farmers to expand area under CA and increase production of cash crops . However, introduction of mechanised CA should be done in such a way that it does not undermine the participation and performance of poorer resourced households (those who do not own draft animals or have access to less land). IPs continue to promote intensive extension for new growers but adopt a system of upgrading for farmers who are performing well and can produce with less supervision FAO should urgently seek ways to resolve the dilemma of how to receive funds from projects that are designed on a cost recovery basis so as not to undermine fledgling business & contracting culture that IPs and Pvt Sector Partners are promoting. FAO Logistics Department investigates suppliers of products more intensively in future to ensure quality and reliability of supply. FAO/IPs seek funding of minimum of 3 years for market linkage projects to enhance the ability of all stakeholders to engage in well planned & phased implementation of development interventions and to engage in appropriate capacity building of all (Govt and Pvt) partners & stakeholders . As donor interventions in market linkage activities expand, there will be an increasing need for a coordinating body to maintain a database of who is doing what and where to avoid duplication of activities and to monitor the process. FAO is uniquely placed to ensure that the process is coordinated for the benefit of all stakeholders. • FAO should initiate a phased withdrawal from direct input distribution for non humanitarian interventions and move to retail voucher based systems to encourage all stakeholders (agricultural input producers, wholesalers, service providers, IPs) to develop market based input distribution systems and to give farmers greater choice in selection of seed varieties & inputs and greater control over the input procurement process . However, the modalities for delivering inputs (direct distribution, open or closed retail vouchers) should be flexible and responsive to individual project situations since direct input distribution systems may still be the most efficient distribution mechanisms for some cash crops where timely delivery of specific inputs is critical to achieving productivity required for success in contract farming . FAO continue to support the institutional mechanisms required for successful implementation of input voucher programmes including innovations that will support electronic voucher systems, standardisation of vouchers that can be redeem across a wide range of participating stores, decentralised warehousing system to supply agro dealers. FAO support training and coordination activities that will increase the ability of all stakeholders (agro dealers, donors, IPs, private contractors, farmers) to use voucher based input distribution systems.

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1. Background and Introduction Agriculture is at the heart of the Zimbabwean economy, contributing approximately 17% to Zimbabwe’s GDP, 40 per cent of total export earnings and 60% of all raw materials for industry. As the main source of livelihood for about 65 – 70% of the population, the performance of agriculture is a key determinant of rural livelihood resilience and poverty levels. General challenges facing smallholder farmers (SHF’s) include low and erratic rainfall, low and declining soil fertility, low investment, shortages of farm power - labour and draft animals, poor physical and institutional infrastructure, poverty and recurring food insecurity. In addition, an estimated 18% of Zimbabwe adult population is HIV positive and there is a high impact of HIV and AIDS in the agricultural sector. 34

Over the last decade, Zimbabwe has experienced a multi-layered and multi-faceted crisis, which led to an enormous setback in the economic and social conditions of the country as a whole and had significant bearing on the performance of the agricultural sector. Following the implementation of the Fast Track Land Reformed in 2000, the country experienced nine consecutive years of negative growth. For most of those years, below normal rainfall was recorded which combined with policy changes and largely unavailable or unaffordable agricultural inputs led to a decline in the performance of the agricultural sector bringing widespread poverty and food insecurity. According to the 1995 and 2003 National Poverty Assessments, poverty has increased in Zimbabwe. The percentage of the population below the Food Poverty line (FPL) increased from 29 per cent in 1995 to 58 per cent in 2003. 35 Although there is no agreed poverty figure beyond 2003, it is apparent that poverty increased through to 2009. Record-breaking inflation and critical shortages of inputs forced production and productivity declines in both rural and urban economies (Chiripanhura, 2010). This is in stark contrast to high growth rates of the 80s and early 90s, based largely on a strong commercial farm sector but supported by growth in production and marketed output from smallholder farmers who benefitted from Government’s post - independence emphasis on smallholder agriculture that resulted in increased access to extension, credit and marketing services. Although marketed output of smallholder producers was concentrated in favourable areas with adequate rainfall and the bulk of marketed surplus came from 15-20% of these households, smallholders were actively engaged in the market and recognised as contributing significantly to post independence agricultural sector performance. The subsequent breakdown of the commercial agricultural sector and the disintegration of the agricultural services supporting it affected negatively on availability of both public and private sector services for SHFs. Difficulties in accessing input and output markets coupled with general economic decline, led to a reduction in smallholder area planted and yields and overall production and marketed output from the smallholder sector dropped significantly, resulting in a household-level and national food security crisis. Over the last decade domestic cereal production consistently fell short of national requirements

34 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) results gave an adult HIV prevalence rate of 18.1 percent in 2005/6. This is from actual population testing for HIV. The adult HIV prevalence rate was estimated at 24.6 percent in 2003 and it had declined to 20.1 percent in 2005. These results show a decline in HIV prevalence, the first such decline Southern Africa.

35 According to the Human Poverty Index (HPI) which is a more holistic measure of the multiple dimensions of poverty; deprivation as measured by the HPI increased from 23 per cent in 1995 to 33 per cent in 2003. 111

and from a net surplus producer the country became a food importer. At the peak of the crisis, some 48 % of rural households were vulnerable to food insecurity and receiving humanitarian assistance.

Following the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of the inclusive Government in early 2009, new policies and budget reforms were implemented and macro-economic conditions started to improve. In 2009, Zimbabwe adopted multiple (hard) currencies in place of the Zimbabwe dollar that led to an improvement in general economic conditions, stabilisation of food prices and laid the foundations for agricultural recovery. For the first time in many years, it now became possible for donors to contemplate programmes that supported market orientated development interventions.

Over the last couple of seasons, the availability of agricultural inputs has improved but SHFs remain constrained due to low productivity and limited scope to generate cash to procure inputs. The problem is further compounded by lack of purchasing power of the traditional commodity buyers, including the Grain Marketing Board, due to the liquidity crunch experienced because of the global economic downturn.

There is consensus among analysts that smallholder agriculture development in Zimbabwe cannot be achieved without improving agricultural productivity and swift progress in re-establishing linkages to both input and output markets. In this regard, FAO and its partners are investing considerable time and resources in supporting projects that have among their objectives, expected outputs and activities, the improvement of smallholder farmers - market linkages. The activities carried out include support to output markets (e.g. Promoting contract farming arrangements between smallholder and private sector)) and support for market-driven input distribution methods (e.g. promoting use of input vouchers and market linkages between agro dealers and wholesalers). These activities have been complemented in many cases by a strong focus on training and extension in conservation agriculture – as a basis for improving productivity.

The activities of FAO and its partners in Zimbabwe have taken place in the context of a challenging political situation and weakened capacity of Government to engage in development and agricultural coordination activities. In addition, donor support for Zimbabwe has only in the last few years begun to shift from humanitarian assistance towards support for rehabilitation and recovery and limited funding for development activities. FAO’s market linkage activities are undertaken by the Emergency Programme and as such are constrained by the funding modalities of Emergency Assistance that tend to be short term (often a single season) rather than multi year. Further, donor support for projects within an Emergency Programme tends to be restricted to a limited range of interventions (E.g. Cropping rather than livestock and input distribution rather than capacity building) which limits the type of interventions which FAO and its partners are likely to receive funding for.

An evaluation of FAO’s Cooperation in Zimbabwe took place in February 2011, covering the totality of FAO’s work over the period 2006 - 2010. In the framework of this evaluation, and given the importance of the topic, it was deemed important to have a deeper study of the impacts of FAO’s interventions that link smallholder farmers to markets and in particular, areas where good practices and lessons learned might usefully be identified. Prior to the country evaluation, this study was commissioned to examine the extent to which FAO’s

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interventions, over the period 2006 – 2010, have served to strengthen smallholder farmer access to markets in terms of:

1. The relevance (pertinence, design) of different projects within the context of the priority problems faced by smallholder farmers 2. The Efficiency of the implementation process 3. The Effectiveness ( outputs produced, outcomes achieved) at individual, organisational and institutional level 4. Impact on beneficiaries & other stakeholders (positive and negative consequences of interventions) 5. Sustainability of different approaches used to link smallholders to markets

2. Methodology With the TOR’s focusing largely on OECD/DAC standard evaluation criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability this helped to focus research questions and provided some guidance in structuring the desk study and fieldwork.

In addition, literature on barriers to smallholder market engagement was consulted at the beginning of the study to assist in the development of a conceptual framework.

As gaps in the secondary data were identified, follow up questions and checklists were developed for key informant and focus groups discussions and data collection tools were adjusted to reflect preliminary findings. For example, the discovery from FAO baseline data set that younger farmers were poorly represented at some project sites led to a decision to include younger farmers in a separate focus group discussion so as to gain their perspective on the barriers to participation of younger farmers and outcomes and project impact on younger households. Projects sites representing all IPs were visited.

The logical framework of each project was used as a guide to expected outputs & indicators but where there were no specific indicators relating to research questions identified in the TOR of the study, relevant hypotheses were generated. For example, a particular aspect of inquiry is equity in general and gender equity in particular. But, since contract farming projects are targeted at the whole community, there is nothing in the outcome indicators about measuring participation rates of vulnerable households or their performance vis a vis better endowed households. The study investigates the type of smallholders that FAO/partners have been working with, and finds out whether there is any evidence that these are just the wealthier farmer. The study hypothesises that the proportion of Vulnerable Households (Households with less than 4 cattle or donkeys) is less than 40%. of beneficiary households. At the time of the inception report, it was also envisaged that

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FAO’s data sets (baseline and post-harvest) would enable the study to investigate the performance of different groups of farmers. Unfortunately, post-harvest data sets were not available for all project sites and when they were, the same beneficiaries had not been interviewed in both surveys. This limited the ability of the study to examine farmer performance in relation to farmer characteristics. Appendix 2 outlines some limitations of FAO databases and highlights M and E problems that need to be addressed.

One IP (SAT), carried out their own post-harvest survey of estimated yields for project households for Hurungwe and Kadoma, (Annex to 2009/2010 final reports) providing information on variability in farmer performance for the 2009/2010 agricultural season at these survey sites. In addition, with the assistance of FAO M and E unit it is possible to link information from this excel file to the FAO, CA baseline survey database to permit limited analysis of performance by household characteristics for a small sample of households. The other IP operating in 2009/2010 (UPT) did not estimate yields at household level but provided estimates of average yield at each project site.

Fieldwork was conducted during the growing season between mid-December 2010 and mid February 2011. Key informant interviews were carried out at more than 10 project sites (several for each IP), and Focus Group discussion were held at three intervention sites with different groups of beneficiaries (younger farmers (< 30 years), male farmers and women farmers) including:

• Chiweshe (APT project site): Contract Farming of 1ha Maize, IST year project, 290 farmers, Maize input package funded by Pvt Sector Partner with 50% fertiliser support from FAO. • Guruve (UP, project site) Support for 1 ha crops (1/3 maize, 2/3 sugar beans), Project support for maize grown under contract to Union project & Pvt Sector Partner for contracted sugar beans, 4th year of project, 250 farmers. • Kadoma (SAT, Project site) Contract Farming 1ha (1/3 maize, 1/3 cowpeas, 1/3 sorghum) plus vegetable gardens, poultry & livestock activities. Free inputs from project for maize crop, Pvt Sector contracts for cowpeas and sorghum. 3rd year project, 750 farmers. The selection of project sites for field visits, key informant interviews aimed to cover at least one site from each District where FAO supported contract-farming interventions are operating, and to include both field and plantation crops. The three project sites where focus group discussions were conducted were purposively selected to include sites from all three IPs, new and established projects, variation in both the types of activities supported and the nature of the Pvt Sector linkage. A list of project sites visited is provided in Appendix 1, together with copies of the main data collection tools.

While all stakeholders gave their perspective on how projects had been implemented and overall project strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges, the key focus with each interest group differed. Discussions with staff of IPs and private sector partners focused on how the project had been implemented and the main opportunities and challenges they faced working in the smallholder sector and working with FAO. Beneficiaries (farmers) were invited to share their views on the relevance of the project in the context of the priority problems they faced the projects strengths and weakness, their perceptions of any discriminatory

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practices in the way the project had been implemented and the main impacts of the project on their livelihoods. Rural Agro dealers were asked to share how effective the project had been in increasing their ability to supply farmers with a range of agricultural inputs, how if at all the project had impacted on other aspects of their businesses such as sales of groceries and purchases of agricultural outputs and how the implementation of the project could be improved in future.

3. Conceptualising Smallholder Engagement with Markets & FAO Market Interventions 3.1. Barriers to Market Engagement According to Barrett (2008), smallholders face two classes of barriers to increased market engagement

• Inadequate Access to Private Assets (productive assets, knowledge of improved production technologies, barriers to financing) to produce a marketable surplus • Institutional and Physical Infrastructure Deficiencies that effect the market environment & increase marketing and transaction costs for both producers and traders thereby limiting incentives for market exchange An inability to produce a marketable surplus prevents smallholders from reaping the gains attainable from market-based exchange which limits their ability to accumulate or borrow assets, reinforcing the initial condition and generating a poverty cycle or trap.

Institutional and physical infrastructure deficiencies limit households’ incentives to increase productivity to generate marketable surpluses reinforcing households’ inclinations towards semi-subsistence production for purely local market exchange. Traders also have little incentives to incur large fixed costs to reach such households, resulting in few buyers & low prices, further reinforcing inclination to semi subsistence production & poverty traps

However, possession of the necessary private assets to produce a surplus and operating in a market environment that is right in terms of institutions and infrastructure does not necessarily mean that a farmer will actually sell into the market. This depends on the nature of the governance mechanism; how farmers are linked to markets. There is potentially therefore, a third set of barriers to smallholder engagement with markets:

• Limited governance mechanisms to link farmers to market (market knowledge, managerial capacity, organisation, dispute resolution mechanisms etc) which limit farmers ability to engage with output markets and make farmers highly susceptible to exploitative contracts or trade FAO supported interventions mainly address the 1st & 3rd types of barriers but projects that promote links between SHFs and the private sector also assist in reducing transaction costs associated with Institutional and Physical Infrastructure deficiencies. For example, Conservation Agriculture projects, linked with Contract Farming(CF) , address barriers associated with inadequate access of smallholders to private assets to produce a marketable surplus. Improved livelihoods are promoted through a combination of input support, knowledge transfer of improved farming practices and linking farmers to markets. In addition, CF partnerships address the governance mechanisms to facilitate smallholder sales into a market and reduce transaction costs thereby increasing incentives to increase productivity to generate marketable surpluses & addressing meso scale barriers.

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At some project sites, FAO has also been directly involved in facilitating activities to overcome physical infrastructural constraints, such as poor roads. For example, banana farmers in the FAO supported contract- growing project in Honde Valley faced a serious physical infrastructural constraint in terms of quality of access road linking banana growers to the local collection point where the Pvt sector Partner picked up farmers bananas. FAO liaised with the District Council and helped secure finance for road and bridge repairs.

If CF projects expand into new smallholder farming areas and as Pvt Sector embraces some of the support functions currently met by donors the importance of addressing physical and institutional barriers is likely to grow. If such barriers to market engagement are not addressed this not only reduces the incentives for smallholder commercialisation but limits market engagement to those communal farming areas that are best served by the existing infrastructure.

3.2. FAO Interventions For the purposes of this study, FAO interventions with market linkage activities can be divided into two broad groups of projects

3.2.1. Conservation Agriculture Projects with Contract Farming Arrangements These projects aim to promote commercialization of smallholder producers through intensified cropping, farmer training and extension in improved management practices and linkages with private sector partners.

The specific objectives of these interventions are to support smallholder farmers in achieving food and nutrition security through increased crop productivity as well as improve their income base through creation of market linkages and the promotion of diversified crop production.

The logic of project intervention rests on the premise that farm management constraints are the single most important factor accounting for low productivity in communal farming areas and as a result isolated input support activities for poor communal farmers have only a limited impact in terms of increasing yields, improving food security and stabilizing livelihoods. Further, in the absence of stable and profitable links to markets for surplus agricultural output farmers with the potential to produce a surplus are unable to realize the full benefits of increased production and improve their incomes. It is envisaged that through an all - inclusive support model (extension, inputs and market linkages) smallholder farmers can increase their productivity considerably and achieve food security and significant marketable surpluses. Many perceived poor and vulnerable households can furthermore transform their subsistence – based farming into more commercially orientated production and enter into contract farming agreements with private sector buyers. Establishing contract growing arrangements with private sector companies, thereby securing extension advice and inputs during and beyond the projects lifespan, is a specific project output.

While expected project outputs vary slightly between different project documents they include

• 90 % households achieving maize yields equivalent to 2 tonnes per hectare or more • 90-100% of households producing enough cereals to last a year • 50-70 % households derive cash income from supported agricultural activities 116

• 50% -70% farmers are linked up with at least one private sector company for at least one crop in the rotation

FAO is also supporting a pilot weather index insurance programme in Chiweshe in collaboration with a Pvt Sector Contract Farming Partner.

3.2.2. Support for Market Driven Input Distribution Methods FAO has directly supported Market Driven Input distribution Systems in two main areas:

3.2.2.1. FAO and SNV’s Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Programme (RARP) In this programme, FAO is facilitating insurance to mitigate distributor’s risks. The objectives of the RARP programme are:

• Reestablishment of sustainable links between suppliers of agricultural inputs and agro-dealers. • Stocking of rural agro-dealers outlets with quality seeds, fertilizers, agro-chemicals, veterinary products, tools and implements; • Strengthen capacities of agro-dealers and wholesalers to do business with each other • Ensuring local access to inputs by smallholder farmers resulting in - Increased productivity resulting in household food and income security; - Contributions to community food security through sale of excess produce In 2009/2010, a pilot project was operational in 15 districts in four provinces, and worked through three wholesalers covering around 60 rural agro dealers. In 2010/2011 there was scaled up project (RARP II) targeting over 500 shops countrywide & working with eight wholesalers.

3.2.2.2. FAO’s Pilot Electronic Input Voucher Project Large scale input assistance projects are part of a general rehabilitation & recovery strategy for smallholder holder agriculture in Zimbabwe. In the 2010/11 season, donors supported extensive voucher based input distribution systems that use local agro dealers to distribute inputs to beneficiary households thereby supporting development of rural input markets. FAO supported two pilot electronic voucher projects within the EU funded programmes implemented by Help Germany to investigate

• the ability of smallholder households to co-finance input vouchers • The viability of electronic voucher systems 3.2.3. Coordination and Capacity FAO is also involved in coordination and capacity building activities at both national level and individual project level that, although not specifically focused on barriers to smallholder marketing, promote a facilitating environment for smallholder commercialisation. These activities include:

• Leadership of Technical working groups (CA, seed houses, gardens, market linkages, livestock) • Providing technical advice & capacity building to partners (NGOs, Govt, Unions, Donors, etc) • Successfully advocated for the inclusion of fertilizer in humanitarian agricultural input packages 117

• Institutionalisation of successful practices/materials ( e.g. CA modules in Agricultural Institutions) • Contributed to the development of key national strategic documents (Sector strategy & policy ) • Supported National Assessments (Crop Assessments by MoAMID Livelihood and Food Security Assessments by FNC ( ZimVAC)

The Market Linkage Technical Working Group ( MLWG), is directly involved with market linkage activities and provides a forum for debating issues & reviewing concepts and proposal around the movement of donors from humanitarian to commercially orientated assistance. The group is an informal body of around 25 members from the private sector, farmer representatives, donors, NGOs and Government stakeholders, which meets to discuss issues around the initiation and strengthening of economic links between input and output markets and smallholder farmers. Activities include monthly meetings to discuss markets, share concepts, experiences, plan group activities, and seminars that feature topical and relevant programmes. The MLWG was funded by SNV until December 2010 and FAO has committed short term funding until April 2011 while the group works out a subscription based funding system. With more private companies seeking to develop new opportunities or expand existing opportunities that include smallholder farmers and donors increasingly supporting market based activities the MLWG envisages playing a significant role in the coordination of activities to prevent duplication and increase efficient use of donor funds and in the dissemination of information on best practice and lessons learnt.

The next two sections examine in more detail the two main groups of initiatives (CA with contract farming arrangements and support for market driven input distribution methods), the key activities implemented under each and the findings of the study with respect to the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of FAO supported market linkage interventions.

4. Conservation Agriculture Projects with Contract Farming Arrangements 4.1. Projects and Implementing Partners Projects in this category promote commercialization of smallholder producers through intensified cropping and linkages with private sector partners. The specific objectives of these interventions are to support smallholder farmers in achieving food and nutrition security through increased crop productivity as well aiming at significant income generation by through creation of market linkages and the promotion of diversified crop production. All project sites are in communal farmer or old resettlement areas. Projects and Implementing Partners (IPS) include:

4.3.1. Conservation Agriculture Programme implemented by the Union Project Trust ( UPT) The Union Project is a joint partnership between the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU) (now known as the Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union – ZCFU), the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to assist farmers in the communal areas of Zimbabwe to achieve sustainable food production utilising CA systems and to promote the commercialisation of smallholders through intensified cropping and linkages with the Pvt Sector. The

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programme started in 2005 and the current three year project cycle (2008/2009 – 2010/2011) is funded by the European Union, supplemented by funds from other donors including Netherlands.

Union project sites are selected by the UP Board and have to meet certain selection criteria including being in communal or old resettlements areas. The sites also include irrigation schemes previously rehabilitated by FAO. Private sector partners also contribute to site selection by indicating the areas in which they wish to carry out production of their crops. Most sites are in the better rainfall areas the project has expanded by adding new sites and increasing the number of beneficiaries at existing sites and in 2009/2010 season UP implemented market linkage projects at 17 sites in 8 Districts.

In order to achieve sustainability it is envisaged that the private sector will eventually take over the supply of inputs to Union Project farmers. This was to be planned on the following basis:

Year One: Extension and inputs provided by the Union Project

Year Two: Extension provided by the Union Project and inputs provided by private sector partners.

Year Three: Sites taken over completely by private sector partners.

4.3.1. Enhancing Productivity for Communal Farmers in Zimbabwe, through Advanced Land Use and Management Practices , Sustainable Agriculture Trust (SAT) The Sustainable Agricultural Trust supports projects with market linkage activities in two Districts, Kadoma and Hurungwe funded respectively by the Spanish and the Swedish Governments. Both programmes support communal households to become food secure and produce and market a range of cash crops to enhance incomes. The projects emphasis creating pathways for sustainability through establishing marketing arrangements with Pvt Sector companies.

The programme in Kadoma is unique among market linkage projects in supporting an integrated range of agricultural development activities. These include small scale vegetable production to enhance household food security and to earn additional income and a livestock component. For those households with cattle and goats the project aims to improve livestock genetics and interventions for those without cattle take the form of group poultry and layer projects. The project also has a reforestation component.

SAT has been working with FAO since 2005 and senior SAT personnel were closely involved in the joint project between FAO and all the farmers unions launched in 2005. The UPT programme itself was started and implemented with the direct involvement of SAT Consultants and these consultants continue to consult to the Union Project.

4.3.1. Smallholder Market Development Project (SMDP), Agricultural Project Trust (APT) The goal of the Smallholder Market Development Project (SMDP) is to improve the availability of agricultural inputs to smallholder farmers through market-based interventions. The two year project, funded by the Dutch

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(OSRO/ZIM/906/NET) will assist in strengthening links between contracting companies and smallholder farmers in the production and marketing of cash crops like sugar beans, paprika, plantation crops and horticultural crops among others. Two important project components include the

• Contract Farming Support Programme (CFSP) - provision of fertilizer support to companies involved in smallholder contract farming of annual crops • Coffee, Tea and Banana (COTEBA) programme - provision of input and extension to support the contract production of smallholder perennial plantation crops. The SMDP is being implemented at a time when the Zimbabwean economy is characterised by illiquidity at all levels. Many companies with contract farming operations are experiencing great difficulty in accessing funds to support their operations. The CFSP and COTEBA programmes are designed to provide companies with resources to supplement their on going programmes. Both the CFSP & COTEBA programmes primarily assist companies already involved in contracting smallholders in UP project areas but through the additional funding from FAO these companies have been able to expand existing activities.

Coffee and Banana farmers are also being supported with maize inputs to enable them to produce 0.33 ha of maize. Farmers received 200kgs each of compound D and CAN. 36

The timing of the SMDP is also appropriate from the Donor perspective. Zimbabwe is emerging from a prolonged agricultural emergency and donors are increasing looking for more developmental-oriented projects. The SMDP will assist in bridging the gap between free-input distribution programmes and market driven approaches of the future. Inputs are provided to companies on a loan basis with favourable terms designed to assist company cash flow. Farmers are required to repay input loans to their contracting companies. The only exception to this general approach is that participating farmers will be provided with free lime. (APT Interim Project, SFS DOO7910 August 31 2010).

4.2. Project Relevancy: Implementation Design Although there are variations between project sites and IPs in the details of project design all project models including similar components:

• Conservation Agriculture (CA) - manual CA system based on planting basins to stabilise fragile production environment & increase productivity using available resources and technology. This is in line with FAOs strategy to promote CA. • Comprehensive knowledge transfer - through a team of consultants and Field Officers in collaboration with AGRITEX and incorporating Participatory Extension Management (PEM) practices with farmer extension groups, farmer-to-farmer extension, on farm demonstrations, lead farmer approach, to ensure that farmers maximise the efficient use of supplied inputs.

36 Tea Farmers were excluded from maize production in 2010/11 since budgetary constraints precluded them from receiving the COTEBA extension support necessary for training in CA 120

• Provision of Input support for up to I ha ( 1/3 food crop, 1/3 legume. 1/3 cash crop) , which is within management capabilities & labour resources of farmer & promotes crop rotations to add fertility to soil & diversification of agricultural income base • Linking smallholders with Pvt Sector companies in contract farming (CF) arrangements - IPs facilitate linkages for at least one crop in the rotation . • Direct input distribution - FAO or Pvt Sector Partner procures inputs and transport to project sites. • Conditions under which inputs provided - free /subsidised inputs in early years phased over time to inputs provided on credit & recovery of inputs advanced at the end of the season after harvest. • Formation of farmer groups - for training, work groups for production, social support & loan repayment • Capacity building of all stakeholders (farmer & community org, Pvt Sector, Government service e.g. AGRITEX) to better serve smallholders.

The projects are implemented in close cooperation with the Farmers Union’s and focus strongly on professional extension support and utilisation of local commercial farming expertise to transfer knowledge to smallholders to boost production. At the institutional level, the formation of the Union Project Trust by the three farmer’s unions is potentially a significant step for the development of the entire agricultural sector in Zimbabwe.

Two other components, which play a key role in contract farming projects, are the practice of Conservation Agriculture (CA) and mutually beneficial links with the private sector. Conservation Agriculture is promoted by FAO as an appropriate technology that can address some of the underlying crop management problems facing farmers and when practised to a high standard can significantly boost production and the livelihoods of farming households. The use of CA principles for project activities is a non-negotiable condition for farmers participating in project activities.

Project interventions and design are well geared towards the needs of SHFs who have the potential to produce a marketable surplus but are constrained by the unavailability and unaffordable of inputs, limited agronomic skills and limited access to output markets. By providing, a comprehensive input package combined with intensive training and extension to improve farmers’ agronomic skills and by linking farmers to the private sector in contract farming arrangements the projects were expected to reduce key barriers to market engagement.

Both FAO and its partners see these projects as building on Emergency and Development Programmes and recognize that target groups may well require humanitarian assistance in the early years that justifies the provision of free inputs in the early stages of a project with a gradual phasing in of full cost recovery over time.

The relevance and appropriateness of project activities within the context of the priority problems faced by smallholder farmers and the needs of different types of farmers & poverty alleviation in general is confirmed from focus group discussions with farmers in Chiweshe (Table 1) and other project sites (Appendix 3). Limited access to inputs is identified as a priority problem by all groups of farmers. The GMB is one market outlet for 121

surplus crops but farmers noted that the GMB has in recent years not been purchasing commodities other than maize and payments are often received late, well into the next agricultural season and too late to finance timely purchase of inputs for the next season. The main impact of these challenges has been to reduce agricultural output through both a reduction in planted area and lower yields. An additional impact noted by farmers is a reduction in diversity of crops grown with households indicating the tendency to mono cropping (maize) with small amounts of other crops such as ground nuts for own consumption. In this context, poorer female headed household indicated that they were restricted to planting retained seed. Some groups also commented that production and marketing challenges had reduced the incentives to produce a surplus such that their goal was only to produce for own consumption. Younger farmers also mentioned that unemployment and absence of opportunities to earn income from agriculture contributes to unsustainable income generating activities such as collection and sale of firewood and distress responses such as crop and livestock theft. During the focus group discussions, farmers were asked about the activities implemented by the project to help them meet the challenges they face and the relevance and effectiveness of these activities. Table 2 summarise discussions with Chiweshe farmers who are in their 1 st year of a contract farming arrangement to grow 1hectare of maize for a Private Sector Partner, facilitated by APT 37 .

The farmers appreciate project activities and highlighted as particularly relevant and effective the timely provision of US$350 of maize inputs, including herbicides, to support the production of one hectare of maize per farmer combined with training & extension on the correct and efficient use of inputs under CA. The free provision of lime by FAO was also relevant in the context of the very acidic soils in the project area. Farmers recognise and that Contract Farming arrangements with the private sector partner enable them to access inputs on credit with no up front co- payments and to repay after harvest. The contract guarantees to purchase up to two tonnes of maize from each assisted producer at a price set in advance (US$250 per tonne). At the time of the focus group discussions farmers had not harvested their maize so could not comment on marketing arrangements. The level of fertiliser support (200kgs of Compound and 200 kgs of AN) is at the upper end of recommended fertiliser levels for smallholder maize production but farmers considered the input package relevant and appropriate given potential yields in this region.

Conservation Agriculture Projects that facilitate contract farming arrangements are in line with Government efforts to improve agricultural productivity and to promote market based approaches that do not distort the operations of the market. In recent years, the Zimbabwean Government has consistently expressed support for a more liberalized marketing environment and for contract farming, most recently in November 2009 through Phase II of the Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERPII) that will be implemented until 2012.

37 It is anticipated that in future seasons farmers will also be contracted by the same Pvt Sector Partner to produce a legume crop such as soya beans or sugar beans in addition to one ha if maize or as a substitute for proportion of maize area. 122

Table 1: Main Challenges Farmers Face in Accessing Inputs & Markets

Male farmers > 30 yrs Women farmers > 30 yrs Mixed farmers < 30 yrs Main challenges Farmers face in accessing inputs ( ranked) 1. Lack of Inputs locally in last 5- 1. Lack of Inputs locally 1. Lack of money to purchase 6 years, especially fertiliser especially fertiliser but also inputs 2. Lack of technical knowledge hybrid maize seed 2. Politicisation of GMB of how best to use inputs. Not 2. Inputs available through GMB 3. Corruption of GMB or any receiving any extension advice arriving too late other source of inputs 3. Lack of money – very few 3. Lack of money to purchase 4. Lack technical knowhow of households have cash to inputs good methods of farming finance purchases of inputs 5. Late arrival of free inputs 4. Favouritism in distribution of cheap or free fertilizer when available Main challenges Farmers face in accessing markets ( Ranked) 1. Low prices for output 1. Where to sell. Dependent on 1. Where to sell crops 2. Long delays in payment from GMB market for maize & 2. Need ‘hand in pocket’ to GMB only few Pvt Buyers for market maize to GMB 3. Lack of GMB market for crops other crops (groundnuts) . 3. Poor local markets for crops other than maize (last year 2. Delays in receiving payment and low prices GMB refused to buy soya when sell to GMB 4. Late payment GMB beans and sunflowers as no 3. Low prices received from Pvt 5. Non availability of transport to money) Traders. take maize to GMB 4. Corruption at local GMB 4. No market for groundnuts 5. Split payments from GMB 6. High cost of transport to GMB 7. Timing of marketing so that moisture content correct asked to take maize home for drying and return later

Impact of challenges on farming situation ( not ranked) 1. Fall in area of agricultural 1. Small areas planted cf to past 1. Reduced area of crops production and quantity 2. Low production cf past 2. Low yields produced 3. Women make do with seed 3. Hunger and poverty 2. People only aim to produce for they have in store (esp. 4. Sell livestock to get food own consumption and not a widows). Plant groundnuts 5. Destroy natural resources to surplus which require little fertilizer. get cash ( sell firewood, stream 3. Mainly mono cropping maize 4. Less variety of crops grown – bank cultivation sugar cane|) with v. small areas of beans & maize and a little groundnuts 6. High local maize prices due to g/nuts for home use 5. Women frustrated and lose reduced production zeal to produce 7. More likely to work for food in 6. Challenges encouraged women other peoples fields to join project even though its 8. Theft of crop and livestock hard work 9. More sickness – spread of HIV among young people due to commercial sex Source: Focus Group Discussions, Chiweshe, Mashonaland Central, Friday, 28 January 2011

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Table 2 Main Activities Implemented to help meet challenges Farmers Face Main challenge Type of Activity Why it is or is not Effective Why it is Relevant? activity addresses

Technical training on CA Poor soil fertility, Very effective - enables farmers Previously lacked CA (farmers specifically mentioned lack of draft who don’t have livestock to knowledge st use of hoes, planting standards, animals, lack of prepare fields & plant with 1 Maize production below placement of fertiliser, knowledge effective rains potential mulching, need for continuous Increases Access to food weeding, timing & splitting of via own production & top dressing applications) increased incomes Free Provision of Lime by Acidic soils Very effective –farmers already Local soils very acidic FAO. noticing difference in soil structure and quality of soils Direct distribution of US$350 Non availability of Very effective -enables farmer Finance is a constraint maize inputs per farmer ( inputs locally who doesn’t have cash to access hybrid seed, fertiliser (200 kg Lack of cash to adequate level of inputs only D and 200kg CAN) & purchase repay at end of season. No upfront herbicides) on credit by Pvt appropriate contribution Sector Partner quantities of inputs Provision of herbicides in input Labour constraints Reduces labour needs for weeding Reduces drudgery of CA package and training in for weeding Cost effective when appropriate use Non availability of compared to cost of hiring herbicides in local casual labour for weeding agro dealers & limited knowledge of herbicide use Facilitating formation of farmers Added Value of Mixed feedback about how Potential value of carrying into (self selecting) groups working & learning groups working. out production activities in groups and (e.g. digging basins, assisting each other. weeding, sharing knapsack Positive - relating to production sprayers etc) in groups Additional security issues. for Pvt sector lender Potential for farmer Negative- not all farmers want to groups to reduce be accountable for non transaction costs and risks performing members with respect associated with linking to loan repayments smallholders with Pvt sector partners Contract farming arrange ment Non availability of Private sector links working well Absence of stable links to with Northern Farming inputs or cash to & farmers very positive about input and output markets finance inputs & timeliness of input supply and absence of stable quality of training and extension.

profitable market Farmers waiting to see how well for maize crop marketing arrangement work & whether maize collected and paid for on time. Farmers only contracted to sell a maximum of 2 tonnes per farmer at guaranteed price which is too little for top performing farmers Source: Focus Group Discussions, Chiweshe, Mashonaland Central, Friday, 28 January 2011

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4.3. Project Results 4.3.1. Number of Farmers and Crops Supported Over the review period, Contract Farming (CF) projects provided inputs & supporting services, including market linkage activities, to a steadily increasing number of SHFs (Table 3). The increase in numbers of farmers assisted came about through both an increase in beneficiaries at existing sites and addition of new sites. In 2006/07, there was one local IP working with 400 farmers in three Districts and by 2010/11 CF interventions are reaching over 6000 households in 16 Districts. This represents a 15 fold growth in the number of farmers reached and all except one IP reached 2010 targets. 38 Although an increasing number of farmers are being supported through CF projects the number still only represent a small fraction of the 1.2m farmers on this sector.

Table 3 : Number of Smallholders Reached 2006-2011 Implementing Cropping Season Target

Partner(IP) 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 2010

UP 400 525 1085 2300 3694 3000

SAT - 300 300 1851 1950 1950

APT

COTEBA - - - - 503 600

CFSP (UP farmers) 3694 3800

Total (excl CFSP) 400 825 1385 4151 6147 6250

Source: Compiled from Project Reports, IPs

CFSP – contract farming support programme

COTEBA – coffee, tea and banana programme

The cropping model outlined in project documents indicates that farmers are expected to receive inputs for up to one hectare of crops, split equally between three crop types (staple food, legume and cash crop). In practice, the area of supported crops per farmer varies between IPs and across project sites, from 0.5ha – 1ha, depending on factors such as farmer interest & capability, availability and interest of Pvt Sector partners, crop viability & characteristics of growing season. During the 2009/2010 agricultural season, the average area supported per farmer across all project sites was 0.75 ha (Table 4).

• 100% farmers supported in maize production & maize accounted for largest share of land area (48%)

38 The shortfall in targeted growers by APT was due to some farmers at one project site withdrawing from Paprika contracts when the contracting company failed to provide seed bed chemicals on time, compounded by very late arrival of FAO lime. At another site, some farmers decided to withdraw from contracts for cowpea production citing dissatisfaction with contracting agreements in the previous season and/or shortage of land.

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• Other crops supported include cowpeas, sugar beans, paprika, seed sorghum, groundnuts, cotton, sun hemp, chillies, bananas, coffee, tea • Cowpeas are the most important non grain crop in terms of number of farmers supported & share of land area (19%). • Only one plantation crop was supported in 2009/2010 but in 20010/2011 there are over 503 growers of bananas, tea and coffee under APT, covering a total land area of 150 ha’s An external evaluation of input distribution for UP project sites in 2009/2010 indicates that whilst 100 % of farmers received maize inputs only 73% received inputs for a cash crop and only 43% of farmers took inputs for a legume crop (TDS Africa, 2010). The report does not explore the reasons for this but key informant interviews with project management and farmers suggest that the situation is partly explained by a general reluctance of farmers to allocate land to legume crops, especially those with small land holdings, given the low economic returns to traditional legume crops such as groundnuts. Other factors affecting the uptake of contracted cash crops include the difficulty in identifying profitable cash crops for some project sites and the understandable reluctance of farmers to participate in contracts if they perceive that returns are not sufficient. At some sites, market conditions, performance experience of past seasons or Pvt Sector interests have led to annual changes in choice of contracted crops which is difficult for farmers but reflects the complexities of decision making in a dry land farming environment and a liberalised market.

Table 4 : Cropping Patterns, 2009/2010 Farmer Involvement

SAT UP Total Crops % of No. Size(ha) No. Size(ha) No. Size(ha) total crops

Maize 1851 797 2300 754 4151 1551 48.3

Sugar beans 583 192 177 31 760 223 7.0 (seed crop)

Cowpeas 1100 275 832 322 1932 597 18.6 (seed crop)

Cotton 751 247 0 0 751 247 7.8

Sorghum - - 150 50 150 50 1.6 (seed crop)

G/nuts - - 150 50 150 50 1.6

Tobacco 1 - - 358 294 358 294 9.2

Flower - - 207 33 207 33 1

(Seed crop)

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Paprika - - 477 112 477 112 3.5

Banana - - 177 8 177 8 0.5

Horticulture - - 147 41 147 41 1.3

Gardens 385 3.85 - - 385 4 insig

Poultry 289 - - - 289 -

Livestock 289 - - - 289 -

Reforestation 750 - - - 750

Total 3210 100

Source: Compiled from Project Final Reports, IPs

Notes: 1. some cash crops, including tobacco, are funded by Pvt Sector Partners & not supported directly using donor funds

At some project sites, private sector partners are supporting the production of 2/3 ha of a cash crop, such as sugar beans, which also doubles as a legume crop. This appears to be a good strategy as it enables farmers to practice rotations whilst also cultivating a cash crop. Farmers participating in focus group discussions at two project sites noted that, with the exception of groundnuts, legume crops are not widely grown as cash crops but just planted in small quantities for home consumption. However, farmers recognise the need to practice rotations and with project support smallholders are keen to try cash legume crops such as sugar beans and soya beans.

4.3.2. Who are Benefitting from Project Activities Contract Farming Projects are not required by donors to apply vulnerability criteria in beneficiary selection. All interested farmers (better off poor, poor & very poor farmers) are invited to participate. Better off farmers are included, as they are required to participate as lead and model farmers who will have a key role in the extension system. Project beneficiaries are therefore largely self-targeted and the only requirement is availability of land and labour to cultivate 0.5 -1ha and willingness to practice CA on project supported crops. In the case of the UP project, membership of the Zimbabwe Farmers Union is also required.

In Zimbabwe, livestock ownership is often used as a proxy for wealth and humanitarian programmes adopt ‘households with less than (4) beasts’ as a criteria for identifying “vulnerable’ rural communal HHs. Other criteria followed in the fine-tuning of beneficiary lists of vulnerable households include

• Priority to families with handicapped, chronically ill or disabled members;

• Priority to families with orphaned children;

• Priority to elderly and child headed families (household head above the age of 60 or below 16);

• Priority to women-headed households;

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• Priority to household large in size ( eight members)

FAO baseline data sets for 2009/2010 were used to tabulate a beneficiary profile for CF project sites, including distribution of beneficiaries by livestock ownership (Table 5) & other characteristics of beneficiaries. (Tables 6 & 7) to identify the type of farmers participating in projects and whether there is any evidence those vulnerable groups are discriminated against.

Table 5 Livestock ownership & distribution of beneficiaries by livestock category39 Project Project Livestock Livestock ownership categories 40 (no.) (% beneficiaries) District mean (std. 7 or zero 1-3 4-6 dev) more

Goromonzi UP 1.9 (2.3) 44.4 33.3 16.7 5.6

Hurungwe SAT 1.5 (2.0) 50.0 36.7 8.3 5.0

Hurungwe-UP UP 2.2 (4.3) 60.0 16.7 13.3 10.0

Kadoma SAT 4.6 (5.8) 31.7 23.3 21.7 23.3

Makoni UP 3.2 (3.1) 16.0 52.0 24.0 8.0

Masvingo UP 6.9 (5.5) 13.6 6.8 36.4 43.2

Mazowe UP 2.6 (2.8) 31.8 36.4 22.7 9.1

Mount Darwin UP 4.5 (4.4) 24.0 20.0 40.0 16.0

Mutasa (Irrig) UP 0.2 (0.8) 93.4 3.3 3.3 0.0

Mutoko UP 4.2 (3.8) 10.0 43.4 33.3 13.3

Mvuma UP 6.8 (3.6) 0.0 10.0 50.0 40.0

Nyanga North UP 4.0 (3.6) 26.7 19.9 26.7 26.7

Source: Tabulated by author using FAO baseline data base 2009/2010 season

In most areas, vulnerable households are well represented among project beneficiaries and in two districts (Goromonzi & Hurungwe) households with zero or only 1-3 cattle account for over 75% of project beneficiaries. Only at two project sites (Mvuma and Masvingo) are project benefits captured by better off households.

39 FAO Targeting criteria, identify vulnerable households as those with < 4 livestock 40 Livestock include cattle and donkeys. Donkeys are common additional sources of draft power in Kadomo, Masvingo & Mvuma project areas but are of minimal importance in other project areas

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Table 6: Age and Sex of Project Beneficiaries Project Project Sex HH Age Age category of he head HH head (% size of had HHs)

District

< 30-44 45-59 60

30yrs yrs yrs yrs + male Female de facto Female de jure Mean mean Goromonzi UP 33 49 18 6.1 48.6 0.0 22.2 66.7 11.1

Hurungwe SAT 70 8 22 6.1 47.3 10.2 40.7 23.7 25.4

Hurungwe-UP UP 83 0 17 5.9 41.3 20.0 46.7 20.0 13.3

Kadoma SAT 78 7 15 6.7 45.8 10.0 38.3 38.3 13.3

Makoni UP 80 8 12 6.1 38.8 8.0 64.0 20.0 8.0

Masvingo UP 84 0 16 8.6 50.3 2.3 34.1 38.6 25.0

Mazowe UP 73 18 9 7.3 43.3 13.6 59.1 18.2 9.1

Mount Darwin UP 92 4 4 5.5 41.9 16.0 52.0 16.0 12.0

Mutasa (Irrig) UP 37 23 40 5.1 54.0 10.0 26.7 16.7 46.7

Mutoko UP 93 0 7 6.6 38.9 6.7 76.7 16.7 0.0

Mvuma UP 67 7 26 6.1 56.0 0.0 26.7 33.3 40.0

Nyanga North UP 53 13 34 5.4 53.3 0.0 23.3 43.3 33.3

Source: Tabulated by author using FAO baseline data base 2009/2010 season

Participation rates of female headed households vary considerably across project sites and seem low at a couple of project sites. However, about two thirds project sites recorded participation rates of female headed households over 20 % (rural population average is estimated at 20%) suggesting that overall there have not been significant barriers to the participation of female headed households (de facto or de jure) in contract farming projects (Table 7). However, women participating in focus groups indicated that men often heard about projects before women which sometimes meant women were too late to register for participation in year one (Table 8 ) .

Participation of farmers of different age groups also varies considerably across project sites. In several project areas beneficiaries 45 yrs. and above account for a larger share of project participants than beneficiaries under 45 yrs. In several project areas, beneficiaries over 45 yrs account for a larger share of project participants than beneficiaries less than 45 yrs. At two UP projects (Mutasa & Mvuma) more than 40% of households heads are 60 years and above. Beneficiary households where the household head is below 30 years of age are poorly represented at nearly all projects sites.

Households caring for orphans or other vulnerable household members are included among project beneficiaries

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although the proportion of beneficiary households with vulnerable members varies considerably between project sites. In Mazowe for example, only 22% beneficiary households did not contain vulnerable people whereas in Mvuma 63% households did not have any vulnerable members. (Table 7).

Table 7: Project Beneficiaries – Vulnerability characteristics Chron/ill or Caring for No. of Vulnerable people in Project Project IP phy/mentally orphans HH challenged ( % HHs) (% beneficiaries) District (% HHs) 3 or Yes No Yes No zero 1 2 more Goromonzi UP 39 61 20 80 55.6 33.3 5.6 5.6

Hurungwe SAT 47 53 37 63 40.0 16.7 25.0 18.3

Hurungwe-UP UP 40 60 7 93 53.3 16.7 13.3 16.7

Kadoma SAT 32 68 17 83 63.3 18.3 3.3 15.0

Makoni UP 40 60 8 92 60.0 16.0 20.0 4.0

Masvingo UP 68 32 3 97 31.8 31.8 27.3 9.1

Mazowe UP 55 45 46 54 22.7 27.3 22.7 27.3

Mount Darwin UP 28 72 16 84 60.0 32.0 4.0 4.0

Mutasa (Irrigsch) UP 50 50 14 86 48.3 17.2 17.2 17.2

Mutoko UP 47 53 20 80 46.7 30.0 13.3 10.0

Mvuma UP 33 67 10 90 63.3 10.0 16.7 10.0

Nyanga North UP 30 70 27 73 50.0 23.3 13.3 13.3

Source: Tabulated by author using FAO baseline data base 2009/2010 season

During focus groups, farmers were asked whether any specific groups of farmers are in anyway disadvantaged, discriminated, or advantaged in their involvement in project activities (Table 8). Farmers indicated that the project generally did not discriminate and was open to everyone. Some farmers chose not to be part of the project, especially when they find out that using manual CA methods (planting basins & hoe cultivation) is required. Some young people may be prevented from participating due to lack of access to land to cultivate. Women farmers suggested that participation of women might be promoted if there were more female Lead Farmers and if farmer mobilisation at the beginning of projects made more effort to ensure that women heard about the project.

It should be recognised that as private sector partners become more involved in commercially driven assistance to smallholder farmers, site and farmer selection will also become more commercially driven.

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Table 8: Focus Group comments about involvement of different types of farmers in project activities

Do farmers think that any specific groups of farmers (men, women; married, single; young and old) are in anyway disadvantaged, discriminated, or advantaged in their involvement in various activities? Comments from men only group • Everyone is at the same level. There is no segregation between rich and poor. • We all plant one hectare and can manage this with the resources we have at home (labour and hoes). • There is even one child headed household in the project who is managing well. • Everyone is treated the same, we all receive the same quantity of inputs and plant the same area of maize. • There are 60 farmers who took inputs to grow only 0.5 ha of maize but this was their choice not discrimination • Lazy people discriminate against themselves by not joining the project • Young people are possibly discriminated against as they don’t always have access to land to farm • Not many women are lead farmers possibly because they are afraid that men will not listen to them Comments from women only group • The project makes no distinction between women, men and widows • Everyone receives the knowledge & training. There is no discrimination • We are not forced to join the project. People chose to join or not join. • Men knew about the project first before women so some women may have learnt about the project too late to join in the 1st year but next year they will join. • Some husbands prevented their wives joining the project as they are worried about repayment of loans. • Project should use female leaders to spread the information about the project to potential members. • Use churches to share information about projects as more women than men are members of churches. Comments from young farmers (women and men) • The project is for everyone and is not targeted at any particular group • No discrimination or favouritism. So far! • Everyone gets inputs for up to one hectare of maize • Project is transparent • You can discriminate yourself by being lazy and not joining the project • Plenty of land in this area ( Chiweshe) so access to land is not a problem for young farmers • Some women registered for the project but then withdrew because they didn’t want to do hoe tillage • Some husbands prevented their wives from joining the project because they were worried about their wives going to the fields with male EWs and the possibility of extra marital affairs

Source: Focus Group Discussions, Chiweshe, Mashonaland Central, Friday, 28 January 2011

4.3.3. Yields and Level of Self Sufficiency It is evident from project reports and visiting field sites that yields achieved by project farmers are noticeably better than the yields of other farmers in the areas where the programme is being implemented. During field visits in December and January the visual difference between project maize and non project maize was striking & explained with reference to the readiness of project farmers to plant project maize with the 1st effective rains and availability of fertiliser . Even in tough cropping seasons, project farmers using CA generally manage to harvest something

4.3.3.1. Maize Project Reports indicate that project activities have enabled beneficiaries to increase maize yields significantly above the national yield average of around 7- 800kg/hectare. The % of beneficiaries achieving maize yields of over 2 tonnes per hectare varies from season to season and between project sites but is 90% or more at some 131

sites in some seasons.

For the 2009/2010 season, estimates provided by IPs indicate that between 67-100%, beneficiaries achieved yields of over 2 tonnes per hectare and 75% - 100% farmers had enough maize for 12 months (Table 9). However, IP staff noted that the very good results in 2009/2010 at some project sites were due to the beneficiaries having also used CA practices during the previous (2008/09) season. The results should be regarded therefore in the context of two to three years of progress. Table 9: Maize yields and level of self-sufficiency. Average % beneficiaries % Farmers % farmers Project producing with reporting Maize equivalent of IP Season enough sale or Yield over 2 tonnes maize for trade of (Tonnes per per hectare 12 months maize ha) maize UP, (av across all sites) 2009/2010 3.75 83% 68% na UP, (av across all sites) 2008/2009 4.13 >90% 93% 75% SAT, Kadoma 2009/2010 2.5 67% 71% na SAT, Kadoma 2008/2009 na na na na SAT, Hurungwe 2009/2010 3.5-4.0 100% 100% na SAT, Hurungwe 2008/2009 2.5-3.0 na na na Source: IP Final Reports, 2008/2009 & 2009/2010 seasons

4.3.3.2. Cash Crops Only one IP (SAT) reported information on yields for cash crops by individual farmer in 2009/2010. The other IP (UP), uses estimates by site as a basis for assessing cash crop yields at project level. The third IP only started operations in 2010/2010 season. Available information suggests that farmers participating in CF projects in 2009/2010 achieved yields well above the national smallholder average in the case of cowpeas and cotton (Table 10). The performance of sugar beans seems to vary as sugar bean yield for 2009/2010 season was estimated at more than twice national average at UP project sites but below average at a SAT project site (Kadoma). IP staff reported that although yields were low at the SAT project site farmers outside the project did not harvest any sugar beans due to drought, showing the effectiveness of conservation agriculture principles. (Kadoma, Final Report, SAT, 2010). Table 10 :Project Yields compared to national average smallholder yields,2009/2010 season Crop National SAT sites UP sites Average Mean estimate Kgs per ha Kg per ha Kgs per ha Cotton 450 - 600 1000 na Sugar beans 300-450 181 800 Cow peas 200 560 800 Source: compiled from data provided by IPs.

4.3.4. Variability in Farmer performance It has long been recognised that there is a considerably variability in performance among smallholder farmers

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with top 25% often accounting for a disproportionate share of output. Since all farmers in CF projects receive similar levels of inputs for a specific project site and have access to the same extension and training one might expect farmers to demonstrate less variability in yields than generally found among SHFs. Average crop output and yields were calculated for all beneficiary farmers and then for three categories of farmers (Top performing 25%, middle 50% and bottom 25%) , using 2009/2010 data from several SAT project sites (Tables 11 - 13). The results show considerable variability in performance among farmers receiving the same input package:

• Top 25% farmers had mean maize yield equivalent to 3500 - 4500 kg per ha , more than three times the yield of the bottom 25% of farmers who had a mean maize yield of 1000- 1300 kg per ha • Top 25% account for 32- 44% maize output but larger share of cash crop output • Middle 50% account for close to 50% output of both staple and cash crops • Bottom 25% account for 9-17% maize output but less than 10% cash crop output Whilst the observed inequalities in the distribution of production for maize and cash crops are probably lower than outside of project areas (studies in the late 80s and 90s commonly found the top 25% of producers account for > 60% of total production and an even larger share of marketed output ) , they warrant further investigation, given that farmers are receiving the same input package and work on the same areas for project crops. What factors account for differences in performance? Soil type and variation in rainfall within project sites undoubtedly accounts for some differences in performance but other factors could be crop management, unrecorded differences in area of project crops, application of additional inputs, non-application of project inputs on project crop. Site consultants and field workers acknowledged that not all farmers are equally good at adopting and implementing recommended practices and extension officers can easily identify farmers who are exceptionally good at following practices shown to them at the demonstration plots and others who have not performed so well. It may be beneficial for IPs to investigate more carefully the reasons for differences in performance and for extension workers to focus efforts on bringing poor performing farmers up to the level of top performing 25%. Inequalities in the distribution of production of cash crops seem to be greater than for maize which lends support to the hypothesis that management practices are an important factor in determining inequalities in distribution of production since famers are generally less experienced in cash crop production than maize production. This suggests that there is scope for improving project outcomes by increase extensions efforts on the cash cropping component of the project.

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Table 11: Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Kadoma Top 25% Middle 50% Bottom 25% All

Av Av. % Av. % Av. % Crop n yield Yield Share Yield Share Yield Share Kg/ha Kg/ha output Kg/ha output Kg/ha output (std dev)

Maize 554 4633 42 2738 49 1000 9 2777

(1439)

Sugar beans 457 416 57 130 36 49 7 181

(204)

Cotton 510 1908 48 885 44 323 8 1001

(649)

Source: Calculated using yield data from Annex A, SAT Spanish Project August 2010

Table 12: Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Hurungwe, Chivakanenyama, Top 25% Middle 50% Bottom 25% All

Av. % Av. % Av. % Av Yield Yield Yield Crop Share Share Share yield Kg/ha Kg/ha Kg/ha n output output output Kg/ha

(std dev)

Cow Pea 919 757 34 564 50 351 16 559

(247)

Maize 909 3554 39 2164 47 1312 14 2299

(inc cob rot) (1030)

Maize 909 2746 45 1390 46 562 9 1522

(good) (980)

Source: Calculated using yield data extracted from SAT Swedish 2009- 2010 yields.xl

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Table 13 : Smallholder Crop Production and Yields, 2009-2010, Hurungwe, Zvipani, Top 25% Middle 50% Bottom 25% All

Av Av. % Av. % Av. % Crop n yield Yield Share Yield Share Yield Share Kg/ha Kg/ha output Kg/ha output Kg/ha output (std dev)

Cow Pea 1134 580 51 230 40 101 9 285

(201)

Maize 1179 3848 33 2898 50 2025 17 2916

(inc cob rot) (728)

Maize 1179 2763 34 1959 49 1323 17 2001

(good) (608)

Source: Calculated using yield data extracted from SAT Swedish 2009- 2010 yields.xl

4.3.5. Performance and Household Characteristics Given variability in farmer performance, it would be interesting to explore whether there are any significant differences in performance based on households’ characteristics such as wealth group & vulnerability. Due to the incompleteness of FAO M & E post-harvest data set for the 2009/2010 season and the fact that currently FAO M & E unit does not interview the same households for all three survey modules in any given season the data is not available to carry out such analysis. However, a preliminary analysis using a combined data set of FAO baseline information and household level yield data for one project site ( Kadoma) provides evidence that poorer households (those with no livestock) achieve lower yields than the sample average and better off households for project supported maize and sugar beans ( Table 14). One of the benefits of CA is that farmers are not dependent on draft power for land preparation and can plant on time with the 1 st effective rains. However, the sample data for Kadoma suggest that the outcomes of farmers without livestock are still below HHs with livestock and indicates that there may be other constraints which prevent poorer households from fully utilising project inputs. This needs to be further investigated.

Age of houshold head, which is a proxy for farming experience, may also be a factor affecting performance but the evidence is not consistent. For example, household heads under 30yrs age achieved lower sugar bean and cotton yields than the sample average and older farmers but their performance was above average with respect to maize yields. Older HHhs achieved the highest average maize and sugar bean yields but performance with respect to cotton was below average and lower than HHs in the 30-60 yrs age categories.

Interestingly female headed households achieved maize yields 30% above those of male headed households and in a season when sugar bean yields were on average low they outperformed male headed households. However,

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their performance with regard to the supported cash crop (cotton) was poorer than male headed households (Table 14), possibly due to labour constraints.

The presence of vulnerable members in the household did not appear to be a factor influencing yields.

The study checked for a relationship between household size and yield, anticipating that availability of labour might influence performance but found only a weak non-significant correlation between the two variables.

Although the analysis of farmer performance in relation to household characteristics is very preliminary the findings suggest that the analysis is fruitful and that FAO and IPs should ensure data are available in future seasons to further investigate the relationship between performance and household characteristics.

Table 14 Performance & Household Characteristics No of Average . Average Average hhlds Maize Yield Sugar Bean Yield Cotton Yield

Kg/ha Kg/ha Kg/ha

Sample 46 3342 (1319) 169 1225

Livestock category

Zero 17 2832 (1294) 110 (108) 1095 (1066)

1-3 9 4000 (1538) 198 (144) 1047 (654)

4-6 9 3417 (994) 226 (154) 1446 (665)

7 or more 11 3531 (1261) 192 (188) 1516 (845)

Age of HHh

< 30 yrs 5 3570 (1400) 77 (81) 857 (479)

30 -44 yrs 17 2885 (1500) 170 (104) 1607 (980)

45-60 yrs 18 3466 (1161) 181 (178) 1134 (815)

Over 60 yrs 6 4075 (921) 206 (203) 954 (762)

Sex of HH

Male 35 3116 (1326) 149 (120) 1263 (894)

Female 11 4063 (1050) 236 (211) 914 (713)

Vulnerable members in HH

Zero 28 3204 (1287) 130 (89) 1318 (967)

1 7 3492 (1105) 283 (208) 1304 (788)

2 or more 11 3599 196 1063

Size of HH

Source : Derived from FAO Base line data set 2009/2010 & IP yield data 136

4.3.6. Private sector Linkages In the early years of projects, private sector participation was adversely affected by an extremely hostile economic environment characterised by crippling cash flow bottle bottlenecks and limited access to affordable finance. Despite this, private sector has been interested in taking up opportunities to expand their activities into smallholder farming areas. The Contract Farming projects supported by FAO and donor partners play a much appreciated role in introducing Pvt Sector companies to local government officers and traditional leadership. The value of such facilitating activities should not be underestimated although it places responsibility on IPs to make sure that Pvt Sector Partners introduced to the community are reliable and honour contracting arrangements.

In the 2010/2011 season, IPs are working with more than 10 Private sector partners including seed companies, commodity brokers and companies specialising in specific commodities such as paprika. The selection of private sector partner was initially a self-selection process as many companies are hesitant to work with SHFs, due partly to lack of experience but also on account of the high cost of transacting with a lot of small growers. As interest from the Pvt Sector has grown and IPs gain experience in linking smallholders with Pvt buyers a more rigorous selection process for private sector participation in donor funded projects has emerged. For the current season APT introduced an application process to screen potential partners using criteria that included prior experience in contracting smallholder producers, technical merit of proposal, potential financial viability of contracted crops, funds available to use for contracting farmers and level of extension support offered to growers.

With respect to project level output indicators project reports indicate that 75% UP farmers and 78% of SAT farmers were contracted for at least one crop in 2009/2010 season. Close to 100% farmers with all IPs are contracted in 2010/11 season.

There appears to be a steadily growing awareness among smallholders that farming is a business, that input loans need to be repaid and contracts with Pvt Sector Partners need to honoured. The main benefits of contracts identified by farmers include

• Assured timely supply of inputs on credit with zero upfront payment and recovery when produce is sold.

• Assured buyer of output at market related prices

• Payment in Cash in timely manner.

The main weaknesses of contracts identified by farmers include:

• Contracts include provisions protecting the Pvt Sector but few clauses to protect the farmer

• Delays in distribution of contracts by some Pvt Sector Partners.

• Late input distribution & poor quality seeds in some contract farming programmes.

• For some crops the contract is only for the purchase of fixed quantity of output not all of crop.

Site consultants noted that if total production increased at individual sites, either through existing project members planting a larger area or through expanding the number of growers, this would help attract Pvt Sector buyers.

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IPs have been actively involved in training activities related to contract farming. This is most evident at UP and APT sites, although field visits indicated that training has been done by the IP in cooperation with Pvt sector with little involvement from the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) who are tasked & funded for this activity.41 Focused group discussions revealed that farmers engaged with EWs and consultants in follow up sessions to get clarification on contracts and have clauses explained. Whilst farmers recognise several strengths in linking to Pvt Sector buyers through contracts they also note that there are few clauses in the contract that protect the producer. For instance, no contracts specify delivery dates for inputs so farmers have no recourse if inputs are delivered late.

Links between smallholders and Private Sector are still fragile and can easily be undermined by many factors (late delivery and poor quality of inputs, lower than anticipated output, drought season, crop diseases lower than expected prices, higher than expected deductions, side marketing by growers, and high transaction costs of dealing with large number of small growers).

Table 15 : Percentage of Households deriving cash income from supported agricultural activities & farmers contracted % % Farmers Farmers deriving contracted IP Season cash income for at least from supported one crop crops UP 2009/2010 100%? 75% UP 2008/2009 75% 70% SAT, Kadoma 2009/2010 100% 78% SAT, Kadoma 2008/2009 100% 0% SAT, 2009/2010 100% ? Hurungwe SAT, 2008/2009 100% 0% Hurungwe Source: IP Final Reports, 2009/2010 season

41 At one project site (Hurungwe) the ZFU officer for the District admitted that the only time he had visited project farmers was at beneficiary selection and he had not done any training in the area. 138

4.3.7. Financial Viability of Contracted Crops In terms of financial viability all project supported crops had the potential to generate a positive return, especially in the early years when farmers were not required to repay FAO maize inputs. The possible exceptions are groundnuts and cotton both of which have, in recent years, shown marginal profitability on account of low market prices. However, given the evident variability in farmer performance it is also clear that if farmers had been required to purchase all inputs for their maize crop, or any other crop, some of them would have lost money due to low yields.

If contract farming projects are to operate on business principles, where farmers are expected to repay their input loans after harvest, then it is essential that all stakeholders are aware of the profitability of supported crops. Financial analysis of supported crops is particularly important in the current liberalised market environment where output prices are a function of local and international supply and demand and Government is not intending to continue past policies of setting prices, based on a cost of production formula. Supported crops need to be examined to assess gross margins of input packages and returns to own labour and scarce resources such $ value of purchased inputs. Until recently, few projects have done little more than estimate crop gross margins, excluding the value of unpaid family labour. However APT, a new IP, embarked on a detailed assessment of financial viability of various contracted crops prior to the start of CFSP and COTEBA programmes in the 2010/2011 season. Private sector companies interested in contracting smallholder farmers had to include an enterprise budget in their application to APT. These submissions were used by APT to examine the financial viability of each crop, including returns to labour .The most profitable crops are tobacco, paprika, horticultural, sugar and seed crops. Grain, legumes, tea and cotton do not provide farmers with significant returns (Table 16)

Profitability of project supported crops varies considerably with grain crops and commercial legume crops offering returns of less than US$360 per hectare in 2010/2011 agricultural season. Legume seed crops show estimated returns of US$500-560 per hectare whereas horticultural crops such as paprika and chillies have a projected return of US$1300 – 1500 per hectare

Based on returns to family labour, seed legume crops and cosmos flower seeds out perform other field crops due to lower labour demands combined with attractive prices and in 2010/2011 provide an estimated return of US10 –US12.0 per labour day. Returns to family labour for other crops range from around USD$2 per day for groundnuts (due to poor prices combined with high labour demand); USD3-4 per day for grain crops and USD$5-6 per day for horticultural crops such as Paprika and Chillies (due to labour demands in excess of 200 labour days per hectare).

Using figures presented in Table 16 it is possible to estimate the total gross margin for one hectare of project supported crops. For example, assuming one hectare split equally between maize, a cowpea seed crop and a cash crop such as paprika, net returns in 2010/2011 season for one hectare of project supported crops will be around US$700 - $800 per hectare or US$5 per Labour Day. The latter is roughly equivalent to the rural casual wage rate but is lower than urban casual wage rate of around US$10 per day. Cash injections of even this low magnitude increase smallholder purchasing power and can have a notable impact on investments in livelihood assets. However, for market linkages projects to have a significant impact on SHF’s incomes farmers need to be 139

supported to grow a larger area of contracted crops and/or to undertake additional activities such as small livestock projects and vegetable gardens.

Cash constraints are a serious challenge in rural areas so in the absence of input support from Pvt Sector Partners, farmers need to consider returns to scarce cash resources in making planting decisions. Crops that perform best using these criteria are paprika, flower seeds and sun hemp due to their relatively low production costs compared to returns (Table 14).

Financial viability indicators are sensitive to changes in yield and prices assumptions. Pre planting contracts generally specify the price at which the Contractor agrees to purchase output so the main uncertainty farmer’s face is yield uncertainty. Under dry land production yields vary from season due to variations in growing conditions but this study has also highlighted considerable yield variation between farmers with the top performing 25% farmers achieving on average around double the yield of bottom 25% project farmers (Table 11).At yields 30% below target, maize, sorghum and groundnuts show very low returns to purchased inputs and labour returns are less than US$2.00 a day. Even the most profitable smallholder crops such as tobacco and paprika look less attractive if yields are 30% below target crops. Seed legume crops are most resilient to variations in yield and this is due to a combination of low production costs, high prices and relatively low labour requirements.

Estimated returns per hectare of supported crops can also be used as a rough guide to total net project returns from FAO supported market linkage activities. For example, assuming the 6147 farmers supported in 2010/11 (see Table 3) achieve an average net return of US$750 per household , total net project returns in the current season will be in the order of US$4.6m. How does this compare to the combined donor investment in UP, SAT and APT projects in 2010/2011 season?

The sensitivity of financial indicators to variations in yield together with variability in farmer performance suggests that not all farmers are likely to be successful in growing contracted crops once donor support is withdrawn and farmers are fully responsible for making repayments for input support extended by Pvt Sector companies .

140 Table 16: Profitability of contracted crops in 2010/2011 season

Product Price Target Costs Gross Gross Own Gross Return per Sensitivity Analysis Yield Return Margin labour margin per $ invested USD/kg ( excl own labour day 30% reduction in yields kg /ha labour) USD/ha (excl own labour $/ labour Yield Gross Gross $ Return USD/ha Days/ha day Return per labour USD/ha Kg/ha Margin $/ha day $/ha

Cowpea 0.70 700 209 490 281 47 6.04 2.34 490 343 134 2.85

Groundnut 0.40 1100 300 440 140 69 2.03 1.46 770 308 8 0.12

Sorghum 0.45 1100 278 495 217 66 3.31 1.78 770 347 47 0.71

Sun hemp 0.50 700 109 350 241 47 5.18 3.21 490 245 136 2.89

Tabasco /chillies 0.50 5000 909 2500 1591 256 6.22 2.75 3500 1750 841 3.29

Paprika 1.15 1500 362 1725 1363 270 5.06 4.77 1050 1207 845 3.13

Banana 0.31 40 000 5157 12400 7243 - - 2.40 28000 8680 3528 -

Tobacco 2.50 1200 1056 2880 1824 432 4.22 2.72 840 2100 1044 2.41

Maize 0.25 3000 389 750 362 100 3.62 3.09 2100 525 136 1.36

Cowpea seed 0.75 1000 242 750 508 47 10.93 3.09 700 525 283 6.02

Sugar Bean Seed 0.90 1000 337 900 562 47 12.10 2.67 700 630 293 6.2

Cosmos Fl seeds 3.50 250 138 875 737 60 12.28 6.34 175 612 474 7.9

Source: Compiled from information supplied by APT

4.4. Project Efficiency 4.4.1. Implementation Issues The main implementation issues identified by IPs and Field staff centre around delays in confirmation of funding and problems with the procurement and distribution of agricultural Inputs.

The input distribution mechanism employed by this group of projects has been direct input distribution whereby FAO or Private Partners procure inputs centrally from reputable dealers and/or donor warehouses and transport inputs to project areas for distribution to beneficiary households. This ensures that the desired inputs are supplied in the quantities specified in the crop budget in a timely manner. IPs all agree that there have been noticeable improvements in FAO procurement (some project sites had no problems in 2010) and that the FAO procurement Officer does a good job within FAO’s staffing and operational constraints. However, overall IPs felt that given the opportunity they could procure and distribute inputs more efficiently than FAO. Some IPs have even approached donors to see if project funds could be provided directly to the IP rather than through FAO. The main criticism of FAO ‘s procurement process relates to the timeliness of delivery, choice of supplier, (which affects the quality of inputs delivered) and time wasted by site consultants in having to make arrangements for receiving inputs sent in several consignments rather than consolidated into fewer loads :

• Delays in confirmation of funding & signing of LoA’s with subsequent delays in planning for the coming season ( recruitment of site consultants & field officers, mobilisation of communities, selection of beneficiaries, identifying input requirements and liaising with FAO procurement and Logistics Personnel, late delivery of inputs) all of which have multiple impacts on implementation of programmes, financial viability of proposed agricultural activities & development of Pvt Sector partnerships. • The main problems cited with respect to the delivery of inputs are : i. timeliness of delivery (e.g. top dressing arrived late in some areas for the 2010/2011 season (Nyanga); ii. need to consolidate loads to reduce the number of input deliveries per project site and consequently the number of times project staff are required to meet delivery vehicle and supervise offloading & storage; iii. Delivery of non-preferred seed varieties. In 2010/2011 FAO asked IPs to indicate which maize seed varieties were required at each site only to find that the FAO tender process couldn’t handle multiple varieties so at the end of the process FAO procured only a few varieties and some farmer received non preferred varieties. • Quality issues with some inputs (e.g. Cowpea seed at the Kadoma site was inferior (mixture of CBC1 and CBC2) in both 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 and needs to be addressed by FAO. This has a negative impact in terms of cash returns, especially for a seed crop as one variety had to be pulled out to maintain purity ; quality of feed & day olds chicks for poultry projects in Kadoma on 2009/2010). • Reliability of Transporters. Some delays in distribution of inputs related to unreliable transporter. A Selection of comments from Site consultants and field staff highlights the frustration felt by some IP staff

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‘Doing everything on time to a high standard is a key principle of Conservation Agriculture.

We teach farmers this lesson & then FAO inputs are not delivered on time (site consultant,)

‘We are the front line people and the ones farmers hold responsible for late delivery or poor quality inputs,

Farmers are not interested in the logistic challenges FAO faces they blame us’ (Comment by Agricultural Field Officer)

‘In agricultural projects with such short time periods, minor delays can result in lower production and reduced impact on the beneficiaries’ food security. Therefore, the delivery of inputs needs to be timed to coincide with field-level operations. The sugar bean seed was delivered two weeks after the planned planting date,

which made farmers vulnerable to midseason moisture stress and resulted in low yields (IP report, 2008/2009 season.

IPs are interested in looking at the feasibility of using voucher based systems for distributing project inputs especially as direct input distribution undermines market based input distribution systems which play a vital role in supporting the development and commercialisation of smallholder agriculture, However, IP staff pointed out that voucher systems will not be effective unless supplies are available at rural retail outlets and this will require forward planning by FAO & IPs to liaise with wholesalers and dealers regarding estimated requirements for project farmers. In addition, since the cost of procuring inputs for direct distribution tends to show savings of 10- 15 %. for project beneficiaries compared to prevailing prices for agricultural inputs at rural outlets. Under market based input distribution systems farmers are likely to face increased production costs. 42

4.4.2. Cost Recovery The conditions under which inputs are provided (free, co-financed or loans) vary by project and change over the project life. In some projects, such as those implemented by the Sustainable Agricultural Trust (SAT), inputs have been free for the food security crop throughout the project life although the IP in consultation with the community requested farmers to contribute between 1-3 bags of maize, depending on performance, to offset project costs which are then sold to the highest bidder and the proceeds go to the community. As far as the cash and legume crop are concerned farmers have mostly received inputs for free 43 and the market linkage component of the project is mainly linking farmers with buyers for project supported crops. With regard to vegetable gardens, the project funded seed packs for the first season and farmers successfully contributed money to buy subsequent seed packs. Similarly, with the poultry projects, project funds were used to kick start group

42 Procurement costs for direct distribution benefit from economies of size and exclude retail margins. For example, the prevailing price of basal and top fertilisers at rural outlets in the 2010/2011 season was US$$30-31 per 50Kg bag compared to US$27 – US$29 levied for these inputs in Union Project Maize contracts! 43 . In 2010/2011 Inputs for the seed sorghum crop were provided under contract by a Pvt sector partner on a cost recovery basis 143

projects and farmers funded subsequent batches of layers or broilers out of group earnings and in some cases used earnings to start individual parallel poultry projects at homesteads. The IP would have liked to move more quickly to operating on business principles but this wasn’t under their control as they had to operate under conditions laid down by funders in the LoA. 44

The arrangement for repayments of inputs under the Union Project is quite varied. When the Union Project started, FAO did not ask farmers to pay back inputs for the grain crop. These inputs are now repayable in kind. The plan with regard to the legume and cash crops was for the project to kick start contract farming arrangements by providing inputs in the first year and with the sale of their produce, farmers will enter into agreements for the following season and use part of their revenue to secure inputs, sourced by the private sector. The need for external input support was based on the prevailing economic environment (high inflation, shortage of inputs, high input costs etc.), in the first year of the project (2008/2009) which meant that many potential private sector companies were not able to pre fund farmers. As a result external input support was needed to set production and crop sales in motion and to encourage private sector to get involved or expand their grower base in project areas. This process was initiated in the first year of the project but it has taken three seasons for it really to get underway. In 2010/2011 (Year 3) cost recovery measures are being implemented across all UP project sites and farmers have signed contracts with either the UP or a Private sector contractor to repay cost of inputs for all crops in the rotation.

2010/2011 is the first year of implementation of APTs Contract Farming Support Programme (CFSP). From the outset this programme intended to operate on business principles including full cost recovery. In the first season FAO and partners funded 50% fertiliser component of the input package private sector extends to beneficiaries to relieve Pvt sector finance constraints and as an incentive to Pvt Sector partner to contract smallholders .It was anticipated that farmers would repay Pvt Sector Partners for these inputs and the monies be placed in revolving fund. The repayment mechanism for FAO support for 50% fertiliser component is now in doubt after a directive in 2 nd LoA that farmers should not pay for FAO inputs. What was envisaged as a revolving fund credit facility for Pvt Sector Partners is in danger of becoming another free input distribution programme. The unfolding of events based on APT Post Planting Report, Dec 2010 are that during the development project phase leading to 2nd LoA:

• Pvt Sector companies in the Contract Farming Support Programme (CFSP) signed MOA’s with APT that committed them to recovering the costs of FOA fertilisers from farmers & paying these funds into a revolving fund • contract agreements were signed between farmers and companies in which a farmers acknowledged their indebtedness for 100% of the input loan including the FAO contribution

44 Before the start of the 2010/2010 season, third year SIDA funding was delayed and SAT collected US$35 towards maize inputs for the coming season from farmers. Instead of being congratulated on their initiative the IP were chastised because co- financing was outside the terms of the LoA. and the US$35 was subsequently returned. 144

• Farmers have received training on contract farming ‘ farming as a business’ which emphasise the importance of a commercial approach to farming • Delay in signing of 2 nd LOA for implementation phase ( submitted mid September, signed November 10 th ) • new LOA included unexpected directive that farmers should not pay for FAO inputs.

The instruction that farmers should not pay for FAO inputs is at odds with the development nature of the CFSP design and came after structures for repayment had been put in place and farmers had acknowledged their indebtedness by signing contracts. APT and private sector partners are now unhappily involved in a free input distribution programme. Companies are concerned that free inputs will distort the economics of farming, sending the wrong message to farmers and that short-term income gains will be offset by major long-term challenges as farmers enter into contract agreements with the wrong mind set. What is striking in this regard is that FAO reacted strongly to an IP (SAT) changing the condition under which farmers would receive inputs in 2010/2011 but in the very same season FAO made changes to its LoA with APT that have the potential to undermine the very market based approach they are supporting.

FAO should urgently seek ways to resolve the dilemma of how to receive funds from projects that are designed on a cost recovery basis so as not to undermine fledgling business & contracting culture that IPs and Pvt Sector Partners are promoting. Options to consider with IPs & Pvt sector Partners include promoting group savings accounts, use of repayments for community projects, IP managed revolving fund, Trust Fund to manage FAO and partner funded programmes etc

4.4.3. Market linkages and Contracting Arrangements Arrangements negotiated between producers and Pvt Sector companies are very variable. In some instances IPs such as SAT have simply acted as brokers to link farmers to a buyer for project supported crops only after harvest. Linking farmers to buyers at harvest time reduces the transaction costs in finding a market and reduces farmers’ susceptibility to unscrupulous traders but such arrangements do not link farmers to input markets or reduce uncertainty of output prices at planting time. In other cases, the IP assists in negotiating pre season contracts with Pvt Sector companies for the purchase of project supported crops at harvest time with or without input support from the Pvt sector Company. There are few examples of contract arrangements, in FAO supported projects, where inputs are fully funded by the contracting company. The most common arrangement and the one exemplified in the APT programme, is for input support to be jointly funded by the donor or IP and Pvt sector. 45

The MoA’s signed by APT & UP with companies included clauses on agreed input support and contract agreements. The MoA stated that all companies should sign contracts with farmers that included sufficient information to allow farmers to assess the profitability of the enterprise (realistic target yields, costs to the

45 In this programme, FAO is funding 50% fertiliser cost for Pvt companies involved in smallholder contracts except in the case of tobacco where FAO is not funding any of the inputs but instead supporting contracted tobacco growers with inputs for 0.33 ha maize. 145

farmers of inputs provided by the company, any other costs for services (management, credit etc, description of grades and minimum price paid for grades, when the produce will be collected and when the farmer will be paid). Compliancy with these requirements was generally good, most farmers were aware of contract conditions prior to the start of the season, and contracts were duly signed. Farmers in Kadoma, one of the SAT sites, indicated in focus group discussions that contracts for seed sorghum were not signed until well into the growing season and they complained that the sorghum contract was not what they had verbally agreed 46 . In future all IPs should ensure that contracts are signed before input support is provided.

Both the tobacco and cotton industries have statutory boards that monitor the contracting process to ensure that all contracts comply with certain criteria and output is purchased in an orderly manner. Other Commodity Bodies should be encouraged to implement a similar mechanism and FAO could use its coordinating position to promote this.

There is also a need for arbitration services when disputes arise between farmers and contracting enterprises. Farmers unions, as farmer representatives, are obvious candidates to provide this service, particularly for farmers participating in the UP project but ZFU has limited vision or capacity to do so.

4.4.4. Monitoring & Evaluation IPs submit timely and well written implementation, interim and post-harvest reports which generally forfill reporting requirements laid down in project documents. Project reporting tends to focus on process monitoring including implementation of project activities and implementation problems. Reporting of results usually includes data on crop yields or livestock performance and some information on gross margins but there is little information provided about variability in performance between farmers or household level impact.

IPs are not good at collecting and documenting household level data that might be useful for assessing variability in performance between different groups of farmers and household level impact. Project reports provide limited information on beneficiary profiles and performance data are usually shown as averages with no information on variability. In the case of the Union Project, yield data presented in recent reports has been based on project site estimates by consultants rather than household level estimates. SAT has household level production data and presents it in report appendices but the data is only used to calculate average yields and is not used to look at yield variability or to identify poor performing farmers.

Project reports include financial indicators such as gross margins of individual field crops and earnings from additional activities ( poultry & vegetable gardens) but it would also be useful to look closely at returns to labour or returns per $ spent on inputs. It also makes sense to examine the contribution of projects to household level income and not just the profitability of individual activities. There is not a single project report that presents

46 The Pvt sector company initially indicated that it would buy all of farmers output but in the contract only agreed to purchase the quantity of sorghum required to repay the inputs. If farmers had known this before sorghum inputs were distributed and planted, some would not have accepted the sorghum contract. 146

an analysis of the contribution of I ha of supported crops to household income. IP staff are open to suggestions and guidance with regard to additional tables and analyses that it might be useful to present in project reports but indicated that they receive little guidance in this respect form FAO and minimal feedback on reports submitted. IPs would like more guidance & feedback on requirements & best practice reporting

IPs vary in their capacity to carry out monitoring and evaluation activities and have generally been slow in developing internal M & E capacity, relying instead on contract staff for specific M & E tasks; All IPs are small local NGOs with management teams drawn mainly from professionals with an agricultural background. Project management has focused on distributing project inputs on time and training farmers to implement project production activities to a high standard. Less effort has been put into collecting & using monitoring and evaluation data and IPs have not looked at the impact of project activities beyond collecting the data required to report on a narrow range of activity related indicators specified in project log frames.

In the 2010/2011 season UP and APT introduced farmer application forms and record sheets to assess farmer performance over the season. Both these tools need fine tuning but such developments show that IPs are becoming more proactive in collecting management information data.

FAO data bases for Contract Farming (CF) projects are incomplete for most years. 47 In addition since M & E activities for CF projects are incorporated in FAOs regular surveys to monitor food security input intervention programmes, generic data collection tools are used which limits the scope for collecting data specifically relevant to monitoring CF projects. Overall the study found that FAO had no clear strategy for monitoring & evaluation of CF projects. The distribution of M & E responsibilities between IPs and FAO is also a grey area with some IPs such as SAT fairly proactive about internalising M & E activities and others, until recently, largely leaving FAO to take responsibility. LoA’s need to specify the distribution of M & E responsibilities between IPs and FAO. Each party should have a clear understanding of what is expected to ensure that baseline & post harvest surveys are implemented & activities & outputs adequately monitored. In addition, the information required for monitoring CF arrangements needs to be thoroughly reviewed and where necessary data collection tools revised. The main issues that need to be reviewed with regard to the M & E of market linkage projects include:

• the validity of implementing a baseline survey on an annual basis in multi year CF projects, • the value and feasibility of keeping the same sample through the agricultural season for the different survey modules and over the life of the project to allow performance data to be related back to baseline information on households characteristics • the need to collect a wider range of data to evaluate project impact on household livelihoods and asset accumulation. • the need for IPs to put in place a system for monitoring household level performance data for project supported crops .

47 For example, the first year in which baseline data were collected by FAO for UP and SAT projects is 2009/2010, the 2 nd year of the current project so there is no baseline data against which to do a before and after impact assessment. Post planting and post harvest data bases for CF project sites are missing some project sites which , with very few project sites covered in the FAO survey 147

Overall the division of M & E responsibilities between IPs & FAO is not always clear and needs to be more clearly specified in LoAs. M & E requirements for Pvt Sector Contractors are also not specified.

4.4.5. Strengths and weaknesses of Projects from the perspective of Beneficiaries Focus group discussions with beneficiary farmers provide additional feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of project activities, including implementation efficiency at three project sites. Whilst assessments are specific to individual project sites the findings show that not all sites experienced implementation problems and that most farmers perceive that the projects strengths far outweigh project weaknesses ( Appendix 3, Tables 23-25)). It is also clear from focus group discussions in Kadoma that supporting a wider range of activities (poultry projects, vegetable gardens, improving indigenous cattle using AI and reforestation) present a range of implementation problems that are different and more complex than projects which focus only on cropping. The topics most frequently raised in discussions are timeliness of input delivery, quality of CA training and extension, promotion of groups, training in business skills and the goals and standards set by the project.

It is encouraging to note that in the first season of CF fully supported by a Private sector partner, Chiweshe farmers are very positive about the timeliness of input delivery (Table 23, Appendix 3). The quality of training and the availably of Private Sector Field Officers is highlighted by participating farmers. Most farmers acknowledge the benefit of working in groups for the digging out of planting basins. The strict standards demanded by Private Sector Partners are noted but farmers also see this as contributing to achieving goals. Farmers also mentioned the lack of corruption and transparency in project implementation. The implementation weaknesses identified by farmers are associated with the quantity of inputs provided (farmers want higher levels of fertiliser & herbicides). There were some reports of poorly packaged fertiliser and underweight bags. Some farmers are still unsure about the use of farmer groups as a basis for loan recovery and don’t like the idea that they may be held responsible for the non repayment of loans by group members. However, generally this project site experienced few implementation problems.

Most farmers participating the in SAT project in Kadoma are now in third year of the project and have benefitted from CA training and free input distribution for at least one if not two crops in the rotation every year. It is not surprising therefore that knowledge of CA and free inputs are identified as key implementation strengths (Table 24, Appendix 3). These farmers also recognise the extension work that field officers are doing visiting farmers fields and note that the mobility of some officers has enhanced their ability to cover the project area, This is in contrast to the situation at a UP project in Guruve where all farmer groups noted that lack of motorbikes was a serious constraint for field officers (Table 25, Appendix 3). Implementation weaknesses mentioned by Kadoma farmers included choice and quality of inputs provided for some crops and poultry projects (FAO problems) and dissatisfaction with contract farming arrangements (Pvt sector /IP issues). The lack of organised marketing for some crops and poultry outputs in also identified as a project weakness.

4.5 Project Impact

There is little doubt from discussions with farmers and reviewing project reports that these programmes have had

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an impressive impact on the ability of beneficiaries to meet staple food requirements through own production. What is more difficult to measure is the extent to which households have generated significant cash incomes and how income generated has enabled households to improve living standards and accrue assets to support further livelihood improvements.

Key informant interviews with farmers and focus group discussions provide some insights into household level impacts and a range of comments from different field sites and different groups of farmers are reported in (Tables 17-19). What was most striking in meeting farmers in focus groups was the renewed hope manifested by farmers of all ages in the ability of agriculture to provide a livelihood. In addition, these farmers were not just talking about a subsistence level livelihood but were envisioning a situation where project income would be reinvested in assets both to improve current activities and to diversify into other activities. The most common physical assets mentioned included livestock (small stock as well as cattle), wheel barrows, knap sack sprayers, and scotch carts, building materials and pumps. There were young men and women who since joining the project had started making a living from agriculture and taken a step towards being independent from parents. Invariably in every focus group there was at least one young man who mentioned that income from project supported crops had enabled him to pay lobola to get married. There were widows who mentioned that project income had enabled their children to stay on at school and even complete secondary school. There were also experienced farmers who acknowledged that access to inputs and training in CA played a key role in re vitalising their farming activities. In addition, the team met farmers who at the start of a project were employed elsewhere but on seeing how well the project was doing, decided to return to their rural areas.

Many women farmers we met in focus groups were widows and these women clearly appreciated the opportunity that project crops provided to earn sufficient income to enable children to complete school and also to have cash in the home to purchase preferred foods, cooking utensils, clothes and blankets Receiving a lump sum after harvest, rather than little amounts from lots of small sales, also gave these women an opportunity to make investments in chickens and goats to provide additional income earning opportunities and to purchase items such as wheel barrows which helped reduce the drudgery of fetching water and firewood and moving crops from the field to home. Some women had even invested earnings at harvest in several months supply of dry goods such as soap. People outside of Zimbabwe, who have not lived through the basic commodity shortages experienced during Zimbabwe’s hyper inflationary period, will not appreciate the significance of this achievement to a rural widow.

A positive effect of the project mentioned by farmers in both Kadoma and Guruve, where projects have been operational for several years, is the increased sense of community and cultural identity from working in groups and interacting with farmers of different ages. Young farmers indicated that they are working and learning with older community members. In one project area farmers were asked at harvest to contribute a 50 kg bag of maize to the project which was then sold to the highest bidder and the proceeds used on community projects such as improvements to local clinics and schools.

One of the expectations of the project model was that if farmers started to achieve better maize yields, through intensifying production, they would be able to grow maize for own use on a smaller area which would release 149

land for other crops. There is limited evidence that this has happened. One Pvt Sector partner thought there had been a gradual reduction in maize area in favour of planting a greater area of cash crops but other Pvt Sector partners and site consultants have not observed any decline in area planted to maize in favour of other crops. Some farmers mentioned that they had reduced planted maize area now that they had seen how CA plus fertiliser enables them to meet food requirements from less than 0.5ha of land. However, for many households production of surplus maize remains a common goal as they don’t want to risk a short fall in maize for home consumption and maize as a cash crop is considered less risky than alternative crops because it requires relatively few inputs. Only one group of farmers, (banana growers in Honde valley) had no hesitation in indicating that if additional finance is made available to expand area under bananas they would abandon growing maize on irrigated plots and purchase consumption requirements.

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Table 17: Project Impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Guruve ( 4 th year of project) Selection of comments from male farmers (>30yrs) Our family is now emotionally and financially secure, able to manage payments for school & home needs without compromising agricultural activities & plan for future • The difference in our productivity compared non project farmers is very visible in the fields • Before the project I opted for employment as a guard elsewhere but now farming is profitable I have left employment to focus on growing crops. • when I joined the project I continued to work in Kariba but at end of 1 st year gave up job to stay in Guruve full time • CA allows better utilisation of available moisture & heat. We prepared basins & place compound fertiliser so as soon as the rains start can put in the seed. • We are the champions now ( compared to those who plough) • Son able to raise from lobola using income from project, without coming to him • realisation that cowpeas and sugar beans can be profitable cash crops • improved soil structure as a result of distribution of free lime by FAO • CA methods save time & labour. In the old system wait for rains, plough, then fertilise, place seed, cover seed. Now we prepare planting basins inc placing of compound fertiliser in Oct as soon as rains come we can place seed. • UP have provided supported new cash crops. If we had been growing tobacco would have wiped out the trees in this area Selection of comments from women farmers of all ages • Project farmers are the first people to eat green maize this season • Now I can plan to buy items even before the season has started. This season I want to buy a wheel barrow & maybe invest in some livestock – goats or chickens • Before the project I didn’t have inputs. I was demoralised and took time before I went to the field. Now I am keen to work. • Before the project I didn’t grow cash crops & I didn’t sell anything. Now I have cash in the home. I feel empowered • My maize yield this year is probably twice as much as last year and I am still putting last years maize on the table. When I first learnt I had to repay inputs I was unsure but after I had paid back I still had cash. • I am still using soap & other dry goods that I bought with lump sum after last years harvest. I am happy that I don’t have to worry about soap and have and don’t have to look for cash to buy it at today’s higher price.($0.90 July 2010 cf to $1.41 a bar in Jan 2011) • With money from the project I purchased a wheel barrow which I can use to transport my crops but more important is that the wheelbarrow helps me carry water containers and firewood so I now make less trips which saves time • I didn’t realise that cowpeas and sugar beans could be cash crops. I haven’t just bought a wheel barrow with income from the project I bought a scotch cart! • I am a widow and the project has enabled me to resume sending my children to school. Thank you for the hole. (reference to CA planting basin!) • Cash from selling project crops comes in lump sum so can do something useful with it. In the past I used to make many small sales • Free lime not only improves our poor soils but stops white ants! • Union Project is like a uniform, everyone’s fields look the same – good! Selection of comments from young male farmers ( < 30yrs ) • There is a sense of independence across generations. 3 generation of our family (son, father & grandmother) are in the project and we are all looking after ourselves. • Project is creating a sense of community in a traditional sense. Young people are spending time with older farmers and we are all learning from each other. • we are empowered to marry, 1 can raise lobola so I am not dependent on father selling cattle • . I can target to buy roofing sheets this season because I have signed a contract to sell my sugar beans so I can budget when I see the crop I have in the field. • project is job creation, we are full time employed in agriculture & don’t need to look elsewhere for jobs • I didn’t consider beans a serious cash crop before but now realise that I need to set aside a special area for them (instead of intercropping) • information about how appropriate use of herbicides is powerful knowledge • new CA methods are helping as in the past it was difficult to do well without livestock . Even some farmers with livestock are using CA methods now. • it seems that CA methods are more efficient in use of fertilisers as we are learning how to put fertiliser in the right place for the plant so the fertiliser is not wasted. • less soil erosion . ploughing used to cause erosion and there was a lot of soil lost through run off. Planting basins help conserve the soil as the seed stays in the hole and Is not swept away when it rains. Source: Focus Group Discussions, Guruve, Mashonaland Central, Friday, 5 February 2011

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Table 18 Project impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Kadoma (3 rd year of project) Selection of comments from male farmers (.>30 years) • You have taught us a way of being lazy (herbicides). My wife is getting old now and cannot work like she used to do herbicides are a real help to us. • Now that I have been exposed to CA methods and CA planters I am interested in obtaining one of these tools. I have a tractor and am considering selling some of my cattle to by a CA planter for the tractor. • With the help of the AI programme I hope to become part of the beef industry. These calves are much stronger and bigger than our indigenous cattle. • I also have a piggery which is not a project activity but it is a profitable way of using surplus maize • We have been exposed to a variety of new crops which are alternatives to the crops we are familiar with ( cotton and groundnuts )which only give little returns at the moment • I am now allocating a smaller area to maize and getting a higher output than when I planted a large area using traditional methods and little fertiliser • I have been growing maize for a long time but have never produce the yields that I am getting now using CA methods with fertiliser. Selection of comments from women farmers (>30yrs) • I am a widow and I have managed to pay school fees and buy uniform and books for my children with project income Mt children don’t look any different than those from a two parent family. I have managed to buy goats and a donkey and this year I am hoping to purchase a scotch cart. • In my kitchen are dishes bought with money from the project. I have also bought a wheelbarrow, clothes and goats • I have purchase no tangible things with project income but I have managed to pay for my orphaned grandchildren to go to school • I don’t need to talk about household utensils what is crucial is how I have been able to empower my daughter with an education. My daughter is working as a nurse aide and didn’t seem to be getting anywhere but I was able to send her to train as a nurse. • I have been able to buy a wheelbarrow and cooking utensils and keep two children in secondary school. • Our lifestyle has improved we can now eat more of the foods that we prefer. I was left with 4 grandchildren to bring up and was worried that I wouldn’t manage to send them to school but I have and they are even properly dressed with ties and tracksuits. Last year I bartered some surplus maize with National Foods for extra fertiliser (1 bag of maize for 50 bag fertiliser) The project helps so many people in this area that if we produce a surplus there is no market land prices are low Extension and training has given me confidence. I am now self sufficient in maize, better clothed and have bought a 2in 1 blanket - the ultimate luxury in this area to hang on the washing line to show ‘I have arrived’ I am now in 3 rd yr of project and when field officer came to my field this year I had already prepared the planting basins and planted seeds that were germinating. I didn’t need to be shown CA methods again.

Selection of comments from young farmers (women and men <30yrs) • Before the project I thought that fertilisers and herbicides were just for commercial farmers because I had no money to access them. Now I know how to use them to my advantage. • Before I had little knowledge about how to feed the soil and planted large tracts of land that produced little. I am now focusing my efforts on a smaller area that I can handle properly and achieve good yields • Before the project I only knew the variety ‘maize’. Now I know there are many different varieties of maize and I need to select the right variety to plant according to rainfall and soil type • Before SAT I just ploughed and dropped seed. Didn’t realise it needed feeding and nursing! • Before project thought sugar beans were just for commercial farmers or vegetable gardens but now realise they can be grown as a cash crop. • Have learnt how with CA methods & fertiliser can harvest enough maize for 12 months from a smaller area and get cash to improve lifestyle I am also learning how to budget and make decision about how much to store and how much to sell • Income from the group chicken project has enabled me to invest my own poultry project at my homestead. • The beef master calves from the AI project are an improvement on local breeds. • On vege projects we are now growing Cucumbers, butternuts and carrots, vegetables we thought were exclusive to supermarkets

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Table 19: Project impact & Most Significant Change (MSG), Chiweshe ( 1 st year of project) Selection of comments from older male farmers (> 30yrs) Selection of comments from women farmers (>30yrs) • The project has given us knowledge about how to produce a good crop of maize without draft power. We used to think that we needed draft power to farm but now we know that we can do it without. • MSC is the time of planting. We all planted our maize early with the first effective rains. • Project has uplifted even widows and their maize fields are looking better than men’s fields especially if those men are not part of the project • People used to laugh at us and say that we are going to die from hunger since we are only digging with hoes but now they have seen the results they all want to join. • Our children were sceptical and worried about whether we would be able to repay the input loan and whether we would manage all the work but now they are seeing the output they are happy • My son came home from Bindura at Christmas and saw that farming could be more profitable than working and was asking whether it is possible for him to leave his job and come and join the project. • I am now old but this year is my best year for maize production

Selection of comments from young farmers (women and men , 30yrs) • it is difficult to find formal employment & this project has given us a source of income • we are doing better than those young people who have tried to get formal employment • young farmers now recognized as farmers because of CA. Young male farmers are more attractive marriage options because they are now recognised as farmers • food security & removal of poverty. We can see that this year we are going to eat and sell. • if involved in agriculture we won’t be thieves! • before NF it was survival of the fittest now we are smiling and enjoying life as farmers. • looking forward to getting money at one time so that I can do something with it and not just a $1 here and a there . • herbicides have helped to reduce labour requirements • before the programme hoe tillage was associated with extreme poverty but now we all like it. CA known as ‘Dig and Eat’ • the CA programme requires standards but it has resulted in good yields • able to stay with wife and children and don’t have to go and look for a job • oxen more healthy as not used for ploughing

Source: Focus Group Discussions, Chiweshe, Mashonaland Central, Friday, 28 January 2011

5. Market Driven Input Distribution Systems 5.1. FAO and SNV’s Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Programme (RARP) The Rural Agro-dealer Restocking Programme (RARP) is designed to encourage wholesalers to place consignment stock in agro-dealer stores therefore making inputs available to farmers. In 2009/2010 SNV, with FAO support implemented a pilot project aimed at re-establishing links between wholesalers and rural stores marketing agricultural inputs and to test the appropriateness of market-driven input distribution methods in the emerging economic environment. It was hoped that the results would help all agricultural stakeholders (i.e. NGOs, Donors, FAO, Research Institutes, Government of Zimbabwe, Farmers Union’s and Private Sector) to re- shape assistance for the 2010/2011 season. From the onset, it was recognised that rural agro-dealers lack the financial capacity to stock their stores; and suppliers would have low financial capacity to support agro-dealers and, would be adverse to agro-dealer financing in the absence of guarantees.

The overall goal of RARP is to strengthen the markets and chains for agro-inputs so that agro-inputs are available to rural households via shops close to their homes at accessible prices, in order to boost and revitalise agricultural production and enhance food security. The objectives of the project are:

• Reestablishment of sustainable links between suppliers of agricultural inputs and agro-dealers. 153

• Stocking of rural agro-dealers outlets with quality seeds, fertilizers, agro-chemicals, veterinary products, tools and implements; • Strengthen capacities of agro-dealers and wholesalers to do business with each other • Ensuring local access to inputs by smallholder farmers resulting in • Increased productivity resulting in household food and income security; • Contributions to community food security through sale of excess produce

The RARP concept was initiated by FAO on a limited budget which required that the programme be kept small and that private sector funding contributions be fully exploited. In the light of the limited funds available for the RARP, it was decided to implement a consignment (rather than the credit guarantee model) stocking system whereby the supplier places stock in the store and retains ownership thereof until it is sold. Once sold, the agro- dealer pays the supplier less his commission. Wholesalers organised credit or consignment terms with their suppliers. Both wholesalers and suppliers were to be encouraged to participate in the consignment stocking system by using donor funds to purchase insurance cover. Capacity building was an important component of RARP and most of the funds were earmarked for agro-dealer business training and extension support.

In the 2009/2010 agricultural season RARP pilot project was operational in 15 districts in four provinces, and worked through three wholesalers – Red Star (40 stores), Feya Feya (15 stores) and Produtrade (three stores). Two out of three of the wholesalers are reported to have performed well and both of these wholesalers initiated additional business activities that benefitted local communities. In addition to stocking agricultural inputs, Feya Feya also became involved in the stocking of grocery products. Unlike agricultural inputs, which are supplied by Feya Feya on consignment, stocks of groceries have to be funded internally. Feya Feya also purchased maize grain from farmers.

Instead of implementing a ‘consignment business model’ with existing rural dealers, Produtrade, with the agreement of SNV, implemented their own franchise development model aimed at establishing a comprehensive network of depots called ‘Trading Posts’ throughout the communal areas of Zimbabwe. These depots serve the dual functions of allowing the company to (1) procure agricultural commodities for its processing business and (2) market its products directly to rural communities. The Produtrade business model revolves around 30 foot shipping containers known as Trading Posts that are placed at strategically located business centres. A contracted storekeeper and two assistants, recruited from within the local community, staff Trading Posts. It is envisaged that contracted storekeepers will eventually take charge of the shop and run it as their own franchise business.

The Produtrade model had a major emphasis on the buying of maize. This output-marketing component was not officially part of the RARP programme but showed RARP that output marketing activities compliment wholesaler business. During field visits, we came across Produtrade trading posts that had bought as much as 30 tonnes of maize a day, for cash, during the peak sales period after 2010 harvest. Produtrade regularly sent trucks to collect the purchased maize and deliver cash to depots to carry on trading. Some trading posts are in the process of installing solar satellite links so that trading posts can install Point of Sale Machines so that transactions with buyers and sellers on agricultural commodities can be made electronically. 154

Produtrade also reported that its intervention resulted in reduced local prices for commodities that it is stocking. In addition, local prices of maize increased because the company is purchasing maize for higher prices than existed before the programme. Produtrade trading posts also stocked a range of groceries in 2009/2010 for retail sales the logic being that grocery sales are an all year round activity so boost monthly turnover making the trading posts more viable.

The enormous potential that insurance has to leverage funding was illustrated in the pilot RARP in 2009 where insurance costing $12,500 (equivalent to 20 tonnes of fertilizer) resulted in the distribution and sales of agricultural inputs through small rural outlets valued at over $400,000. In 2010/2011 FAO has continued its involvement with a scaled up project (RARP II) targeting over 500 shops countrywide, with a catchment area which will enable to make inputs available to over 100,000 households.

A SWOT analysis of the Agrodealer programme was carried out based on key informant interviews with various stakeholders (Table 20). Although the programme is not without its problems (limited range of inputs supplied and limited number of potential, agro dealers covered), the initial results are promising and suggest that the project is facilitating input supply systems in rural areas and has the potential to improve access to output markets for smallholder.

5.2. Pilot Electronic Voucher Projects in Large Scale Input Distribution Projects Large scale input assistance projects are part of a general rehabilitation & recovery strategy for smallholder holder agriculture in Zimbabwe and aim to reduce the dependency of vulnerable rural communities on humanitarian assistance and improve their livelihood outcomes.

Initially the input distribution mechanism employed by these types of projects was direct input distribution whereby the donor procured inputs centrally from reputable dealers and donors or IPs transported inputs to project areas for free distribution to beneficiary households. Whilst these types of projects assure beneficiaries get required inputs to produce a significant proportion of their own food, which is less expensive than distributing an equivalent amount of food aid, free distribution of inputs can potentially create dependency upon donors and undermine local agro dealers.

In recent seasons, however, pilot projects have been implemented using voucher based input distribution systems that use local agro dealers to distribute inputs to beneficiary households thereby supporting development of rural input markets. Lessons from these pilot projects will provide important information for the future development of market based input distribution systems.

During the 2010/2011, various donors supported extensive input voucher programmes in smallholder farming areas. FAO supported two pilot electronic voucher projects within the EU funded programmes implemented by Help Germany with the support of two IPs (SAT and CADS) to test the use of alternative electronic voucher systems.

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The HELP (GERMANY) voucher distribution programme targeted 104,000 beneficiaries in eleven districts. Eight wholesalers took part in the scheme and were encouraged to link with storeowners and agro-dealers in the targeted wards. Wholesalers were expected to enter into a business arrangement whereby wholesalers would deliver a range of agricultural products to the rural stores and these stores would “sell” the products either for cash or for vouchers.

There were four types of voucher schemes tested under this programme:

1. Paper vouchers distributed to – 101,508 beneficiaries – each receiving 4 x US$15.00 open vouchers. 2. REDAN scratch cards distributed to 1,000 beneficiaries in the district of Goromonzi, – each receiving 3 x US$25.00 cards after contributing US$15.00 themselves, leaving a net US$60.00 from the donor. ( IP: CADS) 3. KINGDOM electronic swipe cards loaded with US$60.00, distributed to 792 beneficiaries in the district of Zvimba. 4. CABS electronic swipe cards distributed to 1,000 beneficiaries loaded with S$90.00 (each beneficiary having contributed US$15.00 to the card) The main areas of interest:

• strengths, weaknesses, of alternative voucher input distribution systems from the point of view of all stakeholders (beneficiary farmers, agro dealers and participating wholesalers and humanitarian sector) • the ability of smallholder households to co-finance input vouchers (Hypothesis: less than 10% of targeted households were unable to co-finance vouchers) • the viability of electronic voucher systems ( hypothesis: key factors in the acceptance and viability of electronic voucher systems for all stakeholders ( recipient, agro dealers, wholesale input suppliers, donors) is ease of use, reliability of connection for processing vouchers and trust in the financial/banking partner.

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Table 20 : SWOT Analysis of the Rural Agro dealer Restocking Programme Strengths. Weaknesses. Opportunities. Threats.

1. Strategy and activities are clear 1. Current distribution of agro dealers 1. Combining input and output 1. Private sector commercial specific i.e. re-establishing & creation highly skewed with ?? % in Mash marketing activities . operations compromised by of sustainable commercial links Central, ?? Mash East There are fewer 2. Linking successful agro dealers to too many rules of engagement between distributors of agro-inputs agro dealers currently supported in additional lines of credit to imposed by donors or IPs and rural stores Matableland and Masvingo ( covered finance stocking of less seasonal 2. Limited cash in rural areas 2. Active engagement of 6 Agro by other donor programmes (Masvingo products (e.g. groceries) to 3. Large scale direct distribution distributors and over 500 agro dealers – CARE?) increase business turnover & of free or subsidized inputs located in eight? provinces 2. Agro dealers excluded from the viability for both wholesalers and undermine commercial input 3. Agro dealers benefit from scheme are disadvantaged (lower rural stores. sales consignment stocking which allows range & qty of inputs & higher 3. Use of POS electronic machines 4. Ability of Agro dealers to agro dealers with limited resources to stocking costs leading to less to facilitate instant payment stock & store sufficient access significant stocks of competitive prices) 4. Linking Agro dealers with Donors quantity & range of inputs agricultural inputs 3. Viability of links between agro input & IPs for input distribution required by smallholders 4. Increased and timely availability of distributors and agro dealers programmes 5. Timeliness of input inputs in rural stores, allowing farmers questionable in absence of lge scale 5. Linking Agro dealers with Pvt availability through agro to plan ahead voucher based input distribution sector contractors dealers 5. In 2010/2010 season agro dealer programmes 6. Limited coverage of financial network facilitated use of voucher 4. Input demand seasonal & doesn’t institutions in rural areas based input distribution schemes. sustain business all year round 6. Agro dealers as channels for 7. Limited mobile coverage in 6. Facilitation of insurance to mitigate 5. Limited range of agri inputs supplied, Micro financing schemes rural areas to facilitate use of distributors risks & building capacity delays in stocking stores, some POS electronic machines. of insurance industry to provide consignment stock withdrawn once 8. Ability of agro dealers to services in future years input voucher programme over. stock & store range of 7. Participating agro dealers don’t have 6. Participants in training (owners of agro quantities of inputs required to travel in search of stock & benefit dealers) not often managers of outlet & by from reduced transport costs no way of ensuring training passed on. associated with efficient distribution . network of Agro distributors 8. Provision of Training & transfer of managements skills to agro dealers 9. Output marketing opportunities. 10. Programme demonstrated that market driven approach to input distribution possible.

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Table 21 Strengths and weaknesses of different types of Vouchers. Strengths. Weaknesses.

PAPER VOUCHERS

1. Redeemable at all stores that were contracted by wholesalers in the 1. Cumbersome recording increased staff time for agro dealer, wholesaler & NGO (e.g. security numbers on 11 Districts vouchers at distribution, verification and recording at agro dealers on redemption, reconciliation by wholesalers 2. Easy to distribute to beneficiaries &NGOs 3. Easy to understand by beneficiaries and even elderly and illiterate 2. Due to’1’ late payment of wholesales by NGOs & late payment of commissions from wholesalers to agro could use them dealers 4. Lowest production cost of all voucher systems 3. Only manual recording of what is purchased 5. Easy to handle by agro dealers & being a physical item could easily 4. wholesaler cannot instantly download daily electronic transactions at each store & react with deliveries to calculate commission restock 6. Most popular voucher with beneficiaries & agro dealers 5. Forgery possible REDAN SCRATCH CARDS

1. virtually impossible to forge 1. very expensive in comparison to other electronic systems 2. instant recording at time of redemption (if network available) 2. constrained to areas with good cell phone network 3. easy concept for beneficiary to understand as similar to cell phone top 3. cumbersome for agro dealer to enter scratch card number & wait for service when queues of customers up cards 4. due to ‘3’ agro dealers often recorded manually and installed numbers after hours taking away ‘instant 4. Easy to train agro dealers to operate cell phone provided to record transaction’ advantage transaction 5. Does not capture electronically what was purchased. 6. doesn’t allow for electronic/instant payment to the wholesaler from NGO 5. wholesales able to retrieve daily transactions on volume of sales (but 7. late payment in commissions from wholesalers to agro dealers not details of items purchased)

KINGDOM ELECTRONIC SWIPE CARDS

1. able to electronically record transaction in real time 1. pilot scheme fraught with technical difficulties & not implemented well by Kingdom technicians ( Help 2. Easy concept for farmers if system working properly Germany) 3. able to provide instant payment from NGO to wholesalers but this 2. constrained to areas with good cell phone network didn’t happen due to technical issues 3. for effective implementation, every agro dealer needs a POS machine to record transactions at the store instantly. 4. Easy to train agro dealers on use of system Kingdom only installed 2 out of 8 required machines so farmers had to walk long distances to swipe cards, get 5. cards remain active for possible future interventions receipt & return to store closest to home for redemption 4. The Kingdom System doesn’t record what is purchased 5. Due to technical problems Wholesalers had to present paper receipts to Help Office for payment instead of being paid instantly 6. Not popular with farmers, agro dealers, wholesalers or NGOs because of non performance

CABS

1. Fully electronic system 1. Limited to areas with good cell phone network 2. Reasonably quick at time of redemption using POS machine 2. Costly in terms of POS machines required by all agro dealers in the programme. 158

3. Electronic recording of products purchased with each swipe 4. Wholesalers able to download daily transactions and stock draw down at each store, making to easy to plan deliveries & huge time savings 5. Although not actioned, able to pay agro - dealer commissions more rapidly ( possibly instantly) 6. well priced compared to other electronic systems 7. cards remain active for possible future interventions Source: based on Help Germany Evaluation of Voucher Distribution Scheme and Key informant Interviews with Stakeholders.

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5.3. Results: Effectiveness & Impact The percentage of beneficiaries that made the required co-payment for electronic swipe cards was 94%. Those who failed to make the co payment were replaced. Although the co-payment rate was high & demonstrated farmers ability to co finance inputs there were risks involved in collecting and moving the cash and IPs were not very comfortable being involved with the administration of co payment schemes.

Paper vouchers were the cheapest to produce. The cost of electronic vouchers was lowest for CABS and Redan (Table 21)

Table 22 Cost of Alternative Input Vouchers Paper vouchers Redan Kingdom CABS

Cost per beneficiary US$0.35 (including recording staff) US$6.00 US$3.00 US$3.00

Source: Help Germany

The programme supported targeted agro dealers together with wholesalers with increased throughput of agricultural inputs at their stores. All agro dealers reported increased sales in their shops because of having stock, even to customers outside the voucher programme. Wholesalers estimated that additional turnover from cash sales was around 10-15% of value of voucher sales. The main strengths and weaknesses of the different voucher types from the point of view of all stakeholders are summarised in Table 22. Paper vouchers are the easiest to distribute and the most popular type of voucher with beneficiaries and agro dealers but are very cumbersome administratively for wholesalers as they have to be processed manually. Electronic vouchers of all types are similar to mobile phone top up cards so are understood by beneficiaries and not difficult to use providing the redeeming outlet has a good cell phone connection. Wholesalers like electronic vouchers because they are able to electronically record the transaction in real time which has the potential to provide instant payment from NGOs to wholesalers and from the wholesalers to agro dealer which speeds up the redemption process. Only the CABs electronic voucher is able to record the detail of the actual items purchased with the voucher. Wholesalers and NGOs like this feature as it provides information on the types of items purchased making it easy to plan deliveries and saving a lot of time. CABs electronic vouchers were the best performing in the pilot project and relatively inexpensive to produce. Unfortunately, the use of electronic vouchers is limited to areas of good cell phone coverage and connectivity & network fluctuations are serious challenges that need addressing before electronic voucher systems can be widely implemented. It addition agro dealers need to be encouraged to open bank accounts to allow for instant transactions. Paper Voucher Systems are likely to remain in widespread use for some time so there is a need to look at ways to bar code for electronic processing to speed up information capture and redemption process.

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Surveys of retail outlets participating in the voucher programme and RARP revealed that the cost of inputs to the farmer through local agro dealers and under voucher based input distribution systems is higher than the cost to farmers of inputs provided through direct distribution under contract farming projects. For example, the typical cost of Compound D fertiliser or Top dressing via agro dealers is US$30-32 per 50kg bag compared to US$25-27 in FAO & Pvt sector supported contract farming projects, roughly 20% higher which is likely to impact of crop viability.

An unanticipated benefit of the pilot electronic voucher project is that it brought together rural dealers and financial institutions and resulted in some outlets being identified as service providers for these financial institutions. 48 This is likely to increase financial services at rural growth points.

Wholesalers and IPs noted that both the input voucher programmes and consignment stocking programme are still some way off operating in the traditional commercial way where agro dealers procure their own inputs from wholesalers on terms agreed between the two parties. Both the voucher programme and consignment stocking programmes saw wholesalers delivering product to their selected stores. This often resulted in wholesalers incurring additional delivery costs such as off loading charges and also gave agro dealers little control over the timing of deliveries and inputs stocked.

6. Findings and Recommendations 6.1. Conservation Agriculture Projects with Contract Farming Arrangements 6.1.1. Project Relevance & Implementation Design • Project Activities supporting Contract farming (CF) are relevant and appropriate and address many of the challenges identified by farmers whilst also recognising the risks & uncertainty Pvt Sector Partners face in servicing and linking with SHFs • CF arrangements help overcome the barriers SHF face in engaging with markets and offer considerable potential to raise smallholder productivity & farm incomes • CA is appropriate in contract farming projects for both low resourced and better-endowed smallholders and is often identified by low resourced households as a Most Significant Change (MSC) activity in their lives. • Inclusion of legume seed crops, such as cowpeas or sugar beans, that can double as a cash, helps to overcome SHFs reluctance to allocate limited land resources to a legume crops and improves soil fertility whilst also increasing farm income flows. However:

48 In Mhondoro we met a manager of a supermarket who had been part of the electronic voucher trial who is going to receive Point of Sale (POS) machine from one of the participating financial institution which will not only allow customers to pay for good electronically but will also allow the dealer to offer banking services for this financial provider.

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• The project design is limiting and all project sites in future should incorporate a more holistic set of activities, including cattle & small livestock, home vegetable gardens & reforestation • There is a need to continue testing and piloting mechanical tools (e.g. ox drawn implements) relevant to CA to enable farmers to cultivate a larger area under CA , thereby increasing farm income • The use of appropriate herbicides alongside CA is critical in reducing drudgery, relieving weeding labour bottlenecks and in enabling timely planting of late season cash crops. The costs of herbicides are lower than the cost of tillage so the use of appropriate herbicides may be both economically and environmentally sustainable. . • Efforts should be made to offer various levels of support packages to address the needs of both new beneficiaries, less well resourced farmers and farmers with several years experience of CA projects who are able to graduate to a higher level of support. 6.1.2. Effectiveness • Improvement of farmer management practices using CA approach together with acquisition of adequate levels of inputs ( seed, fertiliser and chemicals) offers considerable potential to raise productivity of smallholder production of both food and cash crops although performance levels vary considerably between farmers receiving similar input packages. • Project activities have enabled SHFs to increase maize & cash crop yields significantly above national average. E.g. 70-100% beneficiaries achieved maize yields equivalent to at least 2000kg per ha in 2009/2010 and top 25% farmers had av. maize yield of 3500-4500 kg per ha • There is some evidence to suggest that poorer households (those with no livestock) achieve lower yields than the sample average and better off households for project supported maize and sugar beans, despite that fact that all HHs receive the same inputs and CA methods are not reliant of draft animals. This may be because better of households hire labour and/or add additional inputs or because better off households have used inputs in the past so their soils are not that poor. • Sample data from Kadoma also shows that maize yields of female headed households were 30 % higher than male headed households in 2009/2010 season. • Despite variability in farmer & private sector performance, projects have made significant progress towards achieving their major objective, which was to establish stable market linkages with the private sector and to support farmers to produce and market a variety of crops profitably. However

• Links between smallholders and Private sector Partners are still fragile and can easily be undermined by many factors (late delivery and poor quality of inputs, lower than anticipated output, drought season, lower than expected prices, higher than expected deductions etc.). Farmers unions and government need to create an enabling environment. 6.1.3. Implementation Efficiency

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• In most areas vulnerable households are well represented among project beneficiaries and there have not been any significant barriers to the participation of female headed or child headed HHs. Beneficiaries 45 yrs and above account for a larger share of project participants in some areas and projects need to identify ways to promote participation of younger farmers and those in 30-45 age group • Projects have experienced implementation problems from time to time because of delays in confirmation of short cycle funding which have contributed to delays in the procurement and distribution of agricultural Inputs. Quality of inputs sourced through the FAO tender process has also been problematic. IPs make supplier recommendations at the beginning of the project but the tender process that FAO has to follow widens the scope for inferior suppliers winning tenders solely based on cost and ignoring quality aspects. Use of debit cards and vouchers should improve this, as farmers will be able to buy inputs of acceptable quality and suited for very specific circumstances. • High extension officer to farmer ratio and use of demonstration plots as a practical training tool has been an effective tool in optimising yields through better management but the wide performance difference between top 25% and bottom 25% of beneficiaries suggests that the extension model is not effective for all farmers. • There is a need for consistency in the implementation of cost recovery • The mobility of Field Officers at UP project sites is compromised by lack of motorbikes even at supervisory level • IPs vary in their capacity to plan and implement M and E activities and in the extent to which these activities have been internalised into their own organisations. All IPs could be more proactive internalising M & E activities 6.1.4. Impact • .There is little doubt that CA programmes with market linkages have had an impressive impact on the ability of beneficiaries to meet staple food requirements through own production. What is more difficult to measure is the extent to which households have generated significant cash incomes and how income generated has enabled households to improve living standards and accrue assets to support further livelihood improvements. Many farmers we met in focus groups indicated that project activities had provided sufficient income to pay school fees and cash in the home to purchase preferred foods, cooking utensils, clothes and blankets. Receiving a lump sum after harvest also enabled some farmers to invest in assets such as cattle, donkey, chickens and goats and to purchase items such as wheelbarrows. Scotch carts and knap sack sprayers • Project activities have introduced new cash crops to SHFs including seed legume crops such as cowpeas & sugar beans and horticultural crops such as paprika and chillies • Additional activities, ( vegetable gardens and poultry projects) offer year round cash flow and potential to kick start self-sustaining parallel projects, although farmers are experiencing difficulty from time to time identifying profitable local markets

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• Both demonstration plots and fields of beneficiary farmers have had a noticeable extension impact on non-beneficiary farmers in the surrounding communities. • Growing awareness among smallholders that farming is a business, that input loans need to be repaid and contracts with Pvt Sector Partners need to honoured. 6.1.5. Sustainability • Linking SHFs to Pvt Sector input & output markets offers potential for sustainable market engagement after projects have finished. • At some project sites IPs have started to withdraw and hand over growers to Pvt sector partners However: • It takes time to build trust between stakeholders and to build the capacity of SHFs to produce a surplus. After 10 years of economic decline, change of currency and serious cash constraints for all partners project support is still needed to facilitate this process. A longer project perspective (5 years) would be needed. • Many potential Pvt Sector Partners are still not able to fully pre fund farmers due to financial constraints and lack off access to working capital at reasonable interest rates. • An additional constraint to PVT sector involvement is that groups of SHFs need to be able to produce sufficient output before Pvt Sector links are viable. This requires either the expansion in the number of growers at individual sites or expansion in quantity produced per grower. 6.2. Recommendations • FAO should continue to promote approaches to recovery & development of smallholder agriculture that enhance linkages with market and reduce farmer dependency on external agencies and on free or subsidised direct input distribution • FAO continue to promote diversified crop mix in contract farming projects and encourage more IPs to adopt a more holistic approach by incorporating vegetable gardens, poultry and livestock activities in programmes. • FAO/IPs continue to promote Conservation agriculture in contract farming projects but should incorporate support for mechanised CA that will enable better resourced farmers to expand area under CA and increase production of cash crops . However, introduction of mechanised CA should be done in such a way that it does not undermine the participation and performance of poorer resourced households (those who do not own draft animals or have access to less land) in contract farming projects. • FAO Logistics Department investigates suppliers of inputs more intensively in future to ensure quality and reliability of supply. • FAO continue to test innovative ways to support Pvt sector involvement in market linkages with smallholder sector (e.g. crop insurance, micro finance schemes ) and support programmes such as smallholder market development project that aim to link SHFs to Pvt Sector using a strictly business approach.

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• FAO/IPs seek funding of minimum of 3 years for market linkage projects to enhance the ability of all stakeholders to engage in well planned & phased implementation of development interventions and to engage in appropriate capacity building of all (Govt and Pvt) partners & stakeholders • FAO needs to develop a clearer understanding of division of M and E responsibilities between IP and FAO M and E unit for market linkage projects to ensure that baseline & post harvest surveys are implemented & activities & outputs adequately monitored. In addition, the information required for monitoring CF arrangements needs to be thoroughly reviewed and where necessary data collection tools revised to ensure that necessary data is collected. Some areas that need attention include the validity of implementing a baseline survey on an annual basis in multi year projects, the feasibility of keeping the same sample through the agricultural seasons for the different survey modules and need to collect a wider range of data to evaluate project impact on household livelihoods and asset accumulation. • FAO should urgently seek ways to resolve the dilemma of how to receive funds from projects that are designed on a cost recovery basis so as not to undermine fledgling business & contracting culture that IPs and Pvt Sector Partners are promoting. FAO rules on this are not clear. Options to consider with IPs & Pvt sector Partners include promoting group savings accounts, use of repayments for community projects, IP managed revolving fund, Trust Fund to manage FAO and partner funded programmes etc. • FAO should continue to play an active role in coordination activities such as MLWG that provide a platform for dissemination of information and a think tank for all stakeholders to learn the needs of business and farmers. • As new initiatives to support Pvt Sector involvement in Contract Farming & agricultural trade and processing get off the ground (e.g. FINTRAC & USAID ZIM –AIED programmes) FAO needs to consider how best to target incentives (e.g. inputs in kind) to promote contract farming among poor and emerging households. • As donor interventions in market linkage activities expand, there will be an increasing need for a coordinating body to maintain a database of who is doing what and where to avoid duplication of activities and to monitor the process. FAO is uniquely placed to ensure that the process is coordinated for the benefit of all stakeholders. • IPs continue to promote intensive extension for new growers but adopt a system of upgrading for farmers who are performing well and can produce with less supervision. • IPs continue to promote legumes in crop rotation that can also double as cash crops • IPs should introduce vegetable gardens & poultry projects in a phased manner after 1 st year project

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6.3. Market Driven Input Distribution Systems • Retail voucher systems, as an alternative or complimentary to direct input distribution, are workable in the Zimbabwe situation and can be adequately supported by wholesalers and agro dealers. • There is need to open up the system to more agro dealers to reduce the distance travelled by farmers to redeem vouchers & to allow agro dealers to compete thereby increasing farmer choice & promoting competitive pricing. Beneficiaries could only redeem the vouchers at one designated agro-dealer shop thereby limiting farmers’ choice. There were notable price variations among the agro-dealers and sometimes an agro dealer who was not in the project was selling inputs at lower prices. Where farmers had a choice between two or more agro dealers, this generally led to more price competition among suppliers. • The pilot electronic voucher system has its strengths such as capturing information on stock movement and the amount of inputs taken up by farmers if there is connectivity. In addition, electronic vouchers have the potential for instant payment to wholesalers & agro dealers although this did not happen in the pilot project. However, connectivity & network fluctuations are serious challenges that need addressing before electronic voucher systems can be widely implemented. It addition agro dealers need to be encouraged to open bank accounts to allow for instant transactions. • Paper Voucher Systems are likely to remain in widespread use for some time so need to look at ways to bar code for electronic processing to speed up information capture and redemption process. • The cost of inputs to the farmer through local agro dealers and under voucher based input distribution systems is higher than cost to farmers of inputs provided through direct distribution under contract farming projects. For example, the typical cost of Compound D fertiliser or Top dressing via agro dealers is US$30-32 per 50kg bag compared to US$25-27 in FAO & Pvt sector supported contract farming projects, roughly 20% higher. The different in costs is due to procurement in bulk and these cost savings have an impact on profitability. 6.4. Recommendations • FAO should initiate a phased withdrawal from direct input distribution for non humanitarian interventions and move to voucher based systems to encourage all stakeholders ( agricultural input producers, wholesalers, service providers, IPs) to develop market based input distribution systems and to give farmers greater choice in selection of seed varieties & inputs and greater control over the input procurement process .However, the modalities for delivering inputs should be flexible and responsive to individual project situations since direct input distribution systems may still be the most efficient distribution mechanisms for some cash crops where timely delivery of specific inputs is critical to achieving productivity required for success in contract farming. Further, closed retail vouchers may be preferable to open vouchers in project areas where retail

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outlets have limited stocks (if any) of agricultural inputs and need the security of demand offered by closed vouchers to ensure stocks agricultural inputs. 49 • FAO continue to support the institutional mechanisms required for successful implementation of input voucher programmes including innovations that will support electronic voucher systems, standardisation of vouchers that can be redeem across a wide range of participating stores, decentralised warehousing system to supply agro dealers. • FAO support training and coordination activities that will increase the ability of all stakeholders (agro dealers, donors, IPs, private contractors, farmers) to use voucher based input distribution systems. • FAO to investigate through pilot projects the feasibility of linking producers to micro finance schemes through agro dealers.

Appendix 1 Field work Visits & Data Collection Tools 1. Fieldwork: Sites

Table A1 Main Project sites visited for Key Informant & Focus Group Discussions

UP Projects

Guruve, Mt Darwin- key informant interviews ( mid January) & Focus Group, 5 February 2011

Goromonzi- Key informant interviews ( December)

Murewa tobacco growers– key informant interviews ( December)

Hurungwe – Key informant interviews ( Mid February)

SAT Projects

Kadoma – key informant interviews ( late January) & Focus groups February 12, 2011

Hurungwe-Key informant interviews ( mid February)

49 Since this evaluation a decision has been made to the effect that there will be no more direct distributions from 2011-12 by FAO Zimbabwe and most partners – and no more free distributions (the poorest will pay back in kind at community level after harvest or livestock/garden production cycle. In addition all agricultural programmes planned for 2011/2012 are voucher and contract farming based. The concept was agreed by all donors and presented to Government and agreed in June 2011

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APT

Chiweshe, Mazowe key informant interviews ( December) & Focus Groups 28 Jan, 2011

Vumba coffee Cooperative – key informant interviews ( mid January

Honde Valley tea & banana growers – key informant interviews (Mid January).

2. Topics to cover in Key Informant Interviews with IPs & Pvt Sector Partners

• History of Involvement with smallholder sector & how this has develop over time (yr started , main crops, no of growers by crop & area and output overtime) • Main Benefits (Strengths) and Opportunities of working with smallholder sector • Perception of constraints smallholders face in commercialising production & activities implemented by the Pvt Companies to address the needs • Perception of main challenges smallholders face in working with private sector and how these can be overcome • Main challenges company faces in working with smallholder sector and how these can be overcome • General mode of operation or current strategy in working with smallholder sector (e.g. identifying farmers, groups or individuals, extension, operational codes etc) • Contracting model for 2009/2010 & 2010/11 seasons & how this has changed overtime & whether different models for different types of farmers, • Gender issues including barriers to participation of female headed households in contract farming & experience of working with female headed HHs. • Involvement with organisations or projects ( e.g. Union Project, SAT) that are supporting contracting process & share of growers base this represent (no’s, area, output) • Main activities that Farmers Unions implementing to support contract farming & effectiveness and relevance of Farmer’s Unions support for contract farming. • Main challenges Pvt companies face in working with Project • Main strengths of current contracting farming arrangements • Main weaknesses in current contracting farming arrangements • Opportunities for increasing value of contracted commodities ( e.g. quality improvements, value adding , introduction of new crops etc) • Main threats or risks to success of contract farming in smallholder sector • Future plans or vision and how this can be supported by farmer organisations, donors, government etc.

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Annex F: Study on FAO Role and Effectiveness in Sectoral Coordination in Zimbabwe

Final Report (Synthesis)

February 2011

Authors: Qualitative Study: Kudzai and Borel, Harare Zimbabwe

Quantitative Survey: Jenny Bonomi, FAO/OED, Rome

Prepared on behalf of the Office of Evaluation, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations.

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Abbreviations ACF: Action Contre la Faim ACWG: Agriculture Coordination Working Group. AGRITEX: Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services. ARDA: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. AUSAID: Australian Agency for International Development. CA: Conservation Agriculture. CAADP: Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program CFU: Commercial Farmers’ Union. CMMYT: International Centre for Maize and Wheat Improvement CSC: Cold Storage Company. FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. GMB: Grain Marketing Board. GoZ: Government of Zimbabwe. ICRAF: Institut Canadien de Recherches Pour’l Avancement de la Femme. LWG: Livestock Working Group. MLWG: Market Linkages Working Group. MOAMID: Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development. NGO: Non-Government Organization. CBO: Community-Based Organization Sub-WG: Sub-Working Group. SWG: Seed Houses Working Group. UN: United Nations. USAID: United States Agency for International Development. ZCFU: Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union. ZFU: Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union. ZNFU: Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union.

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Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 4

2.0 OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL COORDINATION ...... 172

2.1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 2.2. HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL COORDINATION 2.3. CURRENT COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND FAO’ S ROLE 2.4. STRUCTURAL RELATIONS OF ACWG AND SUB -WORKING GROUPS

3.0 REVIEW OF THE AGRICULTURAL COORDINATION WORKING GROUP (ACWG) IN ZIMBABWE ...... 9

3.1 REVIEW APPROACH /METHODOLOGY 3.2 PERFORMANCE OF THE COORDINATION MECHANISM 3.3 STRATEGIC GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES

4. SURVEY ON FAO’S EFFECTIVENESS IN COORDINATION ...... 2190

4.1 METHODOLOGY 4.2 RESULTS

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD...... ……29

5.1 DECENTRALIZATION 5.2. GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 5.3. SHIFTING COORDINATION ARCHITECTURE 5.4. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES 5.5. RECOMMENDATIONS

ANNEX 1: REVIEW TERMS OF REFERENCE - ACWG REVIEW ANNEX 2 ACWG TERMS OF REFERENCE ANNEX 3: REVIEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ANNEX 4: KEY INFORMANTS - ACWG REVIEW ANNEX 5: KEY DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ANNEX 6 : LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS - SURVEY RESPONDENTS ANNEX 7 : SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

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1.0 Introduction Coordination of the food security and agriculture sector has been a key area of activity for FAO Zimbabwe over the past five years. In Zimbabwe, FAO chairs the Agriculture Coordination Working Group (ACWG) and the related sub-working groups (CA Task Force, Livestock Working Group, Garden Working Group and Seed Houses Working Group) and participates in the Market Linkages Working Group. These coordination bodies bring together a large number of key stakeholders of Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector including national and international NGOs, donors, government and private sector. During this period, FAO has continued to consolidate and strengthen the existing coordination mechanism to ensure the most effective outcome of the overall agricultural assistance programs in Zimbabwe. Given the extent of FAO’s efforts in coordinating emergency/recovery agricultural interventions, FAO Zimbabwe requested a review of the existing coordination mechanisms with a view to exploring how these could be further strengthened. The objective of the review, that was carried out in the last quarter of 2010, were: i) to assess effectiveness of the ACWG and its sub-WGs in terms of processes, outputs and outcomes and ii) to Inform FAO, Government and partners on ways to further strengthen coordination mechanisms in the future. The review is based on in-depth interviews of key informants from 22 organizations participating in the working groups. In addition, as part of the Zimbabwe Country Evaluation a pre-mission survey on FAO’s effectiveness in coordinating the emergency and recovery response in Zimbabwe was commissioned by the Office of Evaluation with the purpose of providing the evaluation team with additional information on FAO’s performance in carrying out this task. The survey data provides complementary information to the coordination review, covering a larger group of stakeholders and aiming at assessing more quantitatively FAO’s performance in supporting sectoral coordination. This report presents the results of these two studies combined in three sections: section 2 includes background and context and an historical summary of agricultural coordination and describes existing coordination structures; section 3 presents the results of the review on ACWG and sub- working groups carried out by Kudzai Chatiza and Annalies Borrel; finally, section 4 reports the results of the survey on FAO’s effectiveness in coordination carried out by the Office of Evaluation in the framework of the Zimbabwe Country Evaluation. The report ends with a section outlining conclusions and recommendations drawn from findings in the two exercises. 2.0 Overview of Agricultural Coordination50 Agriculture is, and has been in the past, a central economic sector in Zimbabwe’s development. It is also a sector where the public, private and civil society sectors interact more closely than in other

50 This section was prepared by Kudzai Chatiza and Annalies Borrel in the framework of the review of the ACWG and sub-working groups in Zimbabwe.

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sectors. This interaction occurs across multiple aspects including inputs, output markets, policy and research. The intensity of interaction and the density of specific actor categories vary by sub-sector and farming system. For instance, civil society and public sector activity has traditionally been more intense amongst smallholder farmers while private sector activity was more pronounced in the commercial agricultural sub-sector. At the same time, certain sub-sectors e.g. cotton, tobacco and livestock (particularly large stock), exhibit a longer tradition of private sector participation than other sub-systems. However, recent changes in agrarian structure and performance as well as changes brought about by the recent crisis, has influenced relationships amongst stakeholders in the agricultural sector. 2.1 Government-led Coordination Mechanisms The role of the Government in agricultural development has long been central in coordination, especially in the areas of research and extension, policy development, design and implementation of specific programs as well as coordination of different actors. For example, the Government of Zimbabwe previously had an elaborate and nationwide extension system supported by an equally strong and (until the post 2000 economic crisis) well-resourced research capacity, deployed through a network of national and sub-national research centres. The GoZ deployed agricultural research and extension services through a decentralized structure Provincial, District and Ward representation from the Department for Agriculture and Extension Services (AGRITEX). Other state departments include veterinary services, economics and markets, research and specialist services, irrigation and mechanization and Ministry supervised Parastatals like the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), Cold Storage Company (CSC) and the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). These agencies coordinate activities of relevant stakeholders, albeit with current limited capacity. 2.2 Coordination by Farmer Organizations Farmer Organizations also coordinate agricultural activities to ensure that farmers’ perspectives are channeled to Government. The main farmers’ organizations in Zimbabwe include the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU), the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union (ZCFU) and the more recent established Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU). Common features of these farmer organization are local clubs and ‘syndicates’ comprised of at least ten farmers, Commodity Associations, Annual General Meetings (AGMs) and governing structures including Technical Committees. 2.3 Local Government and Agricultural Coordination Local government structures also play a critical role in coordination within the agriculture sector. Rural District Councils in Zimbabwe use a committee system to conduct their business. One key committee is the Rural District Development Committee (RDDC) chaired by the District Administrator. The RDDC brings together all heads of Government Departments, Parastatals and

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non-state development organizations. The Committee appraises development planning proposals from villages and wards, combines them with sector Ministry proposals and collates them into District Development Plans (DDPs) that are adopted by a advisory Council. Once adopted DDPs are submitted to the Provincial level for collation into Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). Furthermore, another key sub-committee of the Provincial and Rural District Development Committees (PDC and RDDC) is the Agriculture and Natural Resources (ANR). At Provincial and District levels AGRITEX plays the role of leader of the ANR sub-committee. The ANR brings together state and non-state actors involved in the design and implementation of agricultural activities. The ANR subcommittee, among others: provides technical backstopping in terms of district and provincial development planning processes in general but more specifically as they relate to agricultural development and natural resources management (land, water, forests etc), coordinates the activities of different actors, and disseminates information to and from farmers. 2.4 Status of Agricultural Coordination In general, the effectiveness of the different national coordination mechanisms, including the ANR sub-committee and others relevant to agriculture, has regressed in recent years for a number of reasons. First, there is a general loss of institutional capacity amongst local governance institutions principally through staff depletion and rapid turnover. Loss of experienced staff affected the overall development planning process. For instance, the loss of performance in most Councils 51 negatively affected key sub-structures involved in steering development planning. Annual and three-year planning cycles lost their relevance and purpose as resources dwindled and projects were repeatedly rolled-over without rigorous review and updated needs analyses. Second, resource disparities between the state and non-state actors widened, further straining actor collaboration. The state increasingly became unable to meet critical costs affecting its ability to effectively lead or coordinate the sector. State structures became less of a source of or conduit for dissemination of new sector knowledge as their connection with local and international research institutions weakened. A third factor related to cycles of institutional restructuring (reforms) particularly the un-packing (and re-packing) of AGRITEX. This affected Government’s ability to lead the sector particularly in rural areas as, to some extent, institutional momentum was dissipated and stakeholders were confused as to which parts of the Government agricultural development agencies should effectively relate to. Coupled with constraints in terms of human, technical, financial and material resources, this led to the weakening of sector coordination. A fourth factor was the national political polarization that heightened in the post-2000 period. Institutional tensions between the state and non-state (national and international) development organizations led to communication breakdown. At the same time, policy development and implementation adopted a more short-term

51 Rural District and Provincial Councils

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perspective 52 in part because of the need to respond to multiple crises that Zimbabwe underwent between 2000 and 2008. Opportunities for dialogue between the Government of Zimbabwe and key donors largely became limited. Consequently, a significant gap in coordination in the agriculture sector was evident. Furthermore, national and sub-national levels Government’s ability (technical, financial and political) to coordinate agricultural sector work would be potentially further undermined with a significant increase in external donor resources being channeled through non- state actors. 2.5 Current Coordination Mechanisms and FAO’s role In recognition of constraints facing the Government, the Government approached FAO in 20042 to take on the role of coordinating non-state activities and to provide regular feedback to the MOAMID. This gave rise to the Agricultural Coordination Working Group (ACWG). Later, the ACWG then evolved to become the Agricultural Cluster, when the cluster approach (UN coordination system for humanitarian response and early recovery) was formally introduced in Zimbabwe in 2008. The ACWG has been the principal vehicle for coordinating agricultural humanitarian responses since 2002. FAO, through the ACWG, has sought to, inter alia , strengthen consistency across interventions, reduce duplication and gaps, support and facilitate best practice through application of monitoring and evaluation tools. The ACWG, informed by a Terms of Reference (see Annex 2) holds regular monthly meetings 53 which are donor funded and chaired by the FAO. The ACWG is open to all stakeholders including local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private companies, research institutes, consultants, Government and donor agencies. At the ACWG meetings, partners are informed and updated on relevant meteorological information. Partners also have the opportunity to share, update and discuss current coverage and progress on different seasonal agricultural interventions. Findings from reviews and evaluations as well as new research are shared and discussed. Strategic planning processes, albeit ad hoc, are initiated. The coordination structure of the ACWG is further comprised of five sub-working groups (see Box 2). Membership of sub- working groups comprises agencies and individuals with technical expertise in the relevant areas for each sub-group. FAO has a central role in the ACWG and its sub-Working groups. The organization has both a chairing and secretariat role. This involves planning meeting agendas, facilitating participation of new and existing partners, preparation and dissemination of minutes, acting as a repository of information including maintaining a dedicated website, partner data base and preparation of

52 Overlapping programs and operations that the Government of Zimbabwe implemented post-2000, while they had their positive effects, largely detracted from long-term policy making and institutional collaboration with the overall effect of constraining traditional coordination mechanisms. 53 ACWG meetings are held on the last Thursday of every month from about 9am through 12 noon in Harare.

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Journals. FAO has a similar co-chair and secretariat role in each of the five sub-WGs 54 . In general, stakeholders highly value the ACWG meetings and its outputs, mainly the Agricultural Journal, for the purposes of sharing useful information and providing a critical networking platform. Information shared through the ACWG has influenced programs at different levels and has kept different agencies informed about sector developments. Organizations access, disseminate and use ACWG material internally (to field staff) and externally (to networks and headquarters). Different agencies have an opportunity to present at ACWG meetings, enabling them to profile their work, receive feedback and identify partners for replicating or scaling up initiatives. The ACWG allows smaller and less-visible partners to become more visible and engage in partnerships with donors, FAO or other larger NGOs. In addition to monthly Harare-based meetings, the ACWG meetings also take place every three months at Provincial level. Sub-working groups meet less frequently (about every 3 months), have fewer members and aim to identify resources or assign responsibilities collectively to undertake agreed tasks.

2.6 Structural Relations of ACWG and Sub-Working groups The current structure of the ACWG and its sub-working groups is illustrated in Figure Box 1: Sub-Working Groups 1. Although the relationship is not 1. Conservation Agriculture Task Force formalized, the coordination mechanism 2. Livestock Working Group allows interface between Government 3. Market Linkage Association 4. Garden Working Group (MOAMID) through both the ACWG 5. Seed Houses Working Group directly and through each of the sub- Working groups. Ministry departments participate in both the ACWG and sub-working group activities. In principle inter-group (horizontal) interaction is facilitated by leaders (chairs) of the groups and the ACWG coordinator (FAO). In practice this is further supported through the active participation of partner organizations in the different sub-groups. The partner organizations who participate in the ACWG, also tend to be active in up to two sub-working groups.

54 Currently the Market Linkages Group is chaired by SNV but will be handing chair to FAO in 2011.

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Figure 1: Existing ACWG and Sub-Group Structure

Government of Zimbabwe, MoAMID.

ACWG.

Livestock Market Linkage Gardens WG. Seed Houses CA Task WG . Association WG. Force.

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3.0 Review of the Agricultural Coordination Working Group (ACWG) and sub- working groups in Zimbabwe 3.1 Review approach/methodology The review was undertaken by two independent consultants from October through December 2010. At the outset, an analytical framework was outlined which informed the scope of work ( see Annex 3) which informed both key informant discussions and the review of documents. Documents reviewed/analyzed included those available from the FAO’s repository and website and others ‘identified’ during interviews and participation in meetings. Key informant interviews were held with Operational Definition of Coordination representatives of the FAO, Government, used for Review donors, UN, NGOs, academic/research A process of deliberate, orderly institutions and private sector identified on a integration of group or unit efforts in the ‘snowball’ basis (see Annex 4 for key pursuit of a common goal, so as to informants) . Key informant discussions were achieve desired results efficiently and facilitated both on an individual basis and in effectively. small groups. The consultants also attended three ACWG meetings, two MLWG sessions, one CA Task Force ‘open day’ on mechanizing conservation agriculture and one LWG scheduled meeting as observers. The observations helped the team to understand coordination activities, participants’ aspirations and benefits derived from the coordination service. Additionally, preliminary feedback was given to FAO based on the analysis of the findings which further informed the work and analysis. A number of critical premises informed the review. These include the fact that: • The ACWG was set up as an emergency coordination forum, • Government, through the MOAMID asked FAO to take on this role, and • With the evolving context in Zimbabwe, there are new opportunities for further strengthening coordination in the agriculture sector. Overall the consultants undertook the review within the spirit of constructive dialogue and a forward-looking view. In keeping with this approach, the report identifies weaknesses and strengths of different aspects of the coordination structure. Most importantly, it aims to identify opportunities for FAO to play a more effective role within the changing context of Zimbabwe.

Box 2: Conceptualizing Coordination Coordination is usually considered a function of state or regulatory bodies but may be delegated to non-state entities. Coordination is needed because coordinating bodies do not have sole

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responsibility for defining goals and specific strategies or providing all the needed resources. As such, coordination encompasses clarification of goals and strategies, securing commitment, assigning roles and responsibilities and tracking and accounting for results. Coordinating development interventions and agencies often involves resolving conflicts and building consensus on aspects such as objectives, processes or relations, targeting and outcomes. Therefore, coordination draws on both technical and policy functions since it must reflect ‘ what needs to be achieved?, how?, by who?, for whose benefit? and why ?’. Securing answers to these key development questions and triggering relevant actions requires development leadership and management skills. The tools used in coordination vary but often include cycles of joint assessments and planning, implementation of activities, scheduled/regular update meetings and learning through internal and external monitoring-evaluation processes. Effective communication (formal/informal) is key to coordination. Other pre-requisites include transparency, trust, openness and looking beyond a single program. 3.2 Performance of the Coordination mechanism This section aims to provide a brief description of each of the sub-Working groups as well an analysis of their performance in terms of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats. It also analyzes the overall coordination mechanism in terms of processes, outputs and outcomes. 3.2.1 Sub-Working Groups The Livestock Working Group (LWG) The LWG aims to meet every 2 to 3 months. It’s work can be summed into three main thematic areas of animal health, marketing and livestock management and production. Under each of these themes are specific sub-themes that generally focus on the constraints faced by the sub-sector, advancing new technology and coping with threats such as drought. The work of the LWG also addresses issues of livestock production and management, relations with cropping subsystems, broader environmental management issues and food safety and security including local and international trade. The LWG is chaired by Government (Department of Veterinary Services) but has recently appointed an Acting Chair outside government (the Livestock Identification Trust). The membership of the LWG includes: • Government departments (and Parastatals) working on livestock and wildlife related issues, • CBOs, NGOs and Trusts (e.g. SNV, Africare, World Vision, Livestock Identification Trust, Africa 2000 Network, Kulasizwe Trust, Aquatic Trust), • Research Institutes (ICRISAT/Matobo Research Station), • Some donors undertaking relevant work, • UN agencies undertaking livestock-related activities, • Farmers Unions, and • Private sector.

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Table 1: SWOT Analysis of the LWG Sub- Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats Group. Livestock 1. Government co-chairs. 1. Weak linkages 1. Prioritization 1. Weak policy- 2. Integration of market with other sub- and scale up research- linkages and promotion of groups & on based on robust extension- market solutions (e.g. advocacy (e.g. research. farmer links farmer access to drugs). on veld fires). 2. Capacity 2. Weak land and 3. Has an actor database and 2. No strategy to building environmental links with new partners scale up initiatives. stewardship 4. Developing own website interventions i.e. 3. Strengthening (enforcement of 5. Addressing needs of emphasis placed livestock-based key laws). women and small on pilots with livelihood 3. Lack of community groups. limited scale up. options. consensus on 6. FAO hosting government 3. No integration sustainable Intern for 2 years (capacity of nutrition agriculture re building). issues. livestock 7. Support national dipping 4. Some production. program. presentations 4. Weak linking of 8. Contributed towards not analytical. CA into national Livestock smallholder Handbook. farming system.

Conservation Agriculture (CA) Task Force The CA Task Force was established in response to the significant interest in the region and nationally in the use of Conservation Agriculture (CA). Largely through the work of the CA Task Force, CA has been actively promoted since 2004. From a farmer base of 3000, the number of practicing farmers has grown to above 100 000. A national implementation framework targeting at least 500 000 farmers has been developed with the vision of making CA the technology of first choice for farmers in all agricultural sub-sectors. The three basic principles of CA include minimal soil disturbance, maximum soil cover, crop rotations and intercropping.

The CA is co-chaired with Government. Participating organizations include:

• The Ministry responsible for agriculture, • Farmers’ Unions, • FAO, • Research Institutes (ICRISAT, CIMMYT etc), • Local faith-based organizations (e.g. River of Life), • National and international NGOs, • Sector donors, and • The private sector, especially manufacturers of farming implements who have also taken keen interest in CA.

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Table 2: SWOT Analysis of the CA Task Force

Sub-Group. Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats Conservation 1. Action-oriented 1. Weak focus on 1. Adapting CA to 1. Sustainability Agriculture research produce marketing. socio-economic following Task Force disseminated and 2. No integration of and bio- withdrawal of used. nutrition aspects. physical inputs. 2. Strong links with 3. Perceived as “old” contexts. 2. Post-survival regional learning farming technology 2. Independent abandonment. processes in CA. and for “poor” evaluation of 3. Weakening 3. Evidence-based people. key success contribution to scaling-up. 4. Seen as input-driven. factors, economic 4. Active private sector 5. Limited efforts to contribution to growth versus participation. balance views of productivity & conventional 5. Institutional change enthusiasts & livelihoods. subsistence e.g. syllabi skeptics. farming adaptation for technology. colleges). 6. Government co- chairs. 7. Strategy in place emphasizing harmonized promotion, CA options, resource mobilization & training extension staff.

Market Linkages Working Group (MLWG) The MLWG was established following a number of workshops on small holder Contract Farming, led by SNV (Netherlands Development Organization) and the FAO in 2007 and 2008. The workshops led to the establishment of the Market Linkages Working Group, which aimed to focus on developing and applying new methodologies for the marketing of smallholder agricultural produce. The MLWG has been chaired by SNV from inception and meets monthly. The MLG has a diverse range of participants which include:

• Farmers’ Organizations (Unions, the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board etc), • Private sector (e.g. Acumen Africa, AgriSeeds, Cotton Ginners Association, Delta, Origen, Tribac), • International NGOs (e.g. Cordaid, CTDT, ACDI/VOCA, HELP Germany, Hivos, Swedish Cooperative Centre) (SCC) and SNV), • Financial institutions (Standard Chartered Bank), • Government (MoAMID), • Donors (AusAID, EU, SDC and USAID), and • The FAO.

The MLWG is based on the notion that not all smallholder farmers are suited or desire to be involved in commercial farming. It aims to promote linking of productive smallholder farmers (with surplus produce) to dependable markets. The MLWG goal is to initiate and strengthen links between such smallholders and input/output markets. To accomplish this goal, the MLWG pursues the following three interlinked objectives: develop and disseminate knowledge to stakeholders, to

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link and coordinate activities of various actors and interest groups involved in smallholder markets and to lobby stakeholders for increased support and improved conditions for smallholder marketing activities. The Market Linkage working Group recently evolved to become the Market Linkage Association and is chaired by the Private Sector

Table 3: SWOT Analysis of the MLWG Sub-Group. Strengths. Weaknesses. Opportunities. Threats. Marketing 11. Strong research and 7. Weak 1. Advocacy on 7. Private Linkage technical support from participation by produce marketing sector SNV and FAO. government. (pricing etc). domination 12. Strategy and activities 8. Lifespan 2. Links with other are clear specific i.e. ambiguous with group as contract farming minimal long- crosscutting theme. 13. A commitment to term 3. Balancing NGO- innovation. commitment. private sector 14. Active engagement of 9. Poor steering. private sectors and participation of 4. FAO as future chair implementing a local NGOs. may deepen program with private ownership & sector (AgriSeeds). institutionalization. 15. Has established funding system and registered Zimbabwe Agricultural Development Trust to administer Revolving Fund.

Garden Working Group (GWG) The GWG was established in response to an increasing number of agencies supporting and promoting household, community, urban and rural gardens targeting the most vulnerable households for (seasonal) food security. Gardens are also perceived to have arisen as a result of HIV-affected households needing to access diverse foods. At least 30 organizations participate in the Garden Working Group. FAO currently chairs and performs secretariat services for the group owing to limitations in terms of government capacity. The group focuses on both rural and urban gardens.

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Table 4: SWOT Analysis of the Garden Working Group Sub-Group. Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats Gardens 1. Has a clear focus on • No work plan • Research on • Not all nutrition for GWG viability of households can 2. Contributed to activities. gardens (size feasibly access production of Healthy • Weak focus on thresholds markets. Harvest produce to etc). • Seen as 3. Some learning and markets. • Strengthening seasonal by monitoring integrated nutrition most into programs. focus. smallholders. 4. In the process of • Market developing guidelines linkages. distinguishing between different objectives.

Seed Houses Working Group The Seed Houses Working Group (SWG) evolved in response to the high level of inputs required for distribution to farmers throughout the country. Given the nature of inputs, active engagement is usually limited to the pre-season period (August to October). This group comprises representatives from:

• ‘Seed Houses’, • Fertilizer companies, • Farmers’ Unions, • Government (Ministries with portfolios relevant to agriculture, economic development, industry and trade), • National and international NGOs, and • Private sector (especially wholesalers and retailers of agri-inputs).

The SWG provides a forum for interaction between this seed houses and fertilizer companies on one hand and other agriculture sector stakeholders on the other. It focuses on enabling stakeholders to update each other on seed and fertilizer availability, prices and means of improving cooperation and coordination between donors and NGOs on one hand and seed and fertilizer companies on the other. Unlike other sub-working groups, the SWG does not have terms of reference (TOR). There are at least four main seed companies and three fertilizer companies in the country. Representatives of the companies also attend and make presentations at the ACWG.

3.2.2 Analysis of Overall ACWG Performance Process (information sharing, networking) With the exception of the Seed Houses Working Group, the ACWG and the other four sub-working groups are each informed by Terms of Reference. All the groups generate and disseminate information and convene meetings. In general, the strengths of the ACWG and its sub-WGs, in terms of processes include the following:

• Perceived as highly valuable forums for information sharing and networking

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• High level of participation from diverse partner organizations; at least 15 for each of the sub-Working and at least 70 for the ACWG • The ACWG in particular is reputed for timely documentation and sharing of minutes. • All groups act as good repositories of information thereby providing a valuable institutional memory for the sector. • All the groups have acted as ‘melting pots’ for ideas, have supported their piloting and helped reduce inter-institutional gaps (knowledge and perceptions). • Stakeholder database (e.g. LWG, MLWG, CA Task Force). • Minutes, Journals, distribution/circulation lists and Websites (ACWG, LWG and MLWG)

However, with the exception of the ACWG which convenes meetings regularly the other working groups meet less frequently. There is no consistency of interaction and engagement between individual sub-groups and the ACWG. For example, the MLWG, perhaps because of how it emerged, operates in a generally independent manner while the Seed Houses tend to use the ACWG as an effective platform for disseminating information and engaging stakeholders. All sub-groups acknowledge that the ACWG influences some aspects of their agenda but this is not always systematic in terms of distilling issues and providing feedback. Other weaknesses of the coordination process include the following:

• The design of the ACWG website does not necessarily facilitate easy access to information. • Some of the information and updates provided at the ACWG could be more appropriately uploaded on to the website as information, freeing up time for more debate. The numbers (up to 100 at the ACWG and 30 in some sub-working groups) and diversity of participants tend to limit the potential for in-depth debate and dialogue especially in the absence of structured follow-up and feedback. The turnover in organizations have contributed to renewing WG ‘leaders and drivers’ and some WG have ‘lost’ some of their technical authority role and are have become more open, bigger and more ‘information sharing’ • Some aspects of agenda are repetitive and there appears to be limited scope for addressing coordination issues from a strategic focus for the sector, specific strategies, fragmentation and duplication to accountability for results. This reduces the policy relevance of some debates at the ACWG and in sub-working groups. • The coordination mechanisms are essentially perceived as FAO/NGO forums. With the changing context, there has been only some limited progress in terms of increasing Government engagement. The presence of Government is seen as complex in the current context – and Government capacity to take a lead is also an issue. • A lack of trust between Government and non-governmental development organizations has partly influenced some key decision-makers to stay away from the meetings. Outputs (guidance, best practice, planning and prioritization) The coordination mechanism have produced considerable knowledge products in the form of reviews, studies, assessments, evaluations, best practice lessons and guidelines/handbooks ( see Table 5 below and Annex x ). The outputs are perceived as offering valuable guidance in developing and implementing relevant interventions albeit in a humanitarian context.

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Table 5: Examples of Selected Outputs Group/Sub-Working Group Selected Outputs AWG 1. Agricultural Journals (at least 73 Issues since 2004 55 ). 2. Agriculture Atlas of Zimbabwe. 3. Various crop assessment studies. MLWG 1. Contract Farming in Zimbabwe. 2. Maize pricing and marketing study. 3. Zimbabwe Agricultural Development Trust (ZADT). 4. Website ( http://www.mlwg.co.zw ) LWG 1. Livestock Study 2. National Livestock Handbook. 3. Livestock Working Group Journal. 4. Website (forthcoming). 5. LWG Journals (e.g. March 2010 covering 2008-2009 presentations). GWG 1. Healthy Harvest. SWG - CA Task Force 1. Guide to CA in Zimbabwe. 2. CA Upscaling Strategy (investment plan). 3. Training Module for use in Agricultural Colleges.

The generation of outputs has not always been guided by pursuit of formally adopted work plans drawn in line with specific sector strategies. As such, there is a potential that sub-WG have ‘followed passions and funding priorities’ rather than responding to demands arising from independent and rigorous analyses. This is likely to be exacerbated by the absence of a finalized sector policy and a context of weak public institutions. For example, the participatory process by which the Agricultural Research Council previously generated and identified issues for research 56 does not appear to have informed current processes for prioritizing research by the coordination mechanism. This is not to suggest that previous institutional structures should directly and solely influence the agenda but to highlight disconnections and a significant divide between coordination mechanisms and the ambitions of statutory bodies including the MOAMID that seem to have evolved over the years. Other weaknesses regarding outputs of the coordination mechanisms include:

• Absence of work plans, priorities and expected deliverables for most of sub-WGs. • Limited Government ownership of products i.e. lack of “authority” • Lack of systematic sharing of ACWG products as evidence-based outputs • Ad hoc nature of partner roles and contributions rather than a defined set of responsibilities, reliable contributions and consistent accountability for results. • Research function/capacity not systematically present at the ACWG or its sub-groups and hence quality of research variable and not always independent. • Some duplication and poor coordination with PRP/GRM meetings (ACWG/sub WGs). While PRP enjoys a pooled funding mechanism which brings about greater accountability, partners perceive potential duplication of efforts, are frequently expected to be at simultaneously scheduled meetings.

55 These include 11 in 2004, 12 in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009, 9 in 2008 and 5 through May 2010.

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• A lost opportunity to raise, discuss and reflect on challenges and opportunities between food aid and agriculture as well as nutrition and agriculture. Outcomes Coordination outcomes are measured in relation to influencing policy and practice, building capacities, generating actual results and enabling funding outcomes. In the context of agriculture contribution to food security is also an important determinant of the effectiveness or success of coordination. The existing coordination mechanisms including the ACWG and sub-WG have achieved more than simply ‘holding the fort’ and in many instances, have raised the standards of coordination in Zimbabwe. In addition to facilitating a relatively more collaborative relationship connecting the state to non-state actors, in an environment of significant distrust for at least half a decade, the FAO-led coordination mechanisms have generated the following outcomes:

• Government recognition of the ACWG’s contribution to national planning and coordination of emergency responses in agriculture. • Influencing policy in ‘safe technical areas’ like conservation agriculture (CA), contract farming, pricing policies and institutional Box 3: Key Success Factors for arrangements for produce marketing. effective sub-Working Group Examples in terms of markets include 1. Explicit contribution to sector policy, MLWG ideas around the Warehouse Receipt goal, strategy, workplan (clear System (WRS), resuscitation of the priorities) and performance monitoring Commodity Exchange, appraising contracts 2. Strong leadership (technical, (for contract farming developed by private facilitation, companies) and registering contractors by the practical)…knowledgeable individual Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). and institutional champions (MLWG, • Coordination mechanisms have also created LWG, CA Task Force). a forum for strengthening relationships and 3. Active participation and ownership by Government and other key actors. understanding between different 4. An investment case (funding) stakeholders, in particular between the 5. Clear “issues” of coordination private sector and farmers’ unions, the UN defined and roles/responsibilities of and some local NGOs with the net effect of actors defined. improving inter-actor collaboration and 6. Research to produce and utilize mutual understanding. evidence-based guidelines, piloting • Improvements in programming quality and and scaling-up. 7. Regularity of activities including funding options for some NGOs (local and meetings. international) through use of new knowledge shared and accessed at the meetings and from guidelines available on the ACWG website. • Adoption of conservation agriculture (CA) curricula at all agricultural colleges since January 2010.

In terms of outcomes in relation to policy, capacity building, sector funding and improvements to food security, the coordination mechanisms exhibited some weaknesses. The main ones include the following:

• There is a lack of a clear link between the ACWG and the sub-WG with policy formulation or with a strategic dialogue forum, particularly in the absence of participation by senior executives

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in the Ministry responsible for agriculture. This has created a gap in terms of taking policy issues from and to the ACWG or its sub-groups into the Ministry. In the absence of FAO taking a critical role in leadership of such a type of forum, there is a risk that multiple parallel fora will be created. • The ACWG and its sub-groups lacked a clear relation with a solid network of national research capacity taking and bringing issues from and to its fora. Low collaboration with a nationally owned independent, research body or ‘ think tank’ with a defined role denies the coordination mechanism a sounding board from which Government could draw policy-relevant evidence. • The Agriculture Atlas of Zimbabwe is a relatively useful tool for ACWG and sub-group participants. However, it is not combined with an analysis of the needs with current activities by Province, District and Ward, which would be a basis for ‘coordinating’ activities. Furthermore, given the centralized nature of preparing the Atlas (and in some cases, a poor contribution of partners), the Atlas is not comprehensive and quickly becomes outdated and does not reflect realities on the ground. This highlights the fact that the Atlas is more of a historical record of the spatial distribution of activities and does not explicitly address and influence ‘ who and what interventions go where next’ . • Nutritional outcomes of how agricultural interventions are contributing to improved dietary diversity has not been explicitly built into the ACWG and its sub-WGs. This is a lost opportunity. • Despite a general acknowledgement that most important local institutions and structures lack capacity, the coordination mechanisms have surprisingly not emphasized capacity development enough as a core strategy to pursue across sub-WGs and within the ACWG. Efforts to strengthen Government and national NGOs have been not been prioritized in the recent past – in part due to lack of resource partner interest in funding such initiatives. In fact, there is a risk that current coordination and funding mechanisms have further undermined local NGOs rather than creating new opportunities.

3.3 Strategic Gaps and Opportunities Building on sections 2 and 3, section 4 identifies strategic gaps in the coordination of the agricultural sector. It also identifies opportunities for FAO to play a more effective role. A number of opportunities for capacity development are also identified. This analysis forms the basis for a revised coordination structure that is proposed in section 5. The identification of gaps flows from our analysis of the current structure in light of the emerging national stakeholder expectations in relation to policy direction in the sector.

3.3.1 The focus/vision or goal or strategies While many partners broadly recognized “ improved food security as the general goal ” this is neither explicit nor necessarily documented. Many key informants expressed a concern that “ there was a lack of clarity on the overall direction of the ACWG ”. Although the Terms of Reference of the ACWG describe a plausible set of actions and expected outcomes, they are not aligned towards a common policy vision. This gap is due in part to the lack of an overarching agriculture sector policy framework. Nevertheless this report tries to provide insights into what the vision and strategies might be.

The “pursuit of a common objective or vision” is an integral component of coordination as it creates a platform for greater accountability and provides an overall purpose to coordination. In most situations, this overall goal is provided through a Government-led policy document that would provide an over-arching framework against which to develop a strategy or plan of action. Despite

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commendable efforts to date by Government, FAO and other partners to prepare such a policy, there is no finalized Sector Policy document 57 that can provide this overall framework and vision.

As the country moves towards recovery and development, there are a number of opportunities that present themselves to fill this gap. Under the leadership of MOAMID, with FAO support and research input, the 2007 draft of the Agricultural Sector Policy could be revisited, revised and strengthened. Furthermore, the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), an initiative led by NEPAD also presents an opportunity to finalize the policy thrust. Significant progress has already been achieved towards Zimbabwe adopting the CAADP Compact. While guided by a set of agreed principles and targets, CAADP reinforces national efforts and policies. As a framework, CAADP will help align the agriculture sector policy with the MDG Goals, specifically MDG 1 58 .

Following progress in these two initiatives, it would then be possible, to align coordination structures against these policy frameworks which would establish national goals towards which partners contribute. These two policy documents will also inform (and potentially change) the organization of the different Sub-Working Groups to aligned them against a development framework rather than emergency interventions. Similarly, sub-sector strategies like the one developed for Conservation Agriculture, present opportunities to convene partners around a common sector-specific objective.

3.3.2 Accountability While FAO and many partners demonstrate a commendable sense of commitment and enthusiasm for coordination in the agriculture sector, overall there is a lack of accountability of the coordination system and structure. This can be identified on a number of levels. First, given the lack of a vision or goal, this has led to a limited understanding of the specific roles and responsibilities of the different actors. There is also limited analysis of the issues (usually pertaining to strategies) around which partners are coordinated. For instance, the review team learnt, from both Government and non-Government key informants, that there is a lack of accountability by and to Government within the ACWG and individual Sub-WGs, in terms of leadership, authority to talk on issues and to follow-up. Second and related to the above, there is no system to track the contributions of the ACWG and its sub-WG towards a defined set of results or targets and to monitor whether or not coordination is leading to better utilization of resources. Third, there is no consistent and systematic approach to track the performance of each of the ACWG or sub-WGs i.e. against defined criteria and sub-WG work plans. Finally, coordination structures are relatively invisible at District and Provincial levels.

To be effective, the coordination system must be steered towards defined targets or results. A coordination structure must be accountable on a number of levels and capacities developed in accordance with relevant accountability parameters. Results or targets should be set in relation to a vision or shared goal. FAO can design a ‘light’ monitoring system that requires reporting every 6 months and/or on an annual basis by partners 59 . This monitoring system should be aligned with a national accountability framework. Accountability (and ownership) could also be strengthened if it

57 The current Agriculture Sector Policy is still in draft form since 2008. 58 Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger. 59 It may be worthwhile for FAO to review results reporting in the PRP. Though too cumbersome, given that it is a pooled funding system, there may be scope for aligning relevant national monitoring systems.

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was made clearer how each sub-WGs aligned and contributed towards a shared goal. This will also be enhanced if each sub-WG had fewer and more reliable partners with defined responsibilities.

In a workshop type forum, FAO may consider facilitating (with appropriate support) participatory discussions among partners to ensure that there is a more consistent understanding among partners of the definition, purpose and roles of coordination. Furthermore, FAO should consider defining a simple system to independently track the performance of each sub-WG based on agreed criteria and well defined outputs. For example, for the ACWG meeting, there is scope for having one slide summarizing action points and follow-up actions taken. Finally, decentralizing coordination to Districts and Provinces will also result in greater localized accountability for results (see below).

3.3.3 Strategic level forum Key informants acknowledged that the ACWG and its sub-WGs were not the appropriate fora for resolving and addressing strategic and policy issues. As such, it is critical that a forum capable of performing these functions is created as part of the overall coordination structure. A number of partners observed that the ACWG and sub-WGs identified policy or strategic challenges but there was no mechanism for systematically addressing these. Neither does the ACWG get feedback on a number of strategic questions nor is it adequately connected with/to other policy-analytical fora e.g. the World-Bank and other donor groups. Recently there has been some discussion on the establishment of an EU-led strategic dialogue forum. To date, it is not clear how each of these have fed into or linked up with the ACWG. Furthermore, while FAO has made efforts in the recent past to lead a strategic dialogue, it is largely perceived by partners as insufficiently engaged at policy level.

There is scope for establishing a single strategic dialogue forum 60 . The strategic dialogue forum should be small with senior-level representation and it should be led by Government with strategic- level support and guidance from FAO. Representation for the forum will be from Government, donors, NGOs, civil society (Farmers Unions), private sector and academia. One of its main outcomes could include the development and oversight of an agricultural policy and strategy. Through the work of the sector-specific sub-WGs it could also endorse or support the production of sector-specific Policy Briefs. The forum will be informed by issues raised at the ACWG (policy informed by practice) and it should systematically feedback to the ACWG. The strategic policy fora should be supported by a nationally recognized (independent) research body which would allow policy formulation to be evidence-based and facilitate high-quality operational research to be undertaken to document evidence of best practice (see below).

3.3.4 Collaborative and independent research function Currently, a number of institutions and agencies are undertaking research. Notable and locally- based ones include the MDTF-A, individual NGOs, the African Institute of Agrarian Studies, ICRISAT, CYMMT and other independent researchers within and outside Universities. Additionally, there are other international researchers undertaking relevant work on agricultural issues in Zimbabwe. Much of this research is of good quality and has policy relevance. However, there is no recognized facility that connects all these researches and researchers to systematically avail it to policy-makers, technical and implementing organizations. Additionally some public research institutions like the ARC lack adequate resources to fulfill their mandates. There is thus a

60 It may be necessary that two strategic level fora exist, one that is Government-led and another donor-led with active collaboration/sharing between the two on one hand and with ACWG on the other.

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risk that research is being undertaken with limited capacity and is generally driven by funding priorities. Research that is undertaken, for example by the MDTF – A is not necessarily perceived as having any direct impact on the work of the ACWG. The review thus made an impression that sector research is ad hoc, not sufficiently strategic, always independent and is disconnected from policy-making and implementation.

There is potential to strengthen a more formal research function in agriculture. This should be collaborative in nature, with participation from universities, national research bodies, academia and independent consultants. It should aim to reliably provide a service to both strategic policy decision-makers as well as support more practical operational research that could for example, support evidence-based scaling up of small-scale programs 61 . FAO should demonstrate greater leadership in robust research and invest in senior-level research capacity to support this. The collaborative research function should also be structured to draw on senior independent research capacity, retain independence and ensure quality research. Where international researchers are commissioned this should be, wherever possible, undertaken in close partnership with national research institutes, to facilitate national ownership, build capacity and ensure that research is relevant.

3.3.5 Strengthening the role of National NGOs Notwithstanding the achievements that have linked national NGOs to donor funding for emergency programming, national NGOs are increasingly taking on a diminished and secondary role within the coordination structure. National NGOs are increasingly facing constraints to be equal partners, are contracted as ‘junior implementing partners. Furthermore, national NGOs face challenges such as loss of expert staff to higher-paying international organizations. There is an increasing risk of a “slow, even rapid, strangling of local organizations in Zimbabwe ”. The coordination structure has not demonstrated an explicit strategy or efforts to protect and promote national NGOs as a key resource and capacity within the overall structure. Development management particularly the structuring of resource flows under emergency programming and its implications on national organizations and structures, has not been recognized. National NGOs need to be recognized as valuable, sustainable, resources and capacities. There is significant opportunity for the Agriculture sector co-ordination to more explicitly recognize the important role of national NGOs and ensure that their capacities are strengthened and supported.

4. Survey on FAO’s effectiveness in Coordination

4.1 Methodology The survey on “FAO’s effectiveness in coordinating the emergency and recovery response in Zimbabwe” was one of the pre-mission studies undertaken in the framework of the Zimbabwe Country Evaluation. It was based on a short questionnaire on FAO’s work in coordination that was sent to all the participants of the ACWG and related sub-working groups (see annex 7) 62 .

The questionnaire was designed on the basis of a number of documents defining FAO’s role in

61 This research function could support NGOs to conduct operational research for learning, to ensure that it was sufficiently independent and robust. 62 The questionnaire was sent to 855 email addresses. For 79 addresses, a delivery failure message was received. Since some of the participants of the WGs have more than one email address, it is not possible to know the exact number of people reached by the survey.

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coordination. In particular, it drew on FAO’s project documents describing strategic objectives and expected results of coordination interventions in the country and on the summary note on FAO Coordination role in Zimbabwe. In addition, another key document for the preparation of the questionnaire was FAO “Cluster Coordination Guidance 2010”. This guidance aims at providing staff working at country level in humanitarian and early recovery operations with “i) essential information on the purpose and functioning of clusters, and the role and responsibilities of FAO within a cluster system, and ii) practical guidance on what FAO staff need to do to fulfill those responsibilities”. In particular, the guide defines the list of tasks of a cluster coordinator. Relevant points of this list have been adapted to the Zimbabwe specific context and were included in the questionnaire.

As already mentioned, the questionnaire should be considered a complementary short follow up survey of the “ Review of the ACWG and sub-working groups in Zimbabwe” (Kudzai Chatiza and Annalies Borrel 2010), presented in section 3, covering a larger group of stakeholders and aiming at assessing more quantitatively FAO’s performance in supporting sectoral coordination.

4.2 Results Out of 125 participants that responded to the questionnaire, 17 have not attended any meeting during the last 6 months and 4 did not provide this information and therefore they have been excluded from the analysis (see annex 6 for the list of organizations). The table below reports the number of respondents included by type of organization 63 .

Type of Organization Academic/Research 9 Donor 7 Government 9 INGO 21 National NGO 23 Private Sector 17 UN 3 Others 15 Total 104

4.2.1 Added value of participating in the ACWG and related sub-working groups Question 4 was asking what is, for the organization, the added value of participating in the ACWG and/or relative sub-working groups.

Out of 104 participants, 81 identify as main added value of participating in the coordination bodies the access to “ good quality information and data that the organization takes into account to make plans and take decisions ”, the second choice made by 70 participants is the “ provision of networking opportunities that increase the visibility of the organization” and the third one chosen by 36 participants is the “ provision of research studies and policy briefs that inform the work of the organization ”. Only five participants choose the option “ limited added value ”.

63 For 10 organizations, more than one participant responded to the questionnaire. In these cases, the responses of each participant have been included in the analysis separately.

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4.2.2 FAO’s performance in leading the ACWG and related sub-working groups Question 5 was asking what is the overall level of satisfaction of the organization on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) with respect to several aspects of the coordination work carried out by FAO as leader of the WGs. On overall, FAO’s performance was evaluated between medium and medium/high, as shown by the graph below reporting the average score for each aspect.

The table below shows that for each aspect covered by the question the majority of participants indicate a level of satisfaction medium/high with the exception of “ providing adequate reporting ” for which the level of satisfaction is high.

low medium low medium high medium high 1 3 5 2 4 Substance and scope of meeting 54 1% 1 8% 8 15% 15 55 22% 22 agendas % Facilitating discussion in meetings 38 (resolving conflicts and building 3% 3 9% 9 28% 28 38 22% 22 % consensus) Providing adequate reporting 48 1% 1 3% 3 15% 15 33% 34 49 (minutes are accurate and timely) % Ensuring quality of inputs for the 51 discussion such as presentations, 0% 0 7% 7 17% 18 53 24% 25 % information materials etc. Coordinating and promoting inter- 44 action among the ACWG and 3% 3 9% 9 25% 25 44 20% 20 % related sub-working groups Reaching out to all relevant 41 national and international 4% 4 6% 6 32% 33 42 17% 17 % stakeholders Acting as a central repository for 44 food security and agricultural 2% 2 5% 5 18% 18 44 32% 32 % information and knowledge

4.2.3 Participants’ ownership Question 6 tries to capture organizations’ capacity to participate and influence the activities of the Working Groups. Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) the ability of their organizations to “ influence the WGs agenda and raising attention on specific issues ” and to ”participate in the discussion and influencing decisions ”. These aspects were rated on average respectively 3.06 and 3.36. Finally, on average, the capacity of the organizations to “ communicate with FAO” was rated 3.90 (medium/high) .

low medium low medium high medium high 1 3 5 2 4 Influence the ACWG and/or related 32 sub-working groups’ agenda and 13% 14 18% 19 27% 28 33 10% 10 % raising attention on specific issues

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Fully participate in the discussion 38 9% 9 12% 12 29% 30 39 13% 14 and influencing decisions %

39 Communicate with FAO 3% 3 10% 10 20% 21 28% 29 40 %

4.2.4 Communication Tools (Question 7) The ACWG Journal: Out of 104 responses, 81 participants read the ACWG journal. Out of these 76 find the journal useful.

The ACWG website: Only 39 participants have accessed the ACWG website during the last 15 days. Out of these, only three respond that the website is not frequently updated, not useful and information is not easy to find. Of the 59 that did not access the website in the last 15 days, only few give their view on it. The majority of these, around 20 participants, give a positive opinion. However, 11 find the website not useful, 8 not updated and 6 not well-organized.

4.2.5 FAO’s contribution to the successful performance of the WGs Question 8 was asking to evaluate on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) efforts carried out by FAO in contributing to the successful performance of the WGs. For each dimension taken into account, the average score is above medium. The lower score, equal to 3.38, was given to the role played by FAO in “ Advocating for the design of transition strategies from emergency to development interventions ”, followed by “ Improving impact and accountability through adequate Monitoring and Evaluation of interventions ” (3.49) and “ Promoting active involvement and leadership of government authorities in the ACWG and related sub-working groups ” (3.51).

For each dimension, the majority of participants evaluate FAO’s efforts as medium/high.

low medium low medium high medium high 1 3 5 2 4 Engaging in policy dialogue with government authorities on issues of 4% 4 10% 10 26% 26 43% 43 18% 18 concern of the ACWG and related sub- working groups

Promoting active involvement and leadership of government authorities in 4% 4 13% 13 26% 26 42% 42 15% 15 the ACWG and related sub-working groups

Adding value to assessment of 0% 0 8% 8 18% 18 47% 48 27% 28 agricultural sector needs

Promoting emergency preparedness 1% 1 13% 13 26% 26 37% 37 22% 22

Facilitating coherent response planning 2% 2 12% 12 28% 28 31% 31 27% 27 to reduce gaps and duplication

Advocating for the design of transition 5% 5 14% 14 31% 31 40% 40 11% 11 strategies from emergency to

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development interventions

Improving impact and accountability through adequate Monitoring and 5% 5 9% 9 33% 33 40% 40 14% 14 Evaluation of interventions

4.2.6 Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues Question 9 was asking to evaluate on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) FAO’s support to the organizations (through guidelines, discussions, training material, presentations, etc.) for mainstreaming in their activities HIV/AIDS concerns, gender, nutrition and environment . For each issue, FAO support was evaluated on average below the medium. The worst performance is in relation to mainstreaming of HIV/AIDS concerns (2.44) followed by gender (2.55). FAO is performing better in supporting mainstreaming of environment (2.93) and nutrition (3.00).

The majority of participants evaluate as low FAO’s support in mainstreaming HIV/AIDS , as medium FAO’s support in mainstreaming gender, between medium and medium/high FAO’s support in mainstreaming environment and as medium/high FAO’s support in mainstreaming nutrition .

low medium low medium high medium high 1 3 5 2 4 HIV/AIDS 29% 27 24% 22 26% 24 17% 16 4% 4

Nutrition 18% 17 15% 15 26% 25 32% 31 9% 9

Gender 25% 23 25% 23 26% 24 20% 19 4% 4

Environment 15% 14 22% 21 27% 26 27% 26 8% 8

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5. Conclusions and Recommendations for the Way Forward Participants identify as the main three added value of being in the coordination bodies the access to “good quality information and data that the organization takes into account to make plans and take decisions ”, “ provision of networking opportunities that increase the visibility of the organization” and “ provision of research studies and policy briefs that inform the work of the organization ”.

Responses clearly indicate that FAO’s work as coordinator of the Working Groups is well appreciated. For each dimension covered by the questionnaire, with the exception of question 9 on mainstreaming cross-cutting issues, the majority of participants evaluate FAO’s efforts as medium/high (4) and the level of satisfaction with FAO performance is on average scored between medium (3) and medium/high (4).

The main suggestions on how to improve FAO’s coordination work are “ decentralize the coordination mechanisms to regional and provincial level ” and “ enhance government’s ownership and involvement of key government officials ”.

5.1 Decentralization FAO has made some efforts to take coordination to Provincial levels by conducting similar coordination meetings every 3 months 64 and these efforts have been well received and appreciated 65 . However, it is generally perceived by many partners that FAO has not been effective in establishing and strengthening coordination mechanisms at the Provincial and District levels. Previously, coordination of agriculture was carried out through ANR Committees but these have largely become dysfunctional in many Provinces and Districts. There is a risk that NGOs, in their attempts at filling this gap may have further undermined the limited public sector (central and local government) capacity to co-ordinate at these levels.

To enable effective coordination that influences and is influenced by practice and implementation, it is critical that national structures for coordination exist and function effectively up to the District level. Informed by an analysis of capacity and potential structures at the District-level, FAO should take the lead to develop a systematic approach to gradually develop and strengthen national structures to undertake coordination meetings every 3 months. FAO could do this in partnership with NGOs who have the desire and skills to strengthen coordination undertaken by Government. Coordination at the District level should be inclusive (Government, NGOs and civil society such as Farmer Union representatives). From the outset, high quality training on coordination should be conducted at District level including all partners to ensure that there is a shared understanding of what coordination is, roles and responsibilities, and how it can lead to more effective results. Through these structures, more systematic information can be shared (both ways) between national and District levels. The Agriculture Atlas (“ Who, what, where in the agricultural sector ”) can then gradually become a document that is owned and updated at District level.

64 There was no opportunity during the review to participate in Provincial-level meetings. 65 This is based on feedback from MoAMID staff recently promoted to Head Office and NGOs whose field offices participate in provincial meetings.

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5.2 Government Ownership There is a notable lack of Government ownership and leadership of the ACWG and sub-WGs which is generally perceived “ as an FAO/NGO forum for emergencies ”. This is understandable, since it was at the request of the Government that the ACWG was in fact established. In 2004, when communication between Government and the international community was difficult and funding was largely passed through the UN and NGOs, the MOAMID requested FAO to coordinate the partners in the agricultural sector. The ACWG largely focused on emergency interventions (with the exception of Conservation Agriculture) but has also increasingly shifted towards non-emergency approaches such as vouchers instead of free inputs. More recently, Government participation and recognition of the ACWG has gradually been increasing 66 although participation remains largely at junior staff levels without authority for sharing information and decision-making. At times, Government staff (especially the more junior staff) feel blamed publicly which creates difficulty for their participation. There is a strong recognition and desire by all partners within the ACWG to have greater Government ownership and leadership. The current transition provides a window to do so.

Key informants acknowledged that government ownership and leadership of the coordination mechanisms would need to be a gradual process, building on the trust that has been established. Firstly, the merging or evolution of the coordination into a development framework (reinforced through policy) will be useful since the structure will more likely reflect Government capacity and organization (rather than emergency interventions). Secondly, FAO should make explicit efforts to advocate for the engagement of more senior MOAMID Government staff in both the ACWG and the sub-WGs - and ideally, to co-chair all meetings. Thirdly, the agenda and work-planning processes of all WGs should be prepared jointly with Government. Finally, the Government recognizes that it does not have the sufficient capacity to chair and manage the meetings. Therefore, FAO will need to build-in specific capacity on coordination and facilitation with designated staff of the MOAMID. The process of building Government capacity to take on more ownership and leadership of the ACWG should be accompanied by an improvement in mutual accountability and responsibility for results amongst sector actors. Deliberate short to medium term processes of building trust, developing communication skills and mentorship are needed.

5.3 Shifting Coordination Architecture The discussion in the previous sections highlighted operational and strategic gaps that need to be addressed. This analysis informs and leads to a proposal of a revised coordination structure. This section discusses these new coordination structures and how FAO’s role can further catalyze transitioning towards developmental processes through, inter alia , deliberately building national capacities as well as its own. This overall thrust is captured in the proposed structure ( see Figure 2).

66 Two sub-WGs, the Livestock and the CA sub-WGs, are currently co-chaired by Government.

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Figure 2: Proposed Coordination Structures

CABINETCABINET

MOAMID

Strategic Dialogue Forum

‘Think Tank’ MOAMID, FAO, Donors, Research Institutions, NGOs (Collaborative Research Centre).

Agricultural Coordination Working Group (ACWG).

AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION AND AGRICUTLURE AND AGRICULTURE SUPPORT SERVICES PRODUCTIVITY THE ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONS 1. Conservation 1. Water 1. Inputs 1. Structures/functions. Agriculture 2. Forestry 2. Extensive Services 2. Capacity 3. Education /Training 2. Livestock 3. Land management Development. 4. Markets/Trade 3. Gardens

Nutrition, Gender, HIV/AIDS

PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT COORDINATION STRUCTURES

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Figure 2 shows the different components of the revised coordination structure. Under the leadership of the MOAMID, a strategic dialogue forum would be formalized with senior level membership from government, FAO, donors, academia, private sector and NGOs. This would be informed by a collaborative research facility or “think tank”. The ACWG would inform and be informed by outputs from these two strategic level fora. The sub-WGs would fall under four different groups, two that are cross-cutting (Agriculture Support Services and Agricultural Institutions). The other two groups would be Production and Productivity and Agriculture and the Environment. Nutrition, HIV/AIDS and Gender would become integrated explicitly into each of the sub-WGs within each group. The national level coordination structure would systematically inform and be informed by the Provincial and District level coordination structures.

5.4 Capacity development opportunities During this transition period as the country moves into recovery and development, it is critical that every opportunity is taken to ensure there is national ownership and capacity. There are opportunities for strengthening national capacity in the public, civil society and private sectors in an integrated manner and guided by a sector policy. There are also specific opportunities for FAO’s own capacity to be strengthened, particularly in terms of better utilization of the policy and development capacity that exists.

Overall, FAO’s coordination efforts are considered to be commendable. Furthermore, as part of its Strategic Framework 67 2010 – 2015, FAO aims to improve linkages and the transition from emergency through rehabilitation to development. The document, prepared by the FAO Emergency and Rehabilitation Division describes FAO’s strategy to bridge emergency and development as well as aligning FAO assistance with Government priorities. It also prioritizes reinforcement of internal collaboration to enable more integrated planning between the emergency unit and the regular program. This is an important initiative already underway and will potentially contribute to strengthening FAO’s role in coordination and addressing some of the identified gaps during the transition period.

Partners do perceive a number of existing gaps within FAO which have been evident in this review process. First, FAO is not perceived as having adequate capacity for leading strategic and policy dialogue with the Government and with donors (although a track record of diligent attempts and some recent efforts to address this exist). The perception of FAO’s inadequacy in this area arises from lack opportunity to finalize the policy and relative impatience on the part of stakeholders who for years now have not had strategic dialogue opportunities with Government 68 . Second, partners expect FAO to play a greater role in supporting independent, high quality and robust research to support evidence-based policy setting. Third, that FAO has under-estimated the skills and investment required to lead effective coordination. It cannot be assumed that its entire staff has the relevant coordination skills.

There are a number of opportunities to address some of these gaps. FAO must play an equal role in technical, policy and research functions. Building on initial efforts so far, it will be necessary to merge capacity in both the regular and emergency program through a ‘transition unit’. Through

67 Zimbabwe: Transitioning Emergency into Rehabilitation and Development, Plan of Action 2010-2015 (2010), 68 Zimbabwe’s agricultural policy-making has generally been a closed one more under the pre-GNU period but continuing since. Pockets of space below Ministerial levels exist but are decidedly not deep and broad enough for meaningful engagement on policy matters beyond debate on ‘safer’ technical issues.

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this unit, FAO can draw on existing (or invest in) senior level policy and research capacity within the broader program that can serve and support the ACWG 69 . Furthermore, it is recommended that a learning program for its staff in coordination/facilitation, recovery and transition programming be undertaken.

5.5 Summary of recommendations AREA RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WHOM Operational Recommendations Process Identify issues of coordination: Through a facilitated discussion FAO with with partners, and informed by a broader framework, FAO should partners identify more clearly what the issues of coordination are. Together with more analysis, these issues should inform the agenda of the ACWG. Improve website: Access to website should be clarified and FAO website redesigned so that documents are more easily accessible. Links to sub-WG websites should be made clear. Information versus discussion . Some regular agenda items are FAO with better shared through the website allowing more time for debate partners and discussion on issues at ACWG. Accountability and follow-up: Sub-WGs should have agreed FAO with work plans (informed if possible by a sector strategy). partners ACWG should have action points which are systematically tracked. A summary of achievements for ACWG and Sub-WGs should be made and circulated every six months. Sub-WGs should be smaller, with accountable and reliable contribution by partners (defined roles and responsibilities).

Outputs Strengthen Atlas: Further develop analytical component of Atlas, FAO with including consideration of outputs, coverage, gaps, agricultural MOAMID type/zone together with partner capacity. Facilitate a process to and partners enable Atlas to be prepared and owned at District level and Provincial level Support consistently high quality reviews: Quality control of FAO reviews and assessments to ensure that best practice and guidelines are scaled up based on robust and evidence-based research and knowledge. Technical Policy Briefs: Together with MOAMID, prepare short FAO with “Technical Policy Briefs” that synthesize lessons and policy MOAMID implications. and partners Cross-cutting issues: Ensure that there is more explicit inclusion FAO of cross cutting issues reflected in discussions, outputs, including for HIV/AIDs, nutrition, gender and markets (e.g. have dedicated person as member of each sub-WG). Outcomes See below Strategic Recommendations Coordination Revise coordination structure: Revise structure to align with FAO with

69 This transition structure within FAO as well as a revised coordination structure could potentially serve as a model to inform a broader UN policy on effective transition structures and mechanisms in Zimbabwe.

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structures Government development (and policy) framework (see Figure 2). MOAMID “Think tank”: Establish inclusive and collaborative research FAO with facility engaging all national research bodies based on a defined research research agenda to strengthen evidence-based decision making and institutions policy formulation. Establish strategic dialogue forum : Support the evolution of a MOAMID single strategic level dialogue forum that is high level, inclusive with FAO and and agrees to address strategic issues. Forum must be informed by donors and inform ACWG. Strengthen coordination at Provincial and District levels: FAO and Support capacity development process that allows MOAMID to MOAMID strengthen inclusive coordination structure at Provincial and District levels. Create system for two-way information flow to national coordination structure. Government Policy thrust/vision: Provide technical support to MOAMID in FAO, Donors, leadership process to finalize Agricultural policy and ensure this (finalized partners with policy) informs ACWG’s plans and results with a clearer tracking MOAMID of progress towards results Senior MOAMID staff engagement: Lead a process of ensuring FAO with that MOAMID staff at Director level engages in ACWG activities. MOAMID MOAMID engaged in “think-tank”: MOAMID takes active FAO with role in collaborative research facility through Agricultural MOAMID Research Council and research institutions MOAMID co-chair all ACWG and sub-WGs: MOAMID FAO and should co-chair all meetings. MOAMID Agendas & work plans to be jointly planned with Government. MOAMID co-lead coordination at Provincial and District FAO and levels (see above) MOAMID with partners

Capacity Strengthen role of local NGOs: Informed by an assessment and FAO and development strategy, ACWG should explicitly create space for and strengthen partners capacity of local NGOs. Strengthen capacity of MOAMID: As part of a broader capacity FAO with development strategy, support skills of MOAMID staff in MOAMID leadership, coordination and facilitation FAO internal Strategic and research capacity. Invest in (or have access to) FAO capacity strategic and policy capacity. Skills in coordination: Invest in training and capacity FAO development for FAO staff FAO Transition Unit: Establish a ‘transition unit’ that facilitates FAO humanitarian-development linkages and supports ACWG and sub- WGs to transition towards development framework. Inter-sub-WGs collaboration: Strengthen shared understanding FAO of best practice in coordination between Sub-WGs and facilitate discussion and analysis of cross –cutting issues across Sub-WGs

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Annex 1: Review Terms of Reference – ACWG Review

1.0 Background Coordination of Agriculture relief interventions is one of the core tasks of the FAO emergency unit. Through its coordination role, FAO endeavours to consolidate, reinforce, and broaden the existing coordination in order to provide a mechanism to help ensure the most effective outcome of the overall agricultural assistance programs in the country. The coordination activities essentially aim at ensuring an acceptable degree of consistency in the various interventions and at minimizing overlap and/or gaps in the overall agricultural relief programs. Another critical component is the standardization of monitoring tools for agriculture humanitarian interventions.

The main vehicle through which coordination is administered is the Agriculture Coordination Working Group (ACWG). FAO chairs monthly meetings that serve as a central forum for discussion of emergency/recovery agricultural interventions, thematic debates, information sharing and reflection, strategic planning, etc. The ACWG is open to all stakeholders, particularly those in the agricultural sector within the humanitarian framework (NGOs, donors, AGRITEX, research institutes, private sector, UN agencies). FAO prepares an ACWG journal and maintains a web page based on the ACWG meetings. Over time, five sub working groups have been formed out of the ACWG:

Sub-working groups chaired by FAO: 1. Task Force for Conservation Agriculture 2. Livestock WG (co-chaired with Ministry of Agriculture - MoA) 3. Garden WG 4. Market Linkage WG (co-chaired with SNV) 5. Seed Houses

These WGs are small in composition and membership is restricted to technical institutions or experts (e.g. ICRISAT, ICRAF, NGOs, donors, AGRITEX, DVFS, private companies, and consultants/individuals with strong expertise in the relevant field). Please find attached TORs for each sub working groups.

2.0 Objectives and proposed structure of the ACWG review The objective of the study is to assess the effectiveness of the ACWG and its sub working groups. The evaluation team is expected to be conversant with the activities of the working groups from their time of establishment to date. Minutes, presentations and various publications of working groups will be made available to the evaluation team. Part of their evaluation will include discussions with both former and present stakeholders of the WGs. The sample of the latter must be representative of both consistent and inconsistent stakeholders. The study should investigate and explain if and how each working group has evolved to its current status and why. The team is expected to establish an independent view of the effectiveness of each WG in relation to its TORs

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and the perceived direction/future of each WG. The study team needs to attend all WG meetings between 20 September and 31 December 2010 in order to give their own independent view of the current state of affairs in each WG.

2.1 Review outputs will be measured in terms of the following: • Structure of meetings • Transparency in decision making • Participation of stakeholders • Level of attendance to meetings • Liaison with stakeholders o Feedback from consistent members o Feedback from inconsistent members o Feedback from former members that have pulled out • The WG’s life cycle from inception to date: o How the WG has evolved or maintained same style over time and why o If and how it has shifted mandate to suit changing times or meet relevant needs • The evaluation WG’s comparative advantage over other similar WG in terms of: o Relevance o Strengths o Weaknesses o Opportunities • Overall, the team must assess each working group in terms of its objectives and expected outputs and overall outcome : o Establish if each WG operates from a common work plan o Investigate if WG are up to date with their activity plans o Demonstrate that the targeted outputs have been achieved. o Investigate if WG outcomes have been achieved • Ultimately the team is expected to give comments recommendations for future operations.

3.0 Reporting • Preliminary findings of the evaluation are to be summarized in a power point presentation and presented to FAO with a week of completion 7 January 2011 • A comprehensive report, detailing the findings of the study should be submitted to FAO within 3 weeks of completing the review. 21 January 2011

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Annex 2 ACWG Terms of Reference

Purpose

The purpose of the ACWG is to provide a forum that promotes dialogue on current and emerging issues on agriculture, both in rural and urban areas so as to ensure closer coordination, collaboration and networking between partners in the humanitarian agricultural sector.

Objectives

The main functions of the working group are to:

• Provide a mechanism to identify priority areas of intervention in the agricultural sector in order to try to ensure the most vulnerable people in rural and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe are assured of receiving assistance; • Provide a mechanism for the coordination of all the emergency assistance in the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe; • Provide a mechanism to ensure efficient and effective use of resources, minimizing overlapping of assistance and over-/under-coverage; • Provide a mechanism to further develop emergency responses through sub-working groups of the ACWG that analyze specific related issues, and report back to the main ACWG; • Provide a mechanism for the monitoring and evaluation of agricultural and livestock recovery programs. • Promote a forum for presenting findings and recommendations of agricultural related studies, and discuss way forward; • Provide a platform for organizations to promote ideas, technologies and best practices that would improve the livelihoods of rural households; • Provide a forum to discuss integrated and coherent response for the various emergency interventions; • Provide a forum for advocacy towards donors and the government, and networking amongst all kinds of stakeholders; • Provide a mechanism for linking short term strategies to medium and longer term strategies; • Any other task that might be raised as relevant for the benefit of the humanitarian community.

Outcomes

• Highly coordinated activities in the assistance provided by the humanitarian community; • Information on current events disseminated; • Debate on current and emerging issues generated; • Information on improved practices documented and disseminated; • Technical information and advise disseminated; • Guidelines for gardens disseminated; • New technologies ideas for interventions promoted.

Participants

The ACWG is forum open to all players in the agricultural humanitarian community, research

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institutes, AREX and other relevant GoZ agencies and donors.

Structure

Chairing of the working group shall be by FAO. Secretariat services for the group will be provided by FAO and these services shall comprise of the following;

• Circulation of the agenda; • Minuting and keeping a record of the meetings; • Circulation of ACWG Journal and Minutes; • Uploading of presentation and documents on the www.zimrelief.info website.

FAO welcomes contributions from stakeholders on experiences, lessons learnt, findings of surveys or ideas & new technologies. As a general rule, at each ACWG meeting the agenda will include presentations on the following three main areas:

1. Current issues (response from the humanitarian community, coverage, gaps, availability of inputs, outbreak of diseases, meteorological reports, etc); 2. Results from surveys and assessments commissioned; 3. New ideas and technologies for future interventions.

Dissemination

Presentations and other relevant documents are shared through the www.zimrelief.info website (link to coordination>agricultural coordination), and the monthly ACWG Journal. Documents (assessments, studies, reviews, presentations, etc) are also available from FAO upon request.

Meetings Schedule

Meetings are held at the Celebration Centre on the last Thursday of every month. Address: 162 Swan Drive, Borrowdale, Harare. Time: 9.00 am.

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Annex 3: Review Analytical Framework

Sub -Objective Key issues Key questions

Identify agency Introduction: Agency names and Type (Gov, donor, INGO, national roles and NGO, academic/research, UN, private sector) participation in ACWG and sub- What is your agency role/relationship with the ACWG working groups. or sub- Working Groups?

Reflect on the Institutional framework, What has been (or are) the over-arching ACWG institutional policy framework, priorities and plans? i.e. what is the vision that the policies/structu leadership ACWG works/contributes towards? res/capacities which inform What policies/documents should guide the ACWG and and guide work of the sub-WGs? ACWG To what extent do the MDGs guide the work of the ACWG and the sub-WGs? Should they?

What should the primary objectives of the ACWG and sub-WGs be?

What role has the Ministry of Agriculture and Mechanization played in the ACWG and the sub- WGs?? What are its strengths and where could it improve?

What role has the FAO played in the ACWG and the sub-WGs? What are its strengths and where could it improve?

Understand Quality and structure of Is there conceptual clarity on the organization of the effectiveness of meetings ACWG and its sub WGs? the ACWG in Networking terms of Website Are the technical sub WGs that exist sufficient or are processes Information sharing others needed? Are any obsolete/functioning less well than others?

Comment on quality, organization and structure of ACWG and sub WGs (agenda, quality of presentation, chairing, level of participation, relevance of topics, feedback and summary)?

Are the minutes of meetings useful/timely?

Is there sufficient diversity of members? Who is missing?

How useful is the ‘journal’?

What networking opportunities are there?

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Is the website useful? (regularly updated, well organized, accessible, how often do you use it)

Does the ACWG provide an adequate forum for sharing information/updates from different sub-WGs?

Has the ACWG been effective in engaging Provincial and District levels? Understand Planning Does the ACWG and sub WG produce a ‘who, what, effectiveness of Inter-sectoral where?’? If so, is it useful? Has it informed program the ACWG in information sharing planning? terms of New technical Outputs knowledge What linkages have been established with other related Guidelines and best co-ordination mechanisms? (e.g. HIV/AIDS, practice nutrition). Advocacy Funding mechanisms What technical guidelines and best practice have been produced? Which have been most useful and why?

Have best practice been facilitated, applied and expanded?

Is there sufficient ownership by partners?

Has the ACWG got a clear advocacy strategy?

Is there clarity on how the ACWG influences and informs high level decision-making?

Understand Policies What policies have been developed or influenced as a effectiveness of Available funding result of the work of ACWG and the sub-WGs? the ACWG in Application of terms of guidelines Have guidelines influenced practice. If so which ones? outcomes- Improved prioritization impact Influencing decision- Has the ACWG and the sub-WGs improved funding making mechanisms/opportunities? If so, how? Measuring results Has the ACWG and the sub-WGs influenced funding allocations? Have additional resources been allocated to agriculture as a result of the work of the ACWG?

Has your agency/staff gained new technical knowledge/innovation as a result of participating in the ACWG and the sub-WGs?

Has the ACWG and the sub-WGs led to a stronger shared vision, prioritization and planning?

Is there clarity (pathways/follow-up) on how the outcomes of the ACWG and the sub-WGs influence decision-making in Government?

To date, how has the ACWG measured/assessed its effectiveness? What indicators/results should be used to ensure that the ACWG is results focused?

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Assess the Introduction/overview: From your agency’s perspective, what do you think are strengths, Strengths, weaknesses, the most important strengths, weaknesses, weaknesses, opportunities and opportunities and challenges of the ACWG? Give opportunities challenges of ACWG examples if you can. and challenges of the ACWG In general, what has been achieved? What has your and sub agency gained? In your view what else should the Working groups. ACWG do or be?

Reflect ion and Adaptability of ACWG Has the ACWG and the sub-WGs evolved to meet the analysis of Relief to transition/dev changing context? If so, how? changing Engaging, supporting context and and influencing national Has it sufficiently shifted its focus from relief to adaptability of capacities transition/development? the ACWG to changing needs Has there been sufficient engagement with national institutions (diaspora, Government, national research bodies etc)?

Should the ACWG and the sub-WGs have a greater role influencing/managing a pooled funding mechanism? What would be its added value? Reflect on Capacity development Has the work within the ACWG and the sub-WGs led opportunities for and Government role to explicit capacity development initiatives? Give sustainability examples. and capacity development Is national capacity development central in its work? Should it be?

Do the co-ordination mechanisms reflect Government priorities and co-ordination? If not what changes are needed?

What role does/should the Government have in the ACWG and the sub-WGs? Is there sufficient ownership by Government?

Develop Priority On reflection of the above, what would be your 2-3 recommendatio recommendations most important recommendations for improving the ns for the future effectiveness of the ACWG and the sub-WGs in the direction of the future ACWG

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Annex 4: Key Informants (Review)

Organizational Category Organizations Key Informants Local NGOs SAFIRE Peter Gondo CARITAS Zimbabwe Wonder Mufunda. ZFU Gwaringa.

International NGOs Concern Mark Harper. Care International Walter Sanchez. GTZ GRM/PRP Fadzai Mukonoweshuro Odreck Mukorera. UN agencies FAO-ZW Constance Oka David Mfote Tendai Mugara Douglas Magunda Mildred Mushunje Elma Sikala Jean C. Urvoy Michael Jenrich. Mrs. Matemera. Delila IOM Naison Chakatsva Sam Grundy. WFP Sam Chimwaza

Research Institutions University of Zimbabwe Prof. Mafongoya. Agricultural Research Council Dumisani Dube. Clemence Mapika. Bi/Multi-Laterals World Bank David Rohrbach. USAID Tina Dooley-Jones Jenny AusAID Michael Hunt. Dorothy Mufanechiya. EU Joost Francois DFID Public Institutions MOAMID (AGRITEX) Bernard Mache Mrs. Mumera Ms. Chikumbirike. Ms. Nhongonhema. MOAMID (Econs. & Markets) Taonashe D. Nyamwena K. Nicholas G. Private Sector Origen Corporation Rob Hoard ZFC Limited Richard Dafana Acumen Africa Consulting Stephen

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Annex 5: Key Documents Reviewed

1. Issues of the Agricultural Journal, 2004 to 2010.

2. Issue of the Livestock Working Group Journal of March 2010.

3. The Conservation Agriculture Upscaling Strategy Framework (2010 to 2015).

4. FAO’s 2010-2015 Plan of Action: Zimbabwe-Transitioning Emergency into Rehabilitation and Development.

5. Draft Zimbabwe Agriculture Policy (3 rd Draft and another).

6. MoAMID and NEPAD’s CAADP Implementation in Zimbabwe (2009): Review and Stocktaking Report on ongoing development and alignment with CAADP targets and principles.

7. ASTRG 2011-2012 Work Program.

8. FAO and GRM/PRP commissioned study: ‘Future directions for livestock production in the smallholder farming sector in Zimbabwe’.

9. World Bank study: ‘Strengthening Agricultural Extension and Advisory Systems; Procedures for Assessing, Transforming and Evaluation Extension Systems (2010).

10. Economic Livelihoods, Institutional Capacity Building and Infrastructure (LICI) Cluster Zimbabwe – Strategic Objectives, Outputs and workplan (2010)

11. MoAMID (2009) Proceedings Report of a National Agriculture Stakeholders’ Conference.

12. CA Guidelines for Zimbabwe (2009): Farming for the Future.

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Annex 6: List of Organizations Consulted (Survey)

Academic/Research Agronomy Research Institute CIAT CIMMYT ICRISAT University of Zimbabwe - Dept of Geography and Environmental Science University of Zimbabwe University of Zimbabwe Veterinary Science University of Zimbabwe, Crop Science Dept Donor French embassy GIZ German Agency for International Cooperation USAID USAID OFDA Netherlands Embassy Government Crop Breeding Institute Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services Department of Irrigation Division of Livestock Production and Development Food and Nutrition Council Meteorological Services Department Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development Seed Services* INGO Action aid International – Zimbabwe Action Contre la Faim Actionaid International Zimbabwe Africare Care Catholic Relief Services/Zimbabwe Programme CNFA Concern Worldwide COSV DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION INNOVATIONS SOUTHERN AFRICA TRUST GOAL Zimbabwe Help from Germany* Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) IRD* Mercy Corps Practical Action Shanduko: Centre for Agrarian and Environmental Studies* SNV Welthungerhilfe World Vision

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ACDI/VOCA & LEAD Trust National NGO Aquaculture Zimbabwe Conservation Farming Unit* Chengaose Fundation Trust Christian Care CLUSA Cluster Agricultural Develeopment Service COMMUNITY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TRUST Environment Africa Environmental Management Trust LEAD Trust Inkanyezi Development Trust* Municipal Development Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa Organisation of Rural Association for Progress PARTICIPATORY ECOLOGICAL LANDUSE MANAGEMENT Research for Development Trust RUZIVO TRUST SAFIRE SAT Schools and Colleges Permaculture(SCOPE) Programme SHDF-Training & Advisory Services Sustainable Agriculture Trust Union Project Conservation Agriculture Women Farmers Land and Agriculture Trust Africa Center for Holistic Management Others AICOAfrica Ltd* CIAT-TSBF Cadec* Ex Zimbabwe National Soyabean Commodity Association (ZNSCA) now with FINTRAC Fintrac Fundations for farming Goldengro GRM International NATIONAL ASS. OF DAIRY FARMERS OF ZIMBABWE River of life project Tom Barrett (Private) Union Project* ZAVSAP Zimbabwe Farmers Union Zimbabwe Women Rural Development Trust Private Sector Agriseeds - private seed company Almond Agrochemicals Aplus* Capstone Seeds Zimbabwe / South Africa

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Condaid Inv P/L KETTEX (PVT) LTD t/a FEYA-FEYA Klein Karoo Seed Marketing Mashonaland Tobacco Company National Foods Operations Limited* Northern Farming* Origen Corporation Paperhole Investments (Private) Limited PricewaterhouseCoopers Redan Mobile Transactions Sable Chemical Industries Limited Windmill ( Pvt) Ltd Watermark Rural development Consultancy* ZABG BANK ZFC Limited Zimbabwe Farmers Union UN United Nations WFP Zimbabwe

* Organizations not included because they have not participated in any WGs meetings during the last 6 months or because they did not provide information regarding the number of meeting attended.

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Annex 7: Questionnaire (Web/Email-Based Survey)

ZIMBABWE COUNTRY EVALUATION INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF FAO’S EFFECTIVENESS IN COORDINATION

1. Name of the Organization

2. Type of Organization x - Government - Donor - INGO - National NGO - Academic/Research - UN - Private Sector - Others

3. How many ACWG and/or related sub-working group meetings have you attended in the last six months?

4. What is, for your organization, the added value of participating in the ACWG and/or relative sub-working groups? Please indicate the THREE most relevant answers x It provides good quality information and data on agriculture interventions and food security that your organization takes into account to make plans and take decisions; It facilitates agreements on the use of common standards and tools among partners; It provides guidelines, codes of conduct and best practices for agricultural interventions that influence the way your organization works; It provides research studies and policy briefs that inform the work of your organization; It is a source of innovative approaches and technologies; It facilitates resource mobilization;

It provides capacity development and learning opportunities;

It provides networking opportunities that increase the visibility of your organization;

_It provides a forum where policy issues can be raised;

Limited added value.

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5. What is your overall level of satisfaction with the coordination work conducted by FAO with respect to: low medium low medium high medium high Substance and scope of meeting agendas; Facilitating discussion in meetings (resolving conflicts and building consensus); Providing adequate reporting (minutes are accurate and timely); Ensuring quality of inputs for the discussion such as presentations, information materials etc.; Coordinating and promoting inter-action among the ACWG and related sub-working groups; Reaching out to all relevant national and international stakeholders; Acting as a central repository for food security and agricultural information and knowledge.

6. How would you rate the ability of your organization to:

low medium low medium high medium high Influence the ACWG and/or related sub- working groups’ agenda and raising attention on specific issues; Fully participate in the discussion and influencing decisions; Communicate with FAO.

7. Communication tools: Yes No Do you read the ACWG journal? Is the journal useful for your organization? Have you accessed the ACWG website any time during the last month? Is the website frequently updated? Is the website useful for your organization? Is information on the website well-organized and easy to find?

8. How would you evaluate efforts carried out by FAO as leader of the coordination bodies in relation to:

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low medium low medium high medium high Engaging in policy dialogue with government authorities on issues of concern of the ACWG and related sub-working groups; Promoting active involvement and leadership of government authorities in the ACWG and related sub-working groups; Adding value to assessment of agricultural sector needs;

Promoting emergency preparedness;

Facilitating coherent response planning to reduce gaps and duplication; Advocating for the design of transition strategies from emergency to development interventions; Improving impact and accountability through adequate Monitoring and Evaluation of interventions.

9. How would you evaluate FAO’s support to your organization (through guidelines, discussions, training material, presentations, etc.) for mainstreaming in your activities the following cross-cutting issues: low medium low medium high medium high HIV/AIDS

Nutrition

Gender

Environment

10. Please give suggestions on how the coordination work of FAO could be improved

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