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PLANTER’S PARADISE: NATURE, CULTURE, AND HAWAIʻI’S PLANTATIONS

A Dissertation

Submitted to

the Temple University Graduate Board

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

Lawrence Helfgott Kessler

May 2016

Examining Committee Members:

Andrew Isenberg, Advisory Chair, Department of History Beth Bailey, University of Kansas Petra Goedde, Department of History Richard Immerman, Department of History John McNeill, External Member, Georgetown University

©

Copyright

2016

by

Lawrence Helfgott Kessler ______

All Rights Reserved

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ABSTRACT

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Hawaiian industry rose from economic insignificance to become one of the world’s most efficient and productive sugarcane plantation systems. "Planter's Paradise" traces the transnational environmental history of cane planting in Hawaiʻi, from Polynesian settlement to the early twentieth century, to explore how an export-based mono-culture plantation system eclipsed diversified farming, how cultural encounters between indigenous and Euro-American groups influenced agriculture and natural resource use, and how the politics of planting contributed to the rise of American hegemony over the islands. With research grounded in plantation records, agricultural association publications, popular media, and personal correspondence, I address sugarcane planting as a point where ideas about nature, methods of converting nature into commodities for consumption in distant markets, and nature itself influenced each other within the context of U.S. imperial expansion.

I argue that the ascendance of Hawaiʻi’s was the result of cultural encounters, economic relations, and environmental conditions at the local level, but cane planting also connected the archipelago to particular transnational networks of economic, ecological, and cultural exchange. Sugarcane planting introduced to Hawaiʻi foreign ways of relating to the natural world, a host of alien organisms, and advances in agricultural science and technology that impacted all of Hawaiian society. These introductions contributed to planters' power. By the early twentieth century, Hawaiʻi had become a planter's paradise: a society and environment transformed for the industrial cultivation of sugarcane.

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For Allison

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the result of seven years of work in the History Department at

Temple University. Andrew Isenberg, my advisor, introduced me to environmental history and helped me to see the interactions of ecology, economy, and culture in history.

Drew also gave me crucial early encouragement and support, pushing me to apply for doctoral school hardly a month into my first semester as a Masters student and nominating me for a University Fellowship. Drew’s comments on my drafts of this dissertation have made it much stronger. My dissertation committee members, Beth

Bailey, Petra Goedde, and Richard Immerman have also improved this project significantly. Beth’s attention to my writing and repeated questions of agency have helped me focus on the human actors and individual decisions that propelled this history as I veered into more abstract questions about industries, islands, nations, and peoples.

Petra gave my writing the structural push to assert my arguments more plainly and helped me investigate cultural encounters in Hawaiian history. Richard helped me think of my dissertation within the broader context of U.S. transnational history. Each of these committee members led seminars at Temple helped me to develop the ideas I put forward here. John McNeill joined my dissertation committee later; his work on environmental history in the Pacific region and plantation systems has had a significant impact on this project.

Several other faculty members, students, and groups at Temple helped me develop produce this dissertation. Bryant Simon helped me pay attention to questions about the labor involved in sugarcane planting--and took me to to present some of my work. David Watt gave me insight into the religious ideologies that influenced the

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history of sugarcane in Hawaiʻi. The students in the seminars, colloquia, and workshops at the History Department and Center for the Humanities all helped me write and refine this dissertation. The Center for the Humanities at Temple and the Department of History

Colloquium provided opportunities for me to present chapter drafts. I also received generous funding from the Center for the Humanities, the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, the College of Liberal Arts, the Graduate School, and the Global Studies

Program at Temple.

I am grateful to the many archivists and librarians who have helped me conduct research, including Barbara Dunn at the Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Library and Hawaiian Historical Society; Jodie Mattos and Stewart Dawrs at the Hamilton

Library at the University of Hawaiʻi; and Patty Lai at the Hawaiʻi State Archives. Dan

Lewis, Peter Blodgett, Brooke Black, Jenny Watts, and Bill Deverell were all exceedingly helpful during my research at the Huntington Library.

Other readers and conference participants whose comments have improved this dissertation include Elizabeth Varon, Mark Fiege, Erin Mauldin, Mart Stewart, Harriet

Ritvo, Jenny Newell, Jared Orsi, and David Igler. Brenda Frink and Mark Rodriguez at the Pacific Historical Review, Merry Ovnick at the Southern Quarterly, and

Sarah Hamilton at the World History Bulletin and the reviewers they enlisted all provided insightful comments and guidance as I prepared parts of my research for publication.

Babak Ashrafi at the Consortium for History of Science, Technology and , and

Etienne Benson, Jody Roberts, and Jeremy Vetter at the Consortium’s working group on environment and history helped me see my project in a different light and pushed me to consider new questions. I owe special thanks to Seth Archer and Gregory Rosenthal for

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their close reading, advice, and friendship. Those who hosted me during my research, including Leslie and Mitch Aiken in Pasadena, Ruby Goodall in Oakland, Howard Wiig in gave me much more than hospitality. At the University of Hawaiʻi, Kieko

Matteson, John Rosa, Noelani Arista, and Jon Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio were welcoming and helpful.

Friends and family have been truly crucial to whatever success I have achieved. I am humbled by all the love and support I have received from too many people to make an exhaustive list, and trust you know who you are. I am especially grateful for the support I received from Ann Helfgott, David Kessler, and Vivian and Alan Goldberg. Most of all, I owe everything to Allison, whose love and understanding, as well as her very close and frequent reading, made this dissertation possible. I could not have done any of this without her. On the other hand, I definitely could have done this without Ezra and

Zahava. They did not read a word of this, nor did they contribute any reasonable insights.

They did, however, make the process more interesting, more fun, and infinitely more worthwhile.

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ISLANDS HITCHED TO EVERYTHING ELSE ...... 1 The History of Hawaiian Sugar in a Transnational and Translocal Framework ...... 3 Historiography ...... 4 Dissertation Outline ...... 12 CHAPTER 2: NO PERFECT GARDEN: HAWAIIAN ENVIRONMENTS, SETTLEMENT, AND AGRICULTURE ...... 25 Hawaiian Geology, Climates, and Environment ...... 29 The Polynesian Invasion ...... 37 Western Invasions ...... 48 CHAPTER 3: SUGAR WITHOUT RUM: HAWAIʻI’S MISSIONARIES AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SUGARCANE PLANTATION SYSTEM, 1821-1850 ...... 61 Sugar and Rum ...... 68 Encouraging “Pious Merchants” ...... 82 Promoting Self-Reliance ...... 84 Toward a New Definition of Labor and Class Relations ...... 94 Plantations as a Remedy for Depopulation ...... 99 CHAPTER 4: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1850-1876 ...... 106 The Tariff and Annexationism ...... 111 Native Hawaiian Labor and Agricultural Expertise ...... 116 Foreign Labor: and Slaves ...... 126 The Torch of Science ...... 129 “Overcoming Nature by Nature” ...... 137 “King of the Sugar World” ...... 142 CHAPTER 5: REVOLUTIONS, 1876-1893 ...... 147 Irrigation ...... 152 Kānaka Maoli-Haole Cooperation ...... 155 Planter Organization and integration with Transnational Networks of Sugar ...... 173 The Costs of Entering the Global Sugar Market ...... 175 Chinese Immigration and Demographic Change ...... 177 The Bayonet Constitution ...... 180 Ewa: A Revolutionary Plantation ...... 184 Revolution ...... 187

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CHAPTER 6: BIOLOGICAL PEST CONTROL, DIVERSIFIED FARMING, AND HAWAIIAN SUGARCANE PLANTERS’ CAMPAIGN FOR ANNEXATION, 1893- 1898...... 191 Insects and Annexation ...... 193 Ideas and Innovations in Agricultural Pest Control ...... 197 Planters Unite For Annexation ...... 204 Attracting White Americans to Hawaiʻi ...... 208 Biological Control Comes to Hawaiʻi ...... 211 Annexation Achieved; Diversified Agriculture Abandoned ...... 225 CHAPTER 7: PLANTER’S PARADISE ...... 230 Victims of their Own Success ...... 232 “Burying the Hatchet”...... 237 Stopping the Leafhopper ...... 239 Cane Breeding ...... 242 Only Sugar ...... 246 Planter Paternalism ...... 249 Controlling the Environment ...... 253 From Periphery to Core ...... 255 Epilogue ...... 257 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 261 Primary Sources ...... 261 Secondary Sources ...... 270

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: ISLANDS HITCHED TO EVERYTHING ELSE

When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe. John Muir, My First Summer in the Sierra1

Before the nineteenth century, the plant called kō dotted the Hawaiian Islands in wild stands and small cultivated plots. By the early twentieth century, this same species of grass, known to the Anglophone world as sugarcane, spread across nearly 250,000 acres of the archipelago.2 Hawaiʻi’s fast ascent to the ranks of the world’s top sugar producers was almost unparalleled. The rise of sugarcane was also far from a natural occurrence. Rather, it was the result of culturally specific ways of seeing the natural world and the place of people therein; of tactical efforts of individuals to gain political and economic power, in both domestic and international contexts; and of key innovations in agriculture, science, and technology.

This dissertation tells the story of how sugarcane came to take such a prominent role in Hawaiian history. It examines the rise of sugarcane cultivation in Hawaiʻi, the environmental changes that accompanied it and the consequences of those changes for the islands and their human inhabitants. The rise of sugarcane planting was a political as well as an ecological process. To extend their control over the Hawaiian environment, planters wrested control of the land from Kānaka Maoli () and thus

1 John Muir, My First Summer in the Sierra (: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 211.

2 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977), 360.

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opened the way for the absorption of Hawaiʻi into the American empire. Planters’ resulting enhanced political position allowed them to further extend their control over the

Hawaiian environment.

It may seem as though the rise of sugarcane planting in Hawaiʻi was the inevitable, or at least logical, result of climatic and economic conditions: year-round warm temperatures, abundant sunshine, and an adequate water supply made cane planting possible; international demand made sugar production profitable. In this view, it would seem only natural that people in Hawaiʻi planted cane. Little was natural, nevertheless, about the rise of the Hawaiian sugar industry. A web of interactive cultural, economic, and environmental factors gave rise to what I call the Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system. As the term “plantation system” suggests, disparate things formed a complex whole in which interactions produce unanticipated outcomes.3

The plantation system is a system because it orders life and society around it. The sociologist Edgar Thompson described the plantation as a “settlement institution”— something that cannot exist apart from certain territorial and ecological requirements— which “accommodates and settles people of diverse backgrounds on the land.”4 As in a or manor, the land is a working partner in a plantation, giving the plantation influence over patterns of social, economic, and, not least of all, political interaction.

Where and how communities form and types of opportunities available for education and

3 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

4 Edgar T. Thompson, “The Plantation as a Social System,” in Plantation Systems of the New World: Papers and Discussion Summaries of the Seminar Held in San Juan, Social Science Monographs VII (, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1959), 27.

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commerce, for example, depend upon the way land is enlisted into the plantation enterprise. Historically contingent ways of understanding the environment and land use, government policies toward international trade and domestic production, and unanticipated environmental changes operated together to create this system.

The Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system eventually pervaded Hawaiʻi. By the end of the nineteenth century, it wed fields to factories and laboratories, informed religious and political ideology, and touched Hawaiian far beyond plantations themselves, from mountaintop to coastal reefs. As with other plantation systems throughout the world, the Hawaiian plantation system became hegemonic in the efforts of its creators to achieve control over land, labor, and inherently dynamic economic and environmental conditions.5

The History of Hawaiian Sugar in a Transnational and Translocal Framework

Although the rise of the plantation system was the result of actions and events located in Hawaiʻi, and the plantation system caused localized changes in the islands, the environmental history of the Hawaiian sugar industry stretches far beyond Hawaiʻi’s shores. Indeed, the history of the Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system is rooted in encounters that connected one of the most remote and isolated archipelagos in the world to networks of cultural, economic, and environmental exchange. The incursion of foreign ideas, economic forces, technologies, and plant and animal species remade Hawaiʻi, yet

Hawaiians were not passive recipients of foreign invasions. They adopted and adapted

5 For a global perspective on plantation systems as forces working toward stability in land, labor, economic, and environmental conditions, see Frank Uekötter, ed., Comparing Apples, Oranges, and : Environmental Histories of the Global Plantation (New York: Campus Verlag, 2014). 3

foreign elements, and later were active importers of others, as they negotiated their global position. The history of sugarcane in Hawaiʻi is thus an integral part of the history of how

Hawaiʻi became hitched to the rest of the world.

Just as sugarcane touched many aspects of Hawaiʻi’s environment and society, so too does this dissertation engage many disparate historiographies: that of Hawaiian history, environmental history, the history of Hawaiʻi-U.S. relations, the history of the global sugar industry; and the histories of agriculture and agricultural science and technology. The goal of situating this project in conversation with these subfields is to better understand two related questions: how did plantation agriculture come to dominate

Hawaiʻi’s economy and environment, and how did plantation agriculture influence the rise of American hegemony over Hawaiʻi?

Historiography

Through the middle of the twentieth century, the historian Ralph Kuykendall dominated the field of Hawaiian history. His magisterial The , published in three volumes between 1938 and 1967, remains a valuable source for scholars interested in Hawaiian political and economic history. The historians Gavan

Daws and Merze Tate likewise produced in the late 1960s informative histories of

Hawaiʻi and the that primarily focused on policy-making elites. Social and labor historians later addressed the history of Asian immigration to Hawaiʻi and conditions these immigrants faced as they worked on Hawaiʻi’s plantations. The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen a rise in scholarly work examining

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Native Hawaiian history, with particular emphasis on makaʻāinana, or native non-elites.

Jonathan Osorio, Gary Okihiro, Noenoe Silva, and Tom Coffman have all produced work ascribing greater agency to these Hawaiians, whose voices were often neglected in earlier works. This recent scholarship on Hawaiian history told a valuable story of resistance and adaptation on the part of Native Hawaiians, and collectively it has dispelled old notions that Hawaiians welcomed U.S. annexation and did little to oppose their loss of political sovereignty.6

These recent works rightly emphasized the contingency of the political turmoil of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in which many of the Hawaiian haole (literally,

“foreigner”; later, “white”) community attacked Hawaiian sovereignty and ultimately facilitated annexation to the United States. These works also demonstrated that

Hawaiians contested the rise of haole power. While this development offered a crucial corrective to the histories that silenced native voices as they celebrated the spread of

American democracy, it has also obscured the long processes operating in Hawaiian history. In Hawaiʻi, the people who overthrew the monarchy were in the position to do so because they had accumulated power and capital over the course of the previous half-

6 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 3 vols. (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1938, 1953, 1967); Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Merze Tate, Hawaiʻi: Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968). For ethnicity and labor histories of the sugarcane industry in Hawaiʻi see Clarence E. Glick, Sojourners and Settlers: Chinese Migrants in Hawaii (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980); Edward D. Beechert, Working in Hawaii: A Labor History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Ronald T. Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaiʻi, 1835-1920 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1983); and Gary Y. Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaiʻi, 1865-1945 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991). Jonathan K. Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2002); Gary Y. Okihiro, Island World: A History of Hawaiʻi and the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Noenoe K. Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Tom Coffman, Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawaiʻi Revised edition (Kihei, Hawaiʻi: Koa Books, 2009).

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century. The means by which they gained power and capital—cooperation with Hawaiian elite and the formation of a sugarcane plantation system—must be examined in order to understand the 1893 revolution and annexation.

The methods of environmental history offer the opportunity for such a contextualization. The drastic ecological changes that followed the islands’ modern encounter with the outside world as well as the reliance of Hawaiʻi’s economy on its natural resources point to the significance of environmental agents in Hawaiian history.

Additionally, Hawaiʻi’s geographic isolation and the rich documentary record regarding the introduction of foreign species to Hawaiʻi render the islands a compelling subject of study for environmental historians. Environmental history and Hawaiʻi seem like a particularly good match, yet environmental historians have largely ignored the subject.

The historian and scholar of American Studies David Stannard, the marine biologist John

Culliney, and the anthropologist Carol MacLennan have written histories of Hawaiʻi that use some environmental history methods, but they leave much work still to be done.7

Carol MacLennan’s work is particularly significant in the application of environmental history to the history of the Hawaiian sugar industry, and many of the same subjects that she focused on are addressed in this dissertation. MacLennan’s work, however, pays greater attention to the local in Hawaiʻi and the impact that it had on the

7 David E. Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawaiʻi on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1989); John L. Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea: The Fate of Nature in Hawaiʻi Revised Edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2006); Carol A. MacLennan, Soveriegn Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014). See also, Alfred Crosby, “Hawaiian Depopulation as a Model for the Amerindian Experience,” in Terence Ranger and Paul Slack, eds., Epidemics and Ideas: Essays on the Historical Perception of Pestilence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 175-202.

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islands’ environments than it does to the processes of exchange, the push toward stability, and the hybridity of plantation environments that is presented here. This dissertation addresses this gap in environmental historiography, and uses environmental history methodology to examine how haole sugar interests came to consolidate power and capital in Hawaiʻi.

Environmental history includes a variety of methods and foci, but at its core it posits that people’s surroundings matter to history. Environmental conditions influence human actions and are in turn influenced by those actions. The question of how to find a balance between environmental and human causes of historical change has been an ongoing preoccupation of environmental historians. Early works of environmental history, correcting the wide-scale neglect of environmental actors by historians, often tended toward ascribing causal agency to environmental actors alone. The influential environmental historian Alfred Crosby, for example, presented the environmentally determinist view that European conquest of the New World depended upon factors beyond human control or intention.8 More recent environmental history has grown more nuanced, however. Scholars acknowledge that people and the nonhuman world are in constant interaction, creating hybrid landscapes and histories in which human actions on and in their environments, environmental conditions, and ideas about nature are

8 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of , 900-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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intertwined. Even extreme cases of environmental agency—such as epidemics and droughts—operate alongside human economies and cultures to propel history.9

This dissertation answers the environmental historian Donald Worster’s call for an ecological approach to the history of food production, with particular attention to the influence of capitalist economies on land use. Worster’s assertion that the specialized production of food for gain in capitalist markets has fundamentally reorganized the way people interact with the environment may be tested by studying

Hawaiʻi’s sugar plantations.10 However, what Worster calls capitalist agroecology cannot suffice as a tool for analyzing history; it considers human actions almost exclusively in terms of the market.11 By contrast, as the environmental historian Arthur McEvoy argues, ecology, production, and cognition are mutually constitutive forces of historical change.

McEvoy’s insight illuminates how sugarcane plantations, Hawaiian and haole cultures, and the environment were inter-embedded agents of change. It constitutes the analytical foundation for this dissertation.12

9 Paul S. Sutter, “The World with Us: The State of American Environmental History,” Journal of American History 100, no. 1 (June 2013): 94-119. See also, Richard White, “From Wilderness to Hybrid Landscapes: The Cultural Turn in Environmental History,” Historian 66 (Fall 2004): 557-64; Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

10 Donald Worster, “Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History,” Journal of American History 76, no. 4 (March, 1990): 1087-1106.

11 William Cronon and Richard White raised this objection to Worster’s paradigm in the same Journal of American History roundtable. William Cronon, “Placing Nature in History,” Journal of American History 76, no. 4 (March 1990): 1122-1131; Richard White, “Environmental History, Ecology, and Meaning,” Journal of American History 76 (March 1990): 1111-1116.

12 Arthur F. McEvoy, “Toward an Interactive Theory of Nature and Culture: Ecology, Production, and Cognition in the California Fishing Industry,” Environmental Review 11, no. 4 (Winter, 1987): 289- 305. 8

Such a focus on ecology, economy, and culture requires an examination of the transnational networks formed by sugar plantations. plantation agriculture rests on a Western cultural attitude toward land ownership and use, brought to Hawaiʻi by explorers, missionaries, whalers, traders, and entrepreneurs. Additionally, the market and financing for Hawaiian sugar came from the United States. Invasions of foreign ideas and capital were just as significant a source of environmental change in Hawaiʻi as were invasions of alien biotas. These invasions helped tie Hawaiʻi to the United States economically and culturally, and ultimately contributed to the islands’ annexation.

Haole planters were not simple agents of United States imperialism, however. In the 1830s, when the first plantations were founded, U.S. power was not yet established on the Pacific coast of North America, let alone on an archipelago over two thousand miles away from California’s shores. Great Britain and France seemed more eager and more capable than the United States to assert control over the Hawaiian Kingdom. Much of the scholarship on the United States and Hawaiʻi operates from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy makers and American imperialist culture during the second half of the nineteenth century, when U.S. power in the Pacific was on the rise. But the presence of

American-identified planters in Hawaʻi predates any significant presence of the U.S. nation-state. American haole in Hawaiʻi may have been cultural imperialists, but it must not be assumed that the early planters had an interest in extending U.S. sovereignty to

Hawaiʻi.13

13 For interpretations of Hawaiian history that focus on empire, see Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Thomas J. Osborne, “Empire Can Wait”: American Opposition of Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1981); Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture 9

Not only was the influence of the United States in Hawaiʻi weak at the inception of Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry, the United States was hardly the capitalist power that it would later become. This dissertation focuses on sugar interests in Hawaiʻi, the networks they developed, and the markets they built. To understand the growth of the Hawaiian sugar industry, one must look to local actions and conditions in addition to global markets. Arif Dirlik’s notion of translocalism, which incorporates the operation of the capitalist world-system with place-specific networks of culture and politics, provides a useful framework for understanding how sugar planters in Hawaiʻi thought and operated.14 Cultural ties to New , business ties to , and political connections to Washington, D.C., for example, as well as planters’ relationships with

Hawaiian authority and access to Hawaiian resources all played a part in the planters’ world-views. These planters were not simply entering a well-established market dominated by the United States; they were agents in forming that market.

The Hawaiian sugar market may have been a novelty in some important ways, but the global sugar trade was well established by the nineteenth century. Scholars have examined in great depth the history of sugar and sugarcane plantations in the , labeling the seventeenth-century changes to Atlantic sugar islands underwent the “sugar revolution.” The sugar revolution is a broad term with no universally accepted definition,

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). Stuart Banner applies the model of settler colonialism to the Pacific. Stuart Banner, Possessing the Pacific: Land, Settlers, and Indigenous People from to (Cambridge, MA, 2007).

14Arif Dirlik, “Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies),” Journal of World History 16, no. 4 (December, 2005): 391-410. On translocalism in Pacific history, see also Matt K. Matsuda, Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. 5-6.

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but at its core it posits that sugarcane precipitated economic, demographic, social, and political change, and catalyzed modernity in the places it was cultivated on large plantations. Historians have applied the theory that sugarcane was in some ways determinative almost exclusively to the Atlantic world.15 Other scholars have focused on sugar production in , and have produced particularly insightful work on cultural encounters related to land use, the development of an economy dependent upon export agriculture, and the use of technology.16 This dissertation extends the idea of the sugar revolution to nineteenth-century Hawaiʻi.

Finally, historians have recognized that the circulation of agricultural science and technology was crucial to the development of sugar-producing regions. Science and technology were a medium for negotiation between cores and peripheries and connected different plantation systems.17 This dissertation adds the Hawaiian case to the historiography of sugarcane planting, and uses the broader historiography of sugarcane to

15 Classic work on sugarcane and the Atlantic world includes Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), Sidney W. Mintz, and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), and J. H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For an in-depth appraisal of the idea of “sugar revolution,” see B. W. Higman, “The Sugar Revolution,” Economic History Review 53, no. 2 (2000): 213-236.

16 John A. Larkin, Sugar and the Origins of Modern Philippine Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Sucheta Mazumdar, Sugar and Society in China: Peasants, Technology, and the World Market (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); G. Roger Knight, Commodities and Colonialism.: The Story of Big Sugar in Colonial , 1880-1942 (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2013); G. Roger Knight, Sugar, Steam and Steel: The Industrial Project in Colonial Java, 1830-1885 (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2014).

17 Richard A. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Stuart McCook, States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940 (Austin: University of Press, 2002).

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contextualize the Hawaiian case. Questions of relations between both producer and consumer societies and geographically separated producer societies help position this dissertation in the broader context of commodity exchange and agricultural capitalism.

Dissertation Outline

Chapter 2: No “Perfect Garden”: Hawaiian Environments, Settlement, and

Agriculture

This chapter examines the long pre-contact history of sugarcane in Hawaiʻi and early American impressions of Hawaiian agriculture and the Hawaiian environment.

Whereas the sugar islands of the Atlantic World only first saw acquired sugarcane after the voyages of Christopher Columbus, sugarcane’s roots in Hawaiʻi are as deep as those of the archipelago’s first human inhabitants—they arrived together sometime around

1000 CE. Cane was one piece in a complex of ecological imports to the islands. The first settlers brought what the historian Alfred Crosby called a portmanteau biota: pigs, dogs, taro (kalo in Hawaiian) bananas, and other foodstuffs in addition to sugarcane.

Inadvertent imports were also members of this portmanteau biota: fleas, rats, lice, possibly some diseases. Third, these settlers imported the ideas and attitudes regarding the environment that they developed in their society of origin. The chapter explores what the original Hawaiian settlers found and what they brought to the islands.

The overall climate of Hawaiʻi was familiar to the Polynesian migrants, sharing similar characteristics such as mean annual temperature and sunshine with other

Polynesian islands. The plants that the settlers brought were easily adapted to Hawaiʻi.

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The animals they brought also found hospitable conditions in Hawaiʻi. The imported pigs and dogs—small Asian breeds—remained closely tied to human settlements and did not experience large population irruptions or go feral on the islands. Sugarcane was a small but significant part of Hawaiian subsistence. Taro was the staple crop; pigs, dogs, and fish were all used as protein; yet sugarcane served many functions. It was both a and a sweetener of other foods, an ingredient in traditional , and an ingredient in animal feed, building materials, and dyes.

Native Hawaiians developed extensive irrigation and land reclamation projects in order to meet their agricultural needs. They dammed and diverted mountain streams in order to flood taro paddies, with small clusters of sugarcane and banana at the fringes of these paddies. Hawaiians also changed the islands’ environment by building aquaculture works and hunting some native bird species to the point of . The Hawaiʻi that the Polynesians discovered and inhabited was thus significantly different from that which

James Cook encountered when he discovered the islands in 1778.

When Europeans first arrived in Hawaiʻi, they sought to classify the islands within existing European ideas of tropical islands. Yet the high degree of cultivation in

Hawaiʻi in some ways confounded European and American visitors. Early encounters between Hawaiians and foreigners were directly linked to different cultural perspectives on land use, agriculture, and the environment.

Chapter 3: Sugar without Rum, 1820-1850

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When American Congregationalist missionaries arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1820, many initially opposed sugarcane planting for its worldliness and for the negative effects they perceived it was having on the Hawaiians they sought to convert. Foremost among missionaries’ complaints against sugarcane planting was its connection with distilling rum, a crucial source of revenue for cane planters throughout the world. However, missionary ideology proved to be flexible; and economic, environmental, and social factors all contributed to changes in missionaries’ positions toward sugar. Though resolute in their opposition to distilling rum, missionaries came to embrace sugarcane planting by the middle of the nineteenth century. Missionary support was instrumental to the rise of a distinct Hawaiian plantation system which upheld the missionary ideal of temperance, but encouraged missionaries and other haole to have greater involvement in economic affairs than they originally intended.

The eventual missionary acceptance of sugarcane planting contributed to the development of government policies geared toward plantation agriculture and an economy based on the export of an agricultural commodity. Yet missionaries’ influence prevented the adoption of rum distilling, which made it significantly more difficult to develop profitable plantations. The result was that the sugar industry quickly became consolidated in the hands of a small number of well-financed operations. As under- capitalized plantations failed, those that remained expanded and came to exert greater control on government policy and the Hawaiian economy.

By focusing on missionaries, the goals of agricultural development, and the ban on distilling rum, this chapter explores some of the ways the Hawaiian sugar industry was

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exceptional among the world’s sugar producers, and the implications of these unique factors for the development of the Hawaiian sugar industry. Moreover, in examining missionary influence over the rise of the sugarcane plantation system, I make the argument that agriculture and sugar production were much more than economic endeavors, but acts imbued with deep-seated cultural, ideological, and political meaning which took priority over immediate economic self-interest.

Chapter 4: Exports and Imports, 1850-1875

At the mid-point of the nineteenth century, with support for sugar production among Hawaiʻi’s native and foreign elite, and domestic policies geared toward the establishment of large plantations, Planters then turned their attention outward, so that they might enter the international sugar economy. This entailed the development of trade relations that gave planters access to foreign markets free from import duties that rendered their product uncompetitive, the acquisition of a cheap and tractable labor pool, and the participation in the global circulation of knowledge and technology directed toward sugar production.

Much of the sugar producing world possessed the international framework for its produce as a result of its colonial history. The sugar islands of the Greater Caribbean established their plantation systems with the help of access to the markets of their

European metropolitan cores. Additionally, the establishment and expansion of plantation systems in the Atlantic World depended upon the expansion of . Moreover,

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agricultural expertise and technology often traveled along imperial networks from core to colony.

Hawaiʻi had no colonial relationship to facilitate the sale of its sugar, nor a slave system to facilitate sugarcane cultivation, nor a metropole invested in building agricultural knowledge in Hawaiʻi. It was not until 1875, after years of intensive lobbying, that Hawaiʻi and the United States signed a reciprocity treaty, allowing planters to export their sugar to the U. S. duty-free. The treaty led to a meteoric rise in profits, and access to the capital necessary for large-scale importation of foreign plantation workers.

In the meantime, though, as planters and the government worked persistently but ineffectively for profitable access to the American market, they needed to find other means of making sugar pay.

In order to overcome adverse conditions of the international market, planters set about importing foreign technology and expertise. This increased plantation efficiency and improved the quality of Hawaiʻi sugar, both of which helped to improve plantation profits. However, technology and expertise were not alone in helping Hawaiian planters overcome the challenges of producing and selling sugar profitably. Environmental factors made key contributions to the Hawaiian plantation system.

Hawaiʻi possessed many areas of highly fertile soil that had not suffered exhaustion after years of intensive cultivation. Hawaiʻi also enjoyed an absence of the tropical storms that often plagued other cane-growing regions. Finally, while other crops were subject to the depredations of newly introduced crop pests, sugarcane proved relatively resilient to animals. These environmental factors all contributed to the

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expansion of sugarcane planting and made the sugar industry increasingly important to the Hawaiian economy and government policy. The environment thus helped Hawaiʻi shift from more diversified agriculture to an economy dominated by a single crop.

Efforts to connect the islands to foreign markets came at a cost. The introduction of new species, ideas, technologies, and economic relationships brought more cane under cultivation and altered the Hawaiian environment. A more immediate change for

Hawaiians, though, was agricultural marginalization and a culture that erased Hawaiian presence from the land and influence on agriculture in Hawaiʻi. As planters reached out across oceans to bring the sugar world to Hawaiʻi, they made room for their imports by ignoring Native Hawaiian agricultural practices. Consigning Hawaiians to a doomed race, haole planters imposed their agricultural vision upon the Hawaiian environment.

Chapter 5: Revolutions, 1876-1893

If land reform marked the birth of a sugarcane industry in Hawaiʻi, the reciprocity treaty signed between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States in 1875 launched its dominance. The elimination of a duty of between three and four cents per pound of sugar transformed Hawaiian cane cultivation from a marginally profitable enterprise to a cash cow. The number of plantations, acres under cultivation, and quantity of sugar exports all increased dramatically after reciprocity. Most importantly, sugar rose to account for over ninety percent of the value of Hawaiʻi’s exports. This chapter explores the political, social, and environmental consequences of sugar’s dramatic rise in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

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Reciprocity unleashed sugarcane’s full potential to transform the Hawaiian economic landscape. With a sense of security in sugarcane’s profitability, those with the capital to invest in production were able to assert dominance on the industry. Large planters and sugar factors—businesses that acted as multi-purposed intermediaries between plantation and market—accelerated the trend toward vertically integrated operations, gaining larger stakes in more plantations and controlling nearly every aspect of the industry. Sugar money spread further into related businesses; inter-island transportation and shipping, railroads, foundries, and banks became part of the sugar factors’ commercial domain. Planters and factors were also able to integrate horizontally through , consolidating landholdings as well as the rights to surrounding resources.

The number of factors decreased as the more successful among them pushed out smaller operations. Creating a business environment akin to what the historian David Igler labeled the “industrial Far West,” sugarcane interests directed labor, land, and capital toward the industrial production of sugar.18 Reciprocity thus reordered domestic relations in Hawaiʻi as well as Hawaiʻi’s economic relationship with the United States.

Political instability followed the reciprocity treaty. In 1887 a group of haole elites, with the support of a secretly organized militia, forced Hawaiʻi’s King David Kalākaua to sign a new constitution which granted white landholders much greater power in the

Hawaiian government. Five years later, after the new monarch, Queen Liliʻuokalani, tried to restore the country’s old constitution, the same haoles staged a coup with help from the

18 David Igler, Industrial Cowboys: Miller & Lux and the Transformation of the Far West, 1850- 1920 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 7. See also Steven Stoll, The Fruits of Natural Advantage: Making the Industrial Countryside in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

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U.S. Minister to Hawaiʻi and a company of Marines. President Grover Cleveland rebuffed the initial requests for annexation by Hawaiʻi’s new Provisional Government, so on July 4, 1894 the Provisional Government gave way to the Republic of Hawaiʻi. Four years later, with William McKinley occupying the U.S. presidency, the haole oligarchy achieved their aims of annexation to the United States.

As the plural name of the chapter suggests, this dissertation posits multiple revolutions. Environmental and economic revolutions centered around reciprocity predated and were intertwined with the political revolution of 1893. This chapter examines the decisions and events that led from those revolutions to open rebellion against the Hawaiian monarchy, and the role of sugarcane in the political conflict.

Situating the conflict of the 1880s and 1890s in the context of the history of the cane planters’ rise to power, the chapter asks how the different Hawaiian revolutions are related, and how the overthrow of the Hawaiian government developed out of the revolutions that came before.

Chapter 6: “Overcoming Nature by Nature,” 1893-1903

Following the 1893 overthrow of Queen Liliʻuokalani, planters and their allies expected quick annexation to the United States. Even those planters who did not support the revolution hoped to achieve annexation so that their sugar would be a domestic product of the United States, and therefore receive the price protection and market access that domestic status entailed. Annexationists, however, soon met with disappointment, as

U. S. President-elect Grover Cleveland came out against annexation. Anti-imperialist

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outrage over American involvement in the coup and a lobbying battle between supporters of Queen Liliʻuokalani and supporters of the new Provisional Government unfolded in

Washington.

Planters were concerned that their success over the past two decades had given

Hawaiʻi a reputation as a plantocracy filled with Asian workers, and that this made

Hawaiʻi appear undemocratic and inassimilable to the American public. The United

States in the 1890s experienced what Rayford Logan and other historians have called the nadir of American race relations. Post-Civil War Reconstruction had given way to Jim

Crow in the South and anti-Asian legislation in the West. Planters therefore perceived that if they were to convince Americans that Hawaiʻi should become the first extra- continental territory of the U.S., they would need to counter the view of Hawaiʻi as dominated by sugar and its nonwhite workforce with their own vision of Hawaiʻi as a place fit for white American settlement.

To further their political goal of annexation, planters took the counter-intuitive step of working against their own immediate interests by encouraging the development of diversified agriculture and the immigration of white American small farmers. Planters promoted homesteading legislation and also facilitated agricultural research in crops other than sugarcane. Sugarcane was too capital intensive to be accessible to most

Americans, and the requirements for large economies of scale created vast plantations.

Planters understood that the American cultural ideal, epitomized in Thomas Jefferson’s view of republican virtue based on small-scale agriculture and more recently articulated by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, who in 1893 lamented the closing of the

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American frontier, must be brought to Hawaiʻi. Planters thus proposed to create a new

American agricultural frontier in Hawaiʻi.

To achieve the goal of developing diversified agrculture, however, planters and other annexationists needed to deal with an unlikely obstacle: insects. Due to a complex of factors related to Hawaiʻi’s geography and settlement, sugarcane suffered relatively little damage from agricultural pests, but other agricultural crops were so vulnerable to infestations that would-be farmers often failed or replaced their crops with sugarcane.

Hawaiian annexationists needed to find a way to control insect pests if they were to succeed in establishing a society of white American agriculturalists.

If insects posed an unlikely problem for annexationists, they also provided an equally unlikely solution. Planters became early adopters of biological pest control—the use of insectivorous or parasitic insects to prey upon insect crop pests. With cutting-edge entomological research, Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane planters became leaders in the field of biological control. Biological control helped build up diversified agriculture in Hawaiʻi, but these gains were short lived. In 1898, once annexation was achieved, planters maintained their commitment to agricultural science and research, but they no longer supported efforts to develop a white American community based on diversified agriculture. This chapter demonstrates the connection between Hawaiian sugarcane planters’ political agenda and their adoption of innovative scientific agricultural practices. It argues that planters were conscious of their image, and that they committed to transforming the Hawaiian environment into a suitable place for idealized American agriculture when doing so suited their political ends.

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Chapter 7: Planter’s Paradise, 1903-1937

As the twentieth century dawned, sugarcane planters in Hawaiʻi were ascendant.

The market stability they had sought for so long was finally achieved with annexation in

1898. Moreover, their dedication to technological development and scientific research was paying significant dividends. Field, factory, and laboratory merged as technological and scientific expertise helped Hawaiʻi become the world’s most efficient producer of sugar per of cane and per worker. This chapter concludes the dissertation by examining Hawaiʻi’s dramatic transition from a remote and insignificant place at the edge of the sugar-producing world to a center of scientific innovation and technological development. It further asks how Hawaiʻi, as a center of world sugar production, contributed to global environmental change.

Hawaiʻi’s experiences with biological pest control in other agricultural fields became a significant asset to sugarcane planters when, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the sugarcane leafhopper invaded the archipelago. This pest was poised to devastate the Hawaiian sugar industry, destroying over one sixth the entire sugar crop in

1903. Entomologists, however, were able to quickly control the leafhopper and other pests, and soon island plantations were regularly setting new records in sugar production.

Not only were plantations becoming increasingly productive, they were also expanding. The infrastructural system upon which cane planters relied blossomed after annexation, as plantations acquired the capital necessary to invest in new irrigation that dwarfed previous projects. The increase in irrigation gave planters the ability to put more

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land under cane cultivation, and thus gave planters increasing dominance over the

Hawaiian environment. To process all the sugarcane grown on new plantation lands, planters built larger and more sophisticated mills, developing what became the industry standard in the extraction of from cane stalks.

Increased monoculture acreage caused Hawaiʻi’s cane fields to become increasingly prone to crop pests and diseases, but planters again pioneered new solutions to historical checks on the size of plantation operations. Plant scientists in Hawaiʻi bred new varieties of sugarcane that were more resistant to pests and diseases. The development of biological control, irrigation, and lab-bred canes far surpassed visions from the mid-nineteenth century of how planters could alter the Hawaiian landscape, yet they also reflected how thoroughly earlier planters had managed to gain control over

Hawaiʻi’s environment and economy.

By the early decades of the twentieth century, Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane fields hardly resembled those of a century earlier. Planters had engineered a new environment for sugarcane. They introduced insects from far-off places to help protect cane, redesigned watersheds to bring water and cane to lands that were formerly unable to support intensive plantation agriculture, and even engineered new varieties of the plant better suited to their needs. Though sugarcane planting remains rooted in nature, little of

Hawaiʻi’s twentieth-century sugar producing process can be said to be natural. Hawaiʻi’s planters carefully designed an artificial paradise to help them maximize the amount of sugar they could produce.

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Hawaiʻi’s planters not only remade their own environment, but the global sugarcane environment, too. Hawaiʻi became a center for the diffusion of expertise, capital, plants, and animals throughout the sugar-producing world. Hawaiian sugar experts soon moved to other sugarcane plantation systems, bringing with them the expertise they acquired in Hawaiʻi. Planters began investing in plantations in the

Philippines, where they industrialized sugar production. Hawaiian-bred varieties of sugarcane such as H-109, one of the early successes of Hawaiʻi’s cane breeding program became common throughout the world. And planters re-exported the biological control animals that they had previously imported, sometimes causing drastic environmental crises in other plantation regions. Sugarcane, a simple grass, thus remade Hawaiʻi’s economy, culture, environment, and place in the world.

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CHAPTER 2: NO PERFECT GARDEN: HAWAIIAN ENVIRONMENTS, SETTLEMENT, AND AGRICULTURE

Nothing, nothing that ever existed on this island reached it easily. James A. Michener, Hawaii1

When one expects perfection, one is bound to be disappointed. Such was the case when in September 1840 Charles Wilkes, commander of the circumnavigatory United

States Exploring Expedition of 1838-1842, arrived at Hawaiʻi. “From the published descriptions of the Hawaiian Islands,” Wilkes wrote, “I was prepared to see them, and particularly Oʻahu, a perfect garden…I regret to say, any side of [Oʻahu], when seen from the sea, is very far from having an inviting appearance.”2 For Wilkes, the “perfect garden” described in other published accounts of the archipelago was nothing more than a mythologized Hawaiʻi, an impossible place.

While Wilkes’s comments may seem churlish, Oʻahu and the other Hawaiian

Islands are indeed no perfect garden. Nor are they a paradise of the Pacific, as many called the archipelago later in the nineteenth century. To call a place a perfect garden or earthly paradise is to suggest it is unchanging; the natural world is dynamic, even chaotic.3 Calling Hawaiʻi a perfect garden denies the archipelago its natural complexity, ignores the contingency of environmental change, and obscures human agency in manipulating the environment. These things are all anathema to environmental history.

1 James A. Michener, Hawaii (New York: Random House, 1959), 7.

2 Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842 Vol. III (: Wiley and Putnam, 1845), 373.

3 Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Environmental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 156-170.

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Far from a static paradise, the Hawaiian Islands that Wilkes encountered had been undergoing environmental change since they rose from the sea, change that has accelerated since humans first settled the archipelago.

The natural world is, of course, very real. Yet the ways we experience, interpret, and ascribe meaning to the world around us are rooted in our cultures. We rely on received knowledge and culture as well as our observations to understand the world around us, seeing places through the filter of what we think they should be like. We create what the historian Alan Taylor has called a dialectic between environmental experiences and environmental storytelling.4 We transform observed environments into communicated landscapes—verbal or visual representations of a place that reflect our culture and contribute to a shared sense of what that place is.5 In other words, while an environment is material fact, a landscape is a social construction.

Idealized descriptions of Hawaiʻi’s environment–and the more general notion of tropical paradise—are just such social constructions that reveal as much about the views of the people who use them as they do the places to which they are affixed. “The

‘tropics,’” wrote the historian David Arnold, “were invented quite as much as they were

4 Alan Taylor, “‘Wasty Ways’: Stories of American Settlement,” Environmental History 3 (1998), 291-310; esp. 293.

5 The geographer John Kirtland Wright articulated landscape as a historically contingent social construction and the imaginative qualities of geography: John K. Wright, “Terrae Incognitae: the place of Imagination in Geography,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 37 (1947): 1-15. See also David Lowenthal and Martyn J. Bowden, eds., Geographies of the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); David Arnold, “‘Illusory Riches’: Representations of the Tropical World, 1840-1950,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 21, no. 1 (March 2000): 6-18; and Nancy Leys Stepan, Picturing Tropical Nature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

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encountered.”6 Wilkes’s statement neatly illustrates this point. Earlier accounts of

Hawaiʻi as well as a culturally constructed idea of the tropics prepared Wilkes for what to see in the islands. Wilkes’s disappointment upon seeing Oʻahu was the result of his belief in a Western cultural ideal of what Hawaiʻi should be. By comparing his own view of

Hawaiʻi with “published descriptions,” Wilkes used his own cultural background as a frame of reference for seeing the islands.

The ways people relate to the natural environment, the landscapes we see, are dynamic as well. Not only were the tropics invented, they are continually reinvented and transmitted through ongoing representations of that place. These landscapes have the power to shape human behaviors toward the land. As Taylor and other scholars have argued, we act toward the environment as our culture trains us to; culture finds material expression in the built environment. Nature and culture mutually condition each other as both change and respond to each other. Yet people do not simply contemplate nature from a dispassionate remove—we must use it. Society and nature meet at the point where matter becomes a resource, and it is through resource use that cultural attitudes toward the natural world take shape. Ecology, economy, and culture are inextricable drivers of human history. Each facet changes according to its own logic and rhythm, yet each must respond to changes in the others.7

6 David Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze: , Landscape, and Science, 1800-1856 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 6.On the social construction of nature see, William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69- 90.

7 Andrew C. Isenberg, “Environment in the Nineteenth-Century West: Or, Process Encounters Place,” in William Deverell, ed. A Companion to the American West (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 77- 92. The relationship between people and nature is mediated through use in pre-modern economies, as well. 27

Wilkes’s remarks on Hawaiʻi are thus more than mere rhetoric. By adding his own narrative to the many published descriptions of Hawaiʻi, Wilkes joined the explorers, missionaries, and merchants who preceded him to the archipelago, and the

Polynesian migrants who preceded them, in the act of constructing landscapes of Hawaiʻi and thus influencing how people acted toward the environment. Moreover, Wilkes’s visit to Hawaiʻi only three years after the founding of the islands’ first sugarcane plantation offers a window into how Americans saw the islands, their environment, and their agricultural and economic potential at a crucial time in Hawaiʻi’s history. Coming from an officer of the U.S. Navy on a government expedition, Wilkes’s observations on

Hawaiʻi’s agricultural and economic potential had the capacity to influence U.S. policy regarding the islands and their resources.

The chapter that follows tracks the early history of Hawaiʻi as a place in nature, culture, and production—its dynamic environment, landscapes, and economies. It examines the long history of Hawaiʻi’s natural environment through Polynesian settlement and early contact, the landscapes they saw, and the economies they imposed.

The conditions that formed the archipelago created a unique and particularly benign environment insulated by the vastness of the Pacific Ocean.

See Marshall D. Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976); Patrick V. Kirch, “Transported Landscapes,” Natural History, December 1982, 32-35. The notion of “transported landscapes” is a significant factor in scholars’ understandings of pre-contact Hawaiian society. “Transported landscapes” hold a cultural component, but the original meaning is of a material environment transformed by a society according to a specific set of cultural guidelines. This should not be confused with the idea of “landscape” as used by Stepan and others (see note 5). “Landscape” in that sense is a completely cultural construct: the representation of a place through some type of medium.

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An understanding of Hawaiʻi before human settlement demonstrates just how drastically human settlement changed the environment. The environmental conditions of pristine Hawaiʻi made the archipelago attractive to human settlers, conducive to agriculture, and sensitive to change. Once people reached the islands, they exerted pressure on this environment. Like all human societies, the Polynesians exploited and manipulated nature according to the demands of their culture and economy. The chapter then discusses the ecological changes wrought by the Polynesians who first peopled the islands, the landscapes of Hawaiʻi they constructed, and the ways they used the land. A new set of dynamic forces disrupted Hawaiian society and introduced new agents of environmental change after the 1778 “discovery” of the archipelago by James Cook. As the ethic of improvement and the reach of capitalism spread to the islands, Hawaiians and foreigners began to view Hawaiʻi in terms of commercial agriculture, and the cultivation of sugarcane in particular. Finally, the chapter returns to Wilkes; his encounters in

Hawaiʻi and the expectations he brought there reveal the environmental, cultural, and economic conditions of the islands at the earliest stages of commercial sugarcane planting.

Hawaiian Geology, Climates, and Environment

The eight main islands of the Hawaiian Archipelago are the youngest peaks of a vast submarine mountain range that stretches 1,600 miles northwest across the Pacific

Ocean to Kure atoll, and then another 1,400 miles north along the Emperor Seamount chain. These mountains were formed over the past 85 million years as magma from deep

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within the earth forced its way upward to the planet’s surface. The location of the magma’s upwelling, known as the Hawaiian Hot Spot, has remained stationary for at least the past 40 million years while the Pacific Tectonic Plate has slowly shifted above it, creating a chain of volcanic mountains and islands. Each seamount and island throughout the Hawaiian-Emperor chain grew over the course of several million years; each in turn drifted farther away from the hot spot at a rate of about nine centimeters per year; and over several million more years each succumbed to erosion and subsidence and—excepting the main islands and some immediate neighbors—eventually sank back to the sea, leaving a chain of atolls and reefs behind. Five and a half million years ago, the oldest of Hawaiʻi’s main islands, Kauaʻi, rose from the sea. The island of Hawaiʻi, also known as the Big Island, is still growing today.8

Over the course of geologic time the Hawaiian Islands can be expected to follow their predecessors and recede into the Pacific, but for now they are high oceanic islands towering over the sea that surrounds them. The Big Island’s Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa, the highest mountains in the archipelago, stand 13,796 and 13,677 feet above sea level and over 29,500 feet from their bases on the ocean floor—taller than Mount Everest.9 As the youngest of the islands, the Big Island has been exposed to the elements for the

8 David A. Clague and G. Brent Dalrymple, “Tectonics, Geochronology, and Origin of the Hawaiian Emperor Volcanic Chain,” in A Natural History of the Hawaiian Islands: Selected Readings II, ed. E. Alison Kay (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1994), 5-40; John L. Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea: The Fate of Nature in Hawaiʻi, revised edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2004), 3-24; Alan C. Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, Ecology, and Evolution (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2002), 17-31.

9 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 169-183; Marie Sanderson, introduction to Prevailing Trade Winds: Climate and Weather in Hawaiʻi, ed. Marie Sanderson (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1993), 5.

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shortest amount of time. The mountains of the older main islands have eroded and subsided to a greater extent, leading to some important differences between the environments of individual islands. Kauaʻi, Oʻahu, Molokaʻi, and western have developed with age a larger number of perennial streams and more extensive coral reefs than younger eastern Maui and Hawaiʻi Island. Lānaʻi, Niʻihau, and Kahoʻolawe, the smallest of the main islands, are older than Hawaiʻi and eastern Maui but their size and position leeward of larger islands inhibited the development of perennial streams.

Age has caused relative inter-island ecological differences, but each island’s volcanic mountains create particular environmental and climatic similarities among the islands, too. The key feature of Hawaiʻi’s mountains is the creation of a stunning diversity of microenvironments on each island, turning them into what the geographer

Marie Sanderson has called “continents in miniature.”10 The mountains act as giant mid- ocean windbreaks for the Pacific trade winds, creating a strong orographic effect— otherwise known as a rain shadow. For most of the year the trades consistently blow moist air from the northeast toward Hawaiʻi. The air rises and cools as it comes into contact with the mountains. As the air cools and loses the ability to hold moisture it rains on the mountainsides. Bereft of its former moisture, the air then passes over the mountains and the plains behind them. Average annual rainfall varies widely over very short distances: some places on the windward slopes are inundated with as much as 445 annual inches of rainfall while areas only a few miles away in the leeward southwest

10 Ibid.

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receive 10 inches per year.11 As a result, there are at least 38 distinct Hawaiian plant communities within short distance of each other. Over a span of thirty miles, a person moving inland from the Big Island’s coast to the peak of Mauna Kea can see desert, grassland, mesic , , subalpine scrubland, and alpine desert.12

The trade winds dominate Hawaiʻi’s climate for most of the year—they blow over

80 percent of the time in the summer and between 50 and 80 percent in the winter—but their strength can vary from year to year. Shifts in atmospheric and sea level pressure systems can lead to great interannual differences in the intensity of the winter trades, with a correlating variability in precipitation. Violent storms may occur frequently when the trade winds are weaker, while droughts correspond to the ocean pressure and temperature disturbances of El Niño events. Annual rainfalls may vacillate between extremes, rarely approaching the cumulative mean or median.13

In addition to elevation and wind patterns, the sun and the ocean are major defining factors of Hawaiʻi’s climate. But while elevation and wind contribute to a varied climate in Hawaiʻi, the latter two tend more toward consistency. The archipelago’s position in the northern tropics means that there is little variation in the amount of sunlight it receives throughout the year, and thus little fluctuation in average temperature.

The expanse of the Pacific Ocean surrounding the archipelago contributes further to land

11 Sonia P. Juvik and James O. Juvik, eds., Atlas of Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1998), 59.

12 Patrick V. Kirch, “Hawaii as a Model System for Human Ecodynamics,” American Anthropologist 109 no. 1 (2007): 11.

13 Thomas Schroeder, “Climate Controls,” in Prevailing Trade Winds: Climate and Weather in Hawaiʻi, ed. Marie Sanderson (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1993), 12-36.

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temperature consistency. The sea moderates Hawaiʻi’s air temperatures through its high latent heat relative to air: it absorbs excess heat from the air in hot times and transfers heat to the air in cooler times, acting as a natural thermostat. Additionally, water and air temperatures are somewhat cooler in Hawaiʻi than in places of similar latitude because the North Pacific Current moves cold water from the Bering Sea to the islands.14

The coastal lowlands—the most commonly inhabited areas—have generally mild temperatures and plenty of sunshine throughout the year. Leeward lowland air temperatures vary only 6.4°F on average, from 78.4°F in August to 72°F in February, and temperatures above 90°F or below 60°F are rare. Humidity is consistently low (though was possibly slightly higher in the pre-human era, when forests covered more of the islands) and breezes are usually gentle and steady.15 The overall climatic result of

Hawaiʻi’s geographic and topographic conditions thus simultaneously embraces both the erratic and the uniform.

The diversity of Hawaiʻi’s climates and geographies may be matched by the archipelago’s remoteness. The plants and animals that first colonized Hawaiʻi had to somehow cross thousands of miles of ocean. For many organisms, getting to Hawaiʻi was impossible. Several higher taxonomic groups never established populations on the islands, thus rendering Hawaiʻi’s biotic communities “disharmonic” or “depauperate” in biogeographic terms. Two species of bat were the only land mammals to reach Hawaiʻi; the loulu is the single native Hawaiian palm genus out of the hundred Polynesian palm

14 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 69-84.

15 Ibid.; Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 302.

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genera; no mosquitoes or ants lived on the archipelago before the late eighteenth century; and there are no native Hawaiian amphibians.16

Hawaiʻi’s relatively few colonizers arrived at the archipelago by riding water, wind or birds. The North Pacific Current, which moves in an ovoid circuit from the coasts of Japan to California and then back west to the , is responsible for bringing most marine life and some terrestrial biota to Hawaiʻi. While the trade winds blow from the northeast most of the year, the jet stream gusts at a higher elevation from

Southeast Asia to Hawaiʻi during the winter months and probably brought many of

Hawaiʻi’s founding plants and insects. Birds transported seeds and insects in their digestive tracts or stuck to their bodies. Most of these colonizers came from Asia and

Polynesia, though about a third of Hawaiʻi’s avian pioneers may have come from the

Americas. Hawaiʻi’s earliest environment thus bore a strong resemblance to the environments of other Pacific islands.17

The resemblance to other Polynesian environments was only passing, however—

Hawaiʻi’s environment is indeed unique, almost a world unto itself. The organisms that managed to breach Hawaiʻi’s isolation and establish populations there found an environment that fostered the evolution of new species. The biologist John Culliney noted that “many biologists now consider the Hawaiian Islands to be the world’s finest natural laboratory for the study of evolution.”18 Disharmony reduced ecological

16 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 157-68.

17 Ibid.

18 Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 35.

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competition and predation, and natural boundaries such as the distance between islands in the archipelago promoted the process of adaptive radiation, by which populations of a single species divide and evolve into separate species. Hawaiʻi’s honeycreepers—birds in the finch family—evolved through adaptive radiation from a common ancestor into at least 57 species and subspecies.19 As a point of reference to contextualize the evolutionary power of the Hawaiian Islands, the finches of the Galapagos—maybe the most famous example of adaptive radiation—evolved into a mere fifteen different species.

The combination of difficulty for plants and animals getting to Hawaiʻi and opportunities for adaptive radiation has led to an exceptionally high rate of endemism— that is, many of Hawaiʻi’s plants and animals are native to nowhere else on the planet. In fact, Hawaiʻi’s biota is the most highly endemic on the planet. Eighty-two percent of

Hawaiʻi’s bird species and subspecies (including now extinct species) are endemic to the archipelago and ninety-five percent of Hawaiian land snails—some 762 species—are endemic.20 These species evolved in an environment largely free from predators, a fact that influenced the course of evolution. Without the selective force of predation, as is common among oceanic island biota, Hawaiian species lost many defensive evolutionary traits. For example, endemic bird species including ducks, geese, ibises, and rails grew

19 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 266; David Quammen, The Song of the Dodo: Island Biogeography in an Age of Extinction (New York: Scribner, 1996), 230-1.

20 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 252, 157. 35

larger, lost the ability to fly, and decreased the number of eggs laid per clutch. Non- human nature in Hawaiʻi had thus evolved to be diverse, unique, and vulnerable.21

With few initial checks on population growth, Hawaiʻi’s indigenous biota flourished for millennia. In Hawaiʻi the planetary phenomena of plate tectonics, wind patterns, and ocean currents converged with the contingency of island biogeography and evolution to create a place unlike any other. Understanding these processes, however, belies the chaotic nature of Hawaiʻi’s colonization. Colonizers needed to defy extremely long odds to reach the islands. An episodic shift in the winds and pressure systems may have allowed a storm to carry some plants and animals to the islands or a bird may have wandered from its normal migratory path. Most organisms that somehow reached the archipelago died without establishing populations: many made landfall at a place without adequate nutrients. They may also have lacked a mate or the ability to reproduce.

Hawaiʻi’s colonizers represent a very small selection of organisms, dependent on the confluence of favorable conditions and chance.

The first human colonizers of Hawaiʻi must be viewed in similar terms.

Extraordinary luck, skill, and will brought Polynesian settlers to Hawaiʻi. The environment they encountered was equable, yet it was also poorly adapted to absorb the ecological disturbances caused by humans. The first Hawaiians—with and without intention—introduced a host of ecological changes to the Hawaiian environment as they built a new society.

21 Ibid., 277-288; Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 303-9; Quammen, Song of the Dodo.

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The Polynesian Invasion

With no written record of Hawaiian history before the arrival of James Cook in

1778, much of the early Hawaiian past is unknown. However, a rich oral tradition transcribed in the nineteenth century and many years of archeological field work provide a great deal of information on the Hawaiian environment and society before contact with other peoples.

Humans probably first colonized Hawaiʻi from the Marquesas and Society Islands sometime around the year 1000 CE.22 These immigrants, between twenty and one hundred people in one or more large double-hulled canoes, brought with them between forty and fifty species of plants and animals. About twenty-seven of these were intentionally transported while the rest were stowaways or inadvertently carried onto the canoes in bundles of food or supplies. The voyagers brought a common Polynesian suite of food and utilitarian plants and animals, including chickens, dogs, pigs, taro, breadfruit, and sugarcane. Geckos, several weeds, and the Polynesian rat were among the stowaways—though it is possible the rat was intentionally transported as a food source for dogs.23 These organisms form what the environmental historian Alfred Crosby called

22 The designation of 1000 CE as the time of initial settlement is a relatively new development in Hawaiian archaeology, based on advances in radiocarbon dating and a reconfiguration of migration patterns throughout Polynesia: Patrick V. Kirch, “When Did the Polynesians Settle Hawaiʻi? A Review of 150 Years of Scholarly Inquiry and a Tentative Answer,” Hawaiian Archaeology 12 (2011), 3-26. Other calculations date settlement as early as 300 CE, and many have theorized two waves of migration. The ascription of first settlement to around the turn of the millennium holds significant implications for understanding the relationship between early Hawaiians and their natural environments; in particular, it suggests human population growth and environmental change both happened at faster rates than previously thought.

23 Ibid.; George W. Cox, Alien Species in North America and Hawaii: Impacts on Natural Ecosystems (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1999), 176; Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 321-328.

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a “portmanteau biota”: the companion travelers of human groups. Species in a portmanteau biota, such as horses and smallpox in North America, can cause widespread ecological change independent of the people responsible for their introduction.24

The Polynesian portmanteau biota, like the plants and animals that arrived in

Hawaiʻi before them, would have needed to adapt to their new surroundings. However, they had evolved in an environment less depauperate than Hawaiʻi and were in many cases better suited for ecological competition. Moreover, the Polynesians and their portmanteau arrived in Hawaiʻi all at once, not singly over the course of millennia. This sudden influx of new organisms was an overwhelming blow to Hawaiʻi’s native biota.

Alfred Crosby called such an influx “ecological invasion.” Invasion is usually a value laden-term, yet it is an apt way to describe the first peopling of the islands. As the invaders colonized Hawaiʻi, they preyed upon native organisms, outcompeted them for resources, destroyed their , and disrupted their reproductive cycles. As invaders and environment adapted to each other, the environment became prone to greater degrees of change.25

24 Crosby, Ecological Imperialism, 89-90.

25 Andrew Clark and Charles Elton were two of the earliest scholars to address the subject of human ecological invasion: Andrew Clark, The Invasion of New Zealand by People, Plants, and Animals (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1949); Charles Elton, The Ecology of Invasions by Animals and Plants (London: Chapman and Hall, 1958). Alfred Crosby established the significance of ecological invasion to the European settlement of the Americas: Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1972); and Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Environmental historians have done much to expand upon Crosby’s work. See William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Press, 1976); Elinor G. K. Melville, A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Elizabeth A. Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-82 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001); Virginia DeJohn Anderson, Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); John R. McNeill, 38

Ecological invasion was not the only source of environmental change in Hawaiʻi.

In addition to their portmanteau biota, the Polynesian settlers brought their culture to the islands. Building on the work of Edgar Anderson, the archaeologist Patrick Kirch has applied the concept of “transported landscapes” to his examination of prehistoric

Hawaiʻi. The first human invaders of Hawaiʻi introduced their way of seeing, using, controlling, and ordering the environment and its resources that they and their ancestors had developed throughout Polynesia.26 Following patterns of Polynesian culture, the settlers planted their crops and organized their society in a familiar way. In Polynesian fashion, they first colonized Hawaiʻi’s stream-fed bottom lands in communities bound by kinship ties and organized according to lineage-based rank, and they used the familiar methods of swidden agriculture, pondfield terracing, and irrigation as the basis of production. What these settlers produced was also part of their transported landscape.

Other than the stowaways, the portmanteau biota the migrants brought were selected to serve the same functions that they served their cultivators in the Society Islands: taro, yams, and sweet potatoes were agricultural staples; bananas, breadfruit, mountain apples, and sugarcane were supplementary crops; and candlenut, coconut, paper mulberry, and

Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

26 Kirch, “Transported Landscapes.” Kirch has made many very influential contributions to Hawaiian archaeology and natural history, prominent among them being the idea of transported landscape. Kirch has demonstrated that the Polynesian settlers of Hawaiʻi changed the archipelago’s environment according to their cultural understandings of the relationship between people and non-human nature. Like Stepan, Arnold, and other historians who use landscape to examine representations and social constructions of nature (see note 4 above), Kirch’s landscape has roots in culture. But Kirch’s concept moves beyond culture to the material environment. A “transported landscape” in Kirch’s definition is an environment changed by people to conform to their views of what an environment should look like and how it should be used. In other words, Kirch’s transported landscape is a material construction based on social construct. This concept has been used widely by other scholars of Hawaiʻi’s environment. See Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 314 and Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 331-337.

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twisted beardgrass served utilitarian functions such as providing construction and clothing materials.27

Ecological invasion and transported landscape operated in interdependent and mutually reinforcing ways to alter the Hawaiian environment. If, as Crosby suggests,

European settlers of the temperate parts of the New World created “neo-Europes” through the introduction of their portmanteau biota and transported landscapes—that is, ecological invasion caused many American environments to resemble European ones— the Polynesian migrants created what can be considered a neo-Polynesia in Hawaiʻi.

Through ecological invasion and deliberate environmental manipulation, Hawaiʻi’s pioneer settlers reduced the archipelago’s ecological uniqueness and made it more like a general Polynesian environmental template.28

Hawaiʻi’s lowland forests were particularly vulnerable to such change. With no natural predators, Polynesian rats quickly multiplied and invaded lowland forests, where many plant species had lost defensive evolutionary traits. The rats gnawed and ate seeds and seedlings, and they may also have preyed upon the eggs and hatchlings of forest birds. In John Culliney’s vivid description, “a tsunami of rats might have swept through the defenseless forests,” disrupting ecosystems with implacable force.29 Rats were certainly not alone in the devastation of Hawaiʻi’s forests, however; the Polynesians and their other portmanteau animals would have asserted their presence as well. Early settlers

27 Kirch, “Transported Landscapes;” Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 322-323.

28 Crosby, Ecological Imperialism.

29 Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 312.

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relied heavily on Hawaiʻi’s forest resources as they established their first communities.

Lowland forests provided materials for construction and fuel, and the forests’ inhabitants, especially the many large, flightless, and unwary bird species, provided a ready source of food. Such disruptions then gave invading seeds and weeds opportunities to establish populations within these forests, introducing new competition for space and resources among plants and sometimes crowding out native species.30

The Polynesian practice of swidden agriculture compounded the pressure of ecological invasion and prevented the forests from returning to their former ranges.

Hawaiians often used fire to clear fields for planting, which could easily burn beyond control on dry, windy plains. In a series of newspaper articles on pre-contact Hawaiian history first published in 1869, Samuel M. Kamakau, the Hawaiian scholar, legislator, and jurist, noted that until the arrival of metal tools and draft animals, “fire was a man’s plow and his clearing implement.”31 Sharp increases in particles found in archaeological sites and dated to around the turn of the millennium further attest to the prevalence of human-induced forest burning. Comprised mostly of the slow-growing loulu palm, Hawaiʻi’s lowland forests were ill prepared for such activity. Predation, competition, and environmental manipulation together overwhelmed the forests.

Evidence indicates that the forests were gone in probably less than a century, replaced by twisted beardgrass and other alien plants. Birds, snails, and other creatures that inhabited

30 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 324-26; Kirch, “Hawaii as a Model System for Human Ecodynamics,” 15; Kirch, “Transported Landscapes.”

31 Samuel M. Kamakau, The Works of the People of Old: Na Hana a ka Poʻe Kahiko, trans. , ed. Dorothy B. Barrère (Honolulu: Press, 1976), 23.

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these areas were either extirpated or forced to shift their biotic ranges to higher elevations.32

Comprising an area larger than anywhere else in Polynesia other than New

Zealand, Hawaiʻi’s hospitable environment encouraged exponential growth of the human population for about the first five hundred years after first arrival. People spread over the main islands, creating many polities variously aligned through chiefly kinship and alliances. As they spread over the land, they built public works to increase agricultural productivity. Lasting irrigation systems on windward Oʻahu and Molokaʻi which can be dated as early as 1250 CE brought water increasingly further distances to feed

Hawaiians’ taro paddies. These pondfield systems were large enough to create significant food surpluses, an indication of some form of administrative control over production.

Major environmental engineering projects spread over the next few centuries from the optimal agricultural sites already in use to less productive areas. Large pondfield systems terraced up hillsides and fed by canals covered nearly all cultivable land on Oʻahu by about the fifteenth century.33

After about two centuries of settlement, the Polynesian transported landscape gave way to a new Hawaiian one with innovations in land use and social organization.

The Hawaiian environment was highly managed and engineered, geared toward

32 Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 312; Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 331-332.

33 Patrick V. Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawaiʻi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 128-145. Historians have suggested irrigation projects demand social hierarchies that control labor. See Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); and Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of Agricultural Landscapes in the American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999).

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agricultural production and controlled by an entrenched upper class. Increased social hierarchy and labor-intensive environmental engineering projects accompanied population growth, demonstrating both greater need and improved ability to regulate land and resource use.

Beginning in the fourteenth century, groups on Oʻahu, Kauaʻi, and Molokaʻi developed a distinct mode of aquaculture with large stone-walled fishponds extending into the sea.34 Around 1490 CE Māʻilikūkahi, the ruler of Oʻahu, instituted an administrative system based upon the division of the island into roughly pie slice-shaped units radiating from the center of the island, called ahupuaʻa. This system of land division insured that each unit would have access to resources from multiple vegetative zones—though the irregular shape of the island limited some ahupuaʻa. Residents of each ahupuaʻa could fish the seas, farm the lowlands, and hunt and gather in upland forests. Rulers appointed members of the chiefly class to govern, manage, and tax each ahupuaʻa; they in turn allocated control over sequentially smaller administrative areas, down to commoner family groups’ farming plots. The ahupuaʻa system likely spread from Oʻahu to the other islands during the sixteenth century, creating a distinctly

Hawaiian regime of land organization.35

Though chiefs still claimed power and status through kinship ties and genealogy, affiliation based on territory and agricultural production became more socially and

34 Samuel Kamakau claimed that over ten thousand men were employed in the construction of some ponds: Kamakau, The Works of the People of Old, 47.

35 Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings, 83-93, 154-155, 210; Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 334; Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 313-324; Jon J. Chinen, The Great Mahele: Hawaii’s Land Division of 1848 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1958), 1-8.

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culturally significant. Presence upon the land, and the right to claim its produce became the defining characteristic of Hawaiian society in a distinct manner from the Polynesian model of society originally brought to the archipelago. Multiple dimensions of interaction influenced Hawaiian social relations, yet the centrality of land and land use to social definition is reflected in the terms used to differentiated classes. The term for Hawaiian commoners, makaʻāinana, underwent an illustrative change. The term is derived from a

Polynesian word that refers to a group’s lineage, but in Hawaiʻi it came to mean “the people that attend the land.” Hawaiian social relationships were defined through the land, and commoner’s rights to reside on the land depended not on kinship, but on meeting agricultural obligations—a required amount of labor on chiefly plantations and the payment of a tax in the form of agricultural produce. Correspondingly, Hawaiian high chiefs were called aliʻi-ʻai-moku, or chiefs who eat the land.36 As they remade the

Hawaiian environment through agricultural development, ancient Hawaiians also remade their society, dividing and defining themselves as agricultural producers and consumers.

As the Hawaiian population grew agricultural development spread to other, less productive lands on the leeward areas of the Big Island and Maui. These younger islands had more nutrient-rich soil than Kauaʻi and Oʻahu but lacked the streams necessary to support irrigation and the coral reefs necessary for productive fisheries. Hawaiians on these islands instead relied on precipitation to cultivate sweet potatoes and dryland taro.37

It was a decidedly more precarious venture than established methods of stream-fed

36 Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings, 24-26, 41-49, 204.

37 Kirch, “Hawaii as a Model System for Human Ecodynamics,” 16-18.

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pondfield agriculture. Interannual variability in rainfall made dryland planting risky, and the maintenance and cultivation of dryland crops demanded greater labor inputs than the pondfield system. It therefore might not come as a surprise that in the years following the expansion of intensive cultivation to these marginal agriculture sites, the incidence of warfare between island groups seems to have increased as well. Violence between different factions certainly existed earlier, but the nature of warfare changed from raiding to battles of conquest for productive agricultural areas.38

Hawaiian laws governing resource use, as recorded by Hawaiian scholars after the arrival of foreigners, demonstrate the need to regulate consumption as well as the ruling chiefs’ ability to do so. A legal system of riparian rights, for example, mandated the conservative development of waterways. People living downstream from a potential dam site held recognized rights to the continuous flow of water: no irrigation channel was permitted to take more water than what remained in the stream below the dam. Rules governing the collective use of irrigated water were exacting, with specific spans of time allotted for the sluicing of water based upon population numbers and agricultural need.

Finally, the law included severe penalties for the subversion of waterways: a person caught destroying a dam could be put to death, and his or her body would be placed in the dam as warning to others who might attempt similar action.39

38 Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings, 209.

39 Emma Metcalf Nakuina, “Ancient Hawaiian Water Rights and Some of the Customs Pertaining to Them,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1894 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co., 1893), 79; see also Herbert H. Gowen, The Paradise of the Pacific: Sketches of Hawaiian Scenery and Life (London: Skeffington & Son, 1892), 59.

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Such laws indicate a powerful central authority, able to develop public irrigation works and control their private use. They also suggest the pressures of population on agricultural production resulted in growing food shortages. As the sites of established agricultural communities faced nutrient exhaustion and as cultivation expanded to sites of low agricultural productivity, greater inputs of labor resulted in diminishing returns and competition for available resources. Kamakau’s writings provide anecdotal support that hunger was a significant concern and that those on marginal lands had to struggle to feed themselves. “Sometimes famine, bitter famine, came over the land because it had become parched through the excessive heat of the sun and the lack of rain.”40 Further, Patrick

Kirch suggests that increasing social stratification and population growth among a large and powerful elite class placed heavier demands for tribute and taxation on Hawaiian commoners.41 Together, natural climatic variability and social organization tended toward scarcity for Hawaiian commoners.

One means of alleviating famine was turning from agriculture to foraging. David

Malo, a missionary-educated nineteenth-century Hawaiian scholar, listed the many different wild plants that served as food in time of famine.42 Hawaiian planters also responded to famine by breeding new crop varieties. Kamakau wrote that in times of hunger planters cultivated some sweet potatoes that could be harvested in as little as four to five weeks, and when food was more abundant they planted varieties that took longer

40 Kamakau, The Works of the People of Old, 31; see also p. 25.

41 Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings, 190-210.

42 , Hawaiian Antiquities, trans. N. B. Emerson (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1903), 68.

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time to mature but bore fruit that was less susceptible to rot. Indeed, Hawaiians developed a multitude of plant varieties from their original portmanteau biota, not only to address food shortages, but to maximize productivity in diverse microclimates, fulfill different medical, ritual, and utilitarian needs, and offer great variety of diet. From the small stock of original crop plants in the Polynesian portmanteau biota, Hawaiian farmers bred an array of cultigens.43

Hawaiians thus adapted their original Polynesian imports to meet conditions on the archipelago, even as they altered the Hawaiian environment to suit the needs of those imports. The Hawaiian environment had become an anthropogenic one as the social structures, agricultural practices, legal systems of the Polynesian transported landscape, as well as the very components of the Polynesian portmanteau biota, became distinctly

Hawaiian over the centuries of settlement. Hawaiians developed a society and culture that prioritized the productive development of , defined social class based on agricultural production, and favored centralized, hierarchical control of land and resources. The relationship between people and environment would undergo major disruption with the advent of new imports to Hawaiʻi beginning in the late eighteenth century.

43 Kamakau, The Works of the People of Old, 27, 34, 38-39. For greater detail on the varieties of Hawaiian crops see E. S. Craighill Handy, The Hawaiian Planter, vol. 1, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 161 (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1940) and E. S. Craighill Handy, Elizabeth Green Handy, and Mary Kawena Pukui, Native Planters in Old Hawaii: Their Life, Lore, and Environment, Bernice P. Bishop Museum Bulletin 233 (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1972).

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Western Invasions

In 1778 the famed British explorer James Cook landed at Hawaiʻi on his third voyage of discovery, ending at least 500 years of complete isolation and unleashing a new wave of ecological invasion upon the archipelago. While some early Hawaiians may have maintained sporadic contact with the Society and Marquesas Islands for a few generations following first settlement, the Polynesian invasion can be thought of in general terms as a single event. This is categorically different from the western invasion—or rather invasions—which initiated an era of continual contact between

Hawaiʻi and the outside world. If the former was a case of a few invaders sneaking over a gate, the latter saw a host of invaders batter the gate down. Indeed, even the designation of a “western” invasion is inadequate in describing contact. Though Americans and

Britons were the most common visitors to Hawaiʻi, people from many regions of Asia, the Americas, and Europe contributed to the invasions that began in the late eighteenth century. The publication of Cook’s voyage narratives in the early 1780s, with news of a potential Pacific fur trade and the story of Cook’s death in an altercation on the Big

Island, brought regular outside attention to and contact with Hawaiʻi. The first trading ship stopped there in 1785; frequent visits from whalers, merchants, and well publicized expeditions by several renowned explorers followed. Each new visit was an opportunity for the ecological invasion of plants, animals, and diseases, the cumulative effects of which radically changed Hawaiian environment and society.

Along with non-Hawaiians and their portmanteau biota, contact brought new cultural and economic invasions. Cook and those who followed him did not simply note

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Hawaiʻi’s existence; they placed it within their framework of knowledge regarding

Pacific and tropical islands. They arrived in Hawaiʻi with an established notion of what a place like Hawaiʻi should be like. Further, the foreigners who arrived at the islands were not indifferent to the islands. They saw the islands as something to be used, just as they saw other places and their resources. These cultural and economic invasions operated with ecological invasion to destabilize Hawaiian society and alter the archipelago’s environment.

Among the new invasions, cattle stand out as a case of ecological and cultural forces amplifying each other. George Vancouver introduced four cows and two bulls from California to Hawaiʻi Island in 1793, which alone might have caused significant disruption on the island: Hawaiian flora lacked natural defenses such as thorns or toxins that are found in plants that have coevolved with ungulates, and cows spread invasive weeds into forests as they ate and trampled native plants. Cultural conditions on Hawaiʻi intensified this invasion’s impact, however. Vancouver, wanting to establish in Hawaiʻi a depot for resupplying British ships, convinced , then the king of the Big

Island, to proclaim a kapu (a Hawaiian religious proscription, the etymological sibling of the Polynesian taboo) against killing cattle for ten years. Motivated by the prospect of good trade relations with Vancouver, Kamehameha readily agreed to his request. The cattle population on Hawaiʻi, and then on the other islands, irrupted quickly. These and other quadrupeds, especially goats and European pigs—which are much larger and more

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aggressive than their Polynesian counterparts—went feral in Hawaiian forests, destroying native plants and the native fauna that depended upon those plants.44

Early nineteenth century observers noted the depredations cattle caused to

Hawaiian crops. The Russian explorer Urey Lisianski wrote that by 1805, “Some cattle, which Captain Vancouver left in this island, have very much multiplied…It is said, that some time ago a herd came down from the mountains, and committed great ravages in the plantations in the valleys.”45 A year later, Hawaiians had transported a bull to Maui, where according to the trader Amasa Delano, he “made great destruction amongst their sugar canes and gardens, breaking into them and their cane patches, and tearing them to pieces with his horns and digging them up with his feet.”46 Cattle were thus invaders of both Hawaiʻi’s natural and agricultural environments. Hawaiian farming sites, based upon a Polynesian transported landscape unaccustomed to ungulates, were nearly as defenseless against roaming cattle as the native forests. The cultural disruption caused by cattle goes beyond the familiar conflict between farmers and pastoralists, though. Cattle challenged the Hawaiian system of land use, property rights, and

44 Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 326-330; John Ryan Fischer, “Cattle in Hawaiʻi: Biological and Cultural Exchange,” Pacific Historical Review 76 (2007): 347-372. Historians have noted the intertwined ecological and cultural ramifications of quadruped introduction and population irruption in various contexts. See Crosby, Ecological Imperialism; Elinor G. K. Melville, A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of Mexico (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Virginia DeJohn Anderson, Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

45 Urey Lisiansky, A Voyage Round the World in the Years 1803, 4, 5, and 6 Performed by Order of His Imperial Majesty, Alexander the First, Emperor of Russia in the Ship Neva (London: John Booth, 1814), 135.

46 Amasa Delano, Narrative of Voyages and Travels in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres: Comprising Three Voyages Round the World Together with a Voyage of Survey and Discovery in the Pacific and Oriental Islands (Boston: E.G. House, 1817), 389.

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liabilities. Constructing adequate protections against roaming cattle, developing a system to address issues of liability for the damage they caused, and addressing the destruction of forest commons resources were all consequences of Hawaiʻi’s bovine invasion. The interactions of a western desire to use Hawaiʻi to support global trade and travel, the

Hawaiian religious and political authority, and the habits of these large animals thus had a significant on Hawaiian environment and society.

Other examples of the impact of ecological invasion abound. In 1826, a whaler drained its water casks at a stream near Lāhainā, inadvertently introducing what were possibly the first mosquitoes (Culex quinquefasciatus) to Hawaiʻi. The mosquitoes were vectors for bird pox and avian malaria, which quickly spread to many of Hawaiʻi’s endemic birds. Hawaiʻi’s celebrated avifauna, which evolved with no immunity to the disease, were consequently essentially banished from elevations below 3,000 feet, territory now claimed by the mosquitoes.47 In addition to causing the extinction of many species, avian malaria disrupted the birds’ former habitats, where coevolved plants dependent upon these birds to spread pollen and seeds and other members of these ecosystems.

The changes caused by cattle and mosquitoes, though severe, were far less devastating for Native Hawaiians than the invasion of human diseases. Syphilis, cholera, smallpox, influenza, and other pathogens previously absent from Hawaiʻi struck throughout the nineteenth century, claiming thousands of lives. Hawaiʻi’s early censuses tell a tragic story: the kingdom’s first census counted 130,313 people in 1831, a decline

47 Ziegler, Hawaiian Natural History, 353-54; Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 243.

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of 67 percent from an estimated population of 400,000 before Cook’s first visit. A century after contact, the census of 1878 counted 44,088 Hawaiians and 3,420 people of partial Hawaiian descent, a decline of 88 percent from the estimated pre-contact population.48 Though some of that decrease was doubtless caused by factors unrelated to disease, such as emigration, the decline is nonetheless a stark contrast from the rapid population growth experienced before the invasion of alien diseases. These figures also correspond with the geographer William Denevan’s model for tropical virgin soil epidemics. Denevan calculated that native populations of North American tropical lowlands decreased at least 90 percent in the first century after contact with European diseases.49

Even allowing that the exact size of the pre-contact Hawaiian population remains unknown, the introduction of diseases demoralized the Hawaiian people and destabilized their society. The Hawaiian social order, based upon agricultural production as the link between commoner and elite, faced crises of supply and management. As disease ravaged the Hawaiian population, the chiefly class compensated for shortages by pressing the

48 James King, second lieutenant on Cook’s expedition, estimated the Hawaiian population to be around 400,000. While contemporary observers and more recent scholars have debated King’s accuracy, calculations by Kirch and others support King’s figure. European and American visitors to Hawaiʻi in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as scholars in the twentieth century, argued that King grossly overestimated the Hawaiian population, which may have been as low as 100,000. In the late twentieth century, David Stannard argued that the pre-contact Hawaiian population was closer to 800,000: David Stannard, Before the Horror: The Population of Hawaiʻi on the Eve of Western Contact (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1989). Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings, 129-130. For Hawaiian census numbers and epidemics, see Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977), 7, 25, and 58.

49 William M. Denevan, “The Pristine Myth: The Landscape of the Americas in 1492,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 82 (1992): 369-85.

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commoners for greater contributions of tax and labor.50 Inter-island warfare increased as well, and bloody campaigns aided by foreign military technology further weakened the populace. Kamehameha I, a high-ranking chief on the Big Island at the time of Cook’s arrival, initiated a series of wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, ultimately unifying the Hawaiian Group under his control. The diversion of commoners from agricultural to military activities and the destruction of agricultural land further destabilized Hawaiian society and its subsistence patterns.51

Demands on commoners increased further as Hawaiʻi joined the world economy.

What had once been an insular system, in which labor and produce remained in Hawaiʻi, became more porous. The elite saw status and utility in western goods which foreign traders and whalers traded for food supplies. Kamehameha I monopolized the lucrative trade in 1811, requiring commoners to harvest the from mountain forests and then contracting with traders to sell it in China. Commoners also found opportunities to sell their labor as sailors aboard vessels that landed in the islands.

Diminished in numbers and occupied supplying chiefs and traders, the people who had farmed Hawaiʻi so intensively retreated from many agricultural lands.

The Hawaiʻi that westerners first saw was thus in a state of drastic flux following the initial western ecological invasions. As many scholars have demonstrated in the examination of colonial North American, the environments that European settlers encountered in the decades and centuries following initial ecological invasion were much

50 Caroline Ralston, “Hawaii 1778-1854: Some Aspects of Makaʻainana Response to Rapid Cultural Change,” Journal of Pacific History 19 (1984): 21-40.

51 Robert C. Schmitt, “Famine Mortality in Hawaii,” Journal of Pacific History 5 (1970): 109-115.

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emptier of humans and closer to the notion of a pristine wilderness than they were at the moment of first contact.52 Unaware of many of the changes ecological invasion had caused, however, early western visitors to the islands attempted to make sense of Hawaiʻi and its environment within the context of social constructions of the tropics and other

Pacific islands.

Western conceptions of the archipelago relied on a tradition of Orientalism and geographic determinism. Centuries of colonialism and exploration had produced a system of geography that divided the world into different climatic regions. According to this scheme, European climates were the balanced, temperate ideal against which scholars and travelers contrasted other climates. Tropical climates were intemperate; their extreme heat and humidity produced abundance of both the benefits and hazards of the natural environment.53 Through the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Europeans and Americans saw the earth’s hotter regions as places of fertility, where many plants could grow with little cultivation, but they were also places that could weaken the constitutions of people from temperate climes, and where rampant disease could claim their lives.54

Alexander von Humboldt, the preeminent German explorer and naturalist, systematized western understandings of the tropics by delineating global isothermal lines

52 See Denevan, “Pristine Myth” for an overview of this argument.

53 Arnold, The Tropics and the Traveling Gaze, 110-115; Stepan, Picturing Tropical Nature, 15- 24.

54 Karen Ordahl Kupperman, “Fear of Hot Climates in the Anglo-American Colonial Experience,” The William and Mary Quarterly 41 (1984), 213-240; Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006).

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and climatic zones based on average temperatures, weather patterns, and the presence of certain types of plants and animals. According to Humboldt, in the tropics plants such as sugarcane, , and bananas could grow without much need for human cultivation.

Humboldt reified the notion of the tropics as over-fecund and luxuriant. In his view, the abundance of plant life retarded the progress of civilization. Humboldt wrote, “The very wealth of nature has retained [native inhabitants of the tropics] in indolence and barbarism.” Europeans and Americans relying on Humboldt thus categorized tropical climates with material observations which formed the basis for ethnocentric and racialized inferences about the region’s human inhabitants.55

Early accounts of the Hawaiian Islands depicted a land of tropical fertility and beauty. An article for the North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal dated May

1816 claimed that in Hawaiʻi “all the tropical fruits, and most of the productions of the temperate zone are, or may be produced in profusion.”56 Otto von Kotzebue, the leader of a Russian expedition to the Pacific in the years 1815-1818, wrote, “Woahoo [sic] is acknowledged, both by Europeans and by the natives, to be the most fruitful of the whole group; it is called the garden of the Sandwich islands, and it has a right to this name, on account of its extraordinary high state of cultivation, united with the greatest natural beauties…Close to the shore you see verdant vallies [sic] adorned with palm and banana-

55 Alexander von Humboldt, Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctal Regions of America, During the Years 1799-1804, by Alexander von Humboldt and Aimé Bonpland, vol. 2, ed. and trans. Thomasina Ross (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1852), 289; Stepan, Picturing Tropical Nature, 35-43.

56 “Sandwich Islands,” The North American Review and Miscellaneous Journal, May 1816.

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, under which the habitations of the savages lie scattered.”57 Descriptions such as these abounded during the first decades of the nineteenth century, as Euro-American interest in the archipelago grew.

Not only were European and American visitors common in Honolulu and

Lāhainā—the major port on the island of Maui—in the early nineteenth century, but

Hawaiians began to travel abroad, as well. Regarded by western ship captains as good sailors, many Hawaiians joined the crews of visiting ships. By 1804 Hawaiians were living in Oregon fur posts, and by 1809 at least three Hawaiians came to New England.

Of these, Henry ʻŌpūkahaʻia was the most well-known and influential. His encounter with Protestant revivalists fomented the rise of Christian interest in the islands, and in

1820 the first delegation from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign

Missions (ABCFM) arrived in Hawaiʻi.

After the establishment of ABCFM missions, dispatches from Hawaiʻi became regular features in American religious newspapers in addition to scientific, literary, and general interest magazines. The missionary Charles Stewart published several editions of his Journal and had the work excerpted in American and British Christian newspapers.

Upon his arriving at Oʻahu for the first time, Stewart wrote that the island

Burst on the eye in beautiful panoramic view; presenting first the bay of [Waikiki], encircled by heavy groves of the cocoa-nut, and other luxuriant trees…There was much of natural beauty before us. All was in a glow of brightness; but there was a want of life and elasticity, that forced itself at

57 Otto von Kotzebue, A Voyage of Discovery, into the South Sea and Bearing Straits, for the Purpose of Exploring a North-East Passage, Undertaken in the Years 1815-1818, at the Expense of his Highness the Chancellor of the Empire, Count Romanzoff, in the Ship Rurick, Under the Command of the Lieutenant in the Russian Imperial Navy, Otto von Kotzebue, vol. 1, trans H.E. Lloyd (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1821), 319

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once on the notice: a stillness…of a torrid clime, whose enervating and depressing temperature was plainly to be seen in the strong vibrations of heated air…[I saw] naked inhabitants, lounging about in listless inactivity.58

Stewart saw Oʻahu as a typical place of tropical extremes—of beauty and vegetative growth, but also of enervation and barbarism.

The stillness that Stewart remarked upon, however, belied the reality of Hawaiian society. Though certainly suffering from the consequences of western ecological invasions, Hawaiians had built a burgeoning economy tied to the whaling industry and maritime trade. With the only protected harbors near mid-Pacific whaling grounds and forests of valuable sandalwood, Hawaiʻi’s ports were becoming increasingly busy.

Between 1828 and 1840, approximately one hundred whaling vessels and thirty merchant ships visited the islands annually.59

Like Stewart, the missionaries of the ABCFM came to Hawaiʻi with a distinct and powerful conception of the state of cultivation on the archipelago and their own role in agriculture there. Upon arriving in Honolulu in 1828 after enduring the trials of a five- month ocean voyage from Boston, Laura Fish Judd, along with her husband Gerrit, began long and momentous careers as missionaries to Hawaiʻi. She wrote in her journal that she and her compatriots were to work in Hawaiʻi “until the land is filled with churches,

58 Charles Stewart, Journal of a Residence in the Sandwich Islands, During the Years 1823, 1824, and 1825: Including Remarks on the Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants; an Account of Lord Byron’s Visit in the H.M.S. Blonde; and a Description of the Ceremonies Observed at the Interment of the Late King and Queen in the Island of , 3rd London ed. (London: H. Fisher, Son, & P. Jackson, 1830), 92- 93.

59 Richard MacAllan, “Entrepôt to the World: ’s Observations of Trade via Hawaiʻi, 1828-1841,” The Hawaiian Journal of History 34 (2000), 93-111.

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schoolhouses, fruitful fields and pleasant dwellings.”60 The ethic of improvement—the religious obligation to cultivate the land—tied Christianity, civilization, and agriculture together for Judd and the ABCFM. Hawaiʻi, according to the missionaries, could not have “fruitful fields” without Christianity. Though the Hawaiian environment was an anthropomorphic one, ABCFM missionaries often failed to see it as such.

When the U.S. Exploring Expedition arrived at Hawaiʻi in 1840, Commander

Charles Wilkes found a place that combined tropical exoticness with temperate familiarity. “Dusty roads and barren plains [of Honolulu] can, in a few minutes, be exchanged for one of the most agreeable and delightful climates in the world, by a short ride to the valley of Nuʻuanau. The contrast is like passing from the torrid to the temperate zone.”61 Yet even if Honolulu’s natural environment evoked the torrid zone, its built environment did not. Oʻahu had “more the appearance of civilized land, with its churches and spires, than any other island in Polynesia.”62 Hawaiʻi had indeed been significantly altered to conform to western ideals of agriculture, society, and environment.

Wilkes, like many Europeans and Americans who preceded him to the archipelago, was influenced by discourses of land use, cultivation, and improvement in his view of Hawaiʻi. Wilkes repeatedly noted that Hawaiian land could become profitable under American cultivation. Wilkes’s narrative reads at times like a catalog of business

60 Laura Fish Judd, Honolulu: Sketches of Life in the Hawaiian Islands from 1828 to 1861, ed. Dale L. Morgan (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1966), 7.

61 Wilkes, Narrative, vol. 3, 390.

62 Ibid, 373.

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opportunities. In a representative example of many entries, he reported: “On the banks of the ʻEwa [on Oʻahu] are many thousand acres of land wholly unoccupied, which are capable of growing cotton, sugar-cane, indigo, the mulberry, &c. to any extent.”63 Cane, again, was prominent among the agricultural uses Wilkes saw for Hawaiʻi.

Within two generations of contact, the Hawaiian agricultural system of taro and sweet potato cultivation and the social system of hierarchy mediated through control of land was facing a challenge from western invasions. Hawaiian society was in the process of reorganization in order to adapt to multiple disruptive ecological invasions and the intrusion of the world economy. Wilkes and the Exploring Expedition found a place that had undergone two drastic ecological invasions and had been remade by two cultural invasions. The environment was never a static paradise, but it was ecologically isolated.

The remoteness of the archipelago had allowed native organisms to evolve with fewer agents of natural selection than present in continental environments: few predators, little competition for food and . Ecological invasion changed that. Hawaiʻi’s native biota gave way first to Polynesian and then to European, Asian, and American plants and animals.

Successive ecological, cultural, and economic invasions remade Hawaiʻi from a place manipulated to support its local population to one where wealth was extracted in the form of agricultural produce. Changes in the land as well as changes in how people

63 Charles Wilkes, Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition During the Years 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1842, vol. 4 (London: Wiley and Putnam, 1845), 75; see also ibid., 58, 101, 214, and 250 for similar entries.

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saw, related to, and used the land positioned the archipelago to become one of the world’s foremost sugar producers in the ensuing decades of the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER 3: SUGAR WITHOUT RUM: HAWAIʻI’S MISSIONARIES AND THE FOUNDING OF THE SUGARCANE PLANTATION SYSTEM, 1821-1850

As well might you expect an oak to arrive at its imposing maturity, in a year, or two or three. It is impossible. It requires centuries to perfect it.—And the nature of things renders it absolutely necessary that it should have all that time, in which to grow, and knit its fibres together. And perfectly analogous to this, is the condition of a degraded nation, in its attempts to rise. The influences required to produce the result, are manifold; and few, very few of them are indigenous. Almost all of them must be introduced as exotics,—and undergo the slow acclimating process. Edwin O. Hall, ABCFM missionary to Hawaiʻi, 18481

In 1851, at the first annual meeting of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society

(RHAS) in Honolulu, a heated debate occupied the society’s members for the better part of two days. One member proposed a resolution that the society petition the Hawaiian

Legislature to repeal an 1840 law banning the manufacture of alcohol and allow

Hawaiian sugarcane planters to distill rum “to aid them in carrying on their plantations.”

The response to this proposal was fierce. William Little Lee, a native of Sandy Hill, New

York, alumnus, founding president of the RHAS, Chief Justice of the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court, Speaker of the Hawaiian House of Representatives, and a partner in the newly founded Lihue Plantation Company on the island of Kauaʻi, said he

1 , Answers to Questions Proposed by His Excellency, R. C. Wyllie, His Hawaiian Majesty’s Minister of Foreign Relations, and Addressed to All the Missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands, May, 1846 (Honolulu, 1848), 94.

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would “sooner sink his interest, or burn it, before he would distil [sic].” The proposed resolution failed by a wide margin.2

Rum—essentially a byproduct of sugar—had historically been a significant revenue stream for sugarcane planters throughout the Greater Caribbean, where most plantations had their own distilleries.3 Rum might have provided Lee and other Hawaiian planters with similar advantages without much trouble. Opportunities abounded to make

2 Journals of Stephen Reynolds, typescript, August 14 & 15, 1851, Hawaiian Collection, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaiʻi, Mānoa (HL). The “Law Prohibiting the Manufacture and Use of Intoxicating Drinks” was enacted October 1, 1840; Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, Translation of the Constitution of the Hawaiian Islands, Established in the Reign of Kamehameha III (Lahainaluna, 1842), 161-62. The historian Ralph Kuykendall ascribes the first ban on distilling to sometime about the summer of 1838; Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854: Foundation and Transformation (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1947), 163. The official minutes of the meeting praised those who debated the resolution for the “courteous…calm and deliberate manner” of the debate; Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society Transactions 1, no. 2 (1851), 18-20. The Polynesian, Honolulu’s leading newspaper, discussed the debate over rum distilling at length August 30, September 6, September 13, and October 4, 1851.

3 The anthropologist Sidney Mintz noted the ubiquity of distilleries in the British Caribbean, Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: the Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking, 1985), 35, 44, 49. The anthropologist Frederick H. Smith noted that “rum making became increasingly important to Caribbean sugar planters in the nineteenth century; Frederick H. Smith, Caribbean Rum: A Social and Economic History (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005), 194. The precise importance of alcohol to the bottom lines of the world’s sugarcane planters is unclear because the colonial powers governing sugar colonies often heavily taxed or otherwise regulated alcohol in order to favor metropolitan distilleries, and planters distilled spirits for local markets rather than, or in addition to, export. Alcohol was nevertheless an important product for planters. Barbados first began to export rum in the seventeenth century while other islands of the British Caribbean entered the market in the eighteenth century, until “nearly every planter had a still house;” Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 196. Small Jamaican plantations were exporting rum as well as sugar in the mid-eighteenth century; Michelle Harrison, King Sugar: Jamaica, the Caribbean, and the World Sugar Industry (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 13. In the late eighteenth century some Brazilian cane regions specialized in producing alcohol (rum, cachaça, and aguardente), but even the regions that did not specialize in distilling found that “sugar allowed them to break even, cachaça provided the profit;” Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 214, 121, 162-163. Cuban sugar producers began distilling rum for export by the end of the eighteenth century; Manuel Moreno Fraginals, The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in , 1760- 1860, trans. Cedric Belfrage (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), 122. In the early nineteenth century, many large plantations in Martinique used the byproduct of sugar production to produce rum for export and, more often, cheaper and lower-quality tafia for local consumption. Unlike Hawaiʻi, wood was scarce in Martinique, and some Martiniquais found alcohol production unprofitable in part because of the need for timber to fuel distilleries; Dale W. Tomich, Slavery in the Circuit of Sugar: Martinique and the World Economy, 1830-1848 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 184-185.

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money through making liquor. Hundreds of whaling and merchant ships with thousands of thirsty sailors stopped at Hawaiian ports annually, offering a ready market for alcohol.

The costs of importing foreign liquor were high, and domestic producers might have easily competed for this trade.4

Lee’s vehement opposition to distilling rum is all the more striking in the context of the Hawaiian environment and economy. In 1850-51, Lihue Plantation was afflicted by drought and a severe downturn in the market for sugar.5 In October 1851, one of Lee’s partners at Lihue bemoaned the “awfully hard times for planters and all other agriculturalists just now.”6 Lee himself acknowledged in March 1852, “[M]y operations in the farming line have as yet brought me no income.”7 It would seem that Hawaiian sugarcane planters such as Lee could have embraced rum production and the profits that

4 For a discussion of the Hawaiian liquor trade and the various attempts of the Hawaiian government to control the production and sale of alcohol, see Richard A. Greer, “Grog Shops and Hotels: Bending the Elbow in Old Honolulu,” Hawaiian Journal of History 28 (1994): 35-67. It is possible that some sugarcane growers or mill operators produced illicit rum, but demand for and the importation of alcohol remained high, suggesting rogue domestic distilling did not have a significant presence in the market. For example, Judge , who came to Hawaiʻi as an ABCFM missionary in 1828, observed that merchants diluted their alcohol in order to cover the costs of business, making it difficult for visiting sailors to imbibe to the point of drunkenness. “Judge Andrews’ Address,” Friend, January 1, 1848. The success of domestic beer producers suggests that sugarcane planters could have sold rum on advantageous terms. See the Polynesian, February 19, 1848 on the popularity and commercial success of local beer.

5 William Little Lee to Joel Turrill, Honolulu, March 24, 1852, Joel Turrill Letters, Hawaiian Collection, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaiʻi, Mānoa (HL). William Little Lee to Mrs. Stephen Lee (mother), Honolulu, July 26, 1852, Frederick B. Richards Collection, Crandall Public Library's Center for Folklife, History and Cultural Programs, Glens Falls, NY.

6 to Joel Turrill, Honolulu, October 9, 1851, Joel Turrill Letters, HL

7 Lee to Turrill, Honolulu, March 24, 1852, Joel Turrill Letters, HL.

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flowed from it in order to support their fledging sugar enterprises. Why, then, did Lee and his fellow planters undercut their own economic interests and produce sugar but no rum?8

The short answer is that many of Hawaiʻi’s influential early sugarcane planters were temperance men. Honolulu supported a robust community of haole teetotalers which sought to limit the havoc drunken sailors periodically visited upon Hawaiʻi’s port towns and to mitigate the depredations alcohol caused among Kānaka Maoli.9 But planters’ rejection of alcohol stemmed not only from a desire for law and order. Most

Hawaiian sugarcane planters of the 1840s and 50s rejected alcohol production because their religious and cultural roots lay in the Protestant revivals of early-nineteenth-century

New England and western New York.10 Opposition to the production and sale of liquor was one expression of the moral identity that subsumed their identity as planters.

8 Sugarcane planters in the Greater Caribbean faced their own economic obstacles in the mid- nineteenth century in the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. One important distinction between these cases is that in the Atlantic metropolitan governments imposed abolition upon colonial planters, while in Hawaiʻi planters themselves imposed restrictions. See Alan H. Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves: The Political Economy of , 1838-1904 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). As Adamson argues, the political power of Guianese planters enabled them to maintain control in the face of abolition. Likewise in Hawaiʻi, the political power of sugarcane planters enabled them to build a plantation system that conformed to their cultural ideals.

9 Honolulu and Lāhainā, Maui, the archipelago’s two main ports, were the sites of several riots and near-riots related to intoxicated sailors and sexual access to Hawaiian women in the 1820s and 30s. Riots also occurred occasionally in the 1840s and early 50s. See Hiram Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands; or the Civil, Religious, and Political History of Those Islands: Comprising a Particular View of the Missionary Operations Connected with the Introduction and Progress of Christianity and Civilization among the Hawaiian People, 3rd ed. (Canandiagua, New York: H. D. Goodwin, 1855; repr. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 274, 286, 313, 408. See also the Polynesian, November 21, 1846; Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854, 122-23, 231, 311-12.

10 On the relationship between alcohol and early-nineteenth-century Protestantism, see Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeeper’s Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); W. J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

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Growing sugarcane was much more than agriculture; it was an act invested with cultural and political meaning.11

The religious ideology that moved Lee and other planters to oppose distilling first arrived at Hawaiʻi in 1820, when the first company of the Boston-based American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions (ABCFM) established the Sandwich Islands

Mission. The proscription on distilling left a lasting mark on much of Hawaiian history, including the rise of the Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system.12 During the years when

11 Mintz, Sweetness and Power, remains the standard work to discuss the cultural meaning of sugar. While Mintz examined changes in the meaning of British consumption of sugar, others have examined cultural meanings of sugar production. A “planter class,” as the term suggests, requires some form of group identity and consciousness. See Dunn, Sugar and Slaves; Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Thomas D. Rogers, The Deepest Wounds: A Labor and Environmental History of Sugar in Northeast (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

12 On how missionaries developed the persuasive power to influence in early-nineteenth-century Hawaiʻi, see Peter R. Mills, “Folk Housing in the Middle of the Pacific: Architectural Lime, Creolized Ideologies, and Expressions of Power in Nineteenth-Century Hawaii,” in The Materiality of Individuality: Archaeological Studies of Individual Lives, ed. Carolyn L. White (New York: Springer, 2009), 75-91. The anthropologist Carol MacLennan recently argued that missionary ideologies of property and free labor “established an important course of action that bred the foundation for plantation capitalism.” Carol A. MacLennan, Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014), 2. See also Gavan Daws, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968); Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi: The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Paul T. Burlin, Imperial Maine and Hawaiʻi: Interpretive Essays in the History of Nineteenth-Century American Expansion, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Jennifer Fish Kashay, “Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth- Century Hawaʻi,” The New England Quarterly, 80 (2007): 280-298 for discussions of the role of missionary ideology in mid-nineteenth-century Hawaiʻi.

Many scholars have used the term “plantation system” with varying definitions. This essay uses the term to mean a culture, economy, and government policy directed toward the widespread use of land and natural resources for producing a monoculture export commodity. See Donald Worster, “Transformations of the Earth: Toward an Agroecological Perspective in History,” Journal of American History 76, no. 4 (1990): 1087-106; Rogers, The Deepest Wounds. Mintz noted the agro-industrial nature of the plantation system: “neither mill nor field could be separately (independently) productive.” As such, it demanded discipline, organization of the labor force into interchangeable units, strict scheduling in order to process perishable crops, the separation of production and consumption, and the separation of the worker from the worker’s equipment; Sweetness and Power, 51-52. Alan H. Adamson posited five components to the plantation system: relatively large size, agricultural production directed toward sale and export, the use of laborers from outside the family owner, the use of authority to organize collective action, and the investment of great capital in production processes; Adamson, Sugar without Slaves, 9-10. John R. McNeill 65

members and former members of the Sandwich Islands Mission were prominent in the

Hawaiian government—roughly the second quarter of the nineteenth century—their ideas and ideals about agriculture, trade, and social development influenced the formation of the plantation system. Though sugar production was erratic at this time, Hawaiian sugar exports increased from 4 tons in 1836 to 375 tons in 1850.13 Hawaiʻi did not become a major exporter of sugar until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when two reciprocity treaties (1876 and 1887) and then annexation (1898) gave Hawaiian sugarcane planters duty-free access to U.S. markets. Yet it was during the earlier decades of the nineteenth century—from the mid-1820s to mid-1850s, a time characterized by many failed and undercapitalized sugar ventures—that attitudes and policies promoting sugarcane planting took hold in Hawaiʻi.

The ban on distilling notwithstanding, the Hawaiian plantation system was no simple product of a unitary missionary ideology transplanted from New England.14

stressed the ecological changes resultant in the appropriation of lands by the plantation system, particularly , increased vulnerability to diseases, and soil exhaustion; John R. McNeill, “Envisioning an Ecological Atlantic, 1500-1800,” Nova Acta Leopoldina 114, no. 390 (2013): 21-33.

13 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977), 418.

14 Some have presented a view of missionary influence on the rise of Hawaiian sugarcane planting as monolithic and deterministic. Carol MacLennan, most notably, argued that “Hawaiʻi’s economy and its sugar-friendly political system in the 1930s can be traced back directly to the changes in Hawaiian land tenure and political economy that resulted from contact with Euro-American ideology of property as of human freedom, wealth, and the basis of civilization… The particular characteristics of the missionary-settler community determined the evolution of property and production in the islands after 1850.” MacLennan, Sovereign Sugar, 79-80. Scholars have come to question the idea of American cultural hegemony, and more often see cultural change as a combination of localized agents and influences. See Petra Goedde, “The of American Culture,” in A Companion to American Cultural History, ed. Karen Halttunen (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 246-262. See also Arif Dirlik, “Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies),” Journal of World History 16, no. 4 (December, 2005): 391-410.

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Hawaiʻi marks a spot where two historical trajectories of sugarcane converged: one that took the plant in the canoes of Pacific Islanders from its likely point of origin in New

Guinea to islands throughout Oceania, and another which wound through Asia, India, the

Middle East, the Mediterranean, Southern Europe, and the Atlantic World.15 Along each of these routes, people developed different methods of cultivation, use, and signification of sugarcane. What it meant to plant sugarcane in Hawaiʻi in the mid-nineteenth century—and therefore what Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry looked like—was the product of cultural encounters, adaptations, and negotiations; conscious decisions to turn to sugarcane planting for strategic purposes; and responses to ecological conditions dating back to the late eighteenth century.

The members of the Sandwich Islands Mission at first expressed antipathy toward cane planting. This contributed to social and political conflict between missionaries and those who wanted to develop commercial agricultural enterprises, including white,

Chinese, and Hawaiian entrepreneurs. Hawaiʻi’s missionaries initially supported policies to develop a society of small farmers, whose independence and industry would lead, they hoped, to Christian virtue. Gradually, however, missionaries and their allies came to embrace large-scale cane planting. The plantation system they sought was something similar to John Winthrop’s invocation to the : a city upon a hill, which placed religious morality and social commitment above the pursuit of personal gain. Missionaries sought to constrain sugarcane cultivation and use it to further a

Yankee Protestant cultural agenda. The plantations the missionaries hoped to develop

15 For the historical geography of sugar, see J. H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

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were to conform to their religious ideals, such as sobriety. Yet the ABCFM’s imported ideology underwent a process of creolization, and as challenges arose, missionary attitudes toward plantation agriculture shifted. By the early 1850s, with influential positions in government and persuasive power in Hawaiian society, missionaries lent crucial support to the development of a mode of agriculture they had previously opposed.

What began as an effort to use sugarcane as a means of supporting the Sandwich Islands

Mission, inducing cultural and social change among Hawaiians, and promoting Hawaiian interests as the missionaries perceived them, transformed into a system of directing

Hawaiian policy to promote the interests of sugarcane planters. By midcentury, political and popular opposition to distilling rum was one of the few remnants of the Sandwich

Islands Mission’s plantation upon a hill.

Sugar and Rum

Unlike the sugarcane plantation systems of the Greater Caribbean, which had no sugarcane before the arrival of Christopher Columbus, Hawaiians had been cultivating cane since their Polynesian ancestors brought the plant to the archipelago, some time around 1000 CE. From possibly a few distinct imported cane cuttings, Hawaiians developed over twenty named varieties of cane, each with different properties and uses.

Though pre-contact Hawaiians did not produce sugar, sugarcane played a significant role in Hawaiian diets, culture, and ecology.16 The nineteenth-century Hawaiian scholar

Samuel Kamakau noted that in pre-contact Hawaiʻi sugarcane was an important source of

16 S. Schenck, et al., “Genetic Diversity and Relationships in Native Hawaiian Saccharum officinarum Sugarcane,” Journal of Heredity 95 (2004): 327-331.

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sustenance during times of famine and a highly prized snack in times of plenty.17 People chewed raw cane and used its juice as a food sweetener; cane juice was an ingredient in some medicines; and the juice of several different varieties of cane were used in traditional love potions. Cane stalks were fashioned into spears and burned to make a dye, the leaves served as a wall covering, and the tassels were used as mulch. The tops of cane also served as articles of amusement; Hawaiians crafted them into darts, and used them to line hillside sled courses to reduce friction.18 Hawaiians grew cane in dedicated fields and small home gardens, on the fringes of irrigated taro pondfields, and on the embankments surrounding dryland taro and sweet potato plots. Sugarcane thus played an important role in the Hawaiian agricultural complex by supporting the cultivation of

Hawaiʻi’s staple crops. Lining pondfields, cane acted as a windbreak and absorbed taro paddies’ seepage. In dryland field systems, Hawaiian farmers used sugarcane to create a micro-orographic effect: rows of cane planted between fields and perpendicular to the trade winds pulled moisture from the air and onto the upwind sides of their fields, effectively irrigating taro and sweet potatoes planted amid the cane.19

17 Samuel M. Kamakau, The Works of the People of Old: Na Hana a ka Poʻe Kahiko, trans. Mary Kawena Pukui, ed. Dorothy B. Barrère (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1976), 39.

18 Handy, Handy, Pukui, Native Planters in Old Hawaii, 187; Beatrice H. Krauss, Plants in Hawaiian Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1993), 68, 89, 95. Archibald Menzies, Hawaii Nei 128 Years Ago, ed. William Frederick Wilson (Honolulu, 1920), 76 is the only source that notes the use of cane trash as mulch. According to the missionary William Richards, dry sledding was a favorite pastime of Hawaiian chiefs; see William Richards to Charles Wilkes, March 15, 1841, in Marshall Sahlins and Dorothy Barrère, eds., “William Richards on Hawaiian Culture and Political Conditions of the Islands in 1841,” Hawaiian Journal of History 7 (1973): 18-40.

19 T.N. Ladefoged et al., “Agricultural Potential and Actualized Development in Hawaiʻi: An Airborne LiDAR Survey of the Leeward Kohala Field System (Hawaiʻi Island),” Journal of Archaeological Science 38 (2011): 3607.

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Hawaiian cultivation of sugarcane took on new relevance in 1778, when James

Cook first arrived at Hawaiʻi. At the time of first contact between Europeans and

Hawaiians, European sugar consumption was increasing and European explorers expressed interest in the development of potential sources of sugar production. The world sugar economy was a dominant force driving tropical colonialism. In 1776, Adam Smith noted the profits of sugarcane cultivation were “generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America.”20 Demand for and production of sugar rose throughout the eighteenth century. The 1791 revolution in the

French Caribbean sugar-producing colony of Saint-Domingue crippled sugar production in one of the most important Atlantic sugar colonies, raising prices as well as concerns over the stability of plantation systems based upon slave labor. Though distance would have precluded any significant shift away from Atlantic sugar producers, interest in promoting sugarcane cultivation in other regions—such as the British East India

Company’s efforts in Bengal—grew.21

Beginning with Captain Cook, haole visitors to Hawaiʻi expressed interest in the islands as a potential source of sugar, and made particular note of cane growing in both cultivated and wild settings.22 Archibald Menzies, surgeon and naturalist for George

Vancouver’s 1792-1794 expeditions, reflected in his journal, “it might be well worth the

20 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 2 (New York, P. F. Collier & Son, 1902), 82.

21 Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry, 198-201.

22 See, e.g., Archibald Menzies, Hawaii Nei 128 Years Ago, 75, 77; Levi Chamberlain, Journal, vol. 9, July 18, 1828, HMCS.

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attention of Government to make the experiment and settle these islands by planters from the West Indies, men of humanity, industry and experienced abilities in the exercise of their art would ere in a short time be enabled to manufacture sugar and rum from luxuriant fields of cane equal if not superior to the produce of our West India plantations."23 The Russian explorer Urey Lisiansky similarly, though more succinctly, observed that the production of sugar and rum could “yield a tolerable revenue.”24 These men envisioned Hawaiʻi as a colonial sugar and rum producer in a mercantilist system, cultivating cane not as a fringe crop in the Polynesian agricultural complex, but as a commodity to supply distant markets.

Growing sugarcane and making sugar are two very different undertakings; while

Hawaiians had a great deal of experience with the former they had no knowledge of the latter. Turning sugarcane into sugar demands disciplined labor, equipment, and expertise.

In the early nineteenth century this was an arduous process that, as Sidney Mintz argued, wedded the field to the factory and brute labor to artisanal expertise.25 Mature Hawaiian cane, about fifteen to twenty feet tall, with a tough stalk and narrow, serrated-edge leaves that can grow to between five and six feet long projecting from the cane, must be cut close to the ground, where the sugar content is highest. The sucrose in cane degrades soon after cutting and so must be milled within twenty-four hours of harvesting. Once the cane was pressed, sugar boilers heated the extracted juice in a series of cauldrons where

23 Menzies, Hawaii Nei 128 Years Ago, 79.

24 Urey Lisiansky, A Voyage Round the World, in the Years 1803,4, 5, & 6….(London: John Booth and Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, & Brown, 1814), 128.

25 Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 46-52.

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water was evaporated and impurities removed. A sugar master would watch the boiling liquid closely to determine when the liquid had reached that point that sucrose crystals could form. This muddy-looking substance was then moved to large cases where it cooled and formed crystalline sugar and . Once cool, it was transferred to vessels that drain the molasses from the sugar, which then could be packaged for storage, shipment, and sale.

Sugarcane is also the primary component of rum. Rum may be distilled either from the skimmings and molasses that are byproducts of sugar or from the less-processed juice of the sugarcane.26 Cane-juice rum, which requires less specialized equipment or technical expertise than sugar production, was the first step away from the

Hawaiian system of sugarcane cultivation and use. Hawaiians produced other fermented beverages, but there is no record of using sugarcane to make alcohol until the advent of

European distilling knowledge and metal containers.27 The voyager John Turnbull, who sailed throughout the Pacific from the year 1800 to 1804, observed that in Hawaiʻi King

Kamehameha employed “Europeans settled in his to extract spirits from the sugar canes, which grow there of an excellent quality.”28

26 There is little regulation of the term “rum,” and it has been applied to alcohol from a number of different sources. The French made separate designations for cane-juice rum (rhum agricole) and molasses rum (rhum industriel).

27 Distilling technology was not applied only to sugarcane. The use of rudimentary stills to distill the root of the ti plant was common among aliʻi. Archibald Campbell, A Voyage Round the World, from 1806 to 1812…. 2d Amer. ed. (New York: Broderick and Ritter, 1819), 133

28 John Turnbull, A Voyage Round the World: In the Years 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803, and 1804…. vol. 2 (London: Printed for Richard Phillips by T. Gillet, 1805), 66.

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Similar enterprises followed in which foreign entrepreneurs collaborated with aliʻi (members of the Hawaiian chiefly class), who could control land and labor. Don

Francisco de Paula Marín, a Spaniard with knowledge of , winemaking, and distilling, operated a sugar mill in Honolulu, possibly in partnership with the King from about 1812 to 1825.29 Thomas Thrum, a publisher and antiquarian in late-nineteenth- century Honolulu, wrote in 1875 that in the early nineteenth century sugar and molasses production “doubtless with the view of rum making” was extensive in early-nineteenth- century Hawaiʻi.30 These cases of sugar and rum production were very limited, sporadic, and directed toward local consumption or small trade.

When the first ABCFM missionaries arrived at Hawaiʻi in 1820, they found these small sugar- and rum-making operations, as well as other enterprises directed toward supplying visiting whalers and the intensive extraction of Hawaiian sandalwood, which was highly valued in China. The Sandwich Islands Mission soon developed an adversarial relationship with resident haole merchants, who accused the missionaries of stifling business through their efforts to direct Hawaiians’ attention to religious, not worldly matters. However, Hawaiʻi’s missionaries were a more ideologically diverse and flexible lot than their detractors often acknowledged. Significant differences in theology and degree of commitment as well as more mundane generational differences characterized the missionaries, who arrived in the islands as twelve separate companies

29 Robert L. Cushing, “Beginnings of Sugar Production in Hawaiʻi,” Hawaiian Journal of History 19 (1985): 17-34.

30 Thomas G. Thrum, “Notes on the History of the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1875 (Honolulu, 1876), p. 35. Before he turned to publishing, Thrum spent five years in the 1860s working in the sugar industry.

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over the course of twenty-eight years.31 Geography also kept the missionaries apart: most worked in their own isolated mission stations across the archipelago, and only convened as a group in Honolulu every year or so for the Sandwich Islands Mission’s annual meeting. The ABCFM itself was also changing in ideology and practice through the nineteenth century.32

Missionary attitudes toward sugarcane cultivation and agriculture in general were ambivalent and laden with tension. On one hand, in the 1820s, the ABCFM altered its theoretical approach to missionary work by emphasizing “Christianizing” over

“civilizing” the people they hoped to convert.33 Missionaries were to maintain a narrow focus on preaching and promoting religious morality, and to avoid involvement in secular and political affairs.

31 Similar cases of English Protestant settler societies turning to sugarcane planting occurred in the Greater Caribbean. English Puritans established the short-lived Providence Island colony in 1630; see Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Providence Island, 1630-1641: The Other Puritan Colony (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Anglican missionaries with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, originally in Barbados to convert slaves, became planters and slave owners themselves. As a result, the SPG’s ideology concerning slavery softened to the point that it damaged the organization’s credibility; see Travis Glasson, Mastering Christianity: Missionary Anglicanism and Slavery in the Atlantic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

32 Most ABCFM missionaries were Congregationalists while a minority was Presbyterians. The historian Gavan Daws wrote that the ABCFM and Sandwich Islands Mission were more concerned with saving souls than with any particular doctrinal affiliation; Daws, Shoal of Time, 62. For an account of early missionary theology, see Sandra E. Wagner, “Mission and Motivation: The Theology of the Early American Mission in Hawaiʻi,” Hawaiian Journal of History 19 (1985): 62-70. Paul William Harris, Nothing but Christ: Rufus Anderson and the Ideology of Protestant Foreign Missions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) offers an informative account of both ideological diversity within Sandwich Islands Mission and changes within the ABCFM. The motivations and attitudes of early-nineteenth-century American missionaries were often complex and varied; see, for example, Andrew C. Isenberg, “‘To See Inside of an Indian’: Missionaries and Dakotas in the Minnesota Borderlands,” in Conversion: Old World and New, ed. Kenneth Mills and Anthony Grafton (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 218- 240.

33 Harris, Nothing but Christ.

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On the other hand, in their minds Christianity and “civilization” were two closely interrelated attributes of the same culture. This broader attitude toward missionary work found expression in the original mandate of the Sandwich Islands Mission. Rev. Hiram

Bingham, a member of the first company of missionaries who also became influential among Hawaiʻi’s ruling chiefs, wrote that the object of the Sandwich Islands Mission was not only to turn Hawaiians to “the service and enjoyment of the living God” but also to

“extend among them the more useful arts and usages of civilized and Christianized society, and to fill…those important islands with schools and churches, fruitful fields, and pleasant dwellings.”34 Further supporting the mission’s interest in “fruitful fields,”

Daniel Chamberlain, a farmer, accompanied the first company of missionaries as a non- ordained assistant missionary. However, “there not being a demand for his labor as a farmer,” Chamberlain left Hawaiʻi.35

Whatever their internal differences and distinctions between Christianization and civilization, the ABCFM missionaries shared a common set of values that, as the anthropologist Sally Engle Merry noted, “prefigure the values of industrial capitalism”: industry, thrift, self-governance, self-restraint, and commitment to the enduring, property- owning family.36 The tension between narrowly religious and broadly cultural goals of the missionaries became more complicated as the missionaries established close

34 Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, 60-61.

35 Rufus Anderson, History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions: Hawaiian Islands, vol. II (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1875), 380.

36 Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi, 225-26. See also, Harris, Nothing but Christ, 11 for a discussion on the false dichotomization of “Christianization” and “civilization.”

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relationships with Hawaiʻi’s ruling chiefs. In 1825, missionaries had converted

Kaʻahumanu, the kuhina nui (approximate equivalent of a regent or prime minister) of the kingdom and the head of a powerful elite Maui family group, along with other politically powerful aliʻi. As a Christian, Kaʻahumanu implemented laws that conformed to her religious morality, especially concerning sexual behavior, restricting activity on Sundays, and sobriety. Apart from a brief struggle for political power following Kaʻahumanu’s death in 1832, ABCFM missionaries remained close to Hawaiʻi’s rulers, first as informal teachers and advisors, and then in the 1830s and 40s as formal government officials.37

Close personal relationships with Hawaiʻi’s ruling aliʻi were crucial for agricultural enterprise because those chiefs controlled Hawaiian lands and could exact labor from Hawaiian makaʻāinana (commoners). Hawaiʻi’s rulers distributed lands in units of administrative control based on descending social and political rank and decreasing in area from entire islands (mokupuni) to progressively smaller regions (moku, ahupuaʻa, and ʻili). Commoners resided on their lands on the basis of family history and the fulfillment of obligations to chiefs in labor and goods. All lands remained under royal control; all subordinate land rights were revocable at a chief’s or the monarch’s will.38

37 Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi, 40-50; Patrick V. Kirch and Marshall Sahlins, Anahulu: The Anthropology of History in the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, vol. 1, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press: 1994), 120-22. The missionary William Richards left the mission in 1838 to become a government advisor and ambassador; Gerrit Judd, a missionary doctor became Minister of Finance in 1842; the missionary Lorrin Andrews became a judge in 1845; and the missionary Richard Armstrong became Minister of Public Instruction in 1848.

38 The Constitution of 1840 described all Hawaiian lands as historically held and managed by the monarch on behalf of the people. On Hawaiian land tenure, property rights, and labor, see David Malo, Hawaiian Antiquities (Moolelo Hawaii), trans. Nathaniel B. Emerson (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1903); Kirch and Sahlins, Anahulu; Lilikalā Kameʻeleihiwa, Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea Lā E Pono Ai? How Shall We Live in Harmony? (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992); Patrick V. Kirch, How Chiefs Became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawaiʻi 76

The cooperation of governing chiefs was therefore crucial to any business that needed secure access to land, natural resources, and a large labor force.

In the 1820s, the Hawaiian economy, chiefly attention, and commoners’ labor were primarily focused on the sandalwood trade. Sugar making in the 1820s was so rudimentary that missionaries and the government rarely gave much notice to the enterprise, and it continued as before with foreigners and individual chiefs partnering for small operations. In February 1826, John Wilkinson, who arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1825 with experience planting cane in the , was in the process of erecting a watermill for a sugarcane plantation at Mānoa, at the outskirts of Honolulu. Despite the setback of losing part of his mill’s dam to a rain swell, Wilkinson told Levi Chamberlain

(no relation to Daniel Chamberlain), the mission’s secular agent, that in another six months he expected the approximately 6 ¼ acres he had planted in cane to produce 10 tons of sugar.39 Chamberlain did not record how Wilkinson came up with his estimate for sugar production, but it seems like a highly optimistic one. Calculations for sugar production in Jamaica at the turn of the nineteenth century posited about 160 tons of sugar per 300 acres of cane for the average plantation on that island—just over 1 ton per

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). Sahlins notes that hierarchical power over land and labor was not absolute or uncontested; Kameʻeleihiwa notes that commoners had many rights and protections within the Hawaiian system, and argues that social order was in many ways based on reciprocal relations. Nevertheless, ultimate power over land and labor rested with the monarchy and its allied chiefs.

39 Levi Chamberlain, Journal February 24, 1826. Other sources indicate that Wilkinson’s plantation may have been as large as about 100 acres; see Thrum, “Notes on the History of the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands,” Hawaiian Almanac, 1875. The discrepancy may be attributed to the area of land under his control and the area of cane under cultivation at that time.

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2 acres.40 Conditions were significantly different on Jamaica and Hawaiʻi: Jamaica’s soil and forests had been depleted, but its plantations also had the benefit of greater economies of scale, more advanced milling equipment, more experienced mill operators, and a larger, enslaved labor force. By the 1840s other Hawaiian plantations with better mills than Wilkinson’s were producing an average of one ton per acre.41 Such optimistic predictions of early Hawaiian planters suggest just how out of touch they were with the ways of the sugar industry.

In Wilkinson’s case, an over-optimistic view of planting gave way to a much more somber reality: he died that September, and management of the plantation transferred to , the governor of Oʻahu. Boki employed over one hundred Hawaiian laborers at a rate of two dollars per week at his plantation and was also able to have a good cart road built, yet he could not keep the mill working. Chamberlain visited again in

November of 1826 and found that the mill was only able to boil enough to make half a barrel of sugar.42

Boki did not abandon the mill. He partnered with a group of haole Honolulu merchants, and the plantation soon had about 100 acres in cane planted and a distillery

40 Bryan Edwards, The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British West Indies, vol. 2 (London: T. Miller, 1819), 287-290 cited in Deer, The History of Sugar, vol. 2, 333-334.

41 Polynesian, August 1, 1846, p. 42; J. B. De Fiennes, Report on Koloa Plantation, June 4, 1845, Appendix U, no. 4 Report of the Proceedings and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd & Co. (Honolulu: Government Press, 1846), Appendix 102.

42 Levi Chamberlain Journal, November 30, 1826, HMCS.

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built.43 The distillery attracted particular missionary attention. In February 1827, Levi

Chamberlain recorded in his journal that “a hula or native dance has been performed this afternoon at the sugar plantation Manoa, attended by the King and others as spectators.

The performers were we are told persons belonging to Honolulu—The amusement was connected with intemperance. Just at evening we saw a company returning on horse back

[sic]—some of them apparently the worse for liquor. In the company were several foreigners.”44 That July, a merchant observed that Boki was making sugar “with fine success.” By December 1828, Dr. Seriere, “a man of much information, having traveled to most parts of the world,” had built a large distillery at Mānoa, but failed to produce much rum.45 Chamberlain and the missionaries of the ABCFM came from the same schools and religious backgrounds as those who fervently called for total abstinence from alcohol in the 1810s. These early temperance advocates saw alcohol as a civic, moral, and religious scourge.46 The missionaries shared this view, and also perceived in liquor a potent threat to Kānaka Maoli health, industry, and chances of acquiring American civilization.

In this instance, political divisions among the Hawaiian elite doomed Boki’s operation and facilitated a temperance attitude toward sugar. Kaʻahumanu saw Boki as a political rival and sought to limit his wealth and influence; Kaʻahumanu’s Christianity

43 Gavan Daws, “The High Chief Boki: A Biographical Study in Early Nineteenth Century Hawaiian History,” Journal of the Polynesian Society 75, no. 1 (1966): 79.

44 Levi Chamberlain Journal, February 9, 1827, HMCS.

45 “Honolulu in Primitive Days,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1901 (1900)74-87.

46 Rorabaugh Alcoholic Republic, 191.

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and close ties with the missionaries gave her the justification to take action against the plantation and distillery.47 Meanwhile, Rev. Hiram Bingham, an early missionary leader, saw the distillery as a major threat to his mission. Bingham argued that “the culture of the cane, , and the poppy, is right, only where the probability is that the result will be good, and should not be encouraged where the probability is strong that the result will be evil.”48 He encouraged Kaʻahumanu to have Boki’s cane plantation ripped up and the distillery razed. Bingham’s argument subordinated the agricultural and economic development of the islands to the missionaries’ religious morality.49

Other missionaries were not quite so absolutist as Bingham, and were willing to look upon sugarcane as more than just the precursor ingredient to rum. Some missionaries even took to growing cane and making sugar. These efforts were amateurish, geared toward local consumption rather than trade, and certainly not aimed at any market beyond Hawaiʻi. In January 1829, Joseph Goodrich processed a crop of sugarcane and produced “probably more [sugar and molasses] than I shall need for my own family.” Goodrich’s mill was “one of my own construction consisting of 3 upright wooden cylinders about 14 inches in diameter…I suppose similar to sugar mills in general: mine however is turned by hand.”50 Though probably well suited for Goodrich’s

47 Kirch and Sahlins, Anahulu, vol. 1, 67-81. See also Jennifer Fish Kashay, “Native, Foreigner, Missionary, Priest: Western Imperialism and Religious Conflict in Early 19th-Century Hawaiʻi,” Cercles 5 (2002): 3-10.

48 Bingham, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, 340; emphasis in the original.

49 Char Miller, Fathers and Sons: The Bingham Family and the American Mission (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982).

50 Joseph Goodrich Journal, January 9, 1829, HMCS. 80

aims, this was a simple design for a mill. By the early nineteenth century, most sugar producers had replaced the vertical mill for a layout with three rollers arranged horizontally, and water or draught animals provided the necessary force. Goodrich’s mill would have extracted only a fraction of the cane juice—and thus produced only a fraction of the sugar—that contemporary mills were capable of.

Crude though Goodrich’s mill may have been, his and similar projects were geared toward inculcating a New England Protestant ideal of virtuous industry among

Kānaka Maoli, either through example or by enlisting their labor directly. In their mission station reports, missionaries throughout the archipelago recorded their efforts to teach American farming practices. Many Hawaiians were adept farmers, but missionaries complained that the work required to grow the staple taro was so slight, and that the

Hawaiian environment was so fertile, that Hawaiians could easily subsist with hardly any physical effort.51 The missionaries did not simply want Hawaiians to be agriculturalists

(they already were); the missionaries wanted Hawaiians to grow marketable foods likes sugarcane so that they might acquire the means to purchase the consumer goods that would help them meet missionary standards of clothing and furniture, and thereby be able to live in moral Christian fashion.

51 These arguments were clearly based on cultural constructions that dissociated natives with industry. Focusing on the ease with which taro grows ignores the labor involved. Agricultural labor was valorized in Hawaiian society. Kamehameha I famously joined the commoners in preparing taro pondfields. See Campbell, A Voyage Round the World, 115.

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Encouraging “Pious Merchants”

While the missionaries encouraged small farming, their views on commercial plantation agriculture were lukewarm. In the minutes of the 1835 annual meeting, the missionaries resolved that “As to the practicability of introducing improvements in agriculture, we believe that little can be done at present…we should avoid, as much as possible, becoming entangled with secular cares…Nevertheless, we regard the subject of sufficient importance to warrant us to use at least an indirect influence in encouraging the growth of cotton, coffee, sugar cane, &c. &c. that the people may have more business on their hands, and increase their temporal comforts.”52 The following year, the mission requested that the ABCFM send agricultural and industrial teachers so that the Hawaiians might take steps toward becoming small farmers. The mission was wary of deviating far into secular matters yet also eager to improve material conditions of the Hawaiians, and at least tacitly recognized that agriculture was not a wholly secular affair.53

That same year, however, some missionaries seemed willing to move beyond indirect influence to promote sugarcane planting. The missionaries allied with the

Hawaiian government arranged a fifty year lease worth $100,000 for plantation lands at

Kōloa on the island of Kauaʻi, as well as the ability to hire makaʻāinana, to Peter

Brinsmade and his firm Ladd & Co. Brinsmade, a Connecticut native and graduate of

Bowdoin College and Andover Seminary, advocated sugarcane planting as a means of

52 Extracts from the Minutes of the General Meeting of the Sandwich Islands’ Mission, Held at Honolulu, June and July, 1835 (Honolulu: Mission Press, 1835), 19.

53 Merze Tate, “Sandwich Island Missionaries: The First American Point Four Agents,” Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society (Honolulu, 1962): 7-23.

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promoting industry, morality, and temperance among Hawaiians.54 Brinsmade’s religious background was crucial to his success—it helped convince the missionaries that Kōloa

Plantation would uplift, rather than oppress, its employees and Hawaiian society.55 The missionaries considered Brinsmade “a pious merchant” and expected that “he will be a great benefit to the nation” through the employment of Hawaiians on Ladd & Co.’s plantation.56

One of the factors that lent Brinsmade and Ladd & Co. the aura of piety was their opposition to alcohol production. Ladd & Co.’s embrace of temperance carried great weight for the missionaries. The lease between the Hawaiian government and Ladd &

Co. for the Kōloa plantation stipulated that alcohol would neither be manufactured nor consumed on any of the lands for the life of the lease. Subsequent leases for sugarcane plantations continued to ban not only the production of alcohol, but its consumption, importation, and sale as well.57

That Ladd & Co. was willing to forego rum manufacture was no small sacrifice.

In the Caribbean, rum was a crucial part of sugarcane planters’ livelihood, and distilleries were found on most plantations. Caribbean cane planters found that the production and

54 Polynesian, April 17, 1847; April 24, 1847.

55 On the relationship between the Sandwich Islands Mission and Ladd & Co., see Alexander Simpson, The Sandwich Islands: Progress of Events Since Their Discovery by Captain Cook. Their Occupation by . Their Value and Importance. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1843), 33.

56 Juliette Cooke to her sister, August 20, 1839, HMCS Missionary Letters.

57 “Lease of Koloa Plantation,” July 29, 1835, Appendix A, no. 3 in Report of the Proceedings and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd & Co. (Honolulu: Government Press, 1846), Appendix p. 15. See also ibid., “Kamehameha III Lease of Land at Koloa to John Stetson,” January 1, 1841, Appendix A, no. 12, Appendix p. 25; “Contract for Grants and Leases of Land,” November 24, 1841, Appendix B, no. 1, Appendix p. 31.

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sale of alcohol was smart business. Made from sugarcane or low-grade molasses, rum did not interfere with or preclude sugar production. By weight and volume, rum was worth more than sugar, and its quality improved and value increased with age, so shipping rum from sugar island distilleries to European and American markets was a profitable enterprise. Moreover, rum lasted longer in storage than sugar, so a planter had more freedom to wait for an advantageous time to sell his rum than he did with sugar.58 A distiller in Hawaiʻi, a bustling center of Pacific trade and whaling, with hundreds of ships and thousands of sailors visiting annually, would likely have been able to prosper by making rum.

Promoting Self-Reliance

If Ladd & Co. helped to convince some missionaries to embrace sugarcane planting, economics in the United States provided further motivation. A sharp downturn in the U.S. economy known as the Panic of 1837 withered charitable donations to the

ABCFM, which in turn pressed its missionaries in Hawaiʻi into tighter budgets. Several missionaries reassessed the ABCFM’s policy of supporting its missionaries through a common-stock system, and determined to find ways to supplement their income. A few even left the mission over differences concerning funding.59 Some others decided that

58 Frederick H. Smith, Caribbean Rum: A Social and Economic History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005). Historians of sugarcane plantation systems have noted the importance of rum for sugarcane planters. Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 196-197; Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 121, 163, 214. In addition to producing their own rum, Caribbean planters also sold molasses to distilleries in New England.

59 Harris, Nothing but Christ, 59-69; Kashay, “Agents of Imperialism,” 288-94. 84

sugarcane planting was not as bad as they had previously thought. Hiram Bingham, for example, who was one of the most vocal critics of cane planting, began to do so himself in 1838. The missionary noted with some amusement that Bingham and his wife “made several inquiries…about the sugar cane as they had commenced planting.”60 With the example of Ladd & Co. and the threat of disappearing support from the ABCFM, the Binghams and their compatriots turned increasingly toward sugar.

Missionaries saw that raising sugarcane could provide an opportunity to become less reliant on the ABCFM. In an 1838 essay in the Hawaiian Spectator, a short-lived journal edited by Peter Brinsmade and published by the mission press, William Ladd counted twenty-two sugar mills in operation, and noted that “it is a very common opinion that sugar will become a leading article of export.”61 Similarly, Rev. John Diell, chaplain of the Honolulu Mariner’s Church, looking forward to improved transportation across the

Central American isthmus, wrote for the Spectator that agricultural commerce would blossom in Hawaiʻi.62 Indeed, missionaries with concerns their continued support could observe the development of several sugar operations. Chinese sugar manufacturers partnered with Hawaiian aliʻi to establish several mills, and the governors of Hawaiʻi

60 Amos Starr Cooke Journal, November 7, 1838, HMCS.

61 William Ladd, “Remarks upon the Natural Resources of the Sandwich Islands: Read Before the Sandwich Islands Institute, January 30, 1838,” Hawaiian Spectator, April 1838, 76. The Hawaiian Spectator and its partner organization, the Sandwich Island Institute, demonstrated a new, but fragile, degree of cooperation between haole entrepreneurs and missionaries in Hawaiʻi. See, Bob Dye, “‘A Memoria of What the People Were’: The Sandwich Island Institute and Hawaiian Spectator,” Hawaiian Journal of History 31 (1997): 53-69.

62 John Diell, “Sketch of Honolulu,” Hawaiian Spectator, April 1838, 83-92.

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Island and Maui both owned sugarcane plantations.63 Hawaiian commoners were also early sugar entrepreneurs. Two of the three sugar mills operating in Lāhainā, Maui in

1837, for example, were owned by makaʻāinana.64 With Ladd & Co. joining these diverse sugar producers, missionaries saw the economic potential of sugarcane at a time when they needed to secure their finances.

Kōloa was one of the largest and—with the help of missionary and government allies—best-funded sugarcane plantations; but the predominant model for sugar production was smaller-scale. Missionary Richard Armstrong wrote that “the multitude…cultivate sugar-cane,” under arrangement with mill owners.65 Providing crucial instruction for those who might want to venture into sugar production, a letter to the Spectator described and diagramed a Chinese sugar mill formerly in operation on

Waimea, Kauaʻi. However, the letter writer maintained a collectivist view. The author lamented the failure “for the interest of all concerned”—that is, cultivators and mill operators alike—“to keep the mill in operation.”66

Some missions developed a reliance on sugarcane cultivation and simultaneously began to espouse qualified entry into the market through small-scale agriculture.

Missionaries recognized that they needed commerce. Sugarcane cultivation using

63 Peggy Kai, “Chinese Settlers in the Village of Hilo before 1852,” Hawaiian Journal of History 8 (1974): 39-75.

64 Dwight Baldwin, “Report of Lahaina Station, 1837,” Hawaiian Mission Station Reports, HMCS.

65 Richard Armstrong, “Journal of Mr. Armstrong on the Island of Maui,” Missionary Herald, vol. 34, July 1838, 249.

66 H., “Chinese Method of Manufacturing Sugar from the Cane,” Hawaiian Spectator, January 1839, 113-115.

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congregant labor presented an opportunity to advance missionary goals, and by 1838 several missionaries had erected mills.67 In 1839 the congregation at Waiʻoli, Kauaʻi, for example, planted seven acres of sugarcane and directed the proceeds of the crop’s sale toward building a meeting house.68 In a second essay for the Spectator, John Diell discussed missionary ambivalence toward commerce generally, with explicit mention of the Hawaiian sugar trade: “The command is, ‘Go, disciple all nations.’ But how is the missionary to reach these nations? On the wings of the wind, by a miracle? or on the wings of commerce?” Yet Diell also decried the negative influences of commerce, particularly through the spread of liquor. “Commerce,” Diell continued, “while she continues to traffick in ardent spirits…will not bear the scrutiny of the great law of right.”69 Commercial agriculture, when directed with piety—say, for the construction of a church—could be embraced by the missionaries.

The Kōloa mission’s station report to the ABCFM for 1839 affirmed the initial faith in Ladd & Co. The mission happily reported that congregation members were improving their homes, paid greater attention to “decency in personal appearance,” and maintained a better “estimate of time” than they did in previous years. The station report attributed this change to the example and employment offered by the plantation proprietors, and argued that if other prospective planters like Ladd & Co. would be

67 Theodore Morgan, Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 1778-1876 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 176.

68 “Sandwich Islands: Report of the Mission made at the General Meeting May, 1839,” Missionary Herald, vol.36, June 1840, 224.

69 John Diell, “Commerce,” Hawaiian Spectator, July 1838, 307, 314-15.

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allowed to establish themselves, “the fields of Kōloa would be crowned with a rich & abundant harvest, the inhabitants be clad in decent & comfortable garments, lodged in commodious houses, fed on wholesome food, & merit the name of an industrious people.”70 Kōloa Plantation was becoming a crucial tool in the missionary project of civilizing the Hawaiian people.

Kōloa maintained a positive reputation among haole residents of Hawaiʻi in the quality of sugar produced, treatment of laborers, and moral influence, yet the predominating sentiment among missionaries and government remained suspicious toward large-scale planting. The missionaries, “feared the introduction of many foreigners with great capital. They had no fear from the establishment at Kōloa, but from similar ones in other hands they had fears.”71 Likewise, members of the Hawaiian ruling class prioritized small farming over planting as a means of uplift for common Hawaiians.

King Kamehameha III established a mill at Wailuku, Maui in 1840 and contracted with

Hawaiians to grow one-acre parcels of cane.72 The Hawaiian crown also partnered with

Ladd & Co. and other planters to encourage commoners to grow cane on shares, much as independent farmers. Leases obligated planters to cart and mill cane grown on nearby

70 Koloa Station Report, May 1839, HMCS; emphasis in the original.

71 Testimony of William Richards, August 27, 1846, Report of the Proceedings and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd & Co. (Honolulu: Government Press, 1846), 72.

72 “Agreement between the King and Those who Plant by the Acre in Wailuku” September 23, 1840, Interior-Misc., AH.

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government lands, and evenly split the proceeds of that sugar.73 The goal of the missionaries, haole government advisers, and the monarchy, which had tight control over land and labor and thus could effectively block the development of plantations, was small cane farming and contracted agreements between farmers and mill owners.

Missionary-led sugar projects multiplied and improved: in 1840 at Hilo, Hawaiʻi

Island, a cane plantation collective produced about 5,400 pounds of sugar and 400 gallons of molasses, and used its proceeds to support the mission’s boarding school.74 At

ʻEwa, Oʻahu, Rev. Artemas Bishop and Oʻahu Governor Mataio Kekūanāoʻa established a mill together. They agreed that locals who supplied the mill with cane would receive half of the mill’s profits; the other half of the profits were to pay for milling expenses and the remaining profits were to be split between the owners and mill operator. Bishop wrote that the mill “has been undertaken not with a view to the emoluments of the business, which are altogether uncertain, but solely to encourage industry and enterprise among the people by affording them the opportunity to obtain the avails of their labors.” Bishop was right not to go into the sugar business for profits: the plantation was far from a success.

Bishop and Kekūanāoʻa sought to sell the mill at a loss but could not find a buyer. They could not even retain a manager, and Bishop himself was forced to run the mill.75

73 “Contract for Grants and Leases of Land,” November 24, 1841, Appendix B, no. 1 in Report of the Proceedings and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd & Co. (Honolulu: Government Press, 1846), Appendix p. 31.

74 Extracts from the Minutes of the General Meeting of Sandwich Islands Mission, Held at Honolulu, May and June, 1840 (Oʻahu: Mission Press, 1840), 10.

75 Artemas Bishop, "Report for the Station at Ewa [Oahu], May 1839," Hawaiian Mission Station Reports, HMCS; Levi Chamberlain, Journal, January 26, 1841, HMCS.

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Ladd & Co. failed as well, and in sensational fashion. A labor strike in 1840 hurt

Kōloa’s finances and undercut its image as a tool for Christianizing makaʻāinana, and in

1841 Ladd & Co. overextended itself and could not repay its debts. Planters traded accusations and recriminations with the government and the Sandwich Islands Mission;

Peter Brinsmade, once close to those in power, established an opposition press and used it to vilify his former allies; and a protracted episode of lawsuits and arbitration became a public spectacle.76 The Ladd & Co. debacle may have scared missionaries away from involvement in planting, or at least from large-scale agribusiness. The missionaries might have justifiably wondered whether a Calvinist sugarcane plantation could succeed while maintaining its religious principles, and whether a group of seminarians from the northeastern United States was equipped to branch out into such a foreign business.

With the experiment of the “pious merchants” at Kōloa a failure, it was difficult for missionaries to directly involve themselves in constraining what others saw as

Hawaiʻi’s natural agricultural potential. Missionary allies in Honolulu’s business community began to advocate greater encouragement of foreign planters, demonstrating what the scholar of Hawaiian journalism Helen Chapin called “the closing gap between religious and secular American interests.”77 James Jackson Jarves, a native Bostonian who in 1840 established the Polynesian, an English-language weekly newspaper with

76 Polynesian, April 17, 1847 and April 24, 1847; Report of the Proceedings and Evidence in the Arbitration between the King and Government of the Hawaiian Islands and Messrs. Ladd & Co.; on Brinsmade’s role and aim in founding The Sandwich Island News see Helen Geracimos Chapin, “Newspapers of Hawaiʻi 1834 to 1903: From ‘He Liona’ to the Pacific Cable,” Hawaiian Journal of History 18 (1984).

77 Helen Geracimos Chapin, Shaping History: The Role of Newspapers in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1996), 23-28.

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missionary support, ran regular editorials in favor of government policies to build up

Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry. The first series of the paper only lasted a year, but the

Polynesian reemerged in 1844, now sponsored by the government as its official media organ. In the second issue of the new series, Jarves wrote that the mission of the

Polynesian included the dissemination of agricultural information, “to develope [sic] the resources of soil or talent which are now lying to a great extent fallow.”78 Jarves frequently ran pieces praising the missionaries and the cause of Calvinist morality, but also argued for government support of planters. Celebrating Hawaiʻi’s natural resources,

Jarves wrote, “nothing but lack of energy will prevent us from becoming the West Indies of the North Pacific.”79

In the eyes of Jarves and many missionaries, Kānaka Maoli lacked the energy and industriousness necessary to succeed at sugarcane planting. This assessment was no doubt due in part to racist and ethnocentric attitudes. Although Hawaiians had been cultivating sugarcane for centuries, and their Polynesian forebears considered it an important enough plant to transport it on their migration to Hawaiʻi, haole criticized

Kānaka Maoli as poor planters who failed to properly manage their cane fields. At the

McLane plantation on Maui, where the government contracted to have locals plant cane on shares, Jarves wrote that the Hawaiians’ cane fields were “very indifferently cared for, choked with weeds and drying up, although fit for grinding. Another portion was in better

78 Polynesian, June 1, 1844.

79 Polynesian, September 28, 1844.

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order—but the native system of agriculture is careless in the extreme.”80 Similarly, in an

1846-47 survey of missionaries conducted by the Minister of Foreign Relations, the missionaries generally agreed that agriculture suffered from imagined Hawaiian indolence.81

Yet the haole perception of Hawaiians as poor agriculturalists was tied to significant differences between Hawaiian and haole cultures of cane growing. Sugarcane was a part of what the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins called the “poi economy”: a system that prioritized incremental harvesting and frequent trade among agricultural regions over highly concentrated harvests.82 Since sugarcane degrades rapidly after cutting, and since cane served the important function of a windbreak for taro pondfields in addition to its use as a foodstuff, Hawaiians likely would have cut small amounts of sugarcane only as needed.83 As Mintz and others have argued, however, sugar production was an early model of “agro-industry” in which field and mill depended upon each other to produce sugar; a crop of sugarcane had little value if it was not milled properly, and likewise a mill needed to process cane crops continually and efficiently if it was to be profitable. This necessitated a regimented labor force operating under the discipline of a set schedule, harvesting large areas of cane at once.84 The foreign method of clear-cutting fields would have been novel to Hawaiians and also would have allowed weeds—of

80 Polynesian, August 1, 1846.

81 Wyllie, Answers to Questions, 6-12.

82 Kirch and Sahlins, Anahulu, vol. 1, 28.

83 Malo, Hawaiian Antiquities, 272.

84 Mintz, Sweetness and Power, 47-52.

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which many species were haole introductions—greater opportunities to establish themselves.

Two major animal pests for cane planters, the black rat and cattle, were additional haole introductions to the islands that also disrupted Hawaiian forms of agriculture. Pre- contact farmers would not have needed to protect sugarcane from these animals. Several missionaries noted that Hawaiian commoners “have suffered and are now suffering great damage from the large herds of foreigners and chiefs.”85 Roaming cattle were an expensive nuisance most Hawaiians could not afford to combat. In 1846, McLane estimated that cattle caused $1,000 worth of damages to his sugarcane plantation, and would have done much more had he not hired Hawaiians to guard his fields.86 Local farmers with small plots of cane would not have had the resources to either keep cattle out of their fields or sustain the losses that roaming cattle caused.

The biological invasions of pests and differences in agricultural practices led many haole to conclude that foreigners were needed to lead large-scale sugarcane enterprises, but following the public controversy of Ladd & Co.’s demise, missionaries again struck a cautious, if equivocating, note. In 1847 Rev. Ephraim Clark acknowledged that “honest and industrious” foreigners with capital could promote the mission’s agenda among Kānaka Maoli. “But,” he wrote, “any great monopoly of plantations, and sudden influx of a promiscuous foreign population would prove disastrous to the native

85 Wyllie, Answers to Questions, 41. For the history of cattle in Hawaiʻi see John Ryan Fischer, “Cattle in Hawai'i: Biological and Cultural Exchange,” Pacific Historical Review 76, no. 3 (August 2007): 347-372.

86 Polynesian, October 3, 1846.

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population…It would, almost inevitably lead to a disregard of native rights, to serious contentions, and to a system of subjection and servitude, which would soon end in the slavery or extinction of the native government and race.”87 Though recognizing the importance of agricultural development, missionaries remained concerned that unrestrained plantation agriculture would damage Hawaiian society.

Toward a New Definition of Labor and Class Relations

The specter of slavery was indeed a significant factor in how missionaries and other foreigners understood issues of labor and agriculture. Jarves noted that Hawaiʻi was

“clear from the evils of a slave population” and therefore in a position to build a plantation system based on wage labor.88 The members of the Sandwich Islands Mission held strong abolitionist beliefs; some even resigned from the ABCFM because the organization accepted donations from Southerners.89 However, if Ephraim Clark noted that foreign capitalists might import slavery, many missionaries soon altered the subjects in their ideas about slavery in Hawaiʻi. They came to see plantation labor as a way for common Hawaiians to escape their slave-like position to the chiefs.

Missionaries increasingly characterized the relationship between Hawaiian chiefs and commoners as one of oppression, approaching slavery. Missionaries such as John

Emerson, Jonathan Green, , and Richard Armstrong argued that the chiefs

87 Wyllie, Answers to Questions, 11.

88 Polynesian, September 28, 1844.

89 Harris, Nothing but Christ, 77-86.

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maintained an oppressive hold over the common people.90 This argument was rooted in the Hawaiian land tenure and tax systems, which gave chiefs control over agricultural output for large regions and the ability to impose heavy taxes in kind and in labor.

Echoing the missionaries, in April 1847, the Polynesian, still the government’s official newspaper, editorialized that “with soil locked up by a selfish feudalism…this kingdom must continue in its comparative paralytic state.” The newspaper continued throughout the year to criticize the chiefs for commanding labor from the commoners while simultaneously preventing agricultural development on fertile lands.91

Missionaries and haole in government expressed a desire to break the perceived hold of the chiefs over Hawaiian lands and build up an agrarian middle class. To that end, the government implemented a momentous reform of the Hawaiian land tenure system.

Under the traditional system, all Hawaiian lands were controlled by the crown. The monarch distributed lands among chiefs, who divided their lands further and designated lesser chiefs and landlords as overseers. Commoners owed particular taxes to their landlords and chiefs, and in turn had recognized rights to live upon and use the land.

William Little Lee, among his many other positions, became president of the Land

Commission, which was responsible for awarding deeds under the Māhele (division).92

Lee was a close ally of the Sandwich Islands Mission—he wrote that “their line of

90 Wyllie, Answers to Questions, 7, 47, 67-68, 92

91 Polynesian, April 3, September 4, 25, and October 9, 1847.

92 On land tenure and the Māhele see John J. Chinen, The Great Mahele: Hawaii’s Land Division of 1848 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1958); Edward D. Beechert, Working in Hawaii: A Labor History (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1985); Kirch and Sahlins, Anahulu vol. 1; Merry, Colonizing Hawaiʻi.

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conduct comes nearer the path marked out by the meek and lowly One than that of any other Christians I have had the fortune to know”—as well as a strong believer in the importance of land ownership for common Hawaiians and the Hawaiian nation.93 Lee sent letters to many of the American missionaries scattered throughout the islands, imploring them in emphatic language to have the commoners in their districts submit land claims. He was explicit in his aims: “There must grow up a middle class, who shall be farmers, tillers of the soil, or there is no salvation for this nation.”94

What haole saw as chiefly oppression may have been an artifact of demographic change initiated by European contact. Syphilis and gonorrhea, which accompanied James

Cook’s expeditions to Hawaiʻi, caused horrific depopulation among the indigenous population. Hawaiians probably numbered about 400,000 on the eve of foreign contact; by 1832 Hawaiʻi held a population of approximately 130,000, and by 1843 the Hawaiian population fell below 100,000.95 Not only did this destabilize social systems, it also somewhat paradoxically contributed to an increased social stratification. The population of commoners decreased much more drastically than that of the chiefs for several reasons, but the result was that the burden of supporting the chiefly class through taxation fell on fewer people and was thus felt more acutely. Moreover, as chiefs became ever greater participants in Hawaii's new economy, consumption of foreign goods took on

93 William Little Lee to Caroline Scott, September 28, 1849, in Barbara E. Dunn, “William Little Lee and Catherine Lee, Letters from Hawaiʻi 1848-1855,” Hawaiian Journal of History 38 (2004): 73.

94 William Little Lee to Rev. J. S. Green, Honolulu, January 19, 1848, HMCS; emphasis in the original. Lee sent many similar letters to other missionaries; see William Little Lee letters, HMCS.

95 David Igler, The Great Ocean: Pacific Worlds from Captain Cook to the Gold Rush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 58; Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 9.

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signification of status, and chiefs relied upon their commoner communities to support this consumption.96 With increasing expenses and a decreasing tax base, chiefly demands on

Hawaiian commoners became increasingly onerous. The social system that haole decried as so oppressive was thus just as much a foreign product as the system they hoped to institute in its place.

The Polynesian persisted in arguing that chiefs’ domination of commoners impeded economic growth, and that earlier attitudes toward planting were inadequate half measures. With a slow whaling season in 1847, the paper predicted the end of that industry, and exhorted the Hawaiian government to shift the base of its economy from provisioning whalers to exporting agricultural commodities. “Agriculture is the only sure reliance of the country,” the Polynesian editorialized. “It will not be sufficient to permit after long and difficult negotiation certain individuals to obtain lands even at fair rates, but if a market is to be created for native labor and products, foreign capital must be invited hither.”97 The active pursuit of foreign capital was a significant shift from the position that prevailed during the 1830s.

The direction of government policy toward attracting foreign capital and establishing plantations had likewise reversed. In his 1847 address to the Legislative

Council, King Kamehameha III (Kauikeaouli) declared, “what my native subjects are greatly in want of, to become farmers, is capital, with which to buy cattle, fence in the land and cultivate it properly. I recommend you to consider the best means of inducing

96 Kirch and Sahlins, Anahulu, vol. 1.

97 Polynesian, January 1, 1848; emphasis in the original.

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foreigners to furnish capital for carrying on agricultural operations, that thus, the exports of the country may be increased.”98 The Legislature took up the King’s directive, and in the legislative session of 1848 worked to promote and protect planters’ interests. The

Legislature discussed greater enforcement of an 1846 law to prevent stray cattle from roaming onto and damaging agricultural lands, and passed an “Act to Confer Certain

Privileges on the Owners of Plantations,” which allowed planters with over 100 acres to become licensed retailers, helping them to avoid the fees of some merchants and profit from selling merchandise to their own laborers.99

These laws embraced plantations in a way that earlier attitudes did not. Large- scale agriculture was not something to be subordinated to religious ideology or to be seen as a danger; it was inherently good because it promoted industry among the people. The

Polynesian editorialized that “Christianity has done much for the people, but she needs all the aid and support which thrift in temporal affairs can give. The mass of the people want more stimulus to industry. It is vain to expect them to be a virtuous people until they become industrious.”100 This gave planting greater priority than it had received a decade earlier. Rather than being one avenue toward virtue, industry, according to the Polynesian was a prerequisite. Moreover, the most valuable type of agriculture, according to this reasoning, was not the sort of small farming that made independent yeomen, but larger agriculture that could employ the greatest number of Hawaiians and render them

98 Polynesian, May 1, 1847.

99 Polynesian, May 6, 1848; June 24, 1848.

100 Polynesian, October 9, 1847.

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industrious in haole eyes. While the missionaries earlier feared an influx of the wrong kind of capitalist planters who did not commit themselves to Christian values, the

Polynesian suggested planting was an inherently Christian act by virtue of the encouragement of industry among Hawaiians, regardless of the overt religiosity of planters.

Plantations as a Remedy for Depopulation

When epidemics of measles and whooping cough killed 10,000 Hawaiians in the autumn and winter of 1848-49—about ten percent of the native population—at the same time that a season of heavy rains struck many parts of islands, the need to attract foreign capital to develop an agricultural economy seemed all the more urgent. Rev. Titus Coan observed that following the epidemics, “secular affairs [in Hilo, Hawaiʻi Island] have received a shock from which they cannot soon recover.”101 Seeing the devastation caused by disease, many haole who previously hoped to create a nation of yeoman farmers came to believe that Hawaiian bodies could not survive, let alone subdue, the natural world.

William Little Lee, who only a year earlier wrote of building up a Native Hawaiian middle class, took on a much gloomier tone in his correspondence: sickness and death had “brought a cloud over us that well nigh shuts out the fond hopes we have indulged for the perpetuation and independence of this nation as a distinct race…I fear that in spite of all the efforts of the missionaries and others for their salvation, they are destined to

101 Titus Coan, Pastoral and General Report for Hilo for the year ending March 1849, Hawaiian Mission Station Reports, HMCS.

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give place to the White man.”102 With the Hawaiian population decimated, limiting the invasion of foreign capital and planters seemed moot. The epidemic reinforced the idea that if Hawaiʻi’s agriculture was to be developed at all, independent small farmers would not be the ones to do it.

On the heels of these epidemics, the Sandwich Islands Mission received word from ABCFM headquarters in Boston that the ABCFM planned to discontinue its funding of the mission and have its missionaries rely on their local congregations for compensation. Rev. Dwight Baldwin lamented that after disease and rains afflicted his congregation and “no strength or courage were left to sustain themselves…came a general letter from Boston, demanding that they not only sustain themselves, but sustain the Sandwich Islands Mission too.”103 The removal of support from the American Board forced missionaries to rely on community contributions for their salaries. Yet it also freed them to acquire property. Some missionaries sought to acquire lands or enter business, while others remained in their pulpits. Whatever the case, missionaries now had a greater interest in building up Hawaiʻi’s economy and the financial resources of Hawaiian citizens. Commercial agriculture and plantation wage labor provided the missionaries’ congregants with the means to support their pastors.104 With the ABCFM now requiring that its missionaries join Hawaiʻi’s economy, missionaries’ prior resistance to sugarcane planting faded.

102 William Little Lee to Simon Greenleaf, Honolulu, March 3, 1849, William Little Lee Letters, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

103 Dwight Baldwin, Report of Lahaina Station, 1849, Hawaiian Mission Station Reports, HMCS.

104 Harris, Nothing but Christ, 112-122. 100

At a meeting of the King’s Privy Council on March 6, 1850, William Lee presented an application from Reverend John Emerson to purchase land on behalf of his son. “Several objections” were raised to such a grant according to the minutes of the

Privy Council meeting, as Hawaiian law prohibited the alienation of land to non- naturalized foreigners. Yet the Scottish-born Foreign Minister Robert Crichton Wyllie argued that missionary children should be treated as native Hawaiian subjects, “by right of the services of their parents,” and Emerson’s application, as well as one from

Reverend , was granted.105 That July, the Hawaiian Legislature continued its trend of state support for sugar planting with an act exempting agricultural implements, steam engines, and coffee and sugar mills from any import duty. In one of its most controversial and contested decisions, the Legislature passed an act (proposed by William

Lee) granting aliens the right to purchase lands in fee simple.106 With missionaries no longer championing the restriction of agricultural development to small, independent farming, legal obstacles to the development of foreign-owned plantations receded as well.

The following month, Lee convened a meeting in Honolulu for the purposes of forming an agricultural society. Many of Honolulu’s leading men, including missionaries, were in attendance, and thirty of the one-hundred and fourteen men who became annual members of the RHAS that year arrived in Hawaiʻi as part of the Sandwich Islands

105 Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, Minutes of the Privy Council, March 6, 1850: typed transcript of the originals, scan of the holdings of the Hawaiʻi State Archives (AH).

106 Polynesian, July 13 and 27, 1850. William Little Lee proposed an act giving aliens the right to hold lands in fee simple to the Privy Council on June 17, 1850; Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, Privy Council Minutes, June 17, 1850, typed transcript, AH.

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Mission.107 The formation of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society marked a moment when Hawaiian agricultural interests were large and developed enough that they were able to unite to share information and resources and to lobby the government. Just as in previous decades, the members of the RHAS maintained the missionary opposition to converting sugarcane into alcohol, yet they had substantially revised their position toward large plantations. Attracting the capital to fund a plantation system was now among their top priorities.

In his opening address to the RHAS, Lee lamented the “insignificant” and

“unprofitable” pursuits of agriculture in Hawaiʻi, complaining that uncertain markets, ignorance of agricultural practices, and poor capitalization doomed most plantations.

However, Lee celebrated the imminent dawning of a new agricultural age in Hawaiʻi.

The extension of U.S. territory to the Pacific Ocean brought with it a large market as well as civilization, which would lead to greater investment in plantations. “The native government,” Lee said, “impelled by the irresistible influence and example of the Anglo

Saxon energy and progress, which it sees in every direction, is relaxing its former tenacious grasp on the arable lands of the Islands, and even inviting and encouraging their cultivation by foreign skill and capital.” Not only that, plantations were also places where Hawaiians could find health and vigor. Citing mortality statistics of plantations

107 Stephen Reynolds Journal, April 29, 1850, HL. Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society Transactions 1, n. 1 (1850): 79-81.

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during the recent epidemics, Lee argued that on plantations Hawaiians were “less liable to sickness, and less apt to die when sick.”108

By midcentury, missionary advocacy helped establish sugarcane cultivation based on large-scale planting. Government policy and missionary rhetoric focused on large commercial agricultural enterprise, not small farming as they had in earlier decades. As

Charles Reed Bishop, husband of Bernice Pauahi—one of the highest-ranked of

Hawaiian aliʻi—and William Lee’s partner in Lihue Plantation, wrote, “[N]one but those who have considerable capital can commence and carry on a plantation profitably and pleasantly.”109 Rather than place restrictions on foreign capital, the Hawaiian government sought to court it. Foreign Minister Wyllie argued before the RHAS that Hawaiians ought to emulate Barbados, the sugar capital of the British West Indies. Plantations, Wyllie wrote, “are public benefactors… [I]n granting them every possible encouragement, the government will only do its duty, and consult the best interests of the Hawaiian people.”110 Missionaries, former missionaries, and allied haole of influence had altered the means to achieving their ends. No longer would common Hawaiians find Christian virtue through industry and independent farming, but through joining the plantation wage labor force. Plantations organized by foreign capitalists were no longer a menace but a source of freedom—freedom from chiefly oppression and the ravages of disease. The

108 Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society Transactions 1, n. 1 (1850): 7, 31. R. W. Wood also reported there were no deaths at Kōloa Plantation during the 1848-49 epidemic; see the Polynesian, February 23, 1850.

109 Charles Reed Bishop to Joel Turrill, April 29, 1851, Joel Turrill Letters, HL.

110 Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society Transactions 1, n. 2 (1851):116.

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only vestige of missionaries’ early opposition to cane planting was the persistence of the law against distilling rum, which remained in force until 1874.

Even after distilling became legal, it remained somewhat taboo. As late as 1903, a committee of Hawaiian cane planters sought to identify ways to make use of their waste products, but noted the existence of “a sentiment among many of the business men of

[Hawaiʻi], resulting perhaps from the training of many of the early settlers, against the distillation of molasses for the manufacture of any kind of liquor, and the influence of such men has been so great that their ideas have been accepted by and made the policy of existing Governments down to the time of annexation.”111 Without rum, underfinanced sugar producers were less likely to succeed, and foreign capital was all the more necessary to establish secure operations, and a well-financed, well-connected planter class was more likely to rise. Moreover, without the ability to salvage through distilling the waste materials of sugar production, small plantations and inefficient mills were at a greater disadvantage than large plantations with better equipment. While well-capitalized planters such as William Little Lee were able to afford the expense of their ideological commitment, others could not. Indeed, in the 1850s, many plantations fell into bankruptcy, until by 1857 only five plantations—all large ones—remained in business.112

Though rum was only one of many factors in the consolidation of Hawaiʻi’s sugar

111 “Utilization of By-Products,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 22, no. 12 (December 1903), 552. Some plantations were simply discarding their waste molasses; see Report of the Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co. (February 1895), 7, HL.

112 Morgan, Hawaii: A Century of Economic Change, 179.

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industry, the religious ideology of Hawaiʻi’s sugar pioneers helped to establish the kingdom’s plantation system.

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CHAPTER 4: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1850-1876

Then on! bear on, the plough is ready With which to turn the waiting soil; The torch of science now burns steady, To light you on your chosen toil; Then swerve not from the path before you, But onward with unfaltering tread; Success shall wave her banner o’er you, And Hawaii rise, as from the dead.

“Roll on! Roll on!” Composed and performed for the second annual meeting of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, 18521

In 1850, Hawaiian sugarcane planters could take pride in several recent achievements which helped to promote their interests within Hawaiʻi. Many of the kingdom’s most influential haole, with the support of King Kamehameha III and

Hawaiian aliʻi, established the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society (RHAS). The RHAS was modeled after similar agricultural societies established in the United States in the

1840s, with the goals of disseminating agricultural knowledge among planters and encouraging agriculture through the distribution of prizes for agricultural achievements.

New investments in plantations increased exports of sugar from 250 tons in 1848 to 375 tons in 1850, which found an eager market in Gold Rush California. And, most importantly, the Hawaiian government had passed a series of laws to promote planters’ acquisition of land, equipment, and labor at affordable rates. However, this boom was short-lived. In 1851, a severe drought afflicted the islands just as San Francisco’s sugar

1 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1:3 (1852), 15.

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market experienced a glut. Together, these events caused the bankruptcy of many plantations. Production plummeted, and only 10 tons of sugar left the islands that year.2

Plantations are often characterized as enclosed, self-sufficient units, yet this notion ignores the basic need the move the plantation’s produce into a market. Planters realized that crucial challenges in securing a profitable outlet for their sugar remained.

With internal reforms that facilitated the rise of the Hawaiian plantation system in place midway through the nineteenth century, planters then turned their attention outward, so that they might enter the international sugar economy. “Historically and economically,” the economist Ida Greaves argues, “the plantation system is fundamentally international in character.”3 This entailed the development of trade relations that gave planters profitable access to foreign markets, the acquisition of a cheap and tractable labor pool, and the participation in the global circulation of knowledge and technology directed toward sugar production.

Much of the sugar producing world possessed access to markets, labor, and technology that cane planters needed as a result of its colonial history. The sugar islands of the Greater Caribbean established their plantation systems with the help of access to the markets of their European metropoles. Additionally, the establishment and expansion of plantation systems in the Atlantic World depended upon the expansion of slavery.4

2 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, 1:3 (1852), 90.

3 Ida C. Greaves, “Plantations in World Economy,” in Plantation Systems of the New World: Papers and Discussion Summaries of the Seminar Held in San Juan, Puerto Rico Social Science Monographs VII (Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1959), 14.

4 Philip Curtin posited that slavery and an economy based on supplying distant markets were two essential components to what he called the “plantation complex.” Philip D. Curtin, The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). On the 107

Moreover, agricultural expertise and technology often traveled along imperial networks from core to colony.5

However, Hawaiʻi had no colonial relationship to facilitate the sale of its sugar, nor a slave system to facilitate sugarcane cultivation, nor a metropole invested in building agricultural knowledge in Hawaiʻi. It was not until 1876, after years of intensive lobbying, that Hawaiʻi and the United States entered into a reciprocity treaty, allowing planters to export their sugar to the U. S. duty free. The treaty led to a meteoric rise in profits, and access to the capital necessary for large-scale importation of foreign plantation workers. In the meantime, though, as planters and the government worked persistently but ineffectively for profitable access to the American market, they needed to find other means of making sugar pay.

Even without any actual colonial relationship, some scholars have depicted

Hawaiian history as one dominated by imperialism, with Americans “Pulling Hawaii into a global economy.”6 However, the idea of “pulling” Hawaiʻi anywhere denies agency to people in the islands and ignores the complex of local environmental, economic, and expansion of slavery and the economics of plantation agriculture, see Adam Rothman, Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). On the struggles of plantation systems in the face of adverse trade conditions, and the use of cheap, coerced labor as a way of mitigating those trade conditions, see Alan H. Adamson, Sugar without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838-1904 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

5 Richard A. Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Studies in Environment and History) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Richard Drayton, Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the "Improvement" of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); J. H. Galloway, “Botany in the Service of Empire: The Barbados Cane-Breeding Program and the Revival of the Caribbean Sugar Industry, 1880s-1930s,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86 (December 1996): 682- 706.

6 Jessica Teisch, “Sweetening the Urban Marketplace: California’s Hawaiian Outpost,” in Cities and Nature in the American West, ed. Char Miller (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2010), 17-33.

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political factors involved in developing the Hawaiian sugar industry. In the absence of a colonial relationship to provide the international components necessary for the plantation system, Hawaiian planters reached out for trade agreements, labor pools, and expertise.

On the first two scores, their efforts were often unsuccessful, so planters attempted to alleviate the problems of the tariff and labor shortage by adopting advanced sugar production technology and recruiting foreign expertise. Planters reached out to other sugar-producing regions in order to appropriate new methods of cultivation and milling that would increase their output and efficiency. The importation of knowledge helped build the industry into what the historian Ralph Kuykendall called a “vigorous sapling,” despite the economic limitations imposed by the American tariff.7

Technology and expertise were not alone in helping Hawaiian planters overcome the challenges of producing and selling sugar profitably. Environmental factors made key contributions to the Hawaiian plantation system. The fact that sugarcane proved more resistant to pests than other commodity crops such as coffee encouraged the expansion of sugarcane planting and made the sugar industry increasingly important to the Hawaiian economy and government policy. Environmental conditions thus increased the likelihood that Hawaiʻi would shift from diversified agriculture to an economy dominated by a single crop.

Efforts to connect the islands to foreign markets came at a cost. The introduction of new species, ideas, technologies, and economic relationships brought more cane under cultivation and altered the Hawaiian environment. A more immediate change for

7 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom vol. 3, 46.

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Hawaiians, though, was the rise of a culture that marginalized Hawaiian agriculture and ignored the Hawaiian presence on the land. As planters reached out across oceans to bring the sugar world to Hawaiʻi, they made room for their imports by ignoring Native

Hawaiian agricultural practices. Regarding Hawaiians as a doomed race, or, at the very least a race incapable of developing large-scale sugar operations haole planters attempted to push Hawaiian agriculture aside and impose their own agricultural vision upon the

Hawaiian environment.

Even as planters pursued a strategy of importing to Hawaiʻi the equipment and knowledge they needed to succeed as sugar producers, they promoted a notion of the archipelago as a land naturally disposed to sugarcane cultivation. Though discourse on

Hawaiʻi’s natural affinity for sugarcane obscured planters’ role in creating the conditions necessary for cane planting to thrive, they were right that nature played a significant role in their success.8 In particular, the spread of crop diseases that afflicted newer agricultural imports such as coffee caused more planters to turn to sugarcane cultivation. This in turn increased cane planters’ political clout and the need of the Hawaiian government to pursue trade agreements that assisted the sugar industry. It was the interaction of imported practices among cane planters and local environmental conditions that helped the sugar industry overcome the problems of steep tariffs and expensive labor.

8 The interaction of introduced agricultural practices with environmental conditions is a common theme in Western history, often understood in terms of interaction of the “process” of Euro-American expansion with the local ecological conditions of a “place” as forces for historical change. See, especially, Andrew Isenberg, The Destruction of the Bison: An Environmental History, 1750-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 6.

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The Tariff and Annexationism

In order to promote commercial agriculture and disseminate agricultural knowledge, the Hawaiian government, leading Hawaiian aliʻi and landholders, haole merchants, and haole planters founded The Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society.9 The

RHAS established annual meetings and an agricultural fair where it awarded prizes to the producers of the islands’ best agricultural goods, and it published yearly reports from committees researching best practices for raising all sorts of animals and plants. The society also produced reports dealing with issues of labor, infrastructure, pest control, machinery, scientific research, and international correspondence. The government supported the RHAS by granting the society fifty acres of land in Honolulu to establish a nursery and an annual appropriation of five hundred dollars. The RHAS also benefited from the close ties its members had with the government. The RHAS celebrated the fact that the society’s chair for the committee on roads, harbors, and inter-island navigation became the government Superintendent of the Bureau of Internal Improvements, thus enabling him to direct infrastructure improvements toward connecting remote and plantations to Hawaiʻi’s ports.10 With government officials among its most active members, the RHAS sought to address several international and transnational challenges facing Hawaiʻi’s sugar planters.

9 While aliʻi and the monarchy were involved in the RHAS, membership lists indicate that the large majority of members were haole. Haole who straddled positions in government, the Honolulu professional community, and plantation ownership, such as William Little Lee and Stephen Reynolds, were the founders of the Society.

10 The Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1:2 (1851), 6-8.

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The most pressing task facing planters at midcentury was to affect a reduction of the thirty-percent ad valorem duty the United States placed on foreign . With the tariff, planters could not compete in the U. S. market with sugar producers from Manila and China, where labor and production costs were much lower than in Hawaiʻi. Hawaiian

Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert C. Wyllie had been working for a trade agreement since 1848, but to no avail.11 At that time the tariff did not cause such great concern.

Demand for Hawaiian sugar was so high in Gold Rush California that planters could sell their sugar at profitable prices despite the tariff. By 1851, with drought and an economic depression straining planters’ finances—to the point of bankruptcy in some cases—some way around the tariff became a greater priority.

The RHAS and the Polynesian both lobbied the Hawaiian government to pursue a reciprocity treaty with the United States, which would let Hawaiian sugar, , molasses, and coffee into the U. S. duty free in exchange for the same privilege being given to American flour, fish, coal, , and staves entering Hawaiʻi. King

Kamehameha III and the legislature passed such an act, and the American commissioner in Honolulu recommended reciprocity to the U. S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, but nothing was done. Lobbying efforts continued, and advocates of reciprocity were optimistic, but still unsuccessful.

The U. S. tariff was not only an obstacle for Hawaiʻi’s planters to overcome; it presented a problem of national concern. Hawaiʻi needed a positive balance of trade to protect its sovereignty, which had been vulnerable throughout the nineteenth century. The

11 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom vol. 1, 331-332.

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Hawaiian government had been embarrassed by debts to foreign merchants in earlier decades, and visits from foreign naval vessels enforced payment. Though France and

Britain had signed a commitment to Hawaiian independence in 1843, French possession of the Society and Marquesas Islands in 1842 and the British opening of China that same year indicated to the Hawaiian government that the European powers remained capable of aggressive expansion in the Pacific. An 1846 article in the Polynesian, referring to conflict in New Zealand and Tahiti, as well as U. S. dispossession of Native Americans lamented that the “strong are swallowing up the weak the world over, and hardship and injustice are to a great extent the necessary result.”12 When, in 1849-50, a French warship destroyed Honolulu’s fort and imposed several onerous demands on the Hawaiian government, it was clear that Hawaiʻi needed a sound economic foundation for a strong state if it was to avoid becoming one of the swallowed weak.

There were few options upon which Hawaiʻi could rely to build its economy.

Though provisioning the Pacific whaling fleet was the primary source of income for

Hawaiʻi in the 1850s, many knew that Pacific whale populations were declining and that the trade in supplying whalers would necessarily decline as well. Farm and ranch products California markets, including potatoes and beef, also faced the prospect of decline as Gold Rush boomtowns developed into more settled communities with their own farms.13 California could not raise tropical crops though, such as sugarcane and coffee, and thus Hawaiʻi could continue to supply these commodities. Thus with planter

12 Polynesian, August 15, 1846.

13 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom vol. 2, 136; Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977), 539, 551.

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and national interests overlapping, Hawaiʻi began developing a foreign policy in support of its sugar industry.

If the United States would not agree to a reciprocity treaty, an alternate way around the tariff was annexation. The notion of annexation to the United States was not new; many in Hawaiʻi had noted a rise of American influence since the arrival of the

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM )in 1820. The

American community in Hawaiʻi, though numbering only 692 out of a total population of

73,138 in 1853, was a vocal contingent in Honolulu and the kingdom’s government; according to Charles Bishop, “nearly all the good plantations” belonged to Americans.14

And while Hawaiians wanted to maintain their nation’s independence and the United

States expressed little interest in outright annexation of the kingdom, the Hawaiian government used the prospect of American annexation or the establishment of an

American protectorate as leverage in its continued struggles for autonomy against the great international powers at a time when these nations were expanding their empires in the Pacific. In 1849-50, in response to an act of belligerence from the French nominally involving the import duty on French alcohol but more broadly attuned to strengthening

French commercial and diplomatic power in the islands, the Hawaiian government

14 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 92. This is the number of people born in the United States living in Hawaiʻi. Hawaiian-born children of Americans would have increased the number somewhat. Charles R. Bishop to Joel Turill, Honolulu, February 25, 1851, in “The Turill Collection,1845- 1860,” Sixty-Sixth Annual Report of the Hawaiian Historical Society for the Year 1957 (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., Ltd., 1958), 40.

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arranged a secret provisional placement of the kingdom under the protection of the

United States in the case of a French attempt to occupy the kingdom.15

While French marines destroyed the Honolulu fort and threatened to occupy the town, relations between Hawaiʻi and France never became strained to the point that

Hawaiʻi formally asked for American protection. Yet Hawaiian sovereignty was far from secure at midcentury. Navigating foreign relations from a position of vulnerability to the imperial powers was indeed onerous for Kamehameha III, and a responsibility he hoped to be rid of. He confided to Richard Armstrong, his minister of public instruction, that

“his sovereignty is becoming burdensome & unless he can [be] more respected by other powers & more free from the interference of their agents here, he would rather surrender it entirely.”16

Kamehameha III saw annexation to the U.S. as a way to protect Hawaiʻi from

France and as a way to protect himself and his property from a more violent form of his removal from power. Better to cede power on his own terms and with compensation, he seemed to think, than risk losing everything in a hostile invasion or insurrection. Various schemes for revolution made brief appearances: rumors of California filibusters spread throughout Honolulu in 1851; a group of New York investors proposed to purchase the kingdom in 1852; and in 1853 a group of American businessmen in Honolulu known as the “Committee of Thirteen” began agitating for a coup.17 Although none of these

15 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom vol. 1, 388-407.

16 Richard Armstrong Journal, March 3, 1851, typescript, HMCS.

17 Kuykendal, 408-416; see also Greenberg, Manifest Manhood.

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amounted to much, they signified not only a threat to Hawaiian sovereignty but also an attempt to escape the U. S. tariff and develop a market for Hawaiian sugar. Kamehameha

III died in December 1854, and the crown prince Alexander Liholiho, who had a much more negative view of the United States, assumed the throne as Kamehameha IV. With

Kamehameha III’s death, the Hawaiian government ceased its willingness to entertain the idea of annexation. Internal agitation also seemed to dissipate, yet the problem of acquiring a more favorable market for Hawaiian sugar remained.

Native Hawaiian Labor and Agricultural Expertise

Compounding the problems of the tariff was a perceived shortage of Hawaiian workers and an unwillingness of Hawaiians to work at rates planters thought were reasonable. Planters frequently complained about the need for cheap and tractable labor, and conflicts between labor and plantation management dated back at least to 1840, when the Kōloa Plantation workers struck. By the 1850s Native Hawaiians often preferred supporting themselves by remaining within their traditional economy, joining whalers or merchant ships, raising produce to supply those ships, or working in the Pacific

Northwest and the gold diggings of California.18 Missionary Eliphalet Whittlesey wrote in 1851 that “Two young men from California during the year past have applied for land at Honomaile and commenced a sugar cane plantation which is the third in that end of the island. These plantations give proof of something either that the people are possessed of a

18 The emigration of working-age Hawaiian males was a significant contributor to the labor shortage in Hawaiʻi as well as a cause for concern among planters, the government, and aliʻi. Janice Duncan, “Kanaka World Travelers and Fur Company Employees, 1785-1860,” Hawaiian Journal of History 7 (1973): 93-111.

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competence and need not labor for others, or that they are so lazy, that they will not work.

Each establishment would employ more hands but they are not to be had.”19 Foreign capital and industry, in the view of Whittlesey and other haole observers, was being impeded by inadequacy of the local labor pool.

Hawaiʻi’s labor environment was drastically altered by contact with the outside world. Like the Caribbean sugar islands in the years following first contact with

Europeans, Hawaiʻi experienced a series of devastating new diseases, known now as virgin soil epidemics, decreasing indigenous populations by about 90 percent, according to some estimates.20 With Hawaiʻi’s native population already plummeting from introduced diseases, a smallpox epidemic erupted in 1853, killing between five thousand and six thousand people, most of whom were Native Hawaiians.21 The virus most likely arrived to Honolulu via a ship from San Francisco. Quarantine measures had been in place for over a decade, but some criticized those procedures as too lax. Once smallpox had arrived in Honolulu, the government initiated a public health program, though debates over procedures, accusations of mismanagement, limited quantities of vaccine, and ineffective batches of the vaccine exacerbated the response.22

19 Eliphalet Whittlesey, ABCFM Mission Station Report for Hana, Maui, 1851, HMCS.

20 On virgin soil epidemics, see Alfred W. Crosby, “Virgin Soil Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America,” William and Mary Quarterly 33, no. 2 (Apr., 1976): 289-299. For an examination of epidemics in Hawaiʻi, see Seth David Archer, “Epidemics and Culture in Hawai'i, 1778- 1840” (doctoral dissertation, University of California, Riverside, 2015).

21 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 58.

22 Richard A. Greer, “Oahu’s Ordeal: The Smallpox Epidemic of 1853 – Part I,” Hawaiian Historical Review 1, no. 12 (July, 1965): 221-241.

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Sugarcane planting was not the direct cause of this epidemic, or the many others to visit Hawaiʻi.23 Although, as the environmental historian J. R. McNeill argues, sugarcane plantations in the Greater Caribbean often contributed to the rise of disease ecologies, this was true for the mosquito-borne diseases yellow fever and malaria, which had little presence in Hawaiʻi.24 Smallpox has no insect vectors and is transmitted from one person to another, either through the air, direct contact, or sometimes through objects that an infected person had contaminated.25 As a result, relatively remote and isolated plantations were safer than Honolulu, a busy and more populous port town.

Nevertheless, the plantation system altered the way people in Hawaiʻi understood the incursion of alien microbes into Hawaiʻi. No longer was disease simply a matter of public health, nor did it only raise questions among some resident haole about the fitness of the Hawaiian people in the face of competition from Anglo-American immigrants; in the , disease became a problem of labor. William Lee wrote of the ravages of disease in Hawaiʻi in emotional and sympathetic language, and he worked himself to exhaustion to aid Hawaiians during the smallpox epidemic. However, in a rare moment of insensitivity, Lee wrote bluntly of the epidemic’s impact for the sugar

23 Some scholars have suggested a stronger causal link between plantations and disease in Hawaiʻi. See Carol A. MacLennan, Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014), 176-190. MacLennan wrote plantation worker housing, “created the setting for rapid spread of typhus, cholera, and the plague.” Yet she also acknowledged that epidemics were most prevalent in towns such as Honolulu. Sugarcane planting was not the primary cause of the outbreak or spread of disease, but it gave significance to disease as an economic problem.

24 J. R. McNeill, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

25 On smallpox, see Elizabeth Anne Fenn, Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775- 82 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

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industry’s bottom line, noting in his annual address to the RHAS, the “small pox has smitten thousands of our best laborers to the ground.”26 This betrayed a prevalent attitude toward Hawaiians as workers, and acknowledged that if disease was killing off too many

Hawaiian laborers, planters must acquire new laborers from elsewhere.

The editor of the Polynesian made the link between smallpox and foreign labor explicit. Planters must turn to foreign labor “now that the Small Pox has commenced its destructive ravages amongst [Native Hawaiians]. It seems evident that the islands cannot be allowed to remain untilled, especially as the interests already undertaken must be pursued promptly and efficiently, to secure investments already made. This gives the subject of LABOR an importance second to no other at present occupying the attention of planters.”27 These statements prefaced a letter to William Little Lee from John Cass, captain of the bark Thetis, who had previously brought coolies to Hawaiʻi and wrote to inform Lee and the other planters of Hawaiʻi that additional Chinese workers could be readily obtained.

Epidemic disease thus took on a new meaning for those involved in Hawaiʻi’s sugar economy. Epidemics not only contributed to a discourse on the decline of Hawaiian society, but they also presented a practical agricultural problem. Planters and other haole who experienced the demise of the Hawaiian population with a mixture of sadness, resignation, and condescension now considered disease and depopulation to be a threat to agricultural production. If diseases introduced from the outside world were killing

26 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 2:1 (1854), 5.

27 “Labor for the Islands,” Polynesian, July 9, 1853.

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Hawaiians, then laborers also from the outside world who had greater immunity to these diseases must replace the Hawaiians as workers on the plantations.28

Concern over the disease-related decline of the Hawaiian population corresponded with a broader narrative among planters of an overall decline in Hawaiian civilization and agricultural practice. James F. B. Marshall, manager of Lihue Plantation, remarked to the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society that “indisputable traces prove…this beautiful island [Kauaʻi] was one vast garden, highly cultivated,” but the time when Hawaiians so extensively cultivated Kauaʻi was long past.29 With a narrative of a vanished agricultural society, planters could view themselves as heirs to Hawaiian land that had fallen into disuse and the resuscitators of Hawaiʻi’s dormant soil.

Some haole acknowledged the presence and sophistication of Hawaiian agriculture, and sought out Hawaiian agricultural expertise. The English-born coffee planter and physician Thomas Rooke, whose marriage to an aliʻi nui (high chief) made him likelier than many planters to be exposed to Hawaiian culture, detailed the extent of some Hawaiian agricultural knowledge in his 1855 report to the RHAS on sweet potato cultivation. Rooke recorded the names and characteristics of fifty distinct varieties of

Hawaiian sweet potato. Rooke wrote that “all observations of the phenomena of nature were minutely and carefully noted” by Hawaiians, but “the remnants of the knowledge

28 For the application of American discourse on indigenous population decline to Hawaiʻi, see Amy S. Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251.

29 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1:4 (1853), 49.

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once common, is now only preserved among a few old fishermen and farmers.”30 There was, however, no such effort demonstrated in the transactions of the RHAS, Hawaiʻi’s

English-language periodicals, or in the surviving records of contemporary sugarcane plantations to collect Hawaiian knowledge of sugarcane or to enlist Hawaiians in the planting of cane.

More common than Rooke’s attention to Hawaiian agricultural expertise was a contempt for the Hawaiian relationship with the land. In a report to the RHAS on the history of Hawaiian cane cultivation, the planter Linton Torbert, ignored indigenous agricultural agency and remarked that “how long [sugarcane] had been here…is a matter of conjecture. It grows without culture, almost every where [sic].”31 J. W. Marsh quipped to that the RHAS should import moles to the islands, which “would supply a stimulus to industry for Hawaiian youth, excite them to skill in the noble art of digging, and prepare them for profitable toil in California.”32 Marsh’s comment may have simply been denigrating Hawaiian labor, but it also suggested a remaking of Hawaiʻi that both imported foreign species and exported Native Hawaiians. Marsh’s vision of Hawaiʻi relocated Hawaiians to the gold fields of California. Many Hawaiians did indeed travel to

North America during and after the Gold Rush, even prompting the government to enact a law prohibiting the emigration of Native Hawaiian men.33 Yet Hawaiʻi’s planters

30 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 2:2 (1855), 38-43.

31 “Paper Read by L.L. Torbert, Before the Royal H. Ag. Society,” Polynesian, January 31, 1852.

32 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 2:2 (1855), 49.

33 Gregory Rosenthal, “Hawaiians Who Left Hawaiʻi: Work, Body, and Environment in the Pacific World, 1786-1876” (doctoral dissertation, Stony Brook University, 2015).

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seemed particularly willing to elide Hawaiian agricultural expertise from their landscapes; their attention to pulling in from abroad the foreign elements of sugar cultivation paralleled a willful blindness toward internal agricultural activity.

One of the most suggestive expressions of the haole attitude toward indigenous sugarcane culture occurred in Honolulu on July 4, 1854. That summer, annexationist fervor was at its peak, and the American residents of Honolulu, “expressed their hopes of annexation by a grand celebration of the day,” according to Laura Fish Judd. “A car, decorated with evergreens, in which were seated thirty-two girls of American parentage, dressed in white, wreathed in flowers, each bearing the name of a State on her sash, in large gold letters, was drawn by a power unseen. Next followed ‘Young America,’ a company of very young men in uniform, with another triumphal chariot, on which was placed a beautiful boy, the very personification of health, strength, and beauty. ‘Young

Hawaiʻi’ was in tow, and represented by a boat gaily trimmed, in which were eight young native lads, fancifully dressed, and carelessly eating sugar-cane.”34 The annexationists who organized the parade were arguing that Hawaiʻi was a place rich in natural resources yet, in their view, it would require American industry and intelligence to develop sugarcane from a mere snack to a staple commodity.

Of course, despite annexationists’ rhetoric, Native Hawaiians were indeed agriculturalists. In 1856, in order to facilitate Hawaiian agriculture, King Kamehameha

IV established the Native Hawaiian Agricultural Society (NHAS; the Polynesian sometimes called it the Native Agricultural Society or the National Hawaiian Agricultural

34 Laura Fish Judd, Honolulu: Sketches of Life in the Hawaiian Islands from 1828 to 1861, ed. Dale L. Morgan (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1966), 320.

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Society) as a sister organization to the RHAS. Few RHAS members were Hawaiian, and those who were, were aliʻi. In contrast, the Crown seems to have organized the NHAS for commoners, with a message directed toward a Hawaiian agricultural working class. The

Polynesian compared the Hawaiian people to the land, highlighting untapped potential in both. “Like their native soil, [Hawaiians] are capable of producing more than that of which they have hitherto given assurance.”35 Yet, according to the Polynesian, most addresses to the NHAS were critical of Hawaiian laborers, and commonly discussed the

“almost universal want of perseverance which marks the character of the laboring classes.”36 The Polynesian translated selections from the speech of King Kamehameha

IV, who, the newspaper noted, had been “superintending some agricultural operations of his own.” As president of the NHAS, King Kamehameha IV faulted Hawaiian culture for discouraging habits of industry. “[F]oolish hospitality,” the King said, is “extended everywhere towards the lazy and good-for-nothing equally with those who are worthy of it…I am well aware that the sharing of food with every stranger and visitor that comes along is dignified with the name of ancient Hawaiian hospitality. I now tell you it is not true hospitality.”37

In his 1856 address to the NHAS, Prince Lot Kamehameha made clear his views on Hawaiian class relations, as well as his ideas about the role of commoners in the

Hawaiian economy. The Prince scolded his audience, “You have no right to grumble.

35 Polynesian, February 9, 1856.

36 Polynesian, December 13, 1856.

37 Polynesian, February 9, 1856.

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You ought if you are poor and hungry to say, as it says in the Bible, we have been weighed in the balance and found wanting; the government put everything into our hands and we were too lazy to do any good with what it gave us.” Alluding to the land and tax reforms of the 1840s that allowed Hawaiians fee-simple ownership of land and removed the burden of taxes paid in labor to local chiefs, the Prince lamented the decline of forced labor in Hawaiʻi: “Now-a-days we see more old people work at regular employment than young people. The reason is because they were taught to work when they were young by their Chiefs… [O]ur young people are so independent of the Chiefs that they please themselves.”38 These remarks suggest the breadth of the divide between Hawaiʻi’s chiefs and commoners, the chiefs’ desire for a ready supply of laborers for plantations, and their concern that Native Hawaiians were not willing to join that laboring class.

Foreign Minister Robert Wylie similarly lamented what he perceived as a decline in labor and industriousness since the abrogation of traditional labor obligations. In his

1857 address to the NHAS, Wyllie drew a provocative parallel to American history in his speech:

The United States, now a great, powerful, and wealthy people, occupy a territory which 241 years ago was possessed by natives in appearance differing little from yourselves…they bought lands of the natives and cultivated them…but the natives lived by hunting and fishing; they were too lazy to work; they saw the white men living happily, and becoming wealthy by their constant labor in cultivating the soil, but without ever making one effort to follow their example. The consequence was, as the white man advanced from the seaside, reducing field after field to cultivation, and hewing down thick forests to open new fields, the wild animals and game on which the natives lived were frightened away, and they had to follow such wild animals and game farther and farther to the

38 Polynesian, May 24, 1856.

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west every year, until all their tribes have nearly disappeared, leaving only a few wretched wanderers between the and Rocky Mountains.39

Wyllie’s message was stark: adopt Western agriculture or succumb to American expansion. This rationale at once marginalized extant forms of Hawaiian agriculture and gave a justification for foreign acquisition of lands and displacement of Native

Hawaiians.

Problematic though they may have been, speeches such as Prince Lot’s and

Wyllie’s (as well as others’) delivered to the NHAS were exhortations that these officials intended as efforts to increase Hawaiian agriculture. Hawaiians were indeed involved in sugarcane cultivation, and in March 1858 the NHAS had plans to build a sugar mill which would manufacture sugar for Hawaiians who would grow cane on their own lands.40 But the NHAS did not meet again for another year, and by that point the NHAS mill did not receive mention in the Polynesian. Efforts to stimulate Hawaiian involvement in the sugar trade seem to have faded; most Hawaiians involved in agriculture raised the staples taro and sweet potatoes, while some around Kau, Hawaiʻi and Makawao, Maui raised wheat and around Kona, Hawaiians grew coffee until a blight destroyed their trees.41 By 1861 no sugar plantations bought cane from native farmers or ground cane on shares for them.42

39 Robert C. Wyllie, “Address to the Royal Native Agricultural Society of the Hawaiian Kingdom, read to the Society on the 20th of April, 1857,” Broadsides, Misc. Hawaiian, AH.

40 Polynesian, March 6, 1858; May 8, 1858.

41 Polynesian, April 16, 1859; June 11, 1859; March 9, 1861.

42 Polynesian, March 23, 1861.

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Foreign Labor: Coolies and Slaves

Planters looked overseas for plantation workers. The desire for foreign labor was common among plantation societies because disease had decimated indigenous peoples and those who remained often chose to avoid plantation labor. However, with no colonial power to facilitate migration, planters had to take on the expense of acquiring foreign workers themselves. Lihue Plantation was one of the first to bring in Chinese workers, under five-year contracts signed in China, with the cost of transportation deducted from workers’ wages and workers subject to fines or arrest for failure to fulfill their obligations. Thus Hawaiʻi entered into the trade. After arranging for their importation in 1852 the plantation manager found Chinese workers “quick to learn, careful and attentive,” and employed them in skilled positions in the mill and boiling house, even placing one in charge of its new centrifugal separator, as well as unskilled positions in the cane fields, where the manger thought one Chinese worker did the work of three Native Hawaiians.43 The logistics of importing immigrant labor, however, proved difficult and costly. Consequently, only a few hundred contract laborers came to Hawaiʻi in the early 1850s.44

Part of the reason the question of labor was so fraught with tension for planters was their general antislavery attitude. As the predominant mode of labor throughout many sugarcane plantation systems, and an issue of importance to many American

43 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1:4 (1853), 57, 124.

44 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom v. 1, 328-30. In 1853 364 people born in China were living in Hawaiʻi according to Robert C. Shmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaiʻi, 90; many of these were not contract laborers but were entrepreneurs or sugarcane planters.

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residents of Hawaiʻi in the 1850s, slavery loomed over the question of finding plantation workers. Slavery took on even greater significance in light of attempts to annex Hawaiʻi to the United States. William Little Lee, who was closely involved in negotiating annexation in the early 1850s, wrote to a relative about haole excitement over the possibility of annexation, but worried about the extension of slavery to the islands: “The prospect is that we shall have the stars and stripes waving over us in the course of two or three years. The only fear in the matter, is the subject of slavery, Oh, the black curse!”45

Just as Hawaiian planters maintained their commitment to temperance and produced sugar without distilling rum, they sought to balance their need for labor with their opposition to slavery. The solution in Hawaiʻi, as in the Caribbean, was a shift to Asian contract labor that many saw as a compromise between slavery and freedom.46

Hawaiian planters may have abhorred slavery, but they wanted a cheap labor system. After the RHAS’s Committee on Sugar solicited and received a report on sugar production from a Louisiana cane planter, the committee took special note of the cost of labor in Louisiana. In their annual report, the committee members priced five-year contracts for Chinese workers at fifty dollars, plus monthly wages of three dollars, expenses that “but very little exceed the cost of feed and clothing for negroes.” The committee determined that “the comparative cheapness, therefore, of cooly [sic] labor,

45 William Little Lee to Cyrus L. Culver, October 31, 1853, Frederick B. Richards Collection, Crandall Public Library's Center for Folk Life, History and Cultural Programs, Glens Falls, NY.

46 On the use of Asian labor in the Caribbean and American attitudes toward coolies, see Moon- Ho Jung, Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006).

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must forever preclude the possibility of competition, in these Islands, of negro slavery.”47

And it appears as though planters agreed with the committee’s pronouncement. When, in

1858, the newly founded Haiku Plantation solicited George Beckwith of Barrington,

Massachusetts, to be the plantation’s manager, telling him he “could do much good as a

Christian man on the islands,” the plantation first asked that he travel to Louisiana to research the plantations and mills there.48 Though Beckwith discussed in great detail the workings of the plantations, he paid no attention to the labor system present in the Deep

South plantations he visited; he and his employers might have wanted to emulate

Louisianans’ sugar-making, but not their labor management nor choice of labor force.

Despite widespread denigration of Hawaiian labor and frequent demands for the importation of a foreign workforce, Hawaiians made up the large majority of plantation laborers from the 1850s until the mid-1870s. Of the few hundred Chinese workers who came to Hawaiʻi in the early 1850s, planters complained that most chose to find new jobs after the expiration of their initial five-year contracts. It was not until 1864 that a newly formed Planters’ Society emerged and began to lobby for government sponsorship of agricultural laborer immigration. The following year William Hillebrand, a botanist and physician originally from Hamburg, traveled to China as the kingdom’s Royal

Commissioner for Immigration. Hillebrand arranged for the emigration of 530 Chinese laborers that year, and more workers followed in subsequent years, though numbers

47 Transactions of the RHAS, 2:1, 24.

48 Richard Armstrong to George Beckwith, Honolulu, June 1, 1858, Castle & Cooke Papers, HMCS.

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fluctuated from a few dozen to a few hundred.49 However, a survey of the kingdom’s sugarcane plantations and mills conducted in late 1866 counted a total of 3,172 people employed in the industry, indicating that the large majority of plantation workers remained Hawaiian.50

The Torch of Science

With the tariff and labor keeping planting unprofitable, planters needed to become more efficient at converting cane into sugar. At midcentury, Hawaiʻi’s planters were still an inexperienced group who relied too much on rudimentary equipment and poor methods of growing cane and milling sugar. George Wilfong, a former sea captain who turned to planting sugarcane in 1851, taught himself how to boil sugar, something that requires great care and precision, and that professional sugar boilers charged dearly to teach.51 Planters could nevertheless use “the torch of science” to improve their methods of growing and milling cane.52 As the planter Linton Torbert reported to the RHAS,

“whilst the man who works with a mill of two horse-power and makes only 200 lbs. per day affords his sugar in the market at 6 cts per lb., the planter who works with a steam- mill of 40 horse-power, other things corresponding, can afford his sugar at three or four

49 Ursula H. Meier, Hawaiʻi’s Pioneer Botanist: Dr. William Hillebrand, His Life and Letters (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 2005), 33; Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii 97.

50 Samuel C. Damon, “Open Despatch [sic] to the Secretary of State at Washington,” Friend, February 1, 1867.

51 Geo. W. Wilfong, “Twenty Years’ Experience in Cane Culture,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 7 (October 1882), 149.

52 The Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society at its Second Annual Meeting 1, no. 3 (1852), 15.

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cents per pound.”53 Consolidation and technological advancement were keys to the sugar industry’s survival under mid-century market conditions.

Few new technologies made as big of a difference to Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry so soon after their invention as did a device called the centrifugal separator. David M.

Weston, a machinist from Boston, came to Hawaiʻi in 1851 to construct a new mill at

Lihue Plantation. A few months after his arrival, Weston built Hawaiʻi’s first centrifugal sugar drainers, which could separate crystalized sugar from molasses and syrup—a process that previously required weeks in large drying houses—in a matter of minutes.

Centrifugals had only just come into use for sugar production. Historians generally ascribe their first use in the early 1840s in the French West Indies, , and

Réunion, though an article in November 1895 Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly claims

Weston was the original inventor.54 The Polynesian called the advent of the centrifugal a

“revolution in sugar manufacturing” and celebrated Weston for his intelligence and determination.55 Others, too, remarked upon the significance of this innovation. Wilfong later recalled the centrifugal “was a curiosity to the people, and sometimes a hundred or

53 L. L. Torbert, “Report of the Committee on Sugar,” Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1, no. 3 (1852): 125.

54 “A Brief Sketch of the Early History and Growth of the Sugar Industry in Hawaii and its Pre- Eminent Advantages as a Field for Investment of Capital,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 14, no. 11 (November 1895): 497-510. In 1891, a visitor to Hawaiʻi wrote that Hawaiian centrifugals were “of the Weston pattern,” suggesting that Weston was recognized with at least some form of original invention or innovation: Arthur T. Robinson, “Cultivation and Manipulation of Sugar Cane in New South Wales and the Hawaiian Islands,” Planter’s Monthly 11, no. 1 (January 1892): 37. Handbook of the Hawaiian Sugar Industry, 12 and Vandercook also claim Weston was the original inventor of the centrifugal separator: John W. Vandercook, King Cane: The Story of Sugar in Hawaii (Honolulu, Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, 1938), 152. Deerr, The History of Sugar vol. 2, 573-574; Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry, 137-138; Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom vol. 1, 326.

55 Polynesian, November 1, 1851; December 6, 1851.

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more natives came to see it run, the school boys would come every afternoon and run the machine until night without pay, and would dispute their turn to run it, they would make it hum.”56 By drastically increasing the efficiency with which sugar could be separated from molasses, the centrifugal promised to improve the quality of Hawaiian sugar brought to market. Planters had damaged the reputation of Hawaiian sugar by rushing poor produce to market during the Gold Rush boom, and thus hoped the adoption of the centrifugal would help them improve their image as well as differentiate Hawaiian sugar from cheaper Chinese and Philippine sugars.57

Though it is unclear whether Weston conceived his centrifugal independently or based it upon the work of someone else, the introduction of the centrifugal to Hawaiʻi at such an early date indicates the extent to which Hawaiian planters had connected with other parts of the world. As Ulbe Bosma and Jonathan Curry-Machado argued in their examination of the Cuban and Javanese sugar industries, transnational access to sugar- making technologies from the United States, Britain, and France was crucial to nineteenth-century sugarcane plantation systems, allowing them to increase production and keep pace with rising world demand for sugar.58 Weston did not simply happen to appear in Hawaiʻi—the planter Henry A. Pierce recruited him; and, after Weston briefly returned to Boston, Pierce provided him with the investment capital to found the

Honolulu Iron Works, bringing to the islands milling expertise that early planters lacked.

56 Wilfong, “Twenty Years’ Experience in Cane Culture,” 150.

57 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1, no. 2 (1851), 119.

58 Ulbe Bosma and Jonathan Curry-Machado, “Two Islands, One Commodity: Cuba, Java, and the Global Sugar Trade (1790-1930),” New West Indian Guide 86, no. 3-4 (2012): 244.

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Hawaiʻi’s planters put Weston and the Honolulu Iron Works to good use throughout the nineteenth century, and used them to adapt foreign technologies to local conditions.

Technological innovation and investment helped some of the better-financed plantations recover from the dismal market of the first years of the 1850s. In 1853 two sugarcane plantations operated on Kauaʻi: Kolōa and Lihue. Koloā Plantation was in the process of improving its mill to more efficiently grind its 450 acres in cultivation and its estimated crop of 150 tons of cane. Lihue Plantation had 300 acres under cultivation, and the last crop it took in was 125 tons—half of what was expected due to drought. A mysterious blight that began after a severe rainstorm destroyed the greater part of its 1853 crop, yet despite these setbacks, Lihue was expanding and improving; James Marshall, manager of Lihue plantation, planned to increase cultivation to 650 acres, with another 60 acres cultivated by local residents. In order to meet this increased capacity, Lihue ordered a new 25 horsepower steam engine, which could keep the mill running around the clock, as well as a separate, smaller engine to power their new centrifugal separator.59

Others involved in the sugar trade sought out practical knowledge and technology from abroad as well. The RHAS maintained correspondence with planters in Mauritius,

Lima, Sydney, Trinidad, Havana, and many other sugar-growing regions, as well as agricultural institutions in Washington, D. C., and London to exchange seeds and expertise.60 George Beckwith’s 1858 tour of Louisiana sugar operations on behalf of the

Haiku Plantation brought back to the islands much-needed information on advanced

59 Transactions of the RHAS 1:4, 49-50, 55.

60 Polynesian, November 13, 1858.

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milling technology.61 Haiku introduced the first steam-powered mill on the islands, and by 1860 nine of Hawaiʻi’s twenty-two plantations used steam for grinding cane.62 By

1863 Robert Wyllie, who had recently converted Princeville, his plantation on Kauaʻi, from coffee to sugar, built a mill far more advanced than those present in Hawaiʻi only a few years earlier. One observer claimed the mill’s engine, imported from Glasgow, was

“perhaps the finest machinery ever imported” to Hawaiʻi. This engine powered boilers, clarifiers, and a Wetzel and de Bour pan—“two ingenious inventions that mark an era in the science of sugar manufacturing.”63 Presiding over this advanced equipment were an engineer named Webster, who had “large experience on estates in other countries,” and a manager named McGregor, “well known as a scientific and successful sugar boiler.”64

Planters recruited additional sugar experts, including Louisiana sugar boilers fleeing the

American Civil War. An 1864 report in the American Merchant’s Magazine summed up the situation: “Heretofore sugar-boiling has been a matter of experiment, but as soon as experienced men were placed in control of the sugar-houses, the work proceeded with system and economy.”65

61 Castle and Cooke Papers, HMCS.

62 Thomas G. Thrum, “Notes on the History of the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands,” The Sugar Cane: A Monthly Magazine, Devoted to the Interests of the Sugar Cane Industry ,vol. 6 (1874): 159

63 Holstein, “Rural Sketches of the Hawaiian Islands: A Trip to ,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 26, 1863.

64 Holstein, “Rural Sketches of the Hawaiian Islands: A Trip to Kauai, (Continued)” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, December 3, 1863; Holstein, “Rural Sketches of the Hawaiian Islands: A Trip to Kauai,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 26, 1863.

65 Henry B. Auchincloss, “The Sandwich Islands and their Sugar Crop,” Merchants’ Magazine and Commercial Review 51 (1864): 337-351.

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Many technological advances were aimed at saving labor and increasing efficiency. A visitor to James Makee’s plantation at Ulupalakua, Maui, made particular note of a new cart Makee designed to haul two tons of cane and thus conserve labor.

Likewise the visitor was “struck by the labor-saving arrangements of the mill,” constructed by David Weston. “Everything,” the observer reported to the Pacific

Commercial Advertiser, “is arranged with the view of saving labor.”66 As Hawaiian milling practices improved, planters were also able to increase the quantity and value of their output. New mills extracted greater amounts of sucrose from their sugarcane, leaving less sucrose in the form of molasses, which was less valuable. Though sugar exports increased almost every year, molasses exports peaked in 1866 and decreased rapidly after that. Moreover, as a proportion of gallons of molasses exports to pounds of

Hawaiian sugar exports, molasses peaked at about 9.1% of plantation output in 1853, but by 1857 had fallen to 4%, fluctuated around there for about a decade, and then declined steadily to .4% in 1875.67 Relatively rudimentary and low-tech at midcentury, sugar production had become a much more efficient process in order to reduce labor costs and find profitability while subject to the American tariff.

The pursuit of advances in sugar production extended beyond the research and development of better milling practices to the introduction of foreign plants. As some were bringing to the islands equipment and expertise, others were bringing botanical specimens, even new varieties of sugarcane. Such imports were not new; the introduction

66 Holstein, “Rural Sketches of the Hawaiian Islands: Maui Revisited,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, July 2, 1864

67 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 551.

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of foreign plants to Hawaiʻi began with the first European encounter. Haole intentionally introduced coffee, wheat, cotton, tobacco, citrus, grapes, strawberries, and many other plants. Sugarcane, however, both predated the arrival of haole and became an introduced plant. Though Hawaiʻi’s original Polynesian settlers had brought sugarcane with them, and white visitors noted cane growing wild and cultivated throughout the islands, planters sought varieties of cane better suited to plantation agriculture—they wanted sugarcane that grew faster, yielded higher amounts of sucrose, and did not exhaust soils subjected to continuous planting. For that they looked to other sugar-growing regions, and in 1854 the captain of a whaler brought two varieties of cane from for a Kauaʻi planter. The ship ended up depositing the plants at Lāhainā, Maui instead of Kauaʻi, and as a consequence one of these varieties became known in Hawaiʻi as Lāhainā cane.

Lāhainā cane was said to grow so quickly that the noise of its growing kept its owner awake at night.68 This story was repeated in the 1860s and 70s, and in the following decades Lāhainā cane had become the variety of choice on irrigated plantations throughout Hawaiʻi.69

This story surrounding the importation of sugarcane to a place where people had been cultivating the plant for centuries demonstrates a paradoxical celebration among haole planters of Hawaiʻi’s supposed natural fertility and white agricultural talent. But it

68 Hawaiian Gazette, June 27, 1877. Lāhainā cane was likely the Tahitian cane, known as “Otahite” or “Bourbon,” popular on sugar plantations throughout the world; Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, The Relation of Applied Science to Sugar Production in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1915), 43.

69 D. D. Baldwin, “Lahaina Cane,” The Planters’ Monthly 1 no. 2 (May 1882): 42-43. Noël Deerr, Sugar House Notes and Tables: a Reference Book for Planters, Factory Managers, Chemists, Engineers, and Others Employed in the Manufacture of Cane Sugar (London: E. & F. N. Spon, Limited, 1900), 30.

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leaves no room to acknowledge indigenous agricultural knowledge. In order to unlock the potential of Hawaiian soil, according to haole planters, white enterprise needed to be applied; then the Hawaiian soil could perform miraculous feats as the planter slept. Just as planters had been marginalizing Native Hawaiians and their agricultural practices and fitness as laborers, the importation of foreign cane suggests that even Hawaiʻi’s own varieties of sugarcane were not up to the task of plantation agriculture.

The notion that Hawaiian cane was not the ideal plantation crop reveals the differences between Hawaiian cane cultivation and haole plantation agriculture. It likewise reflects the fact that Hawaiian cane had been cultivated for centuries with no thought to monocrop planting or milling sugar. Planters preferred Lāhainā cane for its rapid growth, deep rooting, resistance to rats, high sucrose content, and the white color of the sugar it produced.70 Many of these traits were not important to Hawaiian agriculturalists, but when measured by the standards and desired outcome of planters producing sugar on a large scale from monocrop fields, Lāhainā cane was superior to native varieties of sugarcane. That the cane variety used most heavily on plantations throughout the world spread through Hawaiʻi as well would have significant environmental implications later in the fight against sugarcane disease epidemics.

Sugar also had an indirect influence on ecological imperialism in Hawaiʻi.

William Hillebrand’s 1865 search for Asian plantation workers as Royal Commissioner for Immigration also included the provision of funds—from both the Hawaiian government and the Planters’ Society—to collect suitable plants for introduction to

70 Baldwin, “Lahaina Cane,” Planters’ Monthly 1 no. 2 (May 1882): 42-43.

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Hawaiʻi and to report on sugarcane planting in Asia. Hillebrand wanted to extend the work he had done as Corresponding Secretary for the RHAS by connecting Hawaiʻi to a network of agricultural exchange. In an address before the Planters’ Society, he expressed a belief that “the agricultural resources of our archipelago might be vastly increased and varied by drawing upon the vegetable treasures of, and studying their cultivation in” Asia and the .71 Though poor health forced Hillebrand to return to Hawaiʻi ahead of schedule, he nonetheless achieved most of his aims. After arranging contracts for Chinese laborers to work on Hawaiian cane plantations, he collected botanical specimens from

Singapore, Calcutta, and Java before poor health cut short his mission. Even then, he brought back twenty-nine Wardian cases of plants to the islands, as well as several different animal species.72 Hillebrand thus facilitated the international flow of people, plants, and animals, advancing Hawaiian botany and ecological imperialism along with the sugar trade.

“Overcoming Nature by Nature”

Though Hillebrand and others dreamed of transforming Hawaiʻi into a garden for alien plant species from around the world, they faced serious obstacles. Many newly introduced agricultural plants were vulnerable to crop pests and diseases in Hawaiʻi, while sugarcane was more resistant to these problems. Worms, weevils, caterpillars, aphids, rats, and other crop pests ravaged fields. Crop pests faced few endemic predators

71 “Planters’ Society,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser April 8, 1865.

72 Meier, Hawaiʻi’s Pioneer Botanist, 36-37.

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and little competition for food and habitat space in Hawaiʻi, and so they thrived. In order to control the pests plaguing many agricultural enterprises, the RHAS began a campaign to introduce foreign predatory animals. In his “Report on Birds, Bees, Insects and

Worms,” J. W. Marsh argued that the RHAS must take special pains to introduce

“insectivorous and vermivorous” animals. Marsh exhorted, “if we will and must make the lava bloom, and the desert blossom, in spite of nature, worm and insect, we must at least submit to the policy of overcoming nature by nature. We…can hold [pests] in check and diminish their numbers, by cherishing such reptiles, insects, birds and quadrupeds as are already our allies, and by introducing others to co-operate with them.”73

This call to action was a logical, though subtly different extension of earlier haole acts of ecological imperialism in Hawaiʻi. Earlier introductions focused on species that would be useful by themselves: crop plants, food animals, and some ornamental trees.

The RHAs was now introducing support species. The RHAS made several efforts to import insectivorous birds from California with the support of the Hawaiian government, which, by 1859, imposed legislation such as fines of one dollar on anyone who killed or sold a native insectivorous bird and ten dollars on anyone who killed or sold an imported insectivorous bird.74

Sugarcane was, for the most part, resistant to many crop diseases and pests. The missionary John Emerson reported to the RHAS that “insects can harm [sugarcane] but

73 J. W. Marsh, "Report on Birds, Bees, Insects and Worms" Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 2:2 (1855), 47-48.

74 “An Act for the Protection of the Kolea, or Plover, and Other Useful Birds,” Polynesian, April 23, 1859.

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little.”75 A notable exception to this occurred on Lihue plantation on Kauaʻi in 1851-2, and another blight attributed to the aphid or scale insect struck Kōloa and Lihue in May of 1857, but the damage was restricted to only a small portion of their fields, and planters tended to take the view that some crop loses to pests were inevitable.76 In fact, sugarcane was a beneficiary of crop disease and insects more than a victim. Other crops, notably coffee, suffered much more dramatically from blight, leading owners of large estates to turn from planting other crops to concentrating on sugarcane. The blight first noticed on

Kauaʻi’s cane plantations in 1857 first appeared at Kona, Hawaiʻi (now Hawaiʻi’s premier coffee district) in 1856, where it attacked coffee and orange trees. It spread to the coffee plantation at Hanalei, Kauaʻi by July 1857, where it was expected to reduce the coffee crop by one third.77 By September of that year, coffee planters feared their trees were irreparably damaged.78 The RHAS allocated one hundred dollars to importing from

California insectivorous birds and frogs in the hopes of controlling the insects responsible for the blight.79

The coffee blight was not a recent invader of Hawaiʻi. Robert Wyllie reported to the RHAS in October 1858 that the same insect attacked a cotton plantation at Lahaina as

75 Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1:2 (1851), 96.

76 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, May 14, 1857. On the acceptance among nineteenth-century farmers of some crop loss to pests, see Jonathan H. Brown and H. A. Beecham, “Crop Pests and Diseases,” in The Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1750-1850, ed. G. E. Mingay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4:311 quoted in J. F. M. Clark, “Bugs in the System: Insects, Agricultural Science, and Professional Aspirations in Britain, 1890-1920,” Agricultural History 75 (Winter 2001): 85-86.

77 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, July 9, 1857.

78 Polynesian, September 19, 1857.

79 Paficic Commercial Advertiser, October 1, 1857.

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early as 1826, and that it was “generally asserted by natives, that the insect has, so long as they remember, been known on the islands, as injurious to trees in certain places; and that the only novelty is the greater ravages during the last two seasons.”80 The “novelty” had a great deal to do with the implementation of plantation-style agriculture. With large fields packed with a single crop, plantations facilitated the invasion and diffusion of insect pests. Decreased in monoculture plantation fields helped keep pest predators away, while pests found plentiful food and habitats and were able to reproduce rapidly.81

Older coffee plantations, where trees were planted more densely and had grown larger than those on younger plantations, tended to be the most vulnerable to the blight.82

Blight made coffee crops suffer from “an almost invariable rule of alternation,” vacillating between increasingly meager and abundant crops.83 Moreover, coffee blight also attacked fruit trees, sweet potato plants, indigo, grapevines, and tobacco, but sugarcane only suffered lightly. Recovery of coffee and fruit trees from infestation also takes large amounts of time and money as these trees require years of growing before they are ready to bear fruit.84

80 Polynesian, November 6, 1858.

81 On pets and agriculture see Alan Taylor, William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1995), 91; Annette Atkins, Harvest of Grief: Grasshopper Plagues and Public Assistance in Minnesota, 1873-1878 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1984); Thomas R. Dunlop, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

82 “The Coffee Blight,” Polynesian, August 13, 1859.

83 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, May 13, 1858. Reports indicate each time the blight came back it was increasingly severe; see Pacific Commercial Advertiser, August 4, 1859.

84 Steven Stoll, “Insects and Institutions: University Science and the Fruit Business in California,” Agricultural History 69 (Spring 1995): 224.

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This volatility and continued depredations of the coffee blight led some to turn to sugar. Charles Titcomb, a Kauaʻi coffee planter, put his plantation up for sale in 1858.85

Titcomb struggled on without a buyer for two more years, but in 1859, he abandoned his coffee trees and planted sugarcane.86 A newspaper correspondent writing from Kauaʻi wrote that the coffee blight had “entirely covered” the island’s two coffee plantations.

Where those plantations thrived only a few years ago, “now all was silent. Not a coffee gatherer was abroad, and we saw laborers bringing coffee trees upon their shoulders, to heat the fires under the sugar boilers of Mr. Titcomb… Not only is the blight upon the coffee trees, but the indigo, guava, fig, koa, kukui, and we know not how many other plants, shrubs and trees are withering and dying, beneath the fatal and spreading evil.”87

Robert Wyllie, who in 1853 had purchased a coffee plantation at Hanalei, Kauaʻi, likewise struggled against the blight for a decade. In 1863, he conceded defeat and planted cane. Coffee exports plummeted from a peak of 311,300 pounds in 1857 to

58,100 pounds the following year, while sugar exports rose from 701,000 pounds to

1,205,000 pounds over that same time. Sugar exports continued to rise in the late 1850s as new cane fields matured.88

Despite efforts at control, the ravages of pests continued. Isabella Bird, the British explorer and writer who visited Hawaiʻi in 1872 praised the archipelago’s environment,

85 Polynesian, November 6, 1858.

86 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, November 10, 1859.

87 Friend, September 8, 1860.

88 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 551.

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writing, “wherever there is sufficient rainfall, the earth teems with plenty,” but she went on to write that agriculture was a risky prospect:

The dearth of insectivorous birds seriously affects the cultivation of a soil naturally bounteous to excess…Though wheat and other cereals mature, attacks of weevil prevent their storage, and all the grain and flour consumed are imported from California. Cacao, cinnamon, and allspice, are subject to an apparently ineradicable blight. The blight which has attacked the coffee shrub is so severe, that the larger plantations have been dug up…Oranges suffer from blight also, and some of the finest groves have been cut down. Cotton suffers from the ravages of a caterpillar. The mulberry , which, from its rapid growth, would be invaluable to silk growers, is covered with a black and white blight.89

Indeed, sugarcane rose to the pinnacle of Hawaiian agriculture in part because Hawaiʻi’s island biogeography left newly imported agricultural plants without allied species that might protect crops from pests. With no natural protections against such blights, diverse agriculturalists turned increasingly toward sugar.

“King of the Sugar World”

The switch from coffee to sugar among some planters was particularly fortuitous for the Hawaiian sugar industry, as it immediately preceded a boom in the price of sugar brought about by the . In 1862, the war crippled Louisiana’s sugarcane plantations and severed their distribution routes; Hawaiian sugar producers were poised to make up the shortfall this caused.90 Other industries, such as whaling, also

89 Isabella L. Bird, The Hawaiian Archipelago: Six Months Among the Palm Groves, Coral Reefs, & Volcanoes of the Sandwich Islands (London: John Murray, 1875), 455-56.

90 Walter Prichard, “The Effects of the Civil War on the Louisiana Sugar Industry,” Journal of Southern History 5 (August 1939): 315-332. Some have argued that the Civil War initiated the turn to sugarcane among Hawaiian planters. See James L. Haley, Captive Paradise: A (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), 190. Although the Civil War certainly encouraged Hawaiian planters to favor sugar, and higher wartime prices gave Hawaiian planters greater profits to reinvest in their operations, 142

suffered. The Confederate warships Florida and Shenandoah harassed the Pacific whaling fleet, which was already declining from overhunting and an economic shift toward other commodities.91 The combined effects of the blight and war contributed to a sharp increase in cane planting. The amount of sugar produced for export in the islands more than quintupled in the span of three years, from just over 3 million lbs. in 1862 to

15.3 million lbs. in 1865.92 By 1866, over 10,000 acres were planted in cane and the sugar industry was poised for further growth—Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane plantations held over

112,000 acres of land.93

Foreign writers took notice of, and publicized, the Hawaiian sugar industry’s expansion. Following the Civil War, Mark Twain visited Hawaiʻi on assignment from the

Sacramento Union to report on business in the islands. Acting more as a booster than reporter, Twain echoed the sentiments of stories such as that of the Lahāinā cane, and ascribed an almost miraculous ability of Hawaiʻi to produce sugarcane. Twain wrote that

Hawaiʻi was “a land which produces six, eight, ten, twelve, yea, even thirteen thousand pounds [of sugar] to the acre of unmanured soil! There are precious few acres of unmanured ground in Louisiana—none at all, perhaps—which will yield two thousand

the fact that sugar production and exports had already begun to increase before Hawaiian planters could respond to the war indicates that the blight played a greater role in the initial increase in sugarcane planting.

91 Chalfant Robinson, A History of Two Reciprocity Treaties, the Treaty with Canada in 1854, the Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands in 1876; with a Chapter on the Treaty Making Power of the House of Representatives (New Haven, 1903), 113; Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 554.

92 Thomas G. Thrum, “Notes on the History of the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1875 (Honolulu: Black & Auld, Printers, 1875), 37.

93 Samuel C. Damon, “Open Despatch [sic] to the Secretary of State at Washington,” Friend, February 1, 1867.

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five hundred pounds of sugar; there is not an unmanured acre under cultivation in the

Sandwich Islands which yields less.” Twain went on to call Hawai‘i “king of the sugar world, as far as astonishing productiveness is concerned.”94

Isabella Bird, too, was effusive over the prospects of Hawaiʻi sugar. In contrast to coffee, cotton, silk, and the other attempted export crops that failed in Hawaiʻi, cane seemed to be naturally suited to the Hawaiian environment:

Sugar is now the great interest of the islands. Christian missions and whaling have had their day, and now people talk sugar…150,000 [acres] is said to be specially adapted for sugar culture. Herein is a prospective Utopia, and people are always dreaming of the sugar-growing capacities of the belt of rich disintegrated lava which slopes upwards from the sea to the bases of the mountains…The magnificent climate makes [sugarcane] a very easy crop to grow. There is no brief harvest time with its rush, hurry, and frantic demand for labour, nor frost to render necessary the hasty cutting of an immature crop... The planters can plant pretty much when they please…They can cut when they please…and they can plant, cut, and grind at one time!95

The climate and land were indeed well suited to sugarcane, but Bird’s observations were not completely accurate, as sugarcane had suffered from occasional, limited blights and droughts. In 1868, for example, George Dole reported that at Pakikope on Kauaʻi, part of the plantation he managed was “awfully blighted. The next year a drought was severe enough that his mill could not grind all its cane, and Dole wrote in his diary that the land was “all dry & brown; cane all yellow & withered & the ground all cracked open.”96

94 Mark Twain, “The High Chief of Sugardom,” Sacramento Daily Union, September 26, 1866.

95 Bird, Hawaiian Archipelago, 119-20.

96 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole diaries: typescript, June 13, 1868; March 1, 1869, Huntington Library.

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Sugarcane planting was still precarious, but less so than the cultivation of other crops.

Bird’s observation that Hawaiʻi was “specially adapted for sugar culture” had as much to do with the ecological obstacles to the cultivation of other plants. It was the process of biological invasion to an environment that had few indigenous insectivorous species that limited a more diverse agricultural complex.

Twain and Bird both recognized that sugar had risen to the pinnacle of Hawaiʻi’s economy and become the kingdom’s most important commodity. Yet Bird also noted that sugarcane’s primacy in the Hawaiian environment placed Hawaiʻi’s economy in a vulnerable position: “Hawaii thrills to the news of a cent up or a cent down in the

American market. All the interests of the kingdom are threatened by this one.”97 Indeed, the Hawaiian economy had become dependent upon the sugar industry. In an increasingly urgent effort to lobby the U. S. government for a reduction of the sugar tariff, on

December 18, 1874, King David Kalākua became the first monarch to address a joint meeting of Congress. The reciprocity treaty was signed on January 30, 1875 and went into effect the following year. By that point, sugar and molasses made up sixty-nine percent of the value of Hawaiʻi’s exports.98

By the enactment of the reciprocity treaty, Hawaiian planters had been reaching east toward an American market, west toward a cheap labor pool, and across the world for expertise in developing the technologies of their industry. Yet ecological processes reached across the oceans, too, in ways that people in Hawaiʻi could not always anticipate

97 Bird, Hawaiian Archipelago, 119.

98 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii,539-540.

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or control. Sugarcane and planters were the primary beneficiaries of ecological exchange in the mid-nineteenth century, largely because other plants that might have competed with sugarcane for a position in Hawaiʻi’s environment and economy were more vulnerable to crop pests than cane was. Hawaiian sugarcane planters had survived through years of high tariffs and expensive labor by seeking out foreign expertise and labor. Yet advancing the science of sugar production in Hawaiʻi only took them so far.

Environmental factors assisted sugarcane in its rise to dominance over the Hawaiian economy, which in turn helped planters establish the international market conditions they needed to succeed.

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CHAPTER 5: REVOLUTIONS, 1876-1893

What opes up beauty to the sky From Rose Ranch down to Atooai And makes Hawaii look—O my! Sugary. What whitens all the sea with sails About these isles, and fills the mails— Ay, what alone just now avails, Sugar! And can I ever cease to be A zealous follower of thee, Who art so very sweet to me? Sugar! Oh no, the thought I cannot bear, For sugar making’s all my care, Moreover thou dost pay my fare. Sugar! “Song of the Sugar Boiler,” Wailuku, Maui, April 19, 18641

In 1876, the enactment of the U.S.-Hawaiian Reciprocity Treaty allowing the duty-free importation of Hawaiian sugars into the United States, long sought by many

Hawaiian sugarcane planters, the Hawaiian government, and allies in the United States, caused explosive growth in Hawaiian sugar industry. As the historian of Hawaiʻi Ralph

Kuykendall wrote in his classic three-volume history of the kingdom, “the treaty affected

[the Hawaiian sugar industry] in a manner somewhat analogous to that of an uninhibited pituitary gland in the human body.”2 With the American tariff lifted, the economic calculus of producing sugar changed dramatically. Residents established twenty-eight new plantations in 1877 and 1878. More tellingly, sugar came to dominate Hawaiʻi’s

1 “Song of the Sugar Boiler,” Planters’ Monthly 20, no. 2 (February 1901): 96.

2 Kuykendall, vol. 3, 46.

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export economy. In 1875 and 1876, sugar and molasses made up about 60% of the value of Hawaiʻi’s exports; in 1877 that number increased to 70%, the year after that it was

78%, then 84% in 1879 and 89% in 1880. After 1883, sugar and molasses never accounted for less than 90% of the value of Hawaiian exports.3 Plantation profits increased, too, but not nearly as dramatically or consistently. Planters reinvested their profits into their operations by importing new machinery, thereby increasing efficiency and productivity.4 In the early 1880s, planters averaged about twenty-five tons of sugarcane per acre and about nine pounds of sugar per hundred pounds of cane; by the turn of the twentieth century those numbers had risen to forty tons of cane per acre and twelve pounds of sugar per hundred pounds of cane.5

This explosion of sugar production corresponded with an explosive political climate. King David Kalākaua had been a champion of Reciprocity and a significant actor in securing the treaty, yet the bonanza of reciprocity brought in capital that soon clashed with Hawaiian political authority. Concern over the potential expiration of the reciprocity treaty after its initial seven-year term caused planters to push the monarchy to cede the area of the Pearl River Lagoon to the United States as an inducement to renew the trade agreement, a concession that many Native Hawaiians saw as both an immoral betrayal of the relationship between Hawaiʻi’s aliʻi, makaʻainana, and land, and a politically

3 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, Table 21.1, pp. 539-540.

4 George B. McClellan, ed., A Hand Book on the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands; Together with a List of the Plantations, Agents, Managers, etc. (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, Ltd., 1899), 8.

5 J. N. S. Williams, “New Sugar Mill and Boiling House,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1905 (Honolulu: Thos. G. Thrum, 1904), 102.

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dangerous threat to Hawaiian sovereignty. In 1887, dissatisfaction with King Kalākaua’s policies led many haole to revolt and force the adoption of a new constitution—known as the “bayonet constitution”—that took political power from the king and people and gave it to those with land and wealth. And finally, in 1893, with the help of American forces acting illegally, many resident haole deposed the Hawaiian queen, abolished the kingdom, and pursued annexation to the U.S.

These were all discrete events, yet their temporal proximity and common set of characters give them the feel of scenes in a play leading to the denouement of annexation in 1898. In the aftermath of these political convulsions, many did see a clear linear progression. Writing in 1899, George B. McClellan made a direct link from reciprocity to annexation. According to McClellan, reciprocity “was a turning point in Hawaiian history; for it was at once the decisive factor in making sugar the permanent staple of

Hawaiian commerce, and also the underlying cause which led to annexation. It was perhaps too much to expect King Kalākaua to see that in enriching his kingdom through his successful reciprocity treaty with the United States, he also brought in certain

American ideas and commercial forces which must inevitably overthrow the Monarchy sooner or later.”6 More recently, the historian of Hawaiian politics Jonathan K. Osorio has argued, “colonialism worked in Hawaii not through the naked seizure of lands and governments but through a slow, insinuating invasion of people, ideas, and institutions.”7

6 George B. McClellan, ed., A Hand Book on the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands; Together with a List of the Plantations, Agents, Managers, etc. (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, Ltd., 1899), 8.

7 Jonathan Kamakawiwoʻole Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1877 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2003), 3. Other scholars have similarly stressed continuity in 149

Reciprocity was indeed part of this slow Western invasion, a result of the turn to international capitalist agriculture. Yet, though continuities of tension between Hawaiian and haole cultures, economic models, and political practices certainly existed, during the critical years between reciprocity and the 1893 revolution, unpredictable changes associated with the expansion of the sugar industry also served to destabilize the

Hawaiian government.

Hawaiʻi’s political revolutions of the late nineteenth century did not follow each other quite so neatly. The expansion of the sugarcane plantation system caused a revolution in the relationship between planting interests, the natural environment, and the government. Just as importantly, sugarcane planting itself changed dramatically in the years following reciprocity, becoming increasingly industrialized and technologically advanced. These revolutions were local phenomena, tied to established ideological divisions as well as new conflicts. They were also connected to transnational phenomena: technological developments in sugar production, the circulation of contract workers primarily from Asia, and major fluctuations in the price of sugar. This combination of local and transnational factors created an agricultural regime analogous to what the historian David Igler called the “industrial Far West,” a system based on the “engineering

their attention to the rise of planter power leading to the Bayonet Constitution and the haole coup of 1893. Such frameworks suggest inevitability and teleology. Merze Tate argues that cane planters in Hawaiʻi enlisted mainland American allies in a long campaign for closer ties between Hawaiʻi and the U. S., culminating in annexation. Carol MacLennan argues that planters in Hawaiʻi successfully set Hawaiʻi on a path toward transforming Hawaiʻi through Western industrial agriculture by the 1850s. Merze Tate, Hawaii: Reciprocity or Annexation (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1968); Carol MacLennan, Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014), esp. 248.

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of natural landscapes and mobilizing large labor forces.”8 As Igler argued, industrial agriculture involved both vertical integration of production and horizontal consolidation of natural resources. In Hawaiʻi, this depended upon a global in sugar production.9 Rapid advances in the technology of sugar manufacture increased planters’ need for capital and land, which in turn altered the place of sugar in Hawaiʻi’s economy, ecology, and politics.

Reciprocity thus initiated several overlapping and interrelated revolutions in the

Hawaiian sugar industry that together created a rift between planters and the Hawaiian government. Irrigation opened new lands to sugarcane, which not only increased production but also divorced planting from Hawaiʻi’s earlier agricultural practices; rapid immigration of plantation workers from China and Japan created a demographic revolution that further separated planters from Hawaiian society and agricultural tradition; and a revolution in planters’ use of agricultural science and technology gave planters greater control over the Hawaiian environment and greater ability to maximize their methods of resource extraction. Together, these revolutions pushed the sugar

8 Igler, Industrial Cowboys, 7; Stoll, The Fruits of Natural Advantage.

9 Lassere, G., La : Etude Géographique, vol. 1 (Bordeaux, 1961) quoted in B. W. Higman, “The Sugar Revolution,” Economic History Review 53, no. 2 (2000): 215. My analysis is particularly indebted to, G. Roger Knight, Sugar, Steam, and Steel: The Industrial Project in Colonial Java (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2014). As Higman notes, most scholars use the term “sugar revolution” in analyses of the seventeenth-century West Indies. Higman sees this designation as a result of the global effects of the rapid development sugarcane planting. The term “revolution,” in other words, indicates an event with an impact beyond the sugarcane plantations, namely, an increase in the slave trade and cross-Atlantic trade more generally, changing patterns of consumption, and increased European interest in tropical colonialism. The “industrial sugar revolution” of the late nineteenth century, according to Higman’s review of the scholarship, is usually excluded from the more rigid definition of the sugar revolution. Knight sees an industrial revolution in sugar that circulated the globe between the French Revolution and First World War, which fundamentally altered the process of sugar production as well as the major sources of sugar. Historians of Hawaiʻi and its sugar industry have done little to connect it to the broader industrial sugar revolution.

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industry to an unprecedented position in Hawaiʻi. They gave planters greater cause to organize as a political bloc. Planters did not set out to foment the Bayonet crisis of 1887 or the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893, but their collective pursuit of industrialized planting, with its implications for the natural environment, led to a collision with the monarchy and gave insurgents--some who were planters and some who had looser ties to the sugar industry--opportunity to start the revolution that ended Hawaiian sovereignty.

Irrigation

One of the first and most crucial changes to the sugarcane plantation system was the advent of more extensive irrigation works. This was a departure from past modes of agriculture that fundamentally changed the relationship between planters and the land.

While some irrigation projects dated to the mid-nineteenth century, sugarcane plantations were primarily on lands with ready access to water through rain and streams. Water supply, however, was hardly regular. Both drought and flooding were common occurrences on many sugarcane lands. Planters’ main objective was not necessarily increasing their supply of water, but regulating it so that their crops and mill had an adequate supply at all times. In his diary, George Dole, a plantation manager on Kauaʻi, alternated between comments on a paucity and an overabundance of rain, either of which could ruin sugar production.10 Likewise, Princeville Plantation, at Hanalei, Kauaʻi

10 See Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole diaries: typescript, September 5, 1870; November 23, 1871; September 17, 1880; and August 14, 1881, Dole Family Papers, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California for a sample of Dole’s comments on weather and precipitation.

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suffered severe floods in May 1877; Paauhau Plantation suffered alternately from drought and floods.11

Before reciprocity, and continuing for a time after the treaty in well-watered places, sugarcane irrigation often fit into the established Hawaiian agricultural regime by adapting native agricultural works. Planters encroached on Hawaiʻi’s most productive taro lands, lands that had been in regular use by Native Hawaiian farmers. This often led to conflict between planters and Hawaiian farmers, but it also contributed to a sense of positioning sugarcane planting within the tradition of Hawaiian agriculture. In 1877,

George Dole, for example, made a note in his diary that he took advantage of an “old auwai [irrigation channel]” for his plantation.12 His plantation supplanted, or maybe in his view succeeded, the agriculture for which the auwai was built, but it did not reengineer the land or transform the plantation’s agricultural environment. Dole was not conquering a land he saw as empty or recasting the role of water and agriculture in

Hawaiʻi, only putting working within an existing agricultural framework to put natural resources to what he thought was a better use. Punctuating this idea of stewardship and succession, Dole took the eight-foot-tall idol that the original auwai’s builders had placed at the site, and moved it to his family dining room, where it stood for several years.13

11 Rhoda E. A. Hackler, “Princeville Plantation Papers,” Hawaiian Journal of History 16 (1982): 65-85; Collection Concerning the Sugar Industry Made by Dan Gutleben, Dan Gutleben Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley; Diary of a Sugar Plantation [Paahau, Hawaii] 1880-1885, MS 633.61 D54, Hawaiian Historical Society.

12 Dole, George H., Diary, TS, September 29, 1877, Huntington Library HM76334.

13 Ibid.

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The financial catalyst of reciprocity brought new irrigation projects orders of magnitude greater than those previously attempted. These projects, and others that followed, changed planters’ relationship to the land and Hawaiʻi’s agricultural past. The first of these was the Haiku Ditch, an ambitious 1876 undertaking of the fledgling plantation company Alexander & Baldwin. Founded in 1872 by Samuel Alexander and

Henry Baldwin, both sons of ABCFM missionaries, Alexander & Baldwin was a relatively small venture on Maui. The Haiku Ditch, which brought water to Maui’s dry central plain, delivered approximately forty million gallons of water per day through seventeen miles of rough terrain, and cost about eighty thousand dollars to construct.

While Dole appropriated an auwai and its idol, Alexander & Baldwin and the

Haiku Ditch conquered an unruly frontier. The construction of the Haiku Ditch demonstrated planters’ bravado and sense of superiority as well as their inexperience. In

March 1876, seven months before beginning work on the Haiku Ditch, Henry P. Baldwin lost his right arm in a mill accident when he tried to show his engineer that he thought the mill’s cane rollers were uneven. Despite losing his arm, Baldwin remained an active plantation manager and a leader in the ditch project. During the construction of the ditch, when workers refused to descend the face of a cliff in order to connect irrigation pipe across a gorge, Baldwin is said to have led the work himself, rappelling down the cliff with only one arm and shaming his workers into following him. Baldwin repeated this act every day, until the work was done.14 This is a familiar trope for nineteenth-century

14 Arthur D. Baldwin, A Memoir of , 1841-1911 (Cleveland: Arthur D. Baldwin, 1915), 32-41. This story became a frequently repeated myth. See Kamehameha, “Home Sweet Home,” Washington D. C. Evening Star, 26 September 1896; Vandercook, King Cane; Sugar in Hawaii, 19; Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, Sugar in Hawaii: The Story of Sugar Plantations, their History, 154

American history: the taming or winning of the West by white men.15 Americans in

Hawaiʻi often shared this discourse, celebrating the haole “builders” of Hawaiʻi. If Dole was taking ownership of an established agricultural tradition, Baldwin was building something new.

Kānaka Maoli-Haole Cooperation

Though Dole and Baldwin displayed a sense of cultural superiority among haole, theirs was not the only ethnic group involved in sugarcane planting. In the early

Reciprocity era, sugarcane planting continued to be an area of cooperation between haole and Hawaiians, especially Hawaiian aliʻi.16 Several sugar ventures in the years just after

Reciprocity involved Native Hawaiians, both exclusively and in partnership with haole.

In 1877 King Kalākaua established the Hui Kawaihau, an organization of court retainers, to settle in Kapaʻa, Kauaʻi and plant sugarcane. Kalākaua partnered with James Makee, a haole former sea captain who had a plantation Maui, to build a mill and grind the Hui’s cane.17 On windward Oʻahu, John A. Cummins, an aliʻi nui whose lineage traced through his mother to the Kamehameha dynasty, established the Waimanalo Sugar Company,

their Methods of Operations, and their Place in the Economy of Hawaii (Honolulu: Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, 1949), 19; Dorrance and Morgan, Sugar Islands, 67.

15 For an overview on this trope, see Richard White, It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

16 Historians have often failed to acknowledge Hawaiians’ involvement in the sugar industry, focusing instead on the haole majority of sugar interests or the workers who migrated to the islands.

17 Charles S. Dole, “The Hui Kawaihau,” Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society 16 (October 1929), 8-15. Some seem to have called the organization “Hui Kawaihai;” Dorrance and Morgan, Sugar Islands, 25.

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which in the early years of reciprocity was one of the most valuable plantations with a majority Kānaka Maoli ownership.18 Cummins was closely allied with the monarchy and on several occasions entertained members of the royal family at his plantation. A mele

(traditional Hawaiian song) from the 1880s even recorded a visit of Queen Kapiʻolani,

“And at Rose Mount [Cummins’s plantation] we view the beauty/of the finest sugar mills./Now the grinders flater not at their grinding,/and the machine runs always at even speed./When the steam rises, boiling-time ends./All sweetness is concentrated there.”19 In

1878, T. Akanaliilii, a Native Hawaiian, formed the Huelo Plantation Company on one thousand two hundred and fifty acres that he owned and another ten thousand five hundred acres rented from the government in northeast Maui.20

Hawaiian elites were not the only ones working in sugarcane; commoners joined the industry, too. Hawaiian residents of Kohala, Hawaiʻi worked a plantation established by the ABCFM missionary Elias Bond, and in 1877, C. F. Hart, Kohala’s haole Circuit

Judge, erected a sugar mill in North Kohala so that he could partner with local Hawaiian cane cultivators. A royal commission on the development of Hawaiʻi’s resources noted that the Hawaiian residents of Kohala, as well as others in the and Hilo

18 Royal D. Mead, “A History of the Progress of the Sugar Industry of Hawaii since the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876,” Honolulu Evening Bulletin Industrial Edition, 25 March 1909, 11. “Ownership of Hawaiian Sugar Plantations,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 170-171.

19 Mary Kawena Pukui and Alfons L. Korn, trans., and eds., The Echo of Our Song: Chants & Poems of the Hawaiins (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press), 164.

20 George Bowswer, “An Account of the Sugar Plantations and the Principal Stock Ranches on the Hawaiian Islands,” The Hawaiian Kingdom Statistical and Commercial Directory and Tourists’ Guide, 1880-1881 (Honolulu: George Bowser & Co., Publishers, 1880), 428-29; “Statistical Directory of the Island of Maui,” The Hawaiian Kingdom Statistical and Commercial Directory and Tourists’ Guide, 1880- 1881 (Honolulu: George Bowser & Co., Publishers, 1880), 326.

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districts, “show a commendable zeal to cultivate on their own account,” and should be assisted by government-funded infrastructure development.21 Such involvement of

Hawaiians in the sugar industry, though only a minority in the community of island sugarcane planters, indicates the shared goals that the cane planting could have achieved.

Hawaiians and haole saw planting as a path to both personal and national wealth that cut across ethnic lines.

Cooperation between Hawaiians and haole did not last long into the Reciprocity era, however. Reciprocity pushed Hawaiʻi further into an industrial sugar revolution that, since the mid-nineteenth century, had been changing the sugar-producing world through the introduction of new, dramatically more effective technologies to a process that had changed only slightly over past centuries. Hawaiʻi had previously been part of the industrial sugar revolution, most notably with the invention of the centrifugal dryer, developed in Hawaiʻi by David Weston in the 1850s, which dried crystallized sugar and separated the sugar from molasses in a matter of seconds rather than the weeks required by the previous method, was one such invention.22 Crucial though the centrifugal was, it did not increase mill capacity, but instead made the final stage of sugar production more efficient. Another revolutionary invention for the sugar industry was the multiple effect evaporator: a series of closed chambers that took advantage of the latent heat from another part of the sugar boiling process to remove water from cane juice. The “Multiple

21 Royal Commission on the Development of the Resources of the Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on the Development of the Resources of the Kingdom: Island of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1877), 2, 11.

22 See Ch. 4.

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Effect” became an important piece of technology for sugar mills in the late 1860s that drastically reduced fuel costs and labor requirements in sugar production.23 Hawaiian planters invested their newfound gains under Reciprocity into new technologies like the multiple effect, bringing their plantations and mills in line with some of the world’s best practices in sugar production.24

Investment in new technologies demanded easy access to capital, and none had better access to capital than a recent entrant into Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry: Claus

Spreckels. Spreckels was a German American who had settled in San Francisco and established himself as a major figure in the American sugar trade by the mid-1860s. At first he lobbied against the reciprocity treaty because he feared cheap Hawaiian sugar would hurt his business interests, but once he accepted its passage, he determined to take advantage of it. To that end, Spreckels arrived in Hawaiʻi in 1876, on the same boat that brought news of the treaty’s passage, and began to build a sugar-producing business empire that for two decades controlled much of Hawaiʻi’s sugar industry. Shortly after his arrival, Spreckels sought advice on irrigation and sugarcane planting from Alexander

& Baldwin. In 1878, confident that large-scale planting could be made profitable,

Spreckels leased twenty-four thousand acres of dry crown lands in central Maui.

Spreckels needed water rights to irrigate this land, but the Royal Cabinet opposed such a massive allocation of water to one person. Spreckels extended a forty-thousand dollar loan and a ten-thousand dollar “gift” to King Kalākaua, who dismissed his Cabinet and

23 Knight, Sugar, Steam, and Steel, 17-19.

24 “The Hawaiian Islands: Their Situation, Discovery, Progress, Attractions, Etc.,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1888 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Company, 1887), 65.

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replaced it with another that would grant Spreckels rights to the necessary Maui watershed.25 Spreckels brought in an engineer from California to build another ditch on

Maui, dwarfing even the Haiku Ditch. Spreckels’s ditch cost five hundred thousand dollars and moved sixty thousand gallons per day across thirty miles.26

The scale of the Spreckels Ditch was indeed revolutionary in Hawaiʻi. It opened up lands to intensive agriculture that previously been far too dry to be productive. People in Hawaiʻi recognized Spreckels’s project as a momentous change; they compared it to bringing water and life to wastelands and deserts. Henry M. Whitney, a publisher who was closely involved in the sugar industry, later recalled, “On the sandy isthmus connecting East and West Maui, and on a plain which was formerly an arid desert, where neither a tree and scarcely a blade of grass could formerly be found, can now be seen green pastures, beautiful flower gardens, avenues of trees and twelve thousand acres of growing sugar cane, and a sugar mill capable of manufacturing 100 to 110 tons of sugar per day.”27 Spreckels, with his extensive resources and the political power that he leveraged from his wealth, showed other planters what was possible, and what they would have to do if they wanted to be competitive producing sugar.

25 Jacob Adler, “The Maui Land Deal: A Chapter in ’ Hawaiian Career,” Agricultural History 39, no. 3 (July 1965): 155-163.

26 Jacob Adler, Claus Spreckels: The Sugar King in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1966).

27 H. M. Whitney, Tourists’ Guide through the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., 1890), 84. Quoted in Adler, Claus Spreckels, 48. In the 1880s and 90s, Whitney was the longtime editor of the Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly, the principal organ of the Hawaiian sugar industry.

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The extensive engineering of Spreckels’s ditch remained the largest irrigation project on the islands for over a decade, and Spreckels’s lack of roots in the islands, his great wealth, and the influence he held over the government made him an outsider among sugarcane planters. But planters could not ignore the advances he brought to the sugar industry, and the general adoption of new technologies was rapid. The missionary Daniel

Dole, writing to his son George in February 1878 from Wailuku, Maui, “found that many changes had been made since I was here, 3 years ago. They now use steam power, & burn coal; & they have a vacuum pan...They expect to make 2000 tons of sugar next year, & to have new machinery, at least, in part; & the mill, i.e. the rollers, is to be new. It w[oul]d seem that the machinery for every new plantation is an improvement on what went before.”28 In 1878, W. Renny Watson, junior partner of the Glasgow firm Mirlees, Tate

& Watson, a world leader in the construction of sugar mill machinery, visited Hawaiʻi and secured several orders.29 In 1879 the first railroad to be built in the Hawaiian archipelago was built on Maui, and connected seven plantations to the shipping port at

Kahului. In 1881 construction began on another railroad line through the Kohala sugar district of Hawaiʻi Island.30 The first steam plow on the islands was used at Hamakua in

1881, and steam plows soon came into wider use on other plantations.31

28 Daniel Dole to George Dole, Wailuku, Maui, February 8, 1878, Daniel Dole Letters, MS61A5, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

29 Thos. G. Thrum, “The Hawaiian Islands as a Sugar-Producing Region,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1879, 27-28.

30 “Hawaiian Railroads” 43.

31 Sugar in Hawaiʻi; C. Allan Jones and Robert V. Osgood, From King Cane to the Last Sugar Mill: Agricultural Technology and the Making of Hawaiʻi’s Premier Crop (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2015), 46. 160

Many saw the wave of expansion that the sugar industry experienced as an unequivocally positive development for all of Hawaiʻi. In 1879, at the laying of the cornerstone for the new royal palace in Honolulu, John Makini Kapena, an aliʻi who held many high-ranking government positions over the course of his career, marveled at the recent history of Hawaiʻi and its economic and agricultural development. Kapena asked,

“Fifty years ago, if a prophet had arisen who should have foretold that the wilderness…should be cultivated; that the rushing streams…that then ran to waste in the ocean, should be diverted to fertilize the broad plains…that the bulrushes of the swamps of Ewa and Waikiki should be swept away by the agriculture of a foreign race…what should we have thought of such a prophet?” Kapena went on to argue how the government should continue to support its people: “In these last years we have received a generous national concession [reciprocity], which must encourage and consolidate our agricultural interests, giving new life to the land.”32 Reciprocity allowed for the expansion of sugar onto the arid plains of central Maui and Oʻahu, just as it allowed for the expansion of the monarchy into a new palace more befitting its stature. Kapena saw sugarcane planting as a collective good, reviving the land, people, and nation.

Not everyone thought the interests of the planters and those of the government to be as intertwined as Kapena did. For some, a rift between planters and the government began almost as soon as Reciprocity went into effect. The tension between planters and government can be reduced to a basic question: was it the purpose of the plantation system to enrich the nation, or was it the purpose of the nation to enrich the plantation

32 “Hawaiian National Reminiscences,” Hawaiian Annual for 1906 (1905), 79-80. On Kapena’s life and career, see “John Makini Kapena,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, October 24, 1887.

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system? For some planters, the government was not committed enough to plantation capitalism. In March 1876, before Hawaiʻi had even begun to feel the benefits of

Reciprocity, George Dole complained in his diary, “Out of the $50,000 app[ropriation] for Immigration, $2700 was spent on the King’s ball.”33 The haole missionary community, with its values of public industry and thrift, had often been critical of King

Kalākaua’s and other Hawaiians’ spending habits. Taking money from an immigration appropriation to spend on a ball was particularly unpleasant for planters such as Dole.

Planters had complained of labor shortages since the 1850s, though some of these complaints reflected planters’ desire for cheaper labor rather than an actual shortage of workers. With the drastic expansion of cane acreage that followed Reciprocity, the need for plantation workers became more pressing than ever. The government supported the introduction of workers from Asia—indeed, the initial appropriation of $50,000 to promote immigration demonstrates a firm commitment to bringing in workers for

Hawaiʻi’s plantations. But the diversion of funds from immigration to ceremonial display for the monarchy was nonetheless something planters could perceive as an attack against their interests, an unjust abuse of power by a capricious ruler, and as a moral shortcoming with ethnic undertones of a preference for vanity, leisure, and corruption instead of industriousness.

George Dole, at least, remained unhappy with the government. In 1880, he and other haole planters sent a memorial to the King, with 400 signatures, asking for the discharge of the Royal Cabinet Kalākaua had appointed to help Spreckels gain his Maui

33 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole Diary: typescript, March 18, 1876, Huntington Library.

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water rights.34 In 1882, a change in the Cabinet had taken place, but it was not to planters’ liking. The new cabinet was composed of people who were close with

Spreckels, and led by Walter Murray Gibson, a charismatic crony of the King’s, who campaigned for office on the slogan “Hawaiʻi for Hawaiians.” In May, after learning of the cabinet change, Dole recorded in his diary, “the general sentiment seems to be that of apathetic disgust.”35 By October, sugar interests had formed the Planters’ Labor and

Supply Company (PLSC) and held their first convention, in Honolulu, to better organize and promote their interests. Dole did not travel to Honolulu for the convention, but he nonetheless was interested enough to record that “a number of planters” went to the meeting.36 As the name of the company suggests, one of their primary concerns was acquiring and controlling labor. Yet another of their concerns was their relationship with and treatment from the government. The first issue of the PLSC’s Planters’ Monthly argued, “We believe that no class of men in the Kingdom pay their taxes more fairly and promptly than the Planters; and that they are willing to respond to all fair taxation, but that they have cause for complaint of the manner in which growing crops are assessed.”37

With sugar accounting for the majority of taxable revenue in the kingdom, planters saw it as their right to demand a government that worked for them.

34 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole Diary: typescript, September 10, 1880, Huntington Library.

35 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole Diary: typescript, May 23, 1882, Huntington Library.

36 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole Diary: typescript, October 13, 1882, Huntington Library. Fifty-five men attended the first meeting, according to published meeting minutes, “The Planters’ Convention,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 1, (April 1882), 5.

37 Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 1 (April 1882), 2.

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Meanwhile, Hawaiians found themselves increasingly removed from sugarcane planting. By far, most Hawaiians were small farmers, growing taro, vegetables, and sometimes on farms less than ten acres in size, on land that they owned.38 The few

Native Hawaiian efforts to become planters were short lived. The Hui Kawaihau foundered in 1880 after James Makee died and his son-in-law, Z. S. Spalding took over.

Spalding “lacked the kindly ‘Aloha’ for the hui members which Captain Makee had for them,” according to George Dole’s son Charles.39 Faced with antagonism from Spalding, constrictions on their available capital, and a fire that destroyed about a third of their cane, the Hui’s fields fell into dilapidation. In 1881, George Dole, who managed the

Makee Plantation, wrote in his diary, “We began cutting on the Hui ratoons. It is wretched stuff & will hardly pay for the grinding. Never had any cultivation or watering worth mentioning and besides is badly eaten by rats and borers.”40 That was the last of the Hui’s crop. They sold out to Spalding and most members returned to careers in the government.

The monarchy more easily profited indirectly from sugarcane planting. It rented out vast tracts of crown land to planters: forty-seven thousand acres rented to the Naalehu

Plantation; forty thousand acres to Valdemar Knudsen, a Kauaʻi cane planter originally

38 “A Statistical Directory of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” The Hawaiian Kingdom Statistical and Commercial Directory and Tourists’ Guide, 1880-1881 (Honolulu: George Bowser & Co., Publishers, 1880), 291-351.

39 Charles S. Dole “The Hui Kawaihau,” 13-14.

40 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Diary: typescript, May 18, 1881. HM76346 Huntington Library.

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from Norway; twenty thousand acres to Hilea Plantation.41 These leases were often given for thirty years at rates below their market value, but they still represented a significant revenue stream for the government and gave it an interest in the success of the sugar industry. The Kalākaua regime also profited from sugar indirectly, through its ties to

Claus Spreckels. As Spreckels built a sugar empire in Hawaiʻi, he helped to personally finance the government. Direct involvement in cane plantations, however, had declined.

By 1883, Hawaiians had a financial interest in twelve out of the islands’ seventy-three plantations and mills, but none was solely Hawaiian-owned. The value of Hawaiian ownership in cane plantations was $641,240, out of a total industry value of

$15,886,800.42

Notable Hawaiians were becoming more critical of haole planters for their role in making it increasingly difficult to borrow capital. Edward Kamakau Lilikalani, a

Representative to the Hawaiian Legislature and one of the members of King Kalākaua’s

Hui Kawaihau that took up cane planting on Kauaʻi in 1877, argued in a published manifesto that the inability to borrow capital prevented the Hui from building its own mill and instead forced it to operate “hidden beneath the foreigners who owned the mill.”

The benefits of Reciprocity, argued Lilikalani, had fallen almost exclusively to the haole who had the means to take advantage of the treaty. He wrote, “the once barren plains are green with cane, the old taro patches that had been lying waste for want of hands to plant

41 A Statistical Directory of the Hawaiian Kingdom,” The Hawaiian Kingdom Statistical and Commercial Directory and Tourists’ Guide, 1880-1881 (Honolulu: George Bowser & Co., Publishers, 1880), 291-351.

42 “Ownership of Hawaiian Sugar Plantations,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 170- 171.

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them are covered with rice crops; the pastures where roamed lean scraggy cattle are now occupied by new and large breeds, imported breeds of horses, large mules and fine merino sheep; and all these are signs of the wealth of the land; but all these good things are on the side of the foreigners only; and not for the Hawaiians.”43 William G. Irwin, a

British resident of Hawaiʻi and agent for Claus Spreckels’s plantation corroborated

Lilikalani’s complaint that access to capital restricted entry into planting, observing that

“Everything on the islands is done on credit. Notes are a great commodity there.”44

Lilikalani and others argued that the only bank in Hawaiʻi, established by Charles Reed

Bishop, gave loans at excessively high interest rates, and the government’s ability to bring more capital into the country was obstructed by haole members of the Legislature who opposed any increase to the national debt.

The organization of the PLSC did not improve planters’ relationship with the government. The two most urgent problems facing the PLSC were a shortage of labor and work to renew the Reciprocity Treaty, which was approaching the end of its seven- year term, and members of the company demonstrated little faith that the government would help them.45 On the issue of labor, the editors of the Planters’ Monthly wrote, “we do not wish to make any partizan statements, nor to indulge in any unnecessary criticism

43 Edward Kamakau Lilikalani, Move! Excel to the Highest! The Celebrated Lilikalani Manifesto of the Election Campaign of February 1882: Translated by H. L. Sheldon (Honolulu: Thomas G. Thrum, 1882), 3

44 “Hawaiian Sugar,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser December 21, 1882, reprinted from San Francisco Tribune.

45 The Reciprocity Treaty stipulated that after seven years, either party could give notice that it would terminate the treaty in one year. On the PLSC’s priorities, see “Report of the Trustees of the Planters’ Labor and Supply Company,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 8 (November 1882), 172.

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upon the Government… It remains to be seen whether the Government can be depended upon to do anything in the direction of assisting the planter in his efforts to obtain laborers.”46 That was in July of 1882. Such efforts to avoid “partizan statements” soon gave way, however, to more vituperative attacks. The Hawaiian government had scuttled a plan to subsidize the immigration of Portuguese plantation workers and then refused to give government credentials to a member of the PLSC to work with Japan to arrange for plantation workers from that country. By September, the journal found that the failure of the government to support laborer immigration “can only be accounted for upon the theory of official incompetence or of hostility to the planting interest.”47

The Hawaiian government was more interested in subsidizing immigration that would both supply more plantation workers and also help stanch the decline of the

Hawaiian population. Population decline among Native Hawaiians had been a cause for concern since the early nineteenth century, and was tied to the rise of sugarcane planting in the 1840s and 1850s.48 Sugarcane planters had initially argued that plantation labor could help Native Hawaiians maintain their health through industry and temperance. As the population continued to decline, however, the monarchy made efforts to encourage the immigration of a “cognate race” of people who might intermarry with Hawaiians. At first, sugarcane planters supported this plan by recruiting for their plantations Polynesians who, it was hoped, would assimilate into the Hawaiian populace. In 1877, the Hawaiian

46 Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 4 (July 1882), 74.

47 “Labor,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 6 (September 1882), 113.

48 For responses to demographic collapse, see Archer, “Epidemics and Culture in Hawai‘i, 1778– 1865”; see also Chapter 3 here on population decline as a justification for planting.

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government launched an immigration program from the Gilbert Islands (Tungaru), a group of islands and atolls straddling the equator. Though the Gilberts are about 2,400 miles from Hawaiʻi—greater than the distance between Hawaiʻi and California—they are one of Hawaiʻi’s closest Polynesian neighbors, and thus were one of the primary candidates for supplying a “cognate race.” The Gilbert Islanders, however, were not happy with the move to Hawaiʻi; ABCFM missionaries in the Gilberts were concerned over their treatment on the sugarcane plantations; and planters were not happy with them as workers or with the expense involved in their immigration.49

As efforts to bring in people who would both work the cane plantations and integrate into the Hawaiian population produced unsatisfactory results, planters sought an immigration policy that addressed their need for labor over Hawaiian concerns for a cognate population. By 1883, planters had enough of any scheme that would attempt to both repopulate Hawaiʻi and provide plantation labor. In April the PLSC chartered the brigantine Hazard to recruit three hundred workers from the (), a

South Pacific archipelago over 3,500 miles distant from Hawaiʻi. The labor contracts the

PLSC offered stipulated that workers completing their contract would be returned to the

New Hebrides, and the PLSC explicitly instructed the Hazard’s Captain Tierney not to recruit workers from islands closer to Hawaiʻi. The PLSC told the Captain, “From past experience the Company are of the opinion that the brown or Polynesian races from islands near the equator are unsuitable as out-door laborers in these Islands, you are therefore...on no account to bring up any natives of the various groups lying between

49 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty, 127-128.

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these Islands and the New Hebrides.”50 The PLSC had no interest in repeating the failure of the Gilbert Islands scheme. As long as they could get enough laborers to work on cheap contracts, planters would be satisfied. Indeed, by early 1884 the PLSC even abandoned its New Hebrides immigration program in favor of Asian and Portuguese workers.51 The Native Hawaiian population was not their priority.

On the issue of reciprocity, sugarcane planters had similarly come to see the government as not supportive—or even an obstacle to—their interests. When the PLSC met in October of 1882, the Trustees recommended the PLSC send its own agent to

Washington to lobby for the Reciprocity Treaty’s extension. The PLSC wanted to have an advocate who apparently would not be constrained to limit his work for reciprocity by loyalty to the Hawaiian government. In all likelihood, this was a veiled reference to negotiating for the cession of the Pearl River Lagoon on Oʻahu, which, with some dredging, could become the most important naval harbor in the central Pacific. The idea of ceding a protected area of coastline for a coaling station and naval harbor had circulated in Hawaiʻi and the U. S. for years, and though planters were open to such an arrangement if it secured reciprocity, Native Hawaiians were adamantly opposed to the cession of any territory.52 As plantations themselves were consuming more Hawaiian land, the thought of appropriating even more lands, not for agriculture but as a concession

50 “New Hebrides Immigration,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 2 (May 1883), 33-34.

51 Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 11 (February 1884), 303.

52 Osorio, Dismembering Lāhui, 248-49.

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to a foreign nation, must have been particularly galling to those without the capital necessary to join the sugar industry.

While planters were coming closer to positions that alienated Hawaiian land and undermined Hawaiian sovereignty, King Kalākaua was far too assertive and authoritarian for the taste of the planters. The Planters’ Monthly complained that the King was stacking the ministry and legislature with cronies and buying legislative votes with patronage. Noting that some prominent Native Hawaiians as well as “property owners” were beginning to protest the King’s style of rule, the Planters’ Monthly argued, “There is nothing of race antagonism connected with [criticism of the King]. So far from being treasonable or seditious in their nature or in their object, such discussions prove that there is a public spirit in the land, a spirit that will preserve Hawaiʻi from the dangers of

Egyptian darkness.”53 The PLSC sent a memorial to the King expressing dissatisfaction with his ministers, and requesting he appoint cabinet members “in whom the moneyed classes and other classes have confidence.” Walter Murray Gibson, the influential

Premier of the King’s Cabinet, who was often antagonistic to the sugar interests, responded to the PLSC on behalf of the King, cordially acknowledged the “privilege of any and all subjects of the Kingdom to discuss the conduct of public officers, and to endeavor by constitutional means to bring about reformation of the public administration” and then brushed them off.54 Whatever the PLSC hoped would come of their memorial to the King, Gibson seemed to indicate that no change would be

53 Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 6 (September 1882), 115-116.

54 “Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Planters’ Labor and Supply Company,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 8 (November 1882), 169-170.

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forthcoming. The PLSC’s Board of Trustees then took the matter even further, arguing,

“as the representatives of the greatest if not the only source of revenue the country has to depend upon, [planters] must decide for themselves how far and how long they may be satisfied to rest under an administration of affairs that is open to even a suspicion of bias or favoritism.” Those “great and good friends of this little Island Kingdom,” the Trustees continued, “who have done so much to raise it from the depths of barbarism and to place it within the family of nations, will not now quietly and without rebuke look upon an assumption of autocratical powers which would soon result in a retrogression to the level from whence its people have been lifted.”55

By that point many Hawaiians held the opinion that planters’ interests were not their own, and that, as the PLSC put it, “There is no question as to the unfavorable disposition of a certain class among the native members of the Legislature, as well as many Government officials, towards...the Sugar Planters of these Islands.”56 Kalākaua, interested in cultivating an image of authority and power befitting both the Hawaiian notion of a proper mōʻī (supreme ruler) and the international idea of a head of state, organized a lavish coronation ceremony in 1883. Planters, who saw themselves as the nation’s tax base and economic engine, denounced the coronation as a boondoggle.

George Dole grumbled in his diary that the coronation was a “farce.”57 The Planters’

55 “Report of the Trustees of the Planters’ Labor and Supply Company,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 8 (November 1882), 173.

56 “Planters and Politics,” Planters’ Monthly 3, no. 4 (July 1884), 435.

57 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole Diary: typescript, February 12, 1883, Huntington Library.

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Monthly complained that the coronation diverted much-needed funds from public health and internal improvements, “directly damaging the property interests and welfare of the country.” The journal concluded its report on the coronation with a threat: “Those who are responsible have a weighty account to meet. There is a law of cost and compensation which will be vindicated.”58

The relationship between planters and the government continued to deteriorate through 1883, with increasingly bold threats printed in the Planters’ Monthly. One such comment warned, “The planting interest of this country knows its strength, and when forbearance ceases to be a virtue those in office or out of office who attempt to trifle with public interests and constitutional rights will learn that there is a power in the land with which it will not do to trifle.” Planters’ disgust with Kalākaua’s government also began to take on more overt racial animus. The Monthly went on to argue, “The greatest safeguard to the peace and prosperity of these Islands lies in its property interests, and in the body of those interested in agricultural enterprises who are animated with the Anglo-Saxon love for constitutional government.”59 Yet planters also sought to highlight their loyalty to Hawaiʻi. Noting that planters were “dignified and law-abiding,” the Monthly’s editor wrote, “Although it [the PLSC] is opposed to the present administration, it is the strongest and best friend which the Hawaiian Government has.”60

58 “The Coronation,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 12 (March 1883), 307.

59 “The Planters and Politics,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 6 (September 1883), 121-22.

60 Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 11 (February 1884), 302.

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Planter Organization and integration with Transnational Networks of Sugar

As Native Hawaiians found themselves increasingly shut out of the sugar industry, haole planters were connecting with the wider world of sugar production. The

Planters’ Labor and Supply Company, in addition to its focus on renewing the

Reciprocity Treaty and promoting the immigration of contract laborers, also became an important nexus for the advancement of the Hawaiian sugar industry. The PLSC made an effort to learn from other centers of sugar production, and particularly took cues from the

Louisiana sugar industry. The PLSC itself was founded five years after the formation of the Louisiana Sugar Planters’ Association. The LSPA was in its own way a response to developments in Hawaiʻi. The enactment of the Reciprocity Treaty demonstrated to

Louisiana planters that they needed to organize if they hoped to maintain an advantage in

U. S. markets. The LSPA also concerned itself with the acquisition and control of labor in the Reconstruction South. Like the LSPA in Louisiana, the PLSC in Hawaiʻi proved to be a crucial mechanism for helping planters to improve their operations.61 Both cases indicate a growing connection between planters in different plantation systems, as knowledge and technology of the industrial sugar revolution circulated transnationally.

The PLSC maintained a strong focus on technological and scientific improvement of sugar production, providing its members with access to foreign knowledge through the pages of the Planters’ Monthly. The July 1882 issue, for example, ran articles on the development of new techniques to insure the purity of milled sugar and reprinted a

61 John Alfred Heitmann, The Modernization of the Louisiana Sugar Industry, 1830-1910 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), Ch. 4.

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lecture delivered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on new developments in the manufacture of sugar. The Planters’ Monthly reminded readers that “Scientific research is ever confering [sic] new benefits on humanity, its numberless discoveries made practically available are day by day opening up new manufacturing interests, introducing new systems of woking [sic] in all branches of trade, or devising new and ingenious apparatus for determining the actual commercial values on the different commodities for sale in the world’s markets.”62

The Hawaiian plantation system was no passive receptacle for metropolitan ideas and technologies. Rather, Hawaiian planters continued their tradition of both adopting new technologies and developing their own. Whenever they could, planters imported the latest technologies. By 1883, the Planter’s Monthly was reporting on the triple and double effect boilers that were the industry standard throughout the world and that several plantations were installing, as well as the Jarvis furnace, which was also a popular new technology on Cuban plantations. Planters, however, were also innovating on their own, with new steamers, evaporators, presses, and furnaces uniquely suited to Hawaiian conditions, and the Honolulu Iron Works helped planters develop their own technology by building rollers and boilers.63

Claus Spreckels, though he was an outsider in the planting community, spurred innovation and investment in new technologies. In 1883, Spreckels had his plantation

62 Planters’ Monthly, July 1882.

63 Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 7 (October 1883), 15-147; 163. For some examples of local inventions, see, “Cane Trash as Fuel,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 10 (January 1884), 292; “Coleman’s Patent Cane Planter,” Planters’ Monthly 3, no. 10 (January 1885): 629-30.

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manager devote a five-hundred-acre field to experiments with different fertilizers. In the mill, Spreckels had installed a furnace designed to burn cane trash with greater efficiency than older models, and also added a second set of rollers to his cane-crushing array. Not only did the second set of rollers extract more juice from the sugar cane, but by separating more juice from the cane stalks, it also made the trash easier to burn as fuel.

Spreckels shared the fertilizer experiment’s results and the furnace’s design with the

PLSC, allowing the planter community at large to benefit from his investment in research and technological development.64 In 1884, Spreckels hired an agricultural chemist to study his plantation’s soils and manage the application of fertilizers. This was something all the other planters working in concert could not even accomplish. The PLSC tried to recruit an agricultural chemist but could not afford to do so. Spreckels’s chemist, though, was willing to circulate the results of his experiments to other planters.65

The Costs of Entering the Global Sugar Market

The disadvantages of greater integration into the world of sugar production became suddenly apparent to Hawaiian planters in 1884, when a global depression of sugar prices shook the Hawaiian economy and further damaged the relationship between planters and the government. Planters’ investments in new mill technologies and lands and their commitment to labor contracts left them poorly prepared for a contraction in the market for sugar. Several planters without access to adequate capital, such as the aliʻi

64 “Report of the Committee on Fertilizers and Seed Cane,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 205; “Report of Committee on Machinery,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 250.

65 “Secretary’s Annual Report,” Planters’ Monthly 3, no. 8 (November 1884), 543.

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John Cummins, sold out to larger planters and the increasingly powerful sugar factors— the Honolulu firms that provided planters with operating capital and materials, and sold planters’ sugar to U.S. refiners.66 With sugar prices at unprecedented lows, Thrum’s

Almanac complained that the government’s opposition to “many reasonable desires of the moneyed interests of the country...widened the breach between the ruled and the rulers.”67 Thrum complained of “reckless expenditures of the government,” while the depression of sugar prices forced plantations to retrench and made the need for cheap labor with government subsidies for immigration all the more pressing.

With costs already sunk in plantation operations, the 1884 depression impelled further technological innovation so that planters could achieve greater efficiency. Mills added equipment to “macerate,” or add warm water to sugarcane after the cane ran through the rollers, and then crush it again. This helped extract an additional fifteen to twenty-three percent of the cane’s sucrose, and made the cane trash easier to burn-- adding savings in fuel costs to an increased yield in sugar. The first mill equipped with maceration technology was at Waiākea, Hawaiʻi, where the owners of the Honolulu Iron

66 Pukui and Korn, trans., and eds., The Echo of Our Song, 158; Dorrance and Morgan, Sugar Islands, 43. There is at least some question over when John A. Cummins sold out. In a history of the islands’ sugar industry, the Evening Bulletin reported that Cummins was the principal owner until 1893. Royal D. Mead, “A History of the Progress of the Sugar Industry of Hawaii since the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876,” Honolulu Evening Bulletin Industrial Edition, 25 March 1909, 11. Cummins was listed as the plantation’s president, proprietor, and manager in 1888, and remained manager of the plantation until at least 1889. J.C. Lane, ed., Hawaiian Directory and Hand Book of the Kingdom of Hawaii (San Francisco: McKenney Directory Co., 1888) 203, 356; “Directory of Officers Employed on Sugar Plantations in These Islands,” Planters’ Monthly 8, no. 3 (March 1889), 125.

67 “Retrospect for 1884,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1885, 53.

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Works built a state-of-the-art mill.68 The cost savings and greater efficiency of maceration gave planters cause to invest in updated equipment even under the trying conditions the industry faced, and in 1885, according to Thrum’s Almanac, planters

“have kept the Honolulu Iron Works employed to its full capacity for months past, requiring a double gang for day and night shifts in order to complete contracts in time.”69

Chinese Immigration and Demographic Change

The depression of sugar prices in 1884 also pushed planters to renew their call for government support for the introduction of foreign workers. Planters considered the costs of bringing in Portuguese and Japanese workers too high, and requested that the government lift its ban on Chinese immigration and admit two thousand Chinese immigrants to labor on the cane plantations. The monarchy, concerned with the Native

Hawaiian population, and facing a significant anti-Chinese movement, rebuffed planters’ requests. Planters, however, often managed to circumvent the law and bring in new

Chinese workers.70

68 “Waiakea Maceration Mill,” Planters’ Monthly 3, no. 12 (March 1885), 682-83. See also Dorrance and Morgan, Sugar Islands, 105 for the connection between Waiakea Mill Company and the Honolulu Iron Works.

69 “Retrospect for the Year of 1885,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1886, (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co, 1886), 63-64. The following year’s Almanac further noted investment in updated and improved machinery, “Retrospect for the Year 1886,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1887 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Company, 1886), 84.

70 “Retrospect of the Year 1884,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1885, (Honolulu: Thos. G. Thrum, 1885), 54. “Retrospect of the Year 1885,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1886, (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co, 1886), 62. Walter M. Gibson letter to Messrs. Jona. Austin, John M. Horner, A. Unna and T. H. Davies, Oct. 22, 1884, reprinted in Planters’ Monthly 3, no. 8 (November 1884): 538.

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The influx of Asian coolie labor led to further divisions between planters and the government over the issue of labor control and sobriety. In 1886, the government approved licenses for the sale and use of . Many planters remained committed to the ABCFM support of temperance; many more were committed to the idea that sobriety was an important characteristic to instill in their plantation workforce. The ban against distilling rum had been lifted in 1874, but planters still supported legislation outlawing the sale of alcohol to Chinese and Polynesians. 71 The licensing of opium caused similar concern among planters for keeping control of their workers. Opium use was common on plantations.72 The monarchy’s effort to license and profit from opium sales directly challenged planters’ power to maximize labor from their workers.

Chinese contract labor, though the cheapest and easiest option for planters, had become another wedge between the planter and Hawaiian communities. With Chinese immigration came the introduction of foreign pathogens, which further alienated

Hawaiians from the haole planter community. In the years following the beginning of

Chinese contract labor in the islands, Hansen’s disease (leprosy) spread through Hawaiʻi and caused particular terror. Hawaiians called it maʻi pākē: “Chinese disease.” Although no incontrovertible evidence demonstrates that Chinese immigrants brought Hansen’s disease to Hawaiʻi, the first documented case was from 1860, after the importation of

Chinese workers had already begun, and Hansen’s disease was common in China. More important than the precise route the disease took to Hawaiʻi are the facts that increased

71 “Committee on Legislation Report,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 1 (April 1882), 24.

72 Glick, Sojourners and Settlers, 38.

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immigration changed Hawaiʻi’s disease environment and Hawaiians associated Hansen’s disease with Chinese immigrants. Moreover, the divergent responses of planters and the government to this health crisis indicated a deeper conflict over control of the environment and an understanding of the costs and consequences of environmental change in the service of the plantation system.

Response to the initial outbreak of leprosy focused on preventing the disease from spreading. In 1865, official estimates claimed over two hundred and fifty people were infected and the Hawaiian Legislature established an act to quarantine the afflicted at the rugged and remote Kalaupapa peninsula on the island of Molokaʻi. Admissions to the quarantine settlement varied annually from a low of twenty-seven in 1870 to a high of four hundred seventy-seven in 1873. By the advent of reciprocity a total of one thousand five hundred and nine people had been admitted to the settlement, of whom seven hundred and two were still living.73 Life at Kalaupapa was grim, but the quarantine laws were relatively lenient, and absolute segregation was hardly enforced.

The government’s approach toward leprosy, like much else after Reciprocity, became politicized across a haole/Hawaiian divide. Haole claims of cultural superiority and a monopoly on medical knowledge fueled the dispute. In 1882, the Hawaiian

Government helped support an investigation into the natural history of the disease by Dr.

A. Arning, under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences of . In 1886, however, the Board of Health dismissed the doctor after he clashed with the Royal Cabinet over the extent of his authority. Planters saw another example of government ineptitude. The

73 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 72.

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Planters’ Monthly accused the President of the Board of Health of demanding Dr. Arning change his report to the Hawaiian Legislature to better fit the government’s political views. “The interruption of his important investigations into the causes and nature of leprosy,” wrote the Planters’ Monthly in an editorial, “calls for and has received general condemnation.”74 As haole and Hawaiian alike struggled in vain to understand and control the disease and neither medical tradition proved to be more effective, competing approaches to leprosy demonstrated the larger cultural divide between the Kalākaua government and the increasingly powerful haole community. Hansen’s disease was perhaps the starkest illustration of the existential struggle Hawaiians saw between the

Hawaiian nation and the sugar industry. Not only was immigration overwhelming the

Hawaiian population, but Hawaiians saw those immigrants as spreading disease among

Hawaiians. The sugar industry was thus held responsible for both the increase of foreigners and the decrease of natives.

The Bayonet Constitution

By the middle 1880s, Hawaiʻi’s planters and government were at odds over just about everything. The post-Reciprocity expansion of the sugar industry created conflicts over capital, land, and labor, and raised fundamental questions about the nature of the relationship between the government and the sugar industry. Tensions became even worse when in 1886 Spreckels and King Kalākaua had a bitter falling out. Kalākaua sought to raise capital to get out of debt to Spreckels; Spreckels had no intention of

74 “Leprosy in Louisiana,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 12 (March 1884), 327; “Editorial and General,” Planters’ Monthly 4, no. 10 (January 1886), 256.

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letting his influence over the king and government policy diminish. Yet Kalākaua managed to force men loyal to Spreckels out of the government. Though planters whose roots in Hawaiʻi ran deeper than Spreckels’s may have found him threatening, they nonetheless found that their political interests often aligned with his. While they would have preferred that sugarcane planters wield political power, one monopolistic sugarcane planter wielding power was more agreeable than Native Hawaiians holding power. At the

1886 meeting of the Planter’s Labor and Supply Company, chairman of the legislative committee J. M. Horner remarked, “While former Cabinets were piloting and steering the ship of State, with Mr. Spreckels behind the curtain as prompter, we felt safe, although things were not quite to our liking; but now I feel that we are drifting…” But by now questions about who was in charge were loaded with blanket judgements about race and an increasingly stark divide between haole planters and Native Hawaiians. Horner continued, “We felt safe under the pilotage of former Cabinets, because we knew them to be intelligent and sprung from the ruling race. I have an exalted idea of the high destiny of the white man and of his power to control and govern both men and elements.”75

In July 1887 several haole, using the threat of violence, forced King Kalākaua to adopt a new constitution that removed the monarch’s veto power and command of the military and established voting laws that gave wealthy haole greater representation in the two houses of the Legislature. The insurrectionists called themselves the , but were known to their detractors as the “Missionary Party.” They wanted no less than to reduce the monarchy to a figurehead, to have King Kalākaua reign but not rule. Not all

75 Hawaiian Gazette, October 26, 1886. Also quoted in Adler, Claus Spreckels, 214.

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planters advocated such a drastic move. , a planter of long standing on

Kauaʻi, advocated an attempt for reform that stopped short of constitutional change.76

Isenberg’s, however, was a single voice of dissent in a unanimous chorus of planters. The

Planters’ Monthly celebrated the revolution and the Bayonet Constitution, writing that it was a “most important change and affects planters more, perhaps, than any other class in the community...Bad government meant serious loss to the planter. The people of

Honolulu having got rid of the bad government it becomes incumbent on the entire planting interest to support the present men in office, as long as they do their duty.”77

After the revolution of 1887 placed greater power in the hands of the haole elite, the new government pursued a path of gratifying planters and alienating Hawaiians. As the new government pursued an agenda of increasing Asian labor immigration, it also took greater action to criminalize Hansen’s disease and segregate all infected Hawaiians at the Molokaʻi settlement. The Legislature passed laws banning large passenger ships from carrying people suffering from the disease, made the concealment of people suspected of having the disease a misdemeanor, and gave the board of health authority to declare people who accompanied afflicted family members to Kalaupapa (mea kōkua;

“helpers”) as legally considered lepers.

Planters supported the increased action against those who had contracted

Hansen’s disease, and understood the government’s obligations for public health in terms of their own interests. Regarding a proposal for the government to contract with a private

76 Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom: Volume 3: The Kalakau Dynasty, 361-2.

77 “The New Constitution,” Planters’ Monthly 6, no. 7 (July 1887), 295.

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company to transport people suffering from Hansen’s disease on vessels used exclusively for that purpose, the Planters’ Monthly wrote that the proposal was “one that will be seconded by every tax-payer.” Calling lepers “unfortunate wards of the nation,” the

Planters’ Monthly argued that planters would “cheerfully” bear the expense of funding their removal.78 In 1889, the Planters’ Monthly praised the bayonet government’s

“prompt and successful efforts made to segregate the lepers which had for years been allowed by former Governments to roam throughout the group, scattering the seeds of death in every district, hamlet and house that they entered.”79 Looking to Louisiana as

Hawaiian planters did for many things, the Monthly found that physicians in Louisiana agreed with Hawaiʻi’s policy of segregation.

Native Hawaiians, of course, had different views. The Hawaiian-language press called the Board of Health, responsible for the leprosy laws, the “Board of Death,” and the leper settlement was known as the “Grave.”80 Haole argued that Hawaiians themselves, not the Chinese were responsible for the sickness. The Friend attributed the introduction of Hansen’s disease to an aliʻi who traveled abroad in the 1840s.81 The sugar industry had gone from supporting the development of all of Hawaiʻi to facilitating the demise of the indigenous population.

78 Planters’ Monthly 9, no. 7 (September 1888), 386.

79 “Leprosy in Hawaii and Louisiana,” Planters’ Monthly 8, no. 1 (January 1889), 5.

80 “Leprosy in Hawaii,” The Friend (Honolulu), February 1, 1889.

81 “The First Hawaiian Leper,” The Friend (Honolulu), February 1, 1890.

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By the 1890s, the Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system was heavily industrialized, using ever-increasingly sophisticated technology and greater control of land and labor to fuel its dominance over Hawaiʻi. The Honolulu Iron Works employed over two hundred men to build Hawaiʻi’s sugar machinery, and in 1890 installed the first six-roller sugar mill in the islands, which broke the previous record for extraction of sugar from cane. The Planters’ Monthly estimate that mills were extracting twenty-five percent more sugar, with much lower costs for fuel and labor than they were capable of twenty years earlier.82 Several plantation mills had installed electric lights so that they could operate around the clock.83

Ewa: A Revolutionary Plantation

Many of the innovations of the reciprocity era converged on an arid plain west of

Honolulu. In 1890 the ʻEwa Plain, west of , became the site of Ewa

Plantation, one of the most sophisticated and productive plantations to arise in Hawaiʻi.

For years before the plantation’s founding, the dry ʻEwa Plain was covered with native

ʻilima, a flowering plant which made excellent cattle fodder.84 When the plantation was proposed, overgrazing had turned the plain into an arid scrubland—a “cactus-grown, sand-blown, rubble-filled plot…cracked and fissured under a burning sun,” in the words

82 “Machinery for Paauhau Plantation,” Planters’ Monthly 10, no. 3, March 1891, 102-103.

83 Planters’ Monthly 9, no. 3, March 1890.

84 Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea,

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of the plantation’s managers.85 The agricultural potential of ʻEwa changed in 1879, when

James Campbell, who owned a majority of the land in the area, dug the islands’ first

“artesian” well. Campbell, according to contemporary accounts, noticed cattle from his ranch submerging their heads in the saltwater of the Pearl River lagoon, and concluded that they must have been drinking from an outflow of subterranean freshwater. The source of the water, though not completely understood at the time, was from rain that percolated through Oʻahu’s porous volcanic rock and formed a basal lens resting on top of the ocean.

Over the next ten years more than one hundred wells were bored around ʻEwa and

Honolulu. The exact nature and quantity of this underground water was unknown, but

Ewa’s founders were certain they could capture enough water to feed one of the most ambitious plantations contemplated on the islands. Crucially, artesian water did not fall under the rigid laws of usage that governed the riparian rights of Hawaiʻi’s streams.

Without needing to worry about possible conflicts with small farmers, who lacked the capital necessary to sink pumps, cane planters now had an opportunity to expand onto lands previously unsuited to sugarcane cultivation. By 1900, the U. S. Census noted that irrigation made possible the expansion of sugarcane planting onto lands formerly used only to pasture cattle.86 Artesian water offered a key to once again loosen the sugarcane plantation system from its established constraints.

85 Fifty Years of Ewa Plantation Co. (Honolulu: Castle & Cooke, Ltd., 1940), 3.

86 “The Agricultural Development of Hawaii,” Hawaiian Annual (1903), 52.

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The discovery of Oʻahu’s basal freshwater lens placed the Ewa Plantation

Company in a position to exploit sugar’s industrial revolution. Ewa’s founders set out to build one of Hawaiʻi’s most technologically advanced plantations. This began with the use of railroads. Benjamin F. Dillingham, a recent immigrant to Hawaiʻi and an inveterate entrepreneur, was one of the initial founders of the plantation company, and also held a contract to build Oʻahu’s first railway line. Dillingham leased the lands of the

ʻEwa Plain from James Campbell, and subleased the plantation land to William R. Castle.

Thus connected by rail to Honolulu Harbor, Ewa was able to get its sugar to market.

Ewa’s sugar mill, with equipment made by Honolulu’s Union Iron Works, was designed on the latest principles of the diffusion process: a method taken from the beet sugar industry.87

Ewa’s investments proved to be poorly timed. In April 1891, the United States

Congress passed the McKinley Tariff Act, which did away with all import duties on foreign sugars and instead gave domestic producers a bounty. The benefits of Reciprocity for Hawaiian planters disappeared, sending the islands into an economic depression.

Moreover, problems with the diffusion process were making operations too costly and inefficient. Yet access to capital, a crucial component of Hawaiʻi’s sugar boom, saved the plantation. Castle & Cooke’s board members contributed their personal finances to fund plantation operations and used connections in San Francisco to take out a loan. Ewa

87 “A Castle and Cooke History,” unpublished typescript, 658 C27h, HMCS.

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installed a nine-roller mill, the most advanced in the world’s sugar industry, and began producing sugar.88

With such ambitious expansion of the sugar industry, planters needed political and economic stability to protect their investments. After fifteen years of dramatic expansion, the McKinley Act forced Hawaiʻi’s planters to face the prospect of competition from other sugar producers that had access to much cheaper labor. The

McKinley Act pushed the sugar factors close to financial ruin.89 By October 1892, the

Secretary of the PLSC complained of the “severe trial for sugar planters.” Planters had reduced wages by one third but even so, three plantations had already suspended operations and they expected others to follow. The PLSC did not foresee a quick end to their hard times.90

Revolution

King Kalākaua died on January 20, 1891 and his sister, Lydia Kamakaʻeha

Dominis assumed the throne as Queen Liliʻuokalani. Queen Liliʻuokalani, with the support of many Native Hawaiians, sought to revoke the Bayonet Constitution of 1887 and restore some of the previous power of the monarchy. The Queen’s position further eroded the relationship between the Crown and the sugar interests, with the Planters’

88 “A Castle and Cooke History.”

89 Jared G. Smith, The : A Brief History of Hawaii’s Largest Firms (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., Ltd., 1942).

90 “Eleventh Annual Report of the Secretary,” Planters’ Monthly 11, no. 11 (November 1892), 485-87.

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Monthly continuing to provide a medium for planters to express their opposition to the government. On January 17, 1893, after months of secret meetings and correspondence between Hawaiian annexationists and their allies in the United States, a group of annexationist haole conspired with U. S. Minister to Hawaiʻi John Stevens to overthrow the Queen and pursue annexation to the United States. Stevens, acting without official direction, landed a contingent of marines and sailors to support the insurgents. In the face of this overwhelming force, Liliʻuokalani conditionally stepped down from the throne and sought redress in Washington D. C.

Not all planters supported the coup, and several of the wealthiest and most important figures in the sugar industry were vocal royalists.91 Others, however, joined the coup with enthusiasm.92 The rapid expansion of the plantation system meant that the sugar industry was not controlled by a small handful of elite planters, but was instead spread across the haole community. Two hundred and forty-seven American, British, and

German haole owned stock in sugar companies, and one third of all Americans who were eligible to vote in Hawaiʻi were stockholders.93 As irrigation, immigration, and technological development all demanded greater capital investment, and the instability and economic depression brought on by the McKinley Act threatened those investments,

91 Richard D. Weigle, “Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution,” Pacific Historical Review 16, no. 1 (February 1947): 41-58.

92 Josephine Sullivan, A History of C. Brewer & Company Limited: One Hundred Years in the Hawaiian Islands, 1826-1926 (Boston: Walton Advertising & Printing Company, 1926), 160.

93 Weigle, “Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution.”

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many of those involved in the sugar industry found motivation to take up arms against the government that had once championed their rise.

Although planters were on both sides of the overthrow, they saw opportunity in its aftermath. The Planters’ Monthly wrote,

Whatever our future form of government may be, it is probable that some alliance with the United States will be made. One result of this union will be that all our industries will receive an impetus, and will secure the benefit of any protective duty or bonus given to American products. New industries will spring up, as by magic, affording to industrious Hawaiians- -both male and female--new avenues for employment, with increased opportunities for bettering their domestic and social condition. A union of Hawaii with that great and prosperous nation will create a feeling of confidence in the bosom of every man and woman, and settle the long- disputed question that life is worth living, at least in our own favored and blissful isles--the Paradise of the Pacific.94

In the years between Reciprocity and the Revolution, sugarcane had come to take up more land, more capital, and more labor. The only thing the sugar industry had less of was Native Hawaiian involvement. Kānaka Maoloi investment in cane plantations had fallen from $641,240 in 1883 to $324,047 in 1893, while the total value of Hawaiʻi’s plantations had risen from $15,886,800 to $27,964,290 in that same period.95 As more land came under cane cultivation and the industrial revolution in sugar brought those lands under the control of more powerful and expensive mills, and as an influx of foreign workers not only changed Hawaiʻi’s demographics but also introduced a new disease that

94 “The 17th of January,” Planters’ Monthly 12, no. 2 (February 1893), 50.

95 “Ownership of Hawaiian Sugar Plantations,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 170- 171; J.S. Walker, “Hawaiian Sugar Plantation Corporations,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1894 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co. Steam Print, 1893), 40-41. In the 1893 statistics of plantation investment, the Almanac distinguished between Native Hawaiians, who accounted for $38,991 and “Half Castes,” who accounted for $285,056. Of this latter group, British Hawaiians owned the largest amount of plantation investment with $168,098 and American-Hawaiians owned the next-largest amount of investment with $88,900.

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threatened Hawaiian bodies and their presence on the land, it is little wonder that

Reciprocity created an environment of conflict. King Kalakaua, once a champion of sugarcane planting, and then Queen Liliuokalani came to see the sugar industry as an antagonist. With the crises of 1884 and 1891, it is also apparent that planters perceived the monarchy as an obstacle to stability. The sugar revolutions of the late nineteenth century thus became political, and sought resolution in the political revolution of 1893.

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CHAPTER 6: BIOLOGICAL PEST CONTROL, DIVERSIFIED FARMING, AND HAWAIIAN SUGARCANE PLANTERS’ CAMPAIGN FOR ANNEXATION, 1893-1898

M[ongoose]—“I was brought here by a big fat man from Jamaica, for the purpose of killing off the rats.” C[hinaman]—“Well, why do you not stick to that line of business?” M.—“So I did until the rats became scarce, and I found it was easier to make a living by eating chickens and eggs, and also the eggs and young of pheasants and other birds which are fool enough to make their nests on the ground.” C.—“Well, they will exterminate you because you do not confine yourself to your business.” M.—“That's what they say about you. They will deport you, not because you do not stick to your business, but because you do work that other people cannot do and would not do if they could.” James W. Girvin, The Master Planter; Or, Life in the Cane Fields of Hawaii1

When, following the January 1893 overthrow of Hawaiʻi’s Queen Liliʻuokalani,

Sanford Dole, associate justice of the Hawaiian Supreme Court, son of New England missionary Daniel Dole, and a former president of the Planters’ Labor and Supply

Company (PLSC), assumed the presidency of the new Hawaiian Provisional

Government, the future looked positive for Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane planters. Dole and the other revolutionaries expected to transfer sovereignty to the United States, providing

Hawaiian sugar with all the trade benefits of being a domestic product and reversing the damage of the 1891 McKinley Tariff Act, which rendered the islands’ sugar uncompetitive in the U.S. market. Yet annexationists soon met with disappointment, as

U.S. President-elect Grover Cleveland came out against annexation. Anti-imperialist

1 James W. Girvin, The Master Planter; Or, Life in the Cane Fields of Hawaii (Honolulu: Press of the Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1910), 174.

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outrage over American involvement in the coup and a lobbying battle between supporters of Queen Liliʻuokalani and supporters of the Provisional Government unfolded in

Washington. The Cleveland administration launched an investigation into the affair, rumors circulated that he would have American forces restore the monarchy, and

Hawaiʻi’s political future was in a state of uncertainty throughout the year.2 Planters, like the rest of Hawaiian society, would have to wait and see how their relationship with the

U. S. and its market would develop.

The struggle for annexation and trade stability was certainly not the only problem confronting the sugar interests. The usual questions of controlling cheap labor, improving efficiency, and increasing output were ever present. Added to this list, and dovetailing with other issues in what might seem to be surprising ways, was the issue of insect pest control. But in the 1890s, planters were not merely concerned with pest control on their plantations. Instead, they worked to develop pest control practices that would protect and promote other agricultural pursuits, such as citrus and coffee. In doing so, Hawaiʻi’s cane planters became pioneers in the development of biological pest control—the use of predatory and parasitic animals (mostly insects) to manage populations of agricultural pests.

What at first glance appears to be a story as old as agriculture itself—people protecting crop fields from unwanted animals—with little relevance beyond plantation

2 For a detailed account of the American political debate surrounding annexation, see Thomas J. Osborne, “Empire Can Wait”: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898 (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1981). On the political events in Hawaiʻi in 1893, see Ethel M. Damon, Sanford Ballard Dole and His Hawaii (Palo Alto, California: 1957).

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fields, is in fact much more complex.3 Biological pest control in Hawaiʻi was closely linked to land and labor control and the greater political and cultural agendas of

Hawaiʻi’s ascendant haole sugarcane planters.4 It was a significant front in planters’ increasingly sophisticated scientific and technological campaign for control of the

Hawaiian environment, and connected Hawaiʻi in webs of biological exchange with other regions of the circum-Pacific. Most importantly, biological control—both on and beyond

Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane plantations—was crucial to planters’ efforts to encourage white

Americans to settle in Hawaiʻi and take up farming there. Pest control thus helped planters make the argument to people in the United States that Hawaiʻi was a land worthy of annexation.

Insects and Annexation

Other historians of the Hawaiian sugar industry have focused on infrastructure and civil engineering developments, especially the expansion of irrigation, but most

3 With some notable exceptions, historians of sugar and historians of Hawaiʻi have paid little attention to pests and pest control in sugarcane cultivation. Noel Deerr, whose mid-twentieth century History of Sugar remains one of the most comprehensive and influential works on the subject, briefly noted that Hawaiian planters were pioneers of insect pest control; Noel Deerr, The History of Sugar, vol. 2 (London: Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1949), 587.

Diseases and pests receive brief mentions in J. H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry: A Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 141-42; Carol A. MacLennan, Sovereign Sugar: Industry and Environment in Hawaiʻi (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2014), 40-41. For a broad discussion of insect pest infestations of Hawaiian cane plantations, see C. Allan Jones and Robert V. Osgood, From King Cane to the Last Sugar Mill: Agricultural Technology and the Making of Hawaiʻi’s Premier Crop (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2015).

4 Other works that address connections between agricultural pest control and social control include Thomas R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) and James C. Giesen, “‘The Truth About the Boll Weevil’: The Nature of Planter Power in the Mississippi Delta,” Environmental History 14, no. 4 (October 2009): 683-704.

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scholars have given only brief attention to the work of fighting insects. Yet pest control, more than these other projects, was tied to planters’ efforts to Americanize Hawaiʻi. In fact, Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane planters promoted pest control in support of other agricultural enterprises. In the 1890s, Caucasians still made up only a small portion of the Hawaiian population: the 1890 census recorded 6,220 whites out of a total population of 89,990.5

Planters saw pest control as a way to encourage American settlement of Hawaiʻi and decrease their reliance on Asian plantation laborers, thereby making annexation more attractive to the United States. Better agricultural pest control practices would allow for a broader array of agriculture enterprises in Hawaiʻi—agriculture that did not demand as much capital investment as sugarcane or involve the difficult conditions and stigma of plantation labor. Pest control, annexationists hoped, would help encourage white

Americans to settle in Hawaiʻi and become small farmers.

The racial composition of Hawaiʻi, with its overwhelmingly Asian plantation workforce, was a significant liability for Hawaiʻi’s newly ruling haole community and their aspirations toward annexation.6 In the late nineteenth century, not only had the failure of post-Civil War Reconstruction given way to what Rayford Logan and other historians have called the “nadir of American race relations,” but anti-Chinese sentiment, manifest in a global discourse of anti-coolieism, had spread through the Anglophone

5 Robert C. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 25. This number comprises all Caucasians, excluding Portuguese, who were brought to the islands as plantation workers and who were generally considered separate from other white ethnic groups.

6 William McGowan has argued that Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane planters saw their workforce as a liability after annexation, yet, as this chapter argues, planters recognized the tensions of maintaining control over their workers before annexation, too. William P. McGowan, “Industrializing the Land of Lono: Sugar Plantation Managers and Workers in Hawaii, 1900-1920,” Agricultural History 69, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 177-200.

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Pacific, from California to Australia.7 Race played a pivotal role in anti-annexationist sentiment in Washington and the Cleveland administration, particularly in the conduct of

James H. Blount, the Georgia Congressman commissioned with investigating U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Liliʻuokalani.8 Somewhat paradoxically, this was also a time of ascendant American imperialism, particularly in the Pacific, where the extension of American hegemony facilitated economic entry into Chinese markets. The prospect of

American expansion and absorption of nonwhite people was laden with tension as

Americans advocated and celebrated the growth of the American nation but questioned whether nonwhite people were fit to join that nation.9 Asian workers made Hawaiʻi’s plantations run, but they made annexation less appealing to Americans.

While Hawaiʻi’s population gave many Americans doubts over the archipelago’s ability to be absorbed by the United States, its location also made white Americans question whether they could settle Hawaiʻi in numbers large enough to support

American-style government and culture. In the mid-nineteenth century, American geographers had developed a discourse on the nature of the North American continent, a

7 Rayford W. Logan, The Negro in American Life and Thought: The Nadir, 1877–1901 (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1954); Mae M. Ngai, “Chinese Gold Miners and the ‘Chinese Question’ in Nineteenth-Century California and Victoria,” Journal of American History 101, no. 4 (March 2015): 1082- 1105; Philip A. Kuhn, Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). Anti-Asian bias and anti-coolieism had become increasingly prevalent in Hawaiʻi in the 1880s and 1890s, as well. See Edward D. Beechert, Working in Hawaii: A Labor History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), Ch. 5.

8 Merze Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

9 The paradox of how to expand the borders of the United States and encountering peoples supposedly unprepared to take on democratic citizenship was central to culture and politics at this time. The historian Matthew Frye Jacobson called this expansion “the migration of the state.” Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876- 1917 (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), 222, and esp. Chapter 6.

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sort of geographic equivalent to the political idea of , which held that

North America was a discrete unit within which American ideals of government and culture could flourish.10 This idea of geographic American exceptionalism was reinforced by the prevalent notion among Americans that a stark divide existed between tropical and temperate regions of the world, and that white Americans could not easily extend themselves and their way of life to tropical locales.11 Insects were central to these perceived differences between North America and the tropics. Scholars have often focused on the relationship between insects, human health, and imperialism, but agriculture also played a significant role in the idea that white Americans could not expand their culture into the tropics.12 Hawaiian annexationists fought against these ideas, arguing that Hawaiʻi was indeed suitable for American settlement and annexation.

Hawaiian annexationists challenged American ideas that a tropical, white- minority archipelago with a plantation economy could not absorb American culture or settlers. Annexationists argued that Hawaiʻi could replace, or at least balance, its Asian cane workers with Americans, and that Americans could also practice agriculture and become independent small farmers in the islands. To make these arguments, however, sugarcane planters needed insect pest suppression. Controlling crop pests enabled the

10 David Igler, The Great Ocean.

11 Paul S. Sutter, “The Tropics: A Brief History of an Environmental Imaginary,” in Andrew C. Isenberg, ed., Oxford Handbook of Environmental History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 178-204. Ronald Takaki claimed that Hawaiian sugarcane planters always saw white Americans as unfit for agricultural labor in Hawaiʻi. Ronald Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 66.

12 For insect pest control and American expansionism, see Paul S. Sutter, “Nature’s Agents or Agents of Empire? Entomological Workers and Environmental Change during the Construction of the Panama Canal,” Isis 98, no. 4 (December 2007): 724-754.

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growth of different agricultural enterprises that were not as capital intensive as sugarcane—especially coffee. Only later, after a major infestation struck Hawaiʻi’s cane fields, did planters turn to the pest specialists they had recruited—already world- renowned for their work—to save their cane fields.

Ideas and Innovations in Agricultural Pest Control

Though insects have plagued farmers for as long as there have been farms, the late nineteenth century saw an increase in the severity of crop pest infestations.13 Until that time, agricultural pest control was fairly rudimentary; it involved the importation of predator animals and insects, a good deal of trial and error, and often did as much harm as good. In 1760, the botanist and progenitor of modern scientific taxonomy Carl

Linnaeus attempted to introduce predacious beetles into insect-infested , without notable success. Linnaeus’s greater contribution was the idea of the “balance of nature,” which stated that all animals fit into a certain role in what later ecologists would call an .14 Under the idea of the balance of nature, it was neither possible nor desirable to eradicate an animal, even an insect pest. The best one could hope for would be to

13 A complex of factors likely contributed to the rise of agricultural pests in the mid- to late nineteenth century. More extensive development of monoculture plantations, a general warming of the Earth’s temperature from the last “Little Ice Age,” and an increase in the frequency and rapidity of transportation between regions all created conditions more benign for the invasion and population growth of insect pests.

14 Harry C. Coppel and James W. Mertins, Biological Insect Pest Suppression (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977), 17.

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manage relationships between animals and try to make sure no animal populations grew too drastically.15

Early Hawaiian sugarcane planters stuck to the Linnaean idea of a “balance of nature,” even if they believed they needed to take a more active role in achieving that balance. As early as 1855, at the annual meeting of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural

Society, sugarcane plantation manager J. W. Marsh argued that the Society should take special pains to introduce “insectivorous and verminivorous” animals to the archipelago to compensate for the dearth of such animals that had arrived in Hawaiʻi without human aid. As recounted here in Chapter Four, Marsh hoped Hawaiʻi’s planters could import animals as a means of “overcoming nature by nature.”16

Early agricultural pest control in Hawaiʻi illustrated the harm of unintended consequences in importing foreign species to a remote setting. In 1865 the Royal

Hawaiian Agricultural Society funded the importation of the Indian mynah bird as a means of controlling worms. Over a century earlier, the mynah had been successfully introduced into the island of Mauritius, where it suppressed the red locust (Nomadacris septemfasciata Serville), which had been infesting sugarcane.17 Yet in Hawaiʻi, the omnivorous mynah did not limit itself to pests. The mynah also preyed on the eggs of native birds and fed on the berries of the lantana, a South American bush imported in

1858 as an ornamental plant. With the mynah spreading lantana berries throughout

15 J. F. M. Clark, “Bugs in the System: Insects, Agricultural Science, and Professional Aspirations in Britain, 1890-1920,” Agricultural History 75 (Winter 2001): 85-86.

16 Chapter 4; J. W. Marsh, "Report on Birds, Bees, Insects and Worms" Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 2:2 (1855), 47-48.

17 Coppel and Mertins, Biological Insect Pest Suppression, 18.

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Hawaiʻi, the plant soon became invasive, choked off native grasses, and destroyed significant areas of pastureland in the islands.18 Likewise the Indian mongoose, imported to Hawaiʻi in 1883 to protect cane fields from rats, expanded its diet to ground nesting bird species’ eggs. The PLSC made known the mongoose’s reputation for attacking birds, but planters on the Big Island chose to disregard this information and funded the importation of the animal from Jamaica.19

A targeted approach to pest control was untenable for early planters in part because they had difficulty identifying insect pests. In the 1850s and 1860s, when

Hawaiian plantations were undercapitalized and agricultural entomology was in its infancy, limited knowledge sometimes caused confusion. Hawaiian planters mistakenly called the most destructive sugarcane pest in the mid-nineteenth-century Hawaiʻi the sugarcane borer (Diataea saccharalis), an insect that had ravaged sugar islands throughout the world. Planters sought out information from other plantation regions and the Linnaean Society, but what Hawaiian planters called the sugarcane borer was in fact a completely different insect now known as the New Guinea sugarcane borer

(Sphenophorus obscurus Boisduval).20

18 C. E. Pemberton, “Highlights in the History of Entomology in Hawaii 1778-1963,” Pacific Insects 6, no. 4 (December 1964): 719; John L. Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea: The Fate of Nature in Hawaiʻi revised ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2004), 137.

19 “Hilo Planters’ Association,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 2 (May 1883), 30. Opinions are divided on the extent of damage that the mongoose caused. The marine biologist John Culliney argued that the mongoose’s reputation was worse than its impact, while the historian and professor of ethnic studies Davianna McGregor collected oral histories that blamed the mongoose for the decline of bird populations even on the island Molokaʻi. Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea 137, 333; Davianna Pomaikaʻi McGregor, Nā Kuaʻāina: Living Hawaiian Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2006), 218.

20 Honolulu Polynesian, July 13, 1861. Honolulu Pacific Commercial Advertiser, July 27, 1867; September 14, 1867. F. W. Terry, The Sugar Cane Borer (Sphenophorus Obscurus) in the Hawaiian 199

Confusion over the sugarcane borer is consistent with the state of mid-nineteenth- century entomology. It was not until the 1860s, when monoculture farming began increasing susceptibility to crop pests and steam transportation of agricultural commodities increased the trans-oceanic migration of pests, that American agricultural and horticultural societies began lobbying their states to employ entomologists (Britain likewise saw the rise of applied entomology in that decade).21 But more often than attempting to classify insect pests in Western terms, Hawaiian planters understood pests in the context of the Hawaiian environment and culture. In the 1870s and 1880s, George

Dole, plantation manager on the island of Kauaʻi and Sanford Dole’s brother, noted the ravages of insects several times over the course of his career. Peelua, the Hawaiian term for armyworms, infested a neighboring plantation in 1879; in 1881 borers were in other plantations; and in 1882 ʻeleao, a type of aphid, or possibly a native parasitic fungus, afflicted one of his fields.22 In two of these cases, Dole made no evident attempt to identify the pests beyond the use of their Hawaiian names.

Islands, Report of the Work of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, Division of Entomology, Circular No. 3 (Honolulu, 1907) 7-8.

21 Conner Sorensen, “The Rise of Government-Sponsored Applied Entomology, 1840-1870,” Agricultural History 62, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 98-115; Sorensen, Brethren of the Net: American Entomology, 1840—1880 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1995); J. F. M. Clark, “Bugs in the System: Insects, Agricultural Science, and Professional Aspirations in Britain, 1890-1920,” Agricultural History 75, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 83-114. On the increase in American monoculture planting and the spread of crop pests, see James Giesen, “The Truth about the Boll Weevil” and Andrew C. Isenberg, “Environment and the Nineteenth-Century West,” in William Deverell, ed., A Companion to the American West (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd., 2004), 77-92.

22 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole diaries: typescript, April 20, 1879; May 28, 1881; and October 18, 1882, Huntington Library. For a description of peelua (also written as “pelua”), see Transactions of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society 1, no. 1, 95; J. E. Chamberlain, “The Peelua or Army Worm of the Hawaiian Islands,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1883, 44-50. For a description of ʻeleao see wehewehe.org, accessed February 10, 2015. Armyworms were possibly introduced to Hawaiʻi in the 1840s. Culliney, Islands in a Far Sea, 256. Borer infestations were not uncommon. They also struck Princeville Plantation on Kauaʻi in 1877; Andrew Welch letter to , October 13, 1877, 200

Methods of prevention and control were likewise limited. Planters employed women and children to collect the insects by hand and placed pieces of split cane in their fields as bait to lure the borers away from growing cane.23 Others attempted rudimentary chemical controls. A correspondent to the Hawaiian Gazette suggested that, as “many engaged in raising sugar cane” complained of attacks from the borer, planters should apply a petroleum emulsion to their fields. This was a “remedy to cure this evil, known to me from personal experience…having seen it successfully used at the islands of

Mauritius, Java and Ceylon.”24 There is little evidence, however, that petroleum became a popular agent of pest control among Hawaiian planters. During an 1884 infestation of a pest Dole simply referred to as a “beetle,” Dole offered laborers one cent for each beetle they collected, but one week later reduced the bounty to twenty-five cents per hundred beetles.25 Apparently, the ubiquity of the beetles or the facility of his workers for collecting them forced Dole to reduce his rates.

Hawaiian pest control took a crucial turn in 1890, when an insect that looked like a tiny speck of white fluff and was known as the cottony-cushion scale (Icerya purchasi) began infesting trees in Honolulu. This same insect, originally from Australia, had nearly obliterated California’s citrus industry in the 1880s, but the U. S. Department of

Agriculture saved California’s orchards with an unprecedented and much-lauded

quoted in Rhoda E. A. Hackler, “Princeville Plantation Papers,” Hawaiian Journal of History 16 (1982): 65-85.

23 F. W. Terry, The Sugar Cane Borer, 15.

24 Hawaiian Gazette, June 11, 1873.

25 Dole, George H. and Clara Rowell Dole diaries: typescript, December 4 and 8, 1884, Huntington Library.

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application of a new method of fighting insect pests that came to be known as biological control. Biological control built upon the Linnaean idea of promoting a balance in nature by using insects to fight off insect pests, but added a Darwinian understanding of specialized relationships between certain insect species. The basic premise was the same as earlier efforts of pest control: introduce a foreign species to destroy another. But biological control used greater scientific precision to find insect species that preyed upon only certain pests, and were therefore much more likely to be effective in controlling a specific pest population and much less likely to become pests themselves.26

Chief USDA entomologist Charles V. Riley directed the fight against the cottony- cushion scale by sending his agent, the German-born entomologist Albert Koebele, abroad to find the scale’s natural enemies.27 Riley had been a proponent of biological control since the 1870s, though he did not have other significant opportunities to put his theories into practice before the encounter with the cottony-cushion scale. Koebele, who began working for the USDA in 1881 and had built a reputation as a gifted entomologist, was likewise an advocate for biological control.28 In 1889, after a year of investigation in

Australia and New Zealand, Koebele introduced to California a species of Australian vedalia beetle, or ladybug (Rodolia cardinalis; also known as “ladybirds”). In Australia,

26 Richard C. Sawyer, To Make a Spotless Orange: Biological Control in California Henry A. Wallace Series on Agricultural History and Rural Life (Ames, Iowa: University of Iowa Press, 1996); May R. Berenbaum, Bugs in the System: Insects and Their Impact on Human Affairs (Reading, Mass., Helix Books, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1995); Coppel and Mertins, Biological Insect Pest Suppression.

27 “Vedalia Cardinalis,” Planters’ Monthly 9, no. 5 (May 1890): 228-229. For more on Koebele and pest control in California, see Steven Stoll, “Insects and Institutions: University Science and the Fruit Business in California,” Agricultural History 69, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 216-239.

28 “Koebele, Albert,” Encyclopedia of Entomology, 2nd ed., John L. Capinera, ed. (London: Springer, 2008), 2093-94.

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Koebele observed the ladybugs preying on cottony-cushion scales and keeping their numbers in check. Koebele concluded that the vedalia beetle would control scale insects better than any pesticide spraying, which would kill all insects indiscriminately and allow for harmful insects to invade orchards again unless spraying continued at regular intervals. Koebele’s goal was to introduce an insectivorous or parasitic species which would create a new ecological balance, in which crop pests remained but were limited to lower populations. “It is not that we should exterminate our scale insects,” Koebele wrote, “this is a matter of impossibility even with the best of natural enemies or parasites, and would be contrary to nature; but we can, with the proper natural enemies, keep these insects in check to such an extent that they will not injure our trees, and fruit growing will be possible for all time to come.”29

When the cottony-cushion scale appeared on trees in the vicinity of Honolulu,

Hawaiʻi’s Commissioner of Agriculture sent off specimens to California for identification. California’s entomologists confirmed the Hawaiians’ fears, and provided them with shipments of the vedalia, which brought the cottony-cushion scale under control in a matter of months.30 That Hawaiʻi experienced an infestation of the cottony cushion scale shortly after California did, and that Hawaiʻi then relied on California for pest control expertise and biological control agents should not be surprising. The two places enjoyed a close agricultural relationship in the Pacific World, which itself saw

29 California State Board of Horticulture, Report on the Importation of Parasites and Predaceous Insects, by the State Board of Horticulture, in Accordance with an Act of the Legislature, Approved March 31, 1891 (Sacramento: A. J. Johnston, supt. state printing, 1892), 11-12.

30 “The Vedalia Cardinalis,” Planters’ Monthly 9, no. 6 (June 1890), 244-45; Planters’ Monthly 9, no. 8 (August 1890), 338; “Report of the Committee on ,” Planters’ Monthly 10, no. 12 (December 1891), 551-556.

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frequent transmission of agricultural pests as well as scientific and agricultural practices.

Agricultural ties between Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane planters and California’s orange growers were particularly strong, with several men migrating from one place and vocation to the other. In 1892 the Planters’ Monthly, the PLSC's journal, noted, “on the finest avenue in the city of Riverside,”—then a center of orange cultivation in California—lived “quite a number of Island people.” Among these was George Dole, the former Kauaʻi plantation manager, who had thirteen acres of orange trees; R. McKenzie, formerly of the sugarcane-growing district of Laupāhoehoe, Hawaiʻi, with ten acres of ten-year-old trees; and R. R. Hind of Kohala, Hawaiʻi, another sugarcane district, who also had ten acres of orange trees.31

Planters Unite For Annexation

After the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, strengthening ties to the

United States became an even greater priority for Hawaiʻi’s planters. Several of the largest cane planters opposed the overthrow and initial attempts to secure annexation because it would end the contract labor system and the immigration of Asian workers, but many ultimately decided that annexation would provide better governance and economic stability than they could enjoy under an independent Hawaiian republic.32 Those who did

31 G. O., “Letter from a Hawaiian from Southern California,” Planters’ Monthly 11, no. 3 (March 1892), 116-118.

32 Richard D. Weigle, “Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution,” Pacific Historical Review 16, no. 1 (February 1947): 41-58. Sugarcane planters and their agents ranged across the political spectrum during the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy. After the overthrow, however, the Honolulu-based sugar factors who supported the Provisional Government and Republic Government gained influence. John Whitehead, “Western Progressives, Old South Planters, or Colonial Oppressors: The Enigma of Hawaiʻi’s ‘Big Five,’ 1898-1940,” Western Historical Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 295-326. The German-American sugar magnate Claus Spreckels, known as the “Sugar King” of Hawaiʻi, was one of the most vocal and 204

not agree with the annexationist policies of the Provisional Government were marginalized or pushed out entirely. Joseph O. Carter, president and manager of the sugar agency C. Brewer & Company, which controlled approximately twelve percent of

Hawaiʻi’s sugar, was voted out of his position in the fall of 1894. Peter C. Jones, a former president of the company and Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government, replaced Carter.33 With such internal actions to promote consensus within the community of haole sugar interests, they were prepared to work as a bloc for annexation.

Hawaiian annexationists, however, feared that the sugar industry created a negative image in American culture of Hawaiʻi as a plantocracy filled with Asian workers unfit for American citizenship. Annexationists perceived that they needed to refute the idea that the overthrow was dominated by the sugar interests.34 An article in the

September 1894 Review of Reviews, reprinted in the 1895 Hawaiian Almanac and

Annual, argued “that the “chief obstacle in the way of democratic representative institutions in the Sandwich Islands lies in the fact that the great mass of the laboring prominent planters to argue against annexation, at least in part because of the challenges it would create for controlling the labor supply. Spreckels’s relatively recent arrival to Hawaiʻi, his ownership of California refineries, his vast wealth, and his politics, contributed to his position as an outsider and antagonist to the Hawaiian planter community. Even William G. Irwin, a British resident of Hawaiʻi, and Spreckels’s main business partner there, favored annexation after the overthrow. For a perceptive analysis of Spreckels’s evolving opinion on the revolution, see Jacob Adler, Claus Spreckels: The Sugar King of Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1966). Other planters acknowledged the problems annexation presented, but considered those outweighed by the benefits of becoming domestic sugar producers unconstrained by import duties. See, for example, Report of the Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. (May 1898), 5-6.

33 Josephine Sullivan, A History of C. Brewer & Company Limited: One Hundred Years in the Hawaiian Islands, 1826-1926 K. C. Leebrick, ed., (Boston: Walton Advertising & Printing Company, 1926), 152.

34 William R. Castle, a Honolulu lawyer with family ties to sugar and a member of the annexation commission that visited Washington, D. C. after the overthrow wrote of “refuting the assertion that the movement is a Spreckels one. The enemies of annexation are full of ‘Spreckels and Sugar’ as the secret springs of this movement,” quoted in Adler, Claus Spreckels, 227.

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population is unfit for any share in the responsible political life of the community.

Thousands of Chinese and Japanese coolies are at work upon the sugar plantations, and the element of extremely ignorant Portuguese laborers is a large one. Furthermore, many of the native Hawaiians themselves are wholly unequal to any intelligent use of the ballot.”35 This view of Hawaiʻi as dominated by sugar and inundated with foreign laborers was apt. By 1890, sugar eclipsed all other agricultural enterprises, and accounted for over ninety percent of the value of Hawaiian exports.36 The Hawaiian population was also increasingly transformed by the sugar industry. From 1872 to 1890, the combined

Chinese and Japanese population in the islands increased from 2,038 to 29,362, or from

3.6 percent to 27.9 percent of the total Hawaiian population.37 Most of these people came to Hawaiʻi as plantation workers, though as their initial contracts expired many chose to leave the plantations in favor of other opportunities.38 Sugar thus dominated Hawaiʻi’s economy and immigration flows.

Before the overthrow of the monarchy, Hawaiʻi’s sugar interests fought to protect its contract labor system and to defend it abroad. The Hawaiian government began efforts to limit Chinese immigration in 1883, but planters worked against anti-Asian agitation and used their political and economic power to subvert or weaken legislation restricting

35 Albert Shaw, “The New Hawaiian Constitution,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1895 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co. Steam Print, 1894), 48.

36 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 539-540.

37 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 25.

38 By 1890, plantation employment was approximately 17,895, made up primarily of Asian migrant labor. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 359.

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Asian immigration.39 Planters had been self-conscious of American accusations of slavery since at least the early 1880s, when the San Francisco Chronicle began publishing articles claiming mistreatment of a group of Norwegian plantation workers. Planters made an organized effort to gather affidavits and circulated detailed denials of the allegations in both California and Washington.40

The prospect of annexation changed planters’ calculus; they acknowledged critiques of their labor system and sought to address them. The sugar oligarchy wanted

Americans to look favorably upon the annexation of a racially diverse nation with a small white minority at a time when white supremacist thought dominated U. S. culture.

Hawaiʻi’s planters were well aware of American racial and imperialist thinking, and faced the dilemma of balancing anti-coolie ideas with their need for cheap labor. Thus, in

1893, in order to decrease the number of Chinese workers in Hawaiʻi, the Provisional

Government adopted a Chinese exclusion law based upon the 1892 U. S. Geary Act.

Sugar interests recognized a need to encourage other forms of agriculture, which did not rely on Asian labor.41 Thomas Thrum summed up the problem in the Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1895: “The imperative needs of our sugar and rice plantations and the developing coffee industry for cheap labor keeps continually before the country the question of supply to meet the demand… With the change of government and its

39 Immigration restriction at first focused on limiting Chinese immigration, and Hawaiians looked to Japan as a solution to what they considered too many Chinese immigrants. As Japanese immigration increased, social and political movements arose to end immigration from both nations. Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom, vol. 3, 1874-1893, The Kalakaua Dynasty (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), Ch. 6.

40 Hawaiian planters believed the American sugar trust was behind the Chronicle’s articles as a way to fight the renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty. Planter’s Monthly 1, no. 5 (August 1882), 89-92.

41 “The Sugar Industry in Cuba,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 21 no.5 (May 1902), 252.

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pronounced aim toward annexation with the United States, there arises another important question for solution, viz.: the alteration of our labor system to conform with the laws we hope to come under.”42 Theo. H. Davies, who provided supplies and insurance to plantations and managed the sale of plantations’ sugar through his role as head of one of the “Big Five” sugar agencies, acknowledged the direct pressure of American opinion.

Davies was a royalist, and during the revolution was in England acting as guardian to

Crown Princess Kaʻiulani as she pursued her education abroad, but he took a pragmatic position after the event. Davies wrote to the Honolulu Daily Bulletin, “There must be no misconception as to how much of our prosperity depends on the goodwill of the party in power in the United States… We cannot afford to add, to our other troubles, the hostility which might inflict upon us such a penalty as a duty on our sugar.”43 In order to combat the image of Hawaiʻi as a racially inassimilable plantocracy, planters reasoned, they needed to show that they were changing Hawaiʻi’s agricultural landscape and workforce.

Attracting White Americans to Hawaiʻi

Supporters of American annexation of Hawaiʻi, in both the islands and the United

States, began a campaign to publicize opportunities for American farmers and agricultural workers in Hawaiʻi. At the same time that the historian Frederick Jackson

Turner famously lamented the closing of the American frontier, boosters argued that a new American frontier was emerging in Hawaiʻi, where Americans could find an outlet

42 “Hawaii’s Labor Commission,” Hawaiian Almanac and Annual for 1895 (Honolulu: Press Publishing Co. Steam Print, 1894), 75.

43 Theo. H. Davies, Esq., Letters upon the Political Crisis in Hawaii, January and February, 1894 second series (Honolulu: Bulletin Publishing Company, 1894), 25.

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for their agrarian spirit. Part of this effort came from John Stevens, the former American minister to Hawaiʻi who in 1893 ordered U. S. sailors and marines to land in Honolulu and support the overthrow of the monarchy. In 1894 Stevens published the book

Picturesque Hawaii, which promoted American involvement in Hawaiʻi generally and also stressed the opportunities for Americans to work on cane plantations. Stevens took his readers on a descriptive tour of a plantation and its labor requirements, noting, “This may be a plantation and these may be coolies, but man who works by the sweat of his brow has nowhere an easier lot or is better paid for his labor at its true value than right here on these cane-fields of Hawaii…The same work now done by Chinese and Japanese could be profitably done by many American farmers at greater advantage to their pockets and peace of mind than by continued toiling in the homeland in an uphill struggle with winter and mortgage and a failure of crops.”44

Planters in Hawaiʻi knew that convincing white Americans to work sugarcane plantations was a tough sell, though it was not without precedent, as Louisiana sugarcane planters secured some white tenant cane farmers during Reconstruction.45 Some in

Hawaiʻi acknowledged that white Americans might be reluctant to become plantation workers, but would instead pursue small farming and homesteading. New agricultural enterprises had the potential to get Americans invested—financially and otherwise—in

Hawaiʻi. The Paradise of the Pacific, a “monthly journal devoted to Hawaiian interests,”

44 John L. Stevens and W. B. Oleson, Picturesque Hawaii; A Charming Description of her Unique History, Strange People, Exquisite Climate, Wondrous Volcanoes, Luxurious Productions, Beautiful Cities, Corrupt Monarchy, Recent Revolution and Provisional Government (Philadelphia: Hubbard Publishing Co., 1894), 40.

45 John C. Rodrigue, Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana’s Sugar Parishes, 1862-1880 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

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that is, promoting the islands to Americans, ran items highlighting opportunities for

Americans to become involved in Hawaiian agriculture. In 1893, “for the investment of capital by such of our tourist friends as may be seeking the chance to place their money to good advantage,” the Paradise of the Pacific recommended the Makaha Coffee and

Fruit Company, Limited. Makaha would raise coffee trees as well as “some of the hardy and choice varieties which thrive in the hot valleys of Southern California,” from strawberries and grapes to asparagus and horseradish.46

For diverse farming to succeed, however, pest control was essential. While pests caused relatively light damage on Hawaiʻi’s sugarcane plantations, other agricultural endeavors were much more vulnerable to infestation. In 1882, John Horner, superintendent of the Spreckelsville plantation on Maui, summed up Hawaiʻi’s insect problem for the California Farmer: “Think of the thousands of acres of the richest land on the earth, capable of producing to perfection wheat, oats, barley, hay, potatoes, in fact, everything eatable for man or beast, yet all of the above-mentioned articles, and many more, are imported because the worms will not allow them to grow.”47 The Ceylon coffee blight, which had crippled Hawaiʻi’s coffee industry in the 1860s, continued to limit coffee production and also attacked fruit orchards, causing several Hawaiian farmers to switch from these crops to sugarcane and limiting the agricultural development of commonly infested districts.48 In 1893, the Provisional Government established a Bureau

46 “A Chance for Capital,” Paradise of the Pacific April 1893, 57.

47 “Insect Enemies of the Sugar Cane,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 4 (July 1882), 87.

48 Kessler, Planter’s Paradise, Ch. 3. Of the Kona district, now known as a center for coffee production, government officials wrote in 1877, “if the blight can be overcome it will be a prosperous district.” Hawaii Royal Commission on the Development of the Resources of the Kingdom, Report of the 210

of Agriculture and Forestry to fight these pests. According to bureau commissioner (and sugarcane planter) Joseph Marsden’s first annual report, “One of the first matters the

Bureau had to deal with was the prevalence of many blights and insect pests, which were affecting the vegetation of Honolulu and its suburbs.”49 The bureau initially ordered insecticides and sprayers to combat the pests, but soon determined that chemical controls were only temporary checks to pests, and that “the only means of ridding the country of them was by introducing the natural enemies of the same.”50

Biological Control Comes to Hawaiʻi

Insects that attacked coffee and fruit trees, taro, and garden plants were all a cause of concern among Hawaiian residents, and a significant factor restricting the development of diversified farming.51 In 1893, Joseph Marsden corresponded with Koebele and received from him cases of ladybugs, toads, and other animals that might help control insect pests. Hawaiʻi’s planters, businessmen, and government officials celebrated

Koebele as a sort of agricultural superhero who could rid Hawaiʻi of these injurious insects in an instant. Nor was Hawaiʻi unique in this regard. Biological control became known as the “Koebele method” in , and in California Koebele was a local

Royal Commission on the Development of the Resources of the Kingdom: Island of Hawaii (Honolulu, 1877), 13. Likewise, in 1882 the Planters’ Monthly observed that coffee and fruit cultivation had not progressed from the state they were in in 1850; “Thirty Years Progress,” Planters’ Monthly 1, no. 6 (September 1882), 116.

49 “Mr. Marsden’s Report,” Hawaiian Star, September 19, 1894.

50 “Mr. Marsden’s Report,” Hawaiian Star, September 19, 1894.

51 “Still Chasing Bugs,” Hawaiian Gazette, March 6, 1894.

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hero.52 Marsden eventually offered Koebele a job in Hawaiʻi, but the Hawaiian government could not afford to pay Koebele the $5,000 annual salary he commanded.

Honolulu’s newspapers ran headlines calling the potential to employ Koebele, “A Chance to be Seized,” and reported that “Numbers of curious people visited Commissioner

Marsden’s office” to see the toads that Koebele shipped to the islands.53 When it seemed that the Hawaiian government and Koebele could not come to terms, the PLSC intervened and offered to fund half of the entomologist’s salary, something it could not readily afford either. The company assessed an extra fee to its member sugarcane plantations to secure the money, and though some complained that coffee growers, who stood to benefit the most from Koebele’s work, should be the ones to pay, cane planters acknowledged that they were much better equipped to do so than those struggling with coffee.54

With the sugar industry’s support, Koebele arrived at Honolulu on January 20,

1894. After a tour of parts of Hawaiʻi and some research on local crop pests, Koebele embarked on an expedition to Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon, India, China, and Japan in a search for biological control agents. The press regularly tracked his progress and printed his communications with Commissioner Marsden.55 Koebele shipped back to

52 Coppel and Mertins, Biological Insect Pest Suppression, 24.

53 “A Chance to be Seized,” Hawaiian Star, 26 August 1893; “Mr. Koebele is Coming,” Hawaiian Star, 9 October 1893.

54 “Planters Meeting,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, January 23, 1894; “Planters in Caucus,” Hawaiian Star, November 6, 1894.

55 See “Mr. Marsden’s Report,” Hawaiian Star, 19 September 1894; Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 23 November 1894; “After Blight Destroyers,” Hawaiian Star, 1 April 1895; “Frogs and Bugs,” Evening Bulletin, 17 June 1895.

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Hawaiʻi over 250 varieties of ladybug as well as many different types of frogs and toads.56 One of the first and more prominent targets of these control agents was the

“extensive infestations” of green shield scale (Pulvinaria psidii (Maskell)) on coffee trees and other plants.57 After a brief return to Hawaiʻi, Koebele then traveled to Mexico and

Central America in search of bats to prey upon the particularly destructive Japanese beetle.58 These efforts quickly showed signs of success. Charles Miller, manager of the

Hawaiian Coffee & Tea Company, reported to San Francisco’s Overland Monthly that the White Aphis blight (Dactylopius) had disappeared from his coffee trees and the

Pulvinaria scale, though still common, was manageable. “The most practical and least costly” method of controlling these pests, Miller wrote, was through the introduction of their natural enemies.59

The recruitment of Koebele was part of a broader effort on the part of Hawaiʻi’s planters to bring agricultural scientists to the islands. Planters discussed establishing an agricultural experiment station for several years, and finally did so in 1895. The PLSC secured space for a laboratory and reading room in downtown Honolulu, and appointed as director Dr. Walter Maxwell, an agricultural chemist from Louisiana’s sugarcane experiment station whose credentials included five years’ experience in the German beet sugar industry and the directorship of the USDA experiment station in

56 “In the Legislature,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 4 March 1896.

57 P. H. Timberlake, “Biological Control of Insect Pests in the Hawaiian Islands,” Proceedings of the Hawaiian Entomological Society 6, no. 3 (October 1927): 529-556.

58 Hawaiian Star, 4 March 1896

59 Charles D. Miller, “Coffee Planting in Hawaii,” Overland Monthly and Out West Magazine 25 (June 1895), 675.

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Schuyler, Nebraska.60 The establishment of the experiment station and Maxwell’s appointment as its director demonstrated planters’ desire to adopt more scientifically advanced methods of sugarcane cultivation and sugar production. Koebele fit into this plan as a precautionary defense against cane pests in addition to whatever immediate service he might provide for the farming of other crops.

Such a precaution was warranted. Few sugarcane pests had established populations in Hawaiʻi, but other sugarcane plantation systems throughout the world were experiencing severe pest infestations. Hawaiian planters closely followed news of pest infestations in other sugar islands, and knew that Hawaiʻi’s cane fields could be similarly afflicted. In August 1895, reports that the Japanese beetle had attacked sugarcane in Koʻolau, Oʻahu reinforced planters’ anxiety as well as the anxiety of the business community at large. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser noted with alarm, “So long as [the Japanese beetle] attacked only the commercially unproductive plants, it affected merely the pleasure of people… If it destroys the canes the result will be a national calamity.”61 An infestation of cane plantations would indeed have been an economic calamity for Hawaiʻi. Sugarcane constituted ninety-four percent of the value of all Hawaiian exports that year, and also lent indirect support to the Hawaiian economy through allied industries, such as shipping.62 In addition to the idea that creating a diversified agricultural landscape that would be more appealing to Americans, an interest

60 A. R. Grammer, “A History of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, 1895-1945,” Hawaiian Planters’ Record 51, no. 3 (1947), 183.

61 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 22 August 1895.

62 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, table 21.1, 539-40.

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in the prevention of any infestation of their cane fields also motivated sugar planters to fund biological control.

If funding biological control demonstrated a degree of cooperation between sugarcane planters and others involved in agriculture, planters were simultaneously narrowing their interests. Also in 1895, as planters worried about the Japanese beetle, the

PLSC changed its name to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA). By removing “labor” from the name of their organization, planters were distancing themselves from one of the original reasons they founded the organization—the recruitment of foreign workers. Though the HSPA maintained a committee on labor and continued to seek ways to increase the availability of cheap workers, the old name evoked an image of a plantation system that planters’ were trying to shed. Additionally, by adding “sugar” to their organization’s name, the planters defined their interests more narrowly. These sugarcane planters no longer assumed they could speak for all Hawaiian agriculturalists, and no longer conflated the interests of sugar with the interests of all

Hawaiian agriculture. Their hope was that, given some initial encouragement and assistance, diversified agriculture could grow, and farmers and planters of diversified crops could organize to represent themselves. By limiting their purview to sugar, the

HSPA was making room for others to organize.

With sugarcane planters still supporting broad biological control efforts but expressing their interests in narrower terms, the Hawaiian Provisional Government and the became more active in promoting marginal agricultural industries that might flourish and attract American immigrants. Many saw coffee as an ideal agricultural pursuit for Americans. Accordingly, in 1895, President Sanford Dole drafted 215

a new land law with special incentives for settlers on lands in the ʻOlaʻa region of the Big

Island. Dole hoped the law would be beneficial “not only in relation to residents, but also as an inducement to the immigration of a desirable class of settlers from America and other countries.” The Hawaiian government offered lands for lease on favorable terms, with a newly macadamized road running through the area and into the coastal city of

Hilo, from which farmers could ship coffee and other produce to the mainland. “The government,” Dole declared, “will be unremitting in its endeavors to further promote the immigration of permanent settlers of a character suitable for the building up of our population.”63 With new roads, liberal leases, and biological control managing the coffee blight, Hawaiʻi was set to attract would-be American coffee planters.

To promote these policy initiatives, the Hawaiian government and its allies took to the American press and print. In 1896, Sereno Bishop, editor of the long-running

Hawaiian English-language newspaper The Friend, and whose missionary father had established one of Oʻahu’s earliest sugar mills in partnership with the Hawaiian governor of that island, wrote a series of letters to the Washington, D. C. Evening Star under the penname Kamehameha, to support the mission of the government and burnish Hawaiʻi’s image as a land of agricultural opportunity for Americans. Bishop praised Hawaiʻi’s environment as particularly suited to American annexation, calling the Hawaiian climate

“perfectly adapted to the residence of white farmers working with their own hands the

63 “Land for Homes: A Portion of President Dole’s Message,” Paradise of the Pacific 8, no. 7 (July 1895), 99; “Olaa Reservation: A Portion of the New Land Law,” Paradise of the Pacific 8, no. 6 (June 1895), 85-86. Varied political interests converged in this case. The Republic hoped that by providing economic stimulus to ʻOlaʻa, it could coopt some of the Native Hawaiian supporters of Joseph Nāwāhi, a popular leader of the opposition to haole rule: McGregor, Nā Kuaʻāina, 166.

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year round.”64 The suitability of Hawaiʻi to American-style farming, in Bishop’s view, set the archipelago apart from other sugar-producing regions dominated by absentee planters who focused exclusively on cane cultivation. The following year, the Hawaiian

Department of Foreign Affairs published Coffee: The Coming Staple Product, a book which featured over ninety pages of information on Hawaiʻi’s climate, environment, economy, and government as they related to coffee cultivation. The book touted coffee as

“essentially the crop of the future” which “bids fair to become as important a staple as sugar.” But coffee was not only ready to boom; according to the book it was also easy to get into. The authors argued that coffee “does not require the amount of capital that sugar does, and it can be worked remuneratively upon a small area.”65 These publicity campaigns to convince white Americans that they could settle and farm in Hawaiʻi, predicated on the successful management of crop pests, tied agriculture to race and nationhood, and formed part of a broader argument that Hawaiʻi could be incorporated into the United States.

While sugar producers used biological control to help develop and promote diversified American farming, their investment in Koebele’s salary also provided planters with a more direct and materially apparent benefit. In 1896, a species of aphis had attacked the sugarcane at Kilauea Plantation on Kauaʻi. The manager of the plantation sent word to Koebele, who rushed to the plantation from Honolulu. But, according to

64 Kamehameha [Sereno Bishop], “State of Hawaii,” Washington, D. C. Evening Star, 3 October 1896.

65 Republic of Hawaii, Department of Foreign Affairs, The Hawaiian Islands: Their Resources Agriculture, Commercial and Financial: Coffee: The Coming Staple Product (Washington, D. C.: Gibson Bros., 1897), 12.

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Koebele, insects that he had already introduced made further intervention unnecessary.

Koebele wrote, “We went to the places where the pest had been thickest in the beginning and it was found that the cane was in a perfectly healthy condition with the blight all gone. In place of these were myriads of lady birds… These insects mean business for they are waging effectual warfare against the blight, and before a week is over will completely wipe it out. There was nothing for me to do[,] for my friends the lady birds are doing the work.”66 The Hawaiian Star gushed, “Professor Koebele is a jewel. His latest service is to save cane fields from blight ravages. In any other country the appearance of the aphis on Kauai would have marked the beginning of devastation. The foresight of the Planters and the Government has averted a national calamity. As the

Islands have led in several features of sugar making, so they are in advance in adopting approved scientific methods of guarding against the ravages of insect pests.”67

Scientific methods of sugarcane planting may have protected the sugar industry, but they did little to combat the prejudice white Americans had against becoming plantation laborers. To attract American farmers to Hawaiʻi, planters offered to set them up with small plots of cane and profit-sharing agreements with plantation mills. The immigration of American farmers would both decrease planters’ reliance on Asian labor and also improve the sugar industry’s reputation as a force for Americanizing Hawaiʻi.

Ewa Plantation, established in 1890 and located eighteen miles west of Honolulu on the island of Oʻahu, had successful profit sharing arrangements among Chinese and Japanese

66 “Ladybirds vs. Aphis,” Hawaiian Gazette 28 July 1896.

67 Hawaiian Star, 27 July 1896.

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agricultural workers beginning in 1891.68 Following the overthrow of the monarchy, however, profit sharing took on new significance. In his 1894 book Picturesque Hawaii,

John Stevens held up Ewa as an example of planters’ Americanizing influence over the islands. Ewa’s profit sharing system, Stevens wrote, “presages a radical change in the labor system of Hawaiian plantations…Successfully adapted to all plantations it would obviate the necessity of importing laborers from abroad, and would conserve the interests of Anglo-Saxon civilization.”69 In Stevens’s view, as well as that of Ewa Plantation manager W. J. Lowrie, profit sharing would free Hawaiʻi from the problem common to plantation systems throughout the world—an underclass of politically undesirable plantation workers—while protecting planters and the sugar industry.

Lowrie also agreed with Stevens that it would be ideal to replace Asian plantation labor with American labor; he therefore sought to extend the profit sharing system from

Asian to American farmers. This became all the more pressing, when, in 1896, Alabama

Senator John Morgan told Hawaiʻi’s Ambassador to the United States that the large

Japanese population in the archipelago posed a problem for annexation.70 The following year, Ewa began efforts to recruit American farmers to become profit-sharing sugarcane farmers. In his 1897 report to the Ewa Plantation directors, Lowrie wrote, “Profit sharing is going on as usual very satisfactorily to all concerned, and with the bright prospects of

68 Ewa Plantation, Annual Report (1891), 7, Hamilton Library, University of Hawaiʻi, Mānoa (Hereafter HL).

69 Stevens and Oleson, Picturesque Hawaii, 39.

70 Tom Coffman, Nation Within: The History of the American Occupation of Hawaiʻi, 2d ed. (Kihei, HI: Koa Books, 2009), 199-202.

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annexation, I feel certain we can make a success of this system with White Labor from the United States.”71

Boosters kept hoping that more Americans would cultivate sugarcane, but white antipathy toward the work involved leant increasing importance to the development of other agricultural industries that American farmers might find more appealing. This need to develop diversified agriculture in turn emphasized the need for biological control, without which fruit and coffee trees would not render marketable produce. The success of biological control in Hawaiʻi was indeed remarkable. In an 1897 article in the journal

Nature, R. C. L. Perkins, a British-born entomologist who conducted field research in

Hawaiʻi for the Royal Society and British Association for the Advancement of Science, observed with admiration the increase in coffee and fruit cultivation that had taken place in Hawaiʻi. “Few countries,” wrote Perkins, “have been more plagued by the importation of insect pests than the Hawaiian Islands; in none have such extraordinary results followed the introduction of beneficial species to destroy them.” The reason for the success of biological control in Hawaiʻi was “sufficiently obvious,” according to Perkins.

“The remote position of the islands, and the consequently limited fauna,” Perkins wrote, gave “free scope for increase to new arrivals.”72 Those who could control biological introductions to Hawaiʻi could thus exert exceptional power over Hawaiʻi’s environment and economy, and, planters hoped, the islands’ racial composition.

71 Ewa Plantation, Annual Report (1897), 11, HL.

72 R. C. L. Perkins, “The Introduction of Beneficial Insects into the Hawaiian Islands,” Nature 55, no. 1430 (March 25, 1897): 499-500.

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Entomologists such as Perkins celebrated this power to manipulate Hawaiʻi’s biotic communities, even though they understood the costs of biological control. Perkins lauded Koebele’s actions: “The wisdom of this course [of biological control] cannot be too highly commended, when compared with the indifference shown by countries similarly circumstanced, and is set-off against the reckless importation of infected plants which had been allowed in former years.” Despite his endorsement, however, Perkins concluded his essay on an ominous note. “I cannot help turning to the darker side of the picture,” Perkins wrote. He noted that biological control agents were outcompeting endemic species, and determined, “That success, from an economic point of view, will be attained there is little doubt, and while industries are threatened, or even the gratification of aesthetic tastes, it is certain that no consideration will be given to the native fauna.”73

Perkins had witnessed the threat biological control posed to native species during his extensive field research in Hawaiʻi, and remarked on the spread of the mongoose and mynah, as well as the extinction of Hawaiian species, in his journals and correspondence.74 Less than a decade after the advent of biological control in Hawaiʻi, the environmental impact of the program was already becoming evident, even if planters and the government ignored this impact.

Perkins’s attention to endemic Hawaiian species reflected his training and work in

“pure” entomology, in distinction to the “economic” or “practical” entomologists, who studied entomology as it related to agriculture. Yet even economic entomologists such as

73 Perkins, “The Introduction of Beneficial Insects into the Hawaiian Islands.”

74 R.C.L. Perkins Journal, August 15, 1894, and R.C.L. Perkins to Charles Reed Bishop, Honolulu, February 4, 1896, in Neal L. Evenhuis, ed., Barefoot on Lava: The Journals and Correspondence of Naturalist R. C. L. Perkins in Hawaiʻi, 1892-1901 (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 2007) 244, 306

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Koebele understood that biological control had the power to transform the Hawaiian environment in troubling ways. Even more so than Perkins, Koebele saw economic utility as a greater priority than the protection of endemic species, but he acknowledged that the ideal scenario would be to stop the inadvertent importation of altogether.

To that end, Koebele began agitating for more careful inspection of any imported plant material and more robust quarantine regulations, for both international and interisland shipments.75

If entomologists acknowledged that agriculture was transforming Hawaiian ecology, annexationists argued that it was also Americanizing the islands. In 1897, the

Hawaiian branch of the Sons of the American Revolution—founded in 1895 and the first branch of the SAR outside the United States—along with the Hawaiian branches of the

Sons of Veterans and the Grand Army of the Republic, published a pamphlet to promote annexation. The Hawaiian climate, the pamphlet claimed, was “better suited for white labor than that of a large part of the southern belt of the United States.” The pamphlet went on to argue that the coup, which was led by “the principal tax-payers [and] the leaders of industrial enterprises,” catalyzed an attempt to transition from Asian to

American labor. The pamphlet cited Hawaiian planters’ efforts to turn from contract labor to profit-sharing arrangements, as well as the Republic’s policies to “attract industrious farmers from the United States to develop our coffee lands.” However, the

Hawaiian Sons of the American Revolution added a warning: “if our overtures for a closer union with the mother country are spurned, if our products are discriminated

75 “Plant Quarantine,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 12 October 1896.

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against in American markets, and we are treated as aliens, it is certain that neither of these undertakings [profit sharing and coffee farming] can succeed. The uncertainty that will hang over the fate of this country will deter the most desirable class of settlers from coming here.” “Compatriot” William R. Castle, a Honolulu lawyer and founder of Ewa

Plantation, whose family was part of the sugar agency firm Castle & Cooke, suggested that if the United States failed to support the Americanization of Hawaiʻi’s agricultural population through annexation, Japan would eventually accomplish a “peaceful invasion” of the archipelago through the immigration of plantation workers.76

Seeking to further demonstrate their commitment to bring in American farmers, and acting on manager Lowrie’s recommendation, Ewa Plantation’s directors met with the California Commissioner of Labor and then sent Lowrie to California’s Central

Valley on a recruiting mission. Fifteen farmers arrived in October and November 1898 and established the California Farmers’ Colony at Ewa Plantation. The planters hoped to develop a plantation labor pool that was, “American in spirit, and thus do away with the necessity of looking to the Orient.”77 The colony, however, was a complete failure. Most of the men left within nine months. According to Lowrie, they “flatly refused” to do most of the work that sugarcane cultivation required. The manager concluded that, though

76 An Address by the Hawaiian Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, Sons of Veterans, and Grand Army of the Republic to their Compatriots in America Concerning the Annexation of Hawaii (Washington, D. C.: Gibson Bros., Printers and Bookbinders, 1897). The threat of a “peaceful invasion” of Hawaiʻi by Japanese workers, with ominous implications for the U. S., was common, and even made its way into popular fiction. See, for example, J. H. Palmer, The Invasion of New York; Or, How Hawaii was Annexed (New York: F. Tennyson Neely, 1897), and, for an analysis of Palmer’s work in the cultural context of the annexation debate, John Rieder, “John Henry Palmer's The Invasion of New York, or, How Hawaii Was Annexed: Political Discourse and Emergent Mass Culture in 1897,” in Future Wars: The Anticipations and the Fears, David Seed, ed., (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 85-102.

77 W. J Lowrie and George F. Renton, Why Hawaii Has So Few White Agricultural Laborers and Small Farmers (Honolulu, 1900).

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white Americans were capable of performing all the labor required on cane plantations, an immigration scheme to substitute Asian cane workers with American ones was untenable.78 Other similar projects, such as the recruitment of black plantation workers from Louisiana and Alabama, fared similarly.79

The experience of the California Farmers’ Colony did not deter boosters from continuing to try to win over Americans and divorce the Hawaiian sugarcane plantation system from its association with Asian contract labor. Lorrin Thurston, one of the leaders of the 1893 coup and the annexationist movement, wrote in Outlook that less than one third of Hawaiʻi’s plantation workers were contract laborers, and it was “confidently expected that the system will be abolished entirely within a short time.”80 George

McClellan, who worked with the Hawaiian sugar industry and government to compile A

Hand Book on the Sugar Industry in the Hawaiian Islands, wrote that environment and science alleviated the problems of plantation labor: “The most striking evidence of the steadily improving results of scientific cultivation, systematized modern methods of operation, and perfected plants for manufacture, is shown in the increased tonnage of sugar exported per capita for the total force engaged in its cultivation and manufacture,” thus reducing the need for reliance on foreign labor.81 Moreover, Hawaiʻi offered a

78 Ibid.

79 “Report of the Commissioner of Labor on Hawaii,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 22, no. 7 (July 1903), 290.

80 Lorrin A. Thurston, “President Dole and the Hawaiian Question,” Outlook 58, no. 6 (February 5, 1898), 318.

81 George B. McClellan, ed., A Hand Book on the Sugar Industry of the Hawaiian Islands; Together with a List of the Plantations, Agents, Managers, etc. (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Company, Ltd., 1899), 14.

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benign and attractive environment for Americans: “white laborers can work successfully in the Hawaiian climate, since the heat never exceeds 88 degrees, and is much less severe than that in a harvest field in the States. And it is hoped that an increasing number of steady industrious American laborers may be led to take up cane cultivation in

Hawaiʻi.”82

Annexation Achieved; Diversified Agriculture Abandoned

Annexationists finally achieved their goal in 1898. President William McKinley advocated annexation since he took office in 1897, but his treaty was defeated in the

Senate. In July of 1898, U.S. Representative Francis Newlands of Nevada introduced a joint resolution to annex Hawaiʻi that required only a simple majority rather than the two- thirds vote necessary for the ratification of a treaty. That several attempts at annexation failed, and that one succeeded in 1898 only through a joint resolution, suggests that annexation was indeed a contentious issue in the United States. The racial composition of

Hawaiʻi and the islands’ supposed fitness for white American settlement was but one of several factors influencing the annexation debate, but it was one that Hawaiʻi’s cane planters had sought to turn to their advantage.

Indeed, during the brief era of the Republic of Hawaii, those intent on

Americanizing Hawaiʻi through agriculture could look upon some modest successes. The population of Hawaiian residents born in the United States was increasing, from 1,928 in

1890 to 2,266 in 1896, and would continue to increase to 4,238 in 1900.83 Coffee exports

82 Ibid. 22.

83 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 25. 225

were also increasing, from 118,800 pounds in 1895 to 824,900 pounds in 1899. By 1900 there were 580 coffee farms covering a total of 6,451 acres. Farmers were also raising more bananas, , potatoes, and corn.84 The number of people engaged in farming—excluding laborers—increased from 5,377 in 1890 to 7,570 in 1896.85

These gains were enough for sugarcane planters’ purposes. With annexation,

Hawaiian sugar became a domestic product of the United States, settling the tariff question. Along with any doubts over future access to the American market, the need to promote Hawaiʻi as a paradise for white American farmers dissipated. With annexation, planters had, according to one analysis, “a sense of security and permanency” that had long eluded them.86 Sugarcane planters therefore had little reason to continue supporting efforts to make Hawaiʻi more agriculturally diverse. The HSPA rejected a proposal by the

USDA to merge their agricultural experiment station with a federal one, “as it seemed the part of wisdom to have the full time of our director devoted to the sugar interests.”87

Planters also had little need to continue efforts to become less dependent upon Asian labor in their cane fields. On the contrary, planters needed Asian workers more after

84 Republic of Hawaii, Department of Foreign Affairs, The Hawaiian Islands: Their Resources Agriculture, Commercial and Financial: Coffee: The Coming Staple Product (Washington, D. C.: Gibson Bros., 1897).

85 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 552; 335; 122. As coffee trees take three years to mature, the increase in exports reflects an earlier increase in cultivation.

86 Boris Emmet, The California and Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corporation of San Francisco, California: A Study of the Origin, Business Policies, and Management of a Co-operative Refining and Distributing Organization Stanford Business Series No. II (Stanford: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1928), 1.

87 HSPA Presidential Address of C. M. Cooke, November 1900, quoted in A. R. Grammer, “A History of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, 1895-1945,” Hawaiian Planters’ Record 51, no. 3 (1947), 187.

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annexation than before. U. S. law forbade financially assisted immigration, something that the small numbers of European immigrants that had come to Hawaiʻi under the

Kingdom and Provisional Government relied upon.88 Moreover, the Territorial

Government reversed its insistence that white Americans could become agricultural laborers on Hawaiian plantations, and instead conceded that “it is simply a physical impossibility for the Anglo-Saxon satisfactorily to perform the severe labor required in the sugar fields.”89 Asian laborers seemed to be the only option. In 1898, 9,888 Japanese workers came to the islands, and in 1899 19,908 Japanese immigrated.90 The Olaa Sugar

Company on Hawaiʻi Island, established in 1899, bought up large tracts of lands only recently turned to coffee, and planted cane in its place.91 Among the founders of Olaa were Lorrin A. Thurston, Alfred W. Carter, and Samuel M. Damon—all major figures in the overthrow of the monarchy and the push for annexation.92

Part of the reason that attempts to diversify Hawaiian agriculture were so small was that sugar was much more lucrative than any other crop. William Stubbs, the director of the Louisiana Experiment Station, who visited Hawaiʻi in 1900, did not see much potential for farming beyond cane. “There are in the islands now two or three settlements

88 “Labor Conditions in Hawaii (From the Annual Report of the Governor of the for 1904),” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 5 (May 1905), 229.

89 “The Governor’s Report on Labor Question,” Honolulu Evening Bulletin Industrial Edition, November 1901.

90 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 98. On the strategy of sugarcane planters to delay Japanese immigration until after annexation was settled, see Coffman, Nation Within.

91 “Island of Hawaii,” Paradise of the Pacific 15 (January 1902), 12.

92 Olaa Plantation’s founders hoped at first to attract American small farmers to grow cane on shares, without much success.

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of American farmers,” Stubbs observed, “who are trying to cultivate vegetables for the home markets. But the attempt will probably be abandoned as previous attempts have been.” Stubbs determined, “It is extremely improbable that there will ever be any diversity in farming in Hawaii, for the cultivation of sugar eats up everything else. The price of sugar will have to fall far below the present price before other crops can be raised on suitable lands in the islands.”93 Indeed, these agricultural projects were miniscule in comparison to the sugar industry. The Planters’ Monthly wrote positively of the

“American colony at Wahaiwa,” on Oʻahu, where white farmers were growing oranges, bananas, pineapples, figs, olives, mangos, peaches, and pears, but the colony consisted of only fifty-three people cultivating fifteen hundred acres.94 Sugarcane, by comparison, was planted on one hundred and twenty-five thousand acres of Hawaiian land in 1898.95

Though biological control protected coffee and fruit trees from pests, it could do little to help their produce in the market.

For a brief but crucial moment in Hawaiian history, sugarcane planters worked with other haole to promote agriculture in crops other than sugarcane by white American smallholders. Planters used their financial resources and access to cutting-edge agricultural science to engineer a natural environment conducive to diversified farming, which they thought would help them Americanize the islands and make annexation more palatable to Americans. Agricultural science and biological control made diversified

93 “Prof. Stubbs’ Account of His Recent Visit to Hawaiʻi” (reprinted from Louisiana Sugar Planter’s Journal) Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 19 no. 11 (November 1900): 496.

94 “Agriculture and Forestry in Hawaii,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 20 no.7 (July 1901), 297.

95 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 359.

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farming viable, but they did nothing to diminish planters’ power over Hawaiʻi and its natural resources. On the contrary, though biological control may have been put to use for the cultivation of citrus, coffee, and other plants, it reflected sugarcane planters’ increasing scientific sophistication and control. Planters had come that much closer to achieving J. W. Marsh’s half-century-old dream of overcoming nature by nature.

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CHAPTER 7: PLANTER’S PARADISE

Hawaii has been called, and justly called, the Paradise of the Pacific. But it is a paradise not only of natural beauties and wonders; it is also a paradise of modern industrial combination. In no part of the United States is a single industry so predominant as the sugar industry is in Hawaii, and nowhere else, perhaps, has the centralized control of property reached a state of greater perfection. Hawaii furnishes a vivid illustration of the way in which private business organization in its final stages of development permeates, influences, and controls the life of a country. Ray Stannard Baker, “Wonderful Hawaii: A World Experiment Station,” 19111

Jack, with his unquestionable love of natural beauty, was ever impressed with man’s lordly harnessing of the Outlaw, Nature, leading her by the mouth to perform his work upon the earth. Charmian London, Jack London and Hawaii, 19182

One decade after the overthrow of Queen Liliʻuokalani, eight years after the founding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA) and its sugarcane agricultural experiment station, and five years after annexation to the United States, a tiny insect suddenly posed a giant threat to the Hawaiian sugar industry. The sugarcane leafhopper (Perkinsiella saccharicida) arrived in Hawaiʻi sometime around the turn of the twentieth century and caused severe damage to Hawaiʻi’s cane plantations by 1903.3

1 Ray Stannard Baker, “Wonderful Hawaii: A World Experiment Station; I. How King Sugar Rules in Hawaii,” American Magazine November 1911, 28.

2 Charmian Kittredge London, Jack London and Hawaii, (London: Mills & Boon, Limited, 1918), 294.

3 The leafhopper laid its eggs in the leaf or stem of the cane, near where the two meet. The egg laying and subsequent hatching of the larvae caused harmful scars in the cane; the insects then destroyed leaves by feeding on their juices; and the excretions of the leafhoppers (called, “honeydew”) attracted fungi that afflicted the cane with “rind disease” and “root disease,” causing the cane to deteriorate further. R. C. 230

The leafhopper’s arrival could hardly have come at a more perilous time for the Hawaiian sugar industry. Annexation had increased costs for planters importing foreign goods, such as Australian coal, which was used for milling cane.4 In 1900, the Hawaiian Organic Act established the framework for the islands’ territorial government and abolished plantation labor contracts, which were illegal under U.S. law. As many had predicted, extension of the Organic Act to Hawaiʻi caused a labor shortage, worker organization, strikes, and higher wages. In 1901-1902, a global production glut depressed sugar prices. In 1903, the leafhopper caused over three million dollars in losses for planters (the value of sugar and molasses sales to the mainland U. S. that year was $25,311,000) as the insect destroyed enough cane to produce over eighty thousand tons of sugar; total sugar produced dropped from 437,991 tons in 1903 to 367,475 tons the following year.5 A writer for the HSPA recalled, “Fields attacked by leaf hoppers blackened, withered, died. The hum of their devouring presence could be heard at great distances. The swarm of their incredible billions moved like a visible cloud across the land.”6

This was an inauspicious start to the new century. It was also a predictable outcome of the expansion of the sugarcane plantation system. As the Hawaiian sugar

L. Perkins, The Leaf-Hopper of the Sugar Cane Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry, Division of Entomology, Bulletin no. 1 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1903); R. C. L. Perkins, “On Some Diseases of Cane Specially Considered in Relation to the Leaf-Hopper Pest and to the Striping of Cane,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 23 (mislabeled as 24), no. 12, (December 1904), 633-637.

4 “Prof. Stubbs’ Description of Planting Cane in Hawaii,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 20, no.1 (January 1901), 7-15.

5 Territory of Hawaii Board of Agriculture and Forestry, Report of the Division of Entomology for the Year Ending December 31, 1905 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Col, Ltd., 1906), 99. Jared G. Smith, The Big Five (Honolulu: Advertiser Publishing Co., Ltd., 1942); Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, table 21.4, 546; Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 418.

6 Vandercook, King Cane, 49.

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industry expanded over the previous decades, it created greater environmental problems for itself. Yet even problems such as the leafhopper invasion revealed planters’ increasing control over both the natural environment and society in Hawaiʻi. The leafhopper’s arrival--and the response of Hawaiʻi’s planters--demonstrated just how great planters’ power had become. By the early twentieth century, Hawaiʻi had become a planter’s paradise, where the natural and social environments were optimized for the production of sugar.

As this dissertation has argued, the rise of the Hawaiian sugar industry over the course of the nineteenth century was incremental and due to the complex intersection of multiple factors, from the pre-contact Hawaiian agricultural regime, to the cultural agendas of haole explorers and missionaries, international politics and trade, unanticipated environmental changes, and investment in agricultural science and technology. This last point was key to planters’ continued success in the twentieth century in the face of challenges such as that posed by the leafhopper. Science and technology not only helped Hawaiʻi’s planters overcome the leafhopper, it helped them consolidate their power in Hawaiʻi and become world leaders in sugar production.

Victims of their Own Success

Though the invasion of the leafhopper may have been unintentional, it was hardly an accident. Planters were victims of their own success. Planters’ policies of expanding and intensifying their operations had finally caught up with them. Monoculture planting is inherently vulnerable to pests because planting large areas of land in a single crop provides an overabundance of food and habitat for the pests and simultaneously destroys

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the habitats of animals that may prey upon or compete with the pests. The number of acres devoted to cane planting had been increasing rapidly through the late nineteenth century. Information on cane acreage is incomplete, but the statistics available demonstrate a trend of remarkable growth: sugarcane covered 12,225 acres in 1874, two years before the enactment of the reciprocity treaty with the United States; in 1879 that number had increased to 22,455; then 39,350 acres in 1882; 60,787 in 1889; 125,000 acres in 1898--more than ten times the acreage of twenty-five years earlier.7 By 1899, the federal census reported that 75.6 percent of all Hawaiian land under cultivation was planted in cane.8

Such rapid expansion of sugarcane across Hawaiian lands was largely the result of new irrigation projects. Between 1890 and 1900, investment in irrigation jumped from two million to over ten million dollars.9 Planters not only had workers dig new tunnels and ditches to harness the waters of the islands’ streams, but also excavated new artesian wells, which added hundreds of millions of gallons of water per day to the available water supply.10 Tapping into vast basal aquifers, planters were able to turn some of the

7 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 359-60.

8 Perry Elliott, Production of Sugar in the United States and Foreign Countries U.S. Department of Agriculture Bulletin No. 473 (Washington, D.C., 1917), 16.

9 Another indication of the increase in the importance of irrigation is that in 1870 it made up seven percent of total capital in the Hawaiian sugar industry; by 1900 it accounted for twenty-six percent. J. A. Mollett, Capital in Hawaiian Sugar: Its Formation and Relation to Labor and Output, 1870-1957 Agricultural Economics Bulletin 21 (Honolulu: Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station College of Tropical Agriculture, 1961), 23.

10 Dorance and Morgan, Sugar Islands, 181. For more on artesian wells in Hawaiʻi, see Kessler, Planter’s Paradise, Ch. 4. See also, Carol Wilcox, Sugar Water: Hawaii’s Plantation Ditches (Honolulu, University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1998).

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sunniest and driest lands to cane cultivation.11 With few cloudy days and little concern over receiving too much rain at the wrong time, plantations using well irrigation were able to systematize field operations and produce fantastic sugar yields beyond the reach of most other plantations. By 1903, Forestry & Irrigation, the magazine of the American

Forestry Association, wrote that Hawaiʻi’s irrigation works made up “probably the most expensive system in existence, but the cost is justified by the increased productivity.”12

Moreover, unlike Hawaiʻi’s relatively few streams, which had a long history of riparian law governing their usage, the capacity of basal aquifers appeared to be close to limitless and had few agricultural claims upon it other than large planters with the resources to sink and operate wells. As late as 1906, Michael O’Shaughnessy, an Irish civil engineer who in 1889 began working on irrigation projects for Hawaiian sugarcane planters, wrote that the “artesian supply of the Island of Oahu is the most peculiar most generous found in any country of such a limited area.”13

By the late nineteenth century, with annexation promising to bring government stability and remove the American tariff, investment in irrigation and the expansion of the plantation system was poised to increase even more dramatically than before. In 1897, with a wink to annexationist arguments, one booster wrote that “the development of

[sugarcane planting on] Oahu has only just begun. There are thousands of acres yet lying

11 On solar radiation on Hawaiʻi’s cane plantations, see, Jen-Hu Chang, “The Role of Climatology in the Hawaiian Sugar-Cane Industry: An Example of Applied Agricultural Climatology in the Tropics,” Pacific Science XVII (October 1963): 379-397.

12 Bristow Adams, “Sugar Irrigation in Hawaii,” Forestry & Irrigation 9 (March 1903), 122.

13 M. M. O’Shaughnessy, “Irrigation Works in the Hawaiian Islands,” Journal of Electricity, Power and Gas 17, no. 21 (November 24, 1906), 439-43.

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idle, which energy and engineering skill will develop in the next few years, if political conditions are only favorable.”14 Workers spoke of landscapes wholly dominated by cane, where one “couldn’t see anything but cane and some mountains.”15 Any animal such as the leafhopper that found shelter and sustenance in cane fields had ample space to thrive.

Even with irrigation leading to the expansion of monoculture cane fields, Hawaiʻi might have remained free of the leafhopper. The expanse of the Pacific Ocean prevented insects such as the leafhopper from migrating to the archipelago on their own. As

Hawaiʻi’s superintendent of entomology wrote, “It would be utterly impossible for such pests to enter this Territory by natural distribution of their own migration.”16 Rather, the leafhopper came to Hawaiʻi as part of the new portmanteau biota of the industrial sugarcane plantation system: the species that circulated through the sugar-producing world along with varieties of cane. Though sugarcane had been growing in Hawaiʻi since the arrival of first Polynesian settlers, cane planters sought varieties that would be better suited to plantation agriculture and would help them achieve higher yields of sucrose. By the late nineteenth century, after decades of heavy cultivation, cane varieties that had been in widespread use began to fail. This led to a new search for more amenable cane varieties. In the early 1880s, planters began importing and distributing cane varieties

14 A. T. Atkinson, “Advancement of Oahu,” Paradise of the Pacific 10 (March 1897), 38.

15 Tsuru Yamauchi, n.d., oral history interview, published in Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, Uchinanchu, 488; quoted in Gary Y. Okihiro, Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, 1865- 1945 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), 31. Also in Ronald T. Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 89.

16 Territory of Hawaii Board of Agriculture and Forestry, Report of the Division of Entomology for the Year Ending December 31, 1905 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co, Ltd., 1906), 99.

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from throughout the Pacific, increasing the likelihood of importing pests.17 In 1901 alone,

Albert Koebele, the celebrated HSPA entomologist who was responsible for implementing biological control practices in Hawaiʻi, along with three other men associated with the HSPA, imported thirty foreign varieties of sugarcane.18 As with previous innovations, the drive to advance cane cultivation with foreign varieties was tied to a desire to reduce the need for plantation labor. The foreign cane variety Yellow

Caledonia, for example, became popular in wetter cane districts because the cane shed its leaves on its own, thus eliminating the labor-intensive task of stripping cane leaves.19

This led to the importation of foreign sugarcane pests along with the plants. Planters thus created near perfect conditions to bring the leafhopper to Hawaiʻi and allow it cause as much damage as possible once it arrived, which is indeed what happened in the first years of the twentieth century.

Planters cannot take all the blame for the rise of the leafhopper, however, as environmental conditions in Hawaiʻi also contributed to the leafhopper’s success. The leafhopper was known in other places, but was not a particularly harmful pest.20 The same isolation that made it impossible for many insects to migrate to Hawaiʻi led to the development of an ecosystem with no natural enemies to insects such as the leafhopper.

Moreover, sugarcane has an unusually long growing season in Hawaiʻi, which makes the

17 “Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Planters’ Labor and Supply Company,” Planters’ Monthly 2, no. 8 (November 1883), 180.

18 Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 20, no. 12 (December 1901): 535.

19 C. F. Eckart, “Varieties of Cane,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 23, no.5 (May 1904), 180.

20 Vandercook, King Cane, 49.

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archipelago even more hospitable to pests. While in most places the advent of annual rainy or cold seasons forces planters to harvest their cane one year after planting and leave an interval between harvesting and the next planting when no cane is available to feed and shelter leafhoppers, there is no such seasonal constraint in Hawaiʻi. Hawaiian planters could thus leave their cane in the ground until it has achieved a higher level of sucrose, usually about eighteen to twenty-four months.21 This extra cultivation time gave pests extra time to disperse and breed. With large landholdings, Hawaiian planters often harvested only half of their crop in a given year, or even less. In 1898, out of 125,000 acres planted, planters harvested only 55,235 acres; in 1909, with 201,641 acres planted,

106,127 were harvested.22 This practice ensured a continual habitat and food for crop pests.

“Burying the Hatchet”

The leafhopper galvanized the sugar industry and increased planters’ cooperation both in business and in research and development of scientific agriculture and sugar production. Jared G. Smith, who came to Hawaiʻi as an employee of the USDA’s

Hawaiian Agricultural Experiment Station, saw the incursion of the leafhopper as a turning point in the history of the relations between different sugar agencies. “Brought together by the threat of utter destruction of the industry,” Smith wrote, “the warring

21 Another reason planters adopted a longer growing season was that doing so allowed them to spread planting and harvesting work throughout the year, thus improving labor efficiency and control over workers. A. J. Mangelsdorf, “Sugar-Cane: As Seen from Hawaii,” Economic Botany 4, no. 2 (1950): 165.

22 Delos Lewis Van Dine, The Sugar-cane Insects of Hawaii, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Entomology Bulletin No. 93 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 11; Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 359.

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agencies buried the hatchet and mobilized in a common cause.”23 Though it was likely an exaggeration to call the agencies—Honolulu-based firms that handled plantations’ business affairs—“warring,” the threat of the leafhopper did inaugurate an era of increased cooperation. The sugar agencies became increasingly integrated, often having members sit on each other’s boards and holding stock in each other’s plantations, creating business relationships among plantations and their agencies that were much more cooperative than competitive. Already struggling to protect their position in the mainland sugar market, which was dominated by a few sugar refiners, in 1904 thirty-three plantations representing eighty percent of Hawaiʻi’s raw sugar established a cooperative to refine their own sugar in California.24

Smith’s observation was apt. Cooperation, consolidation, and integration among

Hawaiʻi’s sugar agencies all increased in the decade after the leafhopper’s arrival. The

1911 U.S. Commission of Labor report on conditions in Hawaiʻi noted, “The past five years have witnessed increasing centralization of this (the sugar) industry; large plantations have been combined into still larger plantations; sugar-factor firms, which represent the center of financial control, are fewer but stronger than in 1905; local transportation, both by land and by water, is more centralized and in more direct relations with the sugar-producing interests; and steamship lines to the mainland are more closely allied than ever with sugar factors and planters.”25 From the several sugar factor firms

23 Smith, The Big Five.

24 Emmet, The California and Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corporation; Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, Sugar in Hawaii, 68.

25 Ray Stannard Baker, “Wonderful Hawaiʻi: A World Experiment Station; I. How King Sugar Rules in Hawaiʻi,” American Magazine, November 1911, 28. 238

that existed in previous decades, five emerged to control most of the industry by the first decade of the twentieth century. All five of these were associated with haole families that had resided in Hawaiʻi for generations. Of these, two were controlled by missionary families, and merchants originally from New England, Britain, and Germany established the other three. Rather than curtail operations in the face of leafhopper infestations, these agencies and their allied planters increased their reliance on sugarcane. They sought to make up for shortfalls in sugar production by turning more lands to cane cultivation.

Though 1904 output was much lower than that of 1903, it still exceeded that of all previous years. Planters continued to invest in more ambitious irrigation projects, such as the Kohala Ditch on the Big Island. Constructed in 1905 and 1906, at the height of concern over the leafhopper, the Kohala Ditch included nine miles of tunnels and fourteen of open waterways, and fed water to five different plantations. In 1907, to ship their sugar to the mainland, sugar interests invested in the Matson Navigation

Company.26

Stopping the Leafhopper

One of the clearest ways planters and agents united was in their support for agricultural science. The HSPA had already prioritized scientific research in the 1890s with its investment in biological control. As with the infestations of the cane borer in the

1870s, identification of the leafhopper was at first a challenge, but by this time networks of communication and knowledge, as well as scientific expertise in Hawaiʻi, had

26 California and Hawaiian Sugar Company, These Islands of Hawaii: A Story of Earth’s Fire, Sun’s Energy, and Man’s Ingenuity (California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., 194-), 633.61 H31th, HHS.

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improved. The British entomologist R.C.L. Perkins used his connections to British entomological researchers as well as the global scientific community to discover the insect’s origin. “After much correspondence with other countries,” Perkins followed several leads, and obtained via Germany specimens of Javanese insects, only to discover the Hawaiian leafhopper was a different species. Six months after Perkins began searching for the pest’s origin, he found that it was identical to an Australian leafhopper, and that the Australian leafhopper had probably arrived in Hawaiʻi in a shipment of

Australian seed cane.27 In 1905, with the leafhopper threatening ruin, the HSPA founded its Entomological Division, which dispatched Koebele and Perkins to Australia to study the leafhopper and its natural enemies, and continued for years to keep an entomologist traveling abroad in search of beneficial insects.28

The HSPA’s entomological research put it at the cutting edge of an agricultural problem that was becoming increasingly pressing throughout the world. An article in the

July 1904 Planters’ Monthly noted that estimates suggested insects destroyed ten percent of all farm products in the United States. Hawaiian planters, the article argued, were not willing to accept those losses. According to the article, the successful Hawaiian cane planter “has become a pretty expert economic entomologist.”29 By contrast, insect control in other sugar lands had changed little over the course of the nineteenth century. In the

27 R. C. L. Perkins, The Leaf-Hopper of the Sugar Cane Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry, Division of Entomology, Bulletin no. 1 (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1903), 7.

28 Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association Experiment Station, The Relation of Applied Science to Sugar Production in Hawaii (Honolulu, 1915).

29 John Isaac, “Insects Beneficial to Man,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 23, no. 7 (July 1904), 303.

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West Indies, where labor was cheaper and work cycles followed more pronounced seasonal fluctuations between high and low demand for labor, planters still had workers collect eggs of the moth borer pest.30

The search for leafhopper control agents progressed fitfully. Koebele, who had gone to the mainland U.S. to recuperate from an illness, followed some leads on leafhopper parasites to Ohio, but nothing he found there performed well in Hawaiʻi. He and Perkins, and other entomologists then went to great lengths to identify and obtain many enemies of the leafhopper in Australia, Fiji, and China, but delivering them to

Hawaiʻi alive and healthy, and then establishing populations of the insects in Hawaiʻi proved to be a challenge.31 Once the HSPA had established populations of control agents, the association distributed colonies to the plantations. In 1905 conditions began to improve, yet there was no guarantee that control agents would be effective on all

Hawaiian plantation conditions. Beginning in early 1905, Ewa Plantation, one of the plantations most vulnerable to the leafhopper, introduced several different biological control agents to its fields, but the leafhopper persisted. From 1903 to 1906, Ewa’s sugar output fell from 33,213.9 tons to 29,478.8 tons, until production finally rebounded in

1907. The work necessary to introduce biological control agents was immense. Ewa’s plantation manager placed in the fields 1,241 colonies of a variety of different control agent species, or about one colony for every three acres of cane, and replenished the control agents within each colony every three weeks.32 By May of 1908, Ewa was

30 “Treatment of Insect Pests,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 22, no. 6 (June 1903), 266.

31 Pemberton, “Highlights in the History of Entomology in Hawaii 1778-1963,” 707-708.

32 Ewa Plantation, Annual Report, 1905; 1906; 1907, HL. 241

managing leafhopper infestations well enough that the plantation began boring new wells to increase cane acreage.33

Cane Breeding

Planters’ cooperation and investment in scientific agriculture spread well beyond biological control. Plantations implemented greater differentiation between field and mill operations, employing agricultural chemists and engineers to superintend mills and compliment plantation managers’ expertise in the field.34 Already by 1900, the U. S.

Census Bureau’s bulletin on agriculture in Hawaiʻi found a sophisticated industry, noting that Hawaiʻi was third to Cuba and Java in sugar production, and that it surpassed even those two in average yield per acre. The reason for this, the bulletin observed, was that

“methods employed in cane cultivation are more advanced in Hawaii than in any other of the world’s sugar-producing centers.”35 Scientific development continued with the organization of new groups of specialists such as the Hawaiian Sugar Chemists’

Association, which held its first meeting in 1902, and became even more pronounced after the leafhopper began damaging crop yields. After some debate over the utility and purpose of the HSPA experiment station, planters also expanded operations with substations throughout the islands so that the HSPA could run experiments in a variety of

33 “A Castle and Cooke History,” unpublished MS (1950?), 83, HMCS.

34 Ph. N., “On the Superintendence of Sugar Factories,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 10 (October 1905), 430-32.

35 “The Agricultural Development of Hawaii,” Hawaiian Annual (1903), 58.

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diverse climates and environmental conditions.36 The HSPA also invested in cutting-edge research facilities, building a state of the art microscope installation at the Experiment

Station.37 Further uniting geographically dispersed and plantations and independent- minded planters, the HSPA enlisted its member plantations to coordinate field experiments under a uniform standard of scientific rigor so that planters might benefit from more broadly conducted research.38

As HSPA entomologists worked to neutralize the insects pests that had already established populations in Hawaiʻi, they also set out to insure that no new insect invasions would occur. Planters recognized that the threat of foreign insects demanded a collective response, and the organizational and political power of the HSPA enabled such action. The HSPA lobbied for the revision of Hawaiʻi’s plant quarantine laws, which had first been enacted in 1890 but did not establish any mechanism for inspection. In 1902,

Perkins became a consultant for the Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry and began inspections for all plant imports to the islands. In the following years, with the leafhopper presenting an increasingly urgent threat, the territorial government built a quarantine and disinfection complex for imported plants, and the HSPA began having entomologists inspect the islands’ plantations for signs of infestation. In 1904, the HSPA successfully lobbied the territorial government to impose an embargo on foreign varieties of

36 “The Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Experiment Station,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 10 (October 1905), 432-39.

37 “Reports of Committee on Experiment Station,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 11 (November 1905), 521-571.

38 C. F. Eckart, “Field Experiments with Sugar Cane,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 4 (April 1905).

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sugarcane, and by 1905 the HSPA Experiment Station had erected a “special insect-proof cane propagation house” as a further precaution against stowaway pests on imported seedling canes.39

With tight regulations on the importation of foreign plants and animals, the HSPA not only prevented the invasion of new pests, but also prevented the introduction of several diseases that afflicted sugarcane in other regions, such as sereh, gumming disease, and Fiji disease.40 The greatest benefit for the sugar industry to come out of the stricter quarantine, however, was in the development of a sophisticated sugarcane breeding program. Cane breeding was a recent innovation—it was not until 1889 that sugarcane specialists in Barbados and Java independently discovered that they could propagate new varieties of cane.41 While Hawaiʻi’s planters took notice of cane breeding in the 1890s, the arrival of the leafhopper gave planters new motivation to pursue the development of new cane varieties.42 As the HSPA entomologists struggled to find and send to Hawaiʻi

39 “Report on Precautions to be Observed with Regard to Cane Importations,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 21 no. 6 (June 1902), 265-272. Pemberton, “Highlights in the History of Entomology in Hawaii 1778-1963,” 723-724; Osgood and Wiemer, “Plant Introduction Needs of the Hawaiian Sugar Industry,” in Alien Plant Invasions in Native Ecosystems of Hawaiʻi: Management and Research, ed. Charles P. Stone, Clifford W. Smith, and J. Timothy Tunison, (Honolulu: Cooperative National Park Resources Studies Unit, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, 1992), 727; D. J. Heinz, “Sugarcane,” in Crop Improvement in Hawaii: Past, Present, and Future, James L. Brewbaker, ed., Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station College of Tropical Agriculture and Human Resources Miscellaneous Publication 180 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1982); “Reports of the Committee on Experiment Station,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 24, no. 11 (November 1905), 536.

40 Mangelsdorf, “Sugar-Cane: As Seen from Hawaii,” 169.

41 For an overview of the development of sugarcane breeding, with attention to Barbados, see J. H. Galloway, “Botany in the Service of Empire: The Barbados Cane-Breeding Program and the Revival of the Caribbean Sugar Industry, 1880s-1930s,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86, no. 4 (December 1996): 682-706.

42 “How Sugar-Canes are Raised from Seed,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 22, no. 9 (September 1903), 400; “Disease Resisting Canes,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 23, no. 6 (June 1904), 216.

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natural enemies of the leafhopper, the USDA experiment station released a bulletin arguing that prevention was a more effective tool than direct combat, and that the best means of prevention was the cultivation of sugarcane varieties more resistant to the leafhopper. In mid-1904 a variety of cane that was somewhat less vulnerable to the leafhopper came to the HSPA’s attention, that their experiment station began its own cane breeding program; by the following year, they had established eight nurseries for the propagation of new canes.43

With the embargo on foreign cane varieties in place, the HSPA increased research into its sugarcane breeding program. The HSPA, with its strong interest in scientific cane cultivation, closely followed the development of foreign cane breeding programs and the creation of new cane varieties.44 This led to the development of hardier, sweeter cane varieties, most notably the variety H-109. The HSPA Agricultural Experiment Station developed H-109 in 1909, and distributed seedlings to several plantations. In 1914, after a few years of cultivating enough H-109 cane for seed, Ewa Plantation risked its future by ripping up the naturally occurring variety known as Lahaina cane in its fields and replacing it with the new variety. The gamble paid off. H-109 was more resistant to pests and diseases, grew more cane per acre, and produced more sugar per ton of cane than

Lahaina or any other previously used variety. By 1920 Ewa raised H-109 almost

43 “A Promising Cane,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 23, no. 7 (July 1904), 259-261; A. R. Grammer, “A History of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, 1895-1945,” Hawaiian Planters’ Record 51, no. 3 (1947), 197.

44 See, for example, “Improving Sugar Canes,” and “Cane Experiments,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 22, no. 2 (February 1903), 62-64; 76-78.

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exclusively, and soon other plantations followed suit, making H-109 the most popular cane variety in the islands.45

Only Sugar

Motivated to action by the leafhopper, cane planters became more singularly focused on their own interests and less supportive of broad agricultural research. The

HSPA no longer promoted diversified agriculture, as it did in the 1890s with its assistance toward coffee and fruit growing.46 With the sugar industry unwilling to share its scientific resources, Hawaiʻi became host to three separate groups of agricultural entomologists: a territorial laboratory with three entomologists, a USDA Agricultural

Experiment Station with two, and the HSPA’s private experiment station, which employed six entomologists and had an annual budget of $28,000. Albert Koebele and

R.C.L. Perkins, still considered to be the top entomologists and leading experts in biological control, were no longer government employees, but worked at the HSPA station.47

The territorial government continued to try to bolster diversified agriculture without the support of the sugar industry, and connected such efforts directly to the project of Americanizing Hawaiʻi. In 1902, in connection with a push to found a

45 Fifty Years of Ewa Plantation Co., 18; Transcript, Otto Koch Oral History Interview, October 11, 1971, by Lynda Mair, 4, Watumull Foundation Oral History Project; Noel Deerr, History of Sugar.

46 Kessler, Planter’s Paradise, Ch. 5.

47 F. Silvestri, “A Survey of the Actual State of Agricultural Entomology in the United States of North America,” Extracts from “Reprint from the Bulletin of the Society of Italian Agriculturists,” 14, no. 8 (April 30, 1909) trans., J. Rosenstein, The Hawaiian and Agriculturist 6, no. 8 (August 1909), 287.

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Hawaiian branch of the Farmers’ Institute, Jared G. Smith of the USDA Hawaiian

Agricultural Experiment Station told a group of farmers, “If you are successful other men, other Americans, will want to come here and found homes.”48 In 1905, the legislature passed two acts establishing the College of Agricultural and Mechanic Arts, which later became the University of Hawaiʻi.49 Some new agricultural pursuits, especially , met with success; others, such as tobacco and rubber, failed to gain much traction.50 But the HSPA no longer took a leading role as it once did.

Those who witnessed the sugar industry’s success sought similar benefits for other agricultural enterprises. By 1908, Hawaiʻi’s Territorial Governor Walter Frear noted that science was the key to producing profitable crops in Hawaiʻi. He told a conference of U. S. governors, “in spite of various adverse natural conditions,

[sugarcane] has been brought by the application of science to the highest point of efficiency yet attained anywhere.”51 According to Frear, the success of the sugar industry rested with the HSPA Experiment Station, which, with an annual budget of seventy thousand dollars, was “perhaps the finest private experiment station in the world.” Frear urged the Hawaiian legislature to emulate the HSPA by lending greater support to

48 “Need More Farmers,” Hawaiian Star April 14, 1902.

49 Willis T. Pope, “The College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts of Hawaii,” Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 5, no. 1 (January 1908), 1.

50 Several factors contributed to the rise of the Hawaiian pineapple industry, including canning technology and the removal of American import duties following annexation; Ethel M. Damon, Sanford Ballard Dole and His Hawaii, 347. On rubber, see “Hawaiian Rubber Growers’ Annual Meeting,” “Hawaiian Rubber Growers’ Association: Address by the President,” and Ralph S. Hosmer, “The Harvesting of Rubber in Hawaii: An Outline of a Cooperative Experiment,” Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 5, no. 12 (December 1908), 307-317.

51 Hon. Walter F. Frear, “Hawaii: A Statement Prepared for Presentation at the Conference of the Governors,” Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 5, no.12 (December 1908), 330-31.

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scientific research for small farmers. Frear told the Legislature, “We want to enable [the small farmer] to profit by scientific investigation and instruction just as much as the sugar planters are profiting through their experiment station and through lines of scientific work.”52 Territorial Senator William O. Smith was even more emphatic: “Our salvation is to have other things than sugar…There is no use in bringing small farmers here unless there is something that they can produce at a profit; unless there is something that a man with a few acres of land and small means can make a living on.”53 The Farmer’s Institute attempted to promote scientific agriculture through annual meetings and fairs, but the

Institute remained loosely organized. At the 1908 fair, Queen Liliʻuokalani took second prize for navel oranges, almost exactly fifteen years after she had been deposed.54 Little, however, came of the Farmer’s Institute and other efforts to diversify Hawaiian agriculture.

Cane planters’ success at biological control and plant breeding was not only a result of funding that others did not have access to. Planters’ control over the natural environment, and their objective of using that control to maximize sugar production created an environment that was less hospitable to other agricultural pursuits. The

HSPA’s success in agricultural science did not lie only in monopolizing private capital and expertise, but also in developing an environment that was particularly attuned to their

52 Conservation of Hawaii’s Natural Resources Before the Legislature, 1909: Addresses by the Governor and his Conferees who Attended the Governors’ Conference with the President in Washington, D. C., in May, 1908, and by Others (Honolulu: Hawaiian Gazette Co., Ltd., 1909), 8.

53 Ibid., 21. William O. Smith was a lawyer by trade, and was also involved in the sugar industry. He was also Secretary of the HSPA in 1908. Though Smith apparently sought to diversify Hawaiian agriculture, the HSPA still did little as an institution to encourage the production of other crops.

54 “Agricultural Exhibition,” Hawaiian Forester and Agriculturist 5, no. 1 (January 1908), 14.

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needs. Cane planters could not have imported some of the biological control agents they needed if they had to worry about other crop planters’ interests. In 1908, Walter Froggatt, the government entomologist of New South Wales, remarked that some of the insects that the HSPA used to control the leafhopper were injurious to tea, olive, and other agricultural plants.55 In 1916, Leland O. Howard, head of the USDA Bureau of

Entomology, noted that Hawaiian cane planters enjoyed “the most favorable conditions of cultivation, a small number of crops, a restricted and simple fauna, a highly intelligent body of men in control, with plenty of means, and an altogether admirable force of scientifically trained employees.”56 Few crops and a “restricted and simple fauna” meant that fewer pests could harm enter Hawaiʻi to damage sugarcane and that fewer animals could prevent biological control agents from establishing populations to control the cane pests that were present. Hawaiʻi could not be the cane planters’ paradise and also allow for the complex ecosystem created by a wide variety of crop plants.

Planter Paternalism

Just as the sugar industry curtailed the development of other forms of agriculture, large planters also limited the ability of people of small means to join their ranks. With heavy investments required for advanced mills and irrigation works, soil analysis and fertilizers, and pest control research, only those with large amounts of capital could profit from sugar. After visiting Hawaiʻi, Abraham L. Brick, Congressman from Indiana, noted,

55 “Injurious Insects in Hawaii,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 28, no. 1 (January 1909), 4-5.

56 L. O. Howard, “On the Hawaiian Work in Introducing Beneficial Insects,” Journal of Economic Entomology 9 (February 1916): 179.

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“Today there are practically one crop land—sugar—the crop of the magnate; protection has made Hawaii wealthy, but the wealth is in the hands of the few, for sugar is the millionaires [sic] crop; the small farmer can not grow it successfully.”57 Jack London, who—at the behest of boosters among Hawaiʻi’s haole elite—wrote extensively about his visits to Hawaiʻi, expressed views similar to Congressman Brick’s, “Hawaii is a paradise—and I can never cease proclaiming it; but I must append one word of qualification: Hawaii is a paradise for the well-to-do… The one great industry of the islands is sugar. The unskilled labor for the plantations is already here… For the person without capital, dreaming to start on a shoe-string and become a capitalist, Hawaii is the last place in the world. The shoe-string days are past. The land and industries of Hawaii are owned by old families and large corporations.”58

The concentration of capital, land, labor, material, and expertise necessary to make sugar in the hands of a few was notable even to London, and while this helped the sugar industry protect its interests, it also denied others access to similar opportunities.

London wrote, “Hawaii is patriarchal, rather than democratic. Economically, it is owned and operated in a fashion that is a combination of twentieth century, machine-civilization methods and of medieval feudal methods.”59 London’s wife, Charmian, who also wrote

57 Congressman A. L. Brick, “The Americanization of Hawaii,” Mid-Pacific Magazine, January 1911, 82.

58 Jack London, “My Hawaiian Aloha,” Cosmopolitan 61, no. 6, (November 1916), 172.

59 Ibid.

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much about her time in Hawaiʻi, put her view a bit more bluntly: “Hawaii is feudal, but the masters are benevolent.”60

Observers such as the seemed to consider the planters’ control over natural resources and their high degree of technological and scientific sophistication to demand a feudal social structure. According to Jack London, “The Sugar Planters’

Association and the several sugar factors or financial agencies control sugar, and since sugar is king, control the destiny and welfare of the Islands. And they are able to do this, under the peculiar conditions that obtain, far more efficiently than it could be done by the population of Hawaii were it a democratic commonwealth, which it essentially is not.”61

Even the journalist Ray Stannard Baker, who wrote a series of articles decrying Hawaiian planters’ control over their workers and small farmers, could not help but be impressed by the mode of agriculture that planter power allowed:

I think no one can visit the islands without being impressed with the remarkable intelligence and the high efficiency with which the sugar industry is directed. It has been in a high degree farming with brains. The planters have adapted themselves with wonderful flexibility and ingenuity to all manner of difficult conditions. Marvelous irrigation systems, ditches, and flumes from mountain streams and great pumping plants have been developed. Conditions of soil and rainfall have been studied and the last perfection of modern farm machinery and modern methods of fertilizing have been introduced. I have seen great fields being plowed nearly three feet deep with huge steam plows--and the stories of the use of fertilizers are almost unbelievable to a person accustomed to ordinary farming methods of the middle West.

60 Charmian London journal, Honolulu, Tuesday, August 6, 1907 in Charmian Kittredge London, Jack London and Hawaii, 171.

61 Jack London, “My Hawaiian Aloha,” 172.

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Nor is this all. The Planters’ Association maintains an extensive private experiment station in Honolulu, where a group of scientists is constantly at work experimenting in the production of better grades of cane and in seeking better methods of planting and harvesting the crops… In a hundred other ways the planters have shown remarkable constructive and organizing ability. They have begun a campaign to protect the forests and to plant more trees, they have developed private docks and private railroads, and they are seeking out or developing the very best methods for extracting the sugar in their great mills.62

If cane plantations were to function with the precision of factories, then they could tolerate no dissent or disorganization, nor could they make room for small planters.

Of course, those who sought to grow sugarcane on a small scale disagreed with this assessment, and instead saw a small group of capitalists taking advantage of their position to limit competition. Though several large plantations dominated the sugar industry, many small farmers still grew cane. In 1909, 1,028 farms reported cultivating sugarcane, though that may be because so few other crops were marketable.63 The East

Hawaii Cane Planters’ Association, a collective of smallholders who attempted to cultivate cane, complained that large planters guarded access to the work of the HSPA and thus forced would-be planters to grow cane at an uncompetitive disadvantage. In a

1915 circular titled, “The Real Issue in Hawaii,” the East Hawaii Cane Planters’

Association complained,

The plantations are farmed with all the skill that money can buy. Competent, high-priced managers, chemists, engineer and field overseers, direct all the operations. Frequent conference of these officials are held to discuss ways and means of increasing production, and decreasing cost. The

62 Baker, “Wonderful Hawaii: A World Experiment Station,” 30-31.

63 Elliott, Production of Sugar in the United States and Foreign Countries U.S., 16.

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Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Experiment Station, supported by the plantations, is probably the most advanced of any experiment station in the world in studying the science of sugar… On the other hand, the small grower is a man of little or no capital, without business training, with inadequate equipment, and no one to aid in the improvement of his condition. While the United States Department of Agriculture and the Territorial Government support not only an experiment station, but a College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, the chief energy of these institutions is directed toward the assistance of ‘industries not heretofore greatly developed in the Territory.’ The services of the experts and the publication of the Sugar Planters’ Station are not available to the small grower of cane. Through some complicated manipulation of affairs, Hawaii is the only country under the American flag which has no government bureau working to advance the interests of the small producer of the staple crop of the country. In view, therefore, of these conditions of poverty, lack of equipment and training, and lack of government assistance, it is no wonder that the small producer of sugar cane in the islands is unable to assert himself where his interests conflict with the wealthy and skillful corporate interests to which he must sell his produce.64

Small farmers continued to cultivate sugar cane, but they did so at the margins of the industry, with little opportunity to succeed.

Controlling the Environment

Cane planters came to exert influence over all biological introductions to Hawaiʻi, and thus over the very composition of Hawaiʻi’s ecosystems. While territorial restrictions on importation of plants and animals appeared to be uniform, the HSPA worked with the territorial Board of Agriculture and Forestry, which was in charge of wildlife laws, to create exemptions for the importation of animals that HSPA scientists considered

64 East Hawaii Cane Planters’ Association, The Real Issue in Hawaii, Circular No. 2 (Hilo, February 1915), 633.61 Ea7 P, HMCS.

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beneficial to the sugar industry.65 By 1921, the Board of Agriculture and Forestry sought out the endorsement of the HSPA before allowing foreign birds to be imported. This extended even to birds that would be beneficial to other industries, such as the Australian

Shepherd’s Companion (Rhipidura tricolor), a bird favored by ranchers for its ability to control cattle pests.66 The HSPA thus demonstrated clear dominance over other industries in managing Hawaiʻi’s ecosystems.

The HSPA developed a preservationist policy, hoping not to disturb the ecosystem it had achieved. In 1926, Fred Muir, entomologist of the HSPA Experiment

Station, expressed his position regarding a two-year debate over the introduction of a single bird species, the Peking Nightingale, “The sugar industry has suffered enormous losses in the past through introduced insects, and these have been overcome by the introduction of parasites and predators...The addition of every animal to our fauna adds to the complexity of our biological conditions and thereby possibly adds to the increase of difficulties in biological control. I therefore would take no risks.”67 Though Muir raised the only objection to the bird’s introduction in opposition to several members of the

Hawaiian Fish and Game Commission and Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and

65 F. Muir to C. S. Judd, Honolulu, May 25, 1915; C. S. Judd to Mr. Agee, Honolulu, July 20, 1915; Fred Muir to The Direct, Experiment Station, H.S.P.A. [H.P. Agee], Honolulu, November 10, 1921, Territory of Hawaiʻi, Board of Agriculture and Forestry, 1903-1959, Executive Officer, Box No. COM2- 14, File: Birds--Importation of, 1915-1927, HSA.

66 H.P. Agee to J.N.S. Williams, Chairman, Experiment Station Committee, H.S.P.A., Honolulu, November 21, 1921, Executive Officer, Box No. COM2-14, File: Birds--Importation of, 1915-1927, HSA.

67 F. Muir to The Director, Experiment Station, H.S.P.A. [H.P. Agee], Honolulu, May 20, 1926, Executive Officer, Box No. COM2-14, File: Birds--Importation of, 1915-1927, HSA.

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Forestry, the Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry ultimately sided with

Muir until the HSPA eventually lifted its objections.68

From Periphery to Core

Hawaiʻi became a hub for research and sugar production that influenced other plantation systems throughout the world. The Honolulu Iron Works began manufacturing sugar mills for export to Puerto Rico, Mexico, Formosa, and the Philippines.69 In 1910,

American planters in Puerto Rico organized a planters’ association modeled after the

HSPA and conducted research on controlling infestations of the white grub, though they did not find the same success their Hawaiian counterparts did.70 Hawaiʻi also became an exporter of its locally bred cane varieties, along with other centers of sugarcane breeding such as Java and Australia. With Hawaiʻi’s scientists exporting their research, a local editor and author named Alexander Hume Ford launched the Pan-Pacific Union and Mid-

Pacific Magazine. The Union and its magazine were foremost vehicles for boostering, but they also served to foster cultural and scientific exchange between Pacific nations. The

Union brought together “leading Hawaiians, or Chinese, or Japanese, Korean, Filipinos, or Portuguese, with the leading white men who were behind the movement...all bent toward bringing about a working in unison for the mutual benefit of Pacific nations.”71

68 Edw. M. Ehrhorn to George I. Brown, Honolulu, February 11, 1926, Executive Officer, Box No. COM2-12, File: Birds--Importation of, 1926, HSA.

69 “Hawaii as a Point of International Manufacturing,” Hawaiian Planters’ Monthly 28, no. 5 (May 1909), 158-59.

70 McCook, States of Nature, 72.

71 London, Jack London and Hawaii, 298.

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Backed by planters and sugar interests, the Union promoted the exchange of ideas about science and culture in the Pacific World, with Hawaiʻi at its center. In addition to the expertise that Hawaiʻi exported, the islands also became a center for the dissemination of capital. Hawaiʻi’s planters and sugar factors began investing in plantations in the

Philippines, Formosa, and the West Indies, applying their capital to emerging plantation systems.72

The environmental impact of the Hawaiian sugar industry spread throughout the cane-growing world. Hawaiian sugar technologists and scientists were particularly effective at exporting new varieties of cane and biological control agents. The Hawaiian canes H-109, then H-32-8560, then H-37-1933 each successively held the record for tonnage of sugar per acre of cane.73 The most infamous example, of the Hawaiian sugar industry’s global impact, though, is the case of the Central American cane toad, Rhinella marina (formerly Bufo marinus). In 1932, the HSPA brought the cane toad from Puerto

Rico to Hawaiʻi, where it was a serviceable control agent of several agricultural and garden pests. The HSPA then helped to spread the cane toad throughout the Pacific, from

Taiwan in the north to Fiji and Australia in the south. In Australia, the cane toad became a particularly harmful invasive pest itself. Not only did the cane toad do little to control sugarcane pests, it also predated and out-competed native fauna, and still poses a threat to

Australian biodiversity.74

72 Mollett, Capital in Hawaiian Sugar, 61.

73 Deerr History of Sugar v. 1 p. 28.

74 Simon Easteal, “The History of Introductions of Bufo marinus (Amphibia : Anura); A Natural Experiment in Evolution,” Biological Journal of the Linnean Society 16 (1981): 93-113.

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Epilogue

Though the HSPA managed to reduce leafhopper infestations by about 1907, the insect continued to hamper plantations for several years. This did not keep the sugar industry from growing. By 1916 sugarcane covered 246,332 acres of Hawaiian land— over twenty times the acreage of forty-two years earlier.75 In 1917, about one quarter of

Hawaiʻi’s population was working directly in the sugar industry, with others working in supporting or related fields.76 It was not until 1923 that the HSPA was finally able to fully control the leafhopper, using a parasite from Australia and Fiji.77 After about two decades of fairly static plantation yields, in the mid-1920s Hawaiʻi’s output of tons of sugar per acre increased.78 In 1923, Ewa Plantation, so ravaged by the leafhopper in the first decade of the twentieth century, broke the world record for sugar production in a single field with 18.09 tons per acre. Two years later, Ewa broke the Hawaiian record for average production of an entire plantation, with 11.87 tons of sugar per acre.79 With highly specialized entomologists and other agricultural scientists, Hawaiʻi held some of the world’s most productive cane plantations.

The environment that Hawaiʻi’s planters had built could not last indefinitely. In the early morning of Monday, September 9, 2013, a leak in a shipping pipeline spilled

75 Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii, 359-60.

76 Elliott, Production of Sugar in the United States and Foreign Countries U.S., 16.

77 Fifty Years of Ewa Plantation Co. (Honolulu: Castle & Cooke, Ltd., 1940), 16; F. Muir, “The Sugar Cane Leafhopper and its Parasites in Hawaii,” Hawaiian Planters’ Record 25 (July 1921), 117.

78 Mollett, Capital in Hawaiian Sugar, 15.

79 A Castle and Cooke History, 84; 106.

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233,000 gallons of molasses into the water of Honolulu Harbor. The molasses was on its way to California, where it was to be sold as an additive to cattle feed. Unlike oil, which floats on the water’s surface and can be cleaned with dispersants and skimmers, there was nothing to be done. The molasses sank to the bottom of the harbor, where it suffocated over 26,000 fish and other marine animals. Gary Gill, the deputy director for the

Environmental Health Division of the Health Department, called it “the worst environmental damage to sea life that I have come across.” Gill went on, “this is a biggie, if not the biggest that we’ve had to confront in the state of Hawaiʻi.”80

This may have been one of the more extreme and unusual vestiges of the plantation system, but it was hardly the only reminder of the outsized impact that sugarcane planting continues to exert on Hawaiʻi’s environment. Descendants of people who came to the islands to work the sugarcane plantations make up a majority of

Hawaiʻi’s inhabitants. Animals such as the leafhopper and mongoose have established permanent populations on the islands. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, now called the Hawaiian Agricultural Research Center, is an active institution for research on biological pest control and crop breeding. The agribusiness conglomerate Monsanto now controls vast landholdings on the Hawaiian Islands, where it experiments on genetically modified corn, developing varieties that can withstand greater amounts of chemical pesticides.

80 Tannya Joaquin and Bun Gutierrez, “Underwater Video Uncovers Mass Kill from Matson Molasses Spill,” Hawaiʻi News Now, September 12, 2013. Accessed September 13, 2013: http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/23409767/underwater-video-uncovers-mass-kill-from-matson- molasses-spill. Tanya Joaquin, “25,000 Fish Killed in Matson Molasses Spill,” Hawaiʻi News Now, September 16, 2013. Accessed October 13, 2013: http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/23448407/25- thousand-fish-killed-in-matson-molasses-spill.

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Yet, though the sugarcane plantation system has irrevocably changed the

Hawaiian environment, other forms of agriculture have endured. Even at its apex of power and geographic expansion, sugarcane never erased Native Hawaiians from the land. Many Hawaiians perpetuated traditional communities based on subsistence farming, hunting, and foraging. Hawaiians farming taro in Keʻanae, an ahupuaʻa in the Hāna district of Maui, could trace their presence there to the first settlers of the area, long before contact with the west. A tour of Keʻanae in 1910 noted that “Keʻanae is a sugarless settlement… The natives live contentedly in their homesteads and are unusually well informed on matters of the world, for dwellers in such an out-of-the-world place.”81

Kīpahulu, also in Hāna, was less removed from sugarcane. A traveller in 1922 recorded that he saw Hawaiian homes and farms dotting the land near a cane plantation.82 Keʻanae and Kīpahulu were small enclaves of Hawaiian culture, with fewer than 300 Hawaiians living in either place, yet they remained bastions of a way of life and mode of land use that the plantation system could not entirely push out. In the 1931 census, some 4,222

Hawaiians were living in rural districts with populations over fifty per cent Hawaiian, such as Keʻanae and Kīpahulu.83

Alternatives to plantation agriculture appear poised to reclaim Hawaiian land from sugarcane. Food sovereignty and sustainable agriculture movements are growing in

Hawaiʻi. It is now easier to find a traditional taro pondfield than it is to find a field of

81 Daviana Pōmaikaʻi McGregor, Na Kuaʻāina: Living Hawaiian Culture (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2007), 112.

82 McGregor, Na Kuaʻāina,119.

83 McGregor, 11.

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sugarcane. On January 6, 2016, Alexander & Baldwin, the Big Five sugar agency started in the late nineteenth century by two missionary sons turned cane planters, announced that the Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company, the last remaining sugar company on the archipelago, would cease all sugar operations.84 Faced with a thirty-million-dollar loss for 2015 and forecasts for continued losses into the future, the company decided to transition its landholdings to diversified agriculture, cattle pasture, and alternative crops such as biofuels. The closing of HC&S relegates sugarcane planting to Hawaiʻi’s past. It remains to be seen what will become of the fields once planted in cane, or what industries will rise up in the shadows of Hawaiʻi’s defunct sugar mills.

84 “Alexander & Baldwin Announces Transition of Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company to a Diversified Farm Model,” http://hcsugar.com/2016/01/alexander-baldwin-announces-transition-hawaiian- commercial-sugar-company-diversified-farm-model/ accessed January 8, 2016.

260

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