ST/DPIST/DPI ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY (02(02 ) ) A16A16

YALE-UNYALE-UN ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY

AdnanAdnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh JeanJean Krasno,Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr MarchMarch 14.14.1998 1998 Amman,Almnan, JordaJordann • Yale-UN Oral History ProjecProjectt Adnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh • Jean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr March 14. 1998 • Amman, Jordan ,. Index: Middle East Arab League 4,6, 11,21,45,54,56 Arab Summits 1973/1974 45 Balfour Declaration -.'[:, 4,26-27,51 Fedayeen 5, 7-11,7-1 J, 13, 15-17,15- J7, 19 Jordan, Relationship witwithh 7-11,21-23 Military campaign againsagainstt 12, 15-17 Synthetic Groups (extremists(extremists)) 15-16,18-19 • UncontrollablUncontrollablee 16-17,2116-17, 21 Geneva Conference, October 1973 42 .. Great Arab Revolt 26 Gulf War 1991 54-59 III American Objectives, Opinion of 57-60 Arab World Split intointo Two Camps 54-55 Coincidence with Dissolution of Soviet Union 55,60 ~ Jordanian Position 55-60 Israel, Recognition by Arabs 25-29 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (and Aftennath) 48-51 ., Jerash Confrontation 17-18 Jordan Hybrid Identity 6-7 Military Cabinet 14-18, 19 Relationship with Palestinians/Fedayeen 3,7-12,15-17,19,22-25,44 • Underground Political Parties 12 Jordanian Civil War 2, 15-21 .. American Involvement 16, 17-21 Cairo Agreement (cease-fire) 16-18, 21 ., Israeli Involvement 20 Period leadingleading up toto war 4-17,24 Soviet Involvement 16,20 Syrian Assistance toto Fedayeen 16-17,20-22,27 Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement 51-56,60 I Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement Land for Peace (SCR 242) 8-10,25-27,29-30,35-36,41 • Madrid (Peace) Conference 24,49,55,57 .. Media, changes between 1967 & 1973 wars 27,37-40,41-44 1967 War (Israel(Israel Occupies West Bank) 7-8,22 Odeh, Background 1-4 Oil embargo 43 Oslo Agreements 5, 7, 49, 53-55 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)(PLO) 4,7,8-9,12, 19,44-46,49-50,53 Palestinians, Relationship with JordaniansJordanians after 1967 9-13,12,15-16,19 Sadat's 1977 Visit toto JerusalemJerusalem 42,45-47 Security Council Resolution 338 28,37

11 • Sykes-PicotSykes-Picot AgreementAgreement 4,28-29,544,28-29,54 ThreeThree PeoplesPeoples forfor TwoTwo CountriesCountries 3-7,503-7,50 • Trauma,Trauma, Arab/JewishArab/Jewish 30-3330-33 UnitedUnited NationsNations ; ExclusionExclusion ofof 49-5249-52 • InterferenceInterference 59-6259-62 LegitimacyLegitimacy FunctionFunction 51-52,51-52, 60-6460-64 , OpinionOpinion ofof 59-6459-64 VetoVeto Power,Power, PermanentPermanent Members'Members' 60-6260-62 UnitedUnited StatesStates .­ InterferenceInterference inin MiddleMiddle EasternEastern AffairsAffairs 56-6056-60 UN,UN, RelationshipRelationship withwith 60-6460-64 WaterWater IssueIssue 49-5149-51 III YomYom KippurKippur WarWar (October(October 1973)1973) 27,33-3627,33-36 AdministrativeAdministrative Disengagement;Disengagement; IsraelIsrael && JordanJordan 44-4544-45 JordanianJordanian InvolvementInvolvement 41-4241-42 MilitaryMilitary Disengagement;Disengagement; Israel,Israel, Egypt,Egypt, && SyriaSyria 43-4543-45 .­ PeriodPeriod leadingleading upup toto warwar 7,32-377,32-37 PsychologicalPsychological warfarewarfare 39-4539-45 SovietSoviet RoleRole 3737 IIIr USUS InvolvementInvolvement 37-4437-44 •i • • III

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I YALE~UYALE~UNN ORAL HISTORY AdnanAdnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh I JeanJean Krasno,Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr MarchMarch 14.14. 19919988 I Amman, JordaJordann I Jean Krasno: This isis an interviewinterview with Ambassador Abu-OdehAbu-Odeh inin hishis homehome inin Amman, Jordan onon MarchMarch 14, 1998. And II amam JeanJean Krasno. ForFor thethe record,record, wouldwould youyou

11 please explain somethingsomething about your background? WhereWhere youyou werewere born,born, andand educatededucated 11 and when you became involvedinvolved inin thethe political affairs of Jordan.Jordan.

11 Abu Odeh: Well, II was born inin Nablus 1933. Nablus,Nablus, Palestine.Palestine. II gotgot mymy schoolingschooling inin 11 Nablus under British mandate. II got mymy BABA inin ArtsArts atat DamascusDamascus University.University. II gotgot I involved intointo politics when II was aa student.student. II waswas anti~governmentanti~government..

III JK: Anti-government. III AO: InIn fact,fact, II joinedjoined thethe Communist partyparty inin thethe earlyearly fifties.fifties. AsAs aa youngyoung studentstudent andand

I before thethe British departure fromfrom Palestine, II hadhad developeddeveloped likelike manymany otherother studentsstudents anti-anti- 11 Jewish and anti-British sentiments.

11 JK: InIn Jordan,Jordan, inin thethe fifties.fifties. 11 AO: Yes. I leftleft thethe party inin 1958 after thethe IraqiIraqi bloodybloody coupcoup againstagainst thethe monarchymonarchy

III because I thoughtthought itit was terrible.terrible. ItIt was aa shakingshaking factor.factor. LaterLater onon inin 1966,1966, II joinedjoined thethe III 11 11 I 1

11 government,government, II becamebecame anan intelligenceintelligence officer.officer. II movedmoved quitequite toto thethe oppositeopposite side.side. II waswas 11 inin chargecharge ofof assessmentassessment andand releasesreleases inin thethe intelligenceintelligence department.department. II witnessedwitnessed thethe politicalpolitical developments,developments, especiallyespecially thethe eventsevents thatthat ledled thethe 19701970 showdown.showdown. II joinedjoined thethe

11 military cabinet cabinet thatthat was formedformed byby thethe KingKing inin 19701970 toto restorerestore lawlaw andand orderorder inin thethe

country.country. AndAnd sincesince then,then, II havehave beenbeen inin JordanianJordanian politicspolitics untiluntil II retiredretired inin latelate 1995.1995. MyMy ­ lastlast postpost waswas thethe JordanianJordanian representativerepresentative toto thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations andand II waswas therethere untiluntil II 11 retired.retired. 11 ­ JK:JK: So what years were you representativerepresentative toto thethe UnitedUnited Nations?Nations? 11 AO: 1992-1995. 11 JK:JK: Oh, very recently.recently. Before we turnedturned on thethe tape,tape, we were talkingtalking about thethe

11 showdown inin Jordan.Jordan. 11 AO: My post, do you want toto know aboutabout my postpost inin government?government? II assumedassumed soso manymany

11 posts. 11 11 JK: Describe your posts. 11 AO: II startedstarted as a minister of informationinformation inin thethe military cabinet inin 1970 andand continuedcontinued toto assume thisthis post for several timestimes over more thanthan tenten years. InIn JanuaryJanuary '84,'84, King

11 Hussein appointed me as his Minister of Court. ItIt was an advisory job,job, political advisor 11 2 11 I

I but, thatthat was thethe title.title. The titletitle was abolished at a laterlater stage and II became King I Hussein's political advisor. Twice within 25 years II assumed the post of chief of thethe Royal Court. The lastlast post II had before II was appointed as Jordan's permanent I representativerepresentative toto thethe UN was chief of thethe Royal Court thatthat isis second inin seniority toto thethe I Prime Minister. This post, inin fact,fact, representsrepresents thethe connection between thethe government and thethe King. So, during thisthis period II also had an interestinginteresting experience inin addition toto thethe I I 11 official posts. II became a fellowfellow at Harvard University forfor InternationalInternational Affairs inin '75­'75­ \ I 11 '76'76 and laterlater on, inin '95-'96,'95-'96, II became a fellowfellow at thethe United States InstituteInstitute forfor Peace. II I also got a fellowshipfellowship at thethe Woodrow Wilson InternationalInternational Center. I 11 1I J I 11 JK: Oh, inin Washington, thethe one inin Washington. ~ 11 AO: Yes. So, II am a fellowfellow at thosethose threethree places. So II have thesethese academic scholarly

11 connections with thesethese threethree places. That's part of my background. 11 JK: But you haven't been toto Yale. 11 11 AO: No, II haven't.

11 JK: We'll have toto inviteinvite you toto Yale. 11 11 AO: 111ankThank you. 11 3 11 JK: That would be great. Actually we should trytry toto do that.that.

JK: OK, perhaps because we have somewhat limitedlimited time,time, maybe we'll start, because

I would really likelike toto have your view of what you have termedtermed thethe "showdown" and which thethe internationalinternational media has called thethe civil war inin Jordan inin thethe 1970s, thethe events of thethe 1970s. Could you give some of thethe background leadingleading up toto thatthat period?

AO: The story about thisthis showdown started before 1970. I would say realistically inin

1965, after thethe establishment of thethe PLO inin 1964 by thethe Arab League. All of a sudden thethe government inin Jordan found itself inin opposition with thethe views, goals and policies of latelate

Amad Shukadry who was appointed inin 1964 as thethe Secretary General of thethe PLO,

Palestine Liberalization Organization. Well, I thinkthink I should go throughthrough so many details toto explain. The Jordanian-Palestinian10rdanian-Palestinian interactioninteraction was destined toto be politically activated as early as 1916 when thethe Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain during

World War I produced a map, a colonial map, for thisthis area before thethe fall of thethe Ottoman

Empire, and when Britain inin 1917 gave a pledge, toto thethe Zionist movement at thatthat timetime toto establish a Jewish 1ewish homeland inin Palestine, inin what was known as thethe Balfour Declaration.

The map and thethe Balfour Declaration combined, produced thethe most odd situation on earth, a situation thatthat made conflict inin thisthis part of thethe world inevitableinevitable and instabilityinstability inevitable.inevitable. Why? Simply, inin one sentence thethe Balfour Declaration and thethe Sykes-Picot

Agreement between France and Britain produced threethree peoples inin twotwo countries. We must educate people thatthat thisthis isis thethe origin of thethe tragictragic story: threethree peoples for twotwo countries. ItIt was a recipe for instability,instability, a recipe for continuous conflict. Theoretically,

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I to solve such a problem, there are two ways: one either you eliminate or negate the third I people or you create a third country. The situation as it has been standing since 1920 looks like two seats for three sitters, in the same space. Such a situation is bound to

I create a sort of conflict among the three over who will occupy which seat. One of the I three will be seatless. That has been the story for the last seven or eight decades in the Middle East. That's the main theme to describe our situation.

I As I said, theoretically, there is one of two ways: either you eliminate or negate I one or you build a third seat. The world and the peoples of the area, or the governments of the area, have tried the first one for the last eight decades. Negating the third, went

I through many stages. The first stage was the Arab attempt to negate the Jews in 1948. I They failed. King Abdalla, the founder of the Kingdom of Jordan tried his way to negate I the third. In a constructive way, by merging the Palestinians and Jordanians into one people and one country, toto make thethe twotwo one, by merger and not negation. And thatthat also

11 did not work. III The Palestinian Fedayeen inin 1970 triedtried toto negate thethe Jordanian Government, and thatthat also did not work. Within thisthis context thethe Oslo Agreement, inin my opinion was a

I historic event. ItIt was preceded fivefive years earlier by another historic event, i.e.i.e. King I Hussein's decision toto terminateterminate tiesties with thethe West Bank, administratively and legally.legally. By doing so,so, King Hussein opened thethe way forfor thethe establishment of thethe thirdthird seat,seat, forfor thethe

I thirdthird country. InIn my opinion, thethe Oslo Agreement shouldshould be viewed fromfrom thisthis

perspective.perspective. Rabin, ofof Israel,Israel, waswas thethe firstfirst IsraeliIsraeli leaderleader toto reversereverse thethe IsraeliIsraeli policypolicy of

- negatingnegating thethe PalestiniansPalestinians toto acceptingaccepting themthem asas peerspeers oror partners,partners, andand not,not, asas thethe casecase waswas I

11 - andand asas thethe casecase isis nownow underunder Netanyahu,Netanyahu, toto considerconsider themthem asas anan obstacleobstacle toto bebe removed.removed. 1.1 - 55 - I

I In that context Rabin's assassination was a great loss, not only to the Palestinians but also I to the Israelis and to the peace process itself. Rabin was the leader who finally, grasped the issue, that there should be a third seat for the Palestinians. Otherwise neither Jordan

I irrespective of its peace treaty with Israel nor the Palestinians will be reassured and

satisfied. There should be a third space and the space is there, it's the West Bank and ­ Gaza. But it needs the recognition of the parties that this is the seat of the third sitter who I has been deprived of a place to sit in for eighty years now. I Against this background, I have to tell you about the showdown. King Abdalla in 1950, united the west bank and the east bank into one country. And a hybrid identity

I started to grow. I and Mr. Sallah are of those who accepted this and supported this hybrid

identity, that Trans-Jordanians and Palestinians become one, as Jordanians. In 1964, this

­ process of building a hybrid identity for Jordanians and Palestinians in the two banks of 11 Jordan, was interrupted the establishment of the PLO, the Palestinian Liberalization

11 Organization, by the Arab League. The move to create the PLO was initiated by Nasser 11 of Egypt, supported by Iraq, and by other states. Jordan was obviously against it. But you know, in the Arab League, great pressure was put on Jordan and Jordan had to accept

11 it. Jordan tried, though, to obstruct, obstruct the interruption of the merger process, by 11 trying to keep Jordanians and Palestinians as one people. This unfortunately did not work under the developments resulting from the 1967 war. 11 11 JK: So there were two ideologies that were incompatible. 11

­ 6 11 /' ~ _~_~ ~~_----,,···L I I AO: I would say that the awakening of Palestinian nationalism resulting from the I Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza found itself in a collision course with the status quo in the West Bank and East Bank. An inherent tension emerged. I In 1967, war took place and the West Bank became under Israeli occupation since then. When it became under occupation, the chances for the first ideology, the ­ Palestinian ideology, became greater because the land was no more under Jordan's I authority. Obviously the new generations of the West Bank started to view themselves as I Palestinians rather than Jordanians. The Arab military defeat in the 1967 war produced a number of things. One of them was the realistic attitude of the Arabs after the War. The - new Arab attitude was best manifested in the fact that Israel was there as a reality to be recognized. Ironically, the Israeli military victory produced the opposite, an umealistic - Israeli attitude with I like to call the booty mentality. 11 Two products thatthat were diametrically opposed came out of thethe 1967 War: thethe 11 realistic view of thethe Arabs toto accept Israel, and the unrealistic Israeli attitude not toto accept 11 thethe Palestinians and toto become likelike a spoiled young beautiful girl thatthat refuses thosethose who ask her hand. Like Penelope and thethe upsets of Odysseus, of Greek mythology. ItIt isis

I exactlyexactly likelike this.this. So,So, insteadinstead ofof makingmaking useuse ofof thethe factfact thatthat JordanJordan andand Egypt,Egypt, byby acceptingaccepting I 242,242, acceptedaccepted IsraelIsrael asas aa reality,reality, IsraelIsrael diddid notnot appreciateappreciate thatthat drasticdrastic turnturn inin thethe historyhistory ofof thethe MiddleMiddle East.East. BecauseBecause itit diddid notnot appreciateappreciate it,it, thethe 19731973 WarWar tooktook place.place. AndAnd thenthen

I thingsthings startedstarted toto taketake shapeshape afterafter 1973.1973. However,However, wewe willwill gogo backback toto ourour earlierearlier question.question. 11 BecauseBecause thesethese thingsthings areare soso muchmuch interlinked,interlinked, it'sit's difficultdifficult toto presentpresent aa clearclear interpretationinterpretation 11 withoutwithout goinggoing intointo details.details. II don'tdon't feelfeel II cancan answeranswer youryour questionquestion ifif II missmiss certaincertain pointspoints 11 - 7 that make it clear. Otherwise it would be very superficial. These things are much deeper than they seem.

JK: Intricately interwoven.

AO: Yes. I have to say that right from the beginning, in 1918, the triangular interactioninteraction emerged between the three seaters of over the two seats, the Israeli (the Jewish, itit was first Jewish and then Israeli) the Jordanians and Palestinians. The triangulartriangular interactioninteraction has never ceased. It was marked over the decades by violence and conflict. Now after

Oslo and after Jordan's treaty with Israel, it'sit's supposed toto be transformedtransformed intointo peaceful interaction. Rabin was assassinated, and Netanyahu was elected toto bring us back toto square one, to bring to the scene thatthat typetype of interaction,interaction, thethe adverse interactioninteraction ratherrather than conflict management and confidence-building. Now at thisthis moment while II am talking to you this isis thethe case. I will characterize itit thisthis way. I will go back again toto thethe premise of thethe twotwo seats for threethree sitters, reciperecipe forfor conflict. Part of thisthis history forfor thethe recipe for conflict was thethe Palestinian and JordanianJordanian relationshiprelationship afterafter 1967,1967, whenwhen

Palestinian nationalists wanted toto have IsraelIsrael withdraw fromfrom thethe West Bank,Bank, butbut afterafter thethe withdrawal, thethe PLO, shouldshould be thethe successorsuccessor of JordanJordan inin thethe WestWest Bank.Bank. SoSo therethere waswas aa political conflict between JordanJordan and thethe PLO over who waswas goinggoing toto rulerule thethe WestWest BankBank after thethe Israeli withdrawal. Now, how did itit manifestmanifest itself?itself? ItIt manifestedmanifested itselfitself inin manymany ways. One of themthem was thethe PLO's rejectionrejection ofof JordanJordan toto representrepresent thethe WestWest BankBank inin itsits negotiations and internationalinternational diplomacydiplomacy toto implementimplement 242,242, thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil resolution,resolution, OK? That was thethe politicalpolitical conflict.conflict.

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I But there was also a festering type of conflict that started with the Fedayeen I organizations in Jordan, who right after 1967, stationed themselves in Jordan without any rejection by the country, because the country was in no situation neither morally nor - materially to tell the Palestinians "No, you do not have your right to fight for your country." This was the case in 1967, after June 1967) until the end of the year and the - beginning of 1968. The country was almost open for all Palestinian Fedayeen - organizations, guerrilla organizations, to come and station themselves, to recruit fighters, combatants, Arabs and non-Arabs, and to move in weapons and to open training centers - for their fighters in the country. The country could not stop them, because Jordan - couldn't defend the West Bank, in the first place. So Jordan could not tell them, "I will prevent you from liberating the West Bank." Jordan was in a dilemma. "How can I stop

- people from liberating their country which I couldn't defend." That was Jordan's moral - predicament. It was under this predicament, moral and political, that the Fedayeen came 11 into the country and established themselves as an embryo for another power, ruling 11 power, in the country. Between '67-'70,'67-'70, this new power grew into a real power to a point when we in the - country started to see a state within a state. Between '67-'70,'67-'70, there were so many clashes between the Fedayeen and the government. King Hussein personally appealed to the - Fedayeen leadership at that time to coordinate with the government inin their operations - against Israel and in their policies and they always refused. Sometimes they reached a ~ sort of agreement but, those agreements wouldn't endure more than twelve hours, twenty­ ~ four hours. Maximum three days and then they would collapse. So, there was a real effort to reconcile with the PLO and coordinate, but it was impossible, because King ~ ~ 9 Hussein's policy after thethe 1967 War and after accepting 242, was obvious to reach a peaceful settlement. The PLO's position at that time was no recognition of Israel. So, therethere was a conflict between the twotwo parties. In fact, there were contradicting positions: one that accepts Israel and wants to reach a settlement and the other rejects this policy.

Another difference was that if a settlement was reached on the basis of 242, Jordan would go back to the West Bank, its regained territory. The PLO would say, "No, I will go to the West Bank, not you!" King Hussein at one point even to eliminate this second point of difference, aspect of difference with the PLO, promised that once thethe West Bank was back he would ask the Palestinians themselves to decide whether theythey would continue with Jordan or would become separate or independent, thethe way theythey like,like.

JK: OK, So that was the King's proposition, proposal?

AO: Yes, King Hussein's proposal. But eveneven thisthis waswas notnot accepted.accepted. AndAnd atat oneone point,point, thethe situation deteriorated. So many mercenaries,mercenaries, soso manymany politicallypolitically orientedoriented elementselements were able toto infiltrateinfiltrate intointo FedayeenFedayeen organizationsorganizations andand insteadinstead ofof workingworking toto liberateliberate

PalestinePalestine andand fightfight thethe IsraeliIsraeli troops,troops, theythey startedstarted toto thinkthink ofof howhow toto changechange thethe regimeregime here,here, toto makemake AmmanAmman likelike aa HanoiHanoi ofof thethe Arabs,Arabs, toto liberateliberate HanoiHanoi inin orderorder toto liberateliberate

Saigon.Saigon. TheyThey wantedwanted toto copycopy examplesexamples fromfrom otherother partsparts ofof thethe world.world. ThisThis oneone lookedlooked asas ifif itit waswas intriguingintriguing toto them.them. TheseThese factorsfactors andand othersothers onon thethe Trans-JordanianTrans-Jordanian sideside contributedcontributed toto thethe fadingfading awayaway ofof lawlaw andand orderorder andand mutualmutual hatred.hatred. ThereThere werewere mutualmutual fears,fears, andand thethe KingKing triedtried hishis bestbest toto avoidavoid thethe showdown,showdown, butbut hehe couldn't.couldn't.

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I In the first stage, he used toto contact themthem toto reach agreements, at thethe laterlater stage I when things became worse, he resorted toto thethe Arab League toto help him reach an agreement with them. Once he resorted toto thethe Arab League, thethe PLO insteadinstead of becoming I milder in its attitude, it became more intransigent,intransigent, because that meant toto them,them, thatthat theythey

became another party in the country since thethe King referred thethe issueissue toto thethe Arab League. ­ So they thought of themselves as becoming equal toto thethe legitimatelegitimate government. Without I the Arab League, the King could say, ""I I am telling you, you are violating thethe lawlaw of thethe

land, I want to regain the law of the land, I want to restore it."it." But now when thethe King ­ went to the Arab League, now the country itself has become like a disputed land.land. 11 11 JK: They could sense that he felt weakened in dealing directly with them and needed a 11 third party.

11 AD:AO: Exactly.

­ JK: So they emboldened their own sense of legitimacy. 11 I AD:AO: And so, that's why instead of becoming more pliant they became more defiant, until the showdown took place in September 1970. Of course, that was preceded by two

I attempts on the King's life by the Fedayeen. 11 ~ JK: Right, I think that we should talk about that. How did that happen?

- 11 - AO: Well that happened close to this place. Eight hundred meters down there. The

king was living then in a nearby suburb and he was going to the airport to receive his

daughter. One of the extremist groups ambushed him and a flurry of fire was shot at him

and one of his bodyguards was killed. But he survived it. Another time, they ambushed

him in another place outside of Amman. So, two attempts on the King's life took place

and the situation became impossible. And the people, how did they feel? Now the

people, Palestinians, like Jordanians, were very unhappy about the situation, that's why I

want to negate the idea of a civil war. You know, after all, the individual's judgment on

things has to do with individual's daily life, if one couldn't send his children to school

and feel safe, one couldn't go and earn one's bread, one couldn't see public security as I the place where helshehe/she could go and ask for help, or something like this. So they become I afraid and horrified about the situation. And people within themselves wanted to see law and order restored. I I JK: So there were extremist elements within the PLO?

I AO: That's right. I I JK: That the PLO couldn't completely control.

I AO: Yes. Those most extremist elements were, in fact, partisans, party members, political party members, who transformed themselves into Fedayeen guerrillas. r call I­ I 12 them synthetic groups. Since they were neither Fedayeen nor guerrillas nor party

members, they became something totally new.

JK: When you say party members, what are you talking about?

AO: Political parties.

JK: Just political parties?

AO: Political parties were banned in Jordan in 1957. But they continued to operate

underground. Now those come out in 1967, and took the rifle and the machine gun and

the kalishnikov and posed themselves as guerrilla fighters. But they couldn't forget theirtheir ideological affiliations and political objectives, that's why I call them synthetic groups

because they were neither genuine guerrilla fighters nor political party members who promote their policies through peaceful means. It was thosethose synthetic groups thatthat were thethe extremists.

JK: Now, the ideology, was itit communist ideology?ideology? Or Marxist ideology?ideology?

AO: It was Marxist to some and Arab nationalist toto others

JK: Whatever...... a mixture. You are going toto read from a document right now.

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I AO:Aa: This is an introduction to my book. I JK: An introduction to your book, OK. I

AO:Aa: "On the morning of September 15, 1970, I stood at attention before King Hussein - in his suburban Amman residence and handed in a sealed report from the Director - General of Jordan's Intelligence Department. This was the most unusual practice. It had always been the Director General's job to carry intelligence reports to the King. I was not - aware then that this change in the steps of practice was one signal of the secrecy that - shrouded the formation of a military cabinet. Nor was II aware that II was about to become a member of that cabinet which was being formed as part of the King's decision to crack

- down on the Fedayeen organization. Having quickly read the report, the King said with a - sober concern: 'you'you are one of the few people in this country who are aware of the implication of this situation. If it continues any longer, II am afraid we shall lose Jordan

- and Palestine. Therefore, we, the Royal We, have decided to form a military cabinet to - restore law and order to the country and put an end to this chaos. You will be the I minister of information in this cabinet.'" So that was the beginning. I I JK: OK, we'll leave it there for now. This is a book that you are writing now. What would be the title of the book? Or you don't know yet? I I AO: II know. I - 14 JK: Just for future reference people can look for the book.

AO: The book is called the Jordanian-Palestinian Dynamic in Jordan: Its Origin, I Evolution and Impact on the Peace Process.

• JK: When do you expect the book would be coming out? •I , AO: February of next year. Hopefully.

•I JK: OK, yeah.

­ AO: I finished the manuscript. • - JK: That's a major accomplishment to finish the manuscript. I wanted to put that in - the record because then people could look for the book. AO: Sure. I- I JK: We'11 get this on the Internet and then everyone will know about it. And it will be in English. I AO: Yes, it is in English. I­ I 15 JK: All right so then moving ahead, that date was?

AO: That military cabinet was established on September 15, 1970. The "showdown" took place on September 17, 1970, just 36 hours later.

JK: Goodness, that's a very short time, why?

AO: Yes. The whole idea was if a military cabinet was formed, the Fedayeen

organizations would take the government seriously, and they would abide by whatever

agreement they reached with the government. At the same time, the military command

had already had a contingency plan, in case the Fedayeen would not take the military

cabinet seriously, and failed to reach an agreement with the government. The army

would attack the Fedayeen and dislodge them from their bases in the cities.

JK: That was the contingency plan.

AO: Yes. The government couldn't play the game as in the past I mean to give them

one day, another day, a third day because any procrastination would mean that the

Fedayeen were not serious. That's why after 36 hours the government attacked, and the

"showdown" took place for three or four days, during which the Syrian troops probed into

the country in the North, in our northern borders and proceeded toward the capital.

JK: Why did they do that?

16 AO:AO: ToTo helphelp thethe FedayeenFedayeen organizationsorganizations inin theirtheir fightfight againstagainst thethe government.government. AtAt thethe samesame time,time, inin Cairo,Cairo, NasserNasser calledcalled forfor anan ArabArab Summit.Summit. TheThe showdownshowdown sparkedsparked

AmericanAmerican andand SovietSoviet mobilizationmobilization becausebecause JordanJordan couldcould havehave collapsedcollapsed andand eventuallyeventually

thethe balancebalance ofof powerpower inin thethe regionregion wouldwould havehave beenbeen disrupted.disrupted. JordanJordan soughtsought thethe helphelp ofof

thethe U.S.V.S. TheThe AmericanAmerican administrationadministration pressuredpressured Moscow,Moscow, soso thatthat thethe latterlatter wouldwould putput

pressurepressure onon itsits SyrianSyrian allyally toto withdraw fromfrom Jordan'sJordan's territory.territory. AtAt thethe samesame timetime IsraelIsrael

mobilized somesome of itsits forcesforces along thethe Syrian-Israeli cease-fire lineslines and thethe Syrians

withdrew. The summitsummit inin Cairo reached an agreement between Jordan and Arafat. King

Hussein attended thatthat summit, flew toto Cairo and so did Arafat. On 23 September an

agreement brokered by Nasser was reached. The agreement of cease-fire also included

new arrangements regarding the Fedayeen's presence and activities in Jordan. Its

implementation did not go well. In the first place the agreement allowed the Fedayeen to

exist in the country, and many of the military people did not want that to happen. So,

while before 1970, it was the Fedayeen who usually violated the agreements, after the

Cairo Agreement in 1970, mostly it was the army who violated the agreements that

culminated in another showdown in July 1971 in Jerash forest near thethe ancient Roman

city of Jerash north of Amman. The 1970 showdown went throughthrough two phases, phase one

started after thethe formation of thethe military cabinet on 17 September and endured until the

Cairo agreement, while thethe second phase which resultedresulted inin thethe eviction of thethe FedayeenFedayeen

from Jordan completely, which tooktook placeplace inin JulyJuly 1971.1971.

1717 JK: Why did the military feel that the Fedayeen could not really stay? That was not a viable solution?

AO: Because before 1970 those synthetic groups were so provocative to the army, and

that the army resented all their acts against them. At one point, for example, I remember

when one of the Fedayeen synthetic groups arrested a number of soldiers and took them

on board a pick-up truck and drove them tluoughthrough town, which was under their real

control, in a show of ridicule. Such humiliating acts were not forgotten by the army.

JK: No, it's very provocative.

AO: I guess so. I think there was another psychological factor. In the first phase of the

confrontation the army could not expel the Fedayeen from Amman. When the Cairo

agreement was reached the Fedayeen were still in Amman. It was the Cairo Agreement

that put them out of Amman. They were takentaken out of Amman by diplomatic means ratherrather

than by the army. So thethe army resented thethe fact thatthat it failed toto evict themthem by force.force. So

the military were looking forward to the opportunity that would allow themthem toto trytry theirtheir

muscle effectively. The Jerash confrontation was thethe answer.

JK: But was itit also feltfelt thatthat ifif prior toto 1970, between '67-'70,'67-'70, thatthat thethe PLOPLO

leadership was unable toto control thesethese elements, thethe extremists ofof thethe Fedayeen,Fedayeen, whywhy

would they be able to control themthem after that,that, because ofof thethe agreementagreement inin Cairo?Cairo? II mean,mean,

was that part of thethe thinkingthinking thatthat ifif theythey couldn'tcouldn't controlcontrol themthem before,before, whatwhat makesmakes thethe

1818 difference that they could now control them? That the PLO leadership could control the extremists?

AO: In fact in both cases, they were unable to control them.

JK: Right, that's what I mean.

AO: Before and after, they were unable to control them.

JK: So thethe situation would not really have improved.

AO: Would not have been really improvedimproved only by the political agreement, and the events proved thatthat toto be so, proved thatthat clearly.

JK:JK: You had mentioned thatthat thethe US had intervenedintervened inin a sense. Were you at all in touchtouch with any US diplomats or during thatthat time?time?

AO: Not me.

End of Tape 1, Side 1

JK:JK: II hadhad been asking ifif you had been directly inin touchtouch with thethe Americans, but you hadhad not.not.

19 AO: No. No it was in Rofoi directly between the King and the American embassy.

JK: The American embassy here in Amman.

AO: Which in turn contacted the State Department in Washington. I remember the evening of, I think, 19th September, the Syrians invaded the country, advanced in the north. Irbid,lrbid, one of largest cities in the north, was taken over by the Fedayeen, and was declared to be a liberated area. The Syrian troops moved towards Amman, and the King called the military cabinet. We, the military cabinet, were driven to the King's residence in armored cars, because the shooting was all over town. There was that historic meeting between the King and the Cabinet. The King said to us that the Syrians were in the country after they had crossed the borders, and that the Jordanian troops in the north were engaged with them in fierce fighting. The Syrians came in to help the Fedayeen. The

Iraqi contingent near the Syrian borders opened the way for Syrians to come in, but the

Iraqis did not participate in the fighting.

JK: So that was very serious.

AO: Now the King told us, as the cabinet, that this was an extremely dangerous situation. He had told us that he had ordered more troops to defend Amman. He asked usus toto give him mandatemandate as a cabinet toto call on friendlyfriendly troopstroops toto come in,in, ifif necessary, toto

20 defend the country and we gave him that mandate. Though the King could have called inin whatever friendly troops to help, he chose to get authorization fromfrom thethe cabinet.

JK: Yes, yes, yes right.

AO: He said if necessary. He said also thatthat our troopstroops werewere fightingfighting bravely,bravely, butbut inin casecase the situation deteriorated worse, we mightmight need friendlyfriendly troopstroops toto comecome in.in. WouldWould youyou authorize me to do so? We did. And thenthen thisthis contact tooktook placeplace withwith thethe AmericansAmericans through one of thethe King's associates. ButBut fortunatelyfortunately enoughenough therethere waswas nono needneed toto useuse foreign troops.troops. Two majormajor thingsthings happened, thethe IsraeliIsraeli troopstroops inin coordinationcoordination withwith thethe

Americans, displayed theirtheir forcesforces on thethe SyrianSyrian front,front, asas aa signsign thatthat thethe IsraelisIsraelis mightmight attack thethe Syrians ifif theythey wentwent deeperdeeper intointo Jordan.Jordan. AndAnd thethe otherother one,one, thethe diplomaticdiplomatic contacts betweenbetween Washington andand MoscowMoscow mademade thethe SovietsSoviets movemove againstagainst thethe SyriansSyrians and telltell themthem "Look,"Look, wewe don'tdon't wantwant toto confrontconfront thethe AmericansAmericans inin thethe area."area." TheThe SyriansSyrians pulledpulled outout fromfrom thethe country.country. So,So, wewe didn'tdidn't needneed foreignforeign troopstroops toto fightfight forfor us,us, fortunately.fortunately.

JK:JK: Right.Right. SoSo thosethose werewere veryvery importantimportant contactscontacts andand alsoalso thatthat theythey hadhad toto bebe mademade quickly.quickly.

AO:AO: VeryVery quickly,quickly, yes.yes. ThenThen theythey werewere followedfollowed byby thethe agreement,agreement, thethe CairoCairo

AgreementAgreement betweenbetween thethe KingKing whichwhich waswas sponsoredsponsored byby thethe ArabArab League.League. NasserNasser headedheaded thethe summitsummit andand workedworked hardhard toto bringbring thethe PalestiniansPalestinians andand JordaniansJordanians intointo agreement.agreement. SoSo afterafter thatthat anotheranother committeecommittee waswas establishedestablished toto supervisesupervise thethe implementationimplementation ofof thethe

2121 agreement. It was headed by a senior Tunisian diplomat, Al-Bahi Al-AdghamA1-Adgham who came to Amman to supervise the implementation of the agreement between Jordan and the

Fedayeen that went along a bumpy way until July 1971 when the army evicted the

Fedayeen completely.

JK: OK, so, at the discussions in Cairo with Arafat, at that point he had not agreed to leave Jordan.

AO: Jordan was not asking him to leave Jordan.

JK: At that point.

AO: Jordan was asking the Fedayeen to be under control and abide by the law of the land. And Jordan was ready to give them new positions, not in the cities because when

Fedayeen moved from the front to the cities they built a state within the state, and became almost utterly uncontrollable to the extent that they hijacked three airplanesairp1anes into Jordan.

JK: Yes, I wanted to ask you about that.

AO: ...just before the September showdown, one of those synthetic groups hijacked three airplanes and held its passengers and crews as hostages.

JK: Was that the precipitating event?

22 AO:Aa: Yes it was because it led to the confrontation. Because King Hussein couldn't endure, couldn't accept, couldn't stand that his country had become a place for hostages by people who were challenging his authority; it was a very odd situation. He couldn't take it. We call it the straw that broke the camel back. That was the straw.

JK: That was it. And so at any point was there agreement in '71'71 with Arafat that he

would leave?

AO:Aa: No, there was not. Arafat was smuggled out of the country.

JK: Oh he was, when did that take place?

AO: During the hostilities in the first phase of the showdown.

JK: Oh, during the hostilities.

A0: It was I think...

JK: He was smuggled out to Cairo and then he did not come back?

AO: He did 110tnot come back until 1978 as an official visitor.

23 JK: He did not come back... So can we continue.

This is a continuation of the interview.

AO: In fact, the 1967 War, has been a central event, from which the possibility of making peace emerged and on which the diplomacy to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict revolved for three decades, because the 1967 War produced the 242 Security Council resolution which, until this moment, is considered as the pivot or the base for any solution or settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The reason for that is the fact that Security

Council Resolution 242 emanated from the balanced concept of "land for peace." So, every now and then until this moment, people talk about land for peace. In fact, the

Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, is based on this concept, which was enshrined in 242. Nevertheless, a comprehensive peace has not been achieved. For on the Arab side 242 has deepened their tendency towards litigation as a means for conflict resolution.

242 to the Arabs, meant that it was a verdict passed by the judge and all it waited for was the implementation. To them it was just a matter of enforcement once it is passed to the

Marshall. This fact has governed Arab political thinking for three decades now. On the other hand, Israel took 242 as a framework, a conceptual framework within which it could use its better position, in terms of balance of power, to get the best deal possible of any peaceful settlement. To sum up, the Arabs played the plaintiff and the Israelis played the smart businessman looking always for a better deal. These two concepts governed the politics and the diplomacy of both sides for three decades now.

24 JK: That's a reallyreally fascinatingfascinating description. SoSo inin fact,fact, thethe twotwo sidessides werewere reallyreally operating under different, aa differentdifferent wayway ofof thinking.thinking.

AO; That's right, a different way of attitude andand interpretationinterpretation ofof thethe samesame resolutionresolution called 242.

JK: So when one sideside would discussdiscuss it,it, 242,242, andand thethe otherother sideside wouldwould discussdiscuss 242242 theythey were kind ofjust passing each other.

AO: Each side believes thatthat he/she isis committedcommitted toto 242,242, isis abidingabiding byby 242,242, ThatThat reflects, toto me, how thethe ambiguity of 242,242, thethe wordingwording ofof 242242 waswas toto allowallow such,such, sometimes two, diametrically opposed interpretations.interpretations.

JK: Now, tell me about thethe wording, becausebecause wording inin SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil resolutionsresolutions is very important.important. As a lessonlesson learned,learned, forfor exampleexample forfor futurefuture writingwriting ofofSecurity Security CouncilCouncil resolutions, what was thethe problem with thethe wording?wording?

AO: Ambiguity, for example. You couldn't expect indeedindeed fromfrom aa SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil resolution with conflicting parties, toto be soso specific, inin thethe firstfirst place.place.

JK: OK, in the first place......

25 I AO; In our case in 242, the ambiguity was so harmful because it did not take into I account the fact that 242 implied the Arab recognition of the state of Israel. For you as an American, you might not grasp the significance of this, because Israel is there in your

J mind and on the map. ~ J JK: You're right, I think outsiders see it differently.

AO: To you as an American what's involved is that the Arabs would recognize Israel ,­ by exchange of embassies and establishing normal relations with her. It's not incorrect to wonder what's in that. If you don't know the history of the conflict, or the psychology , that was there. From our side as Arabs, right from the turn of the century, the first seeds , of Arab nationalism were sown. This tendency towards Arab nationalism within the Ottoman Empire was, in the Arab mind, to flourish, bloom, and materialize after World

, War I, when the Turks were defeated in the war. And in the view of the fact that the

Arabs under the leadership of Sharif Hussein, the great grandfather of King Hussein, r - allied with the West in the fight against the Turks in what is called historically the Great J Arab Revolt. So there were the seeds of Arab nationalism and there was the position that J they took, by aligning with the West against the Turks hoping that when the guns fell I silent, that they would have their united Arab state in the area. That ambition, these were the hopes, the burning hopes of the Arabs. But after the war, they were completely J disillusioned to discover that two things happened: one the Balfour Declaration, by which J the British, one of the victors of the war, had already committed themselves to establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. The second one was the Sykes-Picot J 26 f Agreement between Britain and France to divide up or to split up the area under their domination into new nation states, not one Arab state, but new nation states, each one of them consisting of Arabs and one of them, Palestine, was supposed to accommodate the

Jews. So the natural reaction of the Arabs to this, the establishment of a Jewish national state, was to reject it. Because "This is my space, this is my home, how can I bring in an alien body and engrave it in my midst." So there was a psychological rejection ofanother nationalism to be established in the midst of their nationalism. That accounts for the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The idea of rejecting an alien body in their midst, especially Jews in the Middle East in Palestine were a small community, much less than the Palestinians (one-third of the population of Palestine in 1948). The idea of the

Balfour Declaration was to bring Jews from outside to increase the number of this community, so that they would build a state of their own. The Arabs were aware of this and they rejected it. Arab acceptance of 242, from the Arab point of view, has been the major concession the Arabs have made to the Israelis: "Now we accept you amongst us."

Now we give up the idea that you are an alien body to be rejected, now you can be a member of the club." Arab acceptance of 242 was a major transformation in the Arab attitude towards Israel, a development that made peace possible.

JK: Many years coming.

AO: That was, in fact, best manifested in 242 when Egypt and Jordan accepted it because 242 among other things provides for the right of every country to live within secure and recognized borders. Israel is one of those countries. It means that the other

27 side had to recognize it. So, when Egypt and Jordan accepted it, accepted the resolution, it implied so clearly that they accepted Israel in their midst for the first time. That great concession by Jordan and Egypt was not duly appreciated by the Israeli politicians, nor was it duly appreciated by the West. Why do I say that? Because it was not reflected in the Israeli action to the Gunnar Jarring mission in the Middle East as representative of the

Secretary-General of the United Nations. In fact, they behaved like as if they were there all the time as if there was no question about their right to exist there, as if the Arabs had already accepted them much earlier than 1967, so, the question to the Israelis was how much they should reap from their victory. The booty mentality among the Israelis defeated thethe conciliatory mentality; unfortunately this sort mentality is still lingering now, especially in thethe minds of the Likud.

JK: Now there were countries such as Syria, for example, that did not accept 242.

AO: That's right. It took Syria to accept it, another war, the 1973 War. One of the major outcomes of the 1973 October War was that Syria accepted 242. Because the

Security Council Resolution 338 included threethree items,items, a cease-fire, second, agreement of

242 and third,third, toto negotiate peace under appropriate auspices. So, Syria accepted 242 as an item,item, when itit came as one itemitem inin 338 of 1973. Syria came in six years later after

Egypt and Jordan, toto accept IsraelIsrael as a reality.reality.

All thesethese facts,facts, tmfortunately,tmfortunately, have not been focused on, or highlighted in the media,media, inin Western media. That makes us sad and feelfeel thatthat thethe media has not been even­ handed.handed. BecauseBecause therethere was no realreal highlighting of thisthis fact.fact. The Arabs after all accepted

28 Israel. That is the beginning of conciliation. Negating the other means that there will be

no conciliation whatsoever. But now the other is recognized, and the other does not seem

to be appreciating this development on the Arab side. In fact, the residuals of thisthis

mentality are still there in Israel. Recently I was presenting this argument inin a meeting

where some Israelis were participating. One of them retorted by saying, "Why do you

think that the Arabs had to be rewarded for recognizing Israel?" My answer toto him was

"You should be appreciative because the area is an Arab area, it'sit's an Arab lot,lot, and inin thethe

beginning, it's like every body, you come intointo my body as an alien body, I trytry toto reject

you through my lymphatic system. Finally I accepted you as part of me, well, now itit isis up

to you if you want to dig again inin my body, again you make me feel likelike you are alien and

my lymphatic system will be reactivated. But if you appreciate thatthat you are accepted inin

my midst now, I shall take you as a neighbor. If you show me thatthat you appreciate this,this,

that will help me and help you to build confidence, mutual confidence and move towardstowards

interdependence and cooperation and be good neighbors. But ifif you continue toto telltell me

that I have toto move thethe fence between our twotwo gardens back intointo mine, you will continue

to remind me thatthat you are an alien body, a harmful alien body. This isis why you shouldshould

appreciate it.it. He said, "How about us toto recognize you." I said, "It"It isis irrelevant.irrelevant. ItIt isis likelike

thethe relationship between thethe elephant and thethe ant. It isis my space,space, itit isis my world. ItIt does

not mean anything ifif thethe ant said toto Mr. Elephant, 'well'well II recognize thatthat you are there,there, you

exist." It's likelike this,this, you should be more realisticrealistic about it.it. We are talkingtalking about thethe

psychology of a people. Our mutual interestinterest lieslies inin sharing,sharing, itit isis toto recognizerecognize thatthat you are therethere and establish a new relationship not a relationship based on rejectionrejection or expansion,

29 but a relationship that is based on acceptance, sharing, cooperation and interdependence.

That's how people feel.

JK: Is it somewhat, I don't know but from your point of view and understanding of the psychology of the region, does Israel act out of fear? Is part of their stance out of fear?

AO: Out of trauma. Here is another point, Jean. We understand the Jewish trauma; we really do. But we are also traumatized, and being traumatized, we look for our trauma to be recognized by the world. The difference between the two is while Israel's trauma is recognized worldwide, the Palestinian and Arab trauma is not recognized by the world.

We are traumatized too. Just imagine how we feel after eighty years of failure. To be reminded after eighty years how impotent we are is a real trauma. This is the problem.

How our dignity is being marred almost daily, that is our trauma. It's a trauma, but a different kind. There is the Israeli trauma and there is the Arab trauma. The irony is that we are talking about two traumatized peoples. And we are usually asked to recognize the trauma of the other, but the other is exempt from recognizing my trauma. Only two days ago, Mr. Sharon, Minister of Infrastructure in Israel, made a very horrible statement, he said, "We are going to assassinate Mr. Meshal, in Amman." Mr. Meshal is the guy on whose life there was an attempt by the Mossad last fall in Amman. Fortunately, the attempt failed. Do you remember that? And just two days ago, Sharon a cabinet minister, says, "We want to assassinate Meshal." Can you imagine in international relations a senior official in one administration says to the media "We are going to

30 assassinate someone in another country." How can you explain this? Today I have an I article in one of our dailies about this particular incident.

J JK: You did? J AO: Yes, I wrote an article about this. [Shows Dr. Krasno the article] J J JK: I'll get a copy of this article, because they can keep it in the library at Yale, ~ because they read Arabic. f AO: When you hear Sharon say this about a citizen in another country like Jordan who has concluded a peace treaty with Israel, and the country that has been so forthcoming in • nourishing the normalization process with Israel, how would you explain it, except that , he holds a derogatory attitude towards the other, Jordan. He figures out as ifhe is looking ~ at me as an impotent guy and he can punish and do whatever he can, in my cotmtry , without being punished himself. See this type of trauma. This is missed and not understood in America. It's not understood in America, it's not there. One of my basic , points, which I raise here, is the way that the American media addresses such events. I was in the United States when the first attempt on the Meshal took place. I noticed that in ­ the American media they used the following adjective to describe the attempt. They used I the "botched" operation or "bungled" operation, ifyou remember? J JK: Yes, I remember. I recall. I r 31 I J J AO: And this epithet was used all over the land in the United States. Now I analyzed this in my article. I said "botched" is a very accurate word for one who is looking at it as

.~ if he were an employed guy whose job is to judge how well the executive has done of the ~ task. The act, to him, was right, but it was imperfect. This is not the case. Now by repeating this epithet, when this operation was referred to in the media, it has succeeded

~ in neutralizing the ordinary reader or blocking his mind from making the right judgment. , For those who support Netanyahu's policies in the U.S.,D.S., they felt sad and sorry because the operation was not complete. It made them feel sad only because it was not done,

,",If' , because it was not complete. , JK: And not the issue of whether it was right or wrong to be doing it to begin with.

, AO: Exactly, not that issue, not to denounce it, not to say it was wrong. This sort of , thinking, this is why the American mind is far away from the reality of the Middle East, because the type of reporting on the Middle East is void of so many important elements to

J make the ordinary reader have a better understanding of what is going on.

J,i" J JK: So the language defines the situation and then one's interpretation follows that , definition. , AO: Now that's the focus of the language of course. And wording and what you say. , J 32 I

I JK: Well, I want toto go back a littlelittle bit toto justjust some points inin history and toto put thethe J analysis intointo other points of history, and toto talktalk about issuesissues leadingleading up toto '73.'73. At thatthat timetime Sadat was thethe president of Egypt and very secretly, Sadat carried out thethe plan for an

~ attack against Israel. ~ AO: That's a leapleap (ahead). ~ , JK: OK, that'sthat's a leap,leap, thenthen so telltell me, fill me in.in. , AO: Let me telltell you what happened, thisthis isis really important.important. Just go first, and see what J was thethe American policy until 1973. ItIt was toto keep Israel strong, thatthat thethe strength of J Israel would make thethe Arabs finally accept toto make peace with Israel. And thatthat reflected on thethe American diplomacy. There was never a serious diplomatic effort from thethe side of

I thethe United States during thethe Jolmson Administration because thatthat was thethe ideaidea of r Johnson. r JK; So you had 242, but thenthen you had no implementation.implementation. r r AO: No implementation,implementation, so therethere was no real no serious attempt, no serious diplomatic attempt on thethe side ofthe US. Then comes Nixon and Rogers' plan, thethe Foreign Minister r for thethe administration at thatthat time.time. And itit didn't work. Then, Nasser dies and Sadat I succeeds him inin Egypt. Sadat comes up with an initiativeinitiative toto open, reopen thethe Suez Canal, asking for a partial Israeli withdrawal and thethe reopening of thethe Suez Canal, tryingtrying toto linklink

33 his initiativeinitiative with internationalinternational interests,interests, tradetrade interests,interests, and at thethe same timetime with thethe

Egyptian/Israeli conflict. But his initiativeinitiative was not takentaken seriously, neither by Israeli nor by thethe United States of America. That made Sadat thinkthink of another way. Then he started toto plan for a limitedlimited war toto activate thethe diplomacy thatthat his initiativeinitiative failed toto activate earlier. This isis history. Then thethe war takestakes place, after thethe war, American diplomacy has changed drastically.

JK: Now letlet me before we go toto thatthat period, I wanted toto know ifif you did President

Sadat have consultations with King Hussein, prior toto '73'73 War?

AO: No, King Hussein was unaware of a plan for war thatthat Sadat was working on. On thatthat side, Sadat and Assad were working togethertogether inin a very admirable secret mode, which isis not one of thethe traitstraits of Arab policy. It was very strange, very unusual.

JK: Yes, because from everybody thatthat I talkedtalked toto who was around inin thatthat time,time, said thatthat nobody knew.

AO: I was close, I was thethe King's second man inin thethe government, I was his Chief of thethe

Royal Court then.then.

JK: Completely takentaken by surprise. But as I understand itit thethe Egyptian forces were congregating along certain areas. I mean, ifif one had takentaken thatthat seriously, you might have interpretedinterpreted thatthat therethere was an attack being planned.

34 I I I AO:Aa: No, inin thethe first place we didn't know about thethe congregation of thethe Egyptian army, theythey are far away from us. ~ ~ JK: OK, so you didn't have any informationinformation about that.that. Why wasn't itit anticipated at , all? J AO: Because, you know, one importantimportant event tooktook place. Sadat at one timetime talkedtalked ~ about preparing for war toto liberateliberate Sinai. Everybody inin thethe area, was poised toto see thatthat war initiatedinitiated and thenthen Sadat at one point said inin a very famous statement, thatthat we were , tryingtrying toto do itit but thatthat therethere was tootoo much fog thatthat prevented our forces toto operate. ItIt I became ajoke inin thethe Arab world.

J JK: Oh really.

I, r AO:Aa: So, no body tooktook itit seriously, So, whatever informationinformation came laterlater about congregation, no body tooktook itit seriously, and theythey were all jokinglyjokingly referred toto Sadat's r "you are incompetentincompetent for thethe war because of thethe fog." I thinkthink thatthat was an interestinginteresting r event inin thethe Arab-Israeli conflict. Even thethe Israelis didn't taketake him seriously, for thatthat matter. r r JK: But theythey didn't taketake him seriously because...... r 35 I

I AO: They tooktook him seriously, only after thethe 1973 war. And thethe Americans tooktook him I seriously too.too.

I JK: They allowed thethe Israeli forces toto go for Yom Kippur.

­ AO: And according toto thethe reports laterlater on, itit seems thatthat thethe Israeli intelligenceintelligence was I aware a few days before that,that, thatthat therethere was something suspicious going on, on, thethe other - side but, theythey didn't taketake itit seriously. ,-'1,' JK: So King Hussein knew nothing about it.it. J AO: No he did not. To thethe best of my knowledge, no he did not. He was surprised as much surprised as everybody else. ~.

I JK: What, from your understanding, was thethe Soviet role? In termsterms of thethe Syrian part of itit and thethe Egyptian part of it.it.

If I, , AO: Well thethe Soviet role was basically toto supply weapons. r r JK: The Soviets. r AO: To supply weapons toto both Egypt and Syria. Before thethe war, theirtheir shipping of r weapons increased.increased. Still, no one tooktook itit seriously. But I don't know whether thethe Soviets r 36 were aware that Sadat was planning thethe war or not.not. II don'tdon't reallyreally know.know. BecauseBecause therethere was confusion between the need of Egypt forfor weapons toto sustainsustain thethe warwar ofof attritionattrition alongalong the Suez Canal and an all out war. So inin all cases hehe neededneeded thethe weaponsweapons becausebecause therethere was a sort of war of attrition, inin thethe region.region.

JK: Was King Hussein involvedinvolved inin any of thethe talkstalks afterafter thethe warwar hadhad brokenbroken out?out?

AO: No, in fact, the war, was October 6th, and thethe cease-firecease-fire thatthat waswas imposedimposed byby thethe

Security Council resolution 338 was on thethe 22nd. So,So, thethe warwar waswas relativelyrelatively aa longerlonger war, it continued for sixteen days. During which everybody waswas busybusy withwith thethe war,war, ratherrather than in talks with anyone. Until Kissinger and Nixon's AdministrationAdministration movedmoved toto getget along with the Soviet to reach thethe cease-fire.

JK: So let me ask you, there was a specific kind ofof mediamedia coveragecoverage duringduring thethe '67'67 war,war, coming out of the Arab countries, did thethe media coveragecoverage change?change?

AO: Yes.

JK: In what way did it change?

AO: It changed drastically. ItIt was lessless rhetoricalrhetorical itit waswas lessless imaginaryimaginary asas thethe casecase waswas in the 1967 war. It was noticeably more realistic,realistic, notnot completelycompletely butbut moremore realisticrealistic thanthan

3737 thethe approach of thethe coverage thatthat was inin 1967. And one shouldn't also miss the factfact thatthat thethe coverage thisthis timetime was characterized by elation, ratherrather thanthan depression and fear.fear.

End Of Tape One, Side Two

JK: So we were talkingtalking about thethe difference between thethe media coverage of thethe '67'67 war and thethe '73'73 war.

AO: As II said, thethe coverage was lessless rhetoricalrhetorical but more elated simply because of thethe success of thethe Syrian and Egyptian forcesforces toto cross thethe cease-fire line,line, and occupy part or regainregain part of thethe occupied territories.territories. By thethe end of thethe war, when Israel, thanksthanks toto thethe

American armament toto thethe IsraelisIsraelis or toto thethe airlift of sophisticated weapons toto Israel,Israel, thethe tidetide of war started toto change inin favorfavor of Israel,Israel, and thethe media started toto reflectreflect thethe fearfear as theythey did inin 1967. But at thethe beginning, forfor almost tenten toto twelvetwelve days, thethe situation was lessless rhetoricrhetoric and more elated.

JK: Were therethere other changes thatthat happened during thatthat six-year period thatthat made thethe media change theirtheir approach?

AO: Yes, ofcourse, therethere was a lotlot ofself-criticism ofthethe rolerole ofthethe media inin 1967.

JK: What kind of criticism?

38 AO: ItIt was mainly revolvingrevolving around one thing,thing, thatthat thethe media exaggerated and lied,lied, exaggerated thethe Arab achievement which did not exist, inin reality,reality, and itit liedlied and deceived thethe people. ItIt was obvious inin thatthat sense. There was inin thethe 1973 war, II remember,remember, at leastleast on our side, inin Jordan, forfor thethe firstfirst time,time, an exercise of psychological warfare, against thethe

IsraelisIsraelis ratherrather thanthan a psychological warfare addressed toto thethe Arabs. The media inin thethe

Arab world inin 1973 addressed thethe IsraeliIsraeli audience toto weaken theirtheir position, toto demoralize them,them, ratherrather thanthan address thethe Arab audience toto misguide them.them. That did not happen inin

1973. For example, II rememberremember thethe Egyptians on thethe Sinai front,front, were able toto have a number of prisoners of war, IsraeliIsraeli prisoners of war, and theythey releasedreleased a picture of thosethose prisoners and we tooktook thatthat picture here inin Jordan and presented itit on our TV which isis watched by thethe IsraelisIsraelis because of thethe short distances. So inin Jordan, theythey could see our

TV inin IsraelIsrael but theythey couldn't see the IsraeliIsraeli Egyptian TV clearly or partly, but our TV, thethe Jordan TV, could be seen fromfrom thethe heart of Israel,Israel, fromfrom thethe densely populated centers including Tel Aviv itself.itself. So we used thatthat footagefootage of thethe IsraeliIsraeli prisoners, and transmittedtransmitted it having inin mind thatthat we were addressing thethe Israelis.Israelis. We put thethe script thatthat accompanied thethe footage.footage. We addressed thethe mothers of thethe soldiers, thethe wives of thethe soldiers who were prisoners, thethe children of thesethese soldiers. We said "You Israelis,Israelis, now you see your Sons, husbands and maybe your fathersfathers and we are sure thatthat you have Arab prisoners of war who have mothers, fathersfathers and children and we want you toto tmderstandtmderstand thatthat as you feelfeel distressed and worried about your sons, husbands and fathersfathers and so are thethe Egyptians and Syrians are equally worried about theirs."theirs." This sort of approach never existed before.

39 I I I JK: So to try to humanize thethe situation.

AO: Exactly to humanize it. For thethe firstfirst timetime wewe appliedapplied thethe psycho-warfarepsycho-warfare rules.rules. ­_I _i JK: To understand the human quality on bothboth sides.sides.

AO: To appeal to the human aspect which isis usuallyusually dissipateddissipated inin aa war,war, whilewhile thethe warwar " is going on. Our objective inin Jordan was toto bebe ableable toto precipitateprecipitate inin thethe IsraeliIsraeli mindmind thethe ­ need to make peace, real peace. So thatthat isis thethe sophisticationsophistication wewe learnedlearned afterafter thethe 19671967 , war. ~ JK: OK, OK. That's very interesting.interesting. II hadhad beenbeen talkingtalking toto someonesomeone herehere whowho asas aa ­ boy was in the West Bank during thethe '67'67 war andand hehe heardheard overover thethe radioradio thingsthings likelike thatthat I Iraq had entered the war on thethe side of thethe Arabs, andand thatthat thethe ArabsArabs hadhad comecome intointo IsraelIsrael and were liberating the Palestinians. I and were liberating the Palestinians. I AO: That's right, that's thethe exaggerating sideside whichwhich II mentioned.mentioned.

I'/ JK: And that the tanks thatthat were coming were IraqiIraqi tanks.tanks. ButBut whenwhen thethe boyboy wentwent outout I of school to see the tanks, theythey were IsraeliIsraeli tanks.tanks. I AO: Oh, that's '67'67 not '73.'73. Oh thatthat was crazy. I ~ 4040 JK:JK: That'sThat's '67.'67. AndAnd soso whatwhat II waswas wonderingwondering isis thatthat ifif therethere waswas aa changechange inin thethe

approachapproach ofof thethe mediamedia becausebecause ofof thingsthings likelike this?this?

AO:AO: Exactly,Exactly, that'sthat's aa goodgood example.example. InIn 1967,1967, peoplepeople werewere completelycompletely tminformedtminformed aboutabout whatwhat waswas goinggoing on,on, completelycompletely putput inin thethe dark,dark, soso theythey werewere leftleft toto theirtheir

imagination.imagination. II mean,mean, II remember,remember, oneone timetime inin mymy hometownhometown inin NablusNablus whenwhen IsraeliIsraeli tankstanks camecame intointo thethe city,city, theythey thoughtthought theythey werewere AlgerianAlgerian tanks.tanks.

JK:JK: WhenWhen waswas this?this?

AO:AO: InIn '67.'67. AndAnd thatthat isis thethe bestbest evidenceevidence toto telltell youyou howhow peoplepeople werewere unawareunaware ofof whatwhat waswas goinggoing onon aroundaround them.them. NowNow comparecompare thisthis situationsituation withwith 1973,1973, thethe mediamedia waswas moremore accurate,accurate, notnot completelycompletely butbut moremore accurate,accurate, lessless rhetoricrhetoric andand moremore humanhuman inin theirtheir approach,approach, asas II toldtold you earlier.earlier. ThatThat hashas beenbeen thethe change.change.

JK:JK: II thinkthink thatthat waswas anan importantimportant aspectaspect ofof anan importantimportant change.change. So,So, whenwhen SadatSadat enteredentered intointo negotiationsnegotiations toto endend thethe warwar whatwhat waswas Jordan'sJordan's responseresponse toto that?that?

AO:AO: WeWe thoughtthought thatthat waswas aa goodgood beginningbeginning forfor diplomaticdiplomatic effortsefforts thatthat mightmight comecome toto aa fruitionfruition whichwhich thethe SpecialSpecial RepresentativeRepresentative ofof thethe Secretary-General,Secretary-General, AmbassadorAmbassador GunnarGunnar

Jarring,Jarring, ofof Sweden,Sweden, failedfailed toto achieveachieve afterafter 1967,1967, onon thethe basisbasis ofof 242.242. SoSo itit gavegave usus hopehope thatthat whatwhat GunnarGunnar JarringJarring failedfailed toto do,do, thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates maymay succeedsucceed toto achieveachieve becausebecause

4141 r

r thethe United States was involvedinvolved inin thethe peacemaking efforts. Because of that,that, we, inin J Jordan,Jordan, wanted toto be part of thethe process, because we wanted toto get back our territory,territory, thethe r West Bank which was occupied inin 1967, as soonsoon as possible. J JK:JK: Then after that,that, President Sadat made a triptrip toto Jerusalem.Jerusalem.

J AO: That was 1977, fourfour years later.later. But after 1973, somesome importantimportant thingsthings tooktook

place. Mainly thatthat Henry Kissinger focusedfocused on a number of things.things. One of themthem was toto I1 , create a forum,forum, a symbolicsymbolic umbrella, forfor step-by-stepstep-by-step negotiations. Hence was thethe Geneva Conference inin September 21, 1973. Kissinger wanted toto liftlift thethe Arab embargo J on oil because therethere was an oil embargo during thethe October war, imposedimposed by thethe Arabs. ~- Kissinger wanted thethe American people toto believe thatthat American involvementinvolvement inin thethe peace

process was seriousserious thisthis timetime and not motivated by thethe oil embargo, but ratherrather by thethe

I~. general interestinterest of thethe United States inin thethe Middle East. He wanted, also, toto make thethe

Arabs believe thatthat theythey are respondingresponding positively thisthis time,time, not because of theirtheir own I­ embargo but because theythey wanted toto make realreal peace inin thethe Middle East. And theythey rn wanted at thethe samesame timetime toto letlet thethe Soviet Union feelfeel thatthat itit was not excluded fromfrom

peacemaking while practically itit was fullyfully excluded fromfrom it.it. So thatthat was thethe objective of I% thethe Nixon administration, which was implementedimplemented by Henry Kissinger. Now, during his I, efforts, JordanJordan thatthat did not open a frontfront against IsraelIsrael inin thethe 1973 war, but sentsent

I contingents toto thethe Syrian frontfront toto defend thethe Syrian territoryterritory against thethe IsraeliIsraeli offensive,

was excluded fromfrom thethe disengagement agreements. Ir ,~ ·.') I,I

42

,%,- JK: So Jordan did send contingents to Syria.

AO: Jordan sent the contingents to defend the Syrians when the Israeli counter-attacker came into effect after the Americans sent weapons to Israel. Jordan sent a contingent to

Syria to help the Syrians defend their territory. At the same time, Jordan did not open a front along its cease-fire line with Israel. Because the Americans told Jordan, or relayed to Jordan an Israeli message that the Israelis were afraid that Jordan might open a front here. The Israeli message to Jordan was "If you open a front against us along the cease­ fire lines, that would threaten the heart of Israel, in this case Israel would turn itit major power against Jordan to destroy it and then go back to fight its battle against thethe

Egyptians and the Syrians. So Jordan couldn't open a front. Now, we come back toto thethe

American initiative carried out by Henry Kissinger. Jordan was happy thatthat a new diplomatic effort was to begin; that effort might achieve what Gunnar Jarring failedfailed toto achieve and Jordan will get to be a part of thisthis effort. At one point, Henry Kissinger relayed to King Hussein a message fromfrom thethe government of IsraelIsrael thatthat Jordan thatthat did not fight in the war, was not entitled toto a disengagement agreement. So Jordan said, "Oh

God, was that our reward because we didn't fightfight against IsraelIsrael along our front?"front?"

Later on, thethe IsraelisIsraelis came up with a proposal, something thatthat Kissinger more or less endorsed. The proposal was toto have IsraelIsrael and Jordan engaged inin administrative disengagement, not a military disengagement. What does thatthat mean? Three military disengagement agreements were signed by Israel,Israel, Egypt and Syria. Two werewere withwith IsraelIsrael and Egypt and one between IsraelIsrael and Syria. By thethe disengagement agreement,agreement, IsraeliIsraeli forcesforces withdrew fromfrom certain territoriesterritories thatthat theythey had occupied.occupied. JordanJordan wanted toto bebe

4343 another party toto thethe military disengagement agreement and suggested thatthat Israel withdraw

between eight toto tenten kilometers parallel toto thethe River Jordan, as a beginning of a

Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty.treaty. But thethe counter proposal from Israel was "No, we

wouldn't withdraw from our positions along thethe River Jordan, insteadinstead we would agree on

administrative disengagement. What does thatthat mean? Israel would withdraw from

certain cities and villages where Jordan would go inin and administer, taketake over thethe

administration of thosethose cities while thethe Israeli troopstroops would keep theirtheir positions around

thosethose populated centers and along thethe Jordan River.

Jordan refused because thatthat meant Jordan would do thethe jobjob of thethe Israelis who

were still occupying thethe land,land, inin keeping thethe security of thethe cities. At thethe same time,time, thethe

Arab states inin twotwo consecutive summits, one inin Algeria inin November 1973, justjust after thethe

October war and another one thethe next year inin October '74'74 inin Rabat, Morocco, decided toto

consider thethe PLO as thethe sole representative of thethe Palestinian people which impliedimplied thatthat

Jordan was not responsible for thethe West Bank. That ingredientingredient became a central element

inin Arab politics. Since thenthen Jordan and thethe PLO wrestled over thethe West Bank. That fact

persisted until 1988 when King Hussein announced inin a historic speech thatthat Jordan

decided toto terminateterminate itsits legallegal and administrative tiesties with thethe West Bank and toto give thethe

responsibility of regaining itit toto thethe PLO. For fifteen years, thethe Arab summit decision has

governed thethe Palestinian-Jordanian relationship as well as inin many cases, thethe Jordanian­

Arab relationship inin Arab politics over thethe Palestinian situation. These are importantimportant juncturesjunctures inin thethe history of thethe Middle East. Now we go back toto Sadat, and when Sadat went toto Jerusalem inin 1977.

44 JK: In '77.'77. Did Sadat consult with King Hussein before going?

AO: No. But Sadat announced, ifif you remember, announced thatthat during an interviewinterview with Barbara WaltersWaiters on ABC thatthat he was ready toto go toto Israel as far as Jerusalem and announce maybe his good intentionsintentions about peacemaking with Israel. Some people tooktook itit seriously and some people not. So, we learnedlearned from thethe media, likelike others, we were not privy toto what he was planning to do.

JK: What was Jordan's response thenthen toto his visit?

AO: We were really stunned because we tooktook itit as a first sign thatthat Sadat would go unilaterally inin peacemaking with Israel, which toto us meant thatthat thethe Arab position would be weakened because when Egypt went out of thethe gate 8l1d went toto peacemaking unilaterally, thethe Syrian and Jordanian position would be weakened. That's why thethe Arab reaction toto thethe Sadat initiativeinitiative was an Arab Summit inin Baghdad, inin which thethe Arabs tooktook a position toto castigate Egypt, toto punish itit and toto move thethe headquarters of thethe Arab

League from Cairo toto Tunisia.

JK: That decision was takentaken inin Baghdad.

AO: At thethe same time,time, thethe Arab oil countries tooktook thethe position toto strengthen thethe other states likelike JJordan,ardan, Syria and thethe PLO financially, toto make themthem capable of defending themselvesthemselves after being weakened due toto thethe Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.treaty. So, theythey got

45 committed to a ten-year financial aid toto thesethese threethree parties,parties, Jordan,Jordan, SyriaSyria andand thethe PLO.PLO.

Saudi Arabia, only Saudi Arabia, livedlived upup toto itsits commitmentcommitment forfor tenten years.years. OtherOther ArabArab countries like Libya, Algeria and other oiloil statesstates inin thethe GulfGulf diddid not.not. SomeSome ofof themthem diddid for a while like Qatar, thethe Emirates, Kuwait, andand Iraq.Iraq. ButBut forfor somesome years,years, IraqIraq continuedcontinued to be committed to Jordan, but not toto Syria becausebecause ofof thethe Iraq/IranIraq/Iran War.War. TheThe IraqisIraqis werewere financially in a bad situation. But countries likelike Kuwait,Kuwait, likelike Qatar,Qatar, likelike Emirates,Emirates, II thinkthink in 1982, they stopped paying. Libya didn'tdidn't paypay oneone singlesingle pennypenny rightright fromfrom thethe beginning. Algeria paid one or twotwo installments.installments. ButBut SaudiSaudi ArabiaArabia waswas thethe onlyonly countrycountry that kept its commitments until thethe end, lmtil1989.lmtil1989.

JK: So by Sadat coming intointo Jerusalem itit waswas prettypretty muchmuch indicatedindicated thatthat therethere wouldwould be an agreement, and thenthen when Camp David tooktook placeplace itit waswas notnot unexpected.unexpected.

AO:Aa: It was not unexpected because thisthis visitvisit toto JerusalemJerusalem waswas soso obviousobvious thatthat SadatSadat would go it alone. If you go back toto thethe minutesminutes ofof thethe negotiationsnegotiations oror whatwhat waswas writtenwritten about the Camp David negotiations, Sadat waswas veryvery muchmuch seriousserious andand sensitivesensitive toto thethe question of not turning down thethe Palestinians. SadatSadat waswas veryvery sensitivesensitive toto thethe ideaidea thatthat hehe would not be seen as one who turnedturned down thethe PalestinianPalestinian question.question. HeHe wantedwanted aa linkagelinkage between his agreement with IsraelIsrael and thethe PalestinianPalestinian question.question. HeHe waswas insistinginsisting onon it.it.

JK: So there's a piece ofthatthat inin thethe ......

4646 I

I AO:AO: That's whywhy therethere werewere twotwo agreements,agreements, inin fact.fact. TheThe frameworkframework agreementagreement I betweenbetween EgyptEgypt andand IsraelIsrael andand thethe agreementagreement onon thethe self-ruleself-rule inin Palestine,Palestine, onon thethe WestWest BankBank andand Gaza.Gaza. ThatThat waswas thethe linkage.linkage. TheThe wholewhole ideaidea waswas thatthat EgyptEgypt waswas involvedinvolved inin J thethe whole Arab-Israeli conflict because ofof thethe PalestinianPalestinian question.question. So,So, SadatSadat didn'tdidn't wantwant J toto reachreach peace with IsraelIsrael withoutwithout addressingaddressing thethe originaloriginal causecause ofof thethe EgyptianEgyptian involvementinvolvement of thethe Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli conflict,conflict, that'sthat's thethe PalestinianPalestinian question.question. HeHe waswas soso keenkeen r on having somethingsomething workedworked out.out. OfOf course,course, whatwhat hehe andand IsraelIsrael reachedreached aboutabout thethe J Palestinian questionquestion (the(the self-ruleself-rule agreement)agreement) waswas notnot acceptedaccepted by thethe Palestinians,Palestinians, waswas not accepted by Jordanians,Jordanians, was not accepted by thethe Arabs, but he reachedreached somethingsomething toto

J indicateindicate thatthat he had not neglected thethe major issueissue inin thethe Arab-Israeli conflict.conflict. J J JK:JK: Now you mentioned thatthat thethe Arab, oiloil producing ArabArab countriescountries hadhad takentaken onon aa commitment toto economically help certain of thethe other Arab countries. Why was thatthat a

I critical issueissue after Camp David? I AO: It was importantimportant toto strengthenstrengthen thethe confrontation states,states, thosethose who are confronting

I Israel and who had landland or territoryterritory lostlost toto Israel inin 1967 war. You have toto have themthem I strong enough toto defend themselvesthemselves and toto prepare for thethe futurefuture toto regainregain theirtheir I territories.territories.

I JK: Was thisthis inin termsterms of economic aid? I AO: Financial.

­ 47 ~ JK: Financial aid and was this used for economic development or military development?

AO: Both. I think Jordan was allocated 1.1 billion dollars, and Syria 1.8 billion dollars, I heard the PLO got 300 million dollars. But as I said, not all donors lived up to their commitments.

JK: It is interesting to have your analysis as you put things together. Now another issue that's an important issue which we haven't really discussed, is the issue of water.

AO: I think the issue of water is a central issue, in the conflict and the peacemaking.

And also it is central if we want to interpret Israeli political behavior in the peace negotiations, especially over the Arab territories that Israel still occupies: the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and South Lebanon. Part of Israel's insistence to keep certain territories is due to the fact that these territories include sources of water that the Israelis use.

JK: In terms of resolving some of these issues, is there a UN role for reading some kind of solution to the sharing of the water?

AO: So far, the United Nations has been intentionally excluded by Israel with the help of the United States.

48 JK: Why isis that?that?

AO: The IsraeliIsraeli rationalerationale which IsraelIsrael sold toto thethe Americans was thatthat thethe United

Nations would not help toto bring thethe Arabs toto negotiate directly with Israel.Israel. And toto end thisthis conflict according toto thisthis rationalerationale isis a must. That was thethe firstfirst principle thatthat thethe

IsraelisIsraelis stuck toto throughoutthroughout thethe whole period since 1967. And thethe second second principle theythey adhered toto was toto negotiate individuallyindividually with each Arab state, not as a whole. The

Americans adopted thesethese twotwo principles, excluding thethe United Nations and supporting

IsraelIsrael toto negotiate individuallyindividually with thethe Arab states. That started inin Camp David and itit was institutionalizedinstitutionalized at thethe Madrid Conference when thethe Madrid Conference established thethe use of twotwo typestypes of tracks,tracks, a multilateral tracktrack and bilateral tracks,tracks, thethe Syrian-Israeli track,track, thethe Lebanese-Israeli track,track, a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli track,track, (the(the Jordanian and

Palestinian tracktrack was split intointo two,two, throughthrough thethe back channel which thethe PLO and IsraelIsrael had inin Oslo). The Jordanian-Israeli track,track, of course, came toto an end when Jordan and

IsraelIsrael concluded a peace treaty.treaty. Now we have thethe Palestinians-Israeli track;track; we have thethe

Syrian-Israeli track;track; and we have thethe Lebanese-Israeli track.track.

JK: So, even over issuesissues of water, of sharing water resources,resources, between Jordan and

Israel,Israel, thethe UN had been rejected.rejected.

AD: According toto Madrid, thethe Madrid Forum, as II said therethere are twotwo typestypes of tracks,tracks, bilateral and multilateral. InIn thethe Jordan-Israel tracktrack some issuesissues of water considering thethe

49 twotwo countries were discussed and theythey reached certain agreements but thethe water issueissue isis beyond thethe bilateral interest,interest, it'sit's multilateral, because thethe sources of water for example, thethe Yarmuk River comes from Syria, mainly from Syria, and from Jordan but itit goes down as a tributarytributary toto thethe Jordan River, where Israel takestakes a share from itit and Jordan gets itsits share and thethe Palestinians should benefit from it.it. That's why water isis also a major issueissue inin thethe multilateral track.track. In thethe multilateral track,track, therethere are I thinkthink twelvetwelve toto fourteen Arab state and other countries likelike Canada, Japan, France, Germany, United

States. So that'sthat's why itit isis multilateral. What does thethe ideaidea of a multilateral tracktrack reflect?

ItIt reflects thethe internationalinternational involvementinvolvement inin issuesissues thatthat have multilateral nature, likelike water, security, likelike development, likelike environment. These are multilateral issues.issues.

JK: So, would Jordan be interestedinterested inin a UN role inin this?this?

AO: Sure, we believe thatthat thethe UN should have a role. From our point of view as

Arabs, thethe UN has a dormant role, at least.least. It isis a reservoir of internationalinternational legitimacylegitimacy of thethe internationalinternational lawlaw because thethe UN resolutions are part of internationalinternational lawlaw and thethe

United Nations isis thethe reservoir of internationalinternational legitimacy.legitimacy. This isis our view, but itit isis dormant? We are ready toto resort toto itit every now and then.then. But I believe, at one point, down thethe road, ifif thingsthings go thethe right way and bilaterally talkstalks come toto fruition, thethe United

Nations should playaplay a more visible role, a more substantive role inin peace arrangements, security arrangements, inin water, inin thethe refugee problem, inin environment. InIn other words, itit isis more acceptable toto thethe Arabs and itit should be toto thethe Israelis thatthat thoughthough thethe United

50 Nations was excluded from peacemaking, itit should not be excluded from peace maintenance and peace-building.

JK: Well thethe UN has had a presence for since thethe beginning basically inin UNTSO.

AO: This conflict isis thethe oldest inin thethe United Nations among other issues.issues. The United

Nations was established inin 1945, and as of 1947 thethe Arab-Israeli conflict has been there,there, until, thisthis moment.

JK: So, well thenthen as longlong as we have worked our way up toto more recent history, can you describe thethe peace arrangement between Jordan and Israel and how thatthat came toto thethe moment ripened for thatthat toto happen? What were thethe elements thatthat came togethertogether at thethe time.time.

AO: Let's go back toto my basic thesisthesis thatthat thethe Sykes-Picot and Balfour Declaration produced twotwo countries for threethree peoples. The triangulartriangular interactioninteraction was sparked from thisthis reality. For seven decades, thisthis triangulartriangular interactioninteraction was marked by adversity, conflict. Now when we set out for peacemaking, thethe adversity of thatthat triangulartriangular interactioninteraction started toto taketake a different direction, a direction for interdependentinterdependent cooperation.

This isis best manifested now between Jordan and Israel. The thirdthird party thatthat isis thethe

Palestinian party, isis still within thethe bOlmdaries of thethe adverse interaction,interaction, more within them,them, more within thethe adverse interactioninteraction rather thanthan thethe cooperative one. Why?

Because until now, Israel ...... no, letlet me put itit thisthis way...... Until now, Israel has not accepted

51 j

i the establishment of a Palestinian state, to have a full fledged partner in this triangular J interdependent cooperative interaction. So, first things first, before we reached a comprehensive triangular cooperative

I interaction, the third party should have its seat in this space in the room to be equal and to I deal with the other two on equal footing, this lacking element is now in the hands of Israel. That at least was thought to happen under Rabin's administration, because Rabin

i was the Israeli leader who reversed the trend of the Israeli thinking after 1967 that was I based on the fear that the Palestinians were an obstacle to be removed or obstruction to be i bypassed rather than a partner to cooperate with. He reversed this trend and also by accepting the Palestinians as a partner, when Rabin was assassinated, and elections took I place in Israel and a new Prime Minister was elected, Mr. Netanyahu, he reversed Rabin's I orientation and brought us back to square one where he believes that the Palestinians should be largely bypassed by giving them a sort of self-rule but under the Israeli

I sovereignty. So, he has obstructed the momentum that was created by the Oslo I Agreement between Rabin and the PLO. This is the most unfortunate happening since Oslo, it is more than a snag. It's a new policy that is really threatening the whole peace I,"" m process. I I JK: All right then how does that fit in then the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty?

I AO: The Jordanian-Israeli treaty went the right way. Jordan and Israel moved from adverse interaction into cooperative interaction, that was manifested in twenty, at least ','I~ , twenty agreements based on the peace treaty between the two countries, which 52 f I I characterized the concept of complementarily in infrastructure, economics, etc. Now then ~ we come to the reality of how the Israelis and the Jordanian are implementing the agreements, according the papers today, the Minister of Commerce, the Jordanian

Minister of Commerce is accusing Israel that it is obstructing the development of trade IIT I between the two countries. It's unbelievable that this is happening

~ JK: So that is going through more than a snag, I AO: Yes, well in fact, the basics were agreed upon but when itit comes down toto ~ implementation, the Israelis are obstructing it. I JK: In the building up to the Oslo Agreements and the agreements between Jordan and

Iy- Israel, what kind of role did the Gulf War play in '91?'91? E I AO: Oh, it played a very interesting role, a very importantimportant role.role. ItIt made itit possible forfor Madrid to convene. E I JK: In what way did itit make itit possible?

I AO: Iraq was thethe party toto reckonreckon with when itit comes toto thethe solution ofof thethe Arab-IsraeliArab-Israeli I conflict. IraqIraq was always characterized as a belligerent party. WhenWhen IraqIraq waswas destroyeddestroyed I in thethe war, thisthis actor was weakened. Number two,two, thethe warwar amongamong otherother thingsthings sortedsorted outout thethe Arab world intointo twotwo camps. One camp chose toto joinjoin thethe American-ledAmerican-led alliancealliance againstagainst I I 5353 IraqIraq includingincluding EgyptEgypt andand SyriaSyria andand thethe otherother campcamp diddid notnot acceptaccept toto joinjoin itit andand stuckstuck toto anan

ArabArab solutionsolution ofof whichwhich JordanJordan waswas one.one. Psychologically,Psychologically, thisthis splitsplit meantmeant oneone importantimportant thing,thing, thethe ArabArab constraintconstraint hashas eroded,eroded, thethe ArabArab constraintconstraint on JordanJordan toto make peace with

IsraelIsrael has eroded because IraqIraq was not there.there. Syria could not outbid Jordan on making peace with IsraelIsrael because JordanJordan could telltell Syria; "Well"Well you were with Americans while we were not inin thethe Gulf." So, thethe Arab constraint on JordanJordan had eroded inin Kuwait.

JK:JK: So thatthat was it.it.

AO:AO: AndAnd therethere waswas nono SovietSoviet UnionUnion atat all.all. TheThe demisedemise ofof thethe SovietSoviet UnionUnion waswas anotheranother factorfactor andand bothboth coincided.coincided. TheThe GulfGulf WarWar andand thethe demisedemise ofof thethe SovietSoviet UnionUnion coincided.coincided. So,So, anotheranother constraintconstraint hadhad vanished,vanished, thethe SovietSoviet constraint.constraint.

JK:JK: SoSo whywhy diddid JordanJordan taketake thethe positionposition of,of, asas II don'tdon't know,know, II thinkthink youyou saidsaid sidingsiding withwith Iraq,Iraq, butbut howeverhowever youyou wantwant toto saysay it.it.

AO:AO: NotNot sidedsided withwith Iraq,Iraq, JordanJordan sidedsided withwith thethe conceptconcept thatthat anan ArabArab solutionsolution shouldshould bebe adopted,adopted, notnot anan internationalinternational one.one. ThatThat waswas thethe position.position.

JK:JK: Didn'tDidn't thethe ArabArab LeagueLeague meetmeet atat thethe timetime toto trytry andand comecome upup withwith aa solution?solution?

AO:AO: Yes,Yes, theythey metmet sixsix oror sevenseven daysdays afterafter thethe IraqiIraqi invasioninvasion ofof KuwaitKuwait andand theythey disagreeddisagreed onon whatwhat toto do.do. ItIt waswas split.split.

5454 JK: Why was therethere thatthat split?

AO: Here, II don't want toto speak forfor other countries. II would guess as an observer thatthat each individual Arab country had toto looklook intointo itsits own interests.interests. Many of themthem were very much keen toto maintain thethe best relationsrelations with thethe United States of America at thatthat timetime and thethe best relationsrelations with Saudi Arabia and thethe Gulf states thatthat needed thethe defense and thethe protection of thethe internationalinternational community.

JK: So theythey were fearfulfearful ofIraq?

AO: No, theythey were not fearfulfearful ofIraq. These cOlmtries cared more about theirtheir bilateral interestsinterests with actors, likelike thethe United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait and other ratherrather thanthan fearfulfearful of Iraq. But thosethose who were fearfulfearful of IraqIraq are thethe Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, forfor good reasonsreasons but not Egypt, or Syria, or Morocco. They had theirtheir interests,interests, bilateral interests.interests.

JK: But Jordan shares a border with Iraq.Iraq.

AO: That's right,right, we share borders with Iraq.Iraq. We were not fearfulfearful of Iraq.Iraq.

JK: Why not?

55 AO: Because we knew better than the others that the Iraqis made a major mistake by

invading, that the Iraqis couldn't hold onto the Kuwaiti territory, that the Americans were

serious about evicting Iraq from Kuwait and that Iraq would be destroyed. In fact, King

Hussein advised President Saddam against staying in Kuwait and asked him to withdraw

from it. In a letter that was submitted to the Iraqi leader in September 1990. It was

published later on in the White Paper that Jordan published about Jordan and the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait.

End of Tape 2, Side 1

JK: The Arab League had not been able to reach a solution in their meetings in August

of 1990.

AD: Yes, that'sthat's right.right.

JK: So, once itit was clear thatthat thethe Arab League or thethe Arab world were not going toto

comecome upup withwith aa solution,solution, whywhy diddid JordanJordan adhereadhere toto thatthat position?position?

AD:AD: Well,Well, becausebecause ifif JordanJordan wentwent withwith American-ledAmerican-led alliance,alliance, JordanJordan wouldwould havehave lostlost

anyany possibilitypossibility toto becomebecome anan acceptedaccepted brokerbroker becausebecause wewe thoughtthought thatthat eveneven thethe AmericansAmericans

mightmight needneed aa middlemiddle man,man, atat oneone point.point. IfIfyouyou areare committedcommitted toto oneone side,side, youyou willwill notnot bebe aa

crediblecredible broker.broker. ThatThat waswas howhow wewe lookedlooked atat thingsthings atat thatthat time.time. OfOf course,course, wewe diddid notnot attachattach muchmuch significance,significance, oror enoughenough significance,significance, toto thethe factfact thatthat thethe AmericansAmericans hadhad

5656 subliminal objectives. ItIt was not only thatthat theythey were lookinglooking toto removeremove IraqIraq fromfrom

Kuwait, itit was more thanthan that.that. We were not aware of it.it.

JK: So you were not aware of thethe other implicationsimplications of thethe decision toto actually carry out thethe attack.

AO: Not thethe implications,implications, but thethe subliminal objectives which of course were revealedrevealed rightright after thethe war and still theythey persist until today.today. The Arabs only recentlyrecently realized, thatthat thethe Americans had subliminal objectives. The objective was not only liberatingliberating Kuwait, itit was also thethe destruction of thethe military and technologicaltechnological capabilities of IraqIraq and also thethe removalremoval of thethe regimeregime of Iraq.Iraq. The perception of thethe Arabs as toto thethe American subliminal objectives are responsibleresponsible nowadays forfor explaining thethe Arab behavior towardstowards thethe lastlast stand off between thethe United States of America and Iraq.Iraq.

JK: This isis justjust a fewfew months, a fewfew weeks ago. [In[In thethe early months of 1998, thethe US had threatenedthreatened toto attack IraqIraq ifif itit continued toto bar UN inspectorsinspectors fromfrom doing theirtheir investigationsinvestigations intointo Iraq'sIraq's weapons of mass destruction.]

AO: Yes, that'sthat's right,right, until today.today. IfIf thethe Arabs now are asked about thethe issue theythey will telltell you, "Well, thethe ideaidea was toto liberateliberate Kuwait and Kuwait was liberated."liberated." There are

Security Council resolutionsresolutions toto destroy weapons of mass-destruction. OK, that'sthat's fine,fine, theythey should be destroyed. But what we see now isis thethe call forfor an interventionintervention inin thethe internalinternal affairs of a country. We are afraid of this,this, because by thethe same token,token, thethe

57 Americans can find a reason toto interfereinterfere inin mymy countrycountry andand inin youryour country.country. So,So, theythey don't like it.

JK: With the recent events which, forfor thisthis tapetape wewe cancan explain,explain, isis thatthat therethere waswas aa stand-off between Iraq, or Saddam Hussein, UNSCOMUNSCOM oror thethe inspectorsinspectors toto getget intointo certain sites. The result twotwo weeks ago that,that, atat leastleast forfor thethe timetime being,being, Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General

Kofi Annan managed toto get was that,that, inin thisthis particularparticular case,case, aa numbernumber ofof countriescountries inin thethe

Arab world were not willing toto letlet thethe United StatesStates useuse certaincertain basesbases forfor launching launching aa newnew attack.

AO: That's right. In fact, thethe Arab position waswas toto sendsend aa messagemessage toto thethe AmericansAmericans that the issue as it stands isis an American-Iraqi issue,issue, whilewhile inin realityreality itit shouldshould bebe aa UnitedUnited

Nations-Iraqi issue. The Arabs view thethe American interventionintervention asas oneone thatthat aimsaims atat thethe change of the regime, thethe intervention,intervention, emasculating IraqIraq forfor good.good. SomeSome ofof themthem eveneven link this to the Israeli objectives inin Iraq.Iraq. America isis beingbeing seenseen nownow withwith IsraelIsrael asas oneone party against an Arab country.

JK: That's the view from thethe Arab world.

AO: That's why the Iraqis as well as thethe ArabsArabs wantedwanted toto re-establishre-establish thethe factfact thatthat thethe question is a UN question. It'sIt's a UN responsibilityresponsibility notnot anan AmericanAmerican responsibility,responsibility, because that's safer. We would feelfeel safersafer withwith thethe U1\JUN asas thethe otherother partyparty toto thethe standstand offoff rather than America as thethe second party.

5858 JK: So you mentioned thethe issueissue of sovereignty,sovereignty, thatthat ifif thethe UNUN oror thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates isis allowed to interfere with thethe sovereignty ofof IraqIraq whatwhat wouldwould preventprevent itit fromfrom interferinginterfering with the sovereignty of thethe other countries? SoSo thatthat hashas becomebecome anotheranother issue.issue.

AO: That has become an obsession. ItIt meansmeans thatthat youyou areare legitimizing,legitimizing, andand licensinglicensing the strong guy's interventionintervention (that's(that's America) inin anyany otherother country.country. WhoWho knows,knows, oneone dayday the United States would say to thethe Syrians, "your"your countrycountry diddid so-and-so"so-and-so" andand theythey trytry toto mobilize the United Nations behind themthem while,while, inin fact,fact, thethe policypolicy isis anan AmericanAmerican policypolicy and the Americans can mobilize thethe United NationsNations inin theirtheir ownown way.way. TheyThey willwill findfind thethe

British as the first one toto support themthem and thenthen theythey getget thethe supportsupport ofof CostaCosta RicaRica onon thethe phone and the support of Micronesia on thethe phone.phone. PeoplePeople areare awareaware ofof allall thesethese things.things.

There is a majority thatthat America can bring toto itsits sideside onon thethe phone,phone, includingincluding somesome ArabArab countries. This perception isis now flourishingflourishing andand takingtaking rootsroots inin thethe ArabArab politicalpolitical arena.arena.

It is revealed daily inin thethe daily Arab papers.

JK: OK then leading intointo that,that, letlet me askask youyou aa reallyreally ratherrather bigbig question,question, butbut itit hashas toto do with the end of thethe Cold War. You mentionedmentioned thatthat thethe coincidingcoinciding ofof thethe GulfGulf WarWar with the dissolution of thethe Soviet Union, inin factfact hadhad aa positivepositive elementelement thatthat isis laidlaid thethe ground work for Jordan and IsraelIsrael toto come toto anan agreement.agreement.

AO: It laid the grounds forfor a more seriousserious efforteffort forfor aa diplomaticdiplomatic solution,solution, forfor thethe convention of the Madrid Conference.

5959 ~.

J ~ JK: In that sense there was a positive element to the ending of the Cold War but, now how is the UN viewed and the permanent members of the Security Council viewed now?

~ The Cold War has ended, so the stalemate between the East and West has ended as far the

~. Security Council is concerned. Is that completely viewed positively or are there parts of

that which may appear negative? ~ !;

~ AO: Yes, to the Arabs, only recently they start to feel that it was negative to have one

super power. Recently they have started to write some articles and hold symposia where I1 theythey bring up thisthis issue?issue? Why at this time?time? I guess itit has to do with what happened

I recentlyrecently inin Iraq. When Yeltsin came up with the view that if the United States will go I unilaterally toto strike Iraq militarily thatthat might end up in a World War. Yeltsin's threat was not serious,serious, but God, when therethere isis another super power it's to the benefit of the

I weak states.states. ItIt isis safersafer forfor themthem because therethere isis another power to check the giant from I going umestrained inin itsits policies and subduing others. That has been very recent and came as a resultresult ofthe latestlatest standoffstandoff between IraqIraq and thethe United States. I I JK:JK: ThisThis bringsbrings me toto another question having toto do with thethe United Nations, because I thisthis interviewinterview isis underunder thethe auspices of thethe United Nations. There's been a lotlot of criticism byby thosethose whowho areare notnot permanentpermanent members of thethe Security Council, thatthat thethe permanent I members,members, thethe fivefive permanentpermanent members,members, have thethe veto. So one member can stop I somethingsomething fromfrom happeninghappening andand thatthat youyou don'tdon't have a simplesimple majority necessarily toto pass a resolution,resolution, SoSo whatwhat youyou areare justjust talkingtalking about.about. .... I 60 I AO: IsIs thatthat itit isis good toto have thethe veto power.

JK: So may be itit may be inin certain kinds of circumstances, itit isis not so bad.

AO: No, as II said, thisthis has been recent.recent. ItIt started only three,three, fourfour weeks ago. That's

thethe logiclogic of it.it. You see, thethe Americans at leastleast were restrainedrestrained by such a statement given

by a nuclear power likelike thethe Soviet Union, likelike Russia. "There might be another world

war," he said. People started toto remember,remember, oh God when we had thethe Soviet Union, we 1\ were inin a safer world thanthan thethe world of todaytoday where thethe policies of thethe United States go

unchecked. This isis a new phenomenon inin thinkingthinking globally.

JK: InIn order toto avoid thethe veto, inin thisthis particular case as an example, inin order toto avoid

it,it, thethe United States had toto negotiate.

AO: That's thethe meaning of it,it, to have a compromise, toto lowerlower itsits ceiling of objectives,

toto be able not toto have thethe veto. The United States was aware ofthis.this. IfIfyOll yon rememberremember thethe

U.S. continued toto say until todaytoday thatthat theythey don't need ifif theythey were toto strike militarily, theythey

don't need another resolutionresolution fromfrom thethe Security Council. That isis thethe American position.

They don't need itit but, thethe other members said toto them:them: "No you have toto ask forfor or

consult with thethe other Security Council members." InIn other words itit isis invokinginvoking thethe

power of thethe veto of thethe other side. On thethe side ofAmerica, itit isis evading thethe power of thethe

veto of others who do not see eye toto eye with thethe United States' position.

61 JK:JK: But thethe United States needs thethe legitimacylegitimacy ofof thethe internationalinternational community.community.

AO: That's right. But again, therethere are a lotlot of ironiesironies inin this.this. While theythey need thethe legitimacylegitimacy of thethe United Nations, while theythey use thethe United Nations toto justifYjustify formallyformally theirtheir actions outside, you have thethe Congress who refrainsrefrains fromfrom livingliving up toto thethe AmericanAmerican commitment toto financingfinancing thethe United Nations. So thisthis isis America,America, wherewhere youryour StateState

Secretary Albright sayssays somethingsomething and Senator LottLort sayssays somethingsomething else.else. ThereThere isis alsoalso thethe problem of American politics itself,itself, thethe Congress versus thethe White House. II think,think, since thethe end of thethe cold war, only seven years has elapsed now. II thinkthink itit will taketake

America several years inin order toto establish new norms forfor thethe administration: 1) versus thethe Congress, and 2) versus thethe United Nations. As an observer fromfrom outside, II noticed that such a formula has not materialized yet, and still it'sit's inin itsits thethe adolescent phase, maturity hasn't been reached yet. That's what I feel. ItIt was a mere coincidence toto be inin thethe States for thethe lastlast six years. I was therethere from 1992 until lastlast month, when II came home. I had been therethere watching, listeninglistening and readingreading thethe debates inin thethe Congress here and there, the statements given by thethe State Department or by thethe White House. You could see there are differences of attitudes on how toto deal with thethe United Nations. II remember that famous slogan, "How can we accept toto have American troopstroops ledled by thethe

United Nations? By some foreigners?" Such statements were used by thosethose who were against sending American troopstroops toto Bosnia. You could see thatthat thethe rules of how toto deal with the United Nations after the demise of the Soviet Union, have not been agreed upon in the United States itself, not yet.

62 JK: Well we are coming toto thethe end of the interview,interview, pretty close. II was thinkingthinking of a way toto summarize this,this, I'm not sure therethere is,is, but, how would you view inin retrospectretrospect thethe rolerole thethe UJ"fDJ"!" has played inin thethe Middle East? Have theythey been a positive forceforce inin thethe Middle

East or have theythey been forfor all essential purposes been kept toto thethe sidelines?

AO: You know thethe United Nations isis itsits members, itit isis not a separate entity. InIn fact,fact, at one point itit isis usually thethe fivefive permanent members. No matter what, II thinkthink thethe United

Nations has played a positive role.role. Simply because inin thethe worst-case scenario, itit posed as a sanctuary where people rightlyrightly or wrongly believed thatthat theirtheir problem could be solved.

JK: You were saying thatthat thethe United Nations isis reallyreally thethe member states.

AO: Yes. ItIt isis thethe member states ofthethe world. But nevertheless, inin my opinion, inin thethe worst-case scenario, thosethose who believe thatthat theythey were unjustly treatedtreated by theirtheir neighbor or theirtheir region,region, theythey would findfind thethe United Nations, as a refugerefuge throughthrough which theythey can resolveresolve theirtheir problems. Whether or not theirtheir problem isis solved, still theythey resortresort toto it.it. ItIt nourishes their hope thatthat a solution will come. And thethe other factorfactor which II mentioned casually, itit continues toto constitute a reservoirreservoir of intemationallegitimacy,intemationallegitimacy, which isis inin our world, inin our globe inin which we are livingliving todaytoday isis thethe only thingthing we have thatthat will make itit possible forfor us all toto livelive as civilized peoples or nations. We need thisthis institution;institution; otherwise thethe lawlaw of thethe junglejungle will prevail. So, thethe United Nations isis a must. If thethe lawlaw isis 110t there,there, we have toto create it.it.

63 JK:JK: Well, II thinkthink thatthat we covered a great deal inin thethe interviewinterview and II reallyreally appreciate soso much your takingtaking thethe timetime toto do this.this. Thank you soso very much.

AO: ItIt isis my pleasure.

64 I

I Yale-UN Oral History Project AbuOdehAbu Odeh Jean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr March 14. 19919988 I Amman, JordanJordan I Name Index: Middle East Abdalla, King 5-6 AI-Adgham, Al-BahiAI-Bahi 22 I'i Albright, Madeline 62 Annan, Kofi 58 Arafat, Yasser 17,22-23 I Assad, Hafez Al­AI­ 34 Hussein, King of Jordan 2-3,5,9-10,14,17,23,26,36-37,43-45,58 Hussein, Saddam 56,58 I Hussein, Sharif 26 Jarring,Jarring, Gunnar 28,42,44 Johnson,LyndonB.Johnson, Lyndon B. 33 I Kissinger, Henry 37,42-44 Lott, Trent 62 Meshal, Khaled 30-31 I Nasser, Gamal Abdel 6, 16,21,34 Netanyahu, Benjamin 5,8,32,52 Nixon, Richard M. 34,37,43 I Rabin, Yitzak 5, 8, 51 Rogers,Rogers, William 33 Sadat,Sadat, Anwar al­ 32-37,42,45-49 I Sharon,Sharon, Arie1Ariel 31-33 Shukadry,Shukadry, AmadAmad 3 I I I I I I I

I~" UNITED NA110NS, DAG I UNITED NATIONS, DAG HAMMARSKJOLDHAMMARSKJDLD LIBRARYLIBRARY ..

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