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Abu-Odeh 14 March 1998 Transcript

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Abu-Odeh 14 March 1998 Transcript ST/DPIST/DPI ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY (02(02 ) ) A16A16 YALE-UNYALE-UN ORALORAL HISTORYHISTORY AdnanAdnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh JeanJean Krasno,Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr MarchMarch 14.14.1998 1998 Amman,Almnan, JordaJordann • Yale-UN Oral History ProjecProjectt Adnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh • Jean Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr March 14. 1998 • Amman, Jordan ,. Index: Middle East Arab League 4,6, 11,21,45,54,56 Arab Summits 1973/1974 45 Balfour Declaration -.'[:, 4,26-27,51 Fedayeen 5, 7-11,7-1 J, 13, 15-17,15- J7, 19 Jordan, Relationship witwithh 7-11,21-23 Military campaign againsagainstt 12, 15-17 Synthetic Groups (extremists(extremists)) 15-16,18-19 • UncontrollablUncontrollablee 16-17,2116-17, 21 Geneva Conference, October 1973 42 .. Great Arab Revolt 26 Gulf War 1991 54-59 III American Objectives, Opinion of 57-60 Arab World Split intointo Two Camps 54-55 Coincidence with Dissolution of Soviet Union 55,60 ~ Jordanian Position 55-60 Israel, Recognition by Arabs 25-29 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (and Aftennath) 48-51 ., Jerash Confrontation 17-18 Jordan Hybrid Identity 6-7 Military Cabinet 14-18, 19 Relationship with Palestinians/Fedayeen 3,7-12,15-17,19,22-25,44 • Underground Political Parties 12 Jordanian Civil War 2, 15-21 .. American Involvement 16, 17-21 Cairo Agreement (cease-fire) 16-18, 21 ., Israeli Involvement 20 Period leadingleading up toto war 4-17,24 Soviet Involvement 16,20 Syrian Assistance toto Fedayeen 16-17,20-22,27 Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement 51-56,60 I Jordan-Israel Peace Agreement Land for Peace (SCR 242) 8-10,25-27,29-30,35-36,41 • Madrid (Peace) Conference 24,49,55,57 .. Media, changes between 1967 & 1973 wars 27,37-40,41-44 1967 War (Israel(Israel Occupies West Bank) 7-8,22 Odeh, Background 1-4 Oil embargo 43 Oslo Agreements 5, 7, 49, 53-55 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)(PLO) 4,7,8-9,12, 19,44-46,49-50,53 Palestinians, Relationship with JordaniansJordanians after 1967 9-13,12,15-16,19 Sadat's 1977 Visit toto JerusalemJerusalem 42,45-47 Security Council Resolution 338 28,37 11 • Sykes-PicotSykes-Picot AgreementAgreement 4,28-29,544,28-29,54 ThreeThree PeoplesPeoples forfor TwoTwo CountriesCountries 3-7,503-7,50 • Trauma,Trauma, Arab/JewishArab/Jewish 30-3330-33 UnitedUnited NationsNations ; ExclusionExclusion ofof 49-5249-52 • InterferenceInterference 59-6259-62 LegitimacyLegitimacy FunctionFunction 51-52,51-52, 60-6460-64 , OpinionOpinion ofof 59-6459-64 VetoVeto Power,Power, PermanentPermanent Members'Members' 60-6260-62 UnitedUnited StatesStates .­ InterferenceInterference inin MiddleMiddle EasternEastern AffairsAffairs 56-6056-60 UN,UN, RelationshipRelationship withwith 60-6460-64 WaterWater IssueIssue 49-5149-51 III YomYom KippurKippur WarWar (October(October 1973)1973) 27,33-3627,33-36 AdministrativeAdministrative Disengagement;Disengagement; IsraelIsrael && JordanJordan 44-4544-45 JordanianJordanian InvolvementInvolvement 41-4241-42 MilitaryMilitary Disengagement;Disengagement; Israel,Israel, Egypt,Egypt, && SyriaSyria 43-4543-45 .­ PeriodPeriod leadingleading upup toto warwar 7,32-377,32-37 PsychologicalPsychological warfarewarfare 39-4539-45 SovietSoviet RoleRole 3737 IIIr USUS InvolvementInvolvement 37-4437-44 •i • • III •III •~ ' ,~..... , 1111 ..~ I I YALE~UYALE~UNN ORAL HISTORY AdnanAdnan Abu-OdeAbu-Odehh I JeanJean Krasno,Krasno, IntervieweInterviewerr MarchMarch 14.14. 19919988 I Amman, JordaJordann I Jean Krasno: This isis an interviewinterview with Ambassador Abu-OdehAbu-Odeh inin hishis homehome inin Amman, Jordan onon MarchMarch 14, 1998. And II amam JeanJean Krasno. ForFor thethe record,record, wouldwould youyou 11 please explain somethingsomething about your background? WhereWhere youyou werewere born,born, andand educatededucated 11 and when you became involvedinvolved inin thethe political affairs of Jordan.Jordan. 11 Abu Odeh: Well, II was born inin Nablus 1933. Nablus,Nablus, Palestine.Palestine. II gotgot mymy schoolingschooling inin 11 Nablus under British mandate. II got mymy BABA inin ArtsArts atat DamascusDamascus University.University. II gotgot I involved intointo politics when II was aa student.student. II waswas anti~governmentanti~government.. III JK: Anti-government. III AO: InIn fact,fact, II joinedjoined thethe Communist partyparty inin thethe earlyearly fifties.fifties. AsAs aa youngyoung studentstudent andand I before thethe British departure fromfrom Palestine, II hadhad developeddeveloped likelike manymany otherother studentsstudents anti-anti- 11 Jewish and anti-British sentiments. 11 JK: InIn Jordan,Jordan, inin thethe fifties.fifties. 11 AO: Yes. I leftleft thethe party inin 1958 after thethe IraqiIraqi bloodybloody coupcoup againstagainst thethe monarchymonarchy III because I thoughtthought itit was terrible.terrible. ItIt was aa shakingshaking factor.factor. LaterLater onon inin 1966,1966, II joinedjoined thethe III 11 11 I 1 11 government,government, II becamebecame anan intelligenceintelligence officer.officer. II movedmoved quitequite toto thethe oppositeopposite side.side. II waswas 11 inin chargecharge ofof assessmentassessment andand releasesreleases inin thethe intelligenceintelligence department.department. II witnessedwitnessed thethe politicalpolitical developments,developments, especiallyespecially thethe eventsevents thatthat ledled thethe 19701970 showdown.showdown. II joinedjoined thethe 11 military cabinet cabinet thatthat was formedformed byby thethe KingKing inin 19701970 toto restorerestore lawlaw andand orderorder inin thethe country.country. AndAnd sincesince then,then, II havehave beenbeen inin JordanianJordanian politicspolitics untiluntil II retiredretired inin latelate 1995.1995. MyMy ­ lastlast postpost waswas thethe JordanianJordanian representativerepresentative toto thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations andand II waswas therethere untiluntil II 11 retired.retired. 11 ­ JK:JK: So what years were you representativerepresentative toto thethe UnitedUnited Nations?Nations? 11 AO: 1992-1995. 11 JK:JK: Oh, very recently.recently. Before we turnedturned on thethe tape,tape, we were talkingtalking about thethe 11 showdown inin Jordan.Jordan. 11 AO: My post, do you want toto know aboutabout my postpost inin government?government? II assumedassumed soso manymany 11 posts. 11 11 JK: Describe your posts. 11 AO: II startedstarted as a minister of informationinformation inin thethe military cabinet inin 1970 andand continuedcontinued toto assume thisthis post for several timestimes over more thanthan tenten years. InIn JanuaryJanuary '84,'84, King 11 Hussein appointed me as his Minister of Court. ItIt was an advisory job,job, political advisor 11 2 11 I I but, thatthat was thethe title.title. The titletitle was abolished at a laterlater stage and II became King I Hussein's political advisor. Twice within 25 years II assumed the post of chief of thethe Royal Court. The lastlast post II had before II was appointed as Jordan's permanent I representativerepresentative toto thethe UN was chief of thethe Royal Court thatthat isis second inin seniority toto thethe I Prime Minister. This post, inin fact,fact, representsrepresents thethe connection between thethe government and thethe King. So, during thisthis period II also had an interestinginteresting experience inin addition toto thethe I I 11 official posts. II became a fellowfellow at Harvard University forfor InternationalInternational Affairs inin '75­'75­ \ I 11 '76'76 and laterlater on, inin '95-'96,'95-'96, II became a fellowfellow at thethe United States InstituteInstitute forfor Peace. II I also got a fellowshipfellowship at thethe Woodrow Wilson InternationalInternational Center. I 11 1I J I 11 JK: Oh, inin Washington, thethe one inin Washington. ~ 11 AO: Yes. So, II am a fellowfellow at thosethose threethree places. So II have thesethese academic scholarly 11 connections with thesethese threethree places. That's part of my background. 11 JK: But you haven't been toto Yale. 11 11 AO: No, II haven't. 11 JK: We'll have toto inviteinvite you toto Yale. 11 11 AO: 111ankThank you. 11 3 11 JK: That would be great. Actually we should trytry toto do that.that. JK: OK, perhaps because we have somewhat limitedlimited time,time, maybe we'll start, because I would really likelike toto have your view of what you have termedtermed thethe "showdown" and which thethe internationalinternational media has called thethe civil war inin Jordan inin thethe 1970s, thethe events of thethe 1970s. Could you give some of thethe background leadingleading up toto thatthat period? AO: The story about thisthis showdown started before 1970. I would say realistically inin 1965, after thethe establishment of thethe PLO inin 1964 by thethe Arab League. All of a sudden thethe government inin Jordan found itself inin opposition with thethe views, goals and policies of latelate Amad Shukadry who was appointed inin 1964 as thethe Secretary General of thethe PLO, Palestine Liberalization Organization. Well, I thinkthink I should go throughthrough so many details toto explain. The Jordanian-Palestinian10rdanian-Palestinian interactioninteraction was destined toto be politically activated as early as 1916 when thethe Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain during World War I produced a map, a colonial map, for thisthis area before thethe fall of thethe Ottoman Empire, and when Britain inin 1917 gave a pledge, toto thethe Zionist movement at thatthat timetime toto establish a Jewish 1ewish homeland inin Palestine, inin what was known as thethe Balfour Declaration. The map and thethe Balfour Declaration combined,
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