On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About The

ON STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT CONFLICT: THINKING ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTALS Robert L. Helvey The Albert Einstein Institution Copyright © 2004 by Robert Helvey All rights reserved including translation rights. Printed in the United States of America. First Edition, July 2004 Printed on recycled paper. This publication was prepared pursuant to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Grant SG-127-02S, September 19, 2002 This publication has been printed with the assistance of the Connie Grice Memorial Fund. Connie Grice was Executive Director of the Albert Einstein Institution, 1986-1988. With her experience in the civil rights movement and deep commitment to a peaceful and just world, she played a crucial role in the early years of the Institution. Although her life was cut too short, we who worked with her know that she would have been very happy that her memory could continue to support the work of this Institution. The Connie Grice Fund was established by her husband William Spencer and her sister Martha Grice. The Albert Einstein Institution 427 Newbury Street Boston, MA 02115-1801, USA Tel: USA + 617-247-4882 Fax: USA + 617-247-4035 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.aeinstein.org ISBN 1-880813-14-9 “All men dream: but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds wake in the day to find it was vanity, but the dreamers of the day are dangerous men, for they may act on their dream with open eyes, to make it possible.” T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom Dedicated to those who dream by day of victory over tyranny. On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict v TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ix CHAPTER 1 Theory of Political Power 1 CHAPTER 2 Pillars of Support 9 CHAPTER 3 Obedience 19 CHAPTER 4 Mechanisms and Methods of 25 Nonviolent Struggle CHAPTER 5 Problem Solving 41 CHAPTER 6 Strategic Estimate 47 CHAPTER 7 Operational Planning Considerations 67 CHAPTER 8 Psychological Operations 77 CHAPTER 9 Insights into Strategic Thinking 87 CHAPTER 10 Fear 101 CHAPTER 11 Leadership 107 CHAPTER 12 Contaminants 117 CHAPTER 13 Influencing External Audiences 125 CHAPTER 14 Consultations and Training 133 SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 143 vi Robert L. Helvey APPENDICES APPENDIX 1 Glossary of Important Terms in 145 Nonviolent Struggle APPENDIX 2 Methods of Nonviolent Action 153 APPENDIX 3 Example of Problem Solving Using 161 Staff Study Format APPENDIX 4 Suggested Format for Preparing a 165 Strategic Estimate FIGURES FIGURE 1 Monolithic Model of Power 167 FIGURE 2 Pluralistic Model of Power 169 FIGURE 3 Pillars of Support 171 FIGURE 4 Pulling vs. Pushing 173 Pillars of Support FIGURE 5 Loyalty Pie 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY 177 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Without the strong and persistent encouragement of Peter Ackerman from the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict and Harriet Hentges of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), I would have never undertaken the challenge of writing this book. I would also like to acknowledge the patience and encouragement of Ms. Judy Barsalou, Program Officer at USIP. Dr. Gene Sharp, founder and currently Senior Scholar of The Albert Einstein Institution, was most helpful with comments and suggestions. As he is the pre-eminent authority on strategic nonviolent struggle, I was reluctant to attempt a book on a subject that he has so skillfully addressed in his many writings. One day, while discussing my book, I expressed my reservations to him since he had already written the bible on strategic nonviolent conflict (The Politics of Nonviolent Action and From Dictatorship to Democracy) and his response was, “How many books have been written about the Bible?” My brother, Frank Helvey, waded through draft after draft with the critical eye of an appellate lawyer pointing out the need for precision since I would not be present to observe the reader’s expres- sions or answer questions as I normally do when consulting or teach- ing a class. Constance Meadows has never exhibited justified frus- tration at seeing the manuscript returned so many times with major revisions to be edited. There are many others, too numerous to name, who have in- fluenced my thinking and commitment to promoting the under- standing and use of nonviolent struggle against oppressive regimes. To all of them, I give credit. However, I take full responsibility for any errors of commission or omission contained in this book. vii INTRODUCTION The twentieth century was the most violent century in recorded his- tory. Two World Wars resulted in the deaths of more than 200 mil- lion soldiers and civilians. In addition, there were many limited, but just as terrifying, wars of liberation, wars of conquest, and inter- nal wars between people over political and religious beliefs. It is doubtful that there was ever a day in the 20th century that signifi- cant armed conflict was not in progress. As advances in science and technology provide the means to make the consequences of armed conflict increasingly destructive of military targets, there is also the likelihood of even greater collateral damage, that is, the unintended destruction of civilian life and property. This collateral damage occurs not only because of the le- thality of the specific weapons, but also because of the large num- bers of weapons that are employed. Relatively inexpensive chemi- cal and biological weapons of mass destruction and their ease of transport and delivery have frightful consequences for collateral damage to civilian populations. News coverage of the “smart bombs” used in Desert Storm in the early 1990s led the American public into a false belief that war strikes can be swift, clean, and sure. However, the extensive use of precision guided munitions in the war against Iraq in early 2003 by a United States-led coalition should not be considered the new standard for bombardment since few countries can afford the extensive use of these expensive weapons and their supporting technologies. Thus, even in limited wars, including civil wars, it is the civilians who will continue to bear the brunt of modern warfare. As the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West began to thaw in the last two decades of the 20th century, surpluses of small arms, artillery, aircraft, military vehicles, and a wide assort- ment of munitions became available in the international arms market. Economies of scale in production of new weapons (that is, the more items that are produced reduces the cost per item) also con- tributed to making weapons available to buyers at a more afford- able cost. Nations and commercial companies sent their arms sales- men to market their merchandise. This affordability and availabil- ix x Robert L. Helvey ity of weapons ultimately facilitated the worldwide escalation of violent conflicts. One question raised by these developments in military technologies and by the proliferation of increasingly destructive weapons is whether or not any principle is worth fighting for if the out- come of the conflict may be devastation for both sides. Who can really claim victory in a war that may destroy so much of the human and economic resources of a nation that the objective of the struggle cannot be obtained even by the winner? In the face of such destruction, adversaries have increasingly sought to avoid war through policies of deterrence and negotiations. Deterrence policies have been effective, especially in preventing nuclear war. Where parity in the capacity to wage war has not been clearly established, however, armed conflicts continue to occur. Moreover, where ethnic and religious factors are predominant, the calculus for initiating conflict may lose its objectivity. There will always be ideals worth fighting for and oppression to be overcome. Some issues may not be resolvable through negotiations alone, but armed struggle may not be a viable option for an oppressed society, as the state often has the monopoly on military and other instruments of political coercion. This does not mean that oppressed people must then choose between submission and waging an armed struggle where defeat is nearly certain. There is a third alternative to armed conflict for the pursuit of political change— strategic nonviolent struggle. In this book, strategic nonviolent struggle means: nonviolent struggle that has been applied according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of an analysis of the conflict situation, the strengths and weak- nesses of the contending groups, the nature, capacities and requirements of the technique of nonviolent action, and especially the strategic principles of that type of struggle.1 The struggles for democracy in Burma, Belarus, Iran, Tibet and Zimbabwe are examples of nonviolent struggles waged against op- 1 Gene Sharp, There Are Realistic Alternatives, (Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2003), 38. On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict xi pressive regimes for worthy goals—those of ending tyranny and bringing peace with justice to the people. This book is written with hope that it may be of assistance to those who are searching for or examining nonviolent options as an alternative to armed struggle against an oppressive government or foreign occupation. It is not a “how to” book on waging nonviolent struggle. Rather, it offers a framework that encourages orderly thinking about the fundamentals of strategic nonviolent opposition to state tyranny. It includes information on the theory, strategic planning, and operations for waging strategic nonviolent struggle that has proved to be effective. Hopefully, the reader will find the book organized in a way that it can be readily adapted for communicat- ing its subject matter to others in a variety of training environments. Strategic nonviolent struggle is advanced as an alternative to armed conflict, in part, because of the reasonable likelihood that it will result in fewer lives lost and less destruction of property.

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