ZIMBABWE: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 10 March 2003 Africa Report N°60 Harare/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE CONTINUING SLIDE ......................................................................................... 3 A. THE ECONOMY .....................................................................................................................3 B. THE FOOD CRISIS..................................................................................................................5 C. LAND SEIZURES ....................................................................................................................7 D. RULE OF LAW .......................................................................................................................7 III. INTERNATIONAL DISCORD................................................................................... 10 A. THE COMMONWEALTH........................................................................................................10 B. THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................................................................................................11 C. THE UNITED STATES...........................................................................................................12 D. SADC AND THE AU............................................................................................................13 IV. AN EXIT FOR MUGABE AND A NEW POLITICAL OPENING? ...................... 13 A. THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE...............................................................................................13 B. INTER-PARTY TALKS ..........................................................................................................16 V. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 18 APPENDICES 1. MAP OF ZIMBABWE............................................................................................................20 2. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................21 3. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ............................................................................................22 4. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................27 ICG Africa Report N°60 10 March 2003 ZIMBABWE: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The economic meltdown, government-created food about their agenda that have hindered common crisis, and deepening state-sponsored violence that action with Africa on Zimbabwe, not least by have plagued Zimbabwe in the year since President demonstrating that they understand the emotive Robert Mugabe’s ruling party rigged the presidential aspects of the land issue across the continent. election continue to point in one ominous direction: potential state collapse. The international community’s inaction deprives it of a chance to influence what increasingly appears to One of Africa’s most highly developed formal be the onset of a serious succession battle within economies is disappearing. Despite price and wage President Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African controls, the inflation rate may hit 500 per cent National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. before the year is out. Severe food shortages resulting Leading officials are engaged in bitter debates – and from the destruction of the commercial farm sector some clandestine diplomacy – about how to move and the use of food as a political weapon have turned beyond Mugabe. The tensions, which might well one of Africa’s breadbaskets into a beggar nation lead to a ZANU-PF break-up, are driven primarily subject to localised famines. There is real risk that by the accelerating erosion of the state and the deterioration of command and control over the war economy, which threatens the viability of the spoils veterans and youth militias the government has used system from which the party leaders have benefited. against its opponents will lead to a rapid increase in They result partly, however, also from international unstructured violence generally throughout society. pressure and isolation – as divided and inconsistent as these have been. While the crisis deepens, the international response has become more divided. The Commonwealth’s Reducing international pressure on ZANU-PF now, very purpose is being called into question. Though just when it appears that there is some prospect the the principles upon which it is based are being political situation inside Zimbabwe is moving, would flouted, leading members, South Africa and Nigeria, be a great mistake, one that would only lower the are arguing against all the evidence that Zimbabwe’s chance that the change will be peaceful or positive. suspension should be lifted because the situation has New efforts to coordinate both African and wider improved. The relevant regional and continental international efforts are called for, with a practical international organisations (SADC and the African focus on restarting, ideally under new sponsorship, Union respectively) have yet to engage meaningfully the negotiations between ZANU-PF and the while South Africa and Nigeria set the tone. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition European Union is rent by divisions, with France’s that South Africa and Nigeria fitfully facilitated and invitation to Mugabe to participate in a pan-African then abandoned in the first half of 2002. summit in Paris having engendered a controversy that nearly put an end to the targeted sanctions regime that was established shortly before Mugabe’s re-election. RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. remains a weak actor, able to implement a promised asset freeze component in its own targeted To the African Union: sanctions regime only after nearly a year’s delay 1. Invite the wider international community to because of internal mid-level policy disagreements. create with it a new mediation effort, built on the Western nations still need to break down suspicions previous Nigerian and South African-sponsored Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity ICG Africa Report N°60, 10 March 2003 Page ii talks, that involves all relevant Zimbabwean (CMAG) to meet with all relevant stakeholders stakeholders and aims at restoring legitimacy to in Zimbabwe (including civil society and the Harare government. opposition leaders) and investigate the real political situation in the country. 2. Focus on creating a transitional administration, restoring the rule of law, finding an electoral 6. Determine options, through the CMAG, for compromise, reforming economic policies, moving beyond the current stand-off within ensuring a more orderly land reform program, the Commonwealth with the aim of and crafting an exit strategy for President maintaining Zimbabwe’s suspension. Mugabe. 7. Prepare to facilitate inter-party talks if the African Union does not or cannot do so. To the European Union and the United States: 3. Work with African leaders to create a fresh To ZANU-PF and the MDC: inter-party negotiations process aimed at 8. Engage seriously and in good faith with a new resolving the political crisis in Zimbabwe. inter-party negotiations process. 4. Implement fully existing or promised targeted sanctions, including asset freezes, travel bans and To the Government of Zimbabwe: financial transfers, and expand the list of those targeted to include additional ZANU-PF officials, 9. Stop politicising food aid delivery through the their business associates, military and police Grain Marketing Board, including channelling officials, war veterans responsible for human commercial deliveries toward ZANU-PF rights abuses, and the family members of all supporters and away from MDC followers. those targeted. 10. Halt the use of war veterans, youth militias, 5. Provide direct budget and operational support to police and others in attacking opposition Zimbabwean civil society and opposition groups supporters and civil society representatives. working for political and economic reform. To UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and UN 6. Undertake concerted efforts to improve World Food Programme head James Morris: coordination of policy towards Zimbabwe among relevant international actors, including 11. Authorise a UN monitoring mission to ensure by demonstrating greater understanding of the distribution of food in Zimbabwe. African views about the land issue. 12. Prioritise food for work activities, rather than To the Commonwealth: free distributions, in order to protect rural livelihoods and reduce food aid dependency. 5. Send a fact-finding mission from the Harare/Brussels, 10 March 2003 Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group ICG Africa Report N°60 10 March 2003 ZIMBABWE: DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 5 I. INTRODUCTION adult population and may be killing 2,500 6 Zimbabweans a week; ! a breakdown in patronage networks – In the year since President Robert Mugabe’s ruling particularly in the informal security sector ZANU-PF party stole the presidential election, inhabited by war veterans and youth militia – Zimbabwe’s economic and political crises have that may well fuel an increase in unstructured intensified to the point that state collapse, with violence throughout the country;7 and extensive regional consequences, is an increasing prospect. A high-ranking